The Issue The issue in these cases is whether Petitioners are entitled to the Medicaid payments which they received or whether the claims filed by Petitioners were improper. At hearing Petitioners presented the testimony of Gary Allen Kitos; Joseph Namey, D.O.: Herbert Moselli; Robert Grenitz, M.D.; Mary Bone; Herbert Topol, D.O.; Sylvan Goldin, D.O.; and Mildred Martin. Topol Exhibits 1-3 and 5 were admitted in evidence. Goldin Exhibits 1-4, 6 and 7 were admitted in evidence. Topol-Goldin General Practice (GP) Exhibits 1-7 and 35-37 were admitted in evidence. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) presented the testimony of Jules J. Cohen, D.O.; Morton T. Smith, D.O.; and Mildred Martin. HRS also presented the testimony by deposition of Lawrence E. Stivers and Michael W. Forsthoefel, M.D. HRS Exhibits 1-23 were admitted in evidence. Joint Exhibits 1-4 were also admitted, which include three inventory lists and four separate large boxes of patient records. The parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. All proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law have been considered. A ruling has been made on each proposed finding of fact in the Appendix hereto and made a part hereof.
Findings Of Fact During 1932, Petitioners Goldin, Topol, and the Topol- Goldin General Practice Clinic were all operating out of the same facility but each billed Medicaid under a separate physician provider number. Medicaid is a joint state and federal program that is completely voluntary. In entering into a provider agreement with Medicaid, Topol, Goldin and the General Practice Clinic agreed to abide by the provisions of the Florida Administrative Rules, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and federal laws and regulations. Under the Medicaid Program, a state may limit the services provided for under federal regulations. As part of the requirements for participation in Medicaid, the State of Florida has a peer review process to monitor all providers. Peer review is a recognized process utilized by third party payors (such as Medicaid, Medicare and insurance companies) to assure that they are getting the services for which they are paying. Florida's Medicaid peer review process is modeled after the federal Medicare Program's process. In Florida approximately 7,000 physicians are enrolled in the Medicaid program at any one time. In order to monitor all of these physicians' practices, the Medicaid Program reviews those physicians whose practice exceeds the parameters of the average Medicaid physician's practice. Reviews of physicians' practices number between 60 to 85 physicians per year. Approximately 40-50% of those physicians reviewed are referred for peer review. The Medicaid review for physicians consists of a Level I review of the physician's activity in the program compared to the physician's peers. If the physician exceeds the upper limits in the Level I review, a desk review is done by medical consultants who review a "claims detail" of all claims for payment made by the provider. If further review is needed, a disproportionate stratified random sample (DSRS) of the physician's claims is obtained and the physician's patient records for those claims are obtained. The physician's records are first reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant who determines if peer review is necessary. After a peer review is done, an in-house consultant does a line-by-line evaluation based on the peer review findings and medical necessity and makes a recommendation for denial of claims. Those claims denied are then converted into an amount of money for disallowance. The Medicaid program does not review physicians just because of the amount of money they make in the program. In September of 1981 the Medicaid Investigative Section requested updates on providers who had previously been investigated in 1977. Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic were among those providers. Cases for review were then opened for Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice-Clinic in 1982. A preliminary cursory review of the practices of Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic was prepared by a nursing consultant who recommended that the investigation go forward. During the same time period that the review of Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic was beginning, a separate review of a Medicaid recipient raised questions of pingponging (going from one doctor to another) between Drs. Topol and Goldin that would justify a further review of their practice. In February and March of 1983, Level II Review reports (desk analysis) were issued on Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic. These reports contained the Level I Reviews, documentation of the provider's 1982 Medicaid practice, complaints, conclusions, and recommendations. The Level I Review reports included in the Level II Review indicated those areas where the providers exceeded the upper limits of their peers. For example, Dr. Goldin averaged 1,998 Medicaid office visits per quarter compared to an average of 86 for other Medicaid physicians. Dr. Goldin's average exceeded two standard deviations above the average for his peers. The Level II Reviews concluded that the allegations of overutilization for Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic had been substantiated and it was recommended that they be referred to Peer Review. In March of 1983, a meeting was held to discuss these cases because of their complicated nature. At that meeting, Mildred Martin was instructed to proceed with Peer Review In preparing for Peer Review, disproportionate stratified random samples (DHRS) for Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic were obtained. A DSRS is the tabulation of the provider's activities or the amounts paid to him for each recipient during a specific period of time. It lists the recipients in ascending order of amounts paid to the provider. Total amounts of the payments made during the period are divided into five strata of the same or close to the same amounts of money. A DSRS is used to give an overall view of the physician's practice. On each DSRS the computer randomly picked 30 patients for a detailed review of their patient records. Because of the volume of practice of Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic, it would not have been fair to evaluate their entire practice using only 30 records. Therefore, HRS decided to review 7% of records of Topol and Goldin. The General Practice Clinic records were reviewed as randomly selected by the computer. In order to enlarge the sample to 7%, Ms. Martin utilized a random selection process employed by Medicare, which entailed selecting every third patient beginning from the bottom of each strata and working up until a 7% sample was achieved. This does mean that patients in the 7% samples represent the patients in each strata for whom the highest claims were made. When the same patient record appeared in two different samples, the next patient on the list was used to avoid duplication and disallowance of two of the providers for the same patient. The records selected for review were selected randomly and selected utilizing generally accepted statistical techniques. In June of 1983, Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic were requested to submit the records of those claims selected from the DSRS and the 7% sample process. When it was obvious that the records received were not complete, Ms. Martin contacted the offices of Goldin, Topol and the General Practice Clinic, requesting the missing records. Those records received from Goldin, Topol, and the General Practice Clinic were referred to the Florida Osteopathic Medical Association's (FOMA) Peer Review Committee along with information indicating the areas of concern and a letter of explanation from Dr. Goldin. The FOMA Peer Review Committee is an independent organization made up of approximately ten osteopathic physicians from various parts of the State of Florida. The FOMA contracts with third party carriers (Medicaid) to review peers. The cases supplied to the FOMA Peer Review Committee are reviewed and discussed and the committee issues its opinion on overutilization. The FOMA Peer Review Committee's findings are either no overutilization, minimal overutilization (5-20%) overutilization), moderate overutilization (20-50%) or excessive overutilization (over 50%). Upon receipt of the referral from HRS, the FOMA Peer Review Committee set up a meeting and invited Drs. Topol and Goldin. At that meeting held April 28, 1984, eight (8) physicians of the Peer Review Committee reviewed the charts and interviewed Drs. Topol and Goldin. The Peer Review Committee looked for a trend in the physicians' overall practice. The Peer Review Committee found that the records were poorly documented and difficult to read. The Peer Review Committee found that the patients were being seen more than medically necessary. It was a consensus of the members of the FOMA Peer Review Committee that there was moderate overutilization. By letters dated May 9, 1984, the FOMA Peer Review Committee notified Drs. Topol and Goldin and HRS of their findings. The medical records of Topo1 and Goldin were then sent to Dr. Michael Forsthoefel, M.D., for a line-by-line disallowance of services based upon the Medicaid rules and regulations and the Peer Review Committee's findings. Dr. Forsthoefel disallowed an amount of claims in the range of 30-35% which fell within the level of moderate overutilization (20-50%) determined by the Peer Review Committee, however, since Dr. Forsthoefel was an M.D. and not a D.O., HRS decided that in all fairness the determinations should be made by a D.O. who was a peer of the doctors being reviewed. The medical records of Topol and Goldin under review were-then sent to Dr. Morton T. Smith, D.O., for the line-by- line determination. In order to assure further fairness of the review, Dr. Smith was instructed not to review and disallow any claims by a physician that appeared on a record of the other physician being reviewed. As a result of the new review by Dr. Smith and the instructions given him, the total amount disallowed dropped to 16 or 17%. (The Transcript, p. 635, says 60-70%, but that is a typographical error and should read 16-17%). It is found that the peer review and the disallowances by Dr. Smith were reasonable and accurate. It was then necessary to apply the amount disallowed in the 7% sample to the overall Medicaid claims of Topol and Goldin. HRS performed this calculation by determining the average overpayment for the recipients in each strata sample and multiplying that average by the total number of recipients in each strata. However, because the samples were selected from those recipients in each strata with the highest claims (See Finding of Fact 32), the "average overpayment per recipient" method of extending the overpayments in each sample to the total population of claims is arbitrarily skewed. The result is that Topol and Goldin were exposed to liability greatly in excess of the total amount claimed. The more reasonable method for extending the overpayments in each sample to the total population of claims would be to determine the percentage of disallowed claims in each strata sample and to apply that percentage to the total paid in each strata. For example for Dr. Goldin in Strata I a total of $922 was paid and $30 was disallowed, or a 3.25% disallowance. Applied to the total paid in that strata of $21,600.28, a total overpayment for Strata I is shown to be $702.01. Using this method of calculation, it is determined that Dr. Goldin has been overpaid as follows: Strata I $702.01 (30/922 X 21,600.28) Strata II $2,957.64 (204/1490.92 X 21,620.18) Strata III $2,238.49 (274.24/2378.94 X 21,627.92) Strata IV $3,506.92 (617.95/3805.88 X 21,594.33) Strata V $5,886.05 (1841.36/6729.80 X 21,513.33) Total $15,291.11 Using this method of calculation, it is determined that Dr. Topol has been overpaid as follows: Strata I $1,417.87 (60.98/728.16 X 16,939.88) Strata II $2,263.31 (160.00/1199.63 X 16,966.34) Strata III $2,099.45 (225.74/1823.52 X 16,958.37) Strata IV $2,335.17 (402.96/2935.57 X 17,007.75) Strata V $4,195.75 (1358.14/5443.97 X 16,816.65) Total $12,311.55 The General Practice Clinic was treated differently because it was operated differently. The provider number issued to the General Practice Clinic was applied for and granted to Drs. Topol and Goldin as authorized agents. General Practice Clinic was actually operated and run by Mary Petruff Bone. At the General Practice Clinic, Ms. Bone prescribed and mixed antigens for allergy patients, determined what testings were to be done, and handled other medical problems of patients. Neither Dr. Topol nor Dr. Goldin had any expertise in the field of allergy treatment. The records of the General Practice Clinic were the responsibility and the product of Ms. Bone. At all times material hereto, Ms. Bone was a certified physician's assistant competent to provide services to allergy patients. A physician's assistant is not a physician. At all times material hereto, physicians' assistants could not receive a provider number from Medicaid under which they could bill the Medicaid Program. Ms. Bone billed Medicaid for her services under the General-Practice Clinic's physician provider number. Medicaid was billed for physician's services by the General Practice Clinic even though a physician did not see the patient. It is not usual and customary practice for physicians to bill for their services when they do not see the patients. The State of Florida's Medicaid Program does not authorize payment for services to a physician's assistant under the supervision of a physician. The Medicaid program paid $75,654.73 to the General Practice Clinic in 1982 under its physician provider number. Medicaid did not learn that the General Practice Clinic's billings were for non-physician's services until the Peer Review Committee met with Petitioners on April 28, 1984. For the General Practice Clinic, Dr. Goldin admitted that $40,642.85 should have been disallowed due to improper billing procedures. The $40,642.85 calculated by Dr. Goldin did not take into account any possible double billing or the fact that the clinic's services were performed by a physician's assistant. The records for the General Practice Clinic were not referred to a physician consultant because the payment denials were due strictly to noncompliance with Medicaid rules and regulations, not the overutilization findings of the Peer Review Committee. Medicaid claims for the General Practice Clinic were denied for four basic reasons: 1) No records provided to substantiate the claim; 2) improper billing for B-12 injections; 3) duplicate billing where the General Practice Clinic and Topo or Goldin billed on the same day; and 4) office visits not rendered by a physician. Antigen injections and allergy testing were not disallowed in the claims submitted by the General Practice Clinic because those services are commonly reimbursable when done by someone other than a physician under a physician's supervision. The amounts disallowed for the sample of claims for the General Practice Clinic was then applied to the overall clinic practice in the same manner that the Topol and Goldin amounts were applied to their practice in order to obtain an amount owed the HRS Medicaid Program for the disallowed services. However, again the method used by HRS to extend the overpayment amount determined from the sample to the total population of claims is unreasonable because it does not accurately project the total amount overpaid. For example, in Strata I for the General Practice Clinic, a total of $15,177.73 in Medicaid benefits were paid in 1982. Yet, using the HRS method, a total overpayment of $22,201.44 is determined for that strata, or $7,023.71 more than was ever paid in that strata. Such a result must be unreasonable. If instead the percentage method applied above is used, it is determined that the General Practice Clinic has been overpaid as follows: Strata I $12,659.76 (362/434 X 15,177.73) Strata II $12,784.78 (1447/1719 X 15,188.00) Strata III $12,578.68 (3284/4001 X 15,325.00) Strata IV $13,102.67 (4244/4969 X 15,341.00) Strata V $12,215.79 (5369/6427 X 14,623.00) Total S63,341.68 Some disallowances were made on all three provider numbers because no documentation was provided, even after Ms. Martin asked a second time. These disallowances are proper and correct because Medicaid will not pay for services where there is no documentation justifying the services. The fact that Petitioners now claim to have that documentation is irrelevant to the correctness of the disallowances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order which provides: That Dr. Herbert Topol, D.O., reimburse the Medicaid Program for $12,311.55 in Medicaid overpayments for 1982. That Dr. Sylvan Goldin, D.O., reimburse the Medicaid Program for $15,291.11 in Medicaid overpayments for 1982. That the Topol-Goldin General Practice reimburse the Medicaid Program for $63,341.68 in Medicaid overpayments for 1982. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Herbert Topol, D.O. 1111 W. Broward Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Sylvan Goldin, D.O. 1111 W. Broward Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Page, Jr., Secretary Dept. of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Petitioners' proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding of Fact 3 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 32. Proposed Finding of Fact 6 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 76. Proposed Finding of Fact 8 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 77. Proposed Finding of Fact 39 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 70. Proposed Finding of Fact 52 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 55. . 6. Proposed Findings of Fact 1, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 47 and 48 are rejected as constituting argument and as being conclusory. 7. Proposed Findings of Fact 2, 4, 16, 22, 23, 24, 30, 33, 35, 36, 40, 46, 49 and 50 are subordinate to the fact actually found. 8. Proposed Findings of Fact 7, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 34, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45 and 46 are irrelevant and/or unnecessary. 9. Proposed Findings of Fact 17, 25, 28, 32, 43 and 51 are not supported by the competent, substantiated evidence. Additionally, Proposed Findings of Fact 25, 28 and 32 are based on and refer to exhibits which were not admitted in evidence. The exhibits are attached to the proposed order and are rejected as an inappropriate attempt to supplement the record. Rulings on Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact. Each of the following proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance or as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the pro- posed Findings of Fact: 1(1); 2(58); 3(59); 4(60); 5(S1); 6(62); 7(63); 8(64); 9(65); 10(66); 11(67); 12(68); 13(69), 14(70) 15(71); 16(72); 17(60); 18(2); 19(3); 20(4); 21(5); 22(6); 24(7) 25(8); 26(9); 27(10); 28(11); 29(12); 30(13); 31(14); 32(15), 33(16); 34(17); 35(18); 36(19); 37(20); 38(21); 39(22); 40(23). 41(24); 42(25); 43(26); 44(27); 45(28); 46(29); 47(30); 48(31), 49(32); 50(33); 51(34); 52(35); 53(36) 54(37); 55(38); 56(39). 57(40); 58(41); 59(42); 60(43); 61(44); 62(45); 64(46); 65(47) 66(48). 67(49); 68(50); 69(51); 70(53); 74(73); 75(74); 76(76); 79(75); 81(78). Proposed Findings of Fact 23, 63, and 80 are irrelevant. Proposed Findings of Fact 71, 72, 73, 77 and 78 are subordinate to the facts found.
The Issue The principal issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Dr. Livingston, is in violation of Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by reason of certain events which occurred in New Jersey. The Respondent has also raised several collateral issues, including issues concerning the validity of and the interpretation to be given to the cited statutory provision.
Findings Of Fact Based cn the exhibits received in evidence at the hearing in this case, I make the following findings of fact. The Respondent, Robert Michael Livingston, M.D., is a licensed medical physician, having been issued license number NE0009825 by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. His last known address is 33 Southeast Third Street, Boca Raton, Florida 33432. Dr. Livingston has been licensed to practice medicine in both the State of Florida and the State of New Jersey for a number of years. The Dr. Livingston who is the Respondent in this case is the same Dr. Livingston who holds license number 18863 in the State of New Jersey and who was the subject of the administrative proceedings in the State of New Jersey which were resolved by a Final Order by Consent dated January 12, 1983. By an Administrative Complaint dated May 18, 1981, and an Amended Administrative Complaint dated September 17, 1981, the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey sought the suspension or revocation of Dr. Livingston's license to practice medicine in the State of New Jersey. The grounds alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint included conduct which was asserted to constitute (a) the employment of unlicensed persons to perform work which may legally be done only by persons licensed to practice medicine and surgery; (b) gross malpractice and gross neglect in the practice of medicine; (c) professional incompetency; (d) lack of capability to discharge the functions of a medical licensee in a manner consistent with the health, safety and welfare of the public; and (e) habitual use of intoxicants. The allegations of the New Jersey Administrative Complaint and Amended Administrative Complaint were never proven in any proceeding in New Jersey. All of the allegations of the New Jersey Administrative Complaint were resolved by the entry of a Final Order by Consent dated January 12, 1983. The prefatory language of the Final Order by Consent contains the following relevant language: Subsequent to the filing of the complaint the parties have concluded that this dispute can be amicably resolved by means of this Final Order by Consent. In entering into this Final Order Dr. Livingston denies any malpractice, gross or otherwise, and this resolution of the dispute is therefore not to be construed as an admission by Dr. Livingston of any of the allega- tions contained in the complaint. The parties hereto acknowledge that the Board of Medical Examiners does not contend that Dr. Livingston is presently dependent upon controlled dangerous substances. In entering into this Final Order the Board of Medical Examiners relies upon Dr. Livingston's representation that he is not now practicing medicine and surgery in New Jersey, but is so practicing in the State of Florida. The dispositional language of the Final Order by Consent reads as follows: IT IS ORDERED AND AGREED, therefore, on this 12th day of January, 1983, that: Robert M. Livingston will not practice medicine and surgery in the State of New Jersey for a two-year period, that period having commenced on May 22, 1981. If at any time after the expiration of this two- year period he shall seek to practice medicine and surgery in New Jersey, he shall either personally appear before the Board of Medical Examiners or submit proof of his compliance with paragraph 2 of this Final Order. In addition, the Board of medical Examiners may in its discretion reguire Dr. Livingston to submit to a general psychiatric evaluation performed by a Board-certified psy- chiatrist designated by the Board of Medical Examiners to determine whether there exists any medically unjustified dependence upon con- trolled dangerous substances. Bobert M. Livingston will pay $2,500.00 as a sharing of the costs of the Board inquiry into the matters resolved by this Final Order. Robert Il. Livingston will pay the expert fee billed to Dr. Livingston by Dr. Leslie Iffy for Dr. Iffy's testimony during depo- sitions, and Dr. Livingston will be responsible for paying the cost of all transcripts of the depositions of Dr. Iffy, Kathleen M. Brancaccio and Nicholas Brancaccio. None of the provisions of this Final Order by Consent shall be deemed a disciplinary sanction or penalty under the Medical Practice Act. This Final Order by Consent consitutes resolution of all matters arising from the complaint as it pertains to Robert A. Livingston, and the complaint as it pertains to him is dismissed with prejudice. (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, effective July 1, 1953, Dr. Livingston's license to practice medicine in the State of New Jersey was renewed for a two-year period ending on June 30, 1955. ANALYSIS OF TUE ISSUES Issues Regarding Findings of Fact The Respondent has asserted that Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2 constitutes hearsay evidence which would not be admis- sible over objection in a civil action and that, by operation of Section 120.55(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the exhibit is insufficient to support a finding of fact. Contrary to the assertions of the Respondent, it should be noted that Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2 comes within the "public records exception to the hearsay rule [see 90.803(8), Fla. Statutes] and is self-authenticating within the meaning of Section 90.902, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, the exhibit would be admissible over objection in a civil action and is, therefore, a sufficient basis for making findings of fact in this case. In making the foregoing findings of fact, I have, with the exceptions noted hereinafter, incorporated the text or substance of the vast majority of the findings of fact proposed by the parties. My reasons for not making certain findings proposed by the respondent are as follows. The last sentence of Respondent's proposed finding number 3 is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The penultimate sentence of Repondent's proposed finding number 4 is more in the nature of argument or a proposed conclusion of law than a proposed finding of fact. My reason for not making Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 4 is that it is more in the nature of a conclusion of law than a proposed finding of fact--it is a proposed interpretation of the legal effect of the Final Order by Consent rather than a summary of the text of that order. The Delegation of Authority Issue At the hearing in this case, the Respondent also argued that Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes, constitutes an improper delegation of authority to officials of other states because by operation of the statute officials in other states are able to determine who shall be subject to discipline in the State of Florida. This argument has already been resolved contrary to the Respondent's contentions. See Bryan v. State Board of Medical Examiners of Florida, 381 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), affirmed, 398 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 1981). The Sufficiency of the Statement of the Charges Against the Respondent The Respondent also asserts that a finding of guilt in this case would constitute a denial of due process because he was charged in the Administrative Complaint with having his license "acted upon" and was not charged, in the language of the statute, with having his license "acted against." There are, of course, cases in which a failure to charge in the statutory language could deprive a Respondent of his right to know the charges against him and have adequate opportunity to prepare his defense against them. But the Respondent is not entitled to a perfect statement of the charges against him. Rather, the standard which west be met by the language of the Administrative Complaint is that the . . . . grounds for revoking a license to practice medicine must be alleged with reasonable certainty and show the nature and cause of the accusa- tion and he must be given reasonable opportunity to defend against attempted proof of such charges. (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 190 So. 59 (Fla. 1939), at 62. Despite the failure of the Administrative Complaint in this case to track the exact language of the statute, the Respondent had full knowledge of the factual basis for the charge against him and was also fully aware of the legal basis for the charge. Therefore, he knew with "reasonable certainty" what the Petitioner would attempt to prove, and he had a "reasonable opportunity" to defend against the charge. The Principal Issue in the Case Turning at last to the heart of the matter, the principal issue which must be decided in this case is whether the actions of the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey or the Hoard of Medical Examiners of the State of New Jersey described in the findings of fact constitute, in the language of Section 455.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes: Having a license to practice medicine revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against, including the denial of licensure, by the licensing authority of another state, territory, or country. For the reasons explained below, I conclude that they do not. Part of the resolution of this issue turns on the interpretation to be given to the terms "suspended," "acted against," and "licensing authority," as used in Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes. None of these terms are defined in the statute. Accordingly, pursuant to well-established rules of statutory construction, these terms must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. See cases collected at Vol. 10-B, Florida Digest, Statutes, 188, of which the following is a modest sample. Crown Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Watt, 415 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1982); J. C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Miami, 397 So.2d 979 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Gasson v. Gay, 49 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1951); Gaulden v. Kirk, 47 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1950). The term "licensing authority," as used in Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes, means the governmental entity in a foreign jurisdiction which possesses the power and authority to take final action to grant a license or to deny, revoke, or suspend a license, or to otherwise impose discipline on a licensee. In this case, the relevant "licensing authority" is the Board of Medical Examiners of the State of New Jersey. The Attorney General of the State of New Jersey is not a "licensing authority" within the meaning of Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes, because, although the Attorney General prosecutes complaints against licensees, nothing in this record shows that the Attorney General has the power and authority to grant, revoke, or suspend a license, or to impose any discipline on a licensee. Therefore, even if the actions of the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey described in the findings of fact were to be construed as action against a license, such action would not establish a violation of Section 458.331(b), Florida Statutes, because it would not be action by a "licensing authority." Accordingly, in order to establish a violation of the cited statute in this case, the Department must show that the Board of Medical Examiners of the State of New Jersey suspended or acted against the license of Dr. Livingston. 2/ The plain meaning of the term "suspend" is "to render temporarily void" or "to punish by temporary exclusion." See The Random House Dictionary. And the plain and ordinary meaning of "against," in the context in which it appears in the subject statute, is "in opposition or hostility to." Id. A careful review of the Final Order by Consent reveals that the action taken by the Board of Medical Examiners of the State of New Jersey did not suspend Dr. Livingston's license and did not constitute any action against Dr. Livingston's license. The Final Order by Consent does not purport to suspend Dr. Livingston's license and does not purport to impose any other form of discipline against him. This is evidenced by the penultimate paragraph of the order, which specifically states: "None of the provisions of this Final Order by Consent shall be deemed a disciplinary sanction or penalty under the Medical Practice Act." (Emphasis added.) Further, there is nothing in the Final Order by Consent which purports to order Dr. Livingston to do anything or to refrain from doing anything. Quite to the contrary, the dispositive action of the New Jersey Board in the final paragraph of the Final Order by Consent was to dismiss, with prejudice, the complaint against Dr. Livingston. The Department argues that the language of paragraph number 1 of the Final Order by Consent constitutes a suspension of, or action against, Dr. Livingston's New Jersey license and that paragraphs number 2 and 3 of that order also constitute action against Dr. Livingston's New Jersey license. Paragraph number 1 of the Final Order by Consent does state that Dr. Livingston "will not" practice medicine in the State of New Jersey for a specified period and paragraphs number 2 and 3 of that order do state that Dr. Livingston "will pay" certain expenses related to the case. But those paragraphs cannot be interpreted as having the legal effect urged by the Department, because to do so would be to belie the express language of paragraph number 4 of the same document (which states that nothing in the order constitutes "a disciplinary sanction or penalty") and to ignore the operative language of the order, which is to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. It would be a total contradiction to say, on the one hand, that the New Jersey Board dismissed the complaint against Dr. Livingston and did not impose any disciplinary sanction or penalty and to then conclude that the New Jersey Board had suspended Dr. Livingston's license and had otherwise acted against his license. Furthermore, nothing in paragraphs number 1, 2, or 3 of the Final Order by Consent prohibits Dr. Livingston from doing anything or orders Dr. Livingston to do anything. Those paragraphs simply state that Dr. Livingston will not do this and will do that. The clear import of the statements in these three paragraphs is that they recite what Mr. Livingston has agreed to do and not to do. It is noteworthy that these three paragraphs are immediately preceeded by a statement reading "IT IS ORDERED AND AGREED." Inasmuch as the three subject paragraphs do not order Dr. Livingston to do or refrain from doing anything, they can only be construed as manifestations of what Dr. Livingston agreed to do and to refrain from doing. Thus, these paragraphs constitute action taken by Dr. Livingston, not action taken by the Board. Finally, this interpretation of paragraphs number 1, 2, and 3 is compelled by the fact that it would be incongruous to conclude that the New Jersey Board was, in a single act, both penalizing Dr. Livingston (which the order specifically disavows) and dismissing all charges against him. Reduced to the vernacular, the New Jersey Board made a deal with Dr. Livingston that if he would agree to do this and not do that, they would not take any action against him, and the Final Order by Consent is the implementation of that deal. And in this regard it is important to take cognizance of the fact that the Final Order by Consent was not a consent to the entry of an order against Dr. Livingston. Quite to the contrary, it was a consent to a dismissal of all charges. The Department also argues by analogy that the New Jersey consent order in this case is as sufficient a basis for finding a violation of Section 458.331(1)(b) as was the consent order entered by the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners of the State of Georgia, which was relied on in Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Ralph C. Lee, M.D., 4 FALR 2388A (1982) The analogy fails because of the following notable differences. In the Lee case, Dr. Lee's consent in the Georgia case included an admission of some or all of the charges brought against him. Here, Dr. Livingston's consent in the New Jersey case incorporates an express denial of the charges against him. In the Lee case, the Georgia Hoard revoked Dr. Lee's license and then put Dr. Lee on probation. Here the New Jersey Hoard dismissed with prejudice all charges against Dr. Livingston. In the Lee case, a clear violation of Section 485.331 (1)(b) , Florida Statutes, was established. Here, there was no such violation. A Collateral Issue Which Need Not Be Decided Here A final issue which need not be decided here, but which nevertheless warrants brief attention, is the Respondent's contention that his due process rights will be violated unless Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes, is construed quite narrowly. He argues that Section 458.311(1)(b) should be construed . . . . as requiring the allegation, substan- tiated by competent substantial evidence, that a licensee has had his license revoked, suspended or otherwise acted against by the licensing authority of another state, territory, or country, for conduct which would constitute a violation of 458.331, Florida Statutes, if that conduct were committed in Florida. Petitioner replies to the foregoing by arguing that the Respondent's due process arguments involve constitutional issues which are beyond the scope of the Hearing Officer's authority. In view of the foregoing conclusions about the effect of the Final Order by Consent, it is not necessary in this case to embark upon a lengthy analysis of the extent to which the proper interpretation of Section 358.331(1)(b) , Florida Statutes, may be colored by constitutional considerations. 4/ Nevertheless, because occasion to address this issue may arise at some later stage in these proceedings, I commend to the parties' attention the following comments from Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, Local 737 v. Escambia County School Board, 3 FALR 2122A (1981) at 2125A--2126A, affirmed, 426 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983): Prior to embarking upon a discussion of the constitutional ramifications of the issues at hand we hasten to acknowledge that we are well aware of the limitations upon an adminis- trative agency's role in matters which involve the application or interpretation of our State Constitution. As noted in Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1953) , and State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, 94 So. 681 (ala. 1922) the "right to declare an act unconstitutional cannot be exercised by the officers of the executive department under the guise of the observance of their oath of office to support the Constitution." But the fact that we are without authority to rule upon the constitutionality of statutes does not mean that we must ignore the Constitution. To the contrary, where the meaning of a statute is colored by provisions in the Constitution our hope of reaching the correct understanding of that meaning lies in part in a consideration of those constitutional consequences. * * * * And while we may not, in the course of ourefforts to construe applicable statutory provisions, declare a statute to be unconstitutional, neither are we required to fumble around in some pretended ignorance of reality. if we are to act responsibly, we must act in full contemplation of the inescapable consequences of what the courts have already said about similar statutes . . . And even though we lack the power of a court with regard to the ruling upon the validity of a statute, we owe to the Legislature certainly no less duty than is owed by the courts to respect the enactments of that body. In this regard it seems especially appropriate for us to follow the same rules as are followed by the courts in their construction of statutory pro visions which skate near the thin ice of constitutional invalidity particularly in light of the fact that in the event of judicial review of this order notions of stare decisis make it most likely that any reviewing court would also resort to the same time-tested rules of construction. (Word in square brackets added.) See also: Florida Education Association/United v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 346 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), at 553. In Brief Summary In sum: The Final Order by Consent issued by the Hoard of Medical Examiners of the State of New Jersey on January 12, 1983, does not constitute a suspension of Dr. Livingston's license to practice medicine in that state, nor does it constitute action against such license. There is no competent substantial evidence in the record of any other revocation, suspension, or action against Dr. Livingston's license to practice medicine in New Jersey. Therefore, the violation charged in the Administrative Complaint in this case has not been proved and the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon all of the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Florida Board of Medical Examiners enter a Final Order in this case dismissing in its entirety the Administrative Complaint against Dr. Livingston. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of June, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHASEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Mary-Claire Chapman, M.D. (Dr. Chapman) is now, and at all relevant times was licensed as a physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0049241. From May 1989 until May 1992, Dr. Chapman was the chief health officer at Charlotte Correctional Institution (CCI), a prison in the Florida correctional system, in Punta Gorda, Florida. Patient A.J. Inmate A.J. arrived at CCI on August 9, 1989, with no apparent medical complaints. From August 1989, until March 1990, he attended sick call or clinic with complaints related primarily to digestive disorders; the treatment given to him during that period is not at issue. A.J.'s first noted complaints of headaches was on March 8, 1990, when he was seen at Doctor's Clinic at CCI by staff physician, Dr. DeCespedes. He was given Motrin. On March 10, A.J. completed an inmate medical request seeking to have his eyes checked as he stated he was getting daily headaches for three weeks. He was seen in sick call on March 12, with complaint of "severe migraine headache" for two weeks. He was given Motrin and was referred to the senior nurse, who saw him on March 13. The nurse noted his complaint of severe pounding headache and stuffy nose and ears "like on an airplane". He was given Dimetapp and Ibuprofen. A.J. appeared at sick call again on March 16 complaining of headaches that affected his vision. He was referred by the nurse to Dr. DeCespedes, who examined him and noted no acute distress, supple neck and 20/20 vision. Dr. DeCespedes gave him Ibuprofen and suggested return in ten days for follow up. On March 18, A.J. completed an inmate request form to medical: Doc I have been having headakes real bad ones, every day for three weeks now. On 3/17/90 I started to have trouble seeing. I can not fockus with both eyes open but can with one open at atime. Can you pleas help me quickely. thank you (Pet. Ex. #1, p. 15) The form is stamped received on March 19, 1990, "Medical, Charlotte Correctional Institution". That same date A.J. sent an "emergency grievance" to the assistant superintendent stating that the pain was very bad, that he was walking into things and stating that he needed medical assistance as soon as possible. Dr. Chapman examined A.J. on March 20; fundoscopy, temperature and neck movements were normal. Dimetapp was given, and a staff optometry appointment was scheduled for April 2. The staff optometrist examined A.J. and found no problems with his retina or vision but ordered glasses to help with the focusing. The optometry note in A.J.'s medical record states that the patient needs to be reevaluated by the M.D. because of the headaches. A.J. saw the nurse in the clinic on April 8 with complaints of continued, unchanged headache. He was given Ibuprofen and an appointment to see the doctor on April 10. Dr. DeCespedes' notes of examination on April 10 reflect normal findings and an order of an X-ray for sinuses. The X-rays, taken on April 12, reflected sinusitis. Dr. Chapman reviewed the file on April 10 and April 13; she found the work-up for headaches adequate and ordered Keflex for the sinusitis. Dr. Chapman examined A.J. at the clinic on April 17, when he reported feeling bad and unable to go to work. He refused a "lay-in" because he did not want to lose gain time and said, "my boss understands." The examination revealed normal findings. Dr. Chapman added Dimetapp to the Keflex already being taken and advised A.J. to keep his follow-up appointment with Dr. DeCespedes. A.J. appeared at the clinic several time on April 24. In the morning he reported, "I think I'm dying", stated his headache was much worse, held one eyelid half-shut and complained of blurred vision, tinnitis and photophobia. He said his sinuses no longer caused pain. The nurse gave him Ibuprofen and told him he had a doctor's appointment on the next day. The nurse noted he had lost 22 pounds since the end of November and 31 pounds since August. That same day, later in the afternoon A.J. reported to the clinic again, stating that he had gotten up to get a drink of water, blacked out and came to with someone holding him up. He said the Motrin provided no relief from his severe headache. His throat was slightly inflamed with some swelling on the right side. He was referred to the staff physician who observed the patient in distress and hyperventilating. He was given Darvocet; Dr. DeCespedes was consulted; and another sinus X-ray was ordered. On April 26, Dr. DeCespedes admitted A.J. to the infirmary after he had reportedly passed out in his bunk. The sinus X-rays reflected the sinusitis was resolved. From April 26 through April 30, A.J. continued to complain of headaches and loss of vision. A CT scan and bloodwork were ordered. Nursing notes from the infirmary reflect that A.J. was "looking" at TV with no apparent blindness. He was examined on April 30, by Dr. DeCespedes and by the optometrist, who found abnormal fundi (swelling of the optic nerve). The optometrist recommended an opthomologist (MD) consultation as soon as possible. Dr. Chapman examined A.J. at 6 p.m. on May 1. By then he was lethargic, unable to get up without assistance and had difficulty swallowing. Dr. Chapman noted the swelling of the optic nerve and ordered A.J. transferred to the local hospital. Laboratory work on admission showed elevated white blood count which had not been revealed in laboratory findings earlier. Other tests, CT scan and MRI, were initially normal, but brain edema appeared after the third day. Similarly, spinal taps indicated elevated spinal fluid which was clear at first, but, after the fourth hospital day tested positive for streptococcus. The diagnosis after several days was cryptococcal meningoencephalitis. A.J. lapsed into a coma and died at the hospital on May 8, 1990. Patient J. D. J. D., aged fifty-one, entered the Florida Department of Corrections system at the South Florida Reception Center on January 30, 1990. He had a history of peripheral vascular disease (PVD), diabetes and hypertension, and had undergone vascular surgery. In February 1990, under the auspices of the Department of Corrections, J.D. underwent further surgery to repair a prior graft. The patient had a bypass graft performed from the left groin to the right groin using an interposition graft at the left common femoral position, and a 6mm cross-over graft placed from the interposition graft to the right superficial femoral artery. J. D. was transferred to CCI around May 2, 1990. On arrival, he was evaluated by staff physician, Dr. DeCespedes, who noted his history, including the recent surgery. He was given a pass for no prolonged standing, was placed on a low cholesterol diet and was given a lower bunk assignment. Thereafter, J.D. was reevaluated by the staff physician on May 16, 1990; July 10, 1990; October 23, 1990; and February 21, 1991. February 21, 1991, is the first day that a complaint of pain by the inmate was noted. On February 21, 1991, Dr. DeCespedes' clinic notes reflect complaint of pain in J. D.'s legs and a mass in the left inguinal area. Dr. DeCespedes gave J.D. a light duty pass for a few days. On March 5, 1991, J.D. sent this inmate request to Dr. Chapman: Dr.Chapman. I am in the need of help. I have hardening and blood clots in the arteries. I had surgery at So. Fla. Reception in Feb. of last yr. at Larkin Hospital. For the past month I have been experiencing severe pain in my legs. More in the right leg and foot than the left. I saw Dr. DeCespedes last week and told her of the pain and numbness. I also told her that I was having trouble walking to the mess hall and back. She said "you have to walk" and didn't even look at my legs! Dr. I'm really afraid if I don't get some attention soon I may lose my leg. Inmate Logan Ward told me that you are familiar with this type of illness. Would you please call me to see you as soon as possible. I am really scared. My right foot is red and cold and numb most of the time. I have a lot of pain. Thank you. (Pet. #3, p. 169) An inmate request of similar urgency was sent by J.D. to the assistant superintendent the same day. Dr. Chapman responded by setting an appointment for J.D. to see her on March 29. On March 8, J.D. came to clinic reporting a medical emergency. The nurse noted left toes were purplish and cool; the right ankle and foot were cold and dark red and "unable to appreciate peripheral pulses". J.D. complained of pain behind his left knee and severe pain on slight touch to the right leg. He was referred to Dr. DeCespedes, who admitted him to the infirmary for observation. On examination, Dr. DeCespedes noted pulses and no edema. Dr. Chapman examined J.D. in the infirmary on March 13. She could not detect pulses in his lower extremities. She continued current medications and added Trental, a medication to increase blood flow. She ordered a Doppler pulse check and noted that the inmate should sign a medical release for records so that his prior hospital records could be obtained. Dr. Chapman also noted that the inmate should sign a consent sheet for peripheral vascular testing. On March 14, J.D. requested discharge from the infirmary, stating he felt better. He had complained early that morning that he could not sleep in the infirmary. Pulses were present but his lower extremities were cold. Dr. Chapman examined J.D. on March 29 and noted his severe peripheral vascular disease with leg pain. J.D. complained that he had been unable to get to the dining hall and guards were bringing him bagged lunches at times or a wheelchair. Dr. Chapman ordered a quad cane and crutches until the quad cane could be provided. She noted that he should have extra time to get to meals, but should not be given a wheelchair or bagged meals. She noted that she completed a consultation request for peripheral vascular testing by a vascular surgery consultant. For some reason unknown by Dr. Chapman and undisclosed by the record of this proceeding, J.D. was sent to a cardiologist, not a vascular surgeon. He was seen by Robert B. Garrett, M.D. on April 3. That same date, Dr. DeCespedes noted in J.D.'s clinical record that the cardiologist reported severe ischemia in the patient's legs, that J.D. needed special tests and he should be in a wheelchair, but twice daily he should walk 50 to 100 feet to exercise his legs. On April 10, J.D. sent an inmate request to the superintendent complaining about his medical treatment, stating he had pain and trouble walking, that he was given a wheelchair but that it was taken away, even though the specialist had recommended it. Dr. Chapman's response states that J.D. had a quad cane and was to be encouraged to be active. Further, the response states that J.D. had an appointment with her after his next specialist appointment. On April 11, 1991, Dr. Chapman reviewed Dr. Garrett's report and immediately requested a vascular surgery consultation. At some point, J.D. was transferred to administrative confinement, as requested by Dr. Chapman, so that he could have his meals delivered. J.D.'s vascular surgery consultation was scheduled for April 22, but was cancelled by security personnel and was rescheduled for May 9. CCI staff physician, Evidio Tornin, examined J.D. on April 30. He noted "no acute distress", but found a ischemic ulcer, nickel-sized, on J.D.'s right lower leg. He found severe circulatory insufficiency and was unable to detect pulses in J.D.'s extremities. The physician's notes acknowledge that J.D. had a vascular specialist appointment scheduled. Dr. Sweeney, the vascular surgeon, saw J.D. on May 9, 1991. His notes of the examination reveal he found a large ulceration on the right leg and a smaller ulceration on the left Achilles' tendon. Dr. Sweeney's impression was that the bypass grafts had occluded. Dr. Chapman's notes dated May 13 acknowledge the consultation with Dr. Sweeney, including Dr. Sweeney's concern that both legs would likely be lost if surgery were not done within the next two weeks. Dr. Chapman also noted that same date she had informed the regional utilization review nurse of the seriousness of the situation and the nurse agreed to an emergency admission to Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center under Dr. Sweeney's care. An arteriogram was scheduled for May 21, 1991, but was postponed for a day because of hospital equipment problems. After the test was done, Dr. Sweeney concluded that J.D.'s prior grafts were completely blocked and collateral vessels were supplying the only blood to his legs. Dr. Sweeney performed surgery to remove the infected grafts on May 28, 1991. After surgery, J.D.'s status deteriorated; his legs became non-viable and his temperature elevated to 103. On June 7, 1991, J.D. was taken to the operating room where Dr. Sweeney performed bilateral above the knee amputations. The Standard of Care CCI was a new prison when Dr. Chapman was hired to become its chief health officer. Originally built to house 700 inmates, it double-bunked to a maximum capacity of 1488 inmates by August 1989, and approximately 1400 inmates were housed there while Dr. Chapman was chief health officer. CCI was a close custody, medical grade IV institution. That is, it contained the most violent criminals with a full range of medical problems. Medical grade IV includes the sickest population in the correctional system, as well as all of the less serious medical grades. Dr. Chapman provided overall supervision to approximately 45 employees and direct supervision to approximately 10 employees. She held weekly and monthly staff meetings and was expected to review five sick call charts each day, Monday through Friday. There is ample evidence that Dr. Chapman periodically reviewed the files of both inmates at issue here. She was directly involved in their treatment and examined them personally on occasion. She was also responsible for their care as the supervisor of Dr. DeCespedes and the other staff physicians. Dr. Chapman's job was difficult, if not impossible, as conceded by the agency's expert witness. However, she violated the appropriate standard of care as to inmates A.J. and J. D. by failing to adequately supervise the treating physicians and by failing to obtain appropriate and timely consultations. The ultimate tragic outcomes of the two inmates' cases are plainly not the basis for this conclusion. Cryptococcal meningitis is a difficult disease to diagnose. And, there is a possibility J.D. would ultimately have lost his legs as a result of his persistent smoking, according to the warning of the cardiologist. Yet, in both cases there were increasingly urgent complaints by the subject inmates. Those complaints were deferred by punctilious observance of hollow routine, at best , and misplaced scepticism, at worst. In A.J.'s case, the treatment for sinusitis was appropriate, but the continued complaints of headaches and progressive loss of vision should have alerted the staff to a more pernicious cause. In J.D.'s case, although Dr. Chapman contends that his prior medical records were not obtained until several months after the amputations, the medical staff was well aware of his recent surgery and his history at the time he was received at CCI. The clues, in subjective complaints and in such objective physical signs as weak or non- existent pulse and ischemic ulcers, should have prompted a more immediate evaluation of his peripheral vascular status. In making the above findings of violations, substantial weight has been accorded the opinion of the agency witness, C. A. Rosenberg, M.D., who was appointed by the Federal District Court in 1983 after his nomination by the Department of Corrections, to serve on a three-physician survey team to monitor settlement of a case involving medical care in the Florida correctional system. Dr. Rosenberg's testimony was clear, competent and credible. He was not biased against the system, and was experienced in the role of a supervising physician. His analysis of the records he reviewed was incisive; that is, he distinguished convincingly between medical care that was appropriate and what was not. He acknowledged the difficulty of providing medical care under the circumstances experienced by Dr. Chapman and he confined his criticism to discrete, specific areas where action could have been taken, but was not. In that sense, although he articulated a standard of care that is the same standard imposed on a physician outside of an institutional setting, it is plain that he considered the conditions and circumstances under which Dr. Chapman labored in framing his opinion. Just as it is appropriate to consider these conditions and circumstances in determining whether a violation occurred, it is also appropriate to consider them in recommending an appropriate penalty. From her own testimony and those who have worked with her, Dr. Chapman is a caring physician and is well-respected. No evidence of other past discipline or cause for discipline appears in the record of Dr. Chapman's public service presented in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medicine enter its final order finding that Respondent violated section 458.331(1)(t), F.S. and establishing a penalty of two years probation and $2000 fine. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties as required by section 120.59(2), F.S. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted or adopted in substance: Paragraphs #1-5, 7-8, 10-19, 21-25, 29- 35, 38-39, 42-52, 54-59, 61-67, 69-76, 81-84. Rejected as unnecessary: Paragraphs #9, 20, 26-28, 36-37, 40-41, 53, 78- 80. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence: Paragraphs #60, 68, 77. Rejected as a conclusion of law, rather than finding of fact. (Moreover, the standard applied here is described in section 458.331(1)(t), F.S.): Paragraph #6 Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted or adopted in substance: Paragraphs #1-3, 10-15, 17-21, 23-36 (with exception of final sentence), 37-48, 50. Rejected as unnecessary: Paragraphs #4-9, 16, 49. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence: Paragraphs #22 (as to nursing notes being inconsistent with the blindness complaint), 27, 36 (final sentence-At least some evidence indicates he could not sleep in the infirmary and that is why he wanted to leave), 51-53. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Tom Wallace, Assistance Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Brett Thomas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Legal Section 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Anthony D. Demma, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether the Florida Medical Association, Inc. and Florida Association of Physicians Assistants have standing to initiate this challenge to an existing rule. (See Section 120.56(3), Florida Statutes.) Whether Rule 64B1-3.001(6), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the Board of Acupuncture's rulemaking authority contained in Section 457.104, Florida Statutes. (See Section 120.52(8)(b), Florida Statutes). Whether Rule 64B1-3.001(6), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the provisions of Section 457.102, Florida Statutes. (See Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes).
Findings Of Fact It was stipulated that Petitioner FMA is organized and maintained for the benefit of approximately 16,000 licensed allopathic and osteopathic Florida physicians. FMA's standing in this proceeding has always been at issue. The foregoing stipulation encompasses all of the factual allegations about the Petitioner contained in the Petition. It was stipulated that there is only one Respondent, the Board of Acupuncture, created by the Florida Legislature and placed within the Florida Department of Health. It is axiomatic that the Respondent has standing herein. There were no stipulations as to the standing of either Intervenor, and both the Board and FSOMA have asserted in their respective Proposed Final Orders that FAPA, as well as FMA, is without standing to bring this rule challenge. However, no party has contested the veracity of the factual statements concerning standing in either Petition to Intervene, and no party opposed intervention. The Petitions to Intervene of FAPA and FSOMA were granted, subject to proving-up standing at hearing. Even stipulations as to standing do not preclude consideration of standing as a matter of law. Florida Medical Ass'n., Inc., et al. v. Dept. of Health, Florida Bd. of Nursing, et al., DOAH Case No. 99-5337RP (Final Order March 13, 2000), per curiam affirmed Bd. of Nursing, et al. v. Florida Medical Ass'n. Inc., So. 2d (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Therefore, under these circumstances, and applying that case, the Intervenors' factual allegations for purposes of standing may be taken as true for findings of fact, but each Intervenor's status still depends upon that of the respective party upon whose behalf each Intervenor entered this case. Therefore, with regard to the status of FAPA, it is found that: FAPA is organized and maintained for the benefit of the licensed Florida physicians assistants who compromise [sic] its membership and has as one of its primary functions to represent the interests of its members before various governmental entities of the State of Florida, including the Department of Health and its boards. (FAPA Petition to Intervene) Therefore, with regard to the status of FSOMA, it is found that: FSOMA is a Florida nonprofit corporation comprised of over one-third of the doctors of oriental medicine and licensed acupuncturists under the regulatory aegis of the Board of Acupuncture, State of Florida Department of Health, Chapter 457, F.S., with a mission to represent the acupuncture and oriental medicine practitioner interests of its members in judicial administrative, legislative and other proceedings. (FSOMA Petition to Intervene) Existing Rule 64B1-3.001(6), Florida Administrative Code, was promulgated by the Board of Acupuncture. The challenged rule provides: (6) Acupuncture physician means any person certified as provided in this Chapter to practice acupuncture as a primary health care provider. The rule was adopted on August 13, 1984. It was most recently amended on February 27, 1992. The "authority" cited by the Board for the challenged rule is Section 457.104, Florida Statutes. The Board cites the "law implemented" for the challenged rule as Section 457.102, Florida Statutes. Section 457.104, Florida Statutes, currently provides: The board has authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement provisions of this chapter conferring duties upon it. Section 457.102, Florida Statutes, currently provides: "Acupuncture" means a form of primary health care, based on traditional Chinese medical concepts and modern oriental medical techniques, that employs acupuncture diagnosis and treatment, as well as adjunctive therapies and diagnostic techniques, for the promotion, maintenance, and restoration of health and the prevention of disease. Acupuncture shall include, but not be limited to, the insertion of acupuncture needles and the application of moxibustion to specific areas of the human body and the use of electroacupuncture, Qi Gong, oriental massage, herbal therapy, dietary guidelines, and other adjunctive therapies, as defined by board rule. "Acupuncturist" means any person licensed as provided in this chapter to practice acupuncture as a primary health care provider. "Board" means the Board of Acupuncture. "License" means the document of authorization issued by the department for a person to engage in the practice of acupuncture. "Department" means the Department of Health. "Oriental medicine" means the use of acupuncture, electroacupuncture, Qi Gong, oriental massage, herbal therapy, dietary guidelines, and other adjunctive therapies. "Prescriptive rights" means the prescription, administration, and use of needles and devices, restricted devices, and prescription devices that are used in the practice of acupuncture and oriental medicine. (Emphasis supplied) Section 457.116(1)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: A person may not: (b) Use, in connection with his or her name or place of business, any title or description of services which incorporates the words "acupuncture," "acupuncturist," "certified acupuncturist," "licensed acupuncturist," "oriental medical practitioner"; the letters "L.Ac.," "R.Ac.," "A.P.," or "D.O.M."; or any other words, letters, abbreviations, or insignia indicating or implying that he or she practices acupuncture unless he or she is a holder of a valid license issued pursuant to ss. 457.101-457.118; (Emphasis supplied) It was stipulated that witnesses for the Respondent Board of Acupuncture would testify that "A.P." as employed in Section 457.116 (1) (b), Florida Statutes, means "acupuncture physician."1
The Issue Whether Sandra Ann Lindstrom (“Ms. Lindstrom” or “Respondent”), a licensed physician assistant, prescribed Lorcet, a medication containing a controlled substance (hydrocodone), in violation of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed at the Department of Health in DOH Case No. 2006-36542 on October 27, 2014. If so, what is the appropriate discipline?
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department of Health is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of physician assistants in the State of Florida. The regulation is pursuant to both chapter 456 (“Health Professions and Occupations, General Provisions”) and chapter 458 (“Medical Practice”), Florida Statutes. Respondent is licensed as a physician assistant by the Board of Medicine. Her license number is PA 9103823. The license was effective on August 3, 2006, with an expiration date of March 31, 2008. Her license has been continuously renewed since its effective date. See Pet’r’s Ex. A. Ms. Lindstrom is not licensed to practice medicine as a physician. Id. Physician Assistants Physician assistants are governed by section 458.347, a section within the chapter of the Florida Statutes that governs Medical Practice. Physician assistant licensure is provided for in section 458.347(7), and the Board of Medicine is authorized to “impose any of the penalties authorized under ss. 456.072 and 458.331(2) upon a physician assistant if the physician assistant or the supervising physician has been found guilty of or is being investigated for any act that constitutes a violation of this chapter [Ch. 458] or chapter 456.” § 456.347(7)(g), Fla. Stat. A physician assistant’s supervisory physician may delegate authority to conduct aspects of medical practice to a physician assistant under circumstances expressed in the statutes. The limited medical practice that may be delegated to a physician assistant includes certain practices at county health departments. Whether conducting the delegated practice of medicine at a county health department, or not, physician assistants may be delegated authority to prescribe medications provided they are not listed on a formulary created pursuant to section 458.347(7)(f). See § 458.347(7)(d) and (e), Fla. Stat. The formulary must include “controlled substances as defined in chapter 893.” § 458.347(7)(f)1., Fla. Stat. In sum, physicians may not delegate to physician assistants the prescription of medications which are controlled substances as defined in chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The Department’s Investigative Office The Department has an investigative office charged with looking into regulatory complaints. In a typical regulatory investigation, the investigator discloses his identity to any party interviewed, whether the party is the source of the complaint, a witness, or, if amenable to an interview, the licensee who is the subject of the complaint. Aside from interviews, the investigations include record reviews, the obtaining of evidence, and the preparation of an investigative report. In addition to investigating complaints of regulatory violations by licensed health care practitioners, the investigative office looks into cases of unauthorized practice by unlicensed individuals. Investigations of unlicensed activity are conducted by what is known as the “ULA” section of the office. Commonly, ULA investigations are done by investigators who are “undercover,” that is, the investigators hide their identity as investigators and use pseudonyms rather than their actual names. Typically, undercover ULA investigators present at the offices of the subjects of investigation. If the unlicensed subject of the investigation offers to perform services that require a license or engages in practice that requires a license, the Department pursues remedies, including an order that the subject cease and desist from the unlawful, unlicensed activity. Investigations of a licensee for practicing outside the scope of the licensed activity may be viewed as something of a hybrid of a typical regulatory investigation and a ULA investigation. It is regulatory since the subject is a licensee, but it is usually done undercover in the same manner in which a ULA investigation is conducted. One such investigation was conducted by Ryan Heal, an employee of the Department between August and December of 2006. Mr. Heal conducted the investigation undercover using a pseudonym referred to in Department documents as “RJ.” RJ and the 2006 Investigation of JHS Mr. Heal has been a medical malpractice investigator for the Department since November 2000. During the course of his more than 15 years as a Department investigator, Mr. Heal has investigated both regulatory violations and unauthorized practice violations. In 2006, allegations reached the Department that prescriptions were being written at Jacksonville Health Systems (“JHS”), a clinic located on Baymeadows Road in Jacksonville, Florida, by a physician assistant without the supervision of a physician. In response, the Department launched an investigation. The investigation was conducted undercover by Mr. Heal using his pseudonym RJ. Commenced in August of 2006, the investigation lasted until the following December. August 10, 2006 On August 10, 2006, Mr. Heal, using his fictitious name, presented at JHS. A woman behind the counter in the reception area accepted a cash payment for the visit. She took RJ’s blood pressure and requested the name of the pharmacy for any medicine prescribed. To the best of Mr. Heal’s recollection, the receptionist recorded some of the information. After the interaction with staff in the reception room, Mr. Heal took a seat and waited to be called back to the examination room. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Lindstrom emerged and asked for RJ. Mr. Heal “stood up and went over to her.” Hr’g Tr. 19. Ms. Lindstrom identified herself by her first name and said, “I’m the provider here.” Id. Ms. Lindstrom accompanied Mr. Heal to the examination room where only she and Mr. Heal were present. After Mr. Heal complained of back pain, Ms. Lindstrom asked where in his back the pain was located and what caused it, but she did not conduct a physical examination. As Mr. Heal testified at hearing, “[t]here was no examination. She never touched my back. Never took vitals or anything.” Hr’g Tr. 20. Ms. Lindstrom suggested that Mr. Heal use a chair with lumbar support, try stretching, lose weight, and have an MRI. Ms. Lindstrom then stated that she would prescribe medication to treat the pain: Lorcet, Flexeril, and Motrin. With the visit in the examination room concluded, Ms. Lindstrom took Mr. Heal back to the receptionist. The meeting in the examination room and his first visit to the JHS offices being over, Mr. Heal departed the JHS facility. He did not return until the following October. October 31, 2006 Mr. Heal returned to the JHS facility on October 31, 2006. The process during the second visit was similar to the one followed during the visit the previous August. He presented as “RJ.” A staff member took his blood pressure in the reception area and he paid her $90 in cash. Mr. Heal sat down and waited to be called. Again, Ms. Lindstrom appeared in the reception area and took him to the examination room in the back. The visit was shorter than it had been in August. Ms. Lindstrom asked if his pain had improved and if an MRI had been done. With the intention of calling in his prescriptions, Ms. Lindstrom showed Mr. Heal a list of five pharmacies from which to choose. Mr. Heal, however, took a tack that was different from Ms. Lindstrom’s intention and from his first visit: I explained to her that I did not have reliable transportation and asked [for] . . . handwritten prescriptions . . . so that I could take them to whatever pharmacy was convenient . . . . She agreed that she could write them that time, but that on the next visit, I would have to arrange for proper transportation to get to the pharmacy or wherever they needed to be called into. Hr’g Tr. 23. Ms. Lindstrom wrote out three prescriptions: Two of them were for “Flexeril 10mg (ten) #30 (thirty)” and “Ibprofen (sic) [Ibuprofen] 800mg #120 (one twenty).” Pet’r’s Ex. B. The third prescription was for “Lorcet 10/650 #90 (Ninety).” Id. Ms. Lindstrom explained to Mr. Heal that he should use one of the five pharmacies on her list because “several [of the Clinic’s patients] had been kicked out of pharmacies . . . [that] were refusing to fill the prescriptions.” Hr’g Tr. 25. Ms. Lindstrom also “mentioned that a couple of her patients had been arrested for forging prescriptions.” Hr’g Tr. 25-6. At no time during his visit to JHS on October 31, 2006, did Mr. Heal see a physician. No one entered the examination room where Ms. Lindstrom met with Mr. Heal that day. Nor did Ms. Lindstrom leave the examination room while Mr. Heal was present in the room. Like the first visit the previous August, Ms. Lindstrom recommended that Mr. Heal have an MRI. She explained that results from an MRI were needed “in case the DEA wanted to look at the file, to show that [she and JHS] were actually treating [Mr. Heal] for something.” Hr’g Tr. 28. December 1, 2006 Little more than a month later on December 1, Mr. Heal made a third visit to JHS. The reception process was the same. The receptionist took his blood pressure, he paid $90 in cash, and waited in the reception area for Ms. Lindstrom to call him back. While waiting, he was informed that the number of pharmacies that would accept JHS prescriptions had been drastically reduced. Only one pharmacy would now accept JHS prescriptions: a pharmacy called New Horizon. Subsequent to the third visit, Mr. Heal presented to the pharmacy identified as New Horizon. In the company of law enforcement and with its supervision, Mr. Heal had the prescriptions filled for three medications: Flexeril, Ibuprofen at a prescription-strength dosage, and Lorcet. Supervising Physician and Other Claims At hearing under oath, Ms. Lindstrom admitted that she treated Mr. Heal once at the JHS facility and admitted that she prescribed Flexeril and Ibuprofen for him. She claimed under oath that the supervising physician for the 2006 visit in which she prescribed the two medications was James Hendrick, M.D. The Department produced documentation in the Department’s official business records that shows that Dr. Hendrick cancelled his Professional Liability Insurance Policy effective October 1, 2005, the year before Ms. Lindstrom claims to have seen Mr. Heal at the JHS facility under Dr. Hendrick’s supervision. The reason for the cancellation of the policy is listed on the letter from the insurer to the Department as “Retired.” Pet’r’s Ex. F, letter dated October 17, 2005, from FPIC, First Professionals Insurance Company. Department records also include an “Address Change” form that contains a section entitled “Financial Responsibility” dated November 21, 2005, the year before the incidents in this case. No boxes are checked in the section that shows “Financial Responsibility Coverage.” Under a section on the form entitled, “Category II: Financial Responsibility Exemptions,” Dr. Hendrick checked a box that indicated he was “retired or maintain[ed] part-time practice,” id., at least as of late November 2005, 11 months or more before the October 31, 2006, visit by Mr. Heal. Ms. Lindstrom made other claims with regard to RJ’s visit that she asserted occurred on October 3, 2006, rather than October 31, 2006, as charged. Among them was that she left the examination room after completing the prescriptions for Flexeril and Ibuprofen and partially completing a third prescription by inserting all the information, including her signature, except for the medicine to be prescribed and how often it should be taken. Ms. Lindstrom claimed that she intended to write a prescription for Lodine, but failed to write down “Lodine” on the third prescription form because she was distracted by a discussion with Mr. Heal about the need for RJ to have an MRI. She says she left the room to make arrangements for an MRI and when she returned, RJ was gone, together with the two filled out prescriptions, the third incomplete prescription, and her prescription pad. Ms. Lindstrom’s testimony about the theft of the pad and other details about the event, including when it occurred, is not credible. In contrast, Mr. Heal’s testimony about the visits he made to the JHS facility, seeing Ms. Lindstrom, and her prescription of Lorcet, is credited as truthful. Lorcet Lorcet contains hydrocodone, which is a controlled substance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Respondent Sandra A. Lindstrom, P.A., violated section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2006), by violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-30.008 (2006), as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; Imposing a $2,500 fine; and Revoking Respondent’s license as a physician assistant. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra Ann Lindstrom 6726 Pomeroy Circle Orlando, Florida 32810 Yolonda Y. Green, Esquire Maciej Lewandowski, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Andre Ourso, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3253 (eServed) Nichole C. Geary, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
