The Issue Does the taxpayer owe sales tax, penalty, and interest as assessed by the Department of Revenue.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Revenue, is an agency of the State of Florida, lawfully created and organized pursuant to Section 20.21, Florida Statutes. By law, the Department is vested with the responsibility of regulating, controlling and administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including, specifically, the laws relating to the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use tax, pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Worldwide Equipment Group, LLC, is a Florida limited liability company, whose principal address is Post Office Box 1050, Freeport, Florida 32439. Respondent sells and leases heavy equipment. In early 2006, Petitioner, Department of Revenue, conducted an audit of the books and records of Petitioner, pursuant to statutory notice. The period covered by the audit was March 1, 2002, through February 28, 2005. The audit was conducted by Department of Revenue auditor David Collins and addressed three issues. Issue A-01 addressed misclassified exempt sales, i.e. failure to collect appropriate sales and use tax or lack of documentation to prove tax exempt status of certain sales. Issue A-03 addressed discrepancies in sales for 2003 as reported for federal income tax returns and for state sales and use tax returns. Issue A-03 addressed interest owed due to a timing difference between actual transactions and the filing of state returns: basically a manipulation of the grace period for payment of sales and use taxes. Respondent was notified of the apparent discrepancies observed by the auditor. The original Notice of Intent To Make Audit Changes was issued February 17, 2006, and started at more than $75,000.00 in taxes, penalty, and interest due. Respondent then filed amended federal income tax returns, reflecting larger sales figures covering a portion of the audit period which reduced the discrepancy. The dispute was originally referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on or about August 30, 2006. The original facts in dispute surrounded an addendum to the Notice of Proposed Assessment showing a balance due of $31,434.82. This was DOAH Case No. 06-3287. The request for a disputed-fact hearing was made by David R. Johnson CPA, who has a power of attorney on file with Petitioner Agency permitting him to represent Respondent. Throughout these proceedings, Worldwide has been served through Mr. Johnson by Petitioner and by DOAH. The parties filed a Joint Motion for Provisional Closing Order in DOAH Case No. 06-3287 on November 1, 2006. On November 2, 2006, DOAH Case No. 06-3287 was closed with leave to return if the parties' proposed settlement was not finalized. Mr. Johnson met once with counsel for Petitioner during the time the case was returned to the Agency. At some point, Respondent had produced certain accounting entries and supporting documents to the auditor. These were used to adjust the assessment levied by the Department. A Revised Notice Of Intent To Make Audit Changes dated March 13, 2007, was issued with a letter of the same date. The revised, and final Notice included an assessment of tax, penalty and interest totaling $15,065.24, as of the date of issue and information that the tax accrues interest at the rate of $3.10 per diem. On April 4, 2007, Petitioner filed before DOAH its Motion to Re-open Case and Notice for Trial. No timely response in opposition was filed by Respondent. By an Order to Re-open Case File, entered April 19, 2007, the case was re-opened as the instant DOAH Case No. 07-1710. Petitioner has established that the amount of $15,065.24 as tax, penalty, and interest was due as of March 13, 2007.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue sustain the March 13, 2007, assessment of the subject sales tax, penalties and interest to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Warren J. Bird, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Lisa Echeverri, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 David R. Johnson, CPA 1265 Highway 331 South Defuniak Springs, Florida 32435 Worldwide Equipment Group LLC Post Office Box 1050 Freeport, Florida 32439
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable for certain taxes and, if so, how much.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Manatee County, Florida. Petitioner is in the printing business. Specifically, Petitioner produces, manufactures, assembles, and publishes telephone directories for mobile home parks in Florida. All of Petitioner's work in connection with these directories takes place in Florida. The directories list the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of residents of the mobile home park for which the directory is prepared. The directories also contain advertisements, which Petitioner solicits from merchants seeking to sell goods or services to the mobile home park residents. Following the production of the directories, Petitioner distributes them to the mobile home park residents, who maintain possession of the directories. However, Petitioner retains ownership of each directory, even after it is distributed. Petitioner is solely responsible for the manufacture and distribution of the directories. Petitioner owns accounts receivable reflecting monies owned it by entities for which Petitioner has performed work. Petitioner owns treasury stock. Following an audit, Respondent issued its Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes. The proposed changes assessed additional sales and use taxes of $44,151.77, intangible tax of $1297.08, and $194,75 of health care tax. The bases of proposed liability for the sales and use tax were for the publication and distribution of directories for which no sales or use tax had been collected and for the sale of advertising during the period of the service tax from July 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, for which no sales tax on advertising had been collected. The basis of proposed liability for the intangible tax was for the failure to pay intangible tax on accounts receivable and treasury stock. The basis of proposed liability for the health care tax was for the failure to pay the Hillsborough County Health Care Tax and Discretionary Sales Surtax. On February 11, 1991, Petitioner protested the proposed assessments. On April 24, 1992, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision sustaining the proposed sales and use tax and intangible tax, but eliminating the proposed health care tax. On May 12, 1992, Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration concerning the proposed sales and use tax. On November 24, 1992, Respondent issued its Notice of Reconsideration sustaining the proposed sales and use tax. On January 21, 1993, Petitioner timely filed its petition for a formal administration hearing. Subject to the accuracy of its legal position, Respondent's assessment is factually accurate. Petitioner will pay the assessed amount of sales and use tax, plus interest, if its position is not sustained following the conclusion of this proceeding, including judicial review.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered determining that, for each assessed period, Petitioner is liable for the assessed corporate intangible tax plus interest, the use tax on the cost price of the materials and other covered items plus interest, the sales tax on services on the advertising revenues, but not for any sales tax apart from the period covered by the sales tax on services. ENTERED on January 25, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 25, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: David M. Carr David Michael Carr, P.A. 600 East Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Eric J. Taylor Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint for Revocation of Certificate of Registration issued on November 16, 2009, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute that the Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating, controlling, and administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including the laws relating to the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use tax pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. There is no dispute that Abkey is a Florida corporation whose principal address is 7800 Southwest 104th Street, Miami, Florida 33156. Abkey is a restaurant. At the time of hearing, Abkey had 33 employees and was operating at a deficit. There is no dispute that, at all times material hereto, Abkey possessed Florida sales tax certificate of registration number 23-8012096448-9, issued by the Department on April 18, 1994. There is no dispute that Abkey is a dealer as defined in section 212.06(2), Florida Statutes, and has been a dealer at all times material hereto. For the month of June 2009, Abkey failed to file a sales tax return. As a result of this failure, the Department assessed Abkey an estimated sales tax due in the amount of $9,500.00. For 2005, Abkey failed to remit its self-reported sales tax liability to the Department for the months of July, September, October, November, and December. Abkey self-reported its tax liability, by filing sales tax returns, for the said months. For 2006, Abkey failed to remit its self-reported sales tax liability to the Department for the months of January and May. Abkey self-reported its tax liability, by filing sales tax returns, for the said months. Also, for 2006, Abkey failed to timely remit its sales tax liability for the month of October for which the Department assessed a penalty and an administrative/collection/processing fee. For 2007, Abkey failed to remit its self-reported sales tax liability to the Department for the months of February and August. Abkey self-reported its tax liability, by filing sales tax returns, for the said months. Also, for 2007, Abkey failed to timely remit its sales tax liability for the month of October, for which the Department assessed a penalty and an administrative/collection/processing fee. In total, for 2005, 2006, and 2007, Abkey self- reported sales tax due and failed to remit to the Department sales tax reportedly due in the amount of $122,355.36. As a result of Abkey's failure to file the sales tax return, to remit the $122,355.36 in sales tax, and to remit timely sales tax, the Department assessed Abkey, as of October 29, 2009, $16,287.59 in interest, $4,891.73 in penalties, and $13,845.10 in administrative/collection/ processing fees. Additionally, for the month of February 2007, Abkey issued to the Department a dishonored check (electronic funds transfer) on March 23, 2007, in the amount of $18,254.00. The Department assessed a $150.00 return check fee for the dishonored check. Shortly after being notified of the dishonored check by the Department, Abkey paid the $18,254.00. Abkey has a significant history of delinquency in remitting payments to the Department. The Department made several attempts, unsuccessfully, to collect the delinquent tax liabilities, including issuing Tax Warrants. In January 2007, the Department sought to revoke Abkey's Certificate of Registration for delinquent returns and outstanding liability and engaged in an informal conference with Abkey. As a result of the informal conference, Abkey and the Department entered into a Compliance Agreement executed on February 15, 2010. The Compliance Agreement required Abkey, among other things, to remit all past due payments; for 12 months (January through December 2007), to timely file tax returns and to timely remit all sales tax due; and to make a down payment of $45,000.00 (in three monthly installments but no later than April 1, 2007), 11 monthly payments of $5,000.00 (beginning May 1, 2007), and a balloon payment of $141,982.43 on April 1, 2008. Further, regarding the balloon payment of $141,982.43, the Compliance Agreement provided that the balloon payment might be negotiated for another 12 months. However, in order for Abkey to take advantage of this provision, Abkey was required to be compliant with the terms of the Compliance Agreement and its account was required to be in good standing with the Department. In accordance with the Compliance Agreement, Abkey paid the down payment of $45,000.00 (in three monthly installments) and the 11 payments of $5,000.00 although the 11 payments were late. Additionally, for the period of January through December 2007, Abkey was late filing tax returns and remitting sales tax. Abkey requested a renewal of the Compliance Agreement. Despite the late payments, the Department approved the renewal of the Compliance Agreement. A Compliance Agreement Renewal was executed on May 1, 2008. It required Abkey, among other things, to remit all past due payments and to timely file tax returns and timely remit all sales tax due for the next 12 months (May 1, 2008 through April 30, 2009); and to make 11 monthly payments of $5,000.00 (beginning May 1, 2008), and a balloon payment of $120,749.14 on April 1, 2009. Furthermore, regarding the balloon payment of $120,749.14, the Compliance Agreement Renewal provided that the balloon payment might be negotiated for another 12 months. However, in order for Abkey to take advantage of this provision, Abkey was required to be compliant with the terms of the Compliance Agreement Renewal and its account was required to be in good standing with the Department. Under the Compliance Agreement Renewal, Abkey made four payments of $5,000.00 but the payments were late. Abkey requested a reduction in the amount of the monthly payments from $5,000.00 to $2,000.00. The Department granted Abkey's request. Abkey made 12 payments of $2,000.00 but the payments were late. Additionally, for the period of May 1, 2008 through April 30, 2009, Abkey was late filing tax returns and remitting sales tax. Further, Abkey failed to make the balloon payment of $120,749.14 that was due on April 1, 2009. Abkey did not request a renegotiation of the balloon payment. At that time, Abkey did not request another Compliance Agreement. As of September 28, 2010, Abkey owed the Department $122,355.36 in actual sales tax (per Abkey's sales tax returns), $9,500.00 in estimated tax, $4,419.73 in penalty2, $14,572.80 in administrative/collection/processing fees3, $25,032.28 in interest, and $20.00 in warrant fees; totaling $175,900.17. The Department seeks to revoke Abkey's Certificate of Registration.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order revoking the Certificate of Registration issued to and held by Abkey No. 1 Limited. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2011.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Eight Hundred, Inc. (Petitioner), collected and remitted the proper amount of sales tax on its retail sales activities, and either paid or accrued use tax on its purchases.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation. Petitioner's revenues are derived, in part, through the operation of vending machine businesses throughout the State of Florida. Petitioner placed coin-operated cigarette, food and beverage, candy, and amusement vending machines in various bingo halls located throughout the state. These locations included: Pondella Hall for Hire, Inc.; Avon Plaza Bingo; Bingo Trail; Causeway Plaza Bingo; Dunnellon Bingo; Fountains Plaza Bingo; Lamirada Plaza Bingo; Northtowne Bingo; Orlando Bingo; Pondella Bingo; Sanford Bingo; Sarasota Crossings Bingo; South Belcher Bingo; and Towne Centre Bingo. Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949 (Chapter 212, Florida Statutes (2003)), as amended. Among other things, Respondent performs audits on taxpayers to ensure that all taxes due have been correctly paid. In 1994, an audit was conducted on Petitioner covering the audit period from August 1, 1989, through July 31, 1994. After the results of the audit were obtained on June 23, 1995, Petitioner issued a NOI wherein it proposed to assess Petitioner $48,026.75 in unpaid sales tax, $18,520.05 in delinquent penalties, and $15,836.40 in accrued interest on the unpaid tax; and $4,383.13 in unpaid discretionary sales surtax, $1,875.80 in delinquent penalties, and $1,088.58 in accrued interest on the unpaid discretionary sales surtax through the date of the notice for a total of $89,730.71. By letter dated July 18, 1995, Petitioner protested the NOI and stated that (a) Petitioner was not willful in any of the errors discovered during the audit; (b) Petitioner filed and paid the tax it believed to be accurate; and (c) Petitioner has taken steps to correct the problems identified in the audit and is now filing timely in accordance with the applicable rules pertaining to the transactions in which it was engaged. Petitioner requested that the penalties and interest be abated and requested an informal conference if the letter inquiry could not be honored. For reasons unknown, the requested conference was not provided by Respondent. On November 7, 1995, under a search warrant issued at the request of the Florida statewide prosecutor, all business and banking records of Petitioner, then known as Ponderosa-for- Hire, Inc., were seized. Respondent issued its NOPA sustaining the assessment in full, which with accrued interest, then totaled $92,126.52. On March 15, 2000, Petitioner filed a letter of protest of the audit findings. On June 11, 2001, Respondent issued its NOD rejecting Petitioner's position. On July 9, 2001, a Petition for Reconsideration was filed by Petitioner. Additional letters were sent to the Respondent subsequent to the July 9, 2001, petition. Respondent issued its NOR on November 16, 2001, denying the petition. On January 15, 2002, Petitioner filed its petition with Respondent seeking an administrative hearing with DOAH. The private accounting firm of Crawford and Jones conducted a state sales and use tax audit of Petitioner under the authority of Respondent's contract audit program. The audit began on September 8, 1994, upon issuance of Respondent's Form DR-804 (DR-804). The DR-840 included a list of records which were to be produced, including federal tax returns, state sales and use tax returns, sales journals, invoices, and purchase invoices. The authorized representatives of Respondent for the audit was David L. Schultz of the accounting firm Schultz, Chaipel and Company. Representation began upon presentation to Respondent of Form DR-843, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representation, dated January 9, 1995. Included among the records provided to Respondent's auditor were ledgers, journals, taxpayer copies of DR-15 (sales and use tax return), bank statements, tax returns, financial statements. A schedule of income earned by Petitioner, by location and category of income, was provided to Respondent by Mr. Schultz's office. This schedule of income had been created by Philip Furtney, president of Petitioner, from records he kept on his home computer. The categories of income listed on the schedules were, for each hall location: canteen, cigarette, soft drink machines, crane machines, and telephones. Beginning in fiscal year 1992, a new category titled "miscellaneous" was added; and in fiscal year 1993, the category "rent" was added. Respondent's auditor compared the data contained in these schedules, for each tax year, with other reported items, such as tax returns and financial statements, to ascertain if the figures reported were a reasonable representation of income and that reliance could be placed on the data. After determining the schedules to be reasonable, Respondent's auditor used this data to calculate the amount of sales tax due based on the income reported. The effective state sales tax rate, when sales are made through coin-operated amusement and vending machines and other devices, is found in Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.044 and 12A-15.001. The effective state sales tax rate for sales involving fractions of a dollar is found in Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.004 and 12A-15.002. Respondent's auditor's work papers break out the different effective tax rates for each of Petitioner's revenue activities, including the different surtax rates. Credit for taxes remitted by Petitioner was calculated from the Form DR-15 downloads. Adjustments were made to this data where the total amount reported was illogical, duplicative, or otherwise appeared incorrect. The total amount of sales tax due, as reported in the Schedule "A" sales, was determined by subtracting sales tax remitted to Respondent from the amount calculated on total retail sales made. This amount was $33,269.75 in sales tax and $3,912.95 in surtax. "Use" tax liability was calculated on two activities: First, items of tangible personal property purchased by Petitioner during the audit period for which the invoices did not affirmatively show that sales tax was paid; and secondly, on the stuffed animals contained in the crane machines which are considered concession prizes. The method for calculating the use tax on concession prizes is described in Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.080. Because the operator of game concessions award tangible personal property as prizes to those who pay to play the machine, the operator is the ultimate consumer of the property (prize). The basis for determining tax liability is computed by multiplying six percent times 25 percent of the gross receipts from all such games, in this instance, the crane machines. The total amount of use tax due, as reported in the Schedule "B" purchases, was $14,757 in tax and $470.18 surtax. After the NOI was issued, the audit file was forwarded to Respondent's Tallahassee office. The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that the sales activity of Petitioner included revenue received from vending and amusement machines and snack bar operations. Federal tax return for the fiscal year 1992 does not list any amount of income as being derived from rental activity. The federal returns for years 1991 and 1993 list rental income; however, no information was given to Respondent's auditor during the audit to explain what this income was and from where it was derived. Applications for Registration were filed by Petitioner when each hall location began operations. Of the 23 registration applications filed, nine of them listed the major business activity as vending-food and amusement; eight of them listed the major business activity as restaurant, snack bar or canteen service; five listed the major business activity as rental; and one gave no activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Revenue, upholding its assessments in the NOR dated November 16, 2001, for sales and use tax, the applicable surtax, plus applicable penalty and interest against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: John Mika, Esquire Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2005. Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Thomas F. Egan, Esquire Law Office of Thomas F. Egan, P.A. 204 Park Lake Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact On January 22, 1986, American Aviation Resources, Inc., sold an airplane to Munur Yurtsever, a resident of Brazil. This aircraft was a Hansa jet model HFB-320 with U.S. registration number N71DL (the subject aircraft). On January 28, 1986, Mr. Yurtsever transferred title of the subject aircraft to Petitioner, Selcuk Yetimoglu. At the time of the transfer, the subject aircraft was in the State of Florida undergoing repairs. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Yetimoglu resided at 20530 Jacaranda Road, Cutler Ridge, Miami, Florida, in a residence owned by Mr. Yurtsever. The aircraft bill of sale dated January 28, 1986, reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu was the purchaser of the subject aircraft and that Mr. Yurtsever was the seller. The bill of sale recited that the consideration paid was $20.00 and other good and valuable consideration. While the bill of sale reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu resided in Miami, Florida, the bill of sale does not state that the sale occurred in the State of Florida. On January 29, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu applied to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the registration of the subject aircraft in his name. On March 13, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote to the FAA regarding the registration and stated, in pertinent part, as follows: Mr. Munur Yurtsever sold the aircraft to me on January 28, 1986, five days after he bought the aircraft from American Aviation Resources, Inc. when he found out that the government of Brazil did not give him a (sic) permission to import the aircraft and that he could not register the aircraft in the United States because he was not a citizen of the United States. By letter dated May 15, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu provided the FAA proof that the subject aircraft had not been registered in Brazil. Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner of the subject aircraft between January 28, 1986, and March 13, 1987. On March 13, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu sold the subject aircraft back to Mr. Yurtsever. The bill of sale identifies the purchaser as being: Munur Yurtsever Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. Av. Mal. Camara 160-GR. Rio de Janeiro - RJ Brazil On April 8, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote the FAA and stated, in pertinent part: ... I request cancelation of U.S. registra- tion for the aircraft ... because I sold the aircraft back to Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. ... On January 11, 1988, Respondent issued to Petitioner a "Notice of Delinquent Tax Penalty and Interest Due and Assessed" (Notice of Assessment) based on the transaction involving Mr. Yetimoglu, Mr. Yurtsever, and the subject aircraft. The Notice of Assessment contained the following statement: "This Department has information that you purchased the following aircraft. However, there is no evidence of payment of Florida Sales and/or Use Tax". The Notice of Assessment reflected that Respondent had, pursuant to Section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes, estimated the value of the aircraft as being $320,000 and assessed the following taxes, interest, and penalties: Florida State Sales/Use Tax 5% $16,000.00 (Estimated) Per 212.06(8), F.S. Penalty 5% per month; Maximum 25% of 4,000.00 (25%) Tax Due Per Section 212.12(2), F.S. Additional Penalty 11,840.00 (50%) Per 212.12(2)(a), F.S. Interest = 1% per month from date of 3,680.00 (23%) Purchase To Date of Payment Per Section 212.12(3), F.S. Less Tax Paid ----------------- TOTAL DUE WITH THIS NOTICE $35,520.00 Respondent requested that Mr. Yetimoglu provide it information and documentation as to the value of the aircraft. Mr. Yetimoglu contends that he paid Mr. Yurtsever nothing for the aircraft, that the title was transferred to him and registered in the FAA in his name so that the aircraft could be test flown after it was repaired, and that Mr. Yurtsever had paid $100,000 for the aircraft. There was no evidence as to the sales price that Mr. Yetimoglu paid for the aircraft other than Mr. Yetimoglu's testimony. Respondent estimated that the reasonable value of the subject aircraft on January 28, 1986, was $320,000. This estimate was based on an appraisal prepared for Respondent and assumed that the aircraft was in a scrapped or junked condition. Respondent generally uses a standard reference work on the value of aircraft to assist it in estimating the value of the subject aircraft. Because of its age and model, the subject aircraft is no longer listed in this standard reference. In support of his contention that Mr. Yurtsever paid $100,000 for the aircraft, Mr. Yetimoglu provided Respondent with a copy of a wire transfer of funds from Mr. Yurtsever to American Aviation Resources, Inc. in the amount of $100,000. However, there was no documentation provided that established that the $100,000 constituted the entire purchase price paid by Mr. Yurtsever. The dispute between the parties as to the value of the aircraft is resolved by finding, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that the reasonable value of the aircraft at the times pertinent to this proceeding was $320,000.00. In December 1986, while Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner, the subject aircraft engaged in international flight between the Turks and Caicos Islands and the State of Florida. Respondent's Notice of Redetermination, dated February 26, 1990, upheld the Notice of Assessment on the basis that the underlying transaction was subject to use tax pursuant to Section 212.06(8), Florida Statutes. The issue to be resolved was framed by the Notice of Redetermination as being: "The only issue involved pertains to a use tax assessment upon an aircraft brought into this country". This determination was based, in part, upon a letter to Respondent from an attorney who was representing Mr. Yetimoglu at the time the letter was written. 1/ The letter implied that the aircraft was brought into Florida after the title was transferred to Mr. Yetimoglu, and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The transferor of the aircraft, Munur Yurtsever, is a nonresident alien. His inten- tion is to deliver the plane to a purchaser outside the country. Mr. Yurtsever advises that the F.A.A. will not allow the plane to be flown in this country unless it is owned by a U.S. resident. As it was imperative to fly the plane here in order to prepare it for its flight outside the country, Mr. Yurtsever transferred the plane to his partner, Selcuk Yetimoglu, who is a resident of the United States. ... At the formal hearing, Mr. Yetimoglu established that the aircraft was in Florida undergoing repairs at the time the title was transferred to him. Prior to and at the formal hearing, Respondent asserted the position that use taxes, interest, and penalties were due for this transaction. In its post- hearing submittal, Respondent, for the first time in this proceeding, contends that sales taxes, interest and penalties are due for this transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which withdraws the subject assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of March, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1991.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business and domicile in Texas, has an obligation to collect and remit Florida sales taxes on sales it made to a Massachusetts-domiciled corporation, in view of the facts found below.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a Delaware Corporation whose principal place of business is in Austin, Texas. The Petitioner designs, develops, and markets portable computer equipment, chiefly portable "tablet" personal computers with related "peripherals," which it sells and delivers in multiple states, including Florida. It sells these products to "re-sellers" and distributors, as well as to "end users." The Petitioner, by the Department's admission in Exhibit "A" (audit) does not maintain a physical presence in the State of Florida. It does employ one sales person for business in Florida, but maintains no warehouse or other facilities, vehicles nor other indicia of physical locations or operation in the state of Florida. The Petitioner is registered as a "dealer" with the State of Florida, Department of Revenue under the Florida Sales and Use Tax Law. The Petitioner does engage in some sales to Florida "end customers" or to re-sale purchasers in Florida. These transactions, however, are not at issue in this case. The dispute solely relates to transactions between the Petitioner and Advantec Computer System, Inc., of Marlboro, Massachusetts. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the regulation, control, administration, and enforcement of the sales and use tax laws of the State of Florida embodied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Chapter 12A-1. The Respondent conducted an audit of the books and records of the Petitioner, resulting in this proceeding, for the audit period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2006. That audit was conducted by Xena Francis, and revealed, according to the Department's position, a purported sales tax payment deficiency on the part of the Petitioner in the above-referenced amounts. The Department, upon completion of the audit, issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, thus advising the Petitioner of the amount of the tax penalty and interest it was assessing as a result of the audit. The transactions which the Department maintained were questionable, in terms of taxes not being paid with regard thereto, were those where the Petitioner sold computer products to entities who did not produce to the Petitioner a certificate of exemption from collection of sales tax by Florida on that transaction, and where the product was shipped by the Petitioner into Florida by common carrier. The Department essentially takes the position that, since the Petitioner has a state sales and use tax "dealer certificate," that it is responsible to prove any transactions as being exempt from the relevant taxing provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and the above rule chapter. The Department apparently presumes as a part of this position that the fact that the product in question was shipped to ultimate users in Florida by common carrier from the Petitioner's place of business outside the state that such were Florida sales tax transactions. It thus contends that the burden is on the Petitioner to prove that they are exempt from such tax and collection. After it was advised of the audit findings and the basis for the assessment, the Petitioner provided to the Department certain exemption certificates for a number of the entities and transactions for which shipment had not been made into Florida. The Department accepted these and the assessment was adjusted downward to reflect the exempt status of those transactions, pursuant to the further information provided the Department by the Petitioner. The other disputed transactions for which no exemption certificate was provided by the Petitioner, were deemed by the auditor to be taxable. In essence, the auditor took the position, as does the Department, that every person making sales into the State of Florida is subject to sales and use tax unless specifically exempt and that it is incumbent upon the selling dealer (which it maintains is the Petitioner) to establish the exempt status of the transaction, at the time of sale, with a supporting re-sale certificate or some documentation to support the transactions, exempt status.1/ The sales which are the subject of this dispute are exclusively those between the Petitioner and Advantec Computer Systems, Inc. Advantec is a Massachusetts Incorporated and domiciled corporation. It apparently does not possess a Florida "re-sale certificate" or "dealer certificate." The Petitioner sold various computers and related products, as shown by the invoices in evidence, to Advantec. The invoices and the testimony adduced by the Petitioner established that those sales were between the Petitioner and Advantec, the Massachusetts corporation. Advantec, in turn, sold the products or some of them to Florida customers. Those customers did not pay the Petitioner for the sales, but paid Advantec. Advantec directed that delivery from the Petitioner be made not to Advantec itself, but to its Florida-end customer via common carrier from the Petitioner's out-of-state location or from its overseas supplier. In any event, delivery was made from outside Florida to the Florida Advantec customers by common carrier. The Petitioner billed no Florida customer and had no relationship with any Florida customer of Advantec. Instead it invoiced and billed Advantec for the price of the products involved on a "net 30-day" basis. Advantec would then pay the Petitioner for the amount invoiced by the Petitioner to Advantec. As to the Advantec sales at issue, there was no nexus, substantial or otherwise, between the Petitioner and Advantec's customers in Florida, except that the product was "drop shipped" from the Petitioner's relevant location out of the State of Florida to the Florida customer by common carrier, not by any vehicle owned, leased, or operated by any person or entity affiliated with the Petitioner. In fact, the deliveries in question were made by Federal Express as a drop shipment. Advantec's principal business activity is the re-sale and distribution of computers and related products. It has no presence in Florida and is not a registered dealer in Florida. When the Petitioner made the sales to Advantec Computer Systems, as shown by the invoices and testimony in evidence, it billed Advantec for the sales and did not collect sales tax. While the Petitioner has in its possession Advantec's Massachusetts-issued tax-exempt certificate, the Petitioner does not have a Florida tax-exempt certificate on-file for Advantec, because Advantec is not registered in Florida, and the sale by the Petitioner to Advantec is a Massachusetts sale with no Florida nexus. The Petitioner offered three Technical Assistance Advisements (TAA) into evidence, which it obtained from the Department in support of the fact that the transactions in question are not taxable. (See Exhibits 2, 3, 4 in evidence.) These exhibits were admitted on a limited basis over the Department's objection as being possibly material to a determination as to the weight and credibility of the Department's evidence in this case, but not as being legally binding or constituting legal precedent, which last quality is precluded by Section 213.22(1), Florida Statutes (2006). Additionally, the Petitioner offered and had admitted Petitioner's Exhibit 7, which was an e-mail received from a representative of the Department, in response to an inquiry by the Petitioner. This was admitted over hearsay objection as a party statement offered by the opposing party.2/ In that exchange between the Petitioner and the Department, the Petitioner, as shown by testimony and the exhibit, related the facts involved in the sales to Advantec. The Department's response indicated that, if indeed, the buyer and seller were both located outside the State of Florida and the goods when purchased were outside the State of Florida, then the sale is not a Florida sale, between the out-of-state buyer and the out- of-state seller (the Petitioner). If the goods were then delivered by common carrier to the out-of-state buyer's ultimate customers in Florida, from the Petitioner's out-of-state location, then the transaction between the Petitioner and the out-of-state buyer is not subject to the Florida sales tax law and, in essence, is non-jurisdictional, not as a "Florida nexus sale." In summary, the Petitioner sold the goods in question to Advantec and invoiced Advantec at its Massachusetts domicile and address on "net 30-day" term. No Florida customer, person, or entity was billed for the sales in question, nor was any payment collected from any individual or business entity located in the State of Florida. Once the sale was consummated between the Petitioner and Advantec, the Petitioner merely "dropped shipped," by common carrier, the goods purchased by Advantec to Advantec's ultimate customer located in the State of Florida.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue, vacating and dismissing the assessment of the subject sales tax and interest to the Petitioner, Motion Computing, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 2007.
The Issue What, if any, is Petitioner's tax liability to the State of Florida, after any legitimate tax credits are applied, for June 1998 through December 1998?
Findings Of Fact During the period of June 1998 through September 1998, Petitioner Ron Ross Meardy operated a used car lot from a location in Duval County, Florida, to wit: 1400 Mayport Road, Atlantic Beach, Florida, 32233-3440. Mr. Meardy conducted business through a sole proprietorship named Auto Liquidation Center (ALC). Mr. Meardy's business included both retail sales and wholesale sales of motor vehicles. Between June 1998 and December 1998, Mr. Meardy was a registered dealer with DOR. Mr. Meardy's sales tax registration number was 26-02-151942-23/4, which registration number pertains to the Mayport location in Duval County, Florida. Mr. Meardy filed State of Florida Sales and Use Tax returns, standard form DR-15, for each month between December 1997 through May 1998. In so doing, he relied entirely on his employees. Mr. Meardy also filed State of Florida Solid Waste returns, standard form DR-15SW, for each month between December 1997 through May 1998. In so doing, he relied entirely on his employees. In September 1998, Mr. Meardy opened a car lot in St. Augustine, St. John's County, Florida and closed the Duval County car lot. Mr. Meardy filed no DR-15 (sales tax) forms for the period of June 1998 through December 1998. Mr. Meardy filed no DR-15SW (waste tax) forms for the period of June 1998 through December 1998. Mr. Meardy asserted that he did not know that his employees had made a lot of bad loans or failed to file tax returns for June 1998 through September 1998. Mr. Meardy admitted that from September to December 1998, he deliberately filed no tax returns. First, he claimed he did not file returns because there were no taxable sales made in that period. Then, he asserted that he did not file because, in an unrelated matter, the Florida Attorney General's Office, investigating several businesses "run" by him, held necessary business documents from October 27, 1998 until December 11, 1998 (+/- 45 days). Mr. Meardy's credible testimony that he did not have his business records from October 27, 1998 to December 1998 was unrefuted. As a result of Mr. Meardy's not having filed any DR-15 and DR-15SW forms for the period of June 1998 through December 1998, DOR filed a sales and solid waste tax warrant against him dated March 30, 1999, for $11,937.86. As permitted by law, this audit/warrant merely estimated Mr. Meardy's liability. Mr. Meardy did not then file formal tax returns, file a formal request for an alleged credit (DR-95 form), or provide DOR access to his business records so that DOR could make an accurate assessment/audit/warrant for any tax, penalty, interest, and/or credit. Instead, he timely-filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on May 28, 1999. The Petition for Administrative Hearing, dated May 21 and filed May 28, 1999, was the first written expression by which Petitioner alerted DOR that he was seeking a tax credit due to repossessions he claimed to have made on defaulted loans. The Petition only stated that DOR "owes ALC money due to repossession credits." The Petition does not contain all of the information required by rule or by the standard credit claim form DR-95B. Petitioner had, in the past, applied for credit for tax paid on repossessed items by attaching the DR-95B form to his monthly tax returns (P-3). He maintained he had relied on his employees for this function. Petitioner's credible testimony that the Attorney General again held some of his documents from the end of May 1999, until September 30, 1999 (+/-five months), due to an unrelated matter, was unrefuted. However, at no time did Petitioner ever file a formal request for credit (form DR-95B) or any tax returns for the period at issue in this proceeding. Only during the course of discovery in the instant proceeding, which discovery Petitioner resisted by every legal means, did it become clear that Petitioner was claiming a tax credit from his May 1998 sales tax return, and that the credit he sought was in excess of the tax he had paid by way of his May 1998 tax return. Only during the discovery process herein did Petitioner provide DOR with any information concerning repossession and default amounts that he was claiming. He did this by producing a "database" (DOR-4). It is unclear from the evidence at hearing when this information was provided, but the date Petitioner claims in his Proposed Findings of Fact to have first produced DOR-4 is February 10, 2000. Petitioner also claims to have given someone at DOR a computer disc with his supporting information, but no DOR witness confirmed this. Petitioner produced no such disc at hearing. Exhibit DOR-4 did not provide the vehicle registration number as part of the property description, the date the sales and use tax was paid, the purchase price less trade-in, the purchase price less cash down, or the actual date of repossession. A copy of each invoice supporting each repossession was not attached. Petitioner did not submit any tax return with DOR-4. Petitioner admits that DOR-4 does not contain all of the information required by the tax credit claim form, DR-95B. DOR revised its assessment once, based on the information Petitioner was required to produce in this proceeding. DOR revised its assessment a second time as a result of the information Mr. Meardy provided in the course of his deposition taken January 19, 2001, approximately a week-and- a-half before final hearing. As agreed-to within the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, the revised assessment figure in this case is now limited to $2626.31 sales tax, $1313.40 penalty, and $75.35 interest, for a total of $4735.56, as of January 31, 2001. If the foregoing base amounts are, in fact, owed, penalties and interest continue to accrue, pursuant to statute. In making the final audit/assessment/warrant, DOR's Auditor IV, Thelmesia Whitfield, used original materials supplied by Petitioner. From these, she took the actual amounts Petitioner had listed on his dated invoices and other original records as the tax he collected for June 1998 through December 1998. She then calculated the sales tax due, but not remitted, for that period. In so doing, she determined that no additional taxes were due for the months of August 1998 through December 1998. She also concluded that for Petitioner's sales in June and July 1998, a penalty should be assessed at the legal rate of 10% per month on a cumulative basis up to 50% and interest should be assessed at the legal rate of 12% per year or 1% per month on the cumulative balance that is due. Petitioner's solid waste fee liability was calculated by Ms. Whitfield on the basis of the dated sales invoices provided by Petitioner where he had charged fees for tire and battery disposal. Ms. Whitfield's calculations did not include transactions without invoices or other original records. She noted that on several transactions Petitioner had collected more solid waste tax than was required, and she concluded that once collected, those amounts should be remitted to DOR unless they had been refunded to the customer. She calculated local option taxes at the applicable rate for Duval County. Ms. Whitfield's re-calculations do not reflect credits for the repossessions shown on DOR-4, because no state tax returns were filed from June through December 1998, because all the necessary information had not been provided, and because she believed the information on DOR-4 had been provided beyond the period available to claim repossession credits, which is 13 months after the repossession takes place. Ms. Whitfield's re-calculations also do not include credits for worthless accounts orally claimed by Petitioner in the course of his January 19, 2001, deposition or which he urges that she extrapolate from DOR-4, because Petitioner did not also provide either federal tax returns or equivalent financial statements as required by law. Because Petitioner was asking for a refund of more than he said he had paid, and because the sales he was referencing took place before the period being audited, Ms. Whitfield had no way to verify that the amount of sales tax actually had been paid. Therefore, Ms. Whitfield only used DOR-4 where there was a question as to whether a sale had taken place at all. Although DOR-4 is merely a summary, because it was produced by Petitioner and listed sales dates, she used it only as his admission that certain questionable sales had, in fact, taken place. Accordingly, it is found that DOR has not relied on estimations based on prior sales outside the time frame audited, but has made its final assessment (DOR Composite Exhibit 3) upon reasonable documentation provided by Petitioner, which documentation he represented as being accurate to the best of his ability. It is further found that DOR applied defineable legal standards. Petitioner essentially challenges DOR's last assessment/audit/warrant because Ms. Whitfield did not use DOR-4 to assign him a credit or off-set. He seeks to have the undersigned relate, according to his theory of repossession/default credits, DOR's final assessment reflected in DOR's audit report and work papers (DOR Composite Exhibit 3); DOR-4, Petitioner's "database"; and Petitioner's Exhibits 1-3 so as to determine Petitioner's sales tax and solid waste liability for the June 1998 through December 1998 period, and to thereby assign him a credit against his May 1998 tax return and payment (P-3). Petitioner's theory is based on his representation that his database (DOR-4) uses the first time he received money from each sale of a vehicle as the date of the sale/transaction, even though his own invoices and other original supporting data which he provided to DOR, showed different dates as the date of each sale. Then, he asserts that where vehicles have been repossessed, or where a sale has not "gone through," or where a loan has been defaulted (presumably even without repossession, of the car, although this is unclear), a credit should be related back to his May 1998, tax return (P-3). His argument and evidence are not persuasive for the following reasons. At the outset, it is noted that Petitioner's credit claim in excess of $12,000, is more than the tax Petitioner paid in May 1998, as reflected on Exhibit P-3. Likewise, although Petitioner's invoice used in Ms. Whitfield's calculations recorded a sale on June 22, 1998, to Lori Armstrong at $1500.00, Petitioner, without any supporting evidence, asserted at hearing that this sale actually was made on June 23, 1998, and that someone stole $500.00 of the tendered price, so he should pay tax, if at all, on a sale of only $1,000. He had a similar unsupported reason for attempting to reduce, by $100.00, the sales price on another invoice amount for Randy Davis, which invoice Ms. Whitfield had utilized. Petitioner also claimed, at hearing, again with no supporting evidence, that invoices he had previously produced and which were relied upon by Ms. Whitfield for customers Crumley, Mosley, and Lebourgeois "did not go through," and therefore he should not be liable for sales tax on these invoices. He asserted that since DOR could not find any title at the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) for these customers, the inference must be drawn that those sales never closed and therefore no sales tax on them is owed by him. Petitioner also claimed at hearing that the Lebourgeois sale had resulted in a repossession. At hearing, Petitioner admitted liability for a $1,000 sale to a customer Millwater, but claimed that a credit from May 1998 would cover it, without any clear explanation of how this should occur. Petitioner maintained at hearing, again only because no title in that name had been located at the DHSMV, that an invoice of September 14, 1998, to a customer Wilkerson for $200 meant that the sale to Wilkerson was an out-of-state sale, and therefore no tax was owed. In his Proposed Findings of Fact, Petitioner does not address theft as an alleged reason he did not collect the full amounts shown on his invoices (see Finding of Fact 35), but he does seek a tax credit for all sales where no title was found at DHSMV and discusses at least the Crumley, Mosley, and Lebourgeois transactions as a source of these alleged "credits," sometimes for months in which he did not file any tax return. He also addressed customers Varner, Bailey, Little, Wright, Emanual, Lanier, Maynard, Porter, Williams, Arenas, Bays, Beasley, Butt, Carvey, Catlin, Chapman, Clendenin, Cunningham, Forbes, Catina Friend, Gonzalez, Knight, Lloyd, Owens, Strickland, Daniels, Johnson, and McDade, whose names and information (except for Bailey) appear on DOR-4, Petitioner's database, as repossessions or defaulted loans. Bailey appears on DOR-4 but in a different portion of DOR-4. (See Finding of Fact 47). The two biggest problems with Petitioner's theory are that he submitted no evidence to affirmatively demonstrate that any vehicle was repossessed, and Exhibit P-3 does not allow the undersigned any way of determining which vehicle sales were included in the May 1998 tax paid. Exhibit P-3 does provide information as to the repossessions claimed in May 1998 for previous months' sales, but it does not itemize or identify May 1998 sales upon which the tax was being paid in that month. Simply testifying that a repossession or default occurred and that someone entered that information into Petitioner's database (DOR-4) is not competent and credible proof that repossession occurred. In light of Petitioner's testimony that he relied on unreliable and dishonest employees to handle both his sales and tax matters at the Duval County office and without any explanation or documentation of how repossessions or loan defaults were handled from either of his business locations, the undersigned is left with the sense that Petitioner had neither hands-on experience with the listed repossessions nor with the subsequent entries of repossessions and/or loan defaults into his database. Although Petitioner has made a logical argument for "starting at ground zero" with regard to his May 1998 tax return, without more than is in evidence here, vehicles allegedly sold prior to June 1998 cannot be related to vehicles allegedly repossessed after June 1998 by way of the May 1998 tax return (P-3). (See Findings of Fact 21 and 41.) The absence of a title of registration in a given individual's name, without more, is not sufficient to infer that a sale was not consummated or that there had been an out-of- state sale. If the buyer had the duty to transfer title, failure of title proves nothing. If the dealer had the duty to transfer title, Petitioner's failure to transfer title does not automatically translate into a tax credit. The minimal documentation underlying DOR-4 which Petitioner offered (Exhibits P-1 and P-2), also is not persuasive of Petitioner's theory of the case, including but not limited to his suggestion that DOR is required to regard the sale date as being a date when money allegedly was first received, instead of the dates of sale on his invoices or other underlying documentation. It seems undisputed that "Ralston Varner" and "Varner Dean" are the same customer, full name "Ralston Dean Varner." Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is a receipt showing a payment by Ralston Varner for an "'88 Chevy Caviler" [sic] and is dated May 1, 1998, which is the date Petitioner claims to be the completion of sale date. By Petitioner's theory, sales tax on this purchase should have been included in his May 1998 tax return, entitling him to receive a tax credit upon repossession of this or some other vehicle. This cannot be determined from the tax return (P-3). Exhibit DOR-6 is a composite exhibit concerning a sale to Ralson Varner. Those pages preceding the page titled "Certification," dated July 19, 1998, were produced by Mr. Meardy at his office. The materials following the certification constitute a DHSMV "body jacket." The first page of DOR-6 reveals "6-10-98," as the date of the used car order, but pertains to a "1989 Ford T-Bird." The twelfth page, the "Installment Sale Contract-Motor Vehicle," is dated June 10, 1998, and also relates to a 1989 Ford "T-Bird." DOR's final audit refers to a 1989 Ford Thunderbird sold to "Varner Dean," not an '88 Chevy Cavalier, as urged by Petitioner. Petitioner's Exhibit 2 shows two receipts from Dennis Bailey, one on May 26, 1998 and one on June 2, 1998. Petitioner maintained that the sale in question went through on May 26, 1998, the sales tax was remitted on his May 1998 tax return, and the car was later repossessed. The May 1998 tax return (P-3) does not help decipher this. A Dennis Bailey appears on DOR-4 as of May 26, 1998, in relation to a Ford Taurus, but it is not one of the transactions Petitioner has singled out by the hand- written notations on DOR-4 as being defaulted or repossessed. Exhibit DOR-5 is a composite exhibit concerning the sale to Dennis Bailey which Ms. Whitfield audited. Those pages preceding the page titled "Certification," dated July 19, 1999, were produced by Petitioner. The materials following the certification constitute a DHSMV "body jacket." Exhibit DOR-5, page one, shows "June 2, 1998," as the date of the used car order. DOR-5, page 10, the fourth page following the certification, reveals the date of sale as "6-2-98," as reported to the DHSMV, both related to a 1988 Taurus. Under these circumstances, Petitioner's view of this sale cannot prevail. Also, Petitioner admitted that even by his theory and calculations, his May 1998 tax return was "off" by $1,007, and he had been unable to discover the reason (TR-103). Moreover, the evidence does not clearly establish that DOR-4 was presented to DOR within either 12 or 13 months of all the repossessions in question. (See Findings of Fact 19 and 21- 22.) Lastly, Petitioner did not present any evidence of refunds to customers of solid waste tax overpayments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order finding Petitioner is liable for the amounts as set out in Finding of Fact 24, without any credits or set-offs, and providing for accruing interest and penalties, pursuant to law. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Ross Meardy Post Office Box 1853 St. Augustine, Florida 32085 Charles Catanzaro, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue As to DOAH Case No. 18-4475RX, whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.044(5)(a) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.1/ As to DOAH Case No. 18-4992RU, whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") Standard Audit Plan, Vending and Amusement Machines--Industry Specific, section 1.1.3.3 ("SAP") is an unadopted rule in violation of sections 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Audit Period GBR is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida. Gilda Rosenberg is the owner of GBR and a related entity, Gilly Vending, Inc. ("Gilly"). GBR and Gilly are in the vending machine business. At all times material hereto, Amit Biegun served as the chief financial officer of the two entities. The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida's sales tax laws pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. This case concerns the audit period of January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2014. GBR's Provision of Vending Machine Services Prior to the audit period, the school boards of Broward and Palm Beach County issued written solicitations through invitations to bid ("ITB"), seeking vendors to furnish, install, stock, and maintain vending machines on school property. The bids required a "full turn-key operation." The stated objectives were to obtain the best vending service and percentage commission rates that will be most advantageous to the school boards, and to provide a contract that will be most profitable to the awarded vendor. The stated goal was that student choices from beverage and snack vending machines closely align with federal dietary guidelines. GBR operates approximately 700 snack and beverage vending machines situated at 65 schools in Broward, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade Counties. Of these 65 schools, 43 are in Broward County, 21 are in Palm Beach County, and one is in Miami-Dade County. The snack vending machines are all owned by GBR. Beverage vending machines are owned by bottling companies, such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Of the 700 vending machines, approximately 60 percent of the machines are for beverages and the remaining 40 percent are for snacks. GBR has written vending agreements with some schools. In these agreements, GBR is designated as a licensee, the school is designated as the licensor, and GBR is granted a license to install vending machines on school property in exchange for a commission. Furthermore, GBR is solely responsible to pay all federal, state, and local taxes in connection with the operation of the vending machines. Ownership of the vending machines does not transfer to the schools. However, in some cases the schools have keys to the machines. In addition, designated school board employees have access to the inside of the machines in order to review the meter, monitor all transactions, and reconcile the revenue from the machines. GBR places the vending machines on school property. However, the schools control the locations of the vending machines. The schools also require timers on the machines so that the schools can control the times during the day when the machines are operational and accessible to students. The schools also control the types of products to be placed in the machines to ensure that the products closely align with the federal dietary guidelines. The schools also control pricing strategies. GBR stocks, maintains, and services the vending machines. However, Coca-Cola and Pepsi may repair the beverage machines they own. GBR is solely responsible for repairing the machines it owns. The schools require that any vendor service workers seeking access to the vending machines during school hours pass background checks. GBR route drivers collect the revenue from all of the vending machines and the revenues are deposited into GBR's bank accounts. In exchange for GBR's services, the schools receive from GBR, as a commission, a percentage of the gross receipts. However, neither GBR nor the schools are guaranteed any revenue unless sales occur from the machines. On its federal income tax returns, GBR reports all sales revenue from the vending machines. For the tax year 2012, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $5,952,270. Of this amount, GBR paid the schools $1,363,207, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. For the tax year 2013, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $6,535,362. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $1,122,211, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. For the tax year 2014, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $6,076,255. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $1,279,682, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. Thus, for the audit period, and according to the federal tax returns and general ledgers, GBR's gross receipts or sales were $18,563,887. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $3,765,100, as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. The Department's Audit and Assessment On January 27, 2015, the Department, through its tax auditor, Mary Gray, sent written notice to GBR of its intent to conduct the audit. This was Ms. Gray's first audit involving vending machines at schools. Thereafter, GBR provided Ms. Gray with its general ledger, federal returns, and bid documents. On October 28, 2015, Ms. Gray issued a draft assessment to GBR. The email transmittal by Ms. Gray to GBR's representative states that "[t]he case is being forwarded for supervisory review." In the draft, Ms. Gray determined that GBR owed additional tax in the amount of $28,589.65, but there was no mention of any purported tax on the monies paid by GBR to the schools as a license fee to use real property. However, very close to the end of the audit, within one week after issuing the draft, and after Ms. Gray did further research and conferred with her supervisor, Ms. Gray's supervisor advised her to issue the B03 assessment pursuant to section 212.031 and rule 12A-1.044, and tax the monies paid by GBR to the schools as a license fee to use real property. Thus, according to the Department, GBR was now responsible for tax in the amount of $246,230.93, plus applicable interest. Of this alleged amount, $1,218.48 was for additional sales tax (A01); $4,181.41 was for purchase expenses (B02); $13,790 was for untaxed rent (B02); and $227.041.04 was for the purported license to use real property (B03). Ms. Gray then prepared a Standard Audit Report detailing her position of the audit and forwarded the report to the Department's dispute resolution division. On January 19, 2016, the Department issued the Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA") against GBR for additional tax and interest due of $288,993.31. The Department does not seek a penalty against GBR. At hearing, Ms. Gray testified that the Department's SAP is an audit planning tool or checklist which she used in conducting GBR's audit. Employees of the Department are not bound to follow the SAP, and the SAP can be modified by the auditors on a word document. The SAP was utilized by Ms. Gray during the audit, but it was not relied on in the NOD.4/
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, as the managing member of PNC, LLC (PNC), is personally liable for a penalty equal to twice the total amount of the sales and use tax owed by PNC to the State of Florida.1/
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes. PNC is a now-dissolved Florida limited liability company that did business under the name "CHEAP" at 309 South Howard Avenue, Tampa, Florida. PNC was registered as a business and filed its Articles of Organization with the Secretary of State on June 16, 2010. Until the company was dissolved by the Secretary of State in 2018 for failure to pay the 2017 annual filing fees, Mr. Scott served as its managing member and had administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes. Verna Bartlett was PNC's controller. PNC was registered with the Department as a dealer pursuant to section 212.18, Florida Statutes, and was issued Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration 39-8015401140-8. A certificate of registration requires the taxpayer to file sales and use tax returns and pay to the Department all taxes owed as they are received. After making numerous attempts to collect delinquent sales tax owed by PNC for tax reporting periods in 2013 and 2014, the Department filed this action seeking to impose a personal penalty assessment against Mr. Scott, the managing member of the company. Section 213.29, Florida Statutes, provides that any person who has administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes and who willfully fails to pay the tax or evades the payment of the tax shall be liable to a penalty equal to twice the amount of tax not paid. The penalty is based only on the taxes owed, and not the interest and fees that have accrued. The statute provides that if the business liability is fully paid, the personal liability assessment will be considered satisfied. On January 18, 2018, the Department issued a NAPL against Mr. Scott after PNC failed to pay the sales and use taxes owed the State for the reporting periods from February 2013 through October 2014. The outstanding taxes, exclusive of interest or penalties, total $79,325.75. The NAPL imposes a total penalty of $158,647.50, or twice the amount of sales tax owed by PNC. No payments have been made on the account since the issuance of the NAPL, and, PNC, now closed, currently has a total liability in excess of $200,000.00. During the relevant time period, Mr. Scott was personally responsible for collecting PNC's sales tax and remitting it to the Department; he had the authority to sign checks on behalf of PNC; he made financial decisions as to which creditors should be paid; he made the decision to use the sales tax collected for the business and for stipulation payments; and he made the decision not to remit the sales tax that was collected. This was confirmed by PNC's controller, Ms. Bartlett, who responded to the Department's Requests for Admissions. Mr. Scott also confirmed to a Department tax specialist that the admissions provided by Ms. Bartlett were accurate. Mr. Scott either never remitted payment or did not remit payment timely on behalf of PNC for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January through October 2014. Tax warrants were issued and judgment liens were recorded for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January, February, and April through October 2014. Resp. Ex. 5 and 6. All warrants and liens relate to reporting periods that fall within the personal liability assessment period. A Notice of Jeopardy Finding and Notice of Final Assessment (Notice of Jeopardy) dated June 18, 2014, was issued to PNC pertaining to the April 2014 reporting period. Resp. Ex. This notice was issued after Mr. Scott ceased making regular tax payments, the estimated deficiency was substantial, and the Department determined that collection of the tax would be jeopardized by further delay. A Notice of Jeopardy and Notice of Final Assessment dated August 7, 2014, also was issued to PNC pertaining to the April, May, and June 2014 reporting periods. Resp. Ex. 12. Because PNC reported more than $20,000.00 in sales tax each year, unless a waiver was obtained, Mr. Scott was required to file and pay PNC's sales tax electronically for all reporting periods within the personal liability period. See § 213.755(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 12-24.003. Despite having obtained no waiver, Mr. Scott never filed returns or paid PNC's sales tax electronically. And even though he never remitted a payment electronically, Mr. Scott indicated on at least six sales tax returns during the relevant time period that sales tax for the reporting period was remitted electronically. The only conclusion to draw from this action is that Mr. Scott filed or directed the filing of these returns knowing them to be false. The record shows that, dating back to 2011, Mr. Scott has a long-standing history of failing to abide by the tax laws of the state as it relates to PNC. For example, on September 15, 2011, Mr. Scott was referred for criminal investigation by the state attorney for his failure to pay taxes. Also, numerous returns were filed without a payment. This is prima facie evidence of conversion of the money due. § 212.14(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent's Exhibit 1 summarizes numerous contacts by the Department's Tampa District Office with Mr. Scott regarding collection notices, telephone calls, emails, assessment letters, warrant letters, and the like in an effort to secure compliance with tax laws. It is fair to find that Mr. Scott willfully attempted to evade or avoid paying sales and reemployment taxes during the relevant period. To prevent its Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration from being revoked, PNC entered into a compliance agreement on July 10, 2013, to pay past due sales tax and reemployment tax totaling $65,789.25. The agreement required PNC to: (a) accurately complete all past due tax returns and reports no later than July 10, 2013; (b) remit all past due payments in accordance with the attached schedule, which required 11 monthly payments of $4,000.00 beginning on August 10, 2013, and a final balloon payment on July 10, 2014; (c) accurately complete and file all required tax returns and reports for the next 12 months; and (d) timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months. A $15,000.00 down payment also was required to be paid on or before July 10, 2013. An addendum to the agreement (added by Mr. Scott) provided that "[a]ll payments, including the $15,000.00 down payment, shall first be applied to Sales and Use Tax." Although the down payment was made timely, the agreement was breached the first month (August) because Mr. Scott did not make the payment electronically. However, the agreement was not voided by the Department until October 12, 2013. Therefore, any payments made on or after October 12, 2013, were not considered compliance payments and are not subject to the addendum in the agreement. A somewhat confusing aspect of this dispute concerns Mr. Scott's contention, by way of cross-examination, that contrary to the addendum, the Department incorrectly applied his $15,000.00 down payment and subsequent compliance payments to the reemployment tax account, rather than the sales tax account, and that his sales tax liability should be reduced by that amount. As noted above, the addendum governs only the payments that predate October 12, 2013, which are the down payment ($15,000.00) and the August and September payments -- $4,000.00 each month. This issue was not raised by Mr. Scott until the Department issued a NAPL on April 13, 2017. The NAPL issued on April 13, 2017, indicated that the outstanding tax owed by PNC through October 31, 2014, was $90,808.17, and the personal assessment was twice that amount. In response to Mr. Scott's request, the Department acknowledged that it incorrectly applied the down payment to the reemployment account. Also, it took a second look at the two payments made in August and September, which predate the voiding of the agreement. The August installment payment consisted of two separate checks: $3,390.00 for sales tax and $610.00 for reemployment tax, and these amounts were applied in that manner. The September payment, $4,000.00, submitted in one check, was applied in the same manner as the August payment, with $610.00 going to the reemployment tax and the remainder to sales tax. Therefore, only $1,220.00 was incorrectly applied to the reemployment tax during those two months. On July 3, 2017, the Department reapplied a total of $16,551.00 from the reemployment tax account to the sales tax account for the relevant reporting periods. Mr. Scott contends the reapplication of the $16,551.00 to sales tax should reduce the amount of sales tax due by that amount. However, section 213.75(2) dictates that if a lien or warrant has been filed against the taxpayer, as is true here, the payment shall be applied in a priority order spelled out in the statute. Thus, the Department applied that amount in the following order: against the costs to record the liens against PNC; against the administration collection processing fee, if any; against any accrued interest; against any accrued penalty; and against any tax due. Under this priority order, the penalty/interest/fees categories totaled $5,066.58, while the tax liability category totaled $11,484.42. A detailed breakdown of this allocation is found in Respondent's Exhibit 29. Therefore, the total tax liability on the 2017 NAPL ($90,808.17) is reduced by $11,484.42, resulting in a total tax liability of $79,323.75, as shown on the updated 2018 NAPL. In the same vein, in his PRO, Mr. Scott argues that he was not given credit for payments of $9,110.24, $2,688.53, $178.28, and $1,321.80, which reduce his sales tax liability to $66,024.90 and the personal assessment to $132,049.80. See Pet'r Ex. 10. However, all of these payments (some of which are bank levies) were made after the compliance agreement was voided and do not apply to the reporting periods in this case. By way of cross-examination, Mr. Scott also contends that he was never given an accounting of what PNC owes despite "multiple requests" for the same. The record shows otherwise. On April 13, 2017, the 2017 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09, a computer-generated form which lists, in detail, a taxpayer's outstanding taxes owed by reporting period. A second copy of a ZT09 was faxed to him the following day. In his May 3, 2017, letter protesting the 2017 NAPL, Mr. Scott alleges that payments were not applied properly. In response, the Department sent a fax to Mr. Scott on May 10, 2017, listing checks that were not honored by the bank and requesting information concerning which payments PNC contends were not applied properly. In his response on May 12, 2017, Mr. Scott did not provide the requested information. On January 17, 2018, the 2018 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09. Finally, on April 12, 2018, per Ms. Bartlett's request, the Department mailed a ZT09 with the outstanding amounts due. Finally, in its PRO, the Department points out that after the hearing ended, it discovered that it made an error, in Mr. Scott's favor, in calculating his sales tax liability for the relevant reporting periods. Had it correctly calculated the amount of payments made by PNC, the sales tax liability for the relevant period would be increased from $79,323.75 to $84,444.35, which in turn would increase the personal assessment. However, the Department consents to the lower tax and assessed penalty amount, as reflected on the 2018 NAPL.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, is liable to the Department for a penalty of $158,647.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2019.
The Issue Petitioners' liability for sales tax, penalty and interest as set forth in revised notice of proposed assessment dated February 1, 1978.
Findings Of Fact On September 15, 1975, Miles L. Johnson, a Beverage Agent with the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation, conducted a surveillance of premises occupied by Petitioners located at 4440 Southwest 64th Court, Dade County, Florida. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., he observed one Andy Tucker arrive and enter the residence and later exit the same carrying something which he placed in the trunk of a car. He then reentered the house. Agent Johnson looked in the trunk and observed that it contained numerous cartons of cigarettes. Tucker again exited from the residence carrying a case of cigarettes which he also placed in the trunk. He then drove to another house, followed by Johnson, who observed him take the cigarettes into a garage. Johnson then prepared an affidavit and obtained a warrant from the Dade County Circuit Court to search the Marson residence for un-taxed cigarettes. Johnson gave the warrant to another agent, John Fay, to serve the same upon the Marsons. Johnson later arrived at the residence and observed that Marson had a copy of the warrant in his possession and that Fay had his copy and was executing the return thereon. Johnson was informed by officers at the residence that 420 cartons of cigarettes, marijuana and contraband liquor had been found in the house. The agents also had found certain records in the form of invoices from a cigarette distributor in North Carolina indicating purchases of a large amount of cigarettes, together with handwritten notes showing the sale of cigarettes to a large number of individuals, Johnson observed that the cigarettes had North Carolina excise tax stamps, but no Florida tax stamps thereon. The Marsons were thereafter arrested and the cigarettes and other materials were seized and retained by the Beverage Agents. No return was made on the search warrant, however, due to the fact that the Department's copy of the warrant was inadvertently left in the Marson residence and was never recovered (testimony of Johnson). Agent Victor E. Sosa of the Department of Business Regulation was assigned to prepare an excise tax warrant on the cigarettes seized from the Marson residence. For this purpose, he used the case report prepared by Agent Miles Johnson. Thereafter, the report was forwarded to the Department of Revenue. It contained information to the effect that 24, 171 cartons of un- taxed cigarettes allegedly sold by the Petitioners were subject to State sales tax. Respondent's auditor thereafter issued a formal demand to the Marsons to produce records concerning cigarette transactions, but they did not produce any such records pursuant to the request. The auditor proceeded to prepare an estimated proposed assessment on the basis of the information provided by the Department of Business Regulation. Notice of proposed assessment of tax, penalties and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in the total amount of $6,094.08 was issued to Petitioners on December 27, 1977 (Testimony of Sosa, Pooley, Tompkins, Respondent's Exhibits 1, 2).
Recommendation That the proposed assessment against Petitioners be withdrawn. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 1st day of June, 1979. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: William D. Townsend, Esq. Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Richard A. Burt, Esq. 527 Ingraham Building Miami, Florida 33131
