The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed registered nurse in the State of Florida , having been issued license number RN 1525312. Respondent was employed by Humana Hospital Biscayne, Miami, Florida, from January 24, 1987, until January of 1989. She was on a medical leave of absence from Humana Hospital from July of 1988 until her employment terminated. During her employment at Humana Hospital, Respondent was assigned to work in the psychiatric unit of the Hospital. The medical personnel employed in the psychiatric unit wear normal street attire, not medical uniforms. Respondent was considered to be an excellent employee, and she was so evaluated by her supervisor Edwin Smith. In approximately May of 1988 Respondent's son was admitted as a patient in the psychiatric unit at Humana Hospital. From approximately May 28, 1988, through July 28, 1988, Smith and several other employees "documented" Respondent's behavior. These documents were never shown to Respondent until they were offered in evidence at the final hearing in this cause. Near the end of 1987 or the beginning of 1988 Respondent began treating with Dr. Burton Cahn, a psychiatrist who also occupied an administrative post at Humana Hospital Biscayne. At some point, Dr. Cahn admitted her to Hollywood Memorial Hospital and subsequently discharged her. She continued to treat with Dr. Cahn for one year thereafter. At the time that Respondent was placed on medical leave of absence, she volunteered to take both drug and alcohol tests, but her offer was declined by Smith. Sometime subsequent to the filing of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent submitted to psychological testing and provided to Petitioner the results of that evaluation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against her in this cause. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of October, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-8045 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, and the first sentence of proposed finding numbered 6 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 3-5, 7, 10-15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 have been rejected as not being supported by any competent evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 8, 9, 16, 19, and the second sentence in Petitioner's proposed finding numbered 6 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Judie Ritter, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation/Board of Nursing 111 Coastline Drive, East Room 50 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Roberta L. Fenner, Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Donna M. Rigney 590 S.E. 12th Street, Apt. 205 Dania, Florida 33004
The Issue The matters presented for consideration in this instance concern an Administrative Complaint brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent seeking to suspend, revoke or take other disciplinary action against the Respondent's license, in particular, against her license as a Registered Nurse. The substance of the Administrative Complaint is contained in five (5) counts. Count I to the Administrative Complaint alleges that on or about March 10, 1981, Respondent signed out a controlled substance, to wit: two (2) ampules of Demerol, between the approximate hours of 7:00 P.M. to 7:15 P.M. for a patient, DeFrisco [sic]. DeFrisco [sic], reputedly states that she did not receive the Demerol. Based upon the foregoing alleged facts, Respondent has purportedly violated Subsection 464.018 (1)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), by making a false report of record which she knew was false and in addition has violated Subsection 464.018(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1979), by failing to conform with the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. 1/ Count II to the Administrative Complaint alleges that on or about March 5, 1981, the Respondent administered a controlled substance, to wit: Demerol, in excess of that ordered by the attending physician and for that reason violated Subsection 464.018(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1979), in that she failed to conform with the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. 2/ Count III alleges that the Respondent wasted, without a witness, certain controlled substances, in violation of hospital policy, as follows: On 2/28/81 Dilaudid, 1 mg On 2/23/81 Demerol, 100 mg. On 2/22/81 Demerol, 50 mg. On 2/16/81 Demerol, 100 mg. On 2/22/81 Morphene Sulphate 3 mg. On 1/28/81 Demerol, 25 mg. On 1/22/81 Demerol, 100 mg. Based upon these alleged facts, the Respondent purportedly violated Subsection 464.018(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1979), by failing to conform with minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. Count IV to the Administrative Complaint alleges that on or about March 5, 1981, Respondent signed out a controlled substance, to wit: Demerol, at approximately 9: 02 A.M., and at 12:15 P.M., for the use of patient Theodora Durham. It is further alleged that patient Durham states that she did not receive the above mentioned Demerol. Based upon those alleged facts Respondent purportedly violated Subsection 464.018(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), in that she made a false report of record which she knew was false. Further, Respondent, based upon those facts, has allegedly violated Subsection 464018(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1919), by failing to conform with minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice Count V alleges that on or about April 12, 1981, the Respondent reported to her place of employment, Beaches Hospital, under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it affected her body coordination Further, it is contended that Respondent's supervisor; Joyce Strarnes, did not allow her to complete her work shift because she, Respondent was unable to function safely and to conform with minimal standards of acceptable nursing practice Based upon these allegations, the Respondent has purportedly violated Subsection 464018(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1979), for failure to conform to the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice, in which case actual injury need not be established. 3/
Findings Of Fact This case is presented for consideration based upon the aforementioned Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Nursing, against the Respondent, Rebecca Lael Calhoun. The Petitioner, agency, is a regulatory body which has been granted the authority by the State of Florida to license, regulate and discipline those persons who practice nursing in the State of Florida. The Respondent Rebecca Lael Calhoun has been issued a license to practice as a Registered Nurse in the State of' Florida and at all times pertinent to this Administrative Complaint, has held that license issued by the Petitioner. Calhoun was employed at St. Luke's Hospital, in Jacksonville, Florida, between the months of December, 1980, and March 10, 1981. Her position with that institution was that of Registered Nurse. On March 10, 1981, the Respondent worked at the St. Luke's Hospital on Ward 1-C. In that capacity, she had responsibility for the medication cart where controlled substances and other medications were kept for patient use. One of the patients who was on Ward 1-C on March 10,1981, and for whom controlled substances and other medications were made available by physician's orders was one Barbara L. DiFrancesco. On that date, DiFrancesco had an operative procedure known as dilatation and curettage performed and after the procedure, was brought to room 161, which was a room on the ward where the Respondent was on duty. It was 4:30 P.M. when the patient was placed in that room. After DiFrancesco returned to her room, between the hours of 4:30 P.M. and 8:00 P.M. on March 10, 1981, she did not receive any form of controlled substance, in particular, Demerol. The Demerol was in fact removed from the hospital inventory in DiFrancesco's name and Respondent knew that the patient did not receive the Demerol. Nonetheless, the Respondent documented that the patient DiFrancesco had the substance withdrawn for the patient's benefit and had received such a controlled substance. The false documentation was discovered by Kathleen Lawson, Assistant Director of Nursing at St. Luke's Hospital who was investigating possible "discrepancies" on the part of the Respondent in the recordation of entries on the controlled substance forms kept by the hospital. On the evening of March 10, 1981, Lawson checked the controlled substance form at approximately 7:00 P.M., which pertained to Ward 1-C where the Respondent was working. This controlled substance form may be found as a part of the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. (The entries on that form pertain to the time of the sign-out, name of patient, room number, nurse's signature, dosage amount, amount of wastage, if any, and signature of a witness to wastage, and the description of the medication or controlled substance signed out by the practitioner) Lawson's review of the controlled substance form on March 10, 1981, at around `1:00 P.M. did not indicate that Demerol had been signed out for the benefit of DiFrancesco; however, when Lawson returned to Ward 1-C at approximately 7:15 P.M. on that same evening, she observed an entry on the controlled substance form which had been made by the Respondent. This entry indicated that Demerol in the amount of 50 mg. had been signed out for the benefit of DiFrancesco at approximately 5:30 P.M. When confronted with the discrepancy of having failed to make a timely entry of the sign-out of the controlled substance, Demerol, for the benefit of the patient DiFrancesco, that is to say the fact that the 7:00 P.M. check revealed no sign-out and a 7:15 P.M. check revealed a sign-out post-timed to 5:30 P.M.; the Respondent was than asked to perfect all necessary documentation to conform all records on the question of the administration of a controlled substance for the benefit of the patient DiFrancesco. In response to this request, the Respondent made an entry on the nurse's notes portion of the patient DiFrancesco's medical chart, to the effect that at 5:00 P.M. Demerol in the amount of 50 mg., IM, intramuscular, was administered to the patient DiFrancesco for "cramping." A copy of those nurse's notes may be found in Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence. Some of the aforementioned "discrepancies' that officials at St. Luke's Hospital had been concerned about in terms of the Respondent's reporting procedures pertained to the controlled substance form, related to wastage of Schedule II controlled substances. St. Luke's Hospital had a written policy dealing with this subject as may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, which is a copy of that policy related to unit doe drug distribution. That written policy was to the effect that when Schedule II controlled substances are wasted, or partially administered to the patient, the wastage or partial administration is recorded on the controlled substance form through the name of the patient; room number; the nurse who wasted material; the material; the amount injected and/or the amount wasted. The substance is shown to a witness in the process of recording the incident description as set forth herein. Pursuant to the written policy, there is also a line on the controlled substance form for the placement of . Off initials of that person who witnessed the accountability of the wasted Schedule II controlled substance, when the substance is only partially administered. In addition, the Respondent and other nurse practitioners in the hospital underwent an orientation which apprised the Respondent and others of the matters pertaining to wastage of Schedule II controlled substances as set forth in the written procedures and the utilization of the controlled substance form. Also, a customary practice within the hospital was established in which totally wasted narcotics were witnessed by initials placed by the witness on the controlled substance form, in the same fashion as partially wasted substances. Having been made aware of the requirements of that drug distribution handout, the utilization of the controlled substance form and custom, the Respondent did, in fact, on occasion have wastage which was recorded on the controlled substance form and initialed by another nurse practitioner as may be seen in a review of Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1, which is a series of controlled substance forms for various dates. Notwithstanding her knowledge of procedures and customs within the hospital, there were a number of dates in which the Respondent failed to have a witness initial the wastage of Schedule II controlled substances Those occasions were as follows: Date: January 28, 1981 Patient: Pinkney Dose: 50 mg. Demerol Waste: 25 mg. Demerol Witness: No entry Date: February 16, 1981 Patient: Gression Dose: 100 mg Demerol Waste: 100 mg. Demerol Witness: No entry Date: February 22, 1981 Patient: Perry Dose: 50 mg. Demerol Waste: 50 mg. Demerol Witness: No entry Date: February 23, 1981 Patient: Fraser Dose: 100 mg. Demerol Waste: 100 mg. Demerol Witness: An entry made to the effect that a witness was unavailable Date: February 28, 1981 Patient: Bergdorf Dose: 1 mg. Dilaudid Waste: 1 mg. Dilaudid Witness: No entry There were no facts presented other than those related to the patient Fraser on the presence of a witness to the events of wastage and destruction of the Schedule II controlled substances. In addition to the incident with DiFrancesco, there were two other occasions in which the Respondent had signed out a controlled substance and indicated giving that controlled substance to a patient, when in fact the patient did not receive the controlled substance. This pertained to incidents on March 5, 1981, involving a patient on Ward 1-C, where the Respondent was employed as a Registered Nurse at St. Luke's Hospital. On the aforementioned date, i.e., March 5, 1981, the patient Theodora Durham was in the hospital for procedures related to curettage and packing of the uterus. She was assigned to Room 158 on Ward 1-C as her patient's room. The controlled substance sign-out form for March 5, 1981, which is found as part of Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1, indicates that at 9:02 A.M. and 12:15 P.M., Demerol in the amount of 50 mg. on each occasion was signed out for the benefit of the patient Durham. The sign-out and other entries were made by the Respondent. The Demerol was in fact removed from the hospital inventory. The patient's chart, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence, also indicates nurses notes authored by the Respondent stating that the 50 mg. amounts of Demerol were administered intramuscular to the patient Durham at 9:00 A.M. and 12:00 Noon. In fact, the patient Durham never received the Demerol on either of the occasions referred to herein. The Respondent knew the patient had not received the Demerol. Following her employment at St. Luke's Hospital, the Respondent received employment at Beaches Hospital in Jacksonville Beach, Florida. On April 12, 1981, she reported work as a Registered Nurse at Beaches Hospital for the 11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. shift. During the transition from the prior shift into the shift of the Respondent, two (2) fellow employees noticed the aroma of what they felt to be alcohol on the breath of the Respondent. The employees having reported their observation to the nurse supervisor, the Respondent was summoned into the office of the nurse supervisor and under questioning admitted that she had been "drinking." This response was related to the issue of whether the Respondent had been consuming an alcoholic beverage. The nurse supervisor detected an unkempt appearance about the person of the Respondent and the fact that the Respondent's eyes were bloodshot Following this discussion, the Respondent was asked to leave the hospital because she could not afford patient care to those patients on her ward, due to the fact that she had been consuming an alcoholic beverage before coming on duty which was contrary to the policy of the hospital.
Findings Of Fact On or about January 25, 1979, Respondent, while employed as a registered nurse at Coral Reef General Hospital in South Miami, Florida, was assigned as a scrub nurse for Dr. Firth Spiegel. The physician was preparing to perform surgery on a boy, age 10 or 11, for an umbilical hernia. While Dr. Spiegel was scrubbing-up in the room adjacent to the operating room, he relayed an order to Respondent through the circulating nurse, to begin the procedure. Respondent began the procedure by making a U-shape skin incision in the patient's abdomen approximately five centimeters in length. At this point, the physician came into the room, remarked that the incision was a little low, and told the Respondent to continue with the procedure. The Respondent refused to continue and the physician completed the surgery. Nothing unusual was noted in the surgical notes. The patient died shortly thereafter. Approximately one month later, Respondent was terminated from Coral Reef General Hospital over this incident. Respondent had received on the job training as a surgical "first assistant," but had no license or certificate of training in this regard. Respondent had performed surgical tasks numerous times prior to this incident and had observed her direct supervisor also acting as a "first assistant." There was an "unwritten policy" at Coral Reef General Hospital that it was acceptable for scrub nurses to act as surgical first assistants. Respondent had had no other complaints made against her at this hospital prior to being terminated over this incident. Respondent did not continue with the surgical procedure as requested by the physician only because she did not feel it was necessary, although she testified that the doctor is the "captain of the ship," and she would do anything he asked as long as it wasn't a ridiculous order. At all times material to the administrative complaint, the Respondent was a registered nurse, licensed in the State of Florida, license number 56881- 2. Petitioner's expert witness, a registered nurse with extensive operating room experience, believes that the making of surgical incisions is beyond the scope of nursing practice. Her testimony established that the registered nurse is responsible for her actions and may properly refuse to perform procedures for which she is not qualified.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of unprofessional conduct in violation of Subsection 464.018(1)(f), F.S., and issuing a reprimand as provided by Subsection 464.018(2)(d), F.S. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: William Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 3202 Harvey D. Rogers, Esquire 1401 Northwest 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125 Helen P. Keefe, Executive Director Board of Nursing Room 504, 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 458.331(1)(g), (j), (m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.20 and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Ronald L. Cohen, M.D. (Dr. Cohen), is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0024014. Dr. Cohen's last known address is 7800 West Oakland Park Boulevard, Suite 216, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Dr. Cohen's area of practice is urology, and he is board certified. He has been practicing in Fort Lauderdale since 1976. During his years of practice, he has enjoyed an excellent professional reputation. Between on or about July 2, 1990, through on or about May 16, 1992, Dr. Cohen treated Patient R.G. for various complaints. On or about July 2, 1990, Patient R.G., a thirty-four year-old female with a history of chemical dependency from the age of twelve for which she first underwent treatment in or about 1986, presented to Dr. Cohen with voiding complaints including post void dysuria, frequency, urgency, and urgency incontinence. However, such information about chemical dependency was unknown to Dr. Cohen until a subsequent time. Patient R.G. did not reveal to Dr. Cohen either her history of chemical dependency or treatment of that dependency. Dr. Cohen performed a physical examination of Patient R.G. wherein Dr. Cohen dilated Patient R.G.'s uretha. Dr. Cohen noted that Patient R.G.'s urinalysis was entirely within normal limits. Dr. Cohen then diagnosed Patient R.G. with urethritis, urthrel stenosis, and trigonitis. Dr. Cohen prescribed Patient R.G. a three-day supply of Noroxin and pyridium to improve Patient R.G.'s symptoms. Noroxin is an antibacterial agent indicated for the treatment of adults with complicated urinary tract infections. Pyridium is an analgesic agent indicated for the symptomatic relief of pain, burning, urgency frequency and other discomfort arising from irritation of the lower urinary tract mucosa. Patient R.G.'s symptoms persisted. On or about July 13, 1990, Patient R.G. underwent a cystoscopy, urethal dilation, and hydraulic bladder distention by Dr. Cohen at Outpatient Surgical Services in order to rule out interstitial cystitis. Dr. Cohen's postoperative impressions were as follows: Interstitial cystitis (inflammatory lesion of the bladder) and urethral stenosis. On or about July 17, 1990, Patient R.G. presented to Dr. Cohen's office in severe pain secondary to the cystoscopy and bladder distention. At that time, Patient R.G. complained of feeling bloated suprapubically. Dr. Cohen instilled dimethyl sulfoxide to relieve Patient R.G.'s pain. Patient R.G.'s symptoms were subsequently temporarily resolved. On or about January 19, 1991, Patient R.G. next presented to Dr. Cohen with complaints of a recurrent episode of urinary frequency and burning on the previous day. Shortly thereafter, in early 1991, Dr. Cohen asked Patient R.G. to go to lunch. Dr. Cohen and Patient R.G. subsequently began a social relationship which included sexual intercourse. At the time that Dr. Cohen initiated the relationship with Patient R.G. he was aware of the prohibitions against such conduct, knew he had choices available to him, but declined to exercise professional self-discipline. Dr. Cohen did exercise influence as Patient R.G.'s physician for the purpose of engaging in sexual relations. Dr. Cohen has never had a sexual relationship with any other patient. On or about April 8, 1991, Dr. Cohen wrote a prescription for thirty units of Valium 10 mg. for Patient R.G. who had at that time complained to Dr. Cohen of anxiety due to marital difficulties. Valium is defined as a legend drug by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains diazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Valium is indicated for the management of anxiety disorders or for the short-term relief of symptoms of anxiety. Dr. Cohen's medical records of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition do not include any reference to the Valium prescription and therefore the records fail to justify his prescription of Valium, a controlled substance indicated for the treatment of anxiety, to Patient R.G. On May 16, 1992, Dr. Cohen wrote a prescription for thirty units of Prozac 20 mg. Prozac is defined as a legend drug by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Fluoxetine Hydrochloride which is not a controlled substance. Prozac is indicated for the treatment of depression. Dr. Cohen's medical records of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition do not include any reference to the Prozac prescription and therefore the records fail to justify his prescription of Prozac. Dr. Cohen inappropriately prescribed Prozac, a legend drug indicated for the treatment of depression. Prozac, however, was not indicated in the treatment of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition, interstitial cystitis. Dr. Cohen admitted to having prescribed Prozac to Patient R.G. as a favor so that Patient R.G. did not have to see her psychologist for said prescription. Dr. Cohen admitted to having a sexual relationship with Patient R.G. Dr. Cohen, by virtue of his sexual relationship with Patient R.G. and his inappropriate prescribing of Prozac for Patient R. G., failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Dr. Cohen underwent an evaluation by Thomas J. Goldschmidt, M.D., a specialist in neurology and psychiatry, in conjunction with Richard Westberry, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist. Dr. Goldschmidt issued a report on their evaluation in which he stated: We see no evidence of any exploitative tendency regarding Dr. [Cohen] in his relationship with this patient. There is no evidence of any sexual addiction component. And we do not feel that his is behavior that is likely to reoccur or compromise his ability to practice urology. We see this as an isolated incident that Dr. [Cohen] approached in a very naive fashion and was primarily orchestrated by the dynamics of a sexually provocative, aggressive female who proposed a sexual act that was nonthreating (sic) to the patient while simultaneously providing ego gratification for longstanding, underlying emotional conflicts dealing with castration fears and anxiety. Dr. Cohen voluntarily entered into a contract with the Physician's Recovery Network to assist him in dealing with his despondency and depression. Dr. Cohen continues to see Dr. Westberry on a weekly basis for his despondency. Dr. Cohen has never had any disciplinary action taken against his license nor has he been dismissed from any position at a hospital at which he had staff privileges. Dr. Cohen has staff privileges at four hospitals. Dr. Cohen was Vice Chief of Staff at one of the hospitals until he voluntarily resigned that position when this case surfaced in order to avoid embarrassment to the hospital.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Dr. Cohen violated Sections 458.331(1)(g), (j), (m), (q) and (t) as set forth in Counts 1-5 in the Administrative Complaint, and imposing a $5,000 fine for the violations of Sections 458.331(1)(g) and (j), Florida Statutes and a $5,000 fine for violations of Sections 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statues, for a total of $10,000, and placing Dr. Cohen on probation for two years under terms and conditions to be set by the Board of Medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-3274 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-9: Accepted. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12-14: Accepted. Paragraph 15: Rejected as irrelevant because the administrative complaint did not state such a violationas it related to the valium but only as to the Prozac. The violation relating to valium was the record keeping. Paragraphs 16-19: Accepted. Paragraph 20: Accepted except as to the valium. The administrative compliant did not allege such a violationas it related to valium. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Accepted as to his professional reputation. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 5: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 6: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is unnecessary. Paragraphs 7-13: Accepted. Paragraph 14: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 15: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Dr. Cohen is the party whoinitiated the social relationship with R.G. when heasked her out to lunch. He was physically attracted tothe patient and that is why he asked her out. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found because Dr. Cohen did prescribe medication forR.G. which had nothing to do with the complaints forwhich she was seeing Dr. Cohen. Paragraph 18: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. See paragraph 17. Paragraphs 19-22: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23: The first and second sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The thirdsentence is accepted to the extent that he has enteredcounseling. Paragraphs 24: Accepted to the extent that he is in counseling and that such a relationship will not likelyoccur again. Paragraph 25: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance that such a relationship is unlikely to happen in the future. Rejected to the extent that it implies that R.G. gavefree, full informed consent to the sexual activity. Paragraphs 28-29: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 31-34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 36-39: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald G. Korman, Esquire Korman, Schorr and Wagenheim The Dart Building 2101 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 400 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire 2851 Remington Green Circle, Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32308-3749 Albert Peacock, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6506 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Agency For Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jerome W. Hoffman General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
