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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. RICHARD ANGLICKIS AND AMERICAN HERITAGE REALTY, 82-000176 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000176 Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1983

Findings Of Fact Respondent Anglickis is a Florida real estate broker holding license number 0001869. Respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker holding license number 0169476. The address of both respondents is 102 East Leland Heights Boulevard, Lehigh Acres, Florida. (P-26.) Respondent Anglickis is president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., and Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc. All three companies are located at the same address. (Testimony of Campbell; P-5, P-26.) On March 12, 1979, Louis G. Hofstetter and his wife, Dale I. Hofstetter, both residents of North Carolina, entered into a real estate contract with American Heritage Builders, Inc. Respondent Anglickis signed on behalf of American Hertiage Inc. Under the terms of the contract, the Hofstetters were to Purchase a lot and home to be constructed thereon by American Heritage Builders, Inc. The purchase price included the transfer of a lot owned by the Hofstetters and a cash down payment. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-1, P-3, P-26.) The contract estimated closing costs to be approximately $2,000". It also contained conflicting conditions relative to the time within which any mortgage financing must be obtained. . . . In the event PURCHASER'S application for mortgage financing is not approved within sixty (60) days from date hereof, all monies receipted for, less cost of credit report, will be returned to the PURCHASER and this contract will be null and void. * * * FOR MORTGAGE TRANSACTIONS: This contract of Purchase and Sale shall be void unless Purchaser's application for Mortgage has been approved by a bank or financial institution and Purchaser has executed the Mortgage Acceptance Form, within four (3) [sic] months from date of this Contract of Purchase. 2/ (P-1, R-1.) On March 12, 1979, the Hofstetters signed a mortgage loan application and submitted it to Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc. (P-26.) On May 5, 1979, 45 days after accepting the application, Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., submitted the Hofstetters' mortgage loan application to First Federal of DeSoto. (Testimony of Archer.) On June 15, 1979 (95 days after receiving the loan application), Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., wrote the Hofstetters indicating that the local lender needed additional information on their stock holdings, and enclosing a document titled "Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Charges". This document estimated that closing costs would be $2,754--$754 more than the estimate contained in the real estate contract. (P-5.) On June 22, 1979, the Hofstetters protested the increased closing cost, requested clarification, and provided the requested information on their stock holdings. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-26.) On July 7, 1979, the Hofstetters notified Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., that the increased closing cost deviated from the contract, that they therefore considered the contract cancelled and wanted the deposit refunded. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-8.) On June 29, 1979, Robert Campbell, vice-president of Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., wrote the Hofstetters and explained the meaning of each component of the closing cost. (P-7.) On July 17, 1979, respondent, as president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., wrote a letter to the Hofstetters expressing his position: * * * Let me try and put the contract in the proper perspective for you. It's our contention that you have reluctantly provided to us the information that would enable us to make a proper and expedient application to the lending institution and that much of this information has been confused, causing further delays. In accordance with the contract, you were to make this application as quickly and as expediently as Possible so that the contract would not expire. However, this is not the case. Thus, my immediate Position is that the contract should be expired and all of the deposits, including the cash and the lot which we gave you $6,995.00 trade for, would be forfeited as agreed upon liquidated damages. He ended by outlining other alternatives and repeating his asserted right to cancel the transaction and retain the Hofstetters' deposit as liquidated damages * * * First, the lending institution must make a quick determination based on the facts that they have that you are either eligible or not eligible for a mortgage loan as outlined in our contract. If they still do not have enough information, we have no other choice then but to ask you to pay the increase which we have experienced at this time (price list enclosed), and in paying that increase we would be willing to take another 90 days to try and secure a loan for you. If your mortgage loan is denied, your deposit less the costs of processing your mortgage application will be returned to you. Of course, the third choice is the choice I hope we do not have to take, and that is cancelling this transaction and retaining your monies as agreed upon liquidated damages. (P-9.) Mr. Hofstetter responded on July 22, 1979. He denied that he was responsible for any delay or confusion in the Processing of their loan application; asserted that 93 days had elapsed from the submission of their loan application and Mr. Campbell's letter of June 15, 1979, asking for additional financial information; and informed respondent Anglickis that the contract had already expired by virtue of the clause allowing 60 days to obtain mortgage financing. He then, again, asked that his deposit be returned. (P-10.) On July 30, 1979, respondent Anglickis, as president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., wrote to the Hofstetters indicating that the loan had been approved 3/ and he was prepared to build their home at the contract price. He then addressed Mr. Hofstetter's July 22, 1979, denial of any responsibility for delay in obtaining the mortgage loan: I have reviewed your letter of July 22, 1979 and I understand we certainly have a difference of opinion as to whose fault the delay has been caused by. However, I don't think it's time to look at whose fault the delay might be, since it all has worked out to your satisfaction. The mortgage has been approved and we are ready to build. I expect you will now sign the mortgage papers when receipted for so that we may begin construction immediately. (P-11.) On August 6, 1979, the Hofstetters restated to respondent Anglickis that they were not prepared to go ahead with construction, that the contract became null and void by operation of the 60-day mortgage financing clause, and that the deposit should be immediately returned. (P-12.) On August 31, 1979, respondent Anglickis notified the Hofstetters that, pursuant to the contract conditions, he was retaining their full deposit, including cash and the real estate lot for which they received a $6,995 credit toward the purchase price. The full down payment totaled $10,350. (P-1, P-13.) On September 8, 1979, the Hofstetters replied: We cannot understand why you continue to ignore the provisions of the second sentence of Paragraph Two on the reverse side of Contract No. 1997, dated 12 March 1979. You say you intend to invoke the Provisions of the third sentence of this para- graph, but this sentence is Predicated on the assumption that the mortgage would be approved within sixty (60) days. The mortgage was not approved until late July (your letter of 17 July 1979 indicated it was not yet approved, and your letter of 30 July 1979 stated that it had now been approved), more than 120 days past the date of the original contract. Our Position is as Previously stated on several occasions: on 12 May 1979 the contract became null and void, and on that date our deposit should have been refunded. Any action other than this is illegal, according to the terms of the contract. We are due return of our down payment, plus interest, from 12 May 1979. (P-24.) On October 3, 1979, First Federal of DeSoto, which had continued to process the Hofstetter loan application, issued a commitment approving the requested loan. On October 10, 1979, the Hofstetters rejected the mortgage loan. (P-26.) Subsequently, the Hofstetters wrote letters to the Florida Department of Legal Affairs and the Lehigh Chamber of Commerce complaining of respondent Anglickis' retention of their deposit; they, then, retained an attorney and filed a civil action against respondents in the circuit court of Lee County. That action was settled out-of-court. There is no evidence whatsoever to support respondent Anglickis' assertion to the Hofstetters that they were dilatory or responsible for confusion or delay in obtaining the necessary mortgage financing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges against respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., be dismissed; That respondent Richard A. Anglickis be administratively fined $1,000. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oaklnd Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1982.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25725.01
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. MILTON I. MARKOWITZ, 81-002537 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002537 Latest Update: Oct. 29, 1982

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Milton I. Markowitz, was a licensed real estate broker doing business in the State of Florida. Respondent acted as the individual broker for Ford Realty, Inc. At some time, apparently in 1979, Respondent and Jack Arias discussed the possibility of forming a corporation to be known as Miltjack Investments, Inc., for the purpose of acquiring a piece of property (the property) in Pompano Beach, Florida, owned by Richard F. Brohamer. By Deposit Receipt dated December 10, 1979, an offer to purchase the property was submitted by Miltjack Investments, Inc. to the seller through Cronan Realty, another real estate broker. Respondent signed the Deposit Receipt as president of Miltjack Investments, Inc. The Deposit Receipt, by its terms, indicated that the sum of $10,000 had been placed in escrow with Ford Realty, Inc. as a deposit on the purchase price of $567,000. In fact, Respondent knew when he signed the Deposit Receipt and forwarded it to the seller that Miltjack Investments, Inc. was a non-existent corporation. In addition, Respondent also knew that he had been given a $10,000 check by Jack Arias, his coinvestor, with the knowledge that the check could not be covered by sufficient funds, and that it would not be placed in escrow by Ford Realty, Inc. At no time during the negotiations involved in this proceeding did Respondent ever communicate to the seller, or Cronan Realty, that the $10,000 deposit was not being held in escrow or that Miltjack Investments, Inc. was not an existing corporation. After the aforementioned Deposit Receipt was forwarded to the seller, the seller made a counter offer by Deposit Receipt Contract dated January 11, 1980. This instrument contained several changes, but was, in fact, at some point signed on behalf of Miltjack Investments, Inc. by Jack Arias, as secretary-treasurer, and Mr. Arias' signature was witnessed by Respondent. Like the initial Deposit Receipt, this latter agreement also recited that the $10,000 deposit was in escrow with Ford Realty, Inc. Unlike the initial agreement, however, the agreement of January 11, 1980, indicated that Cronan Realty, Inc. was to act as escrow agent. Pursuant to this agreement, Cronan Realty, Inc. made demand upon Ford Realty, Inc. for the $10,000 deposit, so that it could fulfill its obligation under the last mentioned agreement. Upon receipt of this demand, Jack Arias made demand upon Respondent to return the $10,000 check to him, which Respondent did, and apparently Mr. Arias destroyed the check some time thereafter. For reasons not clear from the record in this cause, the transaction involving the sale of the property never closed.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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ROGER B. WOZNIAK vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 87-002018 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002018 Latest Update: Jul. 27, 1987

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Roger B. Wozniak, applied for Florida licensure as a real estate salesman on February 25, 1987. R. Ex. 1. The Florida Real Estate Commission proposed to deny his application due to his answers to questions 6, 13, and 14, in his application, and his admission that he was not a Florida resident as of March 18, 1987. (Letter to the Petitioner dated May 3, 1987, from Randy Schwartz, Assistant Attorney General, which accompanies the request for formal administrative hearing and request for assignment of hearing officer, filed in the files of the Division of Administrative Hearings, and now officially recognized.) The answers to questions 6, 13, and 14 concern the Petitioner's conviction which will be discussed in subsequent findings of fact. On the date that he applied for licensure, the Petitioner was not a Florida resident. T. 26. At the time of the formal administrative hearing, the Petitioner was and is now a Florida resident, and resides in Tequesta, Florida, with his family. P. Exs. 13 and 14; T. 11, 24. He closed on his home in Tequesta on June 10, 1987. T. 24. The Petitioner was licensed as a real estate salesperson in Illinois from 1967 until the early 1980's. P. Ex. 1; T. 12. He worked as a licensed real estate salesperson and real estate appraiser during these years in Illinois. Id. By indictment filed on October 4, 1984, the Petitioner was charged with multiple felony counts involving twelve false applications for FHA and VA loans, obstruction of justice, and failure to report income for income tax purposes. P. Ex. 15. The first offense was alleged to have occurred on January 29, 1980, and the last offense was alleged to have occurred on December 6, 1982. Id. In January, 1985, the Petitioner was convicted of counts one through nine, eleven, twelve, fourteen, and fifteen. T. 13, 29; R. Ex 15. He was initially sentenced to a term of imprisonment for two years on counts one, fourteen and fifteen, concurrently. On June 24, 1985, the sentence was modified by suspension of the sentence of imprisonment and imposition of five years probation. P. Ex. 15. In his application, the Petitioner provided the Real Estate Commission with P. Ex. 15. T. 30, 36. (This exhibit was referred to by counsel as exhibit A, but became P. Ex. 15.) P. Ex. 15 contained only the indictment and the last order reducing his sentence, but from these documents the Real Estate Commission could easily discern the counts upon which the Petitioner was found guilty because the sentencing order was accompanied by a form which completely lists the counts upon which sentence was premised. Thus, in his application the Petitioner disclosed all material matters concerning his conviction. As a result of his conviction, the State of Illinois revoked the Petitioner's real estate license. T. 13. Following his conviction, the Petitioner attended real estate courses taught by the Real Estate Education Company in Chicago, Illinois, receiving credit for courses in basic real estate transactions, advanced real estate principles, contracts and conveyances, finance, and appraisal. P. Exs. 2 and 4. In December, 1986, the Petitioner became a designated member of the National Association of Real Estate Appraisers, and became entitled to the designation of Certified Real Estate Appraiser (C.R.E.A.). P. Ex. 3. He is listed in the 1987 national directory of the National Association of Real Estate Appraisers as a Certified Real Estate Appraiser. P. Ex. 10. In February, 1987, the Petitioner received a certificate for completion of a three hour training session and satisfactory completion of a written test sponsored by the National Association of Realtors. P. Ex. 5. Prior to his felony conviction, the Petitioner was enrolled as a correspondence student in the California Coast University. T. 16. He completed his course of study, and on March 19, 1987, he received a bachelor of science degree in business administration from California Coast University. P. Ex. 9 and 6. As a part of his five year probation, the Petitioner was required to undergo counseling. He was referred to a Dr. Schneider and Dr. Indovina of the DuPage County Health Department in Wheaton, Illinois. He was first seen by Dr. Schneider on November 21, 1985. Both Dr. Schneider and Dr. Indovina were of the opinion that the Petitioner had made considerable-progress since his first referral. As of March 10, 1987, both physicians were of the opinion that the Petitioner had learned the consequences of his past behavior and would not engage in illegal behavior in the future. P. Ex. 8. The Petitioner is currently licensed by the State of Illinois as an insurance producer, and that license was never revoked by Illinois for Petitioner's felony conviction. P. Ex. 11; T. 32. After an administrative hearing at which the Petitioner presented evidence of rehabilitation, the State of Illinois reissued Petitioner's real estate salesperson license. P. Ex. 12; T. 31, 22-23. The Petitioner currently holds a real estate salesperson license from Illinois. Id. The Petitioner is currently serving the remainder of his probation, having about three more years of probation to serve. He reports monthly to a probation officer in West Palm Beach.

Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter its final order denying the application of Roger B. Wozniak for licensure as a real estate salesman in Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of July, 1987. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2018 The following are rulings upon findings of fact proposed by the parties (using the numbers used by the parties) which have been rejected. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: 2-6. There was no evidence presented concerning the deliberations of the Florida Real Estate Commission. Moverover, this evidence is subordinate to finding of fact 1. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: 5. A finding of fact that the Petitioner was elusive cannot be made on this record. As discussed in finding of fact 6 above, the Petitioner candidly provided the Real Estate Commission with a copy of the materials in P. Ex. 15, and from those documents one can easily determine the counts upon which the Petitioner was adjudicated guilty. 8. The two year prison term was suspended. The Petitioner has in fact taken occupancy. There is no contrary evidence in the record. While the voter's registration is evidenced by a temporary card, the temporary card clearly states that it is only to be used until a permanent voter identification card is received. It is inferred that the temporary card is issued only when a permanent voter's registration will soon be issued. There is no evidence in the record that the Petitioner has only registered temporarily. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Roger B. Wozniak 14 Hickory Hill Road Tequesta, Florida 33469 Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Room 212, 400 West Robinson Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 475.17475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. SUN RENTALS AND MANAGEMENT, INC., AND DANIEL OLDFATHER, 81-001786 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001786 Latest Update: Sep. 07, 1982

The Issue The issues in this case are as follows: Was Respondent Daniel Oldfather legally responsible for accounting and refund? Were the refund provisions of the receipt form printed in type as required by Rule 21V-10.15, Florida Administrative Code? Was Richard Vanicek due a 75 percent refund? Was Vanicek due a complete refund because of inaccurate information given him? Did Vanicek make written demand for a refund, and was a written demand for the refund necessary?

Findings Of Fact In September of 1979, Sun Rentals and Management, Inc., was a corporate real estate broker holding license number 0208997 and doing business at 2703 East Oakland Park Boulevard in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. At that time, Victor Stevens was a licensed real estate salesperson employed by Sun Rentals. Stevens, as an employee of Sun Rentals, interviewed Richard D. Vanicek concerning Vanicek's rental needs. Vanicek entered into a contract with Sun Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit number 1) under which he paid Sun Rentals $45 and Sun Rentals was to provide him with rental information on available rentals. Vanicek received a receipt (Petitioner's Exhibit number 3) which provided in pertinent part as follows: ... Notice, pursuant to Florida Law: If the rental information provided under this contract is not current or accurate in any material aspect, you may demand within 30 days of this contract date a return of your full fee paid. If you do not obtain a rental you are entitled to receive a return of 75 percent of the fee paid, if you make demand within 30 days of this contract date. ... It was agreed that the receipt was printed totally in ten-point type. Vanicek attempted to visit one of the listings provided to him by Sun Rentals. He encountered difficulty in locating the listing; however, his lack of familiarity with Fort Lauderdale may have contributed to his difficulties. Vanicek found a rental through his own efforts and requested a refund of 75 percent of his $45 fee by telephone. He made his request first to Stevens, who referred him to Daniel Oldfather pursuant to office policy. As a result of this referral Vanicek spoke with a man at Sun Rentals, who may have been Oldfather, and restated his request for a refund. His request was denied. Daniel Oldfather was the licensed broker/salesman for Sun Rentals during September, 1979. He was the office manager of Sun Rentals at that time. Martin Katz was broker for Sun Rentals in September of 1979 (Transcript; Page 261, L 21). Oldfather was the next man in authority at the office under Katz (Transcript; Page 235, L 6). Katz delegated to Oldfather the authority to make refunds. The rental forms, including the rental receipt form (Petitioner's Exhibit number 3), were submitted to the Board of Real Estate.

Recommendation Having found that Daniel Oldfather was not guilty of any of the allegations in the amended Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that Counts I, II and III against him be dismissed. Having found that Sun Rentals and Management, Inc., is not guilty of the allegations contained in Count III of the amended Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that Count III against Sun Rentals be dismissed. Having found that Sun Rentals is guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(d) and 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the license of Sun Rentals be suspended for 60 days, during which time the officers and directors of said corporation may not engage in the practice of real estate sales or brokerage under their names or in any other corporate name. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. Jordan, Esquire Post Office Box 14723 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 James Curran, Esquire 200 SE Sixth Street, Suite 301 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57475.01475.25475.453
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs PAUL EDWARD EBBERT, JR., 91-002618 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Apr. 29, 1991 Number: 91-002618 Latest Update: Oct. 31, 1991

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violation alleged in the administrative complaint dated March 20, 1991; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and disciplining real estate licensees. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent has been a real estate licensee having been issued salesman's license no. 0455312. In March, 1989, Respondent met with Thomas and Cheryl Bellaw regarding the purchase of real property. The Bellaws were interested in investment property which would enhance their retirement options. Respondent showed the Bellaws a 7.5 acre tract which he claimed could be subdivided into smaller lots and resold at a substantial profit. As an inducement to convince the Bellaws to make the purchase, the Respondent drew several plans to show how the tract could be divided, made resale projections to compute the buyers' estimated profits from the subdivision of the land, and gave the buyers sales comparables from other lots to justify the figures he presented. In truth, the tract could not be subdivided and was the subject of a county ordinance which prohibited its division. Respondent knew that the tract could not be subdivided but nevertheless encouraged the Bellaws to complete the purchase. Once the purchase was completed, the Bellaws listed the property for resale with the Respondent at a substantial increase. At no time prior to the purchase by the Bellaws or prior to the subsequent relisting, did the Respondent advise the Bellaws that the tract could not be subdivided. When the listing produced no offers, the Bellaws investigated and discovered that the tract they had purchased had been illegally subdivided earlier from a 10 acre parcel. Respondent admitted that the 10 acres had been owned by a married couple who, in the course of their divorce, quitclaimed part to the wife (the portion not sold to the Bellaws) and part to the husband (the portion purchased by the Bellaws), and that this subdivision was impermissible. The Bellaws then went to the county for relief. They sought after-the- fact permission to subdivide the 10 acre parcel so that their tract would be able to receive a building permit. That relief was denied. Consequently, the Bellaws have been unable to assure that a building permit can be issued for their property and are unable to use the tract for the purpose for which it was purchased. Respondent should have known of the county ordinance which prohibited the subdivision of the 10 acre tract as it had been enacted some seven to eight years prior to the transaction which is the subject of this case. A prudent real estate licensee checks governmental restrictions which might impair the marketability of a parcel.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order revoking Respondent's real estate license. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted. Paragraph 3 is accepted but is irrelevant to the allegations of this case. Paragraphs 4 through 14 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Paul Edward Ebbert, Jr. 1000 Abernathy Lane, #206 Apopka, Florida 32703 Paul Edward Ebbert, Jr. 770 Lake Kathryn Circle Casselberry, Florida 32307 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller, Director Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.17475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. PHYLLIS I. REAVES AND ANNETTE J. RUFFIN, 85-001008 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001008 Latest Update: Mar. 27, 1986

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: Phyllis I. Reaves is now and was at all times material to these proceedings, a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0351816. Annette J. Ruffin is now and was at all times material to these proceedings, a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0076385. From May 2, 1983 to October 18, 1984, Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves was licensed and operating as a real estate salesman in the employ of Respondent Annette J. Ruffin, as broker, c/o International Investment Development Center, Belleair, Florida or Century 21 A Little Bit Country, Brandon, Florida. At all time material hereto, Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves was a licensed mortgage broker in the State of Florida. DOAH CASE NO. 85-1008/1138. COUNT I No evidence was presented concerning the allegations in Count I.. COUNT II No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count II. COUNT III No evidence was presented concerning the allegations of Count III. COUNT IV On June 10, 1983, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Emmett K. Singleton, as seller to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The sales contract listed a total purchase price of $67,000. C-21 A Little Bit Country was listed on the contract as escrow agent of the binder deposit. The property had an existing first mortgage of approximately $33,854. Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the new mortgage and requested that Mr. Singleton obtain a second mortgage in the principal amount of $26,400. Reaves agreed to assume this second mortgage amount while allowing Mr. Singleton to keep the proceeds. Mr. Singleton agreed that the balance of the sales price would be paid via a purchase money mortgage to Respondent Reaves in the principal amount of $9,643.99. Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves executed a Hold Harmless and Indemnity Agreement which read as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Emmett K. Singleton harmless and does idemnify him against any future liability or losses related to the mortgage on subject property at 1912 Hastings Drive, Clearwater, Florida." The sales transaction closed on July 7, 1983, and Respondent Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $1,955. The contract provided that the "listing agent agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." The purchase money mortgage note was actually signed by Michael R. Fisher, as trustee, and not by Respondent Reaves. Respondent Reaves requested that Mr. Singleton give her the mortgage payment booklets and she would assume and pay off the existing and second mortgages. Singleton trusted Reaves and relied upon her statements that she would do as she promised. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the notes and mortgages and thereby caused the seller to become delinquent with the lenders. After closing, Respondent Reaves, acting as the owner, obtained tenants for the property and collected rental payments. Respondent Reaves solicited and obtained $3,000 in connection with a lease/option agreement. The lease/option agreement provided that the sales price of the home would be $78,000 in three years. The rent would remain at $495 per month for three (3) years. The agreement further provided that $3,000 per year would be paid for three (3) years which would reflect a total down payment of $9,000. This down payment was considered the "option consideration." The agreement provided that one third of the option money would be returned if the option were not exercised. The tenants paid Respondent Reaves a total of $3,000 of the option consideration. The renters became concerned when they began to receive notices from Freedom Mortgage Company stating that certain mortgages on the home were overdue. The renters did not exercise the option to buy the home. The renter requested, but did not receive, $1,000 of the $3,000 option consideration back from Respondent Reaves. COUNT V On July 6, 1983, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Stephen B. Barnes, as seller, to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The property was not listed", but a broker from Tam-Bay Realty approached Barnes and stated that he had a buyer. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $91,000. The agreement listed "C-21 A Little Bit Country" as escrow-agent for the binder deposit. In addition, the purchase and sales agreement provided that: "Listing agent Tam-Bay agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." The seller agreed that he would allow Respondent Reaves to assume the existing mortgage of approximately $52,990. Mr. Barnes then agreed to obtain a second mortgage in the amount of $18,925. The seller agreed that the balance of the sales price would be paid via a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $16,670.91 to be paid by Respondent Reaves. In addition, Mr. Barnes obtained a home improvement loan in the amount of $4,900. According to the agreements between Respondent Reaves and Mr. Barnes, Mr. Barnes was to keep the money obtained by the second mortgage and the home improvement loan. Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the existing mortgage, the second mortgage and the home improvement loan. Respondent Reaves advised Mr. Barnes to state to the lender that the purpose of the loans were for home improvements. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless and indemnity agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Stephen. B. Barnes harmless and does indemnify him against any future liability or losses related to the mortgages on property at 13222 - 88 Place North, Seminole, Florida." The sales transaction closed on August 10, 1983, and Respondent Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $2,513.45 and a mortgage brokerage fee of $946.25. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the notes and mortgages and thereby caused the seller to become delinquent with the lenders. COUNT VI On September 3, 1983 Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Floyd and Christine Erwin, as sellers, to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The contract concerned Floyd and Christine Erwins' home located at 2805 Candlewood Drive in Clearwater, Florida. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $53,000. The agreement listed C-21 A Little Bit Country as escrow agent for the binder deposit. The agreement further provided that the "listing agent agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the existing mortgages of $16,766.29 and $17,457.94. In addition, the sellers agreed to obtain a new mortgage in the principal amount of $4,900 and a $1,500 personal loan. Upon the advice of Respondent Reaves, the sellers stated to the lender that the purpose of the loans were for home improvements. Respondent Reaves and the sellers agreed that the sellers would keep the money obtained by the loans and that Respondent Reaves would assume the mortgages and make all of the required loan payments. The sellers agreed that the balance of the sales price was to be paid via a purchase money mortgage, payable by Respondent Reaves, in the principal amount of $12,375.77. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless and indemnity agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Floyd S. Erwin and Christine E. Erwin harmless and does indemnify them against any future liability or losses related to mortgages or liens on the subject property at 2805 Candlewood Drive, Clearwater, Florida." Floyd and Christine Erwin's home was listed with a broker, and the Erwins understood that Reaves was not their agent. Respondent Reaves told the Erwins that she was representing "some investors." The purchase money mortgage note was actually signed by "Michael R. Fisher, as trustee and not personally." Respondent Reaves made some payments on the purchase money mortgage note which was signed by Michael Fisher. The sales transaction closed on September 23, 1983, and Respondent Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $1,555.50. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the mortgages and notes. Respondent Reaves has not made the payments due on the mortgages and notes and has caused the Erwins to become delinquent with their lenders. COUNT VII The evidence presented concerning Count VII consisted solely of documentary evidence. For reasons enumerated in the Conclusions of Law section, infra, the documents alone are insufficient to establish the basis of any offense. Therefore, a discussion of those documents would serve no useful purpose. COUNT VIII On October 16, 1983, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Patricia and William Willis as sellers, to purchase certain real estate through the use of land trust. The contract concerned the Willis' home located at 417 North Missouri Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $54,000. The agreement listed C-21 A Little Bit Country as escrow agent for the binder deposit. The agreement further provided that the listing agent ". . . agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." Respondent Reaves and the Willis' agreed that Respondent would assume the existing mortgage of $15,396.52. The sellers agreed to obtain the new mortgage in the principal amount of $34,100. The sellers agreed that the balance of the sales price would be paid via a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $8,898.45 to be paid by Respondent Reaves. Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the existing mortgage and the new mortgage in the amount of $34,100 and make all of the required loan payments. Respondent Reaves advised the Willis' to state to the lender that the purpose of the $34,100 mortgage loan was for home improvements. The Willis' applied for the loan but refused to state that the purpose of the loan was for home improvements. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Patricia L. Carrah, a/k/a Patricia L. Willis and William Willis harmless and does idemnify them against any future liability for losses related to any mortgages or liens on the subject property " The sales transaction closed on November 23, 1983 and Respondent Phyllis Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $3,213 and a mortgage brokerage fee of $2,216. Respondent Reaves failed to assume the notes and mortgages and thereby caused the sellers to become delinquent with their lenders. COUNT IX No evidence was presented concerning the allegations of Count IX. COUNT X No evidence was presented concerning the allegations of Count X. COUNT XI No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XI. COUNT XII No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XII. COUNT XIII No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XIII. No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XIV. COUNT XV on January 13, 1984, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Clifford and Virginia Miner, as sellers, to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The contract concerned the Miner's home located at 1247 Burma Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $62,000. The agreement listed "C-21 A Little Bit Country" as escrow agent for the binder deposit. In addition, the agreement provided that the listing agent ". . . agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." Respondent Reaves and the sellers agreed that Respondent Reaves would assume the existing mortgage of $34,424.82. Respondent Reaves advised the sellers to obtain a $20,000 second mortgage that she would also assume. The sellers were to obtain the mortgage and keep the money as their equity, and Respondent Reaves was to assume the mortgage and make the payments. The sellers agreed that the balance of the sales price was to be paid via a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $6,865.33, payable by Respondent Reaves. Respondent Reaves promised the sellers that she would make all the required loan payments and assume the mortgages. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Clifford S. Miner and Virginia N. Miner, his wife, harmless and does idemnify them against any future liability or losses related to any mortgages or liens on the subject property . . . ." The purchase money mortgage note was actually signed by Michael R. Fisher, "as trustee and not personally." Respondent Reaves told Mr. Miner that the hold harmless agreement provided additional assurance that she would personally assume all of the mortgage and loans. The sales transaction closed on January 31, 1984, and Respondent Phyllis Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $1,823.25 and a mortgage brokerage fee of $949.48. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the notes and caused the Miners to become delinquent with their lenders, requiring them to "catch up" on the delinquent loan. COUNTS XVI, XVII AND XVIII. The evidence presented concerning Count XVI, XVII and XVIII consisted solely of documentary evidence. For reasons enumerated in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order, the documents alone are insufficient to establish the basis of any offense. Therefore, a discussion of those documents would serve no useful purpose. COUNT XIX During the later part of 1984, an investigator, representing the Department of Professional Regulation, went to speak to Mrs. Ruffin at her "Little Bit of Country" office concerning this case. The investigator requested that he be provided with the records from all of Respondent Reaves' transactions. Respondent Ruffin stated that she was unaware of the particular real estate transactions in question, but that she would check and provide the records at a later date because she was in the process of moving the location of her office. After subpoena was served, Respondent's counsel provided one of the documents in question. COUNT XX Respondent Ruffin employed Respondent Reaves as a salesman. Respondent Ruffin thought of Respondent Reaves as "an independent contractor." Respondent Reaves decided on her own hours and took care of her own transportation. Respondent Ruffin and Respondent Reaves were on an 85%-15% split fee arrangement. Respondent Ruffin knew that Reaves was interested in "buying a lot of property." Respondent Ruffin was basically aware of the method that Respondent Reaves was using to obtain property. Respondent Ruffin did not feel that the method was wrong, however, she did ask Respondent Reaves to leave employment after she received many calls complaining about Respondent Reaves and information that Respondent was in a "tight financial situation." Respondent Ruffin admitted that she had very little time to provide assistance or guidance to Respondent Reaves. DOAH CASE NO. 85-2454 COUNT I There was no evidence presented concerning the factual allegations of Count I. COUNT II There was no evidence concerning the factual allegations of Count II. COUNT III On October 2, 1984, an investigator, representing the Department of Professional Regulation, went to speak with Respondent Ruffin at her office. The investigator requested certain records relating to Respondent Reaves' transactions concerning the charges herein. Respondent Ruffin stated that she was unaware of the particular real estate transactions in question, but that she would check and provide the records at a later date because she was then in the process of moving her office. After a subpoena was served, Respondent Ruffin's attorney provided one of the documents in question. COUNT IV There was no evidence presented concerning the factual allegations of Count IV of DOAH Case No. 85-2454.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves' license as a real estate salesman be revoked; and, RECOMMENDED that Respondent Annette J. Ruffin be issued a written reprimand and assessed an administrative fine of $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1986. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 16. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Matters not included therein are rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 36 and 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 49. Adopted in Findings of Fact 49 and 50. Adopted in Finding of Fact 55. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 58. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gerald Nelson, Esquire 4950 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33809 E. A. Goodale, Esquire 14320 Indian Rocks Road Largo, Florida 33540 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25689.071
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. WINFIELD EZELL, SR., AND EZELL REALTY, INC., 85-000140 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000140 Latest Update: Aug. 07, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ezell Realty, Inc., was a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0231943 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Respondent, Winfield Ezell, Sr., held real estate broker's license number 0309739 issued by petitioner and was the sole qualifying broker and officer of Ezell Realty, Inc. The firm is located at 1512 West Gore Street, Orlando, Florida. Grover Crawford was an acquaintance of Ezell who was interested in purchasing certain rental property on Coretta Way in Orlando, Florida. When he was unable to purchase the property Crawford told Ezell to let him know if anything else became available in that area. Ezell happened to own a rental house at 1121 Coretta Way which he had just purchased several months earlier in a foreclosure proceeding, and the two eventually began discussions concerning a possible sale. At all times relevant thereto, the house was rented to tenants, and Crawford intended the property to remain as investor-owned property rather than owner-occupied property. Ezell initially agreed to sell the property for $70,000 and the two entered into a contract on January 8, 1983, using this sales price. However, the lender's appraisal of the residence came in far below this figure, and the parties eventually agreed on a sales price of $55,450. A second contract for sale and purchaser was executed on June 22, 1983. Although the contract provided that Crawford would pay a cash deposit of $2,300 to be held in escrow by Ezell Realty, none was paid since Ezell was given $2,300 by the tenants of the house to make needed repairs to the property prior to the sale. This arrangement was agreeable with Crawford. The contract also required the seller (Ezell) to pay all closing coats. Therefore, Crawford was not required to pay any "up front" costs in order to buy the property. Under the terms of the second contract, Crawford was to obtain FHA financing on the property in the amount of $53,150. This type of financing is the most desirable from an investor standpoint since the mortgage can be easily transferred to another buyer for a small transfer fee without lender approval. After executing the first contract on January 8, 1983, Ezell and Crawford executed an "Addendum to Contract For Sale and Purchase" on the same date which provided in pertinent part: This contract is for the sole purpose of having the buyer obtain an assumable FHA mortgage for the seller and reconveying title to the seller. The seller hereby irrevocably assumes the said FHA mortgage from the buyer immediately after closing and the buyers hereby agree to that assumption. For this, Crawford was to receive $1,000. The parties agreed that this addendum would apply to the second contract executed on June 22, 1983. At the suggestion of Ezell, Crawford made application for a $53.150 FHA loan with Residential Financial Corporation (RFC) in Maitland, Florida, a lending institution which Ezell had done business with on a number of prior occasions. However, Ezell was not present at any meetings between Crawford and RFC. When Crawford applied for the mortgage, he indicated the property would be used for investment purposes and would not be owner-occupied. For some reason, RFC assumed the property would be owner-occupied and structured the-loan in that manner. Because of this, Crawford's down payment was slightly less than 5% of the value of the property with the remainder being financed by the institution. Had RFC treated the loan as an investor-loan, the down payment would have been increased to around 15%. Neither Crawford or Ezell advised RFC of the Addendum to the contract which required Crawford to reconvey the property to Ezell for $1,000 once the FHA mortgage was obtained. Had RFC known of this it would not have approved the loan. There was no competent evidence that such an agreement was illegal or violated any federal laws or contravened any real estate industry standard or ethical consideration. The loan was eventually approved, and a closing held on September 22, 1983. After closing, Crawford retained the property in his name with Ezell making all payments from the rent proceeds. This was consistent with an oral agreement between the two that such an arrangement would last for an indefinite period as long as the payments were current. When Crawford later received several notices from the lender stating that mortgage payments were in arrears, he hired an attorney and demanded that Ezell fulfill the terms of the Addendum. He also filed a complaint against Ezell with petitioner which precipitated the instant proceeding. After the closing, Ezell had intended for the tenants to assume the mortgage since they had expressed an interest in buying the property. However, such a sale never materialized. In July, 1984, the property was reconveyed to Ezell, and Ezell paid Crawford $1,000 as required by the Addendum.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be dismissed, with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esq. P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Julius L. Williams, Esq. P. O. Box 2629 Orlando, FL 32802 ================================================================ =

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JACK BRAUNSTEIN AND RENT AID, INC., 81-002641 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002641 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1982

The Issue Whether Respondents' licenses as real estate brokers should be suspended or revoked, or the licensees otherwise disciplined, for alleged violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated September 28, 1981. This proceeding is based on an administrative complaint filed by Petitioner, Board of Real Estate, alleging that Respondents, while engaged in a rental service business which advertised and sold rental property information or lists, for an advance fee to prospective lessees, utilized a contract or receipt agreement which included language defining when a "rental has been obtained" that was contrary to the intent of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and that therefore Respondents had violated Subsection 475.453 and 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. It further alleged that Respondents failed to refund 75 percent of an advance fee to specific prospective tenants as required by Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes and therefore constituted a violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties submitted a Proposed Stipulation of facts which was accepted by the Hearing Officer and constitutes the Findings of Fact hereinafter. No witnesses testified at the proceeding nor were any exhibits entered in evidence other than the four exhibits attached to the Stipulation. (Exhibit 1)

Findings Of Fact Respondent Jack Braunstein is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0146924. The last known address of this Respondent is 916 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304. Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., is a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0133234. The last known main office address of Rent Aid, Inc., is 916 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304. At all times material herein Respondent Braunstein was the sole active broker of and for Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., doing business at the corporate main office located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. As said active broker, Braunstein was responsible and liable for the acts and/or omissions of the associates of Rent Aid, Inc. performed in the scope of their employment; and was responsible and liable for the acts and/or omissions of Rent Aid, Inc. At all times material herein, Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., was engaged in a full service real estate brokerage business which included representing potential buyers and sellers of real property and potential landlords and tenants with regard to rental properties. As part of the business Rent Aid, Inc. entered into contracts with prospective tenants for an advanced fee, as shown by Exhibit "A" to the Complaint and incorporated herein by reference. That the contract or receipt agreement forms provided by the Respondents, have inserted therein additional language as to specifically stating that "a rental has been obtained when company provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by member. On or about September 16, 1980 Jan Spear and Deborah Nigro entered into the contract, an accurate copy of which is appended to the Complaint as Exhibit "A", with Rent Aid, Inc. That under the terms of the contract, Respondent had the discretion to refuse any and all refunds if they had shown to the prospective tenant an available rental unit which met the terms specified and requested by the prospective tenant, even if the prospective tenant declined to rent said unit and demanded a refund of the paid fee within the required time frame. That Respondent's practice was to refuse demands for refund made where, in Respondent's opinion, a bona fide effort had been made to obtain a rental, which efforts had been unsuccessful through no fault of Respondent's. Jan Spear and Deborah Negro made written demand upon Respondent's for a partial refund of the fifty ($50) fee which they had paid Respondent's pursuant to the contract. This demand was made within thirty days of the contract date as shown by therefund refusal dated October 12, 1980, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference as true and accurate. The contract utilized by Respondent's does not strictly conform to the refund required by Rule 21V-10,30 in that the conditions under which a refund would be payable are restricted beyond the scope of said Rule, and SS 475.453(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent utilized the Contract form in question in reliance upon advice received from his prior counsel, Gregory Jones, as shown by a letter dated April 1, 1980. A true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Sal Carpino, attorney for the Department of Professional Regulation, had been provided with a copy of the form utilized by Respondent and had approved the format of said form without approving a discrepancy of the language in question in this proceeding, to wit: "a rental has been obtained with company (Rent Aid, Inc.) provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by members." In response to this proceeding, Respondent has made full and complete refund to Jan Spears and Deborah Nigro and has agreed to voluntarily stop all use of the Contract form in question, and use only such a form as strictly complies with 475.453(1) and Rule 210-10.30 and to furnish a copy of said form to the Department conformance with said Rule."

Recommendation That the Board of Real Estate issue a private reprimand and impose a $100 fine against Respondents Jack Braunstein and Rent Aid, Inc. for violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33306 John P. Gaudiosi, Esquire 3801 North Federal Highway Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C.B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 475.25475.453
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs KENNETH A. NORBERG, T/A ARDEN REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATES, 91-001713 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Mar. 15, 1991 Number: 91-001713 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 1991

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the real estate license issued to the Respondent, Kenneth A. Norberg, should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. At all pertinent times, Respondent, Kenneth A. Norberg, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued License Nos. 0143669 and 0243001 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last licenses issued to Respondent were as a broker t/a Arden Real Estate Associates, 525 West Lantana Road, Lantana, Florida 33462. Respondent operates both an insurance business and a real estate business out of his office. There is a large sign outside the office near the street that indicates both "INSURANCE" and "REAL ESTATE" in large letters. Beneath those words in smaller print, are the words "Arden Insurance" Association and "Ken Norberg Real Estate". This sign is reflected in Respondent's Exhibit 1 and has been in place for approximately fifteen years. Sometime prior to March of 1989, Joe Ann Shoop was awarded ownership of a corporation known as Jerraang Enterprises, Inc. as part of a divorce settlement. That corporation owned certain property located at 7967 Overlook Road, Hypoluxo, Palm Beach County, Florida. There are two small cottages located on the property. Ms. Shoop's attorney is an officer of the corporation, but it is not clear whether he is a stockholder. Ms. Shoop visited Respondent's office in order to inquire about insurance for the property. While she was in Respondent's office, Ms. Shoop asked Respondent if he would be interested in listing the property for sale. She explained that she did not need the property and was anxious to sell it in order to get some cash. Respondent agreed to list the property. Sometime in March of 1989, Respondent received an offer to purchase the property from Bernadette Butler. Included with that offer was a $500.00 earnest money deposit. Respondent placed the $500.00 deposit into his escrow account maintained at the Bank of South Palm Beaches, Hypoluxo, Florida. Ms. Shoop accepted Ms. Butler's offer and a contract was agreed upon in March of 1989 with an anticipated closing date in May of 1989. The contract price was $30,000. The specific terms of that initial contract have not been established. Neither party offered the contract into evidence at the hearing. The parties agreed to extend the closing date of that contract and a new written contract was entered on June 23, 1989. That new contract indicated that the closing was to take place on July 26, 1989. The second contract provided that the sale was contingent upon the purchaser obtaining financing in the amount of $21,000.00. The purchaser was unable to arrange financing and the transaction failed to close by July 26, 1989. The parties verbally agreed to extend the contract, however, the evidence is inconclusive as to how long an extension was agreed to. By October of 1989, it became clear that the transaction would not close. At that time, Ms. Shoop demanded the deposit and began efforts to sell the property to someone else. Ultimately, the property was sold at auction for $15,000. Ms. Shoop claims that she was not advised and would not have agreed to a contract that was contingent upon the buyer obtaining financing. As indicated above, the terms of the first contract have not been established. However, it is clear that the second contract did provide a contingency for financing. On October 31, 1989, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Butler indicating that Ms. Shoop had requested the release of the deposit to her. Respondent enclosed a copy of a Release of Deposit Receipt form for Ms. Butler to execute. Ms. Butler did not execute the form and/or authorize the release of the deposit to Ms. Shoop. Respondent retained the deposit in his escrow account for several more months. During this time, Ms. Butler continued her attempts to obtain financing and also began searching for additional properties. Ms. Butler indicated to Respondent her intention to apply the money held in escrow to any new purchases that may arise if the contract with Ms. Shoop did not close. On several occasions in late 1989 and early 1990, Ms. Shoop attempted to contact the Respondent and determine the status of the escrow money. Respondent did not answer her inquiries. On September 10, 1990, an investigator from the Department visited Respondent's office to conduct a random audit of Respondent's business and his escrow account. During this audit, the investigator discovered the deposit being held in escrow without a current contract. She advised Respondent that he needed to be sure to comply with the requirements of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes and Rule 21V-10.032, Florida Administrative Code. In October of 1990, the Respondent sent a letter to both Ms. Butler and Ms. Shoop enclosing a Release of Deposit Receipt form pursuant to which he suggested that the parties divide the deposit equally. Respondent sent a copy of this letter to the Department to notify it of his attempt to resolve the dispute over the deposit. By letter dated October 11, 1989, Gerri E. Barnoski, an analyst for the Florida Real Estate Commission, (the "Commission") advised Respondent of his options. In this letter, Ms. Barnoski told Respondent that he had to either (1) arrange for arbitration, (2) place the matter before a civil court or (3) request an Escrow Disbursement Order from the Florida Real Estate Commission. The Respondent subsequently requested an Escrow Disbursement Order from the Florida Real Estate Commission and the matter is currently pending resolution by the Commission in Case No. E902949. The deposit remains in Respondent's escrow account. In sum, the evidence demonstrated that Respondent failed to promptly notify the Commission of the conflicting demands to the escrow deposit. Respondent claims that he never received a formal written demand from either party. However, the evidence is clear that by at least October of 1989, Respondent was aware of the conflicting demands for the deposit. After delay of approximately one year, Respondent finally attempted to resolve the matter in an appropriate manner. Respondent says he was concerned that attorney's fees would consume the entire deposit. However, this concern does not excuse the delay. There is no indication that Respondent was manipulating the transaction for his own personal gain and/or that he was trying to defraud either party. There is no indication that Respondent ever used the escrow account for improper purposes or withdrew money from the escrow account for his own personal or business use. At the time Petitioner's investigator visited Respondent's office in September of 1990, there was no sign immediately outside the entrance door to Respondent's office. The large sign alongside the roadway (which is described in Finding of Fact 2 above) was in place and there was a trademark indication of a Realtor on the entrance door. However, a sign which had previously been on the wall immediately next to the entrance door was missing. The evidence established that the sign at the entrance door was temporarily missing due to unusual circumstances. Respondent was in the middle of a hotly contested divorce. Respondent and his former wife had previously worked out of the office together. The sign next to the entrance door had both of their names on it. Respondent taped over the name of his former wife and the sign was subsequently vandalized. Respondent had delayed obtaining a new sign until the divorce proceedings were concluded. The evidence indicates the road side sign was in place approximately fifteen feet from the entrance. Visitors to the office were sufficiently alerted to the identity of the real estate broker within. In view of all the circumstances, Respondent was not in violation of the requirement that he have a sign on or about the entrance to the real estate office.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, finding Respondent guilty of Counts II and III, reprimanding him, placing him on probation a period of one year and imposing a fine of $250.00. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of June, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9-15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 15-18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2 and 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7-15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 10-17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth A. Norberg Arden Real Estate Associates 525 West Lantana Road Lantana, Florida 33462 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.22475.25
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