Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed as a Class "C" private investigator and Class "MA" agency manager, having been issued licenses numbered C-0002856 and NA-8600240, respectively. On or about November 10, 1988, Respondent was engaged in an investigation and surveillance involving Joseph King to determine if King was disabled for purposes of a worker's compensation claim which was being disputed by the insurance carrier. As a result of Respondent's investigation, King was eventually denied certain benefits which he would otherwise have received. Respondent was performing this work through the Hillsborough County branch office of TRACE, Inc., a licensed private investigative agency which he managed. He was accompanied in this investigation and surveillance of King by two other licensed private investigators. During the course of this investigation,and surveillance, King became aware of Respondent and the other two investigators who were following him. He confronted one of the investigators named Tony Hobbs, and after it became apparent that King was preventing Hobbs from leaving, Respondent came to his aid and attempted to calm down the situation. King continued to refuse to allow the investigators to leave, and eventually Deputy Sheriffs arrived and secured Hobbs' release. At hearing, Mr. and Mrs. King both testified that Respondent and the other investigator, Hobbs, falsely identified themselves as federal agents who were allegedly involved in an undercover drug investigation. Respondent denies that he ever made such a representation to the Kings. Hobbs was not present to testify, but in a statement given to the Petitioner's investigator, John Matlack, in the regular course of his investigation of this incident Hobbs stated that he had been told by one of the Deputy Sheriffs that Respondent had made this statement. However, Hobbs was fired from TRACE, Inc., a couple of weeks after this incident, and therefore, has a motive for placing Respondent's license in jeopardy. Based upon the demeanor and testimony of Respondent and the Kings at hearing, as well as the motive which existed for the Kings to try to get back at Respondent for their loss of certain benefits resulting from his investigation, it is found that Respondent did not falsely identify himself as a federal agent at any time during the course of this investigation. Respondent was calm, orderly, logical, coherent and professional in his recollection of events, while Mr. King was aggressive and hostile towards Respondent. It was King who provoked the confrontation with Hobbs by restraining and preventing him from leaving. It was King who was angry with the investigators, including Respondent, and who allowed them to leave only after Deputy Sheriffs arrived. At hearing, it was King who was unclear in his recollection of specific details about the events of November 10, 1988, and he was clearly still angry with Respondent. The Petitioner also alleges that Respondent falsely identified himself as a federal agent to a neighbor of King, but that neighbor was not present to testify and his absence was not explained. Therefore, there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support this allegation concerning a statement allegedly made by Respondent to King's neighbor. It is against the policy of Respondent's company, TRACE, Inc., for any agent to represent himself to be a federal agent, and such misrepresentation is a basis for termination. Respondent is well aware of this policy, and credibly testified that he did not violate it in his investigation of King.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the charge that Respondent violated Section 493.319(1)(i) Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 1990 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings of Fact 2-5. Rejected in Finding of Fact 6. Rulings cannot be made on the narrative statement filed by the Respondent on March 1, 1990, since it does not contain separately numbered proposed findings of fact and does not evidence that Respondent has provided a copy to counsel for the Petitioner. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Michael R. Heiland P. O. Box 152143 Tampa, FL 33614 Ken Rouse, Esguire General Counsel The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Captol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact Richard K. Black submitted his application for a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency license and a Class "C" Private Investigator license to the Department of State on November 11, 1982, together with all the fees. By letter dated November 19, 1982, the Department advised Mr. Black of the approval of the issuance of the Class "A" license subject to certain qualifications, which were not challenged by Mr. Black and are not at issue. By letter dated November 18, 1982, the Department advised Mr. Black that it had denied his application for licensure as a Class "C" Private Investigator because Mr. Black failed to meet the experience requirements of Section 493.306(4), Florida Statutes. Mr. Black made a timely request for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The parties have stipulated that Mr. Black is qualified to hold a Class "C" Private Investigator license except for his lack of experience. Investigative activities of a private investigator include, but are not limited to, searching records, interviewing witnesses, making personal observations of physical evidence, conducting surveillances, and reporting the results and conclusions of these activities. While a student at Broward Community College during 1974 and 1975, Mr. Black served as a member of the "504 Committee," a volunteer organization whose purpose is to assist persons protected by Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Mr. Black's primary duties with said committee consisted of receiving complaints of alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act concerning lack of physical access to public facilities, taking physical measurements of said facilities, performing library research to determine the applicability of the Act to said facility, and attempting to obtain compliance of the owner of the facility when a violation was found. Of these duties, the interviewing process and taking physical measurements would be qualified experience. No evidence was presented by Mr. Black regarding the specific amount of time which he devoted to these functions. While a student at Broward Community College during 1976 and 1977, Mr. Black engaged in a volunteer voter registration project for the handicapped. Mr. Black's primary duties in this regard consisted of obtaining voter registration data from public records, identifying areas in which registration of the handicapped was low, conducting house-to-house registration drives in said areas, writing letters, and arranging car pools. None of these activities qualify as experience for licensure as a private investigator. Mr. Black served as a volunteer firefighter for the North Andrews Volunteer Fire Department from 1972 to 1976. During this time, he attended a bomb and arson investigation seminar and assisted in a few arson investigations. Mr. Black did not document the specific number of investigations which he conducted or the amount of time spent in said investigations. During 1979 and 1980, during the tenure in office of Sheriff Ken Katsaris, Mr. Black served as a volunteer "special deputy" in Leon County. Mr. Black's primary duties consisted of inspecting polling places in the county to determine if proper access existed for the physically handicapped and reporting non-complying conditions to the Sheriff. While not all of Mr. Black's activities were qualified experience, he spent approximately 120 total hours on all activities in this project in 1980. For approximately three months, from August until October 1981, Mr. Black served as a nonpaid intern with the Florida Parole and Probation Services. Approximately 50 percent of this time was devoted to the qualified activities of locating probationers and parolees and assisting in investigations. Mr. Black assisted in processing service-connected or related disability claims for disabled veterans on a volunteer basis in the Leon County area. He assisted on five or six cased during the last several years. No evidence was submitted to document the specific amount of time Mr. Black devoted to the investigation of these claims. Mr. Black assisted the Alburquerque, New Mexico, police in locating the whereabouts of a fugitive from justice. This assistance was as a volunteer, and Mr. Black testified that he spent 20 to 25 hours a week for three months on this project. While attending Florida State University, Mr. Black participated in various programs to assist handicapped students. These activities are similar to the activities in which Mr. Black engaged as described in Paragraph 6 above. No evidence was presented as to the amount of time spent in qualified investigative activities during this time period. Mr. Black completed a four-day course in crisis intervention in 1981. Mr. Black obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in psychology from Florida State University. Although some of his course work in general subjects would be the same as the general course work required for a degree in criminology and some of the psychology courses which Mr. Black took would be helpful to an investigator, none of the course work which Mr. Black took is directly related to training as a private investigator. In evaluating the experience requirement for a Class "C" Private Investigator experience which is substantially identical and equal in force, power, effect and import as the experience gained in actually performing the services of a private investigator as a Class "CC" intern investigator. In evaluating the amount of time spent in investigative activities, the Department applies a standard 40-hour work week to the hours submitted by the applicant. The Department does not count volunteer experience in evaluating whether an applicant has met the time requirement unless the number of hours worked and the supervision exercise can be fully documented. Mr. Black has never been licensed as a Class "CC" intern investigator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the application of Richard K. Black for licensure as a Class "C" Private Investigator be denied. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Richard K. Black 249 Oakview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Stephen Nall, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable George Firestone Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are as follows: (1) whether Shaw Investigations aided or abetted Shaw Investigation Agency, Incorporated, an Alabama private investigative corporation not licensed to conduct business in Florida, and that corporation's private investigator employees, in engaging in unlicensed activity in Florida in violation of Section 493.6118(10(n), Florida Statutes; (2) whether Shaw Investigations failed or refused to cooperate with an agency representative's official investigation by not furnishing documentation required under a subpoena duces tecum in violation of Sections 493.6118(1)(o) and 493.6121(4), Florida Statutes; (3) whether Shaw Investigations committed misconduct in the course of regulated activity by failing to provide a client with written reports and accounting of investigative expenditures in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes; (4) whether Shaw Investigations Agency, Incorporated, performed private investigations in Florida without a license in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and Rule 1C- 3.120(1)(c), Florida Administrative Code; (5) whether Shaw Investigation Agency, Incorporated, allowed unlicensed persons to perform private investigative services in Florida in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(n), Florida Statutes; (6) and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to these consolidated cases, Shaw Investigations, Mitchell D. Shaw, Owner, had a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency license, no. A89-00262, and Mitchell D. Shaw had a Class "C" Private Investigator license, no. C89-00625. Shaw Investigations currently has a valid Class "A" license, which was effective February 3, 1998, and expires on November 8, 1999. Mitchell D. Shaw has a valid Class "C" license, which was effective September 16, 1997, and expires on August 2, 1999. Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc., Mitchell D. Shaw, President, is an Alabama corporation. It is not licensed as a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency in Florida. Michelle Davis, Linda Moulton, and Ricky Tharpe are former employees of Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc. They worked for the Alabama investigative agency at all times relevant here. However, they were not licensed Florida private investigators or private investigator interns on those dates. Ms. Davis worked for Shaw Investigations Agency, Inc. as a private investigator intern and secretary. Ms. Moulton worked as a private investigator for the Alabama investigative agency. Mr. Tharpe was hired to work as a sales manager and private investigator in Alabama. His duties included conducting surveillance and checking tag numbers. F. Page Whatley was an employee of Shaw Investigations Agency, Inc., at all times relevant here. He did not have a Florida private investigator or private investigator intern license on those dates. Mr. Whatley obtained licensure as a Florida private investigator on February 6, 1997. The earliest that Mr. Whatley could have worked as a private investigator in Florida was upon submission of his complete application on November 5, 1996. Jeffery Lee Fears (Fears) was a resident of Georgia. In April of 1994, Fears was in Panama City Beach, Florida, on spring break when he died at a condominium complex, Ocean Towers. The Panama City Beach Police Department ruled his death a suicide.1 The Fears family hired Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc., to conduct a private investigation into the death of their son. They specifically hired the Alabama private investigative corporation because they did not agree with Florida law enforcement authorities that Fears' death was the result of suicide. The Fears investigation consisted of numerous witness interviews in Georgia, Florida, and other states, the gathering of evidence and witness information, and an examination of the physical site of death in Panama City Beach, Florida. When the Fears investigation was initiated and until March of 1996, Mr. Shaw was president of Shaw Investigations Agency, Inc. Sometime between March 15, 1996, and March 15, 1997, Mr. Whatley became president of the Alabama corporation. When the Fears investigation was initiated, the Florida investigative agency was the employer of investigators, other than Mr. Shaw, who held Florida Class "C" Private Investigators licenses. However, Mr. Shaw did not utilize the services of the other licensed Florida investigators in the Fears case. On May 3, 1994, Ms. Davis traveled alone from Dothan, Alabama, to Panama City, Florida, at the direction of Mr. Shaw. While she was there, Ms. Davis attempted to locate Charles Russell, the security guard who was on duty at Ocean Towers the night that Fears died. She also obtained a copy of a report from the Panama City Beach Police Department relative to an accident that occurred the same night as the Fears death. Upon her return to Dothan, Alabama, Ms. Davis prepared a written report of her investigation for Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc. On May 4, 1994, Mr. Tharpe traveled to Panama City, Florida, with Mr. Shaw and another employee of Shaw Investigations Agency, Inc. They first went to the Panama City Beach Police Department, where Mr. Tharpe attempted to get the gun that allegedly killed Fears. The men then went to the Ocean Towers complex where they talked to the manager, took pictures of the accident scene, measured the time required to walk up and down stairs and to go up and down in the elevator, observed blood stains, and looked for bullets on the outside of the building. On May 5, 1994, Mr. Shaw directed Ms. Moulton to travel alone to Panama City, Florida, from Dothan, Alabama, to locate the security guard, Charles Russell. After making inquiries at the apartment complex where Mr. Russell lived, Ms. Moulton learned that he was out of town. She then returned to Dothan where she prepared a report of her investigation for Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc. On May 19, 1994, Mr. Tharpe traveled with Mr. Shaw and the Fears attorney to Panama City, Florida. The men went first to the Panama City Beach Police Department in an unsuccessful attempt to get the gun that allegedly killed Fears. Next, Mr. Tharpe went with Mr. Shaw and the attorney to the Ocean Towers complex where they observed the site of Fears' death. Lastly, the men attempted unsuccessfully to locate Mr. Russell at his apartment. Upon his return to Dothan, Alabama, Mr. Tharpe prepared a written report describing the investigation conducted that day on behalf of Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc. On May 27, 1994, Ms. Moulton again traveled alone to Panama City, Florida, as directed by Mr. Shaw. She first inquired whether two local television stations had any news footage relative to the death of Fears. She learned that the stations did not have any such footage. Next, Ms. Moulton went to Mr. Russell's apartment complex. Her inquiries revealed that he was back in town but not at home. Ms. Moulton set up surveillance to wait for Mr. Russell's return. She subsequently took pictures of a man entering Mr. Russell's apartment and got the tag numbers of six vehicles in the parking lot behind the apartment. Ms. Moulton went to the local tag registration office. She got the names of all the owners of the vehicles except one, which was unregistered. Ms. Moulton returned to Mr. Russell's apartment and continued her surveillance. When Mr. Russell left his apartment, Ms. Moulton took a picture of him with his car, noting his physical description and the make, model, and color of his car. She then returned to Dothan, Alabama, where she made a written report of her investigation for Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc. On June 1, 1994, Mr. Shaw directed Ms. Moulton to travel from Dothan, Alabama, to Panama City, Florida, to set up surveillance on Mr. Russell's apartment. She waited outside Mr. Russell's apartment until Mr. Shaw arrived to conduct an interview. Ms. Moulton then traveled to the local library to research the newspaper coverage on Fears' death. She retained a copy of a newspaper story about the incident. Next, Ms. Moulton went to the Panama City Police Department to obtain information on shootings between March 28, 1994 and April 6, 1994. She learned that there were no such incidents. Ms. Moulton went to the Bay County Sheriff's Department to obtain information on shootings that occurred between March 28, 1994 through April 6, 1994. She learned that her request would require payment for the research and copies of the results. Ms. Moulton went to the Panama City Beach Police Department to obtain the same type of information. She retained a computer print-out on all calls that the department responded to between the relevant dates. Ms. Moulton then returned to Dothan, Alabama. She prepared a written report of her investigations conducted on June 1, 1994, for Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc. On June 22, 1994, Ms. Davis went to Panama City Beach with the Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc., investigators and the Fears family. While she was there, she participated in the investigation by timing the walk from a Burger King restaurant to the sixth floor of the Ocean Towers. On July 18, 1994, Mr. Tharpe traveled alone to Panama City, Florida, on behalf of Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc. He first went to the Panama City Beach Police Department in an attempt to pick up the gun that allegedly killed Fears. Next, Mr. Tharpe conducted an interview with Mr. Russell at his apartment. Mr. Tharpe prepared a written report of his investigation for Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc. On October 18, 1994, Ms. Moulton traveled with Mr. Shaw to Panama City, Florida. She did not independently conduct any investigative work. However, she was present when Mr. Shaw interviewed Dr. William Eckerd, the Bay County coroner. On at least one other occasion, Mr. Tharpe traveled alone to Panama City Beach, Florida, on behalf of Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc. He took a blood test kit to locate spots of blood at the scene of Fears' death at Ocean Towers. Mr. Shaw testified that Mr. Tharpe's primary involvement in the Fears investigation was as an expert hired to build a model of the crime scene. This testimony is not persuasive. On November 18, 1995 or November 19, 1995, Henry Locke of Panama City, Florida, decided to hire a private investigator to research the work history of a co-worker, Ron Barlow. Mr. Locke looked in the local phone book and called Shaw Investigations using a local number. Mr. Locke spoke with a man who identified himself as a private investigator. The man on the phone said that he would meet with Mr. Locke the next day on his way back to Dothan, Alabama, from working on a case in Panama City Beach, Florida. Until that time, Mr. Locke did not know that the investigator was from Dothan, Alabama. Page Whatley was the man who showed up at Mr. Locke's home the next day. Mr. Locke believed Mr. Whatley was the man he had spoken to on the phone. Mr. Locke told Mr. Whatley that he wanted a background check on the work history of Ron Barlow, a co-worker. Specifically, Mr. Locke explained that he wanted to know the places where Mr. Barlow had worked and the type of work he had done. The information that Mr. Locke provided to Mr. Whatley was personal and confidential; Mr. Locke did not want anyone, especially Mr. Barlow, to know about the private investigation. Mr. Whatley agreed to provide Mr. Locke with the requested information for a fee in the amount of $750. Mr. Locke and Mr. Whatley signed a contract dated November 20, 1995, indicating that the work to be performed included a background check. The contract heading was "Shaw Investigations Agency, Inc." The "Inc." on the contract was crossed out, indicating that the contract was with Shaw Investigations, the Florida Agency. In November of 1995, Mr. Shaw was president of the Alabama investigative agency. Mr. Whatley was not licensed in Florida at that time. Mr. Locke mailed a check in the amount of $750 the next day. He sent the check to a Dothan, Alabama, address. The check is dated November 20, 1995, and made payable to Shaw Investigation Agency. Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc., subsequently cashed the check. Shaw Investigations, the Florida agency, does not perform computer-generated background checks because it does not have the necessary technical equipment and staff. Mr. Shaw uses the equipment owned by the Alabama corporation and its employees, who are unlicensed in Florida, to do the research necessary for that type of work. Mr. Locke was not aware of these facts when he sent his check to Dothan, Alabama. He thought the Alabama office was a branch of the Florida agency. In December of 1995, an employee from Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc., called Mr. Locke on the telephone to tell him that a background check on Ron Barlow did not reveal a criminal record. The Alabama employee also discussed the results of Ron Barlow's workman's compensation claim history. At that time, Locke did not complain that the information provided was not satisfactory because it did not include Ron Barlow's work history. Isabel Shaw, an employee of Shaw Investigations Agency, Inc., testified at hearing that she mailed Mr. Locke a copy of the report in January of 1996 in accordance with company procedure. This testimony is not credible. About one year later, Mr. Locke contacted other local investigators. One of those investigators recommended that Mr. Locke contact Petitioner to file a complaint against Shaw Investigations. Petitioner received Mr. Locke's complaint on February 28, 1997. Around the time that Mr. Locke filed his complaint with Petitioner, he called the Dothan, Alabama, office to complain that he had not gotten a report. An employee in the Alabama office told him that he had been given a verbal report in December of 1995. He and the employee got into an argument and the employee hung up the phone. Mr. Whatley wrote Mr. Locke a letter dated April 7, 1997, apologizing for any misunderstanding and enclosing a copy of a two page report containing Ron Barlow's workman's compensation claim history. Mr. Locke has never received the information he originally requested concerning Ron Barlow's work history. In March of 1995, Petitioner received a complaint from officials in the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) concerning Mr. Shaw's investigation of the Fears case. Petitioner directed its investigator, Robert Cousson, to hold his investigation in abeyance until FDLE completed its investigation of the Fears case. On June 28, 1996, Mr. Cousson contacted Mr. Shaw by telephone and requested a copy of expenses involved with the Fears case, the entire case file, a list of investigators who had worked on the case, and a list of the code numbers of those investigators. Mr. Shaw responded that the case was confidential. He stated that he would need to obtain the permission of his clients. On July 2, 1996, Mr. Cousson again telephoned Mr. Shaw. In that conversation, Mr. Shaw stated that the Fears family would not consent to release the case file. According to Mr. Shaw, the Fears family threatened to sue if the file was released. Mr. Cousson responded that he would cure that problem by issuing a subpoena for the file. On July 3, 1996, Petitioner faxed the subpoena to Shaw Investigations, Mitchell D. Shaw, Owner. On July 10, 1996, Mr. Cousson personally served the subpoena on Mr. Shaw in his office. During that visit, Mr. Shaw produced a letter dated July 8, 1996, from Mr. Shaw's attorney. The letter states that the Fears hired Shaw Investigations Agency, Inc., to conduct the Fears investigation. According to the letter, Shaw Investigations Agency, Inc., was not subject to Petitioner's regulations or subpoena power. The attorney's letter reveals that the Florida agency was hired by the Alabama agency to do some work on the Fears case. However, according to the letter, the work of the Florida agency was completed more than two years prior to the issuance of the subpoena. The letter states the records of the Florida agency were not subject to preservation or disclosure under Section 493.6121(2), Florida Statutes. Nevertheless, the attorney's letter enclosed two investigative reports, stating that Shaw Investigations was not in possession of any other records that were responsive to the subpoena. The first report, dated July 18, 1994, was prepared by Mr. Tharpe. The second report, dated October 18, 1994, was dictated by Mr. Shaw and typed by Ms. Moulton. At a later date, Mr. Cousson received a copy of a contract between Shaw Investigations and Shaw Investigations Agency, Inc. The contract is dated April 14, 1994. According to the contract, the Florida agency was paid to take pictures, interview a witness, and provide a scale diagram of the accident scene for a possible model. Mr. Shaw produced no other documents as responsive to the subpoena. However, he verbally provided Mr. Cousson with the code numbers of the Alabama investigators used on the Fears case. The investigation of the Fears case by Shaw Investigation Agency, Inc., was ongoing at the time of the hearing. The entire case file of the Fears investigation is still in existence, including documents generated as a result of the contract between the Florida investigative agency and the Alabama investigative agency. In addition to not providing the subpoenaed investigative files, Mr. Shaw did not provide any records pertaining to the fees and costs paid by the Fears, a list of all personnel employed during the period of April 18, 1994 through June 30, 1995, including the coded list of all employees and payroll records for the period of April 18, 1994 through June 30, 1995. Mr. Shaw did not provide any documents relating to the Florida investigative agency's activities in the Fears investigation other than as set forth above.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending the Florida licenses of Shaw Investigations and Mitchell D. Shaw for three months, and imposing the maximum fine for Counts I-IV and VII-IX in Case No. 97-0369 and for Counts I-II, IV, and VI-VII in Case No. 98-1761. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 1998.
Findings Of Fact The primary issue presented at the hearing in this case is whether the Petitioner has the requisite experience as an investigator. From 1973 through January, 1977, the Petitioner was employed on a full-time basis with the Dade County Department of Human Resources. Although a small portion of his work with Dade County was investigative in nature, his role was primarily as a counselor or social worker. During the same time the Petitioner worked on a part-time basis with the Minorities Contractors Association. In this capacity he did credit checks and background checks on individuals who were seeking loans from the corporation. During this same period the Petitioner worked on a part-time basis with attorneys. He worked as an investigator, observing accident scenes, taking photographs, getting statements from potential witnesses, and other general investigative work. The Petitioner has worked in these part-time capacities for more than three years. The investigative work would amount to approximately 18 months of full-time experience as an investigator. The Petitioner has been arrested approximately 7 or 8 times. The most serious arrest was in 1963 for Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor. This conviction was not reflected on the Petitioner's application. It does not appear that the Petitioner's civil rights have been taken from him, and it does appear that he has not been arrested for a period of in excess of five years. It appears that, except for his lack of experience, the Petitioner is qualified for licensure as a private investigative agency.
The Issue Whether Michael Clay Bishop, d/b/a J and M Enterprises (“Respondent”), failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees; and, if so, whether the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (“Petitioner” or “Department”), correctly calculated the penalty to be assessed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with enforcing the requirement of chapter 440, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent purports to be a “Private Common Law Non- Associated Unincorporated Business Trust Organization,” or “UBTO,” engaged in business in Florida.2/ Michael Clay Bishop is one of Respondent’s trustees. The nature of Respondent’s business was a disputed issue at the final hearing. Mr. Bishop testified that he performed handyman services, such as cleaning, yardwork, removal of old furniture, and repair of flood-damaged properties. The record contains Respondent’s business card, which Mr. Bishop provided to the Department’s Compliance Investigator, Carl Woodall, on January 31, 2017. The business card reads, “J & M Enterprises,” and advertises as follows: Quality repairs, restoration and remodels; paint interior/exterior, flooring, fencing, decks, crown molding, concrete. BIG OR SMALL WE DO IT ALL! The business card indicates the business is “Insured” and has “references available.” Mr. Bishop did not dispute that the business card belonged to Respondent, or that it accurately represented the services provided by Respondent. Respondent accepts monetary payments for work performed by check made out to J and M Enterprises.3/ Respondent maintains a business checking account in the name of J and M Enterprises to which Respondent deposits payments for services performed by Respondent. On January 31, 2017, Mr. Woodall encountered Mr. Bishop at a residence undergoing remodeling at 8623 Lagoon Drive in Panama City Beach. Mr. Woodall observed Mr. Bishop engaged in the act of filling cracks in a bar area of the residence with putty, presumably to prepare the surface for painting. Mr. Bishop testified that he was “cleaning some caulking that wasn’t done very well.” Mr. Bishop objected to characterization of his work as painting, or preparing the surface for painting. However, Mr. Bishop admitted that he was hired by Chris Roberts of Rainbow International as a subcontractor on the remodel. Mr. Woodall testified that he spoke with Chris Roberts on the date in question, who informed him that Mr. Bishop was hired to perform painting services on the remodel, and that he was compensating J and M Enterprises at the rate of $20 per hour for the painting services. Mr. Woodall’s notes, made on his Field Interview Worksheet, corroborate his testimony on these facts. Mr. Bishop’s testimony was neither credible nor reliable. It is inconceivable that Rainbow International hired Respondent to clean caulking at $20 per hour. The evidence supports a finding that Respondent is engaged in the business of residential painting, including preparation of surfaces for painting. It is uncontested that Respondent was not covered by workers’ compensation insurance at all times material hereto. Mr. Bishop testified that he was under a mistaken assumption that he was exempt from workers’ compensation insurance since he had no employees. However, at final hearing, he explained that he had been made aware that the requirement applies to any business in the construction industry with one or more employees. Mr. Woodall personally served Mr. Bishop with a Stop-Work Order and Request for Production of Business Records on January 31, 2017. At all times material hereto, Mr. Bishop maintained that Respondent’s business records were confidential, pursuant to the business trust agreement, and that to disclose those business records would violate his obligation to Respondent’s trustees. A document purported to be Respondent’s trust indenture was admitted in evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit R4. Article 29, Section 29.1, of the Indenture is titled, “Disclosure of Documents,” and provides as follows: NO document, record, bank account, or any other written information dealing with the internal affairs or the operations of this UBTO shall be disclosed to any third party, except upon formal written board approval of the Board of Trustees given at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Trustees as set forth above. Respondent did not comply with the Department’s request for business records, such as check stubs, bank statements, or tax returns, from which the Department could establish Respondent’s payroll for the audit period.4/ Department Penalty Auditor, Eunika Jackson, was assigned to calculate the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. Pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes, the Department’s audit period is the two-year period preceding the date of the Stop-Work Order. The audit period in this case is from February 1, 2015 through January 31, 2017. Respondent provided no evidence that Respondent was not engaged in business at any time during the audit period. Respondent’s trust indenture is dated January 19, 2012. Because Respondent provided no business records from which the Department could establish Respondent’s payroll for the audit period, Ms. Jackson imputed Respondent’s payroll, pursuant to section 440.112(2). Based upon Mr. Woodall’s observations of the work being performed at the jobsite, Ms. Jackson determined that the type of construction work performed was painting. Ms. Jackson consulted the Scopes Manual published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) and utilized classification code 5474, the general painting classification, for purposes of calculating the penalty. Ms. Jackson then applied the corresponding approved manual rates for classification code 5474 for the related periods of non-compliance. Ms. Jackson applied the correct approved manual rates and correctly utilized the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69L-6.027 and 69L-6.028 to determine the penalty to be imposed. Because Respondent did not provide records sufficient to determine its payroll during the audit period, Ms. Jackson correctly assigned the statewide average weekly wage (AWW) to Mr. Bishop, the only employee identified on the jobsite on the date in question. § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat. Ms. Jackson likewise correctly utilized the AWW multiplied by two when applying the statutory formula for calculating the penalty to be assessed. See § 440.107(7)(d)1., Fla. Stat. On April 18, 2017, by certified mail, the Department served Respondent with an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessing a penalty of $30,600.44, which was fully imputed. Respondent made a payment of $1,000 to the Department which has been applied to the imputed penalty. The Department’s Penalty Calculation worksheet notes a balance due of $29,600.44.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, finding that Michael Clay Bishop, d/b/a J and M Enterprises, violated the workers’ compensation insurance law and assessing a penalty of $30,600.44. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2017.
Findings Of Fact DOT has been engaged for some years in a program to improve U.S. Highway 1, which runs through the Florida Keys. The program has involved highway paving, and reconstruction of most of the bridges. The roadway and bridge construction projects require large amounts of fill material. DOT has experienced an increase in the cost of obtaining fill material in the Florida Keys. To lessen the cost of the fill material DOT is seeking to open a borrow pit on Dudjoe Key. The pit, and an adjoining roadway would cover approximately fourteen acres. DOT initially filed a permit application with DER, seeking approval to construct the pit. DER ultimately issued a notice of intent to deny the application on the grounds that reasonable assurances had not been given that the short-term and long-term effects of the proposed project would not violate water quality standards set out in DER's rules and regulations. DOT thereafter filed a request for variance from the water quality standards so that the pit could be permitted. This proceeding ensued. Petitioner is a Florida corporation which does business in Monroe County, Florida. Petitioner has engaged in numerous public road and bridge construction projects in the Florida Keys and in the selling of fill material for road and bridge construction projects. Petitioner currently owns and operates a "borrow pit" on Cudjoe Key. Petitioner's pit is located within one- half mile of DOT's proposed pit. The purpose of the DOT pit would be to provide fill material which the Petitioner currently provides from its Cudjoe Key pit. DOT originally asserted that operation of a state borrow pit would result in savings of nine million dollars. This assertion has been scaled down to three million dollars, and more recently to 1.5 million dollars. Basically, DOT asserts that fill from a state-owned pit would be cheaper because the operation costs would be approximately the same, but no royalty would need to be paid for the material. DOT sought to establish the amount of potential savings at the hearing through two kinds of analysis: First, DOT offered the testimony of its former cost estimator as to the costs per cubic yard of fill from a state-owned pit as opposed to fill from a private contractor pit; and second, DOT offered bid submissions that have been made by contractors in recently bid projects in the Keys, and which had alternative bids for state-owned and private contractor supplied fill material. DOT's estimator calculated that the State would save approximately 1.5 million dollars through operation of a state-owned borrow pit. The testimony, however, is not of probative value, and cannot serve as the basis for a finding to that effect. In the first place, many of the estimator's figures were determined through private conversations that he had with various unnamed contractors. This hearsay evidence is not cumulative nor corroborative of other evidence, and cannot therefore serve as the basis for a finding of fact (See discussion at Paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law, infra.). Furthermore, the estimator underestimated the heavy equipment that would be required to operate the borrow pit; underestimated the cost of the equipment; did not include insurance, social security, and overtime in labor costs; overestimated by twice the number of swings that a dragline would be able to make; and underestimated the cost of moving equipment to the site. Methodology used by the State's estimator would appear to be the best that is available to the State in making initial estimates as to the cost of proposed road-building projects. The State does not have the detailed cost information available to it that private contractors have. While useful for the purpose of making preliminary estimates of the cost of proposed projects, the methodology is not adequate to support a finding of fact based as it is upon hearsay, and containing numerous miscalculations. The second line of analysis offered by DOT to establish the amount of possible savings was a comparison of recent bids submitted by contractors. Special provisions drafted by DOT for the Park and Bow bridge projects using two alternatives for embankment or fill material. Alternate "A" in the bid called for state-furnished material. The low bidder on the project was Atlantic Foundation Company, Inc. Under Alternate "A", Atlantic bid a price of $9.35 per cubic yard for embankment material, and $12.00 under Alternate "B". This would have resulted in a total of $222,574.00 lest using the Alternate "A" bid on the Park and Bow projects. The second low bidder, MCC of Florida, Inc., bid $11.13 for material under Alternate "A", and $14.02 under Alternate "B". Alternate "A" would have been $247,752.00 cheaper under the MCC bid. Petitioner was the next low bidder, and it bid $10.05 per cubic yard under Alternate "A", and $10.25 under Alternate "B". Hardaway Constructors, Inc., was the only other bidder, and it offered $10.00 under Alternate "A", and $10.25 under Alternate "B". The potential savings in favor of Alternate "A" under all of these bids is reduced somewhat by clearing and grubbing costs which were bid separately by the contractors. Clearing and grubbing costs would actually have made Alternate "B" cheaper under the bids submitted by Petitioner and Hardaway. Clearing and grubbing costs would not, however, continue as a cost item in subsequent projects, because once clearing and grubbing is accomplished, it would not need to be done again. DOT seeks to apply bid differentials submitted for the Park and Bow Channel jobs to determine the potential saving the State could realize by using a state-owned landfill for the remaining road and bridge projects in the Keys. Approximately 402,039 cubic yards of embankment material will be needed to complete the remaining projects. Using the high differential between Alternates "A" and "B" submitted for the Park and Bow Channels (that submitted by MCC), which was $2.89 per cubic yard, the potential saving would be $1,161,892.00. Using the low differential (twenty cents per cubic yard as submitted by Petitioner), savings would be $80,407.00. Subsequent to the hearing, DOT awarded the Park and Bow Channel construction to the low bidder, Atlantic Foundation, Inc. The Alternate "B" proposal was accepted. DOT did not accept that proposal because of a preference to do that, but rather so that the otherwise advantageous bid could be accepted despite the pendance of this proceeding. During the hearing, bids were opened for two new road and bridge projects in the Keys: the Kemp and Torch-Ramrod Channel Projects. The apparent low bidder on these projects was the Petitioner. Petitioner bided a price of $11.00 for embankment material if provided by a private contractor, and $10.80 if provided from a state-owned pit for the Kemp project, and $10.40 and $10.20 respectively for the Torch-Ramrod Project. The differences between the two reflect differences in hauling distance. The price differentials for contractor versus state provided embankment material in projects that have already been let cannot be used to determine with any precision the amount of saving that would inure to the State through opening its own borrow pits. Potential savings depend upon many factors. The primary of these factors is which contractor happens to make the lowest bid for the project, and this in turn depends upon the contractor's cost figures for many items other than embankment material will receive the bid only if the total bid is lower than that submitted by other contractors. It is clear that opening a state-owned borrow pit would result in some savings. It appears that $10.00 per cubic yard is the lowest possible price that could be expected for contractor- provided fill material. It appears that state-furnished material could reach a price as low as $7.00 per cubic yard, although none of the bids submitted up to the time of the hearing reflected such a price. It appears that the highest potential saving would be less than the approximately one million dollars that would have been saved if the price differential reflected in the Atlantic Foundation bid on the Park and Bow Channel projects became the differential in all subsequent projects. It also appears that the saving would be somewhat more than the eighty thousand dollar saving that would inure if the price differential reflected in the Petitioner's bid on the Park and Bow projects remained consistent. Beyond these parameters, the evidence would not support a finding as to the amount of savings. The fourteen-acre site of the proposed borrow pit is presently comprised entirely of tidally inundated wetland areas. Approximately two-thirds of the area has average water depths up to six inches. The southeastern portion of the site is dominated by buttonwood, and red, black and white mangrove. All of these species are wetland indicator species under DER's rules and regulations. A large number of mollusks inhabit the area, and it is a feeding area for birds, and for deer. The area of the proposed borrow pit is within the Key Deer Refuge, which is managed by the Refuse Division of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. There is now a stable herd from 350 to 400 Key deer, an endangered species, and they feed primarily on mangrove. There are 15 to 20 deer in the Cudjoe Key area. The deer do presently feed in the area of the proposed borrow pit. The proposed pit, including the access roads, would comprise approximately fourteen acres. It would be located landward of a berm so that there would not be a constant exchange of waters between the pit and surrounding areas. There would be an initial two-foot drop form the edge of the pit, and then a slope of five-to-one extending into the pit. A ten-to-one slope would be preferable because ultimately vegetation would be ore easily established in such a slope area. The term "Borrow pit" is actually a euphemism for a mining operation. Material would be extracted from the pit to be used as embankment material on the Keys road and bridge projects. The pit would ultimately reach a depth of more than thirty feet. Construction of the borrow pit would result in obliteration of approximately fourteen acres of a natural wetland environment in the Keys. All the flora and fauna presently on the site would be destroyed. During the time that the pit is being constructed and actively operated, violations of DER's standards for turbidity, lead, oils and greases, and transparency would be likely. Once the mining operation terminates, these short-term impacts would lessen; however, violations of the Department's dissolved oxygen standards would be likely as long as the pit exists. A viable biologic community could be established along the fringes of the pit, but in the deeper areas, low dissolved oxygen levels would be a limiting factor. Other mining operations in the Keys and elsewhere in Florida confirm the likelihood of dissolved oxygen violations. Loss of the fourteen acres of feeding ground for the Florida Key deer would be a significant loss in terms of preservation of that species. The proposed borrow pit is located adjacent to U.S. Highway 1. On the other side of the highway, there is a housing development. Operation of the borrow pit, especially blasting activities would inevitably prove a nuisance to residents of that area. One witness testified that blasting would likely cause damage to the residences, but this was not confirmed by competent, scientific evidence.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of violating the law regulating private investigators and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Class "C" Private Investigator License bearing license number is C91-00006. Petitioner's files indicate that this license was issued January 10, 1991. Respondent testified that he has been licensed since December 1990. Despite records indicating that the Class "C" license was issued January 10, 1991, Petitioner, by letter dated May 24, 1991, informed Respondent that his Class "C" license "has been issued and is forthcoming." The May 24 letter adds: File review indicates that you are not currently employed. Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, requires you to either own or be employed by a licensed Class "A" Private Investigative Agency. To work as a private investigator without meeting one of the foregoing conditions is a violation of law and subjects you to administrative action up to and including revocation of your Class "C" license. During 1991, Respondent was employed by A & W Investigations, which holds a Class "A" agency license. However, by July 7, 1991, he had completed his duties for A & W Investigations and was not employed by a Class "A" agency after that date. During the period between the termination of his employment with A & W Investigations and the meeting described below with Petitioner's investigator in October 1991, Respondent performed investigations related to workers' compensation for a company known as FEISCO. Serving as an independent contractor, Respondent also hired and paid James Coady for investigative work that he performed on Respondent's behalf for FEISCO. In August 1991, a new attorney in the area, Darren Young, received a letter from Respondent announcing his availability to serve as a consultant in criminal cases involving allegations of driving under the influence (DUI). Respondent had been employed for a couple of years by the Collier County Sheriff's Office and drew upon his experience in local law enforcement in providing DUI consultation services. Respondent and Mr. Young later met and began a business/social relationship. In October or November, Mr. Young hired Respondent as a DUI consultant in a pending case. Respondent served as an independent contractor, not an employee of Mr. Young. Although Mr. Young did not need Respondent to testify, he paid Respondent for his services. By letter dated September 23, 1991, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had learned that he was no longer employed by A & W Investigations as a Class "C" Private Investigator licensee. The letter contains the same warning as that quoted in the last two sentences of the above-cited May 24 letter. In early October 1991, an investigator of Petitioner met Respondent to discuss informal complaints made by two or three Naples private investigators that Respondent was conducting private investigations without a license. Respondent told the investigator that he was working for a tile company association doing investigations of its members and serving as an expert witness for attorneys in DUI cases. Petitioner's investigator explained that if Respondent intended to do any private investigations, he needed a Class "A" agency license with which to place his Class "C" private investigator's license. At the urging of Petitioner's investigator, Respondent agreed to begin the process of obtaining a Class "A" license, and, on October 3, 1991, Petitioner received Respondent's application for a Class "A" license. On December 26, 1991, Respondent obtained the general liability coverage required for the Class "A" license. By letter dated December 27, 1991, and received by Petitioner on January 6, 1992, Respondent submitted to Petitioner a money order in the amount of $300 in payment of the application fee, proof of liability insurance, and a copy of the fictitious name registration form. The letter states in part: I have contacted your office several times and have been informed that my fingerprints have not returned from FDLE. This is the only thing that I am waiting for before my license can be issued. The 90 days will be up in January and I was wondering if there is some provision that would allow me to start operations before they return. I would appreciate your advice on this matter. Prior to receiving the December 27 letter from Respondent, on January 3, 1992, Petitioner mailed Respondent a letter "to notify you that your application for a Class "A" license had been approved." The letter states that Respondent needed to provide several items "so your license can be issued " The required items were a license fee of $300, certificate of insurance, and proof of filing a fictitious name. On January 8, 1992, Respondent mailed two letters. One was to Petitioner's investigator, stating that Respondent had "received the notice of approval for the issuance of my Agency license" and advising that he had "forwarded all of the required documentation to Tallahassee." The other letter of January 8, 1992, was to Petitioner and accompanies the certificate of liability insurance. The letter states that, on December 30, 1991, Respondent had sent Petitioner the application fee, copy of the fictitious name registration, and copy of the insurance binder. Petitioner received the certificate of liability insurance on January Noting that the certificate was not properly notarized, Petitioner mailed Respondent a letter, on January 15, 1992, advising that the certificate of liability insurance was missing. By letter dated January 16, 1992, Respondent forwarded the certificate of liability insurance with proper notarization. Receiving the letter on January 22, 1992, Petitioner mailed a letter on January 24, 1992, advising Respondent that he had been issued on that date a Class "A" license, which was good from January 24, 1992, through January 24, 1994. Respondent engaged in at least two investigations during December 1991, at which time he clearly knew that he did not have a Class "A" license and needed one for the work in which he was engaged. In one case, he performed two days' surveillance on Kelly Trotta for Ray Trotta on December 6 and 7, 1991. By letter dated December 9, 1991, to Mr. Trotta, Respondent described the investigatory services that he provided and suggested future spot checks in order to avoid "running up the costs of the investigation." In another case, Mr. Young was retained on the day after Thanksgiving 1991 by Lawrence Harrison to provide legal services in connection with pending federal and state litigation. Mr. Young introduced Respondent to Mr. Harrison, who agreed to retain Respondent or allow Mr. Young to retain Respondent, in either case as an independent contractor. According to Respondent's invoice, Mr. Young hired him on December 16, 1991. The following day, Respondent checked corporate records as part of his investigative work and conveyed the information to Mr. Young. In the following days, Respondent researched Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, concerning the state litigation, which involved a legal action brought by Frank Coto against Mr. Harrison for unpaid private investigative services. Respondent drafted a complaint against Mr. Coto to be sent to Petitioner. Still in December, Respondent obtained character information on Mr. Coto and directly communicated it to the client. The complaint against Mr. Coto included allegations that he attempted to extort from Mr. Harrison the balance allegedly owed by Mr. Harrison to Mr. Coto for investigative services rendered. Mr. Harrison sent the complaint, under his signature, to Petitioner, which eventually elected not to prosecute. On January 9 and 10, 1992, according to Respondent's invoice of January 13, 1993, Respondent met with Mr. Harrison. By separate invoice, Respondent requested $1200 for the costs of a trip to Oklahoma in connection with investigative services related to the federal litigation. This sum was paid prior to January 24, 1992, which was when Respondent was to depart. On or about January 18, 1992, Mr. Young terminated his employment with Mr. Harrison. On January 23, 1992, Respondent contacted the FBI and informed them that Mr. Young had proposed a criminal conspiracy with Respondent to kill one or more persons involved with the Harrison matter. Subsequent investigations revealed no basis for criminal prosecution, nor professional discipline, against Mr. Young. The record is insufficient to determine if Respondent's charges were made in good faith. Instead of going himself, Respondent sent Mr. Coady and Mr. Trotta to perform investigative services for Respondent on behalf of Mr. Harrison. They departed either January 24 or 25, 1991, and performed the investigative services. There is no competent evidence as to whether Mr. Coady had a Class "C" license and, if so, when he obtained it. The evidence is unclear as to when Mr. Trotta obtained his Class "C: license, but he obtained or renewed a Class "C" license, possibly as early as January 23, 1994. Respondent allowed Mr. Coady and Mr. Trotta to place their Class "C" licenses, or the Class "C" licenses for which they were applying. The record establishes the date of sponsorship only as to Mr. Trotta. Respondent signed the form on January 5 and it was notarized on January 7, 1992. Respondent used his Class "A" license number, which he obtained by telephone from one of Petitioner's representatives prior to the official issuance of Respondent's Class "A" license. On March 4, 1992, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner advising that his firm was no longer sponsoring Mr. Trotta, Mr. Coady, or a third person, Heidi Trotta. Except for this letter, there is no evidence that Respondent ever employed Ms. Trotta, and Petitioner has failed to prove that anyone by that name was ever so employed by Respondent. The letter states that, as of January 30, 1992, Respondent's firm would no longer be responsible for their actions. The record does not indicate when Mr. Trotta and Mr. Coady were terminated. On August 11, 1992, Petitioner's investigator visited Respondent's office and demanded his files for the Harrison and Trotta investigation, as well as a third investigation known as Sparkman/Hayes. Respondent offered to drive home and get the Trotta and Sparkman/Hayes files, but declined to provide the Harrison file until he received approval from Mr. Harrison's attorney, through whom he claimed to work. Petitioner's investigator told Respondent not to go home and get the two files, but to provide them to the investigator later. Respondent agreed to mail them, but did not. Petitioner's investigator never gave Respondent a deadline, nor did he ever again demand that Respondent give him the files. The failure to produce the Harrison file is not the subject of any allegations in the present case. During the course of the August 11 interview, Petitioner's investigator asked Respondent about Mr. Coto and the complaint that had been filed with Petitioner against him. Respondent initially lied, denying knowing anything about Mr. Coto or the complaint. But Petitioner's investigator showed Respondent a letter that Respondent had sent to Mr. Young, which effectively contradicted these denials. Respondent then admitted to Petitioner's investigator that he had drafted the complaint against Mr. Coto and that it had been intended to "muddy the waters." The intent of Respondent was to undermine Mr. Coto's civil action against Mr. Harrison.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of State enter a final order ordering Respondent to pay an administrative fine of $3550. ENTERED on June 24, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 24, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Attorney Ken Muszynski 850 Fifth Ave. South Naples, FL 33940
The Issue The issue is whether the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2004-026 on August 24, 2004, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background The County's original Plan was adopted on August 31, 1989, and became effective on September 11, 1989. In 2000, the County amended its Plan by establishing a Managed Growth Tier System, which includes five classifications of land (Urban/ Suburban, Exurban, Rural, Agricultural Reserve, and Glades), along with three classes of service areas within the County to guide delivery of public services: Urban Area, Limited Urban Service Area, and Rural Service Area (RSA). It also assigned different levels of service for potable water and wastewater for each service area. At the same time, the County amended its FLUE to add a new Policy 3.4-c, which provides as follows: The County shall neither provide nor subsidize the provision of centralized potable water or sanitary sewer in the Rural Service Area, unless urban levels of service are required to correct an existing problem, prevent a projected public health hazard or prevent significant environmental degradation, or the areas meet the criteria described in Future Land Use Policy 3.4.b. The County intended Policy 3.4-c to implement the Managed Growth Tier System by limiting the provision of centralized utility service in the Rural Tier. The effect of this new policy was to prohibit the County from providing urban levels of utility services outside its existing service area boundaries in the RSA unless necessary to correct or prevent a public health hazard, existing problem related to urban levels of service, or environmental degradation. In February or March 2003, the County Planning Department began assessing ways to address the problem of overlapping utility service in the RSA. Shortly thereafter, the Florida Legislature passed the Scripps Law (Chapter 2003- 420, Laws of Florida), which took effect on November 3, 2003. Both of these factors led to the development of the Amendments in issue here. In late 2003, the County staff began the actual development of new amendments to its Plan (also known as Round 04-1 Plan Amendments) that would allow the County to provide services into the RSA. More specifically, the staff proposed to add a new FLUE Policy 3.1, which (as finally drafted) read as follows: The Palm Beach County Water Utilities Department shall provide potable water, reclaimed water and wastewater service to all unincorporated areas of the County except those unincorporated areas where the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners has entered or enters into a written agreement that provides utility service area rights to a public or privately owned potable water, reclaimed water, and/or wastewater utility, or in areas where the Palm Beach County Water Utilities Department is specifically excluded from providing utility service by Florida law. Palm Beach County Water Utilities Department shall continue to provide utility services to incorporated areas where service is already being provided by the County, or as provided for under utility service area agreements or as allowed for by law. In general terms, the new policy designated the County as a service provider of water and wastewater services for unincorporated areas of the County where the County has, or will enter into, interlocal agreements except where excluded by interlocal agreement or by law. The effect of the amendment is to allow the County to extend potable water and wastewater services to unincorporated areas of the County, particularly "the western communities," where it currently does not do so. The County staff also proposed to delete FLUE Policy 3.4-c, described in Finding of Fact 1, which was previously adopted in 2000. Finally, the County staff proposed to delete another policy adopted in 2000, CAI Policy 1.5-c, which read as follows: Urban levels of service shall not be provided by any governmental entity (outside of its existing service area boundary) within the Rural Service Area of the unincorporated area, except where: The Rural Service Area receives urban services pursuant to Objective 1.1 in the Element, or An urban level of service is required to correct a demonstrated public health, or Development on a parcel in the Rural Tier that is adjacent to water and/or sewer lines which existed prior to the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan in 1989 shall be allowed to connect to those existing lines and shall be allowed to connect to public sewer and/or water when required by the Public Health Department. This policy shall not allow the extension of new water and/or sewer lines into the Rural Tier to serve development without first amending the Service Area Map and the Future Land Use Atlas to reflect a change in the service area boundary. By deleting these two provisions, the County would no longer be prevented from providing utility services in the RSA unless certain conditions were met. (The staff also proposed to delete FLUE Policy 1.4-k, but that deletion is not in issue in these proceedings.) On January 14, 2004, the County initiated the adoption process by transmitting Notice of the Amendments to the Intergovernmental Plan and Amendment Review Committee (IPARC), which is made up of all the local governments and special districts in the County, including the City, Wellington, SID, and ITID. IPARC acts as a clearinghouse for all comprehensive plan amendments prepared by the IPARC members. IPARC in turn distributed the notice to its members, including the City, Wellington, SID, and ITID. After a public hearing on March 12, 2004, before the County's Local Planning Agency (known as the Land Use Advisory Board), by an 11-0 vote it recommended denial of Round 04-1 Plan Amendments and recommended that the County meet with the affected parties to resolve problems voiced by various attendees, including the City, SID, and ITID. On April 2, 2004, the County held a meeting with interested persons in an attempt to resolve objections to the Amendments before they were presented to the Board of County Commissioners. The objections were not resolved. On April 5, 2004, by a 5-0 vote, the Board of County Commissioners approved transmittal of the Amendments to the Department, other commenting agencies, and each unit of local government or governmental agency that had filed a written request for copies of the Amendments. The Amendments were transmitted to the Department on April 15, 2004. Between January 2004 and August 2004, the County held at least 37 meetings with utilities and other interested persons to discuss the Amendments, including three meetings with the City, at least five meetings with SID, at least ten meetings with ITID, and at least two meetings with Wellington. In addition, the County invited all utilities to attend meetings on April 28, 2004, at three locations to discuss utility service area boundaries. These meetings were attended by approximately 25 different utilities, including the City, SID, ITID, and Wellington. As a result of these meetings, the County prepared and distributed utility service area maps in an attempt to demonstrate the necessity for better coordination between utilities. On May 21, 2004, the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council notified the County of no objection or comments regarding the Amendments. On June 19, 2004, the Department issued its Objections, Recommendations, and Comments Report, which did not identify any objections, recommendations, or comments with respect to the Amendments. On June 22, 2004, the South Florida Water Management District (District) notified the Department of no objections or comments regarding the Amendments. After a public meeting on August 24, 2004, by a 5-1 vote, the Board of County Commissioners adopted Ordinance No. 2004-26 enacting the Amendments, and they were transmitted to the Department on September 14, 2004. On October 29, 2004, the Department issued its Notice determining the Amendments were in compliance. On November 19, 2004, Petitioners (except Wellington) filed Petitions challenging the Amendments. Wellington filed its Amended Petition on December 16, 2004. The Parties and Their Standing The City is a municipality and adjoining local government of the County, operating its own water and wastewater utility system. The City owns the largest water treatment plant in the County and has an extensive wastewater treatment system, including partial ownership in the East Central Regional Water Reclamation Facilty, the largest wastewater plant in the County. It owns property and currently provides bulk service to entities located within the unincorporated area of the County, including ITID. It submitted written objections to the County during the adoption process and has standing to bring this action. SID is an independent special district created by special act of the legislature in 1970. It lies within the unincorporated area of the County and has the authority to provide water and wastewater service within and without its boundaries. At present, SID provides potable water service within and without its boundaries, but only provides wastewater service within its boundaries. SID owns property in the unincorporated area and submitted objections to the County during the adoption process. These facts establish that SID has standing as an affected person to challenge the Amendments. Callery-Judge is a limited partnership, which owns and operates citrus groves on property located within the unincorporated area. It also submitted objections to the County during the adoption process. Callery-Judge is an affected person and has standing to participate in this matter. Mr. Roberts owns property in the unincorporated area, including Callery-Judge, of which he is the General Manager. He submitted objections to the Amendments during the adoption process and is an affected person. ITID is an independent special district created by special act of the legislature in 1957. (In 2002, the Legislature amended and reenacted ITID's enabling legislation.) In 1998, ITID began operating a water and wastewater system within the unincorporated area. ITID does not generate its own potable water or treat its wastewater. It obtains bulk water from the City and SID and bulk wastewater service from the City. ITID owns property within the unincorporated area and submitted objections to the amendment during the adoption process. As such, it is an affected person within the meaning of the law. Wellington is a municipality and adjoining local government of the County and operates a utility providing water and wastewater service within its boundaries and outside to several developments. It also submitted objections to the County during the adoption of the Amendments. Because Wellington does not own property or operate a business within the unincorporated area of the County, in order to demonstrate standing, it must show that the Amendments will produce substantial impacts on the increased need for publicly funded infrastructure or substantial impacts on areas designated for protection or special treatment within its jurisdiction. See § 163.3184(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Wellington bases its standing on alleged increases in traffic and the use of parks within its boundaries, which purportedly will occur as a result of the Amendments. While Wellington could not give a precise amount (in terms of dollars) of those impacts, the testimony of its Director of Community Services established that the availability of centralized water and sewer services in the areas adjoining Wellington will arguably lead to higher density development patterns, which in turn will lead to an increased need for publicly funded infrastructure. As such, Wellington is an affected person and has standing to challenge the Amendments. The Department is the state planning agency charged with responsibility for reviewing and approving comprehensive plans and amendments. The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and is responsible for adopting a comprehensive plan and amendments thereto, including the Amendments. The County Water Utilities Department currently serves approximately 425,000 people, making it the largest utility provider in Palm Beach County and the third largest in the State of Florida. The Current Plan As noted above, the County initially adopted its current Plan on August 31, 1989, by Ordinance No. 89-17. The Plan has been amended numerous times since its initial adoption. The original 1989 Plan and all subsequent amendments up to the ones at issue in this proceeding have been found in compliance by the Department. The current Plan is made up of sixteen elements, nine of which are mandatory, and seven of which are optional. The parties have indicated that the Utilities Element, CIE, Intergovernmental Coordination Element, and FLUE are relevant to this controversy; therefore, a brief description of their content and purpose is necessary. The purpose of a Utilities Element is to provide necessary public facilities and services correlated to future land uses. See § 163.3177(6)(c), Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.011. The existing Utilities Element contains potable water, wastewater, drainage, and solid waste sub- elements. The aquifer recharge sub-element is found in the Coastal Management Element. The Utilities Element and the aquifer recharge sub-element of the Coastal Management Element constitute the "general sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable water, and natural groundwater aquifer recharge element" referenced in Section 163.3177(6)(c), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.011. The existing Utilities Element has been found in compliance with applicable provisions of statute and rule. Section 163.3177(3)(c), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.016 contain requirements for the capital improvements element of a comprehensive plan. The existing CIE complies with these requirements. Objective 1.7 and Policy 1.7-a describe how the County implements the CIE. Pursuant to these requirements, the CIE is updated annually at the same time as the County budget. Table 10 of the CIE reflects the water utilities revenue and expenditures for the then current budget year and five years into the future. Table 10 was not updated when the Amendments were adopted because any future changes to the County's capital expenditures resulting from the Amendments would be made through the annual budget update process. The Intergovernmental Coordination Element contains provisions encouraging coordination between the County and adjoining municipalities and special districts in order to more efficiently meet the needs of the County residents. (There are more than 25 municipalities and special districts within the County.) This Element has previously been found in compliance with Section 163.3177(6)(h), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.015. One of the coordination tools identified in the Intergovernmental Coordination Element is the IPARC, described in Finding of Fact 5, which acts as a clearinghouse for all comprehensive plan amendments prepared by the IPARC members. IPARC distributes notice of plan amendments to all members, who then have the opportunity to provide comments regarding the proposed action. Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006 contain requirements for the future land use element of a comprehensive plan, including the future land use map (FLUM). According to the Plan, the FLUE "is the nucleus of the . . . Plan" and "defines the components of the community and the interrelationship among them, integrating the complex relationships between land use and all of the other elements of the Plan that address the physical, social, and economic needs of the people who live, work, and visit Palm Beach County." Both the existing FLUE and the current FLUM have been found in compliance. The Amendments do not alter the FLUM, but they do change FLUE Policy 3.1-c and delete FLUE Policy 3.4-c. As noted above, in 2000 the County adopted a Managed Growth Tier System, which is a planning tool intended to manage growth and protect varying lifestyles in the County. The Managed Growth Tier System consists of five categories or tiers, which are described in Objective 1.1 of the Plan. Objectives 1.2 through 1.6 govern development within the five tiers. FLUE Table 2.1-1 establishes permitted densities for each of the tiers. The Amendments do not modify any Goals, Objectives, or Policies governing the five tiers, with the exception of FLUE Policy 1.4-k. However, Petitioners have not challenged the proposed deletion of FLUE Policy 1.4-k and it is not one of the Amendments at issue in this proceeding. Additionally, the Amendments will not alter the permitted densities for any of the tiers. Concurrency Management refers to the system adopted in the CIE to ensure that infrastructure, which meets or exceeds the established minimum level of service standards, is in place concurrent with development approval. According to FLUE Policy 3.5-a, development orders and permits shall not be approved unless services and facilities meet or exceed the minimum levels of service. FLUE Objective 3.1 establishes three graduated service areas in Palm Beach County -- the Urban, Limited Urban Service, and Rural Service Areas. Each service area corresponds to one or more of the five tiers. The minimum levels of service required for each area are listed in FLUE Table 3.1-1. According to FLUE Table 3.1-1, FLUE Policy 3.5-a, and Utilities Element Policies 1.2-g and 1.3-e, the minimum levels of service in the RSA for potable water and sewage are on-site wells and septic tanks, respectively. With the exception of water and sewer, the other minimum levels of service are the same for all three service areas. The Amendments do not alter the minimum levels of service for any service area. Through its planning expert, Wellington contended that the Amendments will cause a de facto change to the minimum levels of service. However, the extension of centralized water and sewer service into the RSA does not change the established minimum levels of service. Petitioners also argue that the Amendments will increase minimum levels of service in the RSA for traffic and parks. However, the minimum levels established in FLUE Table 3.1-1 for all services and facilities, other than potable water and sanitary service, are County-wide standards. Reasons for Adopting the Plan Amendments Policy 3.4-c did not have its intended effect because it prevented the County from providing service to the Rural Tier. After 2000, repeated efforts by the County to negotiate the service areas of the numerous entities operating utility services in the unincorporated area were unsuccessful. Indeed, "there was not a willingness of many utility providers to agree on anything." This created a lack of coordination and planning as to the provision of services in the Rural Tier. The City, SID, and ITID each have utility service areas which overlap the service area of other utility providers. In particular, portions of the Acreage, a community located in the central-western unincorporated area of the County, fall under the claimed utility jurisdiction of SID, ITID, Cypress Grove Community Development District, and the Village of Royal Palm Beach (Royal Palm Beach). The City is also rapidly expanding service in the unincorporated area by entering into bulk water service agreements with a number of utilities located in the Rural Tier, including Royal Palm Beach, Seacoast Utilities Authority, and ITID. The City intends further expansion of bulk service in the Rural Tier, so as to increase utility revenues. It views the Amendments as affecting its substantial interests by potentially limiting these revenues. Royal Palm Beach claims an exclusive utility service area which overlaps the utility service areas claimed by SID and ITID. Royal Palm Beach is located entirely within the legislative boundaries of ITID and claims all of ITID as its service area. The Amendments support the authority granted to the County by the Scripps Law. That law gives the County the exclusive right to provide water and wastewater service to the Scripps Biomedical Research Facility and to construct utility facilities within and without the boundaries of the Scripps project. The enactment of the Scripps Law reinforced the need for the Amendments, as the Scripps Biomedical Research Facility will be located in the unincorporated area. Existing FLUE Policy 3.4-c is arguably inconsistent with the Scripps Law because it prevents the County from providing utility service in the RSA. Since the Scripps Law supersedes all other contrary provisions of Florida Law, it logically follows that FLUE Policy 3.4-c should be repealed. The Amendments are also supported by the provisions of the County Code of Ordinances Sections 27-16 through 27-22, which codify County ordinances that were adopted in the 1970s and deal with utility service. These ordinances authorize the County to designate a Control Area in the unincorporated area and to require County approval of any water and wastewater facilities constructed in these areas. In summary, the County adopted the Amendments to avoid service area disputes between utility providers such as those described above, to prevent wasteful and duplicative utility services, to implement the Legislature’s mandate regarding the Scripps Biotechnology Park, to ensure a sufficient water supply to meet the reasonable development needs of the unincorporated area, and to enforce the provisions of the County Code of Ordinances. Petitioners' Objections Data and analysis Petitioners contend that the only data and analyses submitted by the County to support the Amendments are contained in a rather brief County Staff Report (Petitioners' Exhibit 5), and that no other documentation was actually forwarded to the Department. They further contend that the Amendments must be based on demographic, economic, and fiscal studies, and that none were utilized by the County. Because of these omissions, they argue that the Amendments violate relevant statute and rule provisions and are not in compliance. Section 163.3177(8) and (10)(e), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2) require that plan amendments be based on relevant and appropriate data and analyses applicable to each element. In determining whether a plan amendment complies with this requirement, the Department reviews each amendment on a case-by-case basis. In doing so, it does not require the same amount or type of data for all plan amendments. See, e.g., Zemel et al. v. Lee County et al., DOAH Case No. 90-7793 (DOAH Dec. 16, 1992, DCA June 22, 1993)(projections of aquifer thickness and transmissivity do not require the same precision as calculating volume-to- capacity ratios for levels of service on road segments); 1000 Friends of Florida et al. v. Department of Community Affairs et al., DOAH Case No. 04-4492GM, 2005 WL 995004 at *15 (DOAH April 28, 2005, DCA May 9, 2005)("a numeric analysis is not necessary to justify industrial uses since they may be goal- based and aspirational"). For example, if amendments merely represent a policy or directional change and depend on future activities and assessments (i.e., further analyses and decision-making by the local government), the Department does not require the degree of data and analyses that other amendments require. (These amendments have sometimes been referred to as aspirational amendments. See Collier County v. City of Naples et al., DOAH Case No. 04-1048GM, 2004 WL 1909265 at *5 and *6 (DOAH Aug. 24, 2004, DCA Dec. 28, 2004)). Conversely, amendments which are mandatory in nature, that is, amendments which are required to be implemented by Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, or Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5, require more data and analyses. Thus, under Department interpretations of the relevant statutory and rule provisions, if an amendment does not have an immediate impact on the provision of services in the unincorporated area, is policy- based, does not require any capital improvement expenditures at the time the amendment is adopted, and simply represents a directional change in the County's long-term water utility planning, it is similar to an aspirational amendment and can be based on less data and analyses than might otherwise be required. Here, the County’s actual policy regarding utility service areas will depend on future activities and assessments. The Amendments do not require the County to take any immediate action. The Amendments do not mandate that existing utility customers in the RSA switch to the County. The Amendments do not authorize any new development in the Rural Tier, and any future development would have to be approved by the Board of County Commissioners through the normal development approval process. Therefore, the Amendments are akin to an aspirational amendment and do not require the degree of data and analyses that are required for other amendments. The County Staff Report identifies, albeit in brief fashion, data and analyses in support of the Amendments. It provides, among other things, that the Amendments are necessary because "[t]he lack of County participation as a service provider has created a void in effective long-term utility planning, resulting in duplicative service lines, inefficient services in the RSA, overlapping utility jurisdictions and, absence of some written agreements defining service areas." The Staff Report further identifies the County’s authority to provide service and the necessity for the Amendments to allow the County to provide service to the Biotechnology Research Park in northwest Palm Beach County. In addition, a number of documents presented at hearing provide data and analyses in support of the Amendments. In considering these documents, the undersigned notes that all data or analysis available and existing at the time of the adoption of the plan amendment may be relied upon to support an amendment in a de novo proceeding and may be raised or discussed for the first time at the administrative hearing. Zemel, supra; McSherry et al. v. Alachua County et al., DOAH Case No. 02-2676GM, 2004 WL 2368828 at *54 (DOAH Oct. 18, 2004, DCA May 2, 2005); Melzer et al. v. Martin County et al., DOAH Case Nos. 02-1014GM and 02-1015GM, 2003 WL 2150756 at *33 (DOAH July 1, 2003, DCA Sept. 26, 2003 and Oct. 24, 2003). The District's Districtwide Water Supply Assessment identifies future potable water demands for various utilities in the County. The District's Lower East Coast Regional Water Supply Plan describes the available raw water supply to meet future demands in the County. The District's CUP-CERP (Consumptive Use Permit-Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan) Guiding Principles lists interim water use permitting guidelines, which indicate utilities may experience problems obtaining permitted allocations beyond what is needed to meet their 2005 demands. District Water Use Permit 50- 00135-W is the County's 20-year water use permit, which confirms that the County is the only utility in the unincorporated area with a guaranteed, long-term potable water allocation. The information contained in these documents confirms the County's ability to act as the default water utility provider in the unincorporated area. The County Linking Land Use and Water Supply Plan, Water and Wastewater Master Plan, Reclaimed Water Master Plan, Raw Water Master Plan, 20-Year Wastewater Collection System Master Plan, and Projected Yearly Capital Expenditures each provide data and analysis, which support the County's ability to serve as the default utility provider in the unincorporated area. As a water management district study, the District's documents are professionally accepted sources, which constitute appropriate data and analyses under Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2)(c). Similarly, the County's reports constitute existing technical studies, which are also appropriate data and analysis. Petitioners contend that the County was required to collect new data and prepare a comparative analysis of the County Water Utilities Department and other utility providers in the unincorporated area. However, according to Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2)(b), local governments are not required to collect new data in support of a plan amendment. Further, neither Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2) nor Section 163.3177, Florida Statutes, requires a comparative analysis. It is at least fairly debatable that the Amendments are supported by relevant and adequate data and analyses. Intergovernmental Coordination Petitioners also contend that in order to comply with the Intergovernmental Coordination Element of the Plan, the County must inventory and analyze the facilities and services provided by other utility providers in the areas affected by the Amendments. In other words, they contend that without data and analysis relative to other providers, the coordination function is incapable of being done and is meaningless and renders the Amendments inconsistent with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.015. (That rule sets forth in detail the data requirements upon which the element in a local government's comprehensive plan must be based, and the goal statements, specific objectives, and policies which must be found in the element.) Section 163.3177(6)(h), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.015 set forth requirements for the intergovernmental coordination element of a comprehensive plan. The existing Intergovernmental Coordination Element has been found to be in compliance. The Amendments do not modify this element. Although not required for purposes of compliance, the County followed intergovernmental coordination procedures in the comprehensive plan when adopting the Amendments. The Amendments were submitted to IPARC for review by member governments prior to their consideration by the Board of County Commissioners. The County met with other utility providers and interested persons no less than 37 times to discuss the Amendments. Further, Petitioners' own witnesses concede that their representatives attended multiple meetings with the County regarding the Amendments. Such efforts demonstrate that the County substantively complied with the Intergovernmental Coordination Element. Petitioners' contention that these meetings were not conducted in good faith has been rejected. Petitioners implicitly suggest that intergovernmental coordination means acquiescing to the position of an objector. If this were true, adjacent local governments would have veto power over the County's ability to enact plan amendments, a result not contemplated by the statute. The intergovernmental coordination requirements of Section 163.3177(6)(h), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.015 do not require that local governments resolve all disputes regarding a comprehensive plan and its amendments to the satisfaction of all interested persons, but only that the local government take into consideration input from interested persons. See, e.g., Department of Community Affairs et al. v. Lee County et al., DOAH Case Nos. 89-1843GM and 90-7792GM, 1990 WL 749359 (DOAH Jan. 7, 1993, Admin. Comm. Feb. 10, 1994). The numerous meetings held by the County demonstrate adequate consideration of opposing views. It is at least fairly debatable that the County satisfied the intergovernmental coordination requirements of Section 163.3177(6)(h), Florida Statutes. Economic Feasibility/Comparative Analysis Petitioners argue that the Amendments fail to comply with Section 163.3177(2), Florida Statutes, which requires that "the comprehensive plan shall be economically feasible." Petitioners claim that in order to establish economic feasibility, the County first should have conducted a comparative economic analysis of the cost of utility service in the unincorporated area by various existing and hypothetical service providers. However, this construction of the statute is at odds with the Department's interpretation. The Department does not interpret the economic feasibility requirement of Section 163.3177(2), Florida Statutes, as requiring such a comparison. Instead, it construes the statute as only requiring that a plan amendment be realizable in financial terms, that is, that the local government has the financial ability to achieve what is specified in the amendment. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Department of Community Affairs et al., DOAH Case No. 94- 5182GM, 1995 WL 1052797 *6 (DOAH April 19, 1995, Admin. Comm. Sept. 4, 1998)("Economic feasibility means plans should be realizable in financial terms."). Compare Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. District et al. v. Charlotte County et al., 774 So. 2d 903, 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), where the Court interpreted the use of the term "economically feasible" in a proposed Basis of Review provision as meaning "financially feasible or financially 'doable' . . . [and the] financial ability of a WUP applicant to institute reuse." The Department's interpretation of the statute was not shown to be unreasonable or clearly erroneous. The evidence shows that the Amendments are financially realizable. The County Water Utilities Department is one of the financially strongest utilities in the nation. It has the highest municipal bond rating (AAA) granted by the three major rating agencies. As of August 24, 2004, no other utility in the State of Florida had achieved an AAA rating from the three bond rating agencies, and the County Water Utilities Department is among only a handful of utilities nationwide to have achieved that status. Petitioners have acknowledged that the County is a very strong utility from a financial perspective. Given the County's strong financial state, it is qualified and able to serve as the default provider in the unincorporated area. In summary, it is fairly debatable that the Amendments are economically feasible as the term is used in Section 163.3177(2), Florida Statutes, because the County has the financial ability to extend utility service to the unincorporated area. Urban sprawl Wellington (but not the other Petitioners) essentially contends that the Amendments will promote urban sprawl because the County will now allow new urban services (water and wastewater) into undeveloped areas thereby resulting in urban development. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(5) contains standards discouraging the proliferation of urban sprawl. Existing provisions in the Plan, including the Managed Growth Tier System, prevent urban sprawl within the County. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(5)(k) provides in part that "if a local government has in place a comprehensive plan found in compliance, the Department shall not find that plan amendment to be not in compliance on the issue of discouraging urban sprawl solely because of preexisting indicators if the amendment does not exacerbate existing indicators of urban sprawl within the jurisdiction." The Amendments do not affect existing growth management provisions in the Plan and thus will not exacerbate urban sprawl. Although not required, the amendment of FLUE Policy 1.4-k, which Petitioners did not challenge, will also have the effect of maintaining the status quo with respect to urban sprawl. At the same time, the Amendments do not directly or indirectly authorize new development and are only aspirational in nature. Any extension of water and sewer lines into the unincorporated area does not necessarily create urban sprawl because development is not automatically authorized by these activities. Even Wellington's planning expert concurred that urban sprawl is not caused by the provision of utility services, but by the Board of County Commissioners' approval of development orders. It is at least fairly debatable that the Amendments will not encourage urban sprawl in contravention of the Plan.2 Internal consistency Petitioners next contend that the Amendments fail to comply with Sections 163.3177(2), 163.3177(10)(a), and 163.3187(2), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(5), which require that all elements of a comprehensive plan be consistent with each other. In addressing this objection, only those inconsistencies expressly alleged in their Petitions and Amended Petition will be considered. See, e.g., Heartland Environmental Council v. Department of Community Affairs et al., DOAH Case No. 94- 2095GM, 1996 WL 1059751 at *19 (DOAH Oct. 15, 1996; DCA Nov. 25, 1996). Future Land Use Element Petitioners first contend that the Amendments are inconsistent with Goal 3, Objective 3.1, and Policies 3.1-a and 3.1-b of the FLUE. These provisions require that the County "define graduated service areas for directing services to the County's diverse neighborhoods and communities in a timely and cost-effective manner"; that the County establish graduated service areas "to distinguish the levels and types of services needed within a Tier, consistent with the characteristics of the Tier," which include "the need to provide cost effective services"; that the County establish Urban, Limited Urban Service, and Rural Service Areas based on several factors in Table 3.1.1, including "[t]he cost and feasibility of extending services"; and that the County review minimum levels of service "during preparation of the Evaluation and Appraisal Report [EAR] and the Comprehensive Plan as amended." The latter provision also requires that each service provider determine the maximum and available capacity of their facilities and services for this review. The first broad goal is implemented through the County's existing Managed Growth Tier System and is not affected by the identity of the utility provider. Also, the Amendments do not alter the Managed Growth Tier System, nor do they alter the existing minimum levels of service required for the RSA. Similarly, FLUE Objective 3.1 is not affected, as the Amendments only have the potential to change the utility provider in certain areas, and not the level of service provided within the RSA. Further, the Amendments do not change the existing service area boundaries and established service area definitions. As to Policy 3.1-a, the service areas have been established and found in compliance and the Amendments do not alter the service area designations or Table 3.1-1. Therefore, they are not inconsistent with Policy 3.1-a. Finally, Policy 3.1-b is not affected by the Amendments because the minimum levels of service are not altered and the Amendments are not the product of an EAR. Capital Improvements Element – Table 10 Table 10 of the CIE describes water and sewer revenues, operating revenues, federal/state grants, other revenues, bond/ loan proceeds, fund balances, total water and sewer revenues, water and sewer operating expenditures, water and sewer capital projects, annual surplus/deficit, and cumulative surplus/deficit for fiscal years 2004-2009. Petitioners contend that the Amendments are inconsistent with this provision because the Table has not been amended to reflect the expenditures that will be made by the County as a result of the Amendments. This Table is not affected because the Amendments do not require any changes to the County's capital expenditures. If changes do occur as a result of the County's planned extension of utility service into the unincorporated area, the capital improvements associated with extension of service will be addressed in subsequent annual updates of Table 10. Intergovernmental Coordination Element Petitioners contend that the Amendments are inconsistent with Goal 1 and Objective 1.1 of the Intergovernmental Coordination Element, which require the County to "provide a continuous coordination effort with all affected governmental entities" and to "utilize existing mechanisms to coordinate planning efforts with the plans of school boards, other units of local government providing services, adjacent municipalities, adjacent counties, the region, the State, and residents of Palm Beach County." Petitioners essentially claim that the Amendments were adopted and transmitted without coordination with other local governments, as required by the goal and policy. As explained above, the evidence shows that the Amendments were submitted to IPARC for review by each of the local governments and special districts located in the County, these entities were given ample opportunity to comment or object to the Amendments, and the County utilized existing mechanisms to coordinate planning efforts. Therefore, the Amendments are consistent with these portions of the Intergovernmental Coordination Element. Petitioners also contend that the Amendments conflict with Goal 4, Policy 4.1-a, and Policy 4.1-b of the Intergovernmental Coordination Element. The broad goal relates to coordination of "service provision to assure the most effective and efficient service delivery for the residents of Palm Beach County and its municipalities," while the two policies require that the County coordinate with special taxing districts and each municipality within the County during "the concurrency management and development review processes" and in defining the "ultimate boundaries of that entity's sewer and water service areas." The Amendments are consistent with the goal because their purpose is to create more effective and efficient service delivery by encouraging utility providers to enter into agreements which establish exclusive service areas and eliminate overlapping service areas. For similar reasons, the Amendments are consistent with Policy 4.1-a because the County coordinated with each of the special taxing districts through IPARC and numerous subsequent meetings relating to the Amendments. Finally, the main purpose of the Amendments is to prevent overlapping utility service areas and to encourage utility providers to enter into agreements defining service areas. Therefore, they are not inconsistent with Policy 4.1- b. Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council Plan Petitioners next allege that the Amendments are inconsistent with Goal 8.1, Regional Strategy 8.1.1, and Regional Policies 8.1.1.3 and 8.1.1.4 of the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council's Regional Policy Plan (Regional Policy Plan). In order for a plan amendment to be consistent with a regional policy plan, Section 163.3177(10)(a), Florida Statutes, requires that plan amendments be consistent with the regional plan "as a whole," and that no specific goal or policy be "applied in isolation from the other goals and policies in the plans." Because the Petitions and Amended Petition do not allege that the Amendments are inconsistent with the Regional Policy Plan as a whole, their challenge must necessarily fail. See, e.g., 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc., supra at *38. Even if a provision in the Regional Policy Plan could be viewed in isolation, the Amendments are consistent with Regional Goal Regional Goal 8.1, which requires "public facilities which provide a high quality of life." Nothing in the Amendments would impair the provision of a high quality of life. One of the purposes of the Amendment is to more efficiently provide utility service by defining service areas and improving the provision of services. Regional Strategy 8.1.1 relates to the provision of "levels of public service necessary to achieve a high quality of life cost-effectively." The Amendments are not inconsistent with this strategy, as they are designed to help the County implement the existing objectives and policies relating to this strategy. The purpose of Regional Policy 8.1.1.3 is to "encourage patterns of development which minimize the public cost of providing service, maximize use of existing service systems and facilities and take into full consideration environmental/ physical limitations." As stated above, one purpose of the Amendments is to provide more efficient and cost-effective utility service by encouraging providers to enter into agreements that prevent overlapping service areas and avoid duplication of services. Finally, the purpose of Regional Policy 8.1.1.4 is to "develop local Capital Improvement Programs which maximize development of existing systems before allocating funds to support new public facilities in undeveloped areas." Because the Amendments do not alter the County's Capital Improvement Programs, they do not implicate this policy. State Comprehensive Plan Petitioners further allege that the Amendments are inconsistent with two goals in the state comprehensive plan, which are codified in Section 187.201, Florida Statutes. Like regional policy plans, Section 163.3177(10)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that for purposes of determining consistency, the state plan is to be construed as a whole, with no specific goal or policy applied in isolation from the other goals and policies. If a plan appears to violate a provision of the state plan, a balanced consideration must be given to all other provisions of both the state and local plan to determine whether a local comprehensive plan is consistent with the state plan. Petitioners have not alleged that the Amendments are inconsistent with the state comprehensive plan as a whole. Therefore, their challenge to the Amendments must necessarily fail. See 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc., supra; Heartland Environmental Council, supra. Assuming that a provision within the state comprehensive plan can be viewed alone, Section 187.201(17)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that "Florida shall protect the substantial investments in public facilities that already exist and shall plan for and finance new facilities to serve residents in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner." Petitioners contend that because the Amendments fail to protect the public facilities that already exist in the unincorporated area of the County, the Amendments conflict with this goal. The Amendments are not inconsistent with this goal because their purpose is to implement the Plan provisions in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner. Further, the Amendments are consistent with the specific provisions of Section 187.201(17)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioners also allege that the Amendments contradict the requirements of Section 187.201(20)(a), Florida Statutes, which deals with cooperation between levels of government, elimination of needless duplication, and promotion of cooperation. Again, the purpose of the Amendments is to eliminate duplication and promote cooperation between entities by encouraging utility providers to enter into interlocal agreements with the County that define exclusive service areas and prevent duplication of services. Further, the Amendments are consistent with the specific provisions of Section 187.201(20)(b), Florida Statutes. Other Objections Finally, any other contentions raised in the Petitions and Amended Petition not specifically addressed herein have been considered and found to be without merit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the Amendments adopted by Ordinance No. 2004-026 on August 24, 2004, are in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2005.
The Issue Whether the Appellant, Devoe L. Moore, has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that development rights in certain real property he owns have vested against the provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. On September 18, 1987, Devoe Moore acquired a tract of approximately 28 acres of real estate (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), located on Lake Bradford Road just south of Gaines Street, in the City of Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. The Property was the former location of the Elberta Crate and Box Company. The Property was at the time of purchase, and still is, zoned M-2, Industrial. Development of the Property. Mr. Moore intended to develop the Property consistent with the Property's M-2, Industrial zoning. Mr. Moore intended to build a service/commercial/mini-storage development similar to another such development of Mr. Moore in the City. In December, 1987, Mr. Moore had his engineer prepare grading and drainage plans for the Property. On January 29, 1988, Mr. Moore had an application for an amendment to a stormwater permit, Environmental Management Permit 87-1087, filed with the Leon County Department of Public Works. At that time, Leon County issued such permits for property in unincorporated areas and inside the City's limits. The grading and drainage plans for the Property were filed with the application. Leon County had not been delegated any responsibility or authority to make land-use decisions for the City. The requested amendment to Permit 87-1087 was based on an assumption of Mr. Moore that the Property would consist of 80% coverage with impervious surface. Therefore, the City was aware or should have been aware that Mr. Moore intended to construct a major development on the Property. Such a development was consistent with the zoning on the Property at the time. Neither Leon County nor the City, however, approved or in anyway addressed the issue of whether 80% coverage of the Property with impervious surface was acceptable. Nor did the City or Leon County make any representation to Mr. Moore different from that made by the City's zoning of the Property. Mr. Moore filed a site plan showing a development of 80% coverage with the application for amendment to Permit 87-1087. These plans showed a development consisting of thirteen rectangular buildings, driveways and parking area. The indicated development, however, was not reviewed or in anyway approved by Leon County or the City. On May 6, 1988, a Stormwater Permit, amending Permit 87-1087, was issued to Mr. Moore. This permit only approved the construction of a holding pond and filling on the Property. The issuance of the permit did not constitute approval of any proposed development of the Property. In 1988, Mr. Moore began clearing the Property of buildings on the Property which the City had condemned. Mr. Moore also began filling and grading the Property in 1988, and has continued to do so to varying degrees through July 16, 1991. From January 1989, through August, 1990, SANDCO placed 1,174 loads of fill on the Property. Jimmy Crowder Construction Company has also performed filling and grading work on the Property since 1988. As of the date the City's vesting ordnance was adopted and as of the date of the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings Mr. Moore has not completed filling on the Property. Mr. Moore also has not completed filtration improvements to the storm water hold pond to be constructed on the Property. Additional water treatment facilities on the Property must be constructed to handle runoff from the Property. No roadways, water services, sewer services or electric services have been constructed on the Property. Site preparation on the Property has not been completed so that construction of vertical improvements can begin. At the time that Mr. Moore acquired the Property, only building permits were required for the development of the Property. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore obtained the required building permits. The law was changed, however, to require approval of a site plan. Mr. Moore decided not to submit a site plan at least in part because of the City's work on the sewer main. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that Mr. Moore was prohibited by the City from obtaining site plan approval. The City has not approved or reviewed a site plan for the Property. At the time Mr. Moore purchased the Property, and continuing to the present, a City sewer main which runs along the southern border of the Property has been a problem. The sewer main is a health hazard because it is located in proximity to the surface of the ground and it has numerous leaks. The City indicated that it intended to build a new sewer main across the Property and Mr. Moore agreed to give the City an easement for the sewer main. After Mr. Moore purchased the Property and before February, 1989, Mr. Moore made a number of requests to the City that the City identify the easement it desired and prepare the easement grant so that the City could construct the new sewer main and Mr. Moore could proceed with his development. Requests were also made by some City employees of the City Attorney that the easement be prepared and executed because of the problem with the existing sewer main. In April, 1989, the easement grant was prepared and executed. On August 3, 1990, James S. Caldwell, Assistant Director of the City Water and Sewer Department, wrote the following letter to Mr. Moore: It has been brought to my attention that your are proceeding with construction of a stormwater holding pond on the referenced site [the Elberta Crate Site]. As discussed with you this date and as you are aware, the City has a sewer line on this property. The sewer line would be damaged by your construction activity. The City has designed a relocation and upgrade of the sewer line to be constructed on an easement previously acquired from you. Our schedule for the sewer line construction is completion by January 1, 1991. A review of your stormwater holding pond drawings and the proposed sewer line reveals a potential conflict between the proposed line and the holding pond. We shall have City staff stake out and flag the existing sewer line and the proposed sewer line. We are requesting that your construction activity stay away from the existing sewer line. After stakeout of the proposed sewer line, you may check your stormwater pond plans to assure that there is no conflict. [Emphasis added]. Mr. Moore was also told on other occasions to avoid interfering with the existing sewer line and the construction of the new sewer line. Construction of the new sewer main on the Property was not commenced until January, 1991. The construction had not been completed as of March, 1991. Part of the delay in completing the sewer main was caused by contemplated changes in the location of the sewer main and the possible need for a different easement. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore was told to cease all activity on the Property. Costs Incurred by Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore paid approximately $1,000,000.00 for the Property. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this cost was incurred in reliance upon any representation from the City as to the use the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property. Mr. Moore spent approximately $247,541.22, for demolition of existing buildings, site clearing and grading, engineering costs, fill, permitting fees and partial construction of the stormwater management system for the Property. Mr. Moore also donated an easement to the City with a value of approximately $26,000.00. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit. Mr. Moore also incurred approximately $100,000.00 in expenditures similar to those addressed in the previous finding of fact for which Mr. Moore was unable to find documentation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit. Development of the Property Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property appears to meet the concurrency requirements of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property, however, appears to be inconsistent with the 2010 Plan because the Future Land Use Element district in which the Property is located does not permit industrial uses and the intended industrial use of the Property is incompatible with some of the uses to which adjacent property has been put. Procedure. Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination prior to the filing of the application at issue in this proceeding. That application was denied by the City on October 16, 1991. In the first application Mr. Moore indicated that the Property was to be used for student housing. On or about November 13, 1991, Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application") (Application VR0295T), with the City. "Devoe L. Moore" was listed as the owner/agent of the Property in the Application. It is indicated that the project at issue in the Application is "[i]ndustrial development of former Elberta Crate and Box Company site by Devoe L. Moore." "Progress . . . Toward Completion" is described as (1) Owner/contractor estimate; (2) Environmental Management Permit; (3) Site preparation from December, 1987, to the date the Application was filed; and (4) Construction of the stormwater system in 1990. In a letter dated February 6, 1991, Mr. Moore was informed that his Application was being denied. By letter dated February 18, 1991, Mr. Moore requested a hearing before a Staff Committee for review of the denial of his Application. On March 11, 1991, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee. The Staff Committee was comprised of Jim English, City Attorney, Mark Gumula, Director of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department and Buddy Holshouser, Director for the City's Growth Management Department. At the conclusion of this hearing the Staff Committee voted 2 to 1 to deny the Application. By letter dated March 19, 1991, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, informed Mr. Moore that the Application had been denied. By letter dated April 4, 1991, to Mr. Gumula, Mr. Moore appealed the decision to deny the Application. By letter dated July 3, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on August 27, 1991. F. Other Projects Approved by the City. Mr. Moore submitted, without objection from the City, other vesting rights applications and final orders concerning such applications which were ultimately approved by the City. All of those cases are distinguishable from this matter. See the City's proposed finding of fact 30.
Findings Of Fact On August 17, 1989, the Executive Board acting for the Local Elected Officials of the Heartland Employment and Training Consortium, voted to terminate Clifton Thomas, Jr., from his position as Executive Director of the Heartland Private Industry Council. At the time of his termination from employment, Mr. Thomas was being paid the sum of $47,528 per annum. Mr. Thomas' salary was established on an annual basis by the Executive Board. On or about December 1, 1989, Mr. Thomas, acting through his attorney, Mr. Robert McKee, notified E. John Dinkel, III, acting as counsel for the Executive Board, that he intended to file a law suit against the Heartland Employment and Training Consortium and its Executive Board. The complaint to be filed in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa, Division, demanded equitable relief and damages and alleged that Mr. Thomas was fired without justification and "was not accorded due process." Mr. Dinkel, acting as counsel for the Executive Board, was able to obtain agreement from Mr. McKee, acting as counsel for Mr. Thomas, that the complaint would be dropped upon payment of $24,096 to Mr. Thomas. At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Heartland Private Industry Council held on December 14, 1989, the Council voted to concur in a payment of $24,096 to Mr. Thomas to avoid the cost of litigation. It was understood and agreed that a statement would be signed by Mr. Thomas denying any liability or wrongdoing by any of the parties to the action. At a specially convened meeting of the Executive Board of the Heartland Consortium held on December 15, 1989, the Board unanimously agreed to the settlement. On December 21, 1989, a check in the amount of $21,598.40 was issued to Mr. Thomas. This amount represented the agreed upon amount minus a levy from the Internal Revenue Service. The check (#010471) was charged to the pooled administrative funds from allocations through State of JTPA formula monies. In consideration of the above payment, Mr. Thomas gave up his threatened law suit and signed a statement, dated December 22, 1989, denying any wrongdoing on the part of the Executive Board, the Heartland Private Industry Council and any officers or employees of the Board or Council. In the annual audit of the Heartland Private Industry Council conducted by Grant Thornton, Accountants and Management Consultants, the use of JTPA monies to pay the former Executive Director was questioned. The auditor stated: "The use of JTPA funds in settlement of legal claims was determined by Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security to be an unallowable cost under State and Federal law as indicated in a letter to the Council's attorney dated November 6, 1989, therefore this is a questioned cost." On September 30, 1991, the Heartland Private Industry Council received notification from Patricia S. Gilbert, Director, DLET that the costs questioned by the auditor were disallowed. No reason other than that cited by the auditor was given. On October 24, 1991, Heartland Private Industry Council, Inc., notified the Department of Labor of their intent to appeal the disallowed cost. On November 1, 1991, Jack E. Lyons, Executive Director of the Heartland Private Industry Council, wrote a letter to Secretary Scruggs, questioning the applicability of the statutes, both State and Federal, that were cited by the auditor in the statement of questioned costs. At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Heartland Private Industry Council held on April 17, 1992, the Council denied any misapplication of Federal JTPA dollars and voted to not permit the Executive Director to settle the disallowed costs by payment from non-JTPA dollars. The attached documentation styled Index of Exhibits, containing fourteen (14) exhibits is incorporated by reference into the proposed Statement of Facts.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding the payment to Clifton Thomas, Jr., of $24,096 in settlement of his law suit against the Heartland Private Industry Council Inc. to be a nonallowable cost and improperly charged to federally provided funds. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry R. Jackson, Esquire 300 Parkview Place Lakeland, FL 33805 Carolyn Cummings, Esquire Hartman Building, Suite 307-2102 Capitol Circle SE Tallahassee, FL 32399 Frank Scruggs, Secretary 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle SE Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle SE Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152
