Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a property and casualty insurance license, life and health insurance license, and life insurance license for the State of Florida. She has held her property and casualty license for about 20 years. In 1976, she was employed as an agent for the Orlando office of Commonwealth insurance agency, which she purchased in 1977 or 1978. She continues to own the Commonwealth agency, which is the agency involved in this case. Respondent has never previously been disciplined. In 1979 or 1980, Respondent was appointed to the board of directors of the Local Independent Agents Association, Central Florida chapter. She has continuously served on the board of directors of the organization ever since. She served as president of the association until September, 1991, when her term expired. During her tenure as president, the local association won the Walter H. Bennett award as the best local association in the country. Since May, 1986, Commonwealth had carried the insurance for the owner of the subject premises, which is a 12,000 square foot commercial block building located at 923 West Church Street in Orlando. In July, 1987, the insurer refused to renew the policy on the grounds of the age of the building. Ruth Blint of Commonwealth assured the owner that she would place the insurance with another insurer. Mrs. Blint is a longtime employee of the agency and is in charge of commercial accounts of this type. Mrs. Blint was a dependable, competent employee on whom Respondent reasonably relied. Mrs. Blint contacted Dana Roehrig and Associates Inc. (Dana Roehrig), which is an insurance wholesaler. Commonwealth had done considerable business with Dana Roehrig in the past. Dealing with a number of property and casualty agents, Dana Roehrig secures insurers for the business solicited by the agents. Dana Roehrig itself is not an insurance agent. In this case, Dana Roehrig served as the issuing agent and agreed to issue the policy on behalf of American Empire Surplus Lines. The annual premium would be $5027, excluding taxes and fees. This premium was for the above- described premises, as well as another building located next door. The policy was issued effective July 21, 1987. It shows that the producing agency is Commonwealth and the producer is Dana Roehrig. The policy was countersigned on August 12, 1987, by a representative of the insurer. On July 21, 1987, the insured gave Mrs. Blint a check in the amount of $1000 payable to Commonwealth. This represented a downpayment on the premium for the American Empire policy. The check was deposited in Commonwealth's checking account and evidently forwarded to Dana Roehrig. On July 31, 1987, Dana Roehrig issued its monthly statement to Commonwealth. The statement, which involves only the subject policy, reflects a balance due of $3700.86. The gross premium is $5027. The commission amount of $502.70 is shown beside the gross commission. Below the gross premium is a $25 policy fee, $151.56 in state tax, and a deduction entered July 31, 1987, for $1000, which represents the premium downpayment. When the commission is deducted from the other entries, the balance is, as indicated, $3700.86. The bottom of the statement reads: "Payment is due in our office by August 14, 1987." No further payments were made by the insured or Commonwealth in August. The August 31, 1987, statement is identical to the July statement except that the bottom reads: "Payment is due in our office by September 14, 1987." On September 2, 1987, the insured gave Commonwealth a check for $2885.16. This payment appears to have been in connection with the insured's decision to delete the coverage on the adjoining building, which is not otherwise related to this case. An endorsement to the policy reflects that, in consideration of a returned premium of $1126 and sales tax of $33.78, all coverages are deleted for the adjoining building. The September 30 statement shows the $3700.86 balance brought forward from the preceding statement and deductions for the returned premium and sales tax totalling $1159.78. After reducing the credit to adjust for the unearned commission of $112.60 (which was part of the original commission of $502.70 for which Commonwealth had already received credit), the net deduction arising from the deleted coverage was $1047.18. Thus, the remaining balance for the subject property was $2653.68. In addition to showing the net sum due of $944.59 on an unrelated policy, the September 30 statement contained the usual notation that payment was due by the 12th of the following month. However, the statement contained a new line showing the aging of the receivable and showing, incorrectly, that $3700.86 was due for more than 90 days. As noted above, the remaining balance was $2653.68, which was first invoiced 90 days previously. Because it has not been paid the remaining balance on the subject policy, Dana Roehrig issued a notice of cancellation sometime during the period of October 16-19, 1987. The notice, which was sent to the insured and Commonwealth, advised that the policy "is hereby cancelled" effective 12:01 a.m. October 29, 1987. It was the policy of Dana Roehrig to send such notices about ten days in advance with two or three days added for mailing. One purpose of the notice is to allow the insured and agency to make the payment before the deadline and avoid cancellation of the policy. However, the policy of Dana Roehrig is not to reinstate policies if payments are received after the effective date of cancellation. Upon receiving the notice of cancellation, the insured immediately contacted Mrs. Blint. She assured him not to be concerned and that all would be taken care of. She told him that the property was still insured. The insured reasonably relied upon this information. The next time that the insured became involved was when the building's ceiling collapsed in June, 1988. He called Mrs. Blint to report the loss. After an adjuster investigated the claim, the insured heard nothing for months. He tried to reach Respondent, but she did not return his calls. Only after hiring an attorney did the insured learn that the cancellation in October, 1987, had taken effect and the property was uninsured. Notwithstanding the cancellation of the policy, the October 31 statement was identical to the September 30 statement except that payment was due by November 12, rather than October 12, and the aging information had been deleted. By check dated November 12, 1987, Commonwealth remitted to Dana Roehrig $3598.27, which was the total amount due on the October 30 statement. Dana Roehrig deposited the check and it cleared. The November 30 statement reflected zero balances due on the subject policy, as well as on the unrelated policy. However, the last entry shows the name of the subject insured and a credit to Commonwealth of $2717 plus sales tax of $81.51 minus a commission readjustment of $271.70 for a net credit of $2526.81. The record does not explain why the net credit does not equal $2653.68, which was the net amount due. It would appear that Dana Roehrig retained the difference of $125.87 plus the downpayment of $1000 for a total of $1125.87. It is possible that this amount is intended to represent the earned premium. Endorsement #1 on the policy states that the minimum earned premium, in the event of cancellation, was $1257. By check dated December 23, 1987, Dana Roehrig issued Commonwealth a check in the amount of $2526.81. The December 31 statement reflected the payment and showed a zero balance due. The record is otherwise silent as to what transpired following the issuance of the notice of cancellation. Neither Mrs. Blint nor Dana Roehrig representatives from Orlando testified. The only direct evidence pertaining to the period between December 31, 1987, and the claim the following summer is a memorandum from a Dana Roehrig representative to Mrs. Blint dated March 24, 1988. The memorandum references the insured and states in its entirety: Per our conversation of today, attached please find the copy of the cancellation notice & also a copy of the cancellation endorsement on the above captioned, which was cancelled effective 10/29/87. If you should have any questions, please call. Regardless of the ambiguity created by the monthly statements, which were not well coordinated with the cancellation procedure, Mrs. Blint was aware in late March, 1988, that there was a problem with the policy. She should have advised the insured, who presumably could have procured other insurance. Regardless whether the June, 1988, claim would have been covered, the ensuing litigation would not have involved coverage questions arising out of the cancellation of the policy if Mrs. Blint had communicated the problem to the insured when she received the March memorandum. Following the discovery that the policy had in fact been cancelled, the insured demanded that Respondent return the previously paid premiums. Based on advice of counsel, Respondent refused to do so until a representative of Petitioner demanded that she return the premiums. At that time, she obtained a cashiers check payable to the insured, dated June 1, 1990, and in the amount of $2526.81. Although this equals the check that Dana Roehrig returned to Commonwealth in December, 1987, the insured actually paid Commonwealth $1000 down and $2885.16 for a total of $3885.16. This discrepancy appears not to have been noticed as neither Petitioner nor the insured has evidently made further demands upon Respondent for return of premiums paid. The insured ultimately commenced a legal action against Commonwealth, Dana Roehrig, and American Empire. At the time of the hearing, the litigation remains pending.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 626.561(1) and, thus, 626.621(2), Florida Statutes, and, pursuant to Sections 626.681(1) and 626.691, Florida Statutes, imposing an administrative fine of $1002.70, and placing her insurance licenses on probation for a period of one year from the date of the final order. If Respondent fails to pay the entire fine within 30 days of the date of the final order, the final order should provide, pursuant to Section 626.681(3), Florida Statutes, that the probation is automatically replaced by a one-year suspension. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 James A. Bossart Division of Legal Affairs Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Thomas F. Woods Gatlin, Woods, et al. 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308
Findings Of Fact On January 29, 1980, the Department of Insurance approved the use of the name American Pioneer Title Insurance Company for the Petitioner. On February 4, 1980, American Pioneer Title Insurance Company was authorized to do business as a corporation in the State of Florida by the Secretary of State. American Pioneer Title Insurance Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of American Pioneer Life Insurance Company which has been doing life insurance business in Florida since 1961. American Pioneer Life Insurance Company holds valid federal and Florida trademark registrations for the name "American Pioneer." The American Pioneer Life Insurance Company has duly authorized its subsidiary American Pioneer Title Insurance Company, the Petitioner, to use and market itself under the name "American Pioneer." The American Pioneer Corporation, the holding company for American Pioneer Life Insurance Company, American Pioneer Title Insurance Company (Petitioner) and other related companies using the name American Pioneer, seeks to market and establish in Florida the name "American Pioneer" as representing a related family of insurance companies offering multi-lines insurance service including the title insurance service offered by the Petitioner. This unified marketing effort resulted in the use of the name American Pioneer in the name of the Petitioner. This is part of an effort to create in the public a recognition of the wide spectrum of insurance services offered by these affiliated companies and was the primary reason for the use of the words "American Pioneer" in the Petitioner's name rather than an effort to create confusion and some unfair business advantage vis-a-vis the names of the Intervenors. American Title Insurance Company and Pioneer National Title Insurance Company, the Intervenors, are both authorized title insurers in Florida who contend that their names and their businesses might be adversely effected by the authorization of the Petitioner to use the name American Pioneer Title Insurance Company. American Title Insurance Company has expended substantial sums in promotion and advertising of the name "American" in the last eleven years as an abbreviated form of its name. Pioneer National Title Insurance Company is frequently referred to as "Pioneer" or "Pioneer National." American Title Insurance Company intentionally promotes its name in shortened form as "American." Petitioner's witness Grant Hunt established that American Pioneer, like other title insurance companies, markets its services to professional clients rather than to the general consumer public. His testimony establishes that he is familiar with the title insurance market and that title insurance companies market their services through attorneys, realtors and various financial intermediaries, such as closing agents or officers of lending institutions who are engaged in the real estate mortgage market. His research and experience in the field of banking and financing real estate transactions shows that people placing title insurance consider previous business relationships with title insurance companies or personal experience and contacts first in choosing a title insurance company. The name of the title insurance company is of substantially less importance. The American Pioneer name was used in forming the new company, the Petitioner, because it is a familiar name in Florida with substantial name recognition, since it has been used by American Pioneer Life Insurance Company since 1961. The remainder of the family of subsidiary companies of American Pioneer Corporation have used that name in Florida for a substantial period of time. The commonalty of name between these companies will assist its marketing a brand new title insurance product and company because the professional type clientele discussed above would readily identify with a name already established in the marketing of other insurance lines. Mr. Hunt established that it is a definite business advantage for the Petitioner to be able to cross-relate its name to the already well-known American Pioneer name. If the Petitioner were denied the use of that name it would, in effect, nullify a great deal of public goodwill emanating from the parent company which has benefited the establishment of the new subsidiary, the Petitioner. The Petitioner has been operating in Florida for approximately fifteen months and no evidence has been adduced that the use of the name American Pioneer has beet confused with either Intervenor or any other company. This witness demonstrated that many companies in the insurance field in Florida have similar names and that no confusion results in the broad sense with the similarity of names of many insurance companies, such as the widespread use of the name "American." Robert Buchanan Whitehill, a Vice President of Barnett Bank of Seminole County has extensive experience in real estate transactions and the mortgage business. He testified for the Petitioner in corroboration of previous testimony and established the fact that title insurance is normally sold through closing agents in a given real estate transaction. These are the professional people who make decisions about what title insurance to obtain and place orders for title insurance. He corroborated the fact that no confusion has been occasioned by the use of the name American Pioneer Title Insurance Company. Witness James B. Morgan testified in a similar vein. The closing agent selecting title coverage is typically more sophisticated in matters of real estate finance, law and matters pertaining to closing real estate transactions than the general public, and therefore is abundantly aware of the title insurance companies serving the real estate market and the nature of their products and services, as well as being able to differentiate between their names. In short, the Petitioner established through the testimony of the witnesses as well as James F. Covington, Jr., an attorney with extensive experience in the title insurance industry, that no more than three percent of the title policies in Florida are actually purchased at the request of the buyer or seller in a given real estate transaction, therefore, the consuming public has little contact with title insurance companies directly. Generally, a lender's officer or agent or a party's attorney or sometimes a realtor orders a title insurance policy and is capable of differentiating between the names of the various title insurance companies. Such professional customers will select the company from which they have received the best and most rapid title information service and the company which will give the best expedited service on issuances of policy binders and policies when requested. Additionally, Mr. Dean Tomlinson, the President of Home Owner Title and Abstract Company in St. Petersburg, corroborated the unlikelihood that name confusion will result largely because of the professional and sophisticated nature of the customers these three title insurance companies serve. He is familiar with all three of these companies and in his experience closing agents and other professional customers will not confuse the different companies since they work with title insurance companies on a day-to-day bases as an essential function of their business, as opposed to a member of the real estate transacting public who deals with a title insurance company only once or twice in a life time. The Intervenors' witnesses Robinson and Glover, contended in a general way that the title insurance market is broader based than maintained by the Petitioner. They opined that thousands of consumers will tend to be confused by the similarity of Petitioner's name with that of the Intervenors'. Although they cite instances in their experience of some confusion of phone calls and mail between the Intervenor American Title Insurance Company and First American Title Insurance Company (not a party), and attempted to relate that to the present situation, they failed to refute the Petitioner's evidence that the primary purchasers of title insurance are professional people who work with title insurance on a daily basis and that approximately 97 percent of the title insurance sold is sold to members of this sophisticated professional market. The undersigned finds that the names First American Title Insurance Company and American Title Insurance Company are more similar to each other than American Pioneer Title Insurance Company. The fear expressed by witness Glover that use of the name "American Pioneer" might lead purchasers of title insurance to believe a merger of the three companies had occurred is belied by evidence by all parties that, on the one hand, Petitioner's parent company has long engaged in a comprehensive marketing scheme to sell the name "American Pioneer" as representative of all its companies and insurance lines in order to build up massive name recognition by the Florida insurance-purchasing public. On the other hand, the Intervenors have likewise presented evidence that they have systematically and for a long period of time marketed themselves under the names "American" and "Pioneer" or "Pioneer National," respectively, for purposes of inculcating name recognition to their advantage with the public. Consequently, the evidence of marketing of distinctive names by both parties tends to negate the realization of the fear of witness Glover that the professional public who purchase title insurance will mistakenly believe that the two companies have merged. Witnesses Grady Smith and William Doster merely expressed fear that there might be some confusion among the three subject companies by purchasers of title insurance but offered no competent, substantial evidence to refute the Petitioner's demonstration that the type of customers who purchase title insurance would be unlikely to make such a mistake. The Intervenors presented testimony of Dr. Richard W. Mizerski, an associate professor of marketing at Florida State University, who has research experience in consumer decision making. The witness prepared several studies for the Federal Trade Commission regarding how people process information in order to make decisions on particular goods or services. This witness testified that where names of companies are similar, persons who are knowledgeable in that industry are likely to assume a relationship exists between the companies, which process is called "attribution." Where persons are not knowledgeable in an industry which includes companies with similar names, those persons may be unable to differentiate between the companies, thus choosing a company at random, a process called "stimulus generalization." The witness also discussed the fact that people typically tend to shorten names of companies, known as "cognitive simplification." Similarly, witness Phillip Durbrow, in his deposition, testified generally that the names of American Title Insurance Company, Pioneer National Insurance Company and the Petitioner are quite similar and that people tend to shorten the names of companies in referring to them and in thinking of them. The first argument raised by witness Mizerski concerning "attribution" is belied by the consistent marketing effort of the Petitioner and the Petitioner's parent company to instill in the title insurance purchasing customers recognitions of the name "American Pioneer,": as opposed to simply "American." "American" is the only name common to two of these firms and "American Pioneer" is distinct enough from "American" or "Pioneer National" to allow such a sophisticated, professional clientele to differentiate between the firms. "American" is a name common to thousands of firms in this country whether they are banks, insurance companies or other and the unrefuted evidence of the Petitioner's consistent marketing scheme of calling itself "American Pioneer" tends to negate this supposed likelihood of confusion. Contrary to Dr. Mizerski's thesis that persons who are not sophisticated or knowledgeable in an industry may choose companies at random because they are unable to differentiate between those companies, the unrefuted evidence in this cause demonstrates that a substantially different customer market is involved. Thus, as has been found above, the clientele of the title insurance industry indeed are sophisticated and knowledgeable regarding the products, operations and members of the industry and, since they work with title insurance companies almost on a daily basis, they are likely to be able to differentiate between company names and therefore, not to simply choose a company at random in ordering title insurance service. Thus, Mizerski's concept of "stimulus generalization" is a generalized market principle not shown to apply to the title insurance market. The third market phenomenon raised by this witness regarding a consumer tendency to shorten names of companies ("cognitive simplification"), which he believes will also result in customer confusion between the names of the three companies was shown to have only tangential relevance. All the parties have, for a number of years, recognized this phenomenon and thus held themselves out as doing business under the names "American Pioneer," "American," and "Pioneer National" or "Pioneer." These shortened names are substantially different and unlikely to cause confusion with the educated customers to whom they are directed. Finally, it should be pointed out that this witness was shown to have as his sole experience, studies in mass consumer decision making with no experience whatever with the title insurance industry whose customers are trained and sophisticated in the product they are seeking as opposed to consumers in the more generalized marketplace who buy automobiles or other goods on a rather infrequent basis. Witness Mizerski had done no studies regarding the motivation influencing purchasers of title insurance, nor the degree of sophistication of those customers regarding operation of and members of the industry. He consulted no title companies and has no personal background in marketing title insurance. He therefore did not show that the general marketing principles forming the basis of his expert opinions and testimony could actually be applied to the title insurance industry with a substantial degree of efficacy.
Recommendation Having considered the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of counsel, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Department of Insurance granting the petition herein and authorizing American Petitioner Title Insurance Company to engage in the business of selling title insurance in the State of Florida under that name. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Lang, Esquire and James G. Willard Post Office Box 7838 Orlando, Florida 32854 S. Strom Maxwell, Esquire State of Florida Department of Insurance 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jill Nexon, Esquire One Biscayne Tower, Suite 2800 Miami, Florida 33131 Theodore C. Taub, Esquire and Gregory E. Mierzwinski, Esquire Post Office Box 2312 Tampa, Florida 33601
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, William Robert Pearson, should be disciplined for alleged statutory and rule violations for his role in several insurance transactions.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is licensed in Florida as a life including variable annuity agent (2-14), life including variable annuity and health agent (2-15), life agent (2-16), life and health agent (2-18), and health agent (2-40), regulated by the DFS's Division of Insurance Agent and Agency Services. He was so licensed at all times pertinent to this case. He was first licensed in 1988 and has been disciplined once, in September 2002, when he was given a Letter of Guidance for misrepresenting to a Pinellas Park resident that an annuity he sold her would generate interest in excess of 6.8 percent, when the guaranteed rate was three percent for the first year. During the transactions alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, the Respondent also was registered with OFR's Division of Securities as a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) broker representative associated with Transamerica Financial Advisors, Inc. (Transamerica). On August 21, 2012, based on some of the same facts alleged in this case, OFR charged the Respondent with failing to observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade because he: participated in the liquidation of variable and fixed annuities on behalf of several elderly customers referred by insurance agents not licensed as FINRA broker representatives; executed the liquidations recommended to the customers by insurance agent Richard Carter; failed to appropriately record the transactions on the books and records of Transamerica; failed to review the transactions, or have them reviewed by Transamerica, as to suitability; and provided Agent Carter with blank Transamerica letterhead to be used to facilitate the transactions. A Stipulation and Consent Agreement was entered on December 18, 2012, in which the Respondent admitted the OFR charges and agreed to never seek a license or registration as a dealer, investment advisor, or associated person under the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, chapter 517, Florida Statutes. A Final Order incorporating the settlement agreement was entered on January 11, 2013. (This Final Order is the basis for Count IX, which was added to the charges in this case, as well as for one of the Respondent's affirmative defenses.) Count I-–Geraldine Busing Geraldine Busing was born on December 1, 1930. She has a high school education. Her husband of 44 years died in 2001. When alive, he handled the family finances. Mrs. Busing's income is from a pension of $728 a month and social security payments of $1,090 a month. In addition, she had substantial investments in two Schwab accounts. During the market decline of 2007-2008, Mrs. Busing became dissatisfied with the performance of her Schwab accounts. An insurance agent named Richard Carter recommended that she invest in annuities, which would reduce her taxes. (In her deposition, testimony was elicited from Mrs. Busing that Agent Carter told her that the Respondent would do her taxes for free for the rest of her life. It is not likely that he made such a representation, and there is no evidence that the Respondent knew about such a representation.) Mrs. Busing followed Agent Carter's recommendation. Agent Carter did not have a FINRA license and approached the Respondent, who worked for Transamerica, to facilitate the liquidation of Mrs. Busing's Schwab accounts, so she could follow Agent Carter's recommendations. The Respondent agreed. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent provided blank Transamerica forms to Agent Carter and that Agent Carter "shuffled" the forms together with an EquiTrust Life Insurance Company (EquiTrust) annuity application and suitability forms and requested Mrs. Busing's signatures (although, it is alleged, one or more of the signatures on the Transamerica forms were not hers.) It is alleged that, unbeknownst to Mrs. Busing, Agent Carter gave the Respondent these forms, as well as a copy of her Schwab account statements, so he could liquidate her accounts, which totaled $627,000 at the time, "dump" the proceeds into a Transamerica account, and then "funnel" the liquidated assets into two EquiTrust annuities. It is alleged that Mrs. Busing became aware of these transactions in September 2010 after discussions with her accountant. Mrs. Busing testified that she has never met the Respondent and does not know him. She testified that she gave all of her Schwab account information to Agent Carter and did not expect him to share it with the Respondent. She testified that Agent Carter had her hurriedly sign a stack of papers without giving her a chance to review them. She said she was surprised when her stock broker, Barry Tallman, called to tell her that her Schwab accounts had been liquidated and used to open a Transamerica account. She denied ever receiving or signing the Schwab bank check dated July 7, 2010, used to open the Transamerica accounts; denied ever providing the Respondent and Transamerica with information for her customer account information (CAI) form used to open the Transamerica accounts; and denied that several of the Geraldine Busing signatures on the Transamerica documents used for the transactions were her signatures. She admitted to signing a Transamerica check dated August 13, 2010, which was used to purchase the EquiTrust policies. The Respondent testified that he telephoned Mrs. Busing at Agent Carter's request. He testified that she told him she wanted to implement Agent Carter's recommendation to liquidate the Schwab accounts and purchase annuities. He testified that he told her his services were not required because her current broker (Mr. Tallman) could handle it for her, unless she just wanted to avoid confronting her current broker. He said she wanted the Respondent to handle it, and he replied essentially that he would do whatever she and Agent Carter wanted him to do for her. The Respondent testified that he then mailed Mrs. Busing forms she had to fill out, sign, and return to him. He testified that he talked to her briefly by telephone about 15 to 20 times to answer questions she had about the forms. When she told him she received a Schwab check in the amount of about $150,000 and asked if she should mail it to him, he cautioned her that it would be better not to mail it and offered to drive to her house to get the check, which he did and returned immediately to Transamerica to open a Transamerica account with it. He testified that the Transamerica funds were used to purchase EquiTrust annuities at the direction of Agent Carter and Mrs. Busing. The evidence was not clear and convincing that Mrs. Busing's version of the facts is true and that the Respondent's version is untrue. To the contrary, Mrs. Busing's memory did not seem to be very good, and she seemed confused during her testimony. The evidence was not clear and convincing that the Respondent made any investment or insurance recommendations or misrepresentations to Mrs. Busing. The Petitioner's own witnesses (DFS and OFR investigators, Karen Ortega and Mercedes Bujans) testified that the Respondent never acted as Mrs. Busing's insurance agent. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Busing incurred tax and commission charges as a result of her Schwab account being liquidated, other than Transamerica's standard "ticket charge" for the transactions, which the Respondent admitted. There was no evidence that the Respondent received any remuneration on the EquiTrust annuity sales. Those commissions went to Agent Carter. The Petitioner contended in its proposed recommended order that the Respondent listed Mrs. Busing's annual income to be between $25,000 and $50,000, her investment objective as growth and income, and her investment time horizon as long-term. (Busing Deposition Exhibit 87). There was no testimony to put the exhibit in context or explain it. On its face, Busing deposition Exhibit 87 was a request from Transamerica to the client to confirm certain information. The form had the Respondent's name printed on it, but it was not signed by either the Respondent or Mrs. Busing, and the evidence did not prove who completed the form. (The CAI form contained similar information and had both their signatures.) The Petitioner contends that the information on the confirmation request was "absurd," because it listed Mrs. Busing's annual income as between $25,000 and $50,000, when her taxable income was $11,108 for 2009 and $8,251 for 2010. There was evidence that her total annual income was about $48,000 for 2007, $32,600 for 2008, $22,358 for 2009, and $19,001 for 2010, with the decline due to the decline in the stock market. The evidence was not clear and convincing that the income information on that form or the CAI form was absurd. The investment objective and investment time horizon on the forms were questionable, but the evidence was not clear and convincing that these were misrepresentations by the Respondent. The Transamerica account was a Pershing money market account used to facilitate the purchase of annuities. The evidence was that a separate suitability analysis would be required by the insurance company offering the annuity. The evidence was not clear that the information in the forms signed by the Respondent was used for the purchase of EquiTrust annuities on behalf of Mrs. Busing. Those purchases were recommended and executed by Agent Carter. The evidence was not clear and convincing that switching Mrs. Busing's investments from Schwab to EquiTrust annuities was not suitable for Mrs. Busing or in her best interest. No expert witness testified to that effect. Counts II through IV–-The Kesishes In 2010, William Kesish and his wife, Josefa, owned several annuities. Mr. Kesish had managed their business affairs before he developed Parkinson's disease and dementia in his old age. After that, Mrs. Kesish cared for him and took over the family's finances by default. Mr. Kesish died on November 26, 2010. Mrs. Kesish was born in Spain in 1937. English is her second language. In 2010, she had difficulty conversing and reading in English and was unable to write in English. After her husband became mentally disabled, she used their bank account to provide for their needs, but she had no investment acumen beyond knowing generally that it was better to make more money from their investments than to make less or to lose money. She was recovering from cancer treatment in 2010 and was physically frail. On May 25, 2010, Paula Rego, a professional guardian, met with an attorney who believed the Kesishes were being exploited and in need of a guardian. Ms. Rego reviewed documentation provided by the attorney and, in June 2010, agreed to Mrs. Kesish's voluntary request to become the guardian of the Kesishes' property. On July 8, 2010, Ms. Rego became aware of the Respondent's involvement in the Kesishes' financial business. She telephoned the Respondent to explain her guardianship role and faxed him on July 15, 2010, to direct him to cancel any investment transactions that were underway. The Petitioner presented the testimony of Ms. Rego to explain her review of the documentation she collected in her research to attempt to piece together the financial transactions involving the Kesishes. She also testified as to the surrender charges and, to some extent, the tax liabilities that resulted from them. She also related statements made by Mrs. Kesish to her and, to some extent, to the DFS and OFR investigators, Karen Ortega and Mercedes Bujans, who also related some of the statements Mrs. Kesish made to them. The Petitioner also introduced an affidavit prepared by Ms. Ortega and signed by Mrs. Kesish on March 31, 2011. All of Mrs. Kesish's statements were hearsay. The hearsay cannot itself support a finding of fact.3/ In general, the hearsay demonstrated that Mrs. Kesish did not have a clear recollection of her interactions with the Respondent at the time of her statements. Agent Carter introduced the Respondent to Mrs. Kesish in March 2010. The Petitioner alleged essentially that Agent Carter schemed and collaborated with the Respondent to exploit the Kesishes by tricking them into financial and insurance transactions that would not be in their best interest, but would generate commissions and fees for them. It was alleged that, as with Mrs. Busing, the Respondent's FINRA licensure was required to buy and sell securities in furtherance of the scheme. The Respondent testified that Agent Carter told him about his clients, the Kesishes, and that he went to meet Mrs. Kesish in person because he had difficulty communicating with her over the telephone due to her hard-to-understand Spanish accent and limited proficiency in spoken English. He testified that she told him she wanted to get out of the stock market and was unhappy with her current stockbroker, Doreen Scott. (That part of the Respondent's testimony was corroborated by Ms. Rego, who concurred that Mrs. Kesish did not like dealing with Ms. Scott because she talked down to her.) The Respondent testified that he went to Mrs. Kesish's house, asked if he could be of assistance to her, and discussed her financial situation with her. He testified that he then returned to his Transamerica office and mailed forms for her to fill out and sign.4/ Similar to his dealings with Mrs. Busing, the Respondent testified that he spoke to Mrs. Kesish several times by telephone to answer questions about the forms. It is reasonable to infer that the Respondent knew Agent Carter would be helping her. The Respondent testified that when the completed forms were returned to him by mail, he telephoned Mrs. Kesish to verify the information on the forms and, in some cases, get information that was omitted to add it to the forms. The Petitioner attempted to prove that the Respondent knew or should have known Mrs. Kesish was mentally disabled and incapable of voluntarily instructing the Respondent to effectuate financial transactions on her behalf. Mrs. Kesish lacked knowledge in investing and was susceptible to being misled and exploited, but it was not proven that Mrs. Kesish was mentally incapacitated or unable to consent to Agent Carter's recommendations or instruct the Respondent. Ms. Rego herself did not find it necessary to initiate involuntary proceedings to establish a plenary guardianship of Mrs. Kesish's person and property until October 2013. (Count II) One of the Kesishes' investments was a Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company (Genworth) variable annuity (G-58), which they bought on October 31, 2008, for $86,084.89. It was designed to begin paying monthly income on October 31, 2022. It provided a waiver of surrender charges if either Kesish was hospitalized, admitted to a nursing facility, or died. As of March 31, 2010, G-58 had a contract value of $102,954.90. Mrs. Kesish signed a form on letterhead of the Respondent and Transamerica that expressed her desire for the Respondent to be their insurance agent on G-58. On May 27, 2010, the Respondent used an automated account transfer (ACAT) to liquidate G-58 and transfer the funds to a Transamerica brokerage account he opened for the Kesishes on the same date. The Respondent did not independently determine whether the liquidation was suitable or in the Kesishes' best interest. He relied on Agent Carter to do this. The Respondent and the Kesishes signed the CAI form to open the brokerage account. The surrender of G-58 took effect on June 14, 2010. As a result of the liquidation, the Kesishes were assessed a surrender charge of $4,576.91 and federal tax was withheld, and the net proceeds from the liquidation were $90,314.19. On June 29, 2010, the funds in Mrs. Kesish's Transamerica account were added to an EquiTrust policy Agent Carter had sold her (E-92F). The Respondent testified that this was done at the direction of Agent Carter and Mrs. Kesish. The Respondent did not act as the Kesishes' EquiTrust agent and received no commissions. The Petitioner alleged and proposed a finding that the liquidation of G-58 allowed Agent Carter to represent to EquiTrust that the Kesishes had no other annuities and that the addition to E-92F was not replacing another annuity, which allowed Agent Carter to avoid having Genworth attempt to "conserve" G-58 (i.e., question the Kesishes as to whether they wanted to reverse the liquidation within the grace period for doing so). The evidence cited in support of the allegation and proposed finding is documentation of the initial purchase of E-92F in April 2010, not the addition in June 2010. There was no clear and convincing evidence that actions taken by the Respondent resulted in Agent Carter circumventing the replacement notice requirement, or that the Respondent should be held responsible for what Agent Carter did or did not do regarding the EquiTrust annuity. According to the Respondent, he made no investment recommendations to Mrs. Kesish, and all such recommendations were made by Agent Carter. He testified that he only took action in accordance with the wishes of Mrs. Kesish, who was being advised by Agent Carter. He denied that his purpose was to generate commissions or fees for himself or for Agent Carter, or to enable Agent Carter to conceal the replacement of the Genworth annuity. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's testimony was false. The Petitioner's proposed recommended order cites the testimony of Tarek Richey regarding his concerns about the Respondent's use of an ACAT to liquidate annuities, transfer of the proceeds to Pershing accounts at Transamerica, and use of those funds to purchase other annuities. Mr. Richey is a FINRA- licensed securities broker at Questar Capital Corporation, who employed and supervised the Respondent for about a month in early 2011, after he left Transamerica in December 2010. While supervising the Respondent, Mr. Richey was advised of OFR's investigation of the Respondent and reviewed the Respondent's documentation on the subject of OFR's investigation. One of Mr. Richey's concerns from his review of the Respondent's documentation was the use of ACAT, which would not guarantee that the client is aware of resulting surrender charges and tax consequences. He also was concerned that ACAT could have been used to bypass and avoid the use of forms required to analyze the suitability of annuities purchased for the Kesishes (and other clients). While he expressed these concerns, Mr. Richey had no personal knowledge and did not testify that the Kesishes (or the other clients) actually were unaware of surrender charges and tax consequences, or that liquidation was not suitable or in their best interest. Another of Mr. Richey's concerns was that the use of ACAT could result in the replacement of annuities without completing the required forms that would provide notice to the insurance company that its annuity was in the process of being replaced and give it an opportunity to conserve its annuity. Mr. Richey did not know that the use of ACAT actually resulted in the bypass of the replacement policy notice requirements for the Kesishes and other clients. He also did not testify that the Respondent should be held responsible for what Agent Carter did or did not do regarding replacement notices. Ms. Rego testified (based in part on discussions with a financial planner who did not testify) that she did not think the Genworth and EquiTrust transactions were not in the best interest of the Kesishes, mainly because of the Genworth surrender charge and tax consequences. There was no other expert testimony on the subject, and the evidence was not clear and convincing that those transactions were unsuitable or not in their best interest. (Count III) The Kesishes owned a Riversource Life Insurance Company (Riversource) annuity (R-30) that they bought on October 5, 2006. The contract had declining withdrawal charge rates that held at eight percent for the first four years. It had a death benefit rider. On March 23, 2010, a letter on the Respondent's Transamerica letterhead, written in English and signed by Mrs. Kesish, directed Riversource to list the Respondent as the Kesishes' financial advisor. On April 23, 2010, Mrs. Kesish signed a form directing Riversource to liquidate R-30. She also signed a form saying she knew there would be surrender charges. On April 26, 2010, Riversource sent the Kesishes a check for $26,430.07 (which was net after $2,454.30 in surrender charges). The testimony from Ms. Rego as to whether the liquidation of the Riversource annuity was contrary to the Kesishes' best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements, was similar to her testimony with respect to the Genworth liquidation. There was no other expert or other clear and convincing evidence. (Count IV) The Kesishes also had Great American Life Insurance Company (Great American) annuities in the amounts of approximately $560,854 (GA-25) and $28,785 (GA-00), which were purchased in January 2010. GA-25 was owned by the Kesishes' trust, with Mrs. Kesish as trustee; GA-00 was owned by Mr. Kesish. By June 4, 2010, they had contract values of $580,854.71 and $29,970.46, respectively. On June 18, 2010, Agent Carter took Mrs. Kesish to lunch. A letter dated June 18, 2010, signed by Mrs. Kesish for her and her husband, written in English on the Respondent's Transamerica letterhead, directed the transfer of GA-25 to a Transamerica Pershing account (TA-25). An ACAT form dated June 20, 2010, signed by Mrs. Kesish and the Respondent, directed the liquidation of Mr. Kesish's GA-00 and the transfer of the proceeds to the Kesishes' Transamerica Pershing account. This transaction took effect on July 7, 2010.5/ After becoming involved through Attorney Hook, Ms. Rego had numerous discussions with Mrs. Kesish and with Agent Carter regarding the Kesishes' investments. Agent Carter attempted to explain and justify his actions to Ms. Rego and blame other insurance agents who he claimed had essentially stolen his clients by tricking them into replacing Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America (Allianz) annuities sold to them by him with GA-25 and GA-00. Ms. Rego's research notes evidence her understanding that the Great American sales to the Kesishes were unsuitable. During Ms. Rego's discussions and research throughout June 2010, the Respondent's name did not come up, and Ms. Rego was unaware of the Respondent having anything to do with the Kesishes. When she learned about the Respondent's role on July 8, 2010, she attempted to contact him. On July 15, 2010, she faxed the Respondent to instruct him to stop acting on behalf of the Kesishes. There is no clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent did not follow Ms. Rego's instructions.6/ On July 17, 2010, Great American sent Mr. Kesish a conservation letter urging him not to surrender GA-00. Ms. Rego then contacted Great American and had the surrender of GA-25 and GA-00 stopped. Had the transactions not been stopped, the Kesishes $60,000 in surrender charges would have been imposed. There was no other expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the liquidation of the Great American annuities was contrary to the Kesishes' best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. Counts V through VI–-Edith Paz Edith Paz was born on January 20, 1926, and lives in Sun City Center. She has a high school diploma and held various jobs, from retailing to making plates in a dental office. Mrs. Paz married a GI returning from World War II. Her husband was successful in business before his retirement. Meanwhile, Mrs. Paz founded a successful real estate business and invested in the stock market. Mr. Paz died in 1999. In 2001, Mrs. Paz created a revocable trust with herself as trustee. When Mrs. Paz retired, she moved to Sun City Center. She did some investing, but was dissatisfied with her investments and her financial representative at the time. About that time, she met Glenn Cummings, an insurance agent who was a less experienced associate of Agent Carter and also not FINRA- licensed. After several conversations, Agent Cummings gained her trust and advised her to liquidate and consolidate her assets before deciding what other financial products to purchase. He referred her to the Respondent for that purpose. Agent Cummings and Mrs. Paz testified that he referred Mrs. Paz to the Respondent on the advice of Agent Carter to save "exit fees" on liquidating her investments. The evidence was not clear as to how the Respondent would be able to do this. The Respondent testified to his understanding that Mrs. Paz wanted to get out of the stock market and switch to more stable investments and that she had a bad relationship with her stockbroker. The Respondent's testimony is consistent with Mrs. Paz's actual losses in the stock market and her testimony that she listened to and followed the advice of Agent Cummings because she was dissatisfied with her prior financial advisor, a Mr. Shrago. Mrs. Paz testified that she spoke to the Respondent just once, briefly. That conflicts with the testimony of the Respondent and Agent Cummings. Their testimony was that there were several telephone conversations after the initial contact. They related that the Respondent mailed Mrs. Paz the forms that needed to be filled out, that Agent Cummings was with Mrs. Paz when she filled out the forms, and that both spoke to the Respondent several times during the process. According to Agent Cummings, this happened on July 29, 2010, when he visited Mrs. Paz to show her illustrations regarding the annuities he was recommending. While there, he helped her complete the forms the Respondent had sent to have her investments liquidated and consolidated into a Transamerica Pershing account. There also was conflict in the testimony as to whether anyone explained investment options and consequences to Mrs. Paz. She testified that no one gave her any explanation. Agent Cummings testified that he explained everything in detail to Mrs. Paz and that she also talked to the insurance agents who represented the companies whose annuities she would be surrendering. He testified that Mrs. Paz knew exactly what she was doing. The Respondent testified that he had no involvement in those explanations. He testified that he simply made sure he understood what Mrs. Paz wanted him to do for her. (Count V) In May 2007, Mrs. Paz purchased a Jackson National Life Insurance Company (Jackson National or JNL) annuity (JNL-42A) on the advice of Mr. Shrago. The initial premium was $100,000, and it was issued with a five-percent bonus. As of May 25, 2007, it had an account balance of $105,017.01 and was receiving an annual rate of return of 7.75 percent. On July 12, 2010, Mrs. Paz signed a letter directing Jackson National to make the Respondent, who held an appointment to represent Jackson National, her agent-of-record on JNL-42A. The change took effect on July 15, 2010. On July 29, 2010, Jackson National faxed the Respondent a statement of account for JNL-42A, listing the balance as $108,253.48 (which reflected a prior withdrawal of $2,500 by Mrs. Paz). The statement disclosed the surrender charges in effect. After her discussions with Agent Cummings, Mrs. Paz signed forms requesting that JNL-42A be liquidated and the proceeds rolled over into a Great American Life Insurance Company (Great American or GA) annuity (GA-61). The Respondent facilitated the rollover. As a result of the rollover, Mrs. Paz incurred surrender charges of $4,871.41 and a partial recapture of the initial bonus in the amount of $2,706.34, for a total loss of $7,577.75. The Petitioner alleged, and Mrs. Paz testified, that the Respondent never discussed with her that there would be surrender charges. The Respondent did not disagree, but explained that he understood Agent Cummings already had done so and that he just made sure he was following Mrs. Paz's wishes. Concurring, Agent Cummings testified that he did explain the surrender charges to Mrs. Paz. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's actions "insulated M[r]s. P[az] from comparative financial counseling by her then current Jackson National insurance agent Gary Mahan." This was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. To the contrary, there was evidence that it was Mrs. Paz's choice to change agents, that Mr. Mahan knew about the change, and that he had no objection to the Respondent taking over for him as agent of record on the policy. The Petitioner also alleged that the Respondent "provided [Agent Cummings] with the Transamerica brokerage application, transfer forms and letter of instructions to transfer JNL 42A" to the Respondent as account representative. It was not proven that these documents were not mailed to Mrs. Paz in accordance with the Respondent's testimony. There was no expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the liquidation of Mrs. Paz's Jackson National annuity and purchase of a Great American annuity was contrary to her best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. Mrs. Paz testified that Agent Cummings initially told her she would have to pay the Respondent $1,500 as a fee for his services with respect to JNL-42a and later told her the fee would be $2,600. Agent Cummings testified that the Respondent told her what his fee would be during the telephone conversation on July 29, 2010. Regardless who told Mrs. Paz what the Respondent's fee would be, or what she was told it would be, Mrs. Paz made out a $2,607.28 check to Agent Cummings' company, Big Financial, on July 29, 2010. On August 2, 2010, Big Financial gave the Respondent a check made out to the Respondent for $2,530, with the notation "Paz." (It is not clear from the evidence why the Big Financial check was made out for $2,530. When the DFS investigator questioned the discrepancy, Agent Cummings reimbursed Mrs. Paz $77.28.) The Respondent deposited the check the next day. The Allianz compliance guide prohibited agents from charging an additional fee for services that customarily are associated with insurance products. The Great American compliance guide prohibited fraudulent acts. By accepting the check from Big Financial, the Respondent received a fee from Mrs. Paz that was not authorized. (Count VI) Prior to meeting Agent Cummings or the Respondent, Mrs. Paz had investment accounts with Wedbush (WB-37) and Wells Fargo. There were two Wells Fargo accounts, an IRA (WF-15), and a trust account (WF-70). As of June 30, 2010, the Wedbush account (WB-37) had a balance of $349,438.11. The Wells Fargo IRA account (WF-15) had a net value of $51,737.11 prior to June 30, 2010. The Wells Fargo trust account (WF-70) had a balance of $332,798.76 prior to June 2010. The Respondent and Mrs. Paz communicated in the same manner they did for the Jackson National transaction. Mrs. Paz signed forms that enabled the Respondent to transfer the funds in the Wedbush and Wells Fargo accounts into two Transamerica brokerage accounts (TA-02) and (TA-86) using ACAT. Some of the forms referred to the Respondent as Mrs. Paz's "investment professional," but the sole purpose of the Respondent's involvement was to use Transamerica as a funnel to transfer funds from one investment to another. By August 11, 2010, the funds in the TA-02 account were used to purchase an Allianz annuity sold by Agent Cummings in the amount of $335,589.65. The funds in the TA-86 account were used to purchase a Great American annuity (GA-60) sold by Agent Cummings in the amount of $45,769.38. There was no expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the liquidation of Mrs. Paz's Wedbush and Wells Fargo accounts and purchase of an Allianz annuity was contrary to her best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. Counts VII and VIII-–The Penwardens Wayne Penwarden was born on December 4, 1943. His wife, Sandra, was born on October 10, 1939. They inherited some money and decided to invest it. As of August 31, 2009, they had Morgan Stanley investment accounts that totaled close to half a million dollars. They also had an annuity with ING USA Annuity and Life Insurance Company (ING) purchased for $150,000 on April 24, 2008. Agent Carter became acquainted with the Penwardens and introduced them to the Respondent. The Amended Administrative Complaint alleged that the Respondent provided required forms to Agent Carter for him to get the Penwardens signatures and, then, used funds from their Transamerica accounts to fund the purchase of Allianz annuities, which was deceitful and against the wishes of the Penwardens. The Petitioner's proposed recommended order proposed no such findings, and there was no clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent was guilty of those acts, that he said or did anything to deceive or mislead or withhold information from them, or took any action regarding them without their full knowledge and consent. (Count VII) On September 30, 2009, the Penwardens signed a change of agent request to make the Respondent their new ING insurance agent. They also signed CAI forms to open Transamerica brokerage accounts and transfer the funds from the Morgan Stanley investment accounts into them, using ACAT. The funds in the Transamerica accounts were then used to purchase Allianz's indexed annuities sold to the Penwardens by Agent Carter. On September 23 and October 16, 2009, the Penwardens purchased two Allianz MasterDex X annuities (MD-47) and (MD-24), respectively, with initial premium payments of $141,269.40 for MD-47 and $373,979.59, plus a premium bonus of $37,397.96, for MD-24. On June 17, 2010, acting on instructions from Agent Carter on behalf of the Penwardens, the Respondent liquidated the ING annuity. On June 30, 2010, the Penwardens added the $115,281.47 proceeds from the liquidation of the ING annuity to MD-47. The Petitioner proposed a finding that the surrender of the ING annuity cost $6,000 in surrender charges, which is true. The Petitioner omits from its proposed finding that the Penwardens received a premium bonus on the Allianz policy that more than offset the ING surrender charge. There was no expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the liquidation of the Penwardens' Morgan Stanley accounts and ING annuity and purchase of Allianz annuities was contrary to their best interests, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. (Count VIII) The Penwardens became dissatisfied with Agent Carter, and on November 9, 2010, signed a letter drafted by the Respondent on Transamerica letterhead to substitute him for Agent Carter as their sole financial advisor. On November 12, 2010, the Respondent was notified by Allianz that he would receive no commissions as servicing agent on policies sold to the Penwardens by another agent. On or about November 22, 2010, $37,408.54 was transferred from the Allianz MD-47 annuity into a new Nationwide Life and Annuity Insurance Company (Nationwide or NW) annuity (NW-08). The Respondent also effected a partial Internal Revenue Code, section 1035, exchange from the MD-47 annuity to a new annuity purchased from Nationwide (NW-09) for $23,746.19. On November 7, 2011, the Respondent faxed a request to transfer funds from the MD-24 annuity to fund a North American Company for Life and Health Insurance (North American or NA) annuity (NA-68). The Petitioner proposed a finding that the Respondent undertook these transactions on November 22, 2010, and on November 7, 2011, in order to benefit himself alone by generating commissions to replace the servicing agent commissions he was not getting on the Allianz policies. This was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. To the contrary, the Respondent explained that the transactions were done for the Penwardens' benefit after discussions regarding the benefits of diversifying out of the Allianz annuity into other annuities, which was accomplished cost-free. There was no clear and convincing evidence that these transactions were contrary to the Penwardens' best financial interest or that they were done solely to benefit the Respondent. There was no expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the partial transfers from the Penwardens' Allianz annuities to other Nationwide and North American annuities were contrary to their best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. In early December 2011, Mr. Penwarden replaced the Respondent with another insurance agent. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent went to the Penwardens home to harangue them for two hours about their decision to switch agents. The only evidence on this allegation was the deposition testimony of Mr. Penwarden and the testimony of the Respondent. Mr. Penwarden's testimony as to what occurred was vague. The Respondent agreed that he was disappointed that the Penwardens were switching agents, but testified that he went to the home to retrieve the policies he sold to the Penwardens, which would have to be returned to the insurance companies to cancel at no cost during the "free-look" period. He testified that he waited for an hour or more while Mr. Penwarden tried to find the policies in his home. The evidence was not clear and convincing, and the Petitioner did not propose a finding as to this allegation. Count IX and Related Affirmative Defenses Count IX is based on the Final Order entered in OFR's securities case against the Respondent as an additional ground for discipline under section 626.621(13), Florida Statutes. The Respondent cites it in his affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel on Counts I through VIII. See Finding 2, supra. The Respondent also argues that the additional charge is barred by the ex post facto clause of the Florida constitution and due process clauses of the United States and Florida constitutions. As to the due process argument, the Respondent admitted the OFR Final Order in his answer to the original charges. He also had ample opportunity to demonstrate prejudice from the added charge, which he could not, and to present legal arguments, which he did. As to ex post facto, section 626.621(13) was added to the Florida Statutes, effective June 1, 2011. See Ch. 175, §§ 47 and 53, Laws of Fla. (2010). That was before the Respondent entered into the Stipulation and Consent Agreement that formed the basis for the OFR Final Order. Disciplinary guidelines for section 626.621(13) were added to the Florida Administrative Code on March 24, 2014. Fla. Admin. Code R. 69B-231.090(13). As to the collateral estoppel defense, the Respondent testified that he entered into the settlement with OFR because he was under heightened supervision by his employer due to securities violations, and he did not think any employer wanted to provide the required supervision (which he referred to as "baby-sitting.") The Respondent did not testify that he relied on the OFR Final Order to bar charges by DFS or that he believed the OFR Final Order would bar DFS charges.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Agent and Agency Services, enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of violating section 626.611(7) and rule 69B-215.210 under Count V, and section 626.621(13) under Count IX, dismissing the other charges, and suspending the Respondent's insurance licenses for 12 months. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2014.
