The Issue Whether Petitioner's application to increase its water and sewer rates to its customers in Palm Beach County should be granted; and Whether Petitioner failed to comply with Florida Public Service Commission Orders Nos. 0924 and 8382 directing Petitioner to comply with information submission requirements in connection with its application for rate increase. CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATION Petitioner's rate increase request should he granted in accordance with the findings in this recommended order. Such rates are just, reasonable, not unjustly discriminatory and consistent with Section 367.081, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980) Commission Orders No. 8924 and 0382 did not, by their terms, direct Petitioner to comply with minimum filing requirements by a date certain. Therefore, Petitioner's lengthy and unexcused delay in complying with such requirements does not constitute a violation of the Orders.
Findings Of Fact Background In May, 1978, Petitioner, Mangonia Park Utility Company ("UTILITY"), filed with the Respondent, Florida Public Service Commission ("COMMISSION"), applications to increase, on an interim basis, its sewer and water rates to its customers in Palm Beach County, Florida. By Order Nos. 8924 and 8382, issued on June 21 and July 7, 1978, respectively, the COMMISSION suspended the proposed rates, approved interim water and sewer rate increases, found that the UTILITY's application did not comply with the COMMISSION's minimum filing requirements, and acknowledged the UTILITY's statement that it would file an application which meets filing requirements by September 1, 1979. Between November, 1979, and April, 1980, the UTILITY supplied additional information but did not fully comply with the minimum filing requirements. On May 15, 1980, the COMMISSION issued an Order requiring the UTILITY to show cause why the interim rates should not be repealed and monetary penalties imposed for the UTILITY's alleged failure to comply with Order Nos. 8924 and 8382. The question of the UTILITY's compliance with those Orders was set to be heard in conjunction with its rate increase application. It was not until May 29, 1980 that the UTILITY submitted a completed application and complied with the minimum filing requirements. On November 5, 1980, the COMMISSION forwarded this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a Hearing Officer to conduct a formal Section 120.57 hearing. This case was then set to be heard on January 21, 1981. At hearing, the UTILITY called Philip D. Mitchell and Boyd D. Ellis as its witnesses and offered Petitioner's Exhibits No. 1 through 6 into evidence. On February 16, 1981, the COMMISSION timely submitted its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Testimony of Willis, Ellis, P-2, R-1). II Rate Increase Application The UTILITY owns and operates water treatment facilities consisting of three wells, two pumps, a lime softening unit, and two storage tanks. Since April, 1979, the City of Riviera Beach has provided treatment to the UTILITY's sewage. The UTILITY's sewage facilities now consist of a master lift station, pumps, and sewage lines. The approved test period for this rate proceeding is the twelve months prior to June 30, 1979. During the test year, the UTILITY provided water service to 113 residential customers, 49 general service customers, and one multiple dwelling customer; it provided sewer service to 75 residential customers, 47 general service customers, and one multiple dwelling customer. As a result of its analysis of the UTILITY's application, together with its books and facilities, the COMMISSION proposed various adjustments, almost all of which were accepted and agreed to by the UTILITY. At hearing, issues involving the UTILITY's request for pro forma salary adjustments and recovery for income tax liability were eliminated when it withdrew its request. The only factual issue which remains concerning the requested rate increase is the useful life and depreciation rate which should be applied to the UTILITY's plant and equipment. Useful Life and Depreciation Rate The COMMISSION contends the standard 40-year useful life with a 2.5 percent depreciation rate is appropriate; the UTILITY contends that such a depreciation rate does not take into account changing technology and obsolescence, and that a 25 to 30-year useful life with a 3.3 to 4 percent depreciation rate is more appropriate. The UTILITY acknowledged that the determination of useful life of utility equipment required engineering judgment. However, it presented no testimony by a qualified engineer on the subject. Its evidence consisted solely of its accountant's long- standing "conceptual objection" to use of a 40-year useful life for utility plants. The only competent and credible evidence on the question was presented by the COMMISSION. Its qualified engineer testified that he conducted an on-site independent study of the UTILITY plant and concluded that, in this instance, a 40-year useful life, with a 2.5 percent depreciation rate, was appropriate. In view of the foregoing, it is determined that a 40-year useful life, with a 2.5 percent depreciation rate, should be applied against the UTILITY's plant. (Testimony of Mitchell, Munt). Having thus determined the appropriate depreciation rate for use in this case, the parties have agreed to the following rate- making factors: Rate Base The adjusted test year rate base for the UTILITY's water system is $210,799; the rate base for its sewer system is $65,151. Both are calculated below: RATE BASE TEST YEAR ENDED 06/30/79 WATER SEWER Utility Plant in Service $ 386,611 $ 287,939 Plant Held For Future Use -0- (3,750) Acquisition Adjustment 18,990 -0- Accumulated Depreciation (42,485) (28,541) Amortization of Acquisition Adjustment (4,600) -0- Contribution in Aid of Construction (Net of Amort.) (154,349) (203,069) Working Capital Allowance 6,632 12,572 Income Tax Lag -0- -0- Rate Base 210,799 65,151 (Testimony of Willis, Mitchell, R-3) Net Operating Income The UTILITY's adjusted operating income for the test year - a $15,673 loss (water) and a $46,837 loss (sewer) - together with its rate of return, are depicted below: OPERATING STATEMENT TEST YEAR ENDED 06/30/79 WATER SEWER Operating Revenues $ 46,441 $ 60,192 Operating Expenses Operation 43,759 94,572 Maintenance 9,297 6,002 Depreciation (sic) 4,716 993 Amortization 541 -0- Taxes Other Than Income 3,801 5,462 Income Taxes -0- -0- Total Operating Expenses 62,114 107,029 Operating Income $(15,673) $(46,837) Rate of Return (7.44 perct) (Testimony of Willis, Mitchell, R-3) Capital Structure and Cost of Capital (71.89 perct) The UTILITY's capital structure, and weighted cost of capital, are as follows: COST OF CAPITAL COMPONENT RATIO COST RATE WEIGHTED COST Long-Term Debt Customer Deposits 99 perct 9.84 perct 1 perct 8.00 perct 9.74 perct .08 perct 100 perct 9.82 perct (Testimony of Mitchell, Clinger, R-5) Rate of Return Based on its cost of capital, the parties have agreed that percent constitutes a fair rate of return on the UTILITY's rate base. The UTILITY has a deficit in common stock equity; a return on negative investment is inappropriate. (Testimony of Mitchell, Clinger, (sic), R-5) Rate Structure The UTILITY's current water rates are conventionally structured using a minimum monthly charge which includes a minimum number of gallons and a one-step excess rate over that minimum; its residential and general service sewer rates are structured using a flat rate. The parties agree that the rates should be revised in accordance with what is known as the base facility charge (BFC) rate design. The purpose of this design is to recover the costs of providing service to each particular customer. Its monthly charges consists of two components: A base charge which covers expenses not related to actual water use, such as depreciation, billing and collecting, property taxes, debt interest, maintenance, etc., and a gallonage charge based on the allocated costs associated with pumping, treating and delivering the water to the customer. Sewer rates are similarly structured and directly related to actual water consumption. The BFC rate design structure equitably distributes the fixed and variable costs of providing service to customers and allows them to exercise greater control over the rates which they pay. In implementing the BFC rate design, the COMMISSION makes two specific recommendations which are not opposed by the UTILITY, are reasonable, and should be followed: (1) that public fire hydrants not be charged, and (2) that the monthly charge for private fire lines be one-third of the BFC charge for the particular sized connection. (Testimony of Taylor, R-4A) Required Revenue In order to be allowed the opportunity to earn a 9.82 percent return on its rate base, the UTILITY should file rates which generate annual gross revenue at $83,747 for the water system and $114,792 for the sewer system. This revenue should produce net operating revenue of $20,700 and $6,398, respectively. (Testimony of Mitchell, Willis, R-3) III Alleged Violation of Commission Order Nos. 8924 and 8382 The COMMISSION contends that the UTILITY violated Order Nos. 8924 and 8382 by its failure to comply with minimum filing requirements until May 29, 1980. For such violations, the COMMISSION seeks to impose a penalty of $200. The orders in question do not explicitly direct or order the UTILITY to file an application which complies with the minimum filing requirements by a date certain. Consequently, the UTILITY's lengthy and unexcused delay in complying with such requirements does not constitute a violation of or refusal to comply with the orders in question. (Testimony of Mitchell, Willis, R-1)
The Issue Whether the challenged agency statement is a rule as defined under Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes. If the agency statement is a rule, whether Respondent has violated Section 120.535(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to adopt the alleged agency statement as a rule. If the agency statement is a rule, whether it is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), is the administrative agency of the State of Florida which administers the relevant portions of Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and the rules pertaining thereto with regard to the reimbursement of actual and reasonable costs of cleanup of petroleum sites. Petitioner, American Factors Group, Inc. (AFG), is engaged in the business of financing storage tank clean-ups eligible for reimbursement pursuant to Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, The Environmental Trust (TET), is affiliated with AFG. Certain principals of AFG are also trustees of TET. TET acts as the funder of the contractors and subcontractors performing rehabilitation activities at petroleum sites. Environmental Factors, a division of AFG, negotiates and enters into the financing contracts with the contractors and subcontractors. American Environmental Enterprises, which is affiliated with AFG, handles the financial transactions relative to the contracts in which Environmental Factors enters as a division of AFG. In other words, American Environmental implements the contracts on behalf of AFG. Under the reimbursement program, the invoices are submitted to DEP after the program task is completed or not more than once every six months for remedial actions. DEP will reimburse the applicant for the actual and reasonable costs incurred for site rehabilitation. The application is reviewed by DEP within sixty days of receipt. If additional information is needed, DEP will advise the applicant. DEP is required to deny or approve the application for reimbursement within ninety days of the date the additional information is submitted or at the end of the sixty-day review period if no additional information is requested. Because of backlogs in the past, DEP has taken longer than the statutory time frames to make a payment for reimbursement. In the financial arrangements between a contractor and AFG, the contractor is required to submit invoices to AFG upon the completion of the contractor's services. AFG advances the contractor a discounted amount based upon a percentage of the face value of the invoice. The contractor is also required to contribute a certain percentage of the invoice amount to a reserve trust account. The turn around time between AFG's receipt of the contractor's invoice and the advance of the discounted amount to the contractor is typically five to ten days. This financial arrangement between AFG and the contractors is known as factoring. Factoring is generally construed as the purchase of an asset, which may include an account receivable, from another person at a discount. An account receivable reflects the costs that a company charges for its service after that service has been rendered but has not been paid by the entity responsible for payment. Thus, when a contractor completes his rehabilitation task, the amount of his invoice that would be submitted to DEP for reimbursement is an account receivable. In determining how much the invoice is to be discounted, AFG will take into consideration the time value of the funds. In other words, AFG uses how long will it take for AFG to receive the invoice amount from DEP as a component in determining the percentage of discount. In the instant case, AFG is not actually buying the account receivable, but is buying the right to receive the payment for the account receivable when it is paid. AFG has recourse against the contractor through an indemnity and such recourse is secured by the contractor's contribution to a reserve trust account. AFG has been using this type of financing in Florida in the context of clean ups of petroleum sites since 1993. By letter dated September 10, 1993, Paul DeCosta, an attorney representing AFG, requested Lisa Duchene of the DEP to advise him how certain activities contemplated by AFG in financing expenses for reimbursable environmental cleanups would be treated by DEP pursuant to Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes. By letter dated November 4, 1993, E. Gary Early, counsel for AFG, advised Bill Sittig of DEP of his understanding of a discussion between Mr. Sittig and representatives of AFG on October 21, 1993. The discussion concerned DEP's position on certain aspects of the financing arrangements that AFG contemplated using for the environmental cleanups. On January 18, 1994, Mr. Early wrote to Lisa Duchene, outlining AFG's plan for providing capital for site rehabilitation, and requesting that she advise him if there were any obvious problems with the proposed financing structure. Rule 62-773.350(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code prohibits the reimbursement of costs associated with interest or carrying charges of any kind with the exception of those outlined in Rule 62-773.650(1), Florida Administrative Code. In November, 1994, Mr. Early, Ms. Duchene, and Charles Williams, Environmental Administrator for DEP's Bureau of Waste Cleanup, had a telephone conversation concerning factored invoices. Mr. Early was advised the following by DEP staff: That the difference between the amount that a contractor accepted in payment for his services, which was a discounted amount after factoring, the difference between that and the face value of the invoice which was claimed and marked up in the application was determined to be a carrying charge or interest, which is specifically disallowed for reimbursement in the reimbursement rule. This position had been formulated at meeting of DEP representatives prior to the telephone call. The statement was limited to the scenario that Will Robbins of AFG had outlined in an earlier meeting with DEP staff. The statement of DEP was an informal opinion of how DEP would propose to deal with an application involving AFG and the scenario described if such an application should be submitted to DEP. In determining whether DEP would also treat the discounted amount as a carrying charge in other transactions of other entities involving factoring, DEP would have to deal with it on a case by case basis. By memorandum dated April 21, 1995, Bruce French, an Environmental Manager with DEP, set forth DEP's policy regarding factored and/or discounted reimbursement applications. The memorandum was issued to provide guidance to DEP reviewers when considering applications that involve factoring and reimbursement fees. The memorandum provided: Regarding reimbursement applications where the program task organization structure of the applicants may involve any combination of a general contractor, management company, funder and responsible party and any other parties with claims in applications from these entities, only incurred costs of the general contractor and subcontractors including allowable markups are to be considered for reimbursement. Specifically, invoices from subcontractors, vendors, suppliers, and/or the general contractor which were paid a factored (e.g., discounted) amount by a third party capital participant (e.g., funder) represents the actual amount incurred by that entity and subsequently by the general contractor. Additionally, the memorandum gave an example of factoring involving the payment of factoring fees, and explained what amounts would be allowed in the scenario. The factoring scenario described in the memorandum was not the same scenario that AFG representatives described to DEP. Petitioners have not challenged the validity of the April 25, 1995, memorandum as a rule.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a state agency whose primary purpose is to provide an adequate supply of potable water to the Florida Keys. To this end, it has acquired or constructed well fields, treatment plants, transmission pipelines, pumping stations, distribution pipelines, and other related facilities. Because of its exaggerated linear service area of 130 miles, it incurs high capital and operating costs. Chapter 76-441, Laws of Florida, Respondent's enabling act, confers upon Respondent the authority to impose the subject System Development Fee. Respondent imposed the subject System Development Fee, which is an impact fee, in December 1974. Respondent's Rule 48-3.002(1) expressed the purposes of the System Development Fee as follows: The System Development Fee is an impact fee charged to new and existing customers who modify, add or construct facilities which impose a potential increased demand on the water system. This fee is charged in order to equitably adjust the fiscal burden of a new pipeline and expanded or improved appurtenant facilities between existing customers and new water users. All system development fees are allocated to the direct and indirect costs of capital improvements made necessary by actual and expected increased demand on the water system. The term "unit" is a commonly accepted concept in the public utility industry, and impact fees are often assessed on a per "unit" basis. Respondent's Rule 48-3.002(5)(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 5.(b) Where the premises served consists of single or multiple commercial units, the System Development Fee shall be assessed based on each individual unit. ... The term "unit", as used by Respondent is a technical term that is defined by Respondent's Rule 48-2.001(19) as follows: (19) "Unit" A unit is a commercial or residential module consisting of one or more rooms with either appurtenant or common bathroom facilities and used for a single commercial purpose or single residential use. The number of units existing in a structure containing multiple units should be determined in accordance with Rule 48-2.007(1)(c), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: ... The number of units, whether residential or commercial, will normally be determined according to applicable city or county occupational licenses, building permits, or plans of the subject structure. In cases of discrepancy or inconsistency in definition, or interpretation, the following Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority definition will control: A unit is a commercial or residential module consisting of one or more rooms with either appurtenant or common bathroom facilities and used for a single commercial purpose or single residential purpose. Respondent is concerned with the potential use of a unit because its system must be designed by its engineers and constructed to respond to that potential use. The actual water consumption of any particular unit is not a primary consideration in determining the engineering requirements of Respondent's water system. Respondent has consistently applied the System Development Fee charges on a per unit basis for the purposes stated in its Rule 48-3.002(1). The "unit", as used by Respondent, provides a reasonable basis for Respondent to impose its System Development Fees. The per unit charge was $600 when first enacted in 1974, was increased to $1,500 in 1984, and was increased to its present level of $2,000 in 1986. A widely publicized amnesty program was in effect from August 1, 1984 through October 1, 1984, during which customers who had added units to their property without reporting same to Respondent could report the units and pay the System Development Fee on an installment basis. Customers were advised that after the amnesty program closed, the System Development Fee would be based on rates in effect at the time an unreported unit was discovered, not at the rate the unreported unit was constructed. This policy serves to encourage Respondent's customers to promptly report newly added "units", and the policy produces fees commensurate with the expenses to be incurred by Respondent after it learns of the new units. On April 11, 1978, Robert Ford, as owner, submitted an application for water services with Respondent for residential premises located at 1024 Eaton Street, Key West, Florida. The application, which was accepted by Respondent on April 11, 1978, contained the following provision: "Where System Development Charges are applied, all conditions apply as authorized in the Customer Service Policy Booklet". Petitioner changed the use of this property from residential to commercial during the time he owned the property. At the time he bought the property in 1975, it was a large, single family residence containing eight bedrooms. Mr. Ford changed the use of the property from a residence that housed a single family to a guest house that rented its rooms on a daily or weekly basis to tourists or other members of the public. He added four bedrooms to the eight bedrooms that existed when he purchased the premises so that a total of twelve guest rooms were available to rent. There were no substantial changes made to the plumbing system; no bathrooms were added and no water pipes were enlarged. No structural changes, other than the changing of the locks on the doors, were made by Mr. Ford to the eight bedrooms that existed when he purchased the property. There was no evidence that actual water consumption for the premises had increased because of the change in usage. Respondent first learned in the changes Mr. Ford made to the premises at 1024 Eaton Street in 1989. Thereafter, Respondent issued the subject System Development Charge based on its determination that Petitioner had added 11 units to the one existing unit, for a total of 12 units. The assessment was based on the rate of $2,000 per unit, the rate in effect at the time the changes were discovered. Petitioner agreed to pay the System Development Fee for the four bedrooms that he added to the residence. Petitioner did not contest the reasonableness of the fee currently being charged by Respondent ($2,000 per unit), but he did challenge the imposition of the current rate to the changes he made to the premises located at 1024 Eaton Street because those changes predated 1986, when the $2,000 per unit rate went into effect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order which upholds the assessment against Petitioner of the System Development Fee based on 11 additional units at the rate of $2,000 per unit. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1-4 and 7-10 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence since four bedrooms were added to the premises. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact relating to occupancy levels are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12-14 and 16-17 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence and because of the failure to provide pertinent citations to the record as required by Rule 22I-6.031(3), Florida Administrative Code. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 15 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached, but are treated as a preliminary matter. The respective paragraphs in the Findings of Fact section of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order were not numbered. For ease of reference, these paragraphs have been numbered 1-10 sequentially. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 7 and 10 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the fifth and sixth sentences of paragraph 2 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4 and 9 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the second sentence of paragraph 5 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are rejected as being an incomplete statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Galetti, Esquire 616 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 Robert T. Feldman, Esquire Feldman and Koenig, P.A. 417 Eaton Street Key West, Florida 33040 Floyd A. Hennen, Esquire General Counsel Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority 1100 Kennedy Drive Key West, Florida 33041-1239 Douglas M. Cook, Director Planning & Budgeting Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
Findings Of Fact William J. Colello is a registered real estate broker holding license number 0147272 issued by the Board of Real Estate. Colello is the only active firm member for Cindy Realty of Hernando, Inc., a registered corporate broker holding license number 0181975. Sea Pines, Inc., was the developer of Sea Pines Unit Three Addition. Wet Water, Inc., is a water and sewage company regulated by the Public Service Commission of Florida. Sea Pines and Wet Water agreed that the first purchaser of real property in Addition Three to Sea Pines would owe Wet Water $540. This assessment covered the cost of providing the water and sewage service to the subdivision. This was later termed a service availability charge. In addition, the property owner would have to pay water and sewer hook-up charges. The purchaser could elect to pay the assessment in a lump sum or in 100 monthly installments of $5.50. Lot 197 of Sea Pines, Unit Three Addition, the piece of property involved in this dispute, was initially bought in 1974 by J. R. Martinez, who elected to pay the water and sewage assessment in monthly installments. Martinez paid the monthly installments for approximately a year and then ceased making the payments. Colello purchased Lot 197 on June 4, 1975, and sold it on June 16, 1975, to Dennis Garcia, who was Colello's brother-in-law at the time. Colello made no payments on the water and sewage assessment. However, Wet Water billed on the first of each month, and Colello did not own the property when the bill was due. Although the Public Service Commission approved a charge by Wet Water of $5.50 per month for service availability in late 1974, there was no evidence that Colello was aware of the change in position of the Public Service Commission. Wet Water sent bills to Colello from immediately after his purchase of the property in 1975 until December of 1977. Colello denied knowledge of these bills; however, there were no bills sent to Colello after December, 1977, and as a result of a letter sent by Wet Water to Colello in August of 1978, Wet Water learned that Lot 197 had been sold to Garcia. Colello had no knowledge of the bill after December of 1977, and after August, 1978, Wet Water knew that Colello was not the owner of the property. In 1979, although Garcia's sister and Colello had been divorced for a number of years, Garcia listed Lot 197 for sale through Cindy Realty. Pat Bramanti, a salesman for Cindy Realty, sold this property to James and Mildred Mulligan. The sales agreement provided for a warranty deed, a title search and title insurance for the Mulligans. Closing was handled through the title company, and the title search did not reveal any lien against the property. Some months after the closing, the builder retained by Mulligan to construct his house sought to have the water connected and was advised by Wet Water that the water could not be connected until the arrearage of monthly payments had been paid. This amounted to $280.50. Because water was needed to complete the construction, Mulligan paid the arrearage and the hookup fees. The records of Wet Water show that the $280.50 was due from Garcia. It was Wet Water's policy not to file liens against the property of owners who owed Wet Water money, which is why the title search failed to reveal the debt. There was no evidence that Colello knew of this policy. Colello had no personal contact with the Mulligans until after the problem arose over the arrearages. Colello advised Mulligan at the time the problem arose that if the debt did not appear in the records it was not Colello's concern. Mulligan was also advised of the 1974 decision by the Public Service Commission that Wet Water could not make the assessment. There is no evidence that Colello had knowledge of any change in the Public Service Commission's decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Board of Real Estate dismiss its complaint and take no action against the Respondents. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Grover C. Freeman, Esquire Suite 410, Metropolitan Bank Building 4600 West Cypress Tampa, Florida 33607 Harvey V. Delzer, Esquire Post Office Box 279 Port Richey, Florida 33568 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts relevant to the four issues presented for determination are found: WORKING CAPITAL In calculating debt and equity costs for the petitioner, it is appropriate to use the parent company's capital structure. Here, forty percent (40 percent) of the parent's capital structure is equity and sixty percent (60 percent) is debt. In order to support its operating and/or construction activities, the petitioner receives advances from its parent company, Utilities, Inc., a Delaware corporation, or from its subsidiary, Water Service Corporation. The petitioner has treated these advances as part of its equity structure since there is a cost to these funds to petitioner, in substance if not in form. If these funds do have a specific, identifiable cost in the test year ending December 31, 1979, such as interest, they are properly includable as part of petitioner's equity structure. Pursuant to an Agreement between petitioner and its parent, the monetary advances by petitioner's parent company or its subsidiary to support petitioner's operating and/or construction activities will bear interest at the end of each calendar quarter at the rate of prime plus one quarter of one percent per annum on the average advances outstanding during the quarter. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10). This is a known and identifiable cost, and therefore the position taken by the petitioner regarding working capital allowance is correct. The proper amount attributable as "working capital allowance" is $54,699 for the water rate base and $28,179 for the sewer rate base for the test year ending December 31, 1979. UNCOLLECTIBLE REVENUES For the years 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980, the petitioner's bad debt expense averaged 1.2 percent of its total revenues. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9). The petitioner proposes a pro forma bad debt expense contending that the number of people who do not pay their bills remains essentially constant and that as rates increase, the dollars increase in relationship to the rates. In other words, petitioner proposes that the annual expense for uncollectible accounts should be increased by the same percentage that the test year dollars uncollected from customers who did not pay their bills relates to the amount of dollars which would be collected under the increased rate. The respondent's witness felt there had been no proof of the direct relationship between the increase in uncollectible accounts. In designing rates for the future, the amount of the customer's consumption of utility services during the test year are employed on the assumption that past consumption will represent future consumption. ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION The petitioner has requested an adjustment in its depreciation rate from 2.0 to 2.86 percent, based on all facilities other than general plant. The respondent has concurred with this requested increase to 2.86 percent, but would apply that depreciation rate to the beginning of the 1979 test year, thereby treating the difference as a deduction in rate base. If the adjusted rate is applied to the expense side, it must also be applied to the investment side, according to respondent's accounting analyst. The petitioner feels that the depreciation expense should be treated as a reduction in rate base only to the extent that it has been allowed in previous rates and collected from the customers. The increased expense will not be collected until the year 1981. The effect of charging the increased depreciation back to the 1979 test year would mean a $9,732 reduction in the water rate base and an $8,540 reduction in the sewer rate base. RATE OF RETURN The petitioner and the respondent agree that petitioner's capital structure is composed of forty percent equity and sixty percent debt capital, and that the cost of debt is 9.63 percent, for a weighted cost of 5.78 percent. The petitioner feels that the appropriate return to be placed on equity capital is 19.63 percent, for a weighted cost of 7.89 percent and an overall 13.63 percent return on rate base. The respondent would place the cost rate for equity at 16 percent, for a weighted cost of 6.40 percent and an overall 12.18 percent return on rate base. The petitioner utilized three methods of calculation to arrive at its proposed rate of return on equity capital, and then averaged the three results. One such method was to create a hypothetical Ba rating and then add a risk factor of 4 percent, resulting in a cost of equity of 20.7 percent. A second method, utilizing a combination of dividend yield on listed water companies and a growth factor, resulted in a cost of equity capital of 18.72 percent. The third approach involved the addition of the 4 percent risk factor of equity over debt to the average yield outstanding for various water companies, resulting in a return of 18.4 percent, Considering an attrition allowance on equity capital of 1.2 percent, a 14.7 percent overall rate of return would be within the bounds of a reasonable rate of return. Utilizing a comparable earnings analysis of nonregulated and regulated utilities, including electric, gas and telephone as well as water and sewer utilities, and taking dividend yield rates and adding growth rates, respondent's financial analyst computed the reasonable range of the cost of equity for the Florida water and sewer industry to be between 14.25 and 16.25 percent. With the equity ratio being 40 percent, respondent's witness recommended a 16 percent return on equity, with permission to fluctuate plus or minus one percent. PUBLIC TESTIMONY Members of the public who testified at the hearing were concerned with increased charges for water and sewer service since many of them were on fixed and limited incomes. While one witness complained of mosquito larvae in a dish of water left over a weekend for a dog, other witnesses opined that they had received good service from the petitioner.
Conclusions In consideration of the above and the entire record, we make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: Utilities, Inc. of Florida is a public utility subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission. The value of the Utility's rate base devoted to public service on which it is entitled to earn a fair return is $589,663 for its water division and $427,422 for its sewer division. The Company's adjusted net operating income for the test year was $18,847 and $24,405 for its water and sewer divisions, respectively. A range of 15 percent to 17 percent constitutes a fair and reasonable return on equity for Utilities, Inc. of Florida with rates to be set at the mid- point of 16 percent which gives an overall rate of return of 12.18 percent. The rates collected on an interim basis pursuant to Order Nos. 9446 and 9559 were lawful, just and reasonable and the revenues received thereunder should be retained by the Company. That the revised rates, as authorized herein constitute just, reasonable compensatory and not unfairly discriminatory rates within the meaning of Chapter 367, Florida Statutes. The use of a base facility charge rate structure eliminates discrimination against seasonal customers and encourages conservation and is appropriate for use in this docket. NOW, THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED by the Florida Public Service Commission that each and every finding of fact and conclusion of law as expressed herein is approved. It is further ORDERED that Utilities, Inc. of Florida is hereby authorized to file rate schedules consistent herewith designed to generate gross annual revenues of $350,316 for the water system and $206,865 for the sewer system, which represent increases over the test year revenues of $85,007 and $41,335, respectively. It is further ORDERED that Utilities, Inc. of Florida will make refunds to its water customers consistent with the discussion in the body of this order. It is further ORDERED that the rates approved as a result of this Order shall be effective for consumption after the date of this order, but no bills will be rendered thereunder until after the filing and approval of revised tariff pages appropriate with this Order. It is further ORDERED that the Company include in each bill during the first billing cycle during which this increase is effective a bill stuffer explaining the nature of the increase, average level of increase, a summary of the tariff changes, and the reasons therefor. Said bill stuffer shall be submitted to the Commission's Water and Sewer Department for approval prior to implementation. By Order of the Florida Public Service Commission this 9th day of June , 1981. (SEAL) HDB Steve Tribble COMMISSION CLERK
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitioner's application for a rate increase be granted as requested except for adjustments made for uncollectible debts or accounts. Respectfully submitted and entered this 5th day of March, 1981. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: R.M.C. Rose Myers, Kaplan, Levinson, Kevin and Richards Suite 103 1020 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harry D. Boswell Staff Counsel Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Tribble, Clerk Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION In re: Application of UTILITIES, DOAH CASE NO. 80-1893 INC. OF FLORIDA for an increase DOCKET NO. 800395-WS(CR) in water and sewer rates in ORDER NO. 10049 Seminole and Orange Counties, ISSUED: 6-9-81 Florida. / The following Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter: JOSEPH P. CRESSE, Chairman GERALD L. GUNTER JOHN R. MARKS, III KATIE NICHOLS Pursuant to notice, an administrative hearing was held before Diane D. Tremor, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings, on January 20, 1981, in Maitland, Florida. The Hearing Officer's Recommended Order was entered on March 5, 1981, and oral argument was held on May 11, 1981, on exceptions filed by the Commission staff. We now enter our order.
Findings Of Fact Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company filed petition with the Public Service Commission pursuant to Section 120.54(5), Florida Statutes, seeking to have the Commission adopt a new rule numbered 25-9.11(2). By Order entered April 10, 1979, the Commission initiated rule-making proceedings in accordance with the petition of Southern Bell, and by Order entered May 4, 1979, amended the rule-making proceeding by expanding the applicability of the proposed rule to include not only telephone utilities as proposed by Southern Bell, but also electric, gas, water and sewer utilities. On May 24, 1979, the Citizens of the State of Florida, represented by the Office of Public Counsel, initiated the instant proceeding by filing a petition to determine that a portion of the proposed rule is invalid. Various regulated utilities moved to intervene in the proceeding, and were granted intervenor status. The Public Service Commission and various other Intervenors moved to dismiss the proceeding on jurisdictional grounds. The motions were denied by Orders entered June 12 and 19, 1979. The Public Service Commission filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition in the Supreme Court of Florida with respect to the jurisdictional issues. Proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings were stayed. The Petition for Writ of Prohibition was denied on September 5, 1979. Florida Public Service Commission v. Division of Administrative Hearings, Case No. 57,116 (Supreme Court of Florida). A Petition for Rehearing was denied by Order entered November 9, 1979. Subsequently, the final hearing was scheduled to be conducted on December 27, 1979, and upon stipulation of the parties was rescheduled for January 22, 1980. At the final hearing, the Public Service Commission and the Intervenors stipulated that the Petitioners have the requisite substantial interest in the proposed rule to maintain the instant rule challenge. The Petitioners and the Commission stipulated that the Intervenors have the requisite standing to participate in the proceeding as Intervenors. A copy of the rule was received in evidence. Issues respecting the validity of the rule are legal rather than factual, and the parties have submitted post-hearing briefs and legal memoranda. The proposed rule [25-9.11(2)] relates to whether a regulated utility is entitled to a rate increase during the period in which a rate proceeding is pending before the Public Service Commission. The rule provides: In any general rate case filed by a utility, the utility shall be permitted upon thirty (30) days' notice to increase its rate pending final disposition of the case by an amount sufficient to produce a rate of return on its investment rate base at the bottom of its most recent previously allowed zone of reasonableness; provided, however, that any such interim increase shall be subject to refund. The rule purports to implement the provisions of the so-called file and suspend laws. As to telephone companies, the file and suspend law is set out at Section 364.05(4), Florida Statutes. The section provides: Pending a final order by the Public Service Commission in any rate proceeding under this section, the commission may withhold consent to the operation of all or any portion of the new rate schedules, delivering to the utility requesting such increase, within 30 days, a reason or written statement of good cause for withholding its consent. Such consent shall not be withheld for a period longer than 8 months from the date of filing the new schedules. The new rates or any portion not consented to shall go into effect under bond at the end of such period, but the commission shall, by order, require such utility to keep accurate account in detail of all amounts received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts were paid, and upon completion of hearing and final decision in such proceeding, shall by further order require such utility to refund with interest at a fair rate, to be determined by the commission in such manner as it may direct, such portion of the increased rate or charge as by its decision shall be found not justified. Any portion of such refund not thus refunded to patrons or customers of the utility shall be refunded or disposed of by the utility as the commission may direct; however, no such funds shall accrue to benefit of the utility. Virtually identical provisions have been adopted with respect to gas and electric utilities [Section 366.06(4), Florida Statutes], and with respect to water and sewer utilities [Section 367.081(5), Florida Statutes]. The leading judicial decision interpreting the provisions of the file and suspend laws is Citizens of the State of Florida v. Mayo, 333 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1976). The Court described the alternatives available to the Public Service Commission in conjunction with a request for interim rate increase as follows: (at p. 4) If the Commission does not affirmatively act within 30 days to suspend the proposed new rate schedule file as a part of the request for higher rates, the new rates go into effect automatically on the 31st day following the utility company's filing. Since the Commission's inaction is equivalent to its consent to the new rate schedule, no bond is required of the utility and there is no mechanism by which customers of the utility system can ever recover interim charges which, after the full rate proceeding, the Commission may find to have been wholly or partly unwarranted. If the Commission acts within thirty days to suspend all or part of the tariffs, the utility may not charge its customers the proposed new rates. The Commission's action is effective on a day to day basis until either (a) it grants full or partial consent to the new rates, or (b) eight months elapse from the date the new schedules were filed. If consent is given before the time expiration, as it was here, the utility may then begin to charge the new rates. Where consent is continuously withheld, the utility may still begin to charge its customers on the new basis after eight months have passed, under bond and record-keeping requirements required by statute. The relationship of the interim rate relief provisions to the general scheme of rate regulation was described by the Court as follows: (at p. 5) The Legislature did not intend all public utility filings to go into effect without some review by the Public Service Commission. Had that been the intent the Legislature would not have created a "suspend" power in the Commission. By placing the file and suspend law in Section 366.06, however, the Commission was given direct responsibility in this type of proceeding to insure that all charges collected by a public utility are lawful. See Section 366.06(1), Florida Statutes (1975). The Legislature did not intend a full rate hearing before all new rate schedules become effective. Had it intended that result, there would have been no need to enact subsection 366.06(4) at all. The Legislature obviously intended to allow public utilities the benefit of proposed rate increases from the date they could satisfy the Commission on the basis of an uncontested preliminary showing that the needs of the company were such as to necessitate immediate financial aid. Where the Commission is so satisfied after a preliminary analysis extending over a period not longer than thirty days, the rates become effective without further action by the Commission. (It follows from this, of course, that the Commission's affirmative act of suspending proposed rates means that the Commission is dissatisfied with the utility's preliminary showing.) The Legislature has relieved the Commission of the responsibility for balancing the rights of the company and its customers when the utility is unable to develop new facts to show that there exists good cause to put into operation the new rates which have been found to be unjustified on the basis of the preliminary showing. This was done by providing that Commission inaction following an initial suspension is overcome by time, and that the rates become effective at the end of eight months, automatically, under bond. In light of the conclusion in paragraph 5 and the fact that the Commission must provide its "reason or written statement of good cause" whenever it withholds consent to the new rates, the Legislature must have intended that there be some presentation of evidence or development of new facts between that initial withholding of consent by the Commission and its later grant of consent. (citations omitted) Petitioners contend that the proposed rule is invalid because it would render an interim rate increase automatic upon the filing of a request for interim rate relief by a regulated utility without regard to the merits of the request and without any review of the propriety of the request by the Commission. Petitioners argue that the proposed rule removes the discretion and range of alternatives available to the Commission set out in Citizens of Florida v. Mayo, supra. These contentions are without merit. Rather than making an interim rate increase automatic, the proposed rule sets the standard against which a proposed increase would be measured, that being a rate sufficient to produce a return on the utility's investment at the bottom of the most recently determined zone of reasonableness. The utility's expenses, revenues and investment rate would be calculated in the same manner as was used in the most recent general rate case involving the utility. See: proposed Rule 25-9.11(4). Under the proposed rule, the public Service Commission would retain its discretion to suspend an interim rate increase if the substantive requirements of the proposed rule were not met. The Commission would also retain its responsibility to consider the propriety of interim rate increases. Petitioners' contention that the proposed rule improperly denies appropriate parties who may contest the need for interim rate increases an opportunity for hearing is also without merit. The rule does not address procedures to be followed by the Commission in applying the substantive standards of the rule. The fact that procedures are not addressed does not mean that no such procedures exist. The rule neither expressly nor implicitly undermines rights to a hearing that parties may have under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, or under constitutional due process requirements, Florida Power Corporation v. Hawkins, 367 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 1979). Petitioners further contend that the proposed rule is an effort to reinstate the so-called "make-whole" doctrine set out in Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Bevis, 279 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1973). Petitioners' argument is that the make-whole doctrine has been superseded by the file and suspend laws. In Southern Bell, the utility requested that the Public Service Commission grant it an interim rate increase pending completion of a general rate proceeding. The Commission denied the request for interim relief. The Court stated: (at p. 286) Thus when Southern Bell alleged that its rate of return was below that approved by the Commission as a minimum it had alleged a prima facie case to require approval of the Commission for an interim rate increase, so long as the increase would not raise the company's rate of return above the minimum level of 8.25 percent approved by the Commission. Since it must be assumed that the Commission obeyed its statutory mandate. . . any rate of return above the authorized minimum must, of necessity, be unfair, unjust, unreasonable and insufficient. If Southern Bell has proved the allegations which were made in its petition for an interim rate increase, the Commission must approve that request so as to bring the Southern Bell rates within statutory guidelines. It is for the Commission to determine whether or not Southern Bell has met this requirement, as the Commission sits as trier of fact, rather than this Court. The proposed rule adopts this same standard. The file and suspend laws have not changed that standard, but rather have streamlined the mechanism for considering whether interim rate increases should be granted. Maule Industries, Inc. v. Mayo, 342 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1977); Citizens of the State of Florida v. Mayo, supra, at Footnote 12, p. 6. The Petitioners have failed to establish that Public Service Commission Proposed Rule 25-9.11(2) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The proposed rule is presently pending for consideration before the Commission. Whether the proposed rule constitutes the best of various policy alternatives that may be available to the Commission has not been an issue in this proceeding. Based upon the foregoing, it is, hereby ORDERED: Petitioner has failed to establish that Proposed Rule 25-9.11(2) of the Public Service Commission constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and the petition to determine invalidity of the proposed rule filed by the petitioners is hereby dismissed. ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Norman H. Horton, Jr., Esquire Marta Crowley, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Benjamin H. Dickens, Jr., Esquire Office of Public Counsel Room 4, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lorin H. Albeck, Esquire Post Office Box 110 Tampa, Florida 33601 Lee L. Willis, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William E. Sundstrom, Esquire Myers, Kaplan, Levinson Kenin & Richards 1020 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James F. Sanfield, Esquire Post Office Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Ms. Nancy H. Roen 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Matthew M. Childs, Esquire 1400 Southeast First National Bank Bldg. Miami, Florida 33131 Ms. Mary Jo Francis Post Office Box 47000N Miami, Florida 33147 William B. Barfield, Esquire General Attorney 666 North West 79th Avenue, Room 680 Miami, Florida 33126 Ms. Liz Cloud, Chief Bureau of Administrative Code Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carroll Webb, Esquire Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Room 120, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a state agency whose primary purpose is to provide an adequate supply of potable water to the Florida Keys. To this end, it has acquired or constructed well fields, treatment plants, transmission pipelines, pumping stations, distribution pipelines, and other related facilities. Because of its exaggerated linear service area of 130 miles, it incurs high capital and operating costs. Chapter 76-441, Laws of Florida, Respondent's enabling act, confers upon Respondent the authority to impose the subject System Development Fee. Respondent imposed the subject System Development Fee, which is an impact fee, in December 1974. Respondent's Rule 48-3.002(1) expressed the purposes of the System Development Fee as follows: The System Development Fee is an impact fee charged to new and existing customers who modify, add or construct facilities which impose a potential increased demand on the water system. This fee is charged in order to equitably adjust the fiscal burden of a new pipeline and expanded or improved appurtenant facilities between existing customers and new water users. All system development fees are allocated to the direct and indirect costs of capital improvements made necessary by actual and expected increased demand on the water system. The term "unit" is a commonly accepted concept in the public utility industry, and impact fees are often assessed on a per "unit" basis. Respondent's Rule 48-3.002(5)(b) provides for the assessment of the System Development Fee on a per unit basis and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 5. (b) Where the premises served consists of single or multiple commercial units, the System Development Fee shall be assessed based on each individual unit. In those cases where the individual unit will require a meter size that exceeds a 5/8" meter to properly support the unit, the System Development Fee shall be based on the meter size required to serve that unit, whether individually metered or not. ... The term "unit", as used in Respondent's System Development Fee Rule is a technical term, but it is defined by Respondent's Rule 48-2.001(19) as follows: (19) "Unit" A unit is a commercial or residential module consisting of one or more rooms with either appurtenant or common bathroom facilities and used for a single commercial purpose or single residential use. The number of units existing in a multiple unit service operation are to be determined in accordance with Rule 48-2.007(1)(c), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: ... The number of units, whether residential or commercial, will normally be determined according to applicable city or county occupational licenses, building permits, or plans of the subject structure. In cases of discrepancy or inconsistency in definition, or interpretation, the following Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority definition will control: A unit is a commercial or residential module consisting of one or more rooms with either appurtenant or common bathroom facilities and used for a single commercial purpose or single residential purpose. Respondent grandfathers in units that were in existence prior to December 1974 when the System Development Fee was first enacted. A System Development Fee is not imposed on any unit that was in existence prior to December 1974. Of the 376 improved campsites that presently exist at Petitioners' campground, 279 were improved prior to 1974. Consequently, only the 97 campsites improved after the enactment of the System Development Fee are at issue in this proceeding. Respondent is concerned with the potential use of a unit because it must be prepared to respond to that potential use. Once a customer has paid the System Development Fee for a unit, the owner of the unit can transfer the unit without the purchaser having to pay an additional System Development Fee regardless of the use the purchaser intends to make of the unit. Respondent has consistently applied the System Development Fee charges on a per unit basis for the purposes stated in its Rule 48-3.002(1). The per unit charge was $600 when first enacted in 1974, was increased to $1,500 in 1984, and was increased to its present level of $2,000 in 1986. A widely publicized amnesty program was in effect from August 1, 1984 through October 1, 1984, during which customers who had added units to their property without reporting same to Respondent could report the units during the amnesty program and pay the System Development Fee on an installment basis. Customers were advised that after the amnesty program closed, the System Development Fee would be based on rates in effect at the time an unreported unit was discovered, not at the rate the unreported unit was constructed. This policy serves to encourage Respondent's customers to promptly report newly added "units", and the policy produces fees commensurate with the expenses to be incurred by Respondent after it learns of the new units. Petitioner George W. Eager is the owner of approximately 30 acres of real property located west of U.S. 1 at Key Largo, Florida. Mr. Eager purchased the subject property in 1969, sold it in 1974, and reacquired it in 1975 by a deed given in lieu of foreclosure. This property is located within the area served by Respondent. Petitioner Calusa Camp Resort, Inc., a closely held Florida corporation whose stock is owned by Mr. Eager and his two children, operates a campground on this real property. In addition to the 376 campsites, the campground contains a grocery store, a marina, laundry facilities, bathrooms and showers, a swimming pool, a sewage treatment plant, and a sewage pumping station. The marina was not in operation at the time of the formal hearing. Petitioners hold the two business licenses they are required to have by Monroe County. One business license is for the operation of the campground while the other one is for the operation of the grocery store. Petitioners secured all pertinent building permits during the course of the improvement of the campground. Mr. Eager opened the campground in 1969, at which time he entered into a contract for services with Respondent. Mr. Eager constructed a private water system as part of the improvements to his real property. This private water system was connected to Respondent's water transmission system in 1969, and a one inch master meter was installed at that point of delivery. This one inch master meter has served Petitioners' property at all times pertinent to this proceeding. Mr. Eager entered into a new contract for services with Respondent in 1975. This contract did not indicate that Mr. Eager's property was considered a multiple unit operation and it did not indicate in the space available the number of units to be served. By a provision in this contract, Respondent reserved the right to change its rules and regulations and the rates for use of water from time to time. In 1976, Mr. Eager entered into another contract for services with Respondent for the provision of water to a swimming pool that he had constructed. This contract did not indicate that Mr. Eager's property was considered a multiple unit operation and it did not indicate in the space available the number of units to be served. Of the thirty acres owned by Mr. Eager, approximately twenty acres are west of the access road that divides the property and approximately ten acres are east of the road. Prior to 1974, Mr. Eager developed 279 individual campsites on eighteen of the acres west of the access road. These campsites had water, electrical, and sewer hookups for recreational vehicles and could accommodate all types of camping. A grocery store, bathrooms and showers, laundry facilities, and recreational facilities were also located on these eighteen acres. The remaining two acres west of the access road were reserved as the site for the marina. Prior to 1974, the ten acres east of the access road was used for open camping, but individual campsites were not designated. Water was made available to the campers who used this area through approximately 32 spigots spaced throughout the area and the other campground facilities were available to them. The ten-acre open area would accommodate up to 125 campsites. Since the enactment of the Systems Development Fee, Petitioners converted the ten-acre open camping area into 97 campsites with each campsite having water, electrical, and sewer hookups. This development, completed in 1983, organized the camping in the ten-acre area, but it did not increase the number of potential campers in the ten-acre area over the 1974 level. This development did, however, change the type camping that could be accommodated in this area. Prior to the development, the area could not accommodate camping in large vehicles such as motorhomes and recreational vehicles. After the development, the campsites were improved to accommodate all types of camping. None of the campsites are permanently improved with any structures or rooms and Petitioner does not rent campsites with accommodations on them. Persons renting the campsites provide their own method of camping, whether it be by car, truck, motorhome, travel trailer, tent, or otherwise. In 1983, Petitioners requested that the size of the water meter serving his property be increased from one inch to two inches. At that time, Respondent's staff suspected that Petitioners may have modified the campgrounds so as to have triggered the System Development Fee. Consequently, Mary Castellano, Respondent's Policy & Procedure Coordinator wrote a letter of inquiry to Petitioners' attorney. This letter, dated May 2, 1983, provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The material submitted by you last March 2, 1983, has been reviewed. Although a planned layout of the campground was provided from 1969 showing a plan to develop 279 camp and trailer spaces, what is required, prior to approval of a change to a larger meter, is some type of proof showing the number of camp and trailer spaces in existence and actually served prior to June 13, 1974, and certification regarding the actual number of camp and trailer spaces in existence today. If those two numbers are the same, no system development fee will be assessed and Mr. Eager's request for a 2" meter will be honored upon payment of additional deposit, new service charge and tapping fee. However, if there were less camp and trailer spaces in 1974 actually in existence then than there are at the present time, then additional system development fees will be assessed on a per space basis for the difference. Ms. Castellano's letter of May 2, 1983, accurately stated Respondent's interpretation of its rule imposing the System Development Fee. The information requested by this letter was not forthcoming, and Petitioners did not pursue the request to change the master meter from one inch to two inch again until 1989. Respondent's staff did not pursue whether Petitioners owed a System Development Fee until the issue was again raised in 1989. The water bills sent by Respondent to Petitioners up until April 1989 reflected that Petitioners had been classified as a "single unit commercial" account. In April 1989, the billing reflected that Petitioners were classified as a "multiple unit commercial" account. Because Petitioners' private water system is located on private property, Respondent's staff could not discover any undeclared units except by conducting an appropriate inspection. In 1989 Respondent's staff conducted such an inspection of Petitioners' campground and determined that Petitioners had added 97 campsites, that each campsite was a "unit" within the meaning of Respondent's rules, and that a system development fee of $2,000 was due for each site. This was the first time that Respondent had inspected the property and was the first time that Respondent knew that Petitioners had improved the 97 campsites. Respondent does not routinely inspect all private water systems or keep an up-to-date count of all units within its service area because of the costs of gathering such information. On April 26, 1989, Mary Castellano, who was still employed by Respondent, but whose title had been changed to Director of Policy Administration, wrote Petitioners a letter which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Of the 376 spaces/units currently existing, the Authority accepts the documentation submitted to establish that 279 spaces/units existed prior to June 1974, for which no System Development Fees are due. However, the following fees are assessed and due for the remaining 97 spaces/units: System Development Fee ($2,000 x 97 Units) $194,000.00 Deposit ($75 x 97 Units) 7,275.00 Service Charge ($15 x 97 Units) 1,455.00 $202,730.00* *Plus Tapping Fee * * * 4. The Authority will require the execution of a Restrictive Covenant since a potential for future expansion exists. Petitioners thereafter filed a timely request for formal hearing after Respondent's Board of Directors upheld the assessment of the System Development Fee at a duly called meeting.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order which upholds the assessment against Petitioners of the System Development Fee based on the improvement of the 97 campsites since 1974. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Gus H. Crowell, Esquire Tittle & Tittle, P.A. P. O. Drawer 535 Tavernier, Florida 33070 Floyd A. Hennen, Esquire Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority Post Office Box 1239 Key West, Florida 33040 Patty Woodworth, Director Planning & Budgeting Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-5620 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 as being subordinate to the findings made or as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2-10, 12, 14, and 18-21 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. While it was established that one corporation operated the campground, it was not established that no additional business purpose exists at the property. The property contains, in addition to the subject campsites, a grocery store, a marina, laundry facilities, and a sewage pumping station that is available to non-campers. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 13 are rejected as being conclusions of law. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 15 and 16 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 17 and 23 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The findings of fact contained in the first three sentences of paragraph 23 are adopted in material part. The findings of fact contained in the final sentence of paragraph 23 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent. The paragraphs contained in the findings of fact section of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order have been numbered 1-13 for convenience. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 3, 6, 7, 12, and 13 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The examples given by Respondent were not incorporated as a finding of fact because the examples used are not analogous to the facts of this case. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in part by of the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are rejected as being recitation of testimony or as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 10 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being recitation of testimony or as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order with the exception of the findings of fact contained in the final sentence of the paragraph, which are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Lagoon Oaks, Inc., (Petitioner) is entitled to an award of attorney's fees, pursuant to Section 57.111 Florida Statutes, by becoming a prevailing party in accordance with the final order issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) in the underlying case related to this proceeding which is Case No. 95-4394. The primary issue concerns whether the Agency's intended action was "substantially justified." Additionally it must be determined whether the Petitioner is a "small business party" in terms of its net worth.
Findings Of Fact The preponderance of the testimony and evidence of record establishes that the Petitioner, Lagoon Oaks, Inc.'s domicile and principal office is located in Panama City, Bay County, Florida. Lagoon Oaks is a de Jure Florida corporation. It has no employees and has a net worth which does not exceed $2 million. Additionally, it is established that Lagoon Oaks, Inc., is a "prevailing small business party," inasmuch as the above- referenced final order has been entered by the Department granting Lagoon Oaks' permits, which were originally denied, thereby sustaining Lagoon Oaks' position that it was entitled to the permits pursuant to applicable Florida Statutes and Rules. That order has not been reversed on appeal and the time for seeking judicial review thereof has expired. Further, this case qualifies as an "administrative proceeding pursuant to Chapter 120 initiated by a state agency." The agency herein was required by law to advise the Petitioner of a clear point of entry after some recognizable event in the investigatory or other proceeding by the agency, to wit, the denial of the sought permits. See Section 57.111(3)(b), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner has requested and the undersigned takes "judicial notice" of the original record in this proceeding including the transcript of the hearing in DOAH Case No. 95-4394, pursuant to Rule 60Q.2010, Florida Administrative Code. The Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law in the Recommended Order entered by the undersigned in that proceeding are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference herein as well. In the final order entered, the Department found and conceded that: ". . . the Department did not follow the applicable rules in Chapter 10D-6 Florida Administrative Code, in denying the permit applications. The site evaluation forms do not identify a recognizable water body (ie. a normally wet drainage ditch), nor do they establish the presence of surface water for the requisite 72 hours following rainfall. The forms do not indicate the setback which exists from the proposed system to the disputed feature. The forms are not signed or dated. The observed water table and estimated wet season water table are not provided, nor is high water table vegetation indicated. The extensive soil sampling that was detailed at the hearing is not described. Much of the evidence tending to demonstrate the presence of a surface water apparently was not gathered until well after the permits were denied. Finally, the denial letter, as noted by the hearing officer, references a 'normally wet area' which is not a 'surface water' feature described in statute or rule that may justify denial of a septic system permit. (footnotes omitted)." The Department has thus conceded that it did not follow its own rules in denying these permits, that the documentation allegedly supportive of the denial was incomplete and did not justify the denial and that much of the evidence tending to demonstrate the presence of a surface water apparently was not gathered until well after the permits were denied. Thus, when the intended agency action was taken (the denial) by the Department's own admission, it had not gathered much of the evidence which it contended supported its position concerning presence of the surface water involved in the underlying proceeding. Attorney's fee affidavits required by Section 57.111(4)(b)1. Florida Statutes and submitted by the Petitioner demonstrate that Lagoon Oaks incurred the sum of $17,950.00 in attorney's fees and $2,281.98 in costs in the course of this proceeding. Additionally, the affidavit of R. Steve Lewis, Esquire, illustrates that Lagoon Oaks incurred an additional $2,707.50 in attorney's fees for services he performed for this proceeding (This is not inclusive of any fees or services for which Mr. Lewis might have become entitled for work done unrelated to the subject proceeding). The attorney's fees submitted and represented by affidavit (Exhibit E) by Attorney Lee Killinger, counsel of record, alone exceed the $15,000.00 limit provided for in Section 57.111(4)(d)2, Florida Statutes. Testimony and evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that the fees and costs claimed are reasonable under the circumstances of the underlying case and this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Quality of Service Of more than 250 customers presently served by the utility, only four customers testified at the hearing. Two were concerned that water and sewer rates were already too high and no further increase in rates should be allowed, a third complained of the utility's water having a bad taste and odor, while the fourth objected to an odor emanating from the utility's sewerage treatment plant approximately one year ago. Additionally, a number of deficiencies in the quality of service were identified by the Commission in Order No. 9216, supra. However, all deficiencies have now been resolved to the Commission staff engineer's satisfaction. Based on the entire record, the evidence supports a finding that the utility's water and sewer service is satisfactory. Rate Base Petitioner has proposed a rate base of $10,897 and $36,832 respectively for its water and sewer operations for the twelve months ending June 30, 1979, which is the test period in this proceeding. The Commission staff proposed five further adjustments to water and sewer rate base, none of which were contradicted by the utility. These adjustments affect plant in service, accumulated depreciation, contributions in aid of construction (CIAC), accumulated depreciation on CIAC and the working capital allowance. The adjustments are supported by the record, and should be accepted. The following schedule portrays the adjusted rate base for the utility's water and sewer operations, and the basis for each of the adjustments made in arriving at those amounts. Ponderosa Parks, Inc. Average Rate Base Year Ending June 30, 1979 WATER ADJUST TEST UTILITY ADJUST. YEAR Utility Plant $52,293 9,142 (1) $61,435 Accum. Deprec. (9,335) (1,055) (2) 10,390 CIAC (33,926) (5,938) (3) (39,864) Accum. Deprec.- CIAC -0- 6,742 (4) 6,742 Working Capital 1,865 60 (5) 1,925 Rate Base $10,897 $19,848 SEWER ADJUST TEST UTILITY ADJUST. YEAR Utility Plant $92,962 ($15,631)(6) $77,331 Accum. Deprec. 18,270 5,718 (7) (12,552) CIAC (39,188) 254 (8) (38,934) Accum. Deprec.- CIAC -0- 6,320 (9) 6,320 Working Capital 1,328 (215)(10) 1,113 Rate Base $36,832 $33,270 Adjusts water plant in service by (a) reallocating a portion of sewer plant to water operations, (b) readjusting the cost of certain water meters, and (c) adjusting the plant accounts from a year-end basis to a 13-month average balance. Adjusts accumulated depreciation to (a) reflect the use of a composite depreciation rate of 2.5 percent of all water plant and lines except meters for which a 2.63 percent rate is used, and (b) restate the balance in the account using a 13-month average balance in lieu of year-end balance. Adjusts contributions in aid of construction by (a) restating an amount previously improperly booked as revenues during the years 1970-1974, and (b) restating the year-end balance to a 13-month average. Adjusts the balance in the accumulated depreciation on CIAC account to reflect the use of a 13-month average rather than a year-end balance. Recomputes the working capital allowance to reflect one-eighth of adjusted operating and maintenance expenses. Adjusts sewer plant in service by (a) reallocating certain water lines from sewer to water operations, (b) removing certain non-utility land from the land account, (c) deleting that portion (50 percent) of the sewage treatment costs not used and useful in providing sewer services, and (d) adjusting the plant accounts from a year-end balance to a 13-month average balance. Adjusts accumulated depreciation by (a) using a 2.5 percent composite depreciation rate on all sewer plant and lines except for a 2.63 percent rate on meters, and (b) reflecting the use of a 13-month average in said account. Adjusts contributions in aid of construction by (a) adding to that account contributions previously recorded as revenues in 1970-1974, and (b) using a 13-month average in lieu of a year-end balance. Restates accumulated depreciation on CIAC by using a 13-month average in lieu of a year-end balance. Recomputes the working capital allowance to reflect one-eighth of operating and maintenance expenses. Net Operating Income Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 shows adjusted test year gross operating revenues of $20,370 for water operations and $14,692 for sewer operations. The utility's net operating income for the same time period on water and sewer services was $1,282 and $48 respectively. Staff Exhibit Nos. 2 and 4 make adjustments to operating revenues, operating and maintenance expenses, depreciation expense, and taxes other than income, none of which were contested by the utility. The record supports a finding that these adjustments are appropriate, and should be accepted. The following schedule shows the net operating income of the utility for the year ending June 30, 1979 and the derivation of those amounts. Ponderosa Parks, Inc. Average Rate Base Year Ending June 30, 1979 WATER ADJUST TEST UTILITY ADJUST. YEAR Operating Revenues $20,370 2,083(1) $18,287 Operating Expenses: Operation 16,137 (736)(2) 15,401 Depreciation 1,663 (1,119)(3) 544 Taxes other than 1,228 (52)(4) 1,236 Income Net Operating Income $ 1,282 $ 1,106 SEWER ADJUST TEST UTILITY ADJUST. YEAR Operating Revenues $14,692 4,293 (5) $10,399 Operating Expenses: Operation 10,121 (1,216)(6) 8,905 Depreciation 2,741 (1,781)(7) 960 Taxes other than 1,783 (107)(8) 1,675 Income Net Operating Income $ 48 $ 1,141 Adjusts test year water revenues by (a) removing that amount requested by the utility to show actual results of operations, and (b) reflecting a new surcharge rate (66/1000 gal.) charged by Pasco Water Authority. Adjusts operating and maintenance expenses by (a) removing costs associated with excessive unaccounted for water, (b) disallowing purchased water costs related to a prior accounting period, and (c) annualizing the new cost of water ($1.03/1000 gal.) purchased from Pasco Water Authority. Adjusts depreciation expense by (a) reflecting a composite depreciation rate of 2.5 percent for plant and lines and 2.63 percent for meters, and (b) removing depreciation expense on CIAC from operating expenses in accordance with Section 367.081(2) Florida Statutes (1980). Adjusts taxes other than income taxes by removing gross receipts taxes associated with the requested revenues previously removed in item (1)(a) above. However, an appropriate amount of taxes ($52) should be added back after the new revenue requirements are determined. Adjusts test year sewer revenues by removing the revenues requested by the utility to show actual results of operations. Adjusts operating and maintenance expenses by amortizing the cost of nonrecurring repair work over a 3-year period instead of charging the total cost to test year operations. Adjusts depreciation expense by (a) recomputing the balances using a 2.5 percent composite depreciation rate for all sewer plant and lines except for a 2.63 percent rate on meters, and (b) removing depreciation expense on CIAC in accordance with Section 367.081(2), Florida Statutes (1980). Restates taxes other than income by removing gross receipts taxes associated with the requested revenues previously removed in item (5). However, an appropriate amount of taxes ($107) should be added back after the new revenue requirements are determined. Cost of Capital Ponderosa has not requested a specific rate of return on utility investment. However, the requested revenues on water operations equate to a rate of return of 11.76 percent on water rate base while the requested amount of sewer revenues produces a rate of return on sewer operations of 9.15 percent. The utility and Commission staff agree such returns are reasonable given the circumstances of this proceeding. These rates of the returns are supported by the record, and should be used. Revenue Requirements The application of a 11.76 percent rate of return to the adjusted rate base for water operations reflects the utility is entitled to increase its water revenues by $1,260 in order to achieve that return. Similarly, it is necessary to increase sewer revenues by the amount requested, or $4,293, to produce the requested return of 9.15 percent. The utility should be permitted to revise its tariffs to generate these amounts of additional revenues. Rate Structure The utility's present rate structure imposes a minimum charge for the first 3,000 gallons of water used, and a gallonage charge for each 1000 gallons thereafter. Sewer charges for residential customers are presently assessed on a flat rate basis irrespective of the usage of the individual customer. This type of rate structure has two inherent deficiencies. First, it offers no means by which a customer may control the amount of his bill by consuming more or less amounts of water. Second, it fails to allocate in a fair and impartial manner the minimum costs associated with providing water and sewer service. A base facilities charge will remedy these deficiencies. Under this structure, a minimum charge will be imposed for the purpose of recovering the fixed or base costs of providing water and sewer service, such as depreciation, taxes and a portion of billing and customer accounting expenses. Thereafter, a charge for each thousand gallons used will be made. The latter charge will cover costs relating to purchased water, transmission and treatment expenses, and a portion of billing, collecting and customer accounting expenses. This type of rate structure is supported by the evidence, and should be used.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Ponderosa Parks, Inc., 301 Embassy Boulevard, Port Richey, Florida 33568, be granted and that the utility be authorized to file new tariffs to be approved by the Florida Public Service Commission that will generate additional annual gross water revenues of $1,260 and additional annual gross sewer revenues of $4,293. It is further RECOMMENDED that the utility be required to implement a base facility charge in structuring its water and sewer rates. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 21st day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's 1978 medicaid Cost report be modified in accordance with the foregoing adjustments. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1982.
