Findings Of Fact At the time of final hearing the Respondent, Myron Lewis, was the holder of State Certified General Contractor's Licenses as follows: Myron Lewis d/b/a Interior Concepts of Palm Beach, Number CG C005282; Myron Lewis d/b/a Whitten Corporation South, Number CG CA05282; and Myron Lewis d/b/a Custom Pools of the Palm Beaches, Inc. Number CG CB05282. Respondent was engaged in the business of building swimming pools in the Palm Beach area. In connection with that business the Respondent entered into contracts for the construction of pools with several individuals, including the following: James Riley; Michael Belmonti; Walter Beasley; Jose Dorribo; Gerald Gottner; James Overton; and Ronald Malcolm. With regard to the first six names listed above, Respondent had failed to complete the pool and perform according to the contract and, apparently, abandoned the project after accepting a major portion of the contract price agreed upon. With regard to the seventh name listed above, Respondent accepted an initial deposit of $680.00 for construction of a swimming pool but never performed any work and did not return the deposit. Some efforts were made by the Respondent to settle each of the claims against him and to that end there was submitted into evidence general releases from Malcolm, Riley and Belmonti each reciting that the general release was a settlement and compromise of disputed claims and that the payments are not to be construed as admission of liability on the part of Custom Pools of the Palm Beaches, Inc. and/or Myron Lewis. (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3) With regard to the projects set forth in Paragraph 2 above, Respondent apparently terminated because of financial difficulties he and his company were in, none of which was the fault or responsibility of the persons for whom Respondent had contracted to build pools. More than ninety days had elapsed from the time of termination of the project by Respondent and this final hearing. All of these projects occurred prior to 1978. The Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board, by action taken on January 23, 1978, suspended Respondent's license until further notice. That suspension was the result of the termination of the projects set forth above. The evidence presented indicates that an unspecified amount of money paid Respondent for the construction of specific pools was actually used for other obligations of Respondent and such funds were not used for the prosecution or completion of the project for which they were paid.
Findings Of Fact Peter P. Sedler, at all times material to the complaint, has been licensed as a real estate broker, holding license 0079017. He was last licensed as a broker c/o Marshall & Sedler, Inc., 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Marshall & Sedler, Inc., at all times relevant to the complaint, had been registered as a Florida real estate broker, holding license 0250511, its last licensed address was 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Peter P. Sedler was the qualifying broker and officer for Marshall & Sedler, Inc. On about July 3, 1987, Tom Teixeira was employed as a salesman by Cartier Realty, of 11852 42nd Road North, Royal Palm Beach, Florida. Cartier Realty had solicited, through a direct mailing, listings for property in the Royal Palm Beach area. Ms. Mary Myers, an older woman of about 70 years of age, responded to the advertisement, and gave Mr. Teixeira an open listing for real property which she owned. While Mr. Teixeira placed a Cartier Realty "For Sale" sign on the property, the sign was somehow removed shortly thereafter, and no party dealing with Ms. Myers during the months of July, August and September of 1987 would have been placed on notice that Cartier Realty had any listing on the property. Mr. Sedler had nothing to do with the disappearance of the sign. Ms. Myers had originally acquired the property from her daughter. Long before Ms. Myers gave a listing to Cartier Realty, William Kemp and his wife Gina DiPace Kemp had told Ms. Myers that they were interested in purchasing the property, which is adjacent to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Kemp. When Mr. and Mrs. Kemp first contacted Ms. Myers, she had wanted to keep the property, in the belief that she might eventually convey it back to her daughter. Mr. Teixeira brought to Ms. Myers an offer from David R. and Maureen C. Rose to purchase the land for $11,900. Ms. Myers did not accept that offer, but the Roses accepted Ms. Myers' counteroffer on July 24, 1987, to sell it for $12,300. The sale was contingent upon the buyers obtaining financing; they applied for a loan, and ordered both an appraisal and a survey. The closing was to be held by September 1, 1987. (Contract, paragraph VI.) The closing date passed, without the buyers obtaining the necessary financing, so the contract was no longer effective. On about September 8, 1987, Mr. Teixeira attempted to contact Ms. Myers. He had obtained no written extension of the contract but hoped the sale might yet close. Ms. Myers told Teixeira that she was still willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose. In the meantime, Mr. and Mrs. Kemp became aware that Ms. Myers wanted to sell the property, because they noticed Mr. and Mrs. Rose coming to look at the land, and had engaged them in conversation. Ms. Kemp then contacted Ms. Myers to remind her that they were still willing to purchase the property, and also to say that they would offer more than the current offer on the property. On about September 11, 1987, Ms. Kemp contacted Cartier Realty to say that she also wished to make an offer on the Myers' lot. For a reason which was never adequately explained at the hearing, Teixeira, who should have been working on behalf of the seller, refused to take the offer, even though it was for a higher price. After this rebuff by Teixeira, Ms. Kemp contacted Marshall & Sedler, Inc., in order to try to find a broker who would convey their offer to Ms. Myers and spoke with Patricia Marshall, Ms. Marshall referred her to her partner, Peter Sedler. The Kemps told Sedler that Ms. Myers had told them that she had received a $9,000 offer on the lot. Why Ms. Myers told the Kemps that the Rose offer was $9,000 is not clear, for the actual offer had been $12,300, but Sedler did not know this. There was no listing of the lot in the local board of realtors multiple listing service book, and Mr. Sedler found the address of Ms. Myers through the public records. Mr. Sedler knew from his conversations with Ms. Kemp that Cartier Realty had some involvement with an offer on the property. He called Cartier Realty and tried to speak with the broker handling the matter. He spoke with a man named Tom, who he thought was a brother of the owner of Cartier Realty, Pete Cartier. Mr. Sedler actually talked with Tom Teixeira. Sedler believed he was dealt with rudely by Teixeira, who had hung up on him. Sedler then called Pete Cartier directly to find out whether there was an outstanding contract on the property, and Cartier told Sedler that he would call Sedler back. When Cartier called Sedler, Cartier warned Sedler that he should stay out of the deal. Mr. Sedler became suspicious about Cartier Realty's failure to bring a higher offer to the attention of the seller, and on September 16, 1987, filed a complaint against Tom Cartier with the Lake Worth Board of Realtors. Mr. Sedler then traveled to Pompano Beach to meet with Ms. Myers at her home, and brought with him a contract for sale and purchase of the property, already signed by the Kemps and dated September 14, 1987. While at the door, Ms. Myers asked Peter Sedler if he was "Tom." Ms. Myers knew that she had been dealing with a "Tom" at Cartier Realty, but all her dealings were on the phone, and she did not know what Tom Teixeira looked like. Sedler replied "Yes, but you can call me Pete." Sedler merely intended the comment as humor. At that time Sedler gave Ms. Myers his pink business card and specifically identified himself as Pete Sedler of Marshall & Sedler, Inc. Mr. Sedler asked Ms. Myers if she had any paperwork, such as the prior contract for the sale of the lot which had expired on September 1, 1987, but she did not. While Sedler was with Ms. Myers, she agreed to sell the property to the Kemps for $12,500 and signed the Kemp contract. The Kemps had put the purchase price of $12,500 into the Marshall & Sedler escrow account. Three days later, on September 18, 1987, Mr. Sedler, in the company of his wife Bonnie, presented a post-dated check to Ms. Myers in the amount of $11,020, the net amount due to Ms. Myers for the lot, based on the purchase price of $12,500. When they met this second time he introduced himself again as Pete Sedler and offered Ms. Myers his card for a second time. The post-dated check was conditioned by an endorsement making it good upon a determination that the title to the lot was good. A quit claim deed to Mr. and Mrs. Kemp was executed by Ms. Myers and witnessed by Bonnie Sedler. The post-dated check was given to Ms. Myers because she was about to leave on vacation. The check was given as a sort of security for good title, in return for the quit claim deed which closed the transaction. Mr. Sedler had structured the transaction in this way because he was concerned that someone at Cartier Realty might also attempt to purchase the property from Ms. Myers on behalf of one of their clients. At that time, Mr. Sedler held the reasonable belief that no other party had a subsisting contract to purchase the property from Ms. Myers. Sedler had no reason to believe the Roses would or could pay more for the property than the Kemps offered. Ms. Myers knew that Tom Teixeira from the Cartier realty firm represented a distinct business entity from Marshall & Sedler or Pete Sedler. After a title search showed that Ms. Myers had clear title to the property, the check which Mr. Sedler had given to Ms. Myers on September 18, 1987, with the restrictive endorsement was replaced. Later Mr. and Mrs. Rose tried to close their purchase, but found they could not. Ms. Myers had failed to inform them of the sale she made to the Kemps through Mr. Sedler. Mr. Teixeira, in retribution, filed an ethics complaint about Mr. Sedler with the West Palm Beach Board of Realtors.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Peter P. Sedler and Marshall & Sedler, Inc., be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of March, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6183 Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: 1. Rejected as unnecessary. 2 and 3. Adopted in Finding 1. 4 - 6. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 3. Implicit in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 6. Implicit in Finding 6. This does not mean that the contract subsisted, however. Rejected. Ms. Myers was willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose after the contract expired, but she was not under any obligation to do so. Adopted in Finding 7. Rejected, because there was no pending contract. Teixeira never obtained a written extension of the closing date and Ms. Myers was free to sell elsewhere. Rejected. No one could have truthfully told Sedler there was a pending contract. None existed. Rejected, because Mr. Sedler had no reason to believe that there was a subsisting contract for the sale of the property; there was none. Admission number 20 is not to the contrary. Adopted in Findings 10 and 11. Rejected. See, Findings 9 and 10. Rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected as cumulative to Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 14. Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Frank W. Weathers, Esquire Frank W. Weathers, P.A. Post Office Box 3967 Lantana, Florida 33465-3967 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact South Palm Beach Utilities Corporation is a private provider of water and sewer services in Palm Beach County, Florida. It is presently operating within a specified service area according to a certificate issued by the Public Service Commission. The utility is seeking to expand its service area north of the present boundaries, and has filed various notices of its intention with the Public Service Commission. As to some of these notices, no protests were filed, and the utility has commenced preliminary engineering planning activities to provide water and sewer lines to those areas. Palm Beach County has filed timely protests with respect to four off the parcels to which the utility is proposing to extend its certified service area. These four properties have been called the "Atlantic," "Mitchell," "Snow," and "Benson" properties. In its notices, the utility described the "Atlantic" property as follows: Tracts 49 thru 56 inclusive; 73 thru 88 inclusive and 105 thru 120 inclusive, in Section 21; and Tracts 9 thru 24 inclusive; 41 thru 56 inclusive; 73 thru 88 inclusive; and 105 thru 120 inclusive, in Section 28, all as shown on Palm Beach Farms Company Plat No. 1, as recorded in Plat Book 2, Pages 26, 27 & 28, Public Records of Palm Beach County, Florida, together with the West Half of the East Half of Section 21 and the West Half of the East Half of Section 28, all in Township 46 South, Range 42 East, Palm Beach County, Florida. EXCEPTING therefrom the dedicated public right of ways of record, as shown on the said Palm Beach Farms Company Plat No. 1, and the Plat of Delray Roads (containing 10.9500 acres) and the following Lake Worth Drainage District right of ways: LWDD Canal L-34: Beginning at a point where the Southerly line of a public right of way, 120.0 feet wide known as Del Ray West Road (State Road 806) intersects the North & South Quarter Line of Section 21, Township 46 South, Range 42 East, Palm Beach County, Florida, said point being S 1 degree 54' 34" E, 34.13 feet from the North Quarter Corner of said Section 21; run thence along said Quarter Section Line S 1 degree 54' 34" E, 90.02 feet; thence N 89 degrees 18' 11" E, 1342.63 feet to the East line of the West Half of the East Half of said Section 21; thence along said East Line N 2 degrees 06' 02" W, 90.03 feet to the South Line of said Del Ray West Road; thence along said South Line S 89 degrees 18' 11" W, 1342.33 feet to the Point of Beginning, Containing 2.7737 acres; LWDD Canal L-35: The South 10.0 feet of the West Half of the Northeast Quarter; the North 80.0 feet of the West Half of the Southeast Quarter; the South 15.0 feet of the Northwest Quarter (less the West 55.0 feet); and the North 75.0 feet of the Southwest Quarter (less the West 55.0 feet), in Section 21, Township 46 South Range 42 East, Palm Beach County, Florida, Contain- ing 8.2207 acres; LWDD Canal L-36: The South 15.0 feet of the West Three-Quarters of Section 21 (Less the West 55.0 feet); and the North 75.0 feet of the West Three-Quarters of Section 28 (less the West 40.0 feet); all in Town- ship 46 South, Range 42 East, Palm Beach County, Florida, Containing 8.2672 acres; LWDD Canal L-37: The South 40.0 feet of the North Half of the West Three-Quarters; and the North 50.0 feet of the South Half of the West Three-Quarters of Section 28, Township 46 South, Range 42 East, Palm Beach County, Florida, (Less the West 40.0 feet Thereof), Containing 8.1733 acres; LWDD Canal L-38: The South 105.0 feet of the West Three-Quarters of Section 28, Township 46 South, Range 42 East, Palm Beach County, Florida (less the West 40.0 feet thereof), containing 9.6120 acres; and LWDD Canal E-3: The West 55.0 feet of the South Half, and the West 55.0 feet of the South 664.91 feet of the North Half of Section 21; and the West 40.0 feet of Section 28, all in Township 46 South, Range 42 East, Palm Beach County, Florida, con- taining 9.2135 acres. Containing a net acreage of 816.1290 acres. The utility described the "Mitchell" property as follows: All of Tracts 65 to 128 inclusive, Section 29, Township 46, South, Range 42 East, (less 30.59 acres sold to Florida State Turnpike Authority and more particularly described in Deed Book 1104, Page 577), The Palm Beach Farms Co. Plat No. 1, according to the Plat thereof on file in the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, recorded in Plat Book 2, Pages 26 to 28. The "Snow" Property is described as follows: The North half of Sections 31 & 32, Town- ship 46 South, Range 42 East, Palm Beach County, Florida, and also known as Tracts 1 through 60, Block 71 and Tracts 1 through 64 of Block 70, Palm Beach Farms Company, Plat No. 3, as recorded in Plat Book 2, Page 52, Palm Beach County, Florida. At the hearing, the utility amended its notice with respect to the "Snow" property to withdraw its intention to provide service to the north half of Section 32, or that property east of Lyons Road. As to the property west of Lyons Road, being the north half of Section 31, the utility maintains its intention. The "Benson" property has been described by the utility as follows: Tracts 65 through 70, 91 through 102, and 123 through 128, Block 70, Palm Beach Farms Company, Plat No. 3, Plat Book No. 2, as recorded on Page 52 wholly within the South Half of Section 31, Township 46 South, Range 42 East, Palm Beach County, Florida. [This finding is determined from a stipulation of the parties as stated on the record at the final hearing, and from Exhibit 1.] The South Palm Beach Utilities Corporation is a fit provider of water and sewer service. No issue has been raised with respect to the quality of the service provided by the utility, and it is under no citations from any government agency. The utility has the financial integrity and engineering capability to provide service to the four properties involved in this proceeding. With respect to each of the four properties, the utility has provided the notices required by statute. Extension of the utility's service area to include the four properties would not result in a duplication of any existing facilities. No other utility is providing service to the area. In its long-range plans, the County envisions providing service to the area, but it does not provide service now, and would not be in a position to provide service for at least three to five years. The owners of the four proporties have proposed developments which would require provision of water and sewer service. [This finding has been determined from stipulations stated by the parties on the record at the final hearing.] In accordance with the "Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975" (Florida Statutes Section 163.3161, et seq.), Palm Beach County has promulgated a comprehensive plan which includes a "sewer, potable water, drainage and solid waste element" and a "land use plan element." The land use element of the comprehensive plan provides that the areas where South Palm Beach Utilities Corporation is seeking to expand its territory will be set aside for low density development. The County contends that expansion by the utility into these areas would allow for a level of development which is not in harmony with the land use element of the comprehensive plan. The evidence does not support this contention. No specific evidence was presented as to development densities proposed by developers, and it does not appear that allowing the utility to expand its service area would as a factual or legal matter allow for development of any kind. [This finding is determined from the testimony of the witnesses Garbrick and King, and from Exhibits 3, 4 and 5.] Extension of the South Palm Beach Utilities Corporation service area into the four properties at issue would conflict with the "sewer, potable water, drainage and solid waste element" of the County's comprehensive plan. Under this element of the comprehensive plan, which is in harmony with an overall management plan to treat wastewater pollutants that the County has developed in accordance with Federal funding requirements ("201 Plan"), the County envisions that it would provide sewer service to the "Atlantic" and "Mitchell" properties through a central wastewater treatment facility. Plans for providing such service have been made on a long-range basis, and the County is in the process of refining the plans so that it can obtain Federal funding. Removal of the "Atlantic" and "Mitchell" tracts from the area that the County proposes to serve through the central facility would not be in accordance with the "201 Plan." Removal of the properties would reduce the service area of that central facility, and could affect the size of the central facility, and funding. Removal of the properties would furthermore be contrary to the plans because of the introduction of a wastewater treatment facility other than the central facility. Both the "sewer, potable water, drainage and solid waste element" of the County's comprehensive plan and the "201 Plan" are long range. The County is not presently prepared to offer service to the properties at issue, and will not be prepared to do so for some time. This finding is determined from the testimony of witnesses Garbrick and King, the stipulation of the parties stated on the record at the final hearing, and Exhibits 2, 3 and 5.] While the evidence establishes that extension of the South Palm Beach Utilities Corporation's service area would on its face conflict with the County's comprehensive plan, the evidence does not establish that the conflict would adversely affect the plan. The evidence does not reveal that provision of services by facilities other than the County's central system would render the central system less feasible. While it was speculated that the central system might need to be reduced in size as a result, and that the rate base for it would be lessened in an unspecified amount, no competent evidence to these effects has been presented. [This finding is determined from the record as a whole.]
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent committed violations alleged in an Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school psychologist. At all times material to this case, Respondent was a member of the Classroom Teachers Association (CTA) Bargaining Unit. At all times material to this case, Respondent was receiving benefits under a valid claim for Workers' Compensation benefits arising from an accident on January 7, 2000. In conjunction with investigations as to Respondent's eligibility for Workers' Compensation benefits, video surveillance of Respondent's activities was conducted on several occasions. At the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year, Dr. Laakso worked for Petitioner as a school psychologist in Area 3, and was assigned to Palm Beach Lakes High School, Forest Hill High School, and Conniston Middle School. His immediate supervisor was Mary Kate Boyle, the Area 3 Exceptional Student Education (ESE) Team Leader. On January 7, 2000, Dr. Laakso was working in his car while parked in the Palm Beach Lakes High School parking lot, and when exiting the car, hit his head on the door jamb causing a compression of his spine. He then received a second injury to his back while pulling psychological testing kits out of his car. Dr. Laakso submitted this injury to Petitioner as a workers' compensation injury, and it was covered as such. Christopher Brown, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon and one of Dr. Laakso's workers' compensation physicians, treated Dr. Laakso. On February 8, 2000, Dr. Brown placed Dr. Laakso on a "no-work" status. Dr. Laakso suffers from cervical spinal stenosis, which is a narrowing of the spinal canal. Because Dr. Laakso had underlying spinal stenosis secondary to arthritis, combined with disc herniations, his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Brown, diagnosed Dr. Laakso's stenosis as severe. Also on February 8, 2000, Ms. Boyle held an investigative meeting with Respondent and his then-attorney, Stephen Fried, to discuss Respondent's continued absences since January 7, 2000 (the date of Respondent's workers' compensation injury) and his work status. In a letter to Dr. Laakso dated February 9, 2000, Ms. Boyle explained what her expectations were with regard to Respondent's absence and work status. On February 9, 2000, Dr. Laakso requested unpaid sick leave for January 11, 2000 to May 31, 2000, which the School Board granted. In March of 2000, Dr. Laakso was released back to light duty work, with restrictions. Some of the physical restrictions placed on Dr. Laakso's activities included no overhead use of the right upper extremity and no heavy use of the right upper extremity greater than 5 pounds. In addition, Dr. Laakso was told to be careful and to try not to hurt himself. Dr. Brown also imposed a 10 mile driving restriction on Dr. Laakso because Dr. Brown believed Dr. Laakso's spinal stenosis placed him at increased risk if he hit his head or was in a car accident. Dr. Laakso argued against the driving restriction because he was capable of driving and believed that the restriction would "mess things up" if he was unable to use his car. Dr. Laakso neither asked for the driving restriction nor represented that he needed the restriction.4 Dr. Laakso conveyed the driving restrictions to both Ms. Boyle and Linda Meyers in Risk Management. On March 21, 2000, Dr. Laakso was given a light duty placement in which he was assigned to Atlantic High School watching the school's security cameras. This assignment was for Dr. Laakso's regularly scheduled 7.5 hours a day, and was within the physical and driving restrictions imposed by Dr. Brown. While on light duty assignment at Atlantic High School, Dr. Laakso reported to Assistant Principal, Marshall Bellin. Dr. Laakso also submitted his time sheets to Mr. Bellin for Mr. Bellin's verification and signature. After Mr. Bellin signed the light duty time sheets, Dr. Laakso faxed them to Ms. Boyle for payroll purposes. Around this time period, in approximately April of 2000, the third party administrator, FARA, who handles the School Board's Workers' Compensation claims, hired private investigator Richard Mains to conduct surveillance of Dr. Laakso. Mains observed Dr. Laakso at various times from April 3, 2000 through October 2, 2000. Mains documented Respondent's driving to and from his Matlacha home and the activities in which he engaged while there. Mains did not know whether Dr. Laakso was taking pain or anti-inflammatory medication, or whether Dr. Laakso was under the influence of these types of medications at the times Mains observed him. On May 17, 2000, Ms. Boyle held another investigative meeting regarding Respondent's absences while on light duty. The minutes from that meeting indicate that Ms. Boyle expressed her concern to Dr. Laakso regarding his absences, discussed his light duty assignment at Atlantic High School, and directed him to call her beeper if he was going to be absent. He was also directed to provide a doctor's note if he was absent. Dr. Laakso remained in the light duty assignment at Atlantic High School for the remainder of the 1999-2000 school year. On Wednesday, August 9, 2000, the first day of the 2000-2001 school year, Dr. Laakso again reported to Atlantic High School to resume his light duty placement. On August 15, 2000, Marshall Bellin signed Respondent's light duty sign-in sheet, which covered Dr. Laakso's work attendance for August 9, 10, 11, and 14, 2000. Around August 14 or 15, 2000, Dr. Laakso received verbal notification that because his driving restriction had been lifted, he was being taken off light duty assignment and was to report to Area 3. Prior to this verbal notification, Dr. Laakso had not been advised by his physicians that his driving restriction had been lifted. However, he subsequently learned through someone at the Risk Management Department that, in fact, the driving restriction had been lifted. Upon hearing the news, Dr. Laakso contacted Dr. Brown. When he went to see Dr. Brown, Dr. Brown explained to Respondent that the Board had sent him a questionnaire asking whether he believed that Dr. Laakso could drive a car as opposed to whether he should drive a car. Dr. Brown further explained that he responded that Dr. Laakso could drive a car, but felt he had made a mistake as he felt it was still dangerous for Dr. Laakso to drive. Accordingly, on August 17, 2000, Dr. Brown reinstated Dr. Laakso's driving restriction of no more than 10 minutes. On August 17, 2000, Dr. Laakso sent a memo to Ms. Boyle indicating that his driving restriction had been reinstated. A copy of the note from Dr. Brown was attached to this memo. Because of her continuing concern regarding Respondent's absences, on October 2, 2000, Ms. Boyle held another "investigative meeting" regarding Dr. Laakso's absences. This meeting resulted in Boyle's issuing Dr. Laakso a written reprimand for unacceptable and unexcused absences, failure to call in intended absences as required, and insubordination. The written reprimand specifically addressed Dr. Laakso's absences on August 9, 10, 11, 22, and September 20, 27, 28, and 29. Ms. Boyle believed her issuance of the written reprimand dated October 2, 2000, was consistent with the progressive discipline policy. At the time that Ms. Boyle wrote the reprimand, she also notified the District's Professional Standards Department and requested a formal investigation of Respondent's absences. Ms. Boyle then contacted Ray Miller in Professional Standards to be sure that she was following appropriate procedure. In October of 2000, Ray Miller received Respondent's case for investigation, and the investigation was assigned case number 101. Specifically, Miller investigated allegations involving Respondent's misuse of leave, unauthorized absence, failure to call in and report absences as required, and insubordination for the time period of January 2000 through December 2000. At the time of his interview with Respondent, Miller had a surveillance video and a report of Respondent's activities for April of 2000. Respondent neither denied that he was the subject of the video nor that he failed to report and call in his absences. Shortly before December 4, 2000, Miller signed off on the investigative report for case number 101, and on December 4, 2000, Paul Lachance issued a letter to Dr. Laakso indicating that the investigation was complete, and that a determination of probable cause had been made. The investigative report was then reviewed by the Case Management Review Committee to determine whether there was just cause to recommend discipline and, if so, provide a discipline recommendation. The Committee found just cause and recommended Dr. Laakso's termination. A number of meetings were held in December 2000 with representatives of Petitioner, Dr. Laakso, and his then- attorney, Mr. Fried. As a result of these meetings, an informal settlement was reached; Dr. Laakso's employment was not terminated, but rather he was transferred to the Area 1 ESE office. By a letter to the file dated January 8, 2001, Paul Lachance, Director of Professional Standards, administratively closed case number 01-101 against Dr. Laakso with "no action." While assigned to Area 1, Dr. Laakso was under the supervision of Area 1 ESE Team Leader, Paul Sayrs. As supervisor, Mr. Sayrs was responsible for keeping track of Respondent's attendance. Accordingly, Sayrs directed Respondent to call and notify secretary Judy Fabris if he was going to be absent, who in turn would notify Mr. Sayrs. While assigned to Area 1, Dr. Laakso missed work for several days in January and February 2001, and was also out for most of March and April 2001. On April 4, 2001, Mr. Sayrs sent Dr. Laakso a letter listing the dates of his absences and directing him to submit a doctor's note for the dates listed, as well as for any future absences. The next day, April 5, 2001, Mr. Sayrs sent another letter to Dr. Laakso advising him he was currently absent without approved leave. Mr. Sayrs advised Respondent further that due to an absence of correspondence from Respondent, Mr. Sayrs would assume Respondent had decided to discontinue working for Petitioner and Respondent's name would be submitted to the School Board for acceptance of Respondent's resignation. Dr. Laakso immediately contacted Dr. Sachs regarding Mr. Sayrs' request for medical documentation, but was unable to get an appointment with Dr. Sachs until April 20th. However, prior to his April 20th appointment, Dr. Laakso forwarded to Dr. Sachs a copy of the District's letter, which indicated he would be terminated if he did not provide the requested documentation prior to his appointment on April 20th. In response, Dr. Sachs accounted for Dr. Laakso's absences, noting they were due to his symptoms and cervical condition. Additionally, Dr. Laakso followed through by faxing his Request for Leave of Absence without Pay form with his signature, dated April 18, 2001, directly to Dr. Sachs for his signature. The leave was ultimately granted retroactive to March 8, 2001, prior to Dr. Laakso's being terminated by the District. On April 18, 2001, Dr. Laakso sent a handwritten note to Dan McGrath explaining his absences. Dr. Laakso attached to his note to Mr. McGrath two documents from Dr. Sachs, one dated April 15, 2001, and the other dated April 6, 2000. On May 18, 2001, Paul Sayrs evaluated Dr. Laakso's performance. The evaluation sheet indicated that Dr. Laakso was "presently on a medical leave of absence." Dr. Laakso has a second home in Matlacha, located on the other side of Cape Coral. Matlacha is located in the Fort Myers area and is approximately 150 miles from the West Palm Beach area, roughly a three-hour trip using country roads. Because he had not been feeling well, Dr. Laakso had not been taking care of his property in Matlacha. As a result, he received notices from the county telling him he needed to clear up the property or face a potential daily fine of $225. Specifically, the county informed Dr. Laakso that he needed to mow the grass, move a boat, register a pickup truck, and park the truck somewhere where it was not in open view. He asked for an extension in which to do these things, which was granted. However, the county advised Dr. Laakso that if he did not get the work done by the date established, the daily fine would be imposed. Although while at his Matlacha home Dr. Laakso did work outside of the restrictions imposed on him by his physician, he could work for 20 or 30 minutes and then go inside and rest, unlike when he was at work for the School Board, which required he work a full eight-hour day. While he was on his Matlacha property, he continued his daily swimming as part of his physical therapy, which he had discussed with, and received approval for, from Dr. Brown. At no time did Dr. Laakso attempt to hide the fact that he drove to the Matlacha property or that he worked in his yard while there. In fact, he disclosed this information when deposed in his workers' compensation case, and he discussed it with his doctor. While the doctor did not give Dr. Laakso permission for this type of conduct, Dr. Laakso did discuss it with him.5 Following the closing of the first investigation numbered 101, the office of Professional Standards received a memo from Diane Howard, Director of Risk Management, dated January 9, 2001. Ms. Howard was requesting a reinvestigation of Dr. Laakso's absences. In response to this memo, Miller did not interview Respondent, but instead viewed surveillance videotapes from August 11 through October 1 or 2, 2000. In addition to the videos, Miller reviewed memos from Nancy Patrick, Mary Kate Boyle, and Paul Sayrs. Miller testified that the difference between this investigation and the previous one was that it involved a different period of time, both for the videos and regarding issues of Respondent's attendance in January, February, and March of 2001. The allegations against Respondent for this investigation were that he was obtaining leave due to sickness or illness and that he was performing actions that were inconsistent with his alleged illness or sickness. This second investigation followed the same pattern as the first and was sent to the Committee for review. The Committee again recommended Dr. Laakso's termination. Dr. Laakso timely requested an administrative hearing, and these proceedings followed. The collective bargaining agreement describes procedures for discipline of employees, including this: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. The collective bargaining agreement also requires progressive discipline (reprimand through dismissal) . . . [e]xcept in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the district or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered in this case dismissing all charges in the Administrative Compliant, reinstating Respondent to his position of employment with the School Board, and providing Respondent with such back pay and attendant benefits as are authorized by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2003.
The Issue Whether respondent's registered building contractor's license should be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined based on allegations he violated (1) Section 489.129(1)(c), Florida Statutes, in that he violated a provision of Chapter 455, Florida Statutes; (2) Section 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes, in that he acted in the capacity of a contractor under a name other than on his registration; and (3) Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes, in that he failed, in two material respects, to comply with the provisions of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, respondent was licensed by the Construction Industry Licensing Board as a registered building contractor, having been issued a license number RR 0007671. He was not, however, licensed as a roofing contractor. Neither did he, at any time, qualify Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., with the Construction Industry Licensing Board. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 1). In 1968, respondent was issued a limited general contractor's license by Palm Beach County, Florida, under which he was authorized to install roofs only on structures which he constructed; he was not authorized to re-roof existing roofs. He has continuously renewed this local license, from 1968 to the present. On November 26, 1979, he qualified Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., with the Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board, which qualifications he has maintained to the present time. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 5). At all times material hereto, he held no other certificates of competency issued by Palm Beach County, Florida. At all times material hereto, he was the only qualifier for Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc. ( See Petitioner's Exhibit 5). On or about May 5, 1980, he signed and submitted a notarized letter of authorization to the Palm Beach County Building Department. By this letter, he authorized Linda DeVito, his daughter, to obtain local building permits in the name of Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., and accepted liability for all acts performed under the permits. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 6). On or about May 29, 1980, Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., contracted with Mr. and Mrs. Garrett McLaughlin to remove and replace the existing roof over the carport and entry-way of the McLaughlin's home, and waterproof the entire roof. The house is located at 2041 Upland Road, West Palm Beach, Florida. The contract was signed by an employee of the respondent, and contained a five-year warranty on the work performed by Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc. The contract price was $2,532.00. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 8). On or about June 16, 1980, Linda DeVito, as the authorized agent for Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., applied for a county building permit to perform the roofing work on the McLaughlins' home. Based on her application, a county building permit, number 80-14711, was issued to Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc. (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 7). This permit was issued based on respondent's letter of authorization, dated March 5, 1980, which was on file with the Palm Beach County Building Department. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 6 and 7). In or about August 1980, Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., completed the re-roofing work on the McLaughlins' home, without subcontracting it. Between May 29, 1980, and July 29, 1980, Mrs. McLaughlin paid Gus Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc., $2,532.00--the full contract price. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 10). A few weeks after the roofing work was completed, Mrs. McLaughlin checked the roof and discovered that the coating had not completely covered it. There were openings where stones were showing. She became concerned and called Gust Schmidt Home Improvements, Inc. She was told not to worry because the work was covered by a five-year warranty. During 1981, weeds began to grow on the McLaughlins' roof. In May or June of 1982, Mrs. McLaughlin called respondent to complain about the roof's condition. He told her that he had gotten out of the business before the work on the McLaughlins' home was completed, and that a company on Lake Avenue in West Palm Beach, Florida, had done the work on her home. He told her that he would call her back with further information, but never did. When respondent did not call back with further information, Mrs. McLaughlin checked the phone book and decided that respondent must have been referring to a company called Florida Exteriors. She called that company and was told that they would honor her warranty. But the roof on Mrs. McLaughlin's home was never repaired, even though the roof leaked where boards had been replaced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's contractor's license be suspended for six months, and that he be administratively fined $1000. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie A. Daniel, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gus Schmidt 602 North "A" Street Lake Worth, Florida 33460 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is eligible for vested deferred retirement pension benefits payable by the West Palm Beach Police Pension Fund ("Fund").
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, on the stipulation of the parties, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Fund is a vested defined benefit pension plan created by Special Act of the Florida Legislature pursuant to Chapter 185, Florida Statutes. See Ch. 24981, Laws of Fla. (1947), as amended by Ch. 88-105, Laws of Fla. ("Fund documents").1 It is funded by contributions from its members; the City of West Palm Beach, Florida; and the State of Florida. Mr. DeLong was employed by the Police Department of the City of West Palm Beach ("Police Department") on November 26, 1979. Mr. DeLong was injured in the line of duty in or about 1987. He submitted an Application for Retirement dated May 26, 1988, under the category of "Duty Disability." Mr. DeLong retired from the Police Department effective November 17, 1988, after the Board approved his application for disability retirement benefits. At the time of his disability retirement, Mr. DeLong had service credit under the Fund of eight years, 11 months, and 21 days. Mr. DeLong received a monthly disability retirement benefit of $1,725.59. In a letter dated April 19, 1989, Mr. DeLong applied for a specialized assignment with the Police Department. He enclosed with the letter an Application for Specialized Assignment, indicating that his "requested assignment" was "helicopter flight officer," and he stated that he believed he could "perform flight operations."2 The opening for specialized assignment for helicopter patrol was advertised in the April 7, 1989, Police Department Bulletin, and the assignment was described in pertinent part as follows: "The position will be considered a Part-time Position that will utilize selected officers both during their On-Duty and Off-Duty hours. Overtime will be afforded those who work while Off-Duty." At its meeting on June 14, 1989, the Board was advised of Mr. DeLong's application for specialized assignment as a helicopter pilot. Questions arose as to whether Mr. DeLong continued to be disabled, as defined in the Fund documents, and entitled to continue receiving disability retirement benefits. In order to determine if Mr. DeLong was still disabled, the Board directed that Mr. DeLong be examined by a physician chosen by the Board "for the purpose of securing a medical opinion as to whether Mr. DeLong is physically able to perform the duties of the position being sought."3 In a letter dated June 20, 1989, Michael F. McClure, the Assistant Chief of the Police Department's Uniform Services Division, advised Mr. DeLong that he could not be considered for the helicopter patrol assignment because he was "not a full-time employee with the police department."4 Chief McClure further stated that "[i]f, at some later date, you are determined by a physician to be capable of returning to full duty, you [sic] application will be considered."5 As reflected in the minutes of the Board's meetings on August 22, 1989; November 8, 1989; and December 7, 1989; the Board was unable to conclude, on the basis of the information provided to it, that Mr. DeLong was physically capable of performing the duties of a police officer. The minutes of the December 7, 1989, meeting reflect that Mr. DeLong's attorney at the time, Scott Richardson, represented to the Board that "Dr. Stone [the physician chosen by the Board to examine Mr. DeLong] stated that while Mr. DeLong is not totally disabled that he would be limited in terms of being prevented from performing the normal duties of a Police Officer."6 The minutes also reflect that Mr. Richardson stated that "the Police Department states that due to these limitations that Mr. DeLong would not be rehired."7 The Board's attorney framed the question before the Board at the December 7, 1989, meeting as follows: "[T]he question is whether Dr. Stone's re-evaluation would warrant the Trustees determining that Mr. DeLong was no longer eligible to receive Disability Benefits." At the conclusion of its discussion of Mr. DeLong's situation, the Board voted unanimously "to accept Dr. Stone's report and to recognize that Mr. DeLong is still eligible to receive Disability Benefits." Mr. DeLong continued receiving disability retirement benefits until the Board decided to discontinue the benefits at its meeting on October 30, 1990. In or about early October 1990, the Board learned that that Mr. DeLong was employed as "a sworn Law Enforcement Officer" with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office.8 Mr. DeLong was advised in a letter from the Board's attorney dated October 12, 1990, that “disability retirement is payable only as long as you are totally incapacitated from performing the functions of a police officer." Mr. DeLong was asked to appear at the Board's October 30, 1990, meeting to "show cause why your disability pension should not be terminated."9 In a letter dated October 23, 1990, Mr. DeLong's attorney advised the Board's attorney as follows: "Please be advised that Mr. DeLong, effective immediately, resigns his position with the West Palm Beach Police Department and relinquishes any right that he presently has to the disability pension previously granted. This letter will obviate the need for us to appear at the [Board's] October 30, 1990, meeting."10 In a letter dated October 29, 1990, Mr. DeLong returned his disability retirement benefit check to the Fund and confirmed that he "resigned his job as a police officer and terminated my duty disability pension."11 Because Mr. DeLong began his employment with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office effective May 1, 1990, the Board requested that he refund the amount of $10,553.54, which represented the total amount of disability retirement benefits he received between May 1, 1990, and October 1990.12 Mr. DeLong repaid the Fund in full. Mr. DeLong was not entitled to a return of his contributions to the Fund because the amount of disability retirement benefits he received exceeded his contribution. He did, however, receive payment of $5,497.90, which was the balance in his share account as of October 1, 1989.13 Mr. DeLong submitted to the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan a form dated June 24, 2005, requesting that it verify his retirement system service credit. He noted on the form that he had been employed by the West Palm Beach Police Department from November 1979 to April 1990. Mr. DeLong sent a letter to the Fund administrator, which was received on September 29, 2008, inquiring about his eligibility for a pension, the years of service that were credited to him, and any refunds due to him. Although the record is incomplete, it appears that, between July 2009 and February 2010, the Fund's representatives were trying to determine if Mr. DeLong was entitled to vested deferred retirement benefits either upon early retirement or upon normal retirement at age 55 years. Mr. DeLong was notified that his request for vested deferred retirement benefits would be discussed at the March 12, 2010, meeting of the Fund's Board. The minutes of the Board's March 12, 2010, meeting reflect that Mr. DeLong was not present. The issue of Mr. DeLong's eligibility to receive vested deferred retirement benefits was presented to the Board, and the minutes indicate that the Board decided not to "apply any credited service to Mr. DeLong during his time of disability."14 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and of the parties thereto pursuant to the contract between the Fund and the Division of Administrative Hearings and Sections 120.565 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2010). Mr. DeLong is seeking to establish his eligibility for vested deferred retirement benefits from the Fund and, therefore, has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Haines v. Department of Children & Families, 983 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)(citing Department of Banking & Fin. v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996))(general rule is that party asserting affirmative of issue has burden of presenting evidence as to issue, as well as ultimate burden of persuasion); Florida Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. ("Findings of fact shall be based upon a preponderance of the evidence, except in penal or licensure disciplinary proceedings or except as otherwise provided by statute "). The preponderance of the evidence standard requires proof by "the greater weight of the evidence," Black's Law Dictionary 1201 (7th ed. 1999), or evidence that "more likely than not" tends to prove a certain proposition. See Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276, 289 n.1 (Fla. 2000)(relying on American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987)). At the times pertinent to this proceeding, the Fund documents defined the terms under which the Fund operated. Section (2) of the Fund documents included the following definitions, pertinent to this proceeding: "Member" or "participant" means any person who is included in the membership of the fund. * * * (k) "Police officer" means any person who is elected, appointed, or employed full-time by the city . . . . * * * "Retirant" means any member who retires with a pension from the fund. "Retirement" means a member's withdrawal from city employment with a pension payable from the fund. * * * (q) "Service," "credited service," or "service credit" means the total number of years, and fractional parts of years, of service of any police officer omitting intervening years and fractional parts of years, when such police officer was not employed by the city. . . . Section (8) of the Fund documents described the age and service requirements for retirement and provided for normal retirement, vested deferred retirement, and early retirement. Pertinent to this proceeding, "vested deferred retirement" applied to members of the Fund "with 10 or more years of credited service" who "leave the employment of the department for any reason except retirement or death." § (8)(b) of the Fund documents. If a police officer is eligible for vested deferred retirement, the police officer shall be entitled to a pension on early retirement or at the normal retirement age. Id. Mr. DeLong claims that he is entitled to a vested deferred retirement benefit because his years of active employment as a police officer with the Police Department, plus the one year, five months, and 13 days during which he received disability retirement benefits, total slightly more than 10 years. Duty disability retirement pensions are governed by the provisions of Section (11) of the Fund documents, which provided in pertinent part: (a) Retirement.--Any member who becomes physically or mentally, totally and permanently disabled to perform the duties of a police officer, by reason of a personal injury or disease arising out of and in the course of the performance of his or her duties as a police officer, in the employ of the city, shall be retired with a pension provided for in this subsection; provided, that after a medical examination of the member made by or under the direction of the medical committee, the medical committee reports to the board, in writing whether: The member is wholly prevented from rendering useful and efficient service as a police officer; and The member is likely to remain so disabled continuously and permanently. . . * * * (c) Duty disability pension benefits; disability occurs before age and service eligibility.--A member whose retirement on account of disability, as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection, occurs prior to the date he or she would become eligible to retire under paragraph (8) hereof [normal, vested deferred, or early retirement], shall receive a disability pension The disability pension . . . shall be subject to subsection (12) hereof. Subsection (12) of the Fund documents sets forth "[c]onditions applicable to all disability retirants," and provided in pertinent part: (c) Payment of disability pensions.-- Monthly disability retirement benefits shall be payable as of the date the board determines that the member was entitled to a disability pension; . . . The last payment shall be, if the police officer recovers from the disability prior to his or her normal retirement date, the payment due next preceding the date of recovery, . . . . * * * Reexaminations of disability retirants.--At least once each year during the first 5 years following a member's retirement on account of disability, and at least once in each 3-year period thereafter, the board shall require any disability retirant who has not attained age 50 to undergo a medical examination to be made by a physician designated by the board. . . . If, upon such medical examination of such retirant, the said physician reports to the board that the retirant is physically able and capable of performing the duties of a police officer in the rank held by him or her at the time of his or her retirement, the member shall be returned to employment in the department at a salary not less than the rank held by him or her and his or her disability pension shall terminate. Credited service for disability retirant.-- In the event a disability retirant is returned to employment in the department, as provided in paragraph (e), he or she shall again become a member of the fund and the credited service in force at the time of the member's retirement shall be restored to his or her credit. If he or she retired under a duty disability as provided in paragraph (11)(a) hereof, he or she shall be given service credit for the period he or she was in receipt of a disability pension. . . . Pursuant to Section (12)(e) and (f) of the Fund documents, Mr. DeLong would have been eligible to receive service credit for the period during which he received disability retirement benefits only if it was determined that he was physically capable of performing the duties of a police officer and if he returned to employment with the Police Department. Based on the minutes of the relevant Board meetings, there was no determination by the Board that Mr. DeLong was physically capable of returning to duty as a police officer prior to its learning, in October 1990, that Mr. DeLong had been employed by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department since May 1, 1990. In fact, Mr. DeLong's attorney conceded at the Board's December 7, 1989, meeting that Mr. DeLong continued to have limitations on his ability to perform the normal duties of a police officer. The Board voted at that time to continue Mr. DeLong's disability retirement benefits, an implicit finding by the Board that Mr. DeLong remained totally and permanently disabled as defined in Section (11)(a) of the Fund documents. Based on the findings of fact herein, even had the Board concluded that Mr. DeLong was no longer permanently and totally disabled, the Police Department did not refuse to return him to employment. The only application for employment submitted to the Police Department by Mr. DeLong was an Application for Specialized Assignment as a helicopter pilot, which he submitted in April 1989. Mr. DeLong could not be given this "specialized assignment" because he was no longer employed as a full-time police officer by the Police Department, which employment was a prerequisite for consideration for a specialized assignment. Consequently, the Police Department could not hire Mr. DeLong for this position. Mr. DeLong contends in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that his employment with the Police Department actually ended when the Police Department terminated his employment effective May 1, 1990, the day he began his employment with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department. To the contrary, in accordance with the definition of "retirement" in Section (2)(o) of the Fund documents, Mr. DeLong withdrew from his employment with the Police Department on November 17, 1988, the effective date of his retirement and his entitlement to disability benefits from the Fund. His purported "resignation” of his position with the Police Department on October 23, 1990, was ineffective and did not alter his termination date under the Fund documents. Based on the pertinent provisions of the Fund documents, as applied to the facts found herein, Mr. DeLong is not entitled to service credit for the period of time he received disability retirement benefits from the Fund. His service credit at the time of his retirement and withdrawal from employment with the Police Department was, pursuant to Section (2)(q) of the Fund documents, eight years, 11 months, and 21 days. Mr. DeLong has fewer than 10 years of service credit with the Police Department, and he has, therefore, failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is eligible for vested deferred retirement benefits from the Fund.15
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the West Palm Beach Police Pension Fund enter a final order finding that Michael L. DeLong did not accrue service credit during the time he received disability retirement benefits and is, therefore, not eligible for vested deferred retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 2010.
