The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is liable for payment of sales and use taxes.
Findings Of Fact The Department conducted an audit of the business records of Petitioner, a Florida corporation operating a food catering business, covering the audit period of June 1, 1985 through May 31, 1990. As a result of that audit, the Department determined that Petitioner had failed to collect and remit sales taxes due to the Department and was liable for the payment of those unpaid sales taxes. The Department issued an assessment determining that Petitioner owed the amount of $213,683.87 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalty for the audit period. On October 9, 1992, the Department issued its second revised audit assessment based upon its redetermination of Petitioner's tax liability. On that date, the Department reduced Petitioner's liability to the amount of $147,924.45, which sum includes the unpaid tax, the penalty therefor, and interest through that date. Based on its revised calculations, the Department also determined that interest would accrue at the rate of $27.06 per day until the date of payment. Through the date of the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner has made no payments to satisfy or reduce the amount of assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner liable for the payment of sales tax, penalty, and interest through October 9, 1992, in the amount of $147,924.45 together with the amount of $27.06 interest per day until the date of payment. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 6-8 have been adopted in substance in this Recommended Order. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-5 and 9-16 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or recitation of the procedural context of this case. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Richard J. Hays, Esquire 7100 West Commercial Boulevard Suite 109 Lauderhill, Florida 33319 Mark D. Cohen, Esquire 121 Southeast First Street Suite 600 Miami, Florida 33131 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Does Petitioner have standing to challenge Rule 12A- 1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code? If Petitioner has standing, is Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority? See Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Rathon Corporation, formerly known as Diversey Corporation, is a Delaware Corporation authorized to do business in Florida. It manufactures various detergents, cleaners, and soaps, and the equipment to dispense those products. The products are marketed in Florida and other states. The customers of the products include hotels, hospitals, factories, and restaurants. The devices that dispense the detergents, cleaners, and soaps are referred to as "feeders." Those feeders can range from simple hand soap dispensers to electronically regulated machines that inject soap into commercial dishwashers. The feeders are loaned to Petitioner's customers at no additional charge for the period of time that the customer continues to purchase the product(s) dispensed by the feeder. These circumstances existed in the period of July 1993 through March 1995. In the period of July 1993 through March 1995, Diversey Corporation, now Rathon Corporation, paid the State of Florida $58,969.22 in use tax associated with the feeders. During the period in question, the Petitioner manufactured the feeders at a facility in Santa Cruz, California. The feeders were not warehoused in the Santa Cruz facility for an extended period. They were prepared for shipment and shipped to customers in the various states, to include Florida and California customers, to be used in the places of business operated by the customers. The feeders being shipped were not packaged with other products. During the period July 1993 through March 1995, the Petitioner not only paid use tax to Florida for the feeders, it paid use tax in forty-four other states and the District of Columbia, based upon the costs of manufacturing the feeders. California was among the other forty-four states. During the period in question, Petitioner accrued and paid use taxes to Florida and California limited to the feeders used by customers in those states, based upon the product sales allocation method it used in relation to the forty-three other states and the District of Columbia. The feeders that were provided to Florida customers were shipped by common carrier. Upon their arrival in Florida no tax had been paid to California pertaining to those feeders. When the feeders arrived in Florida during the period at issue, use tax would be remitted to Florida. Subsequently, the Petitioner paid the State of California a use tax associated with the feeders that had been shipped to Florida customers and upon which a use tax had been imposed by the State of Florida and paid. The California payment is described in detail below. Petitioner had paid Florida use tax on the feeders shipped to Florida customers based on the total manufactured cost of the feeders to Petitioner, including materials, labor, and overhead. The additional use tax paid to California for those feeders was based only on the cost of materials. The overall costs of feeders allocated to Florida for the refund period was $982,803.00. Petitioner remitted a 6% use tax to Florida totaling $58,969.22 for the period in question. In 1996, Petitioner was audited for sales and use tax compliance by the State of California. That audit process included the refund period that is in question in this case, July 1993 through March 1995. Following the audit, the State of California issued a Notice of Determination asserting additional liability for tax and interest that totaled $355,753.95. Petitioner paid that assessment. The California auditor had arrived at the assessment by concluding that Petitioner owed California for 44.57% of all feeders manufactured at Petitioner's Santa Cruz facility. The 44.57% represented all newly manufactured feeders that had been loaned by Petitioner to its customers during the refund period over the entire United States. As a consequence, the assessment of use tax by the State of California included tax on feeders for which Petitioner had paid Florida $58,969.22 in use tax prior to the California assessment of $355,753.95. Petitioner did not apply for credit in California for the portion of the $355,753.95 that would relate to the feeders brought to Florida during the period in question. Petitioner took no action to obtain a credit on the amount paid to Florida as a means to reduce the California tax obligation pursuant to the 1996 audit, because Petitioner had been told that the use tax for the feeders used by Florida customers was legally due in California and not in Florida. In arriving at the determination that 44.57% of the feeders manufactured during the period in question had been loaned to customers within the continental United States, the California auditor took into account that 21.8% of the feeders and feeder parts were sold for export, leaving 78.2% to be used in the United States. Of the 78.2% remaining for the United States, 57% were complete feeders sent to customers within the United States, and 43% were repair parts that were sent to Petitioner's Cambridge Division in Maryland, where those repair parts were being stored for future use. The percentage of 44.57% was arrived at by multiplying 57% times 78.2%, representing the percent of total feeders manufactured for use in the United States that were sent to customers within the United States and not held in inventory as repair parts. Again, California based its use tax for tangible personal property manufactured in that state to include only the cost of materials. Consequently, when the California auditor computed use tax to be collected by California using the 44.57% of total feeders manufactured to be used in the United States by Petitioner's customers in the United States, the California auditor used a cost factor of 55% of overall costs which was attributable to the cost of materials only. The total cost of feeders manufactured by Petitioner in California during the period in question, as related in the California tax audit, was $19,028,714.00. The total cost manufactured for use in the United States was $8,481,098.00, representing 44.57% of the overall cost of manufacturing. When the $8,481.098.00 is multiplied by 55%, representing the cost of materials only, the total costs of the goods subject to the use tax for the period in question is $4,664,604.00. A use tax rate of 7% was applied against the amount of $4,664,604.00. To attribute the portion of use tax paid to California following the 1996 audit associated with feeders that had been sent to Florida during the period in question, the answer is derived by multiplying $982,803.00 by 55% for a total of $540,542.00, and in turn multiplying that amount by 7%, the rate of tax imposed by California. That total is $37,837.91 in use tax that was subsequently paid to California after $58,962.22 had been paid to Florida for use tax on the same feeders. Diversey Corporation sought a tax refund in the amount of $58,977.00, through an application dated August 8, 1996, in relation to the period July 1993 through March. Eventually through the decision by the Respondent in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial dated July 16, 1997, Respondent refused to grant the refund of $58,977.00. At present, Petitioner requests that it be given a refund of $37,837.91, which represents the portion of use tax paid to Florida that has been duplicated in a payment of use tax to California. Respondent, in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial entered on July 16, 1997, and based upon the facts adduced at the final hearing, premises its proposed agency action denying the refund request upon the language set for in Section 212.06(1)(a) and (7), Florida Statutes. The determination to deny the refund request was not based upon reliance on Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code. The theory for denying the refund is premised upon Respondent's argument that use tax was due to Florida, "as of the moment" feeders arrived in Florida for use in Petitioner's business operations associated with its customers. Petitioner then paid the use tax to Florida at the time the feeders arrived in Florida. Having not paid California Use Tax prior to paying Florida Use Tax, Respondent concludes, through its proposed agency action, that it need not refund to Petitioner the use taxes it paid to California at a later date. Petitioner had referred to Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, following receipt of the Notice of Proposed Refund Denial issued on December 9, 1996, possibly creating the impression that Petitioner believed that Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, would support its claim for refund. It later developed that Petitioner did not have in mind reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, to support its claim for refund. Instead, Petitioner made reference to that rule and specifically Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, as a means to perfect a challenge to Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 15, 1997, claiming that the challenged rule was an invalid exercise of authority. That challenge was assigned DOAH Case No. 97-5908RX. In summary, notwithstanding Petitioner's argument to the contrary, Respondent has never relied upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, or any other part of that rule in its proposed agency action denying the refund request. Absent Petitioner's affirmative reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, the rule has no part to play in resolving this dispute. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties to this action in accordance with Sections 120.56, 120.569(1), and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner sought repayment of funds paid into the State Treasury for use taxes for the period of July 1993 through March 1995. See Section 215.26(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent, in defending its decision to deny the repayment, has consistently relied upon provisions within Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as well as the language within Section 215.26(1), Florida Statutes. In particular, Respondent has relied upon the language at Section 212.06(7), Florida Statutes, in defending its proposed agency action. Petitioner did not look to the provisions of Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, to assist the Petitioner in its refund claim. Instead, Petitioner claims that an inference has been created that Respondent utilized Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, to determine the refund question adverse to the interest of Petitioner. Petitioner believes this creates the opportunity to challenge the rule. Given that Respondent did not rely upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, to defend against the Request for Repayment of Funds, Petitioner is not substantially affected by the rule and is not entitled to seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule. Upon consideration, it is ORDERED: That Petitioner's challenge to the validity of Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, is DISMISSED.1 DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1998.
The Issue The issue posed herein is whether or not the Petitioner remitted to Respondent, pursuant to Chapter 212.05(1), Florida Statutes, the, proper amount of sales tax on the boat "Captain Deebold" which was purchased on November 29, 1976. A related issue, assuming that the proper sales taxes were not remitted by Petitioner, is whether or not a levy of penalty and interest is warranted under the circumstances.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, legal memoranda submitted by the parties and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Petitioner purchased the vessel "Captain Deebold" on November 29, 1976, and alleged that the purchase price of the boat was $20,000.00. Accordingly, Petitioner remitted to the Department sales taxes based on the declared value of $20,000.00. Respondent maintained that the subject boat was purchased for the sum of $75,000.00 and has, therefore, issued an assessment against Petitioner for the additional taxes, penalty and interest. By letter dated November 29, 1978, Respondent's Revenue Investigator, Leslie J. Smithling, advised Petitioner that a routine verification concerning his purchase of the subject boat revealed a transaction amount of $75,000.00 upon which the four percent Florida Sales Tax is $3,000.00. Petitioner was further advised therein that his remittance in the amount of $4,202.00 was due no later than December 15, 1979. Taxes, penalties and interest were calculated as follows: Purchase Price $75,000.00 Tax Rate 4% Tax $ 3,000.00 Minus Tax Paid (Based on $20,000.00) $ 800.00 Tax Due $ 2,200.00 Administrative Penalty (Ch. 212.12[2], F.S.) $ 550.00 Fraud Penalty (Ch. 212.12[2], F.S.) $ 1,100.00 Interest: 1% per month from 8/1/77 to 12/1/77 16% Plus $.72 daily thereafter Total Interest Accrued $ 352.00 Total Tax, Penalties & Interest Due $ 4,202.00 In support of its position that the true purchase price of the boat was only $20,000.00, Petitioner points out that the seller of the boat, Frank Deebold, had neglected the boat and had only made repairs that were absolutely necessary to operate the vessel. Thus, when Petitioner purchased the vessel, numerous repairs were made to make it seaworthy including 1) repaired electrical wiring; 2) sealed the deck seams; 3) reconnected the port fuel tank; 4) repaired the clutch in the port engine; 5) repaired leaks in the starboard stern quarter; 6) replaced and rebolted the chines; 7) replaced a section of the keel; 8) rebuilt the main clutch; 9) caulked deck; 10) replaced or repaired the winch on the anchor; 11) reworked and/or repaired the engine room, including insulation, lighting, lining, painting and hauling. To perform these repairs, Petitioner places the value on materials utilized at approximately $18,000.00. Additionally, Petitioner estimated that the value of his labor involved in making the approximately $25,000.00. The articles of agreement for the purchase of the boat provides in pertinent part as follows: Witnesseth, that if the said party of the second part shall (purchaser) first make the payments and perform the covenants hereinafter mentioned on his part to be made and performed, the said party of the first part (seller) hereby covenants and agrees to convey and assure to the said party of the second part, his heirs, personal represent- atives or assigns, clear of all encumbrances, whatever by a good and sufficient bill of sale the Oil Screw vessel, Captain Deebold, o/n294675, gross tons-36, its equipment, hull, machinery, present insurance policies and business including fifty or more used rods and reels, one 3.5 KW Lister auxiliary generator, used and in need of repair, spare Jabsco water pump (used and in need of repair), spare 24 volt DC alternator, spare 24 volt DC main engine starter, spare stub shaft, three spare propellers (used and in need of repair) and a spare UHF Pierce- Simpson radio transceiver (used and in need of repair) and the said party of the second part hereby covenants and agrees to pay to the said party of the first part the sum of seventy-five thousand and 00/100 ($75,000.00) dollars in the manner following. . . . Nevertheless, Petitioner stressed that inasmuch as the Articles of Agreement provided that the seller only required Petitioner to maintain insurance coverage in the amount of $50,000.00 indicating that the purchase price was something less than $75,000.00 and in fact was no more than $50,000. Pursuant to the Articles of Agreement, the amount insurance coverage required was $50,000.00. Petitioner also declared that included in the $75,000.00 purchase price were other items which included the business (dock space), and reduced prices for miscellaneous supplies and fuel prices. In this regard, an examination of the Articles revealed that these items were provided Petitioner on a cost plus basis and the dock space was leased for an amount based on a rebate of the percentage of ticket sales or charter fees received. Petitioner ultimately sold the boat for 95,000.00. Petitioner initially tried to sell the boat for the sum of $105,000.00 of which $10,000.00 represented the value he (Petitioner) placed on the business. An examination of the accounting records introduced indicated that Petitioner placed the sum of $75,000.00 as the purchase price for the boat. Petitioner thought that his estimation of the labor and materials necessary to properly repair the boat were items that could be used as a setoff to reduce the amount of taxes due. Petitioner testified that he, in no way, intended to defraud the Respondent of taxes properly due and owing. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner remit to the Respondent the proper interest as set forth herein in paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner remit to the Respondent an administrative penalty of 5 percent of the aggregate taxes due as set forth herein in Paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner not be held liable for payment of for allegedly filing a "false or fraudulent" return for reasons set forth herein in Paragraph 6 of the Conclusions of Law. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of February 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February 1981.
The Issue This concerns the issue of whether wooden stakes utilized in the growing of tomatoes in the State of Florida are exempt from the Florida State sales tax under Florida Statute 212.08(5)(a). At the formal hearing, the Petitioner called as witnesses James Felix Price and George Marlowe, Jr. The Respondent called no witnesses. The Petitioner offered and had admitted three exhibits and the Respondent offered and had admitted into evidence two exhibits. Counsel for the Petitioner and counsel for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact are consistent with the findings herein they were adopted by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law are inconsistent with the findings and conclusions in this Order, they were considered by the Hearing Officer and rejected as being not supported by the evidence or unnecessary to the resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Pitch Pine Lumber Company, sells tomato stakes to tomato growers in Florida. As a result of these sales, the Petitioner was assessed and ordered by the Department of Revenue to pay sales tax due on the sales of tomato stakes. It was stipulated by and between Petitioner and Respondent that the amount in controversy is $11,723.26 and that if the exemption under Florida Statute 212.08(5)(a) does not apply then the Petitioner shall owe that amount plus interest and penalties if applicable from October 3, 1980. Tomato stakes are used in almost every area of Florida today which produces tomatoes. Approximately two- thirds of the 44,000 acres used to grow tomatoes in Florida utilize tomato stakes. The only area which does not utilize these stakes is the Dade County area and this is due to the coral rock soil conditions. The stakes which are used are wooden stakes. These stakes are driven into the ground and used to hold the tomato plants upright or vertical. This prevents the fruit of the tomato plants from resting directly on the soil. Tomato stakes and cotton cloth are both natural plant materials and contain cellulose. One of the benefits of using tomato stakes is that by holding the plant upright, the plant will form a natural canopy which then shades the fruit and prevents sun scalding and sunburning of the fruit. This shade is provided by the leaf canopy of the plant and the stakes themselves provide no shade. Another benefit of utilizing tomato stakes is increased insect control and decreased fruit loss. This is the result of the fruit of the plant being held up off the ground by the plant which is being held upright by the tomato stakes. Tomato stakes were used for this purpose in Florida as early as 1947 and 1948. By 1960, tomato stakes were being used extensively in Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order requiring the Petitioner to pay $11,723.26, plus interest and penalties, if applicable from October 3, 1980. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Roderick K. Shaw, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2111 Tampa, Florida 33601 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LLO4 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Levy, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact During the three year period from October 1, 1974 through September 30, 1977 Air Jamaica purchased prepared meals from Jerry's Caterers at Miami (Jerry's) in the total amount of $740,760.04 and Taca purchased prepared meals from Jerry's in the total amount of $161,379.72. Sales tax, penalty and interest through March 20, 1978 were assessed against Air Jamaica in the amount of $35,291.54 on the total paid for meals from Jerry's. Sales tax plus interest through November 20, 1977 were assessed against Taca in the amount of $9,359.86 on the total paid for meals from Jerry's. These figures are accepted as accurately representing 4 percent of the cost of meals purchased plus interest and penalties. The operations with respect to the meals were identical for both Air Jamaica and Taca. Prepared meals were delivered to the aircraft by Jerry's in trays holding 25 meals. These trays are supplied with heating elements and act as ovens in which the meals are heated. When placed aboard the aircraft by Jerry's' employees the trays holding meals intended to be served hot are plugged into electrical outlets on the plane. Prepared food delivered to the aircraft by Jerry's intended to be served cold obviously are not plugged into the electrical outlets. Air Jamaica departs from Miami and serves only Montego Bay and Jamaica. Taca departs from Miami and serves the cities of Belize, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama. Some 30 to 50 minutes after leaving Miami each company serves a meal for which no separate charge is made to the passenger. At the time these meals are served the aircraft is well outside the boundaries of Florida and either over Cuba or international waters. Although no separate charge is made for the meal served the cost of the meal, like every other operational and administrative cost, is considered in arriving at the air fare charged to the passenger for the transportation from Miami to destination. Jerry's bills the airlines for the number of meals delivered at a wholesale price of $3.48 per meal for meals served to first class passengers and $2.19 for meals served to economy passengers. Each airline provided Jerry's with tax resale certificates which relieved Jerry's from the collection of sales tax on meals delivered to the aircraft.
The Issue The factual issue in this case is whether Respondent failed to disclose certain information, of which he had knowledge, which would have adversely impacted the consideration by the Board of his financial responsibility. The legal issue raised by the Administrative Complaint is whether the failure to disclose such information constitutes a violation of Section 489.127(1)(d) , and thereby a violation of Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1979). However, neither allegation alleges fraud on an application. The case should be dismissed.
Findings Of Fact On or about March 26, 1980, the Respondent filed for a change of status as a certified general contractor from a company to operating as an individual. On his application, Respondent answered in the negative the following questions: Question 16 (b): Are there now any unpaid past-due bills or claims for labor, materials, or services, as a result of a construction operation of any person named in `(i) below' or any organizations in which any such person was a member of the personnel? Question 16(c): "Are there now any liens, suits, or judgments of record or pending as a result of a construction operation of any person named in `(i) below' or any organiation in which any such person was a member of the personnel?' Question 16(d): Are there now any liens of record by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service or the State of Florida Corporate Tax Division against any person named in `(i) below' or any organization in which any person was a member of the personnel? Evidence was received that a number of judgments and liens had been obtained against t Donald B. Richards personally or as a member or qualifier of a registered or certified company, specifically Acme Aluminum Sales and Service. There is no credible or substantial evidence that the judgment of Nu-Vue Industries, Inc. (Petitioner's Exhibit 7), arose from contracting operations in which Respondent was involved. There is no substantial and competent evidence that the notes upon which the judgment of Commercial National Bank (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) was obtained related to contracting operations. (Tr. 17, 19.) Tax liens for nonpayment of unemployment compensation were introduced. These liens were mailed to 2120 West Parker Street, Lakeland, Florida. Question 16(d) on the subject application limits tax liens to those of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and the Corporate Tax Division of the State of Florida. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9 (Composite).] The custodian of the records for Florida Industries, Inc., could not recall what Respondent purchased from that company or why Respondent purchased it. The records custodian could only say that the items were probably building materials, and could not way whether the company's judgment had been satisfied. (See Deposition of Saul Rachelson; pages 5, 7.) The records of the judgment reflect that it was sent to 446 North Wabash, Lakeland, Florida. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 10.) The records of the Board do not reflect that Respondent ever resided or worked at 446 North Wabash, Lakeland, Florida. Said address is also listed within the judgment as the address of John Stinson, who was Respondent's business partner at the time. There is no substantial evidence that this judgment was related to contracting, that Respondent was aware of this judgment, or that the judgment was outstanding at the time Respondent made his application on March 26, 1980. The judgment obtained by Wells Carmel Aluminum, Inc., on May 4, 1977, was a default judgment. The attorney for Wells Carmel Aluminum did not know whether the items purchased, from which the default judgment arose, were construction materials and did not know why Respondent had purchased them. (Tr. 28.) There is no substantial and competent evidence that these materials were related to contracting. The judgment obtained by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company dated June 4, 1978, was related to Respondent's business. The business of Acme Aluminum Sales and Service was contracting. However, the judgment reflects on its face that it was sent to 2120 West Park Street, Lakeland, Florida 33001, on or about the date that it was entered. By said time, the business was no longer operating at that address, and said property had returned to the possession of the original owner, Arley Propes. The evidence indicates that Respondent had no knowledge of State Farm's judgment. The judgment obtained by the Pope Shopper Shopping News, Inc., on February 7, 1970, was related to Respondent's contracting business. A copy of the judgment was sent to Respondent's home address at 630 Candyce Avenue, Lakeland, Florida 33801. The Respondent had knowledge of this judgment and that it was related to his contracting activities. On November 3, 1977, Richard Allen obtained a judgment against Respondent arising from Respondent's failure to correct certain conditions on a contracting job which he had done for Allen. A copy of this judgment was sent to 2120 West Parker Street, Lakeland, Florida 33801. By that time, Respondent was no longer doing business at that address. The evidence indicates that Respondent had no knowledge of the judgment obtained by Allen.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board take no action against Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald B. Richards 630 Candyce Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33801 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue Is the taxpayer, Epic Hotel, LLC, entitled to a refund of $10,000 of sales tax paid for building materials that were used for the rehabilitation of real property located in an enterprise zone, on the basis that 20 percent of its permanent, full-time employees are residents of the Enterprise Zone?
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida and is authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. In 2008 Epic constructed and began operation of a hotel in a State of Florida Enterprise Zone in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Epic sought a refund of sales tax paid on building materials for the construction of the hotel. The sales tax paid on building materials used in the rehabilitation of real property located in an Enterprise Zone may be exempt up to $10,000, upon a showing that the items have been used for the rehabilitation of real property located in an Enterprise Zone and that 20 percent or more of the taxpayer’s fulltime, permanent employees reside in the Enterprise Zone. On or about August 24, 2009, Epic filed an Application for Refund–Sales and Use Tax. It requested refund of $10,000 in sales tax for building materials used to build the hotel. It submitted a completed Department form DR-26S and other documents, including a completed Department form EZ-M. The form EZ-M is the Department’s “Application for Eligibility” for the Florida Enterprise Zone Program Building Materials Sales Tax Refund. The form included a completed Section I identifying permanent, full-time employees Epic represented reside in the Enterprise Zone. The form represented that 22 percent of Epic’s full-time, permanent employees reside in the Enterprise Zone. The Enterprise Zone Coordinator for the area signed the EZ-M certifying, “that I have examined the statements contained on this application certificate, and to the best of my knowledge and belief they are true, correct and complete.” The record does not indicate whether the Enterprise Zone Coordinator is an employee of the Department. John Shettle, Tax Auditor for the Department, audited Epic’s refund application. Mr. Shettle is responsible for auditing refund applications. His duties include verifying that refund applications are complete and accurate, and that the applicant has provided the documentation required by the refund statute. The Department issued Epic a Notice of Intent to Make Refund Claim Changes, Form DR-1200R (for Refund Number R09246069). It proposed to deny the refund claim for $10,000. The Notice asked Epic to provide additional documentation aimed at establishing that Epic owned the property where the hotel was located and that the individuals identified in Section I to the form EZ-M were full-time, permanent employees of Epic. The requested documents included a copy of Epic’s 940 Federal Unemployment Tax Return and a copy of Epic’s W3 form. Mr. Shettle conducted independent research on the employee issue. He used the State’s unemployment tax records and the Department of Business and Professional Regulation’s employee leasing company registration data. He was unable to locate any evidence that the employees listed in Schedule A were employed by Epic. Epic has not presented any. Epic has a Hotel Operating Agreement with Kimpton Hotel & Restaurant Group, LLC. The Agreement provides for Kimpton to “supervise, direct, and control the management, operation, and promotion of the Epic hotel.” The employees identified as Epic employees on Section I of Epic’s EZ-M form are employees of Kimpton who provide the contracted services at Epic. They are not direct employees of Epic or employees leased by Epic. Epic relied upon the Final Order of the Department of Revenue in The Angler Resorts, LLC v. State of Florida, Department of Revenue, Case No. DOR-08-17-FOI (Fla. Dept. of Rev., March 16, 2008), in its dealings with the Department. In reliance upon that Final Order, Epic maintained that it was not required to provide anything more than the certified form EZ-M and a completed Department form DR-26S. The Department denied Epic’s refund application on the basis that Epic could not be verified as the owner, lessee, or lessor of the rehabilitated parcel, and that the individuals listed in Section I could not be confirmed as employees of Epic. During the course of this dispute about entitlement to the refund, Epic established ownership of the property at the time of the application. The Department consequently issued Epic a refund of $5,000. The Department has adopted rules governing the manner and form of refund applications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Department of Revenue grant Epic’s refund application and approve a sales tax refund for the total amount of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Herb Friesner Economic Development Consultants, Inc. 14361 Commerce Way, Suite 205 Miami Lakes, Florida 33016 Lisa Echeverri, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Frank O. Sherrill is the sole stockholder of Oceania Charters, Inc. and is a resident of North Carolina from where he directs the operations of Oceania Charters, Inc. The principal, if not sole, asset of Oceania Charters, Inc. is the 101 foot motor yacht Captiva II. The Captiva II was built in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, pursuant to contract between the shipbuilder and Oceania Charters, Inc. and/or Frank Sherrill entered into in 1972. Sherrill purchased the vessel for the intended purpose that it be used as a charter vessel hired to various charterers for short or longer-term cruises. This is the fourth or fifth vessel that Respondent has owned and used in the charter business. The evidence was uncontradicted that the purpose of acquiring the Captiva II was to place it in charter service. The vessel was originally scheduled for completion in the summer of 1973 and it was intended to have the Captiva II proceed from Amsterdam to North Carolina under her own power. The vessel was not completed until late fall or early winter and the insurers would not insure the Captiva II if it proceeded across the North Atlantic under her own power at that time of year. Arrangements were made to ship the Captiva II from Amsterdam to Bermuda via freighter to off-load the Captiva II there and proceed under her own power to Wilmington, North Carolina for custom clearance and documentation. While loading the Captiva II damage was done to one stabilizer and to the hull. Upon arrival of the ship carrying the Captiva II at Bermuda, excess costs involved in off-loading and repairing there were weighed against the carrier's offer to off- load the Captiva II at the next port of call, Miami, and facilities at the latter port. It was then decided that the Captiva II should stay aboard for the voyage from Bermuda to Miami and there be off-loaded and repaired. This was done and upon arrival in Miami the Captiva II was off-loaded, repaired and fitted out for charter operations. Berthing arrangements were made and, except for charter trips, trips to Palm Beach soliciting charters, and sea trials the Captiva II has been moored at Miami. Mr. and Mrs. Sherrill stayed on board the Captiva II during the period she was being outfitted for charter operations and on several of the sea trials the vessel underwent. They were not on board during any of the charter trips and did not use the Captiva II for cruises themselves or make her available for use by their friends unless pursuant to a charter party. These facts were undisputed.
Findings Of Fact On January 31, 1984, the subject vessel, a 1969 sixty-five foot Hargrave Halmatic motor yacht, was purchased by Nelson Gross as President and principal of the corporation, Binghamton Too, Inc., for $457,500 in Houston Texas. It was financed through a Connecticut bank. The closing was held in Mr. Gross' New Jersey office. No sales or use tax has been paid on the yacht in Florida or in any other state. Mr. Gross' initial intent was to operate his new purchase as a commercial charter boat in conjunction with the "Binghamton," a ferryboat permanently moored and operating in Edgewater, New Jersey, as a floating restaurant. To get the new motor yacht there, Mr. Gross directed that it be brought to New Jersey around the Florida coast under its own power. The motor yacht reached Florida on February 17, 1984, but en route from Texas an unexpected vibration had arisen which required emergency repairs. These repairs were commissioned at Bradford Marine, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, where the motor yacht remained, except for sea trials in connection with the vibration problem, until the first week in April, 1984. A cracked strut was diagnosed as the cause of the vibration problem. Repair costs of this emergency problem totalled $5,975. The balance of charges incurred at Bradford Marine, Ft. Lauderdale, was $21,729, including dockage. Many more of the repairs catalogued by Respondent's Exhibit 5, the Bradford Marine records for this period, were clearly voluntary, discretionary, and cosmetic in nature. The majority were of a non-emergency nature. The vessel, by then relettered "Binghamton Too," left Florida waters approximately April 20, 1984. "Binghamton Too" next spent approximately three weeks at Thunderbolt Marine Industries in Georgia at an approximate cost of $12,000. There, a strap was fabricated to hold the strut and the yacht proceeded on to New Jersey. The "Binghamton Too" began its charter business as part of the "Binghamton" operation in Edgewater, New Jersey on May 5, 1984. Seventy-five to eighty charters were accomplished between May, 1984 and October, 1984 under New Jersey state and local chartering, transit liquor, and environmental licenses and under U.S. Corps of Engineers permits. "Binghamton Too" returned to Florida waters sometime on or before October 25, 1984, when it was sighted at the Indian River Causeway Bridge. On October 26, 1984, it was sighted at Flagler Bridge in West Palm Beach. Thereafter, it went on to the Lantana Boat Works Marina, Lantana, Florida, for repairs. Lantana is the location of the yacht's original builder, whose equipment and expertise were preferable to that of other boatyards for certain strut repairs due to the peculiar nature of this type of yacht. After those repairs, the yacht was anchored in Palm Beach from January 1985 to April 1985. Although Mr. Gross testified that the strut repairs of necessity had to be done in the Lantana boatyard, his view is not necessarily conclusive of this issue because he admitted "Binghamton Too" was the first yacht he had ever purchased, because he was vague about equating desirability and necessity without any supporting direct expert testimony, and because of the facts found infra. The Lantana repair records from October 29 to December 31, 1984 show $42,521.82 in repairs, of which only $2,500 pertain to fabrication of a strut. Again, the majority of repairs was to refurbish and paint the vessel. Mr. Gross spent approximately October 1984 to April 1985, October 1985 to April 1986, and October 1986 to April 1987 in his father's home in West Palm Beach, Florida. By his own testimony, he confirmed that he established the "technical" office for his "Binghamton Too" business there. He applied, in early December 1984, for a Florida sales tax registration to operate a charter business, representing Palm Beach as his place of business. The account was established January 1, 1985 with the account number of 60-22-080051-61. The captain and mate of the "Binghamton Too" also wintered in Florida each of these years. On December 6, 1984, Mr. Gross wrote the State of New Jersey's Division of Taxation that the yacht's "principal location and headquarters are in West Palm Beach, Florida where it maintains an office and full-time employees," thus successfully arguing that the "Binghamton Too" should be exempt from New Jersey's registration requirements for any vessel residing in that state in excess of 180 days. This correspondence was in connection with a tax problem of the mother ship "Binghamton," still moored in New Jersey. Mr. Gross further represented that Florida was "Binghamton Too's" primary location with trips to the Bahamas." For most of the period from late December, 1984 to early April, 1985, the yacht was in Palm Harbor Marina, West Palm Beach, Florida, the first time not in repairs, and clearly could have returned to New Jersey under its own power had Mr. Gross chosen to do so. From January 24 to March 26, 1985, the boat was in operation, as sighted at the Pompano Beach and Fort Lauderdale bridges. From April 1985 until October of 1985, the yacht was operated as part of Petitioner's commercial charter operation in New Jersey, which included over 100 charters during this time period. Nonetheless, on June 10, 1985, Mr. Gross purchased a boat slip at Ocean Reef Club in Key Largo, Florida. This slip was later sold. Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact 6-12, which clearly establish a pattern of wintering the yacht in Florida waters, it is inferred that, despite Mr. Gross' testimony that it was "necessary" to have "Binghamton Too's" strut repaired in late 1984 by the original Florida manufacturer of the yacht, its presence in Florida from October 1984 until April, 1985 was primarily and substantially due to the preference of Mr. Gross, Petitioner's President, and not due to necessity or emergency. In October of 1985, the yacht returned to Florida where it remained until April of 1986. During this time, the boat underwent further repairs, including the complete repainting of the hull, the need for which Mr. Gross attributed to the old paint being cracked and shaken off by the vibration of the yacht. From April 1986 until October of 1986, the yacht was operated as part of Petitioner's commercial charter operation in New Jersey, which included over 100 charters during this time period. The yacht returned to Florida in October, 1986, and again remained in Florida until early April, 1987, when it left for New Jersey. In late October 1987, the yacht returned to Florida where it was traded in as part of the consideration for a larger yacht in November of 1987. The closing date was December 30, 1987. The cash equivalent received by Petitioner as credit on the trade-in was $100,000. In all, Petitioner asserts that over $200,000 was spent by the corporation on the "Binghamton Too" before it was traded. Shortly after buying the "Binghamton Too", Petitioner had begun trying to sell it for the highest price obtainable. These sales efforts included large ads in national yachting publications and listings with active yacht brokers. The highest outright offer received by Petitioner was $75,000. However, this was Mr. Gross' first sales effort of this kind, and his opinion testimony that the "Binghamton Too" was not bought from the Petitioner outright and at a good price because of latent defects and cost of repair is neither credible nor persuasive since his opinion does not possess the reliability of an expert in assessing whether it was the condition of the yacht, its unusual "Halmatic" type, or some other factor which made the "Binghamton Too" undesirable to potential purchasers. The Florida Department of Revenue issued a Notice of Delinquent Tax January 30, 1987, of five-percent use tax upon the purchase price plus 25 percent penalty. Interest was figured at 12 percent per annum. Petitioner timely protested. The agency conceded that the purchase price on the original notice was mistakenly listed at $475,000, that the assessment appropriately should have been on $457,500 (see Finding of Fact No. 1) and that the State presently claims only the tax amount of 5% of Petitioner's initial $457,500 purchase price at $22,875, the 25 percent penalty at $5,719, and interest on the tax from February 18, 1984, to June 18, 1989 at $14,650. (Interest accrues at $7.52 daily.) The total assessment through June 18, 1989 is $43,234.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order affirming the assessment of $22,875, with 25% penalty and interest at $7.52 per day from February 18, 1984 until paid. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon consideration of Section 120.59(2) Florida Statutes the following rulings are made upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 2,3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22: Accepted except to the degree not proven. 4: Rejected as stated because not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as a whole. 6, 12: Rejected in part as not proven, in part as subordinate and unnecessary, and in part as to the conclusion-if law as "latent." 7, 8, 9: Accepted except as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 16: Accepted that Mr. Gross testified to this amount, however, the evidence does not support the amount precisely nor that it all went to "repairs." 20: Accepted as modified to better express the record as a whole. Respondent's PFOF: 1: Accepted, but as a Conclusion of Law. 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23: Accepted. 5: Accepted in substance; what is not adopted is either mere recitation/characterization of testimony, is cumulative, or is subordinate to the facts as found. 6: Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 7: Sentence 1 is accepted. The remainder is rejected as mere legal argument or subordinate to the facts as found. 8, 11: Accepted as modified to conform to the record as a whole. Mr. Gross testified to a May 5, 1984 date for No. 8. 18: Except for mere legal argument, accepted. 24: Accepted upon the terms set forth in the Recommended Order. 25: Except as subordinate and unnecessary, accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Gene D. Brown, Esquire 3836 Killearn Court Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William D. Moore, General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Katie D. Tucker Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue (DOR) has properly issued an assessment against Petitioner for sales and use tax, interest, and penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida resident. In 1996, Petitioner began doing business as a sole proprietor under the name of "Duraline Industries" and registered with DOR as a sales tax dealer. Later, this entity was called "Dura Steel." Petitioner also operated as a corporation, Steel Engineered Design Systems, Inc. Petitioner's Florida sales tax numbers are 42-11-009271-63 and 40-00-003416- For purposes of these consolidated cases, Petitioner has been audited and charged individually as "Charles R. Bielinski," because the audit revealed that no checks were made out to the corporation(s) and that the monies received were received by Mr. Bielinski as a sole proprietor in one or more "doing business as" categories. Petitioner engaged in the business of fabricating items of tangible personal property, i.e., prefabricated steel buildings, many of which later became improvements to real property in Florida. Petitioner used some of the steel buildings in the performance of real property contracts by installing the buildings as improvements to real property. Petitioner also engaged in the business of selling buildings and steel component parts such as sheets and trim in Florida. Petitioner sold buildings and component parts in over- the-counter retail sales, also. On October 7, 2002, DOR issued Petitioner a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records for the period of September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2002. This audit was assigned number AO226920428. In 2002, Petitioner provided DOR's auditor with his sales activity records, such as contracts and job information. A telephone conversation/interview of Petitioner was conducted by the auditor. Over a period of several months, the auditor attempted to get Petitioner to provide additional records, but none were forthcoming. DOR deemed the contracts and job information provided by Petitioner to be an incomplete record of his sales activity for the audit period. Petitioner claimed that most of his sales activity records had been lost or destroyed. Due to the absence of complete records, DOR sampled Petitioner's available records and other information related to his sales in order to conduct and complete its audit. Petitioner purchased materials used to fabricate his steel buildings. Petitioner sometimes would erect the buildings on real property. Petitioner fabricated main frames for smaller buildings at a shop that he maintained at the Bonifay Airport. Otherwise, Petitioner subcontracted with like companies to fabricate main frames for larger buildings. Petitioner made some sales to exempt buyers, such as religious institutions and government entities. When he purchased the materials he used to fabricate the buildings, Petitioner occasionally provided his vendors with his resale certificate, in lieu of paying sales tax. Petitioner did not pay sales tax on the materials he purchased to fabricate buildings when such buildings were being fabricated for exempt buyers such as churches and governmental entities. On June 23, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Form DR-840), for audit number AO226920428, covering the period of November 1, 1997 through August 31, 2002. DOR has assessed Petitioner sales tax on the buildings, sheets, and trim he sold over-the-counter in Florida. DOR has assessed Petitioner use tax on sales of the materials used in performing real property contracts in Florida. The auditor calculated a method of estimating taxes based on the limited documentation that had been provided by Petitioner. She used a sampling method based on Petitioner's contract numbering system; isolated the Florida contracts; and divided the Florida contracts between the actual sale of tangible property (sale of just the buildings themselves) and real property contracts (where Petitioner not only provided the building but also provided installation or erection services). The auditor scheduled the real property contracts and assessed only the material amounts as taxable in Florida. Since she had only 19 out of 47 probable contracts, or 40 percent, she projected up to what the taxable amount should be and applied the sales tax and surtax at the rate of seven percent, as provided by law. She then divided that tax for the entire audit period by the 58 months in the audit period, to arrive at a monthly tax amount. This monthly tax amount was broken out into sales and discretionary sales tax. Florida levies a six percent State sales tax. Each county has the discretion to levy a discretionary sales tax. Counties have similar discretion as to a surtax. The auditor determined that Petitioner collected roughly $22,000.00 dollars in tax from one of his sales tax registrations which had not been remitted to DOR. During the five-year audit period, Petitioner only remitted tax in May 1998. DOR gave Petitioner credit for the taxes he did remit to DOR during the audit period. The foregoing audit processes resulted in the initial assessment(s) of August 28, 2003, which are set out in Findings of Fact 25-31, infra. On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR-832/833), for additional discretionary surtax, in the sum of $2,582.19; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $782.55; and penalty, in the sum of $1,289.91; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.50 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0008) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional sales and use tax in the sum of $154,653.32; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $50,500.06; and penalty, in the sum of $77,324.54, plus additional interest that accrues at $31.54 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0009) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional local governmental infrastructure surtax, in the sum of $7,001.82; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $2,352.09; and penalty in the sum of $3,497.35; plus additional interest that accrues at $1.45 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0010) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional indigent care surtax, in the sum of $513.08; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $156.33; and penalty, in the sum of $256.24; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.10 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0011) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional school capital outlay surtax in the sum of $3,084.49; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $922.23; and penalty, in the sum of $1,540.98; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.60 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0012) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional charter transit system surtax, in the sum of $2,049.22; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $766.07; and penalty, in the sum of $1,023.27; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.46 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0013) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), additional small county surtax, in the sum of $10,544.51; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $3,437.85; and penalty in the sum of $5,282.30; plus additional interest that accrues at $2.15 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0014) However, the auditor testified at the May 13, 2004, hearing that she attended Petitioner's deposition on March 18, 2004. At that time, Petitioner provided additional documentation which permitted the auditor to recalculate the amount of tax due. The auditor further testified that she separated out the contracts newly provided at that time and any information which clarified the prior contracts she had received. She then isolated the contracts that would affect the Florida taxes due. Despite some of the new information increasing the tax on some of Petitioner's individual Florida contracts, the result of the auditor's new review was that overall, the contracts, now totaling 33, resulted in a reduction in total tax due from Petitioner. These changes were recorded in Revision No. 1 which was attached to the old June 23, 2003, Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, which was sent by certified mail to Petitioner. The certified mail receipt was returned to DOR as unclaimed. The auditor's calculations reducing Petitioner's overall tax are set out in Respondent's Exhibit 16 (Revision No. 1). That exhibit appears to now show that taxes are owed by Petitioner as follows in Findings of Fact 34-40 infra. For DOAH Case No. 04-0008, discretionary surtax (tax code 013), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $1,937.37, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0009, sales and use tax (tax code 010), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $111,811.04, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0010, local governmental infrastructure surtax (tax code 016), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $5,211.00, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0011, indigent care surtax (tax code 230), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $317.39, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0012, school capital outlay tax (tax code 530), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $2,398.68, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0013, charter transit system surtax (tax code 015), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $1,558.66, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0014, small county surtax (tax code 270), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $7,211.83, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order upholding the amount of tax calculated against Petitioner in its June 21, 2003, Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, Revision No. 1, in the principal amounts as set forth in Findings of Fact Nos. 34-40, plus interest and penalty accruing per day as provided by law, until such time as the tax is paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2004.
