The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit (“Tax Credit”) application filed by Petitioner, Florida Power Development, LLC, A Florida Limited Liability Company (“Florida Power”), was eligible for consideration by Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Office of Energy (“DACS” or the “Department” or “Office of Energy”).
Findings Of Fact Florida Power is a company which produces power by way of burning biomass materials, primarily wood chips, at its energy plant at 10311 Cement Plant Road, Brooksville, Florida. Most of the energy it produces is sold to Duke Energy. The plant had previously been a coal fired power plant, but Florida Power spent $196 million converting it into a renewable energy facility utilizing biomass fuel. JP Morgan is the parent company of Florida Power. The Office of Energy is the state agency responsible for overseeing the Tax Credit program authorized under section 220.193, Florida Statutes (2016).2/ The Department is empowered to review and approve (or disapprove) all Tax Credit applications which it receives. The Office of Energy is located at 600 South Calhoun Street, Suite 251, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001. Applications for a Tax Credit are available on the DACS website, as are the statutes and rules governing the Tax Credit program. The rules specify the date applications are due in each “production year” and set forth the process for filing the applications. Applications addressing the production year at issue in this proceeding of January 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016, were due at the Office of Energy no later than August 15, 2016. Florida Power’s application was not received by the Office of Energy until August 17, 2016, two days after the deadline. As a result, the Department deemed Florida Power’s application ineligible for consideration. Florida Power believes that circumstances surrounding the filing of its application for a Tax Credit excuse or make moot its failure to meet the deadline. Florida Power had filed applications for Tax Credits in prior production years. In 2015, its application was prepared by Tateswood, a company located in Houston, Texas. Tateswood provides management services to several power plants, including several owned by Florida Power. The application was submitted via overnight delivery, i.e., FedEx, from Houston, Texas, to the Office of Energy in Tallahassee, Florida. A senior official from Tateswood, Jeff Winkler, signed the application and had it overnighted to the Department. The application was received timely and approved by the Office of Energy.3/ Florida Power received a tax credit that year of approximately $1.49 million. Around July 28, 2016, Florida Power received the data it needed from Duke Energy to file the Tax Credit application for the 2016 production year (which was less than a full year as the Tax Credit program was expiring). Florida Power’s accountant, Lashauna Filo, also worked for Tateswood in Houston, Texas. She prepared the 2016 application for Mr. Winkler’s signature. Mr. Winkler was traveling, but he was expected to be in Brooksville prior to the application submission deadline. Ms. Filo emailed the application to the Brooksville plant on August 10, 2016, five days prior to the date it was due in Tallahassee. Mr. Winkler signed the application and gave it to Ms. Brown, plant administrator, who was given the task of submitting the application to the Office of Energy.4/ She noted verbiage on the face of the application form which says it can be submitted to the Department via “certified mail or hand delivery.” The due date of August 15 also appeared on the face of the application. Ms. Brown had not been involved with filing a Tax Credit application previously. After conferring with one of her supervisors, Dave Hermanson, she selected the first option--certified mail–-for submitting the application. She typed an envelope, filled out a Certified Receipt form, and put the application into a post office box at the Brooksville, Florida, post office. Ms. Brown did not consider literally hand-delivering the application to DACS because Tallahassee is roughly a four-hour drive from Brooksville, and it seemed there was enough time for the package to get to the Department. Ms. Brown did not understand that “hand delivery” allowed for delivery by overnight courier. Neither Florida Power nor Tateswood have attorneys on staff to provide guidance or assistance in matters such as these. Instead, Ms. Brown relied upon the advice given her by Mr. Hermanson. Unfortunately, the application did not sail smoothly through the USPS system. It was received by a Tampa USPS facility at 8:00 p.m., on August 10, was “coded” for Tallahassee, and departed that facility at 9:43 p.m., the same evening. It arrived at the Adams Street USPS facility in Tallahassee at 1:19 p.m., on August 11. However, the package had been improperly “coded” in the Tampa USPS facility to zip code 32301, rather than to zip code 32399. The 32399 zip code is used for state agencies in Tallahassee. This mis-code by the Tampa office caused the package to be erroneously sent from the Adams Street office to the downtown Tallahassee facility, rather than being processed for a “state agency” delivery. Thereafter, it went to another USPS site, the Lake Jackson facility, where it arrived on August 12. The package did not make it back to the Adams Street facility where it belonged until 5:36 a.m. on August 16-–one day after the submission deadline. The application was delivered to DACS on August 17, 2016, at 9:08 a.m., two days after the deadline. Clearly, Florida Power’s application for a Tax Credit was not timely received by the Office of Energy. However, Florida Power raises several facts which may relate to whether equitable tolling or equitable estoppel principles apply to this situation. Florida Power points out that verbiage on the face of the application itself does not specifically use the words “overnight express” as a means of submitting the application. Florida Power maintains, therefore, that it was misled into believing that physical hand-delivery or certified mail were its only options. Inasmuch as Florida Power had submitted their prior year’s application via FedEx, their claim lacks credence. Furthermore, the rule addressing application submission defines “hand delivery” as “any physical submission of an application to the Office [of Energy] from a representative of an applicant, courier, or a private delivery service.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 5O-2.003(3)(b)2. Florida Power was very familiar with the Tax Credit program, but could not say why it was not familiar with the rules governing that program. Unfortunately, certified mail, Florida Power’s delivery option for the application at issue, does not guarantee delivery by a date certain. Rather, certified mail-–which is processed exactly the same way as non-certified mail-–is merely a means for tracking a letter or package. Thus, a person who mails a letter by way of certified mail assumes the risk that the letter may not be delivered on or before a desired date. It appears that the risk is quite high. A USPS employee testified at final hearing that there are 50 to 70 complaints per day in Tallahassee concerning certified mail and several hundred certified letters may be misdirected each week. Florida Power further argues that the Department has seen several applications submitted via certified mail arrive at DACS late, i.e., after the “received by” deadline. Florida Power asserts that this fact has put DACS on notice that allowing an applicant to submit an application via certified mail constitutes a flaw in the system. The Department maintains that the use of certified mail is a valid way of tracking applications and is feasible. During the development of the rule governing submissions of the applications, no interested party voiced any objection to the use of certified mail as a delivery option. There is no evidence in the record that DACS was previously aware of the magnitude of errors by USPS so that it (DACS) should not include certified mail as an option for submitting applications. One must wonder, as does Florida Power, why there needs to be tracking of the applications at all since the operative date is the date of receipt by DACS. But the Department must deem it necessary for some reason and it is the current state of the law. Florida Power contends in its PRO that there are numerous fallacies in the Department’s rule regulating Tax Credit applications. This proceeding, however, is not a rule challenge brought pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The validity or propriety of the rule is not in question. At issue in the instant proceeding is whether Florida Power complied with the duly promulgated and existing rule. DACS is one of the few state agencies which await delivery of its mail from the post office, rather than sending someone to retrieve it from USPS. DOAH is also one of those agencies. While awaiting delivery may delay an agency’s receipt of mail at times, it would not have affected Florida Power in this case because the package was not available for pick-up until August 16, one day after the deadline. There is no requirement in law or rule that any state agency opt to pick up its mail from USPS rather than have it delivered. Florida Power’s lament that DACS could have chosen to have its mail delivered is of no consequence. Some government agencies use the postmark on letters or packages as evidence that the item was timely mailed out; think IRS and April 15, for example. However, the DACS rule requires receipt of the application by the Department; the rule does not currently employ a “submitted by” compliance date. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 5O-2.003(b). When the Tax Credit program was originally initiated, the Department undertook regular rule development. The first rule promulgated by the Department was drafted in July 2012 and was ultimately adopted in the spring of 2013. That version of the rule stated that all applications must be “submitted” by a date certain. Upon receipt of one application after the due date, but which had been “submitted” by the applicant before the deadline, the Department decided it needed to re-think that provision. Rulemaking was recommended in order to amend the language relating to timely filing of applications. During the rulemaking process, which was duly noticed and advertised, DACS received no input from interested parties concerning the proposed amendment to the rule. The amended rule requires applications to be “received by” DACS on or before the deadline established by rule. This amendment eliminated any disputes concerning when an application was “submitted” by an applicant. The current, duly promulgated rule utilizes “received by” rather than “submitted” as the operative date. Florida Power points out that DACS has missed some of its own statutorily mandated deadlines concerning the reporting of Tax Credit information to the governor’s office. Florida Power does not cite to any authority which relieves an applicant from the requirements of a rule when an agency misses its own deadlines. So, that DACS was not timely in carrying out its own mandated duties is irrelevant to whether Florida Power satisfied its required actions. Nonetheless, the Department provided a legitimate rationale for its tardiness, though such reasons are irrelevant to the issue in this case. DACS employees utilize a checklist when reviewing Tax Credit applications. The checklist is just that, a matrix that can be checked off as each element or requirement of the application is reviewed, i.e., date of receipt, signature, application form, etc. The first question on the checklist asks whether the application “was submitted by” the requisite due date. April Groover Combs, who reviewed the Florida Power application using the checklist, simply interpreted the “was submitted by” language as “was received by.” Mrs. Combs had authored the rule and was involved in its amendments, so she understood what was required regardless of how the checklist referred to the items. Florida Power suggests that the internal checklist error somehow invalidates the Department’s actions; it does not. An internal document used by employees is not meant to provide rights to the public. It is not a rule. Thus, any errors within such a document are immaterial.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services upholding its rejection of the Tax Credit application filed by Florida Power as ineligible for consideration. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the pleadings, stipulations and oral representations of the parties, the following facts are found: During the years in question, petitioner was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and was duly qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Florida. Petitioner is the parent corporation of a consolidated group of corporations, two of which (including petitioner) had Florida transactions or were otherwise separately subject to the Florida corporate income tax code. None of the other members of the consolidated group were subject to taxation in Florida. For the fiscal and calendar years 1972 through 1974, Petitioner filed federal and Florida income tax returns on behalf of the parent corporation, which included the returns for the consolidated group of corporations -- both the Florida and non- Florida members. Each member of the group consented to such consolidated filing and the component members of the Florida return group were identical to the members of the federal return group. Respondent issued its proposed deficiencies for the 1972 and 1973 tax years, ruling that for a parent corporation to include all of its subsidiary corporations for the purposes of consolidating its taxable income, it must be incorporated in Florida. For the years 1972, 1973 and 1974, respondent's Rule 12C-1.131(1), F.A.C., contained a definition of a "Florida parent company" as the term is used in the second sentence of Florida Statutes 220.131(1). This rule was amended on August 4, 1975, to delete said sentence defining the term "Florida parent company."
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that: petitioner pay the assessment of $3,786.33 for the year 1972, with interest, as stipulated by petitioner, the proposed assessment for the year 1973 in the amount of $112,281.06 be dismissed and set aside, and the petitioner's method of computing its corporate income tax for the year 1974 be upheld. Respectfully submitted and entered this 21st day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: M. Lewis Hall, Jr. Hall and Hedrick Greater Miami Federal Building 200 Southeast First Street Miami, Florida E. Wilson Crump, II Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Does Petitioner have standing to challenge Rule 12A- 1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code? If Petitioner has standing, is Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority? See Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Rathon Corporation, formerly known as Diversey Corporation, is a Delaware Corporation authorized to do business in Florida. It manufactures various detergents, cleaners, and soaps, and the equipment to dispense those products. The products are marketed in Florida and other states. The customers of the products include hotels, hospitals, factories, and restaurants. The devices that dispense the detergents, cleaners, and soaps are referred to as "feeders." Those feeders can range from simple hand soap dispensers to electronically regulated machines that inject soap into commercial dishwashers. The feeders are loaned to Petitioner's customers at no additional charge for the period of time that the customer continues to purchase the product(s) dispensed by the feeder. These circumstances existed in the period of July 1993 through March 1995. In the period of July 1993 through March 1995, Diversey Corporation, now Rathon Corporation, paid the State of Florida $58,969.22 in use tax associated with the feeders. During the period in question, the Petitioner manufactured the feeders at a facility in Santa Cruz, California. The feeders were not warehoused in the Santa Cruz facility for an extended period. They were prepared for shipment and shipped to customers in the various states, to include Florida and California customers, to be used in the places of business operated by the customers. The feeders being shipped were not packaged with other products. During the period July 1993 through March 1995, the Petitioner not only paid use tax to Florida for the feeders, it paid use tax in forty-four other states and the District of Columbia, based upon the costs of manufacturing the feeders. California was among the other forty-four states. During the period in question, Petitioner accrued and paid use taxes to Florida and California limited to the feeders used by customers in those states, based upon the product sales allocation method it used in relation to the forty-three other states and the District of Columbia. The feeders that were provided to Florida customers were shipped by common carrier. Upon their arrival in Florida no tax had been paid to California pertaining to those feeders. When the feeders arrived in Florida during the period at issue, use tax would be remitted to Florida. Subsequently, the Petitioner paid the State of California a use tax associated with the feeders that had been shipped to Florida customers and upon which a use tax had been imposed by the State of Florida and paid. The California payment is described in detail below. Petitioner had paid Florida use tax on the feeders shipped to Florida customers based on the total manufactured cost of the feeders to Petitioner, including materials, labor, and overhead. The additional use tax paid to California for those feeders was based only on the cost of materials. The overall costs of feeders allocated to Florida for the refund period was $982,803.00. Petitioner remitted a 6% use tax to Florida totaling $58,969.22 for the period in question. In 1996, Petitioner was audited for sales and use tax compliance by the State of California. That audit process included the refund period that is in question in this case, July 1993 through March 1995. Following the audit, the State of California issued a Notice of Determination asserting additional liability for tax and interest that totaled $355,753.95. Petitioner paid that assessment. The California auditor had arrived at the assessment by concluding that Petitioner owed California for 44.57% of all feeders manufactured at Petitioner's Santa Cruz facility. The 44.57% represented all newly manufactured feeders that had been loaned by Petitioner to its customers during the refund period over the entire United States. As a consequence, the assessment of use tax by the State of California included tax on feeders for which Petitioner had paid Florida $58,969.22 in use tax prior to the California assessment of $355,753.95. Petitioner did not apply for credit in California for the portion of the $355,753.95 that would relate to the feeders brought to Florida during the period in question. Petitioner took no action to obtain a credit on the amount paid to Florida as a means to reduce the California tax obligation pursuant to the 1996 audit, because Petitioner had been told that the use tax for the feeders used by Florida customers was legally due in California and not in Florida. In arriving at the determination that 44.57% of the feeders manufactured during the period in question had been loaned to customers within the continental United States, the California auditor took into account that 21.8% of the feeders and feeder parts were sold for export, leaving 78.2% to be used in the United States. Of the 78.2% remaining for the United States, 57% were complete feeders sent to customers within the United States, and 43% were repair parts that were sent to Petitioner's Cambridge Division in Maryland, where those repair parts were being stored for future use. The percentage of 44.57% was arrived at by multiplying 57% times 78.2%, representing the percent of total feeders manufactured for use in the United States that were sent to customers within the United States and not held in inventory as repair parts. Again, California based its use tax for tangible personal property manufactured in that state to include only the cost of materials. Consequently, when the California auditor computed use tax to be collected by California using the 44.57% of total feeders manufactured to be used in the United States by Petitioner's customers in the United States, the California auditor used a cost factor of 55% of overall costs which was attributable to the cost of materials only. The total cost of feeders manufactured by Petitioner in California during the period in question, as related in the California tax audit, was $19,028,714.00. The total cost manufactured for use in the United States was $8,481,098.00, representing 44.57% of the overall cost of manufacturing. When the $8,481.098.00 is multiplied by 55%, representing the cost of materials only, the total costs of the goods subject to the use tax for the period in question is $4,664,604.00. A use tax rate of 7% was applied against the amount of $4,664,604.00. To attribute the portion of use tax paid to California following the 1996 audit associated with feeders that had been sent to Florida during the period in question, the answer is derived by multiplying $982,803.00 by 55% for a total of $540,542.00, and in turn multiplying that amount by 7%, the rate of tax imposed by California. That total is $37,837.91 in use tax that was subsequently paid to California after $58,962.22 had been paid to Florida for use tax on the same feeders. Diversey Corporation sought a tax refund in the amount of $58,977.00, through an application dated August 8, 1996, in relation to the period July 1993 through March. Eventually through the decision by the Respondent in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial dated July 16, 1997, Respondent refused to grant the refund of $58,977.00. At present, Petitioner requests that it be given a refund of $37,837.91, which represents the portion of use tax paid to Florida that has been duplicated in a payment of use tax to California. Respondent, in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial entered on July 16, 1997, and based upon the facts adduced at the final hearing, premises its proposed agency action denying the refund request upon the language set for in Section 212.06(1)(a) and (7), Florida Statutes. The determination to deny the refund request was not based upon reliance on Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code. The theory for denying the refund is premised upon Respondent's argument that use tax was due to Florida, "as of the moment" feeders arrived in Florida for use in Petitioner's business operations associated with its customers. Petitioner then paid the use tax to Florida at the time the feeders arrived in Florida. Having not paid California Use Tax prior to paying Florida Use Tax, Respondent concludes, through its proposed agency action, that it need not refund to Petitioner the use taxes it paid to California at a later date. Petitioner had referred to Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, following receipt of the Notice of Proposed Refund Denial issued on December 9, 1996, possibly creating the impression that Petitioner believed that Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, would support its claim for refund. It later developed that Petitioner did not have in mind reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, to support its claim for refund. Instead, Petitioner made reference to that rule and specifically Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, as a means to perfect a challenge to Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 15, 1997, claiming that the challenged rule was an invalid exercise of authority. That challenge was assigned DOAH Case No. 97-5908RX. In summary, notwithstanding Petitioner's argument to the contrary, Respondent has never relied upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, or any other part of that rule in its proposed agency action denying the refund request. Absent Petitioner's affirmative reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, the rule has no part to play in resolving this dispute. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties to this action in accordance with Sections 120.56, 120.569(1), and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner sought repayment of funds paid into the State Treasury for use taxes for the period of July 1993 through March 1995. See Section 215.26(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent, in defending its decision to deny the repayment, has consistently relied upon provisions within Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as well as the language within Section 215.26(1), Florida Statutes. In particular, Respondent has relied upon the language at Section 212.06(7), Florida Statutes, in defending its proposed agency action. Petitioner did not look to the provisions of Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, to assist the Petitioner in its refund claim. Instead, Petitioner claims that an inference has been created that Respondent utilized Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, to determine the refund question adverse to the interest of Petitioner. Petitioner believes this creates the opportunity to challenge the rule. Given that Respondent did not rely upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, to defend against the Request for Repayment of Funds, Petitioner is not substantially affected by the rule and is not entitled to seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule. Upon consideration, it is ORDERED: That Petitioner's challenge to the validity of Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, is DISMISSED.1 DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Allis-Chalmers Corporation (ACC), Petitioner in Case 82-2774, is a Delaware corporation commercially domiciled in West Allis, Wisconsin. ACC operates in Florida at the following locations: U.S. Highway 1 opened 2/1/77 Grant (Industrial Pump Division) 5200 Kennedy Blvd. closed 10/30/78 Tampa (Industrial Pump Division) 406 Rio Street opened 11/1/78 101 Federal Place opened 5/1/80 Tarpon Springs (Cement & Mining System Division) (The locations listed are those operating during the audit period. Other locations closed prior to or opened after the audit period.) ACC makes sales of tangible personal property to Florida customers directly from the locations at (b) and (c) and also makes sales to Florida customers from these two locations where the property is shipped from out-of-state locations to the Florida customers. ACC is a diversified company which manufactures and markets the following items: (a) agricultural equipment; (b) hydropower equipment; (c) coal gasification systems; (d) ore conveyors, crushers and screening equipment; (e) bulk material-handling equipment, such as ship self-unloaders; (f) stackers and reclaimers for steel mills; (g) compressors and pumps; (h) cement and asphaltic concrete production equipment (i) valves for units larger than household or commercial plumbing installations; (j) systems for the direct reduction of iron ore; (k) kilns and coolers; (l) lawn and garden equipment; and (m) lift trucks and industrial tractors. The amount in dispute is as stated in the Petition and is not an issue in these proceedings. The only issue is the method of computing the intangible taxes. ACC contends the tax base should be the net accounts receivable based on sales transacted in Florida divided by sales transacted everywhere else. The department contends the ratio should be Florida-destination sales divided by sales everywhere else. The issue is the "business situs" of the intangibles. Allis-Chalmers Credit Corporation (ACCC), Petitioner in Cases 82-2816 and 82-2817, is a Wisconsin corporation doing business in Florida. It is the wholly-owned subsidiary of ACC and its principal business is financing the sale or lease of equipment by ACC dealers. Case 82-2816 involves an income tax assessment against ACCC for the years 1977-1979. The item in dispute involves treatment given to "waiver interest" in arriving at the ratio by which federal income tax is multiplied to determine state income tax due. This issue applies to the denominator of that equation, hence the higher the figure the lower the tax. On occasion ACC, as a marketing tool, agrees to forego interest on either retail or wholesale financing for a period of perhaps six months. If these notes are assigned to ACCC, ACC must pay the waived interest to ACCC that its dealer or the dealer's customer would otherwise have paid. This is charged to ACC at the rate of one and one-half times the cost of funds to ACCC plus the actual cost of insurance. This rate is one percent to three percent per annum less than ACCC would charge the original debtors for the same period. The difference takes into account the elimination of bad debts and the simplified collection from one source instead of many. Therefore, as contended by ACCC, this "waiver interest" is thus already net of the "expenses of the recipient related thereto." The department contends that "waiver interest," and ACCC's explanation thereof, merely reflects the fact that a reduced rate of return "interest" is charged by ACCC with respect to the higher quality risk attendant to its relationship with its parent, ACC. As to ACCC's interest expense as a cost carrying the underlying receivables, the department contends that the ratio of ACCC's interest expense as applied is an appropriate adjustment as none is reflected elsewhere as a cost of carrying "waiver interest" generating receivables. As to the related bad debt expense, the department contends it merely applied the overall bad debt information ACCC used in determining its underlying federal taxable income and, that in its use of such data, the department did not find evidence wherein ACCC in its determination of its federal bad debt expense, distinguished between classes of risks which may be in its aggregate receivables, including the receivables giving rise to the "waiver interest." Thus, the department contends that directly related expense includes interest expense and bad debt expense. By the department's calculation, "waiver interest" as an item in the sales denominator has been reduced by 61 percent to 70 percent in various years to reflect these two categories of directly related expense as mandated by Section 214.71(3)(b) Florida Statutes, and Section 220.44, Florida Statutes. The issue is what constitutes directly related expense to inter-company income. There is no dispute on the numbers. Either the return numbers or the audit numbers on this item will prevail. Case 82-2817 involves an intangible tax assessment against ACCC for the years 1979-1981. During the audit period ACCC was represented in Florida by one employee whose duties were to call on ACC Florida dealers to persuade these dealers to use ACCC for financing sales they made, to keep these dealers supplied with necessary forms, and to give advice to these dealers if complicated or difficult financing situations arose. This representative worked out of the Atlanta office but lived in Florida, the state for which this representative was responsible. Buyers of ACC equipment with good credit ratings can generally obtain bank financing at better rates than are offered by ACCC. The dealer is not required to assign conditional sales contracts to ACCC (via ACC) but is encouraged to do so. The sales contracts for Florida buyers of equipment delivered to Florida are the intangibles upon which the tax here involved was based. When a dealer sells a piece of equipment on which the buyer wants financing by ACCC, the dealer has the retail customer fill out the purchaser's statement and execute three additional forms that are provided by ACCC. Under his franchise agreement with the parent corporation, the dealer is required to use appropriate precautions in conducting financing transactions, to warranty the truth and completeness of statements in the documents and their enforceability, and to repurchase the paper on demand in the event of default. The dealer forwards the executed documents to ACCC's Atlanta branch office for review and approval before any extension of credit to the customer. In Atlanta ACCC's branch manager, acting under a power of attorney from the parent corporation, accepts the document on behalf of the parent corporation, and tenders them to himself as agent for ACCC. If the paper meets the ACCC requirements as to form, terms, execution and credit-worthiness, as defined in the Master Credit Agreement between the parent corporation and ACCC, he then accepts the documents on behalf of ACCC. In some instances he conducts a supplemental credit inquiry by mail or telephone to assure ACCC's requirements are met. His acceptance of the documents for ACCC constitutes in effect the purchase and receipt of the obligation. The customer receives his financing, and the appropriate credits are transferred from ACCC to the parent corporation to the dealer's inventory account. The dealer receives an additional credit as an incentive to recommend ACCC's financing services to his customers. ACCC files the signed financing statement with the Florida Secretary of State to protect its security interest under U.C.C. Article 9, and pays the appropriate filing fee. ACCC also files continuation statements in the event the account is extended or refinanced beyond five years. The customer makes his installment payments reflecting the base price plus a time-price differential or finance charge by mailing the payments to ACCC's Atlanta lock box. ACCC furnishes him coupon books or reminder notices by mail. In the event a customer account becomes overdue, ACCC takes limited enforcement action by issuing dunning letters. ACCC, through its Florida Finance Representative, contacts the delinquent customer by telephone or in person, and arranges in appropriate cases for extensions or refinancing of the initial obligation, using printed forms with ACC's name prominently displayed thereon. In the event the customer defaults, ACCC has authority to repossess and resell the security, to sue on the note, or to amend, extend, renew or release the customer's obligations. In practice ACCC rarely, if ever, exercises these powers, but simply resells the paper to the parent corporation which takes the actions described above. The agreement between Allis-Chalmers and its dealers is that of buyer and seller and this agreement specifically provides the dealer is not an agent of Allis-Chalmers and is without authority to bind the company. In Case 82-2817 Petitioner contends that no tax is due because it is not transacting business within the state. The department contends that tax is due because the original contracts, which have been assigned once or twice depending upon whether they were wholesale or retail, have acquired a business situs in the state since they arose from, or are issued in connection with, the sale of tangible personalty in this state. In the event the department prevails, the parties have stipulated to the manner in which the modified tax shall be computed, for this case only. This stipulation is not material to the issues involved and is not replicated herein.
The Issue Is the Respondent's assessment for corporate income tax and interest for the tax years ending 12/31/78, 12/31/79, and 12/31/80 appropriate, and may it be properly imposed upon Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact The instant dispute between the parties arose out of how the substantial business interests of Petitioner Murray Kramer Corp. are to be defined and by what accounting method its corporate income tax assessments are to be made. Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A., is Petitioner's accountant and qualified representative for purposes of this proceeding. He is neither an internal bookkeeper for the corporation nor a corporate officer thereof. At all times material, Petitioner was conducting business, deriving income, or existing within the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 220, F.S. Petitioner invests primarily through partnerships. Among Petitioner's holdings and investments is ownership of an orange grove in the State of Florida from which it derived income by way of the sales of citrus fruit grown in Florida during the taxable years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. The orange grove constitutes real and tangible property in Florida for purposes of Florida's corporate income tax. Petitioner has consistently filed Florida corporate income tax returns on a "separate accounting" basis since the inception of Florida's Corporate Income Tax Law on January 1, 1972. Petitioner used this method for the years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. It did so without petitioning the Respondent Department of Revenue for permission at or before the filing of the returns to use the "separate accounting" method to determine the Florida tax base. Accordingly, Petitioner did not receive prior written permission from the Department to use the "separate accounting" method for those years, and the Department did not require that the Petitioner use the "separate accounting" method in those years. Nonetheless, Petitioner asserts that its pattern of using the "separate accounting" method for six years put the Department on sufficient notice that the corporate taxpayer would continue to use that method indefinitely and further asserts that it was therefore entitled to use such a "separate accounting" method on the basis of its prior consistent usage. Petitioner's Florida corporate returns declare investment income from dividends, interest, gains from securities, partnership income, and income from its orange grove located in Florida. In each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner entered its federal taxable income on Line 1 of the Florida Corporation Income Tax Return, FORM F-1120. This amount is not at issue and is accepted as a "given" by both parties. However, in each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner did not complete the apportionment schedule on Page 3 of the respective returns. Instead of using the apportionment method, Petitioner computed what it characterized as "Florida Profit" or "Florida Income" on a schedule it attached, based totally on the profits it derived from the Florida orange grove and then inserted that amount on Line 6, Florida Portion of Adjusted Federal Income, of the "Computation of Florida Tax Liability" on the Florida return. This entry did not relate computationally to the amount of federal taxable income reported federally on Line 1. All gross receipts from the sale of citrus fruit by Petitioner were derived from sales made to Zellwood Fruit Distributors. This dollar amount is also undisputed. Petitioner received payment from its Florida orange grove operation in the form of checks drawn by Zellwood. Approximately June 20, 1983, Respondent Department of Revenue made an initial audit of Petitioner's books and records for the taxable years in question. Respondent's auditor assigned at that time had full and free access to Petitioner's books and records. He and his supervisor memorialized their view that the "separate accounting" method employed by Petitioner was proper, but this judgment call (by the auditor on June 29, 1983 and by his supervisor on July 1, 1983) was in the nature of free-form agency action and was neither accepted nor formalized by their superiors within the agency who ultimately determined that the Petitioner should have employed the "apportionment" method and that the burden was upon the Petitioner even under the apportionment method to establish that one hundred percent of its income was not derived in Florida. The Respondent Department therefore determined the tax owed by Petitioner upon the basis of 100% of Petitioner's income as opposed to the yearly percentages that Petitioner had unilaterally assigned to its orange grove, and issued its Revised Notice of Intent to Make Corporate Income Tax Audit Changes on November 7, 1983. Florida's apportionment formula is a three-factor function which takes selected business activities of the taxpayer and computes the portion of that activity attributable to Florida, divided by that activity everywhere. A composite of the subtotal of those three measures (payroll, sales, and property) of business activity are used to compute Florida's share of the "everywhere" base that would be available under the adjusted federal taxable income base. See, Section 214.71(1), F.S. The Department calculated the tax using the three statutorily recognized apportionment factors of payroll, sales, and property. Concerning the first apportionment factor, payroll, Petitioner had federally reported no amount of payroll, and therefore this factor was determined by the Department to be zero, and pursuant to Section 220.15, F.S., the payroll factor was eliminated and the other two factors were used exclusively. Concerning the sales factor, all gross receipts of the orange grove were considered to be derived within the State of Florida, and all gross income attributable to intangible personal property was excluded from the sales factor, pursuant to Section 220.15(1), F.S. Concerning the property factor, the Department determined that all real and tangible personal property was within the State of Florida. The situs of the intangible property was not established by the taxpayer. Therefore, because Section 214.71, F.S. limits the construction of the property factor to include only "real and tangible personal property," it was thus determined to exclude intangible property. The Respondent Department of Revenue issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment on November 16, 1983, showing a balance of $10,596.00 ($7308.00 tax, $275.00 penalty, and $3,013.00 interest computed through October 31, 1983, plus notice of daily interest of $2.40 per day from November 1, 1983 until paid.) Petitioner timely availed itself of informal protest procedures, and the Department issued its Notice of Decision on March 15, 1985. By its June 21, 1988 Notice of Reconsideration, the Department concluded its informal proceedings and denied Petitioner's assertion of the right to use a "separate accounting" method and further denied Petitioner's challenge to the Department's assessment by the "apportionment" method, which in this instance had not made any apportionment for "outside Florida" activities. The situs of intangible personal property was not sufficiently demonstrated by the Petitioner at formal hearing. The Petitioner also did not establish that it owns real or tangible personal property outside Florida. Zellwood Fruit Distributors provided Petitioner Murray Kramer with letters attesting that, based upon information received from Winter Gardens Citrus Products Cooperative, Winter Gardens' sales percentages in the State of Florida were as follows: 1979 1980 18.60% 21.07% Zellwood provided no such figures to Petitioner for the year 1978. Petitioner contends, on the basis of the after the fact Zellwood letters, that Zellwood was a member of Winter Gardens, a cooperative, and Murray Kramer was an associate grower of Zellwood. At formal hearing, no one from Zellwood or Winter Gardens testified; no contract between Petitioner Murray Kramer and either Zellwood or Winter Gardens was introduced to prove agency; no bills of lading, sales slips, corporate documents, or other connective link among the three entities was offered in evidence; nor was any primary, direct, non-hearsay evidence of sales amounts or situs of Winter Gardens' sales offered by Petitioner. Milton Weiss, Petitioner's accountant, asserted that if a straight "apportionment" (not "separate accounting") calculation had been made for the income derived in Florida by Petitioner, percentages would be: 1978 1979 1980 24.03% 15.31% 15.01% These percentages rely in part on what are clearly the out-of-court statements of Zellwood's correspondent, relaying further out-of-court statements from Winter Gardens Citrus. (See the immediately preceding Finding of Fact). Neither of these out-of-court hearsay statements is such as may be used to supplement or explain direct evidence, since no direct, primary source evidence of these sales or income has been presented before the undersigned in this de novo proceeding. See, Section 120.58(1), F.S. Petitioner has not directly paid wages during the tax years at issue. Petitioner has not produced any federal partnership tax returns nor other persuasive proof to account for the return on its investments through partnership channels. During the tax years at issue, Petitioner was not a member of a Florida cooperative, as that term, "cooperative," is used in Section 214.71(3)(a)2, F.S. (See Finding of Fact 15). Petitioner was unable, by evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, to establish that all amounts other than the percentages of gross income Petitioner had assigned by either of the alternative accounting methods was generated outside of the State of Florida. In so finding, the undersigned specifically rejects Petitioner's assertion that the initial audit report of June 1983 could, by itself alone, legally or factually establish that only the orange grove income was Florida income, that Petitioner's Florida income was solely from the orange grove, that the interest, dividends, and gains on securities sales were not derived in Florida, that the Petitioner taxpayer received rent income from partnerships, that the partnership real estate which gave rise to the rent income was 100% outside Florida, or that the Respondent's initial audit "verified" the figures needed to compute the sales factor, the figures for the property factor, and the figures for the payroll factor of the "apportionment" method for the following reasons: In addition to the first auditor's report being free-form agency action which was ultimately rejected by the agency, and in addition to the failure of either the first auditor or his supervisor to testify in the instant Section 120.57(1) de novo proceeding as to the accuracy of the underlying primary documentation which Petitioner Murray Kramer claimed the first auditor had apparently reviewed, Petitioner did not offer in evidence at formal hearing any such direct evidence documentation which it claimed had been reviewed by the auditors. Further, Respondent's successive auditor, Mr. Siska, testified that it is auditor practice to only examine those books and records individual auditors believe to be necessary to complete the audit. This discretionary element eliminates any guarantee of what the initial auditor relied upon. For the same reasons, Petitioner's assertion that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit of its books and records for the year 1979 "verifies" that the Petitioner's books and records accurately reflect the transactions that took place, is rejected. Petitioner Murray Kramer had admitted a letter (P-10) notifying the corporation that the IRS' "examination of ... tax returns for the above periods shows no change as required in the tax reported. The returns are accepted as filed." The tax period indicated on this exhibit is "7912", which is not helpful, and even if it means, as Mr. Weiss testified, that the 1979 federal tax return which is part of the Florida Corporate Tax Return is accurate under federal law, this IRS letter alone does not verify all the underlying documentation for all three years in question. Also, specifically with regard to investments made through other entities, Mr. Weiss' testimony suggests that the wages paid and partnership returns of these other entities never were in the possession of, nor accessible by, this Petitioner. Petitioner's reliance on its federal returns is apparently based, in part, at least, upon its assertion that it is a "financial institution" as defined in Sections 214.71(3)(b) and 220.15(2), F.S., but the presentation quality of evidence in this case does not permit of such a finding, either. Petitioner has paid no portion of the assessed taxes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order which dismisses the Petition and affirms the assessment. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4100 The following constitute rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 6. Accepted. 2, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19. Rejected for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue for the reasons set forth in the Recommended Order. With regard to item 8, specifically, this determination is non-binding in the de novo proceeding. 4. Rejected upon the citation given as not proved or applicable as stated. 13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as not proved or applicable as stated. See Conclusions of Law 11-12. 15, 18. Rejected as out of context and misleading upon the record as a whole, and as not dispositive of any material issue, and as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Respondent's PFOF: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18. Accepted. 4, 5. Accepted in part; what is not adopted is subordinate or unnecessary to the facts as found. 17. Accepted, but by itself is not dispositive of any material issue at bar, for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 686 Hampstead Avenue West Hampstead, New York 11552 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Sharon A. Zahner, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Room 204, Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 William D. Townsend, Esquire General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Katie D. Tucker, Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 3091 North Course Drive Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 =================================================================
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent failed to file surcharge tax reports and to remit surcharge tax in the amount of $55,478.84 for the audit period January 1, 1994, through July 28, 1999; (b) whether Respondent failed to file surcharge tax reports from August 1, 1999, and continuing to the present; (c) whether Respondent failed to pay penalties and interest in the amount of $29,325.62 for the period beginning August 1, 1999, through December 31, 1999; and, if so, (d) whether Petitioner should revoke Respondent's alcoholic beverage license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing regulations related to alcoholic beverage licenses in Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed to sell alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises of its establishment in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent held License No. 26-0058. Alcoholic beverage licensees may elect one of two ways to calculate and pay the required surcharge tax on alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises. First, the licensee may calculate, report, and pay the tax using the "sales method" based on retail sales records. Second, the licensee may calculate, report, and pay the tax using the "purchase method" based on wholesale records such as invoices from wholesale distributors. In this case, Respondent elected to calculate, report, and pay its surcharge tax using the "purchase method." Licensees who are authorized to sell alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises are required to submit surcharge tax reports and to pay the tax for each month by the 15th day of the following month. Respondent submitted reports and paid the tax for the months of January and February 1999. The next time that Respondent submitted a report and paid the tax was for the month of November 1999. For a licensee who uses the "purchase method," Petitioner conducts an audit by comparing the licensee's sales history and payment history. The sales history is based on invoices for the purchase of alcoholic beverages from wholesale distributors who report their sales to each licensee every month. The payment history is based on the monthly surcharge tax reports filed by the licensee. Petitioner conducted a surcharge tax audit of Respondent's business for the period beginning January 1, 1994, and ending July 28, 1999. The audit began on August 1, 1999, and ended on August 17, 1999. The audit established that Respondent owed $31,809.72 in surcharge tax, penalties, and interest for the audit period. The Final Surcharge Audit Report established that Respondent would owe $55,478.84 in surcharge tax, penalties, and interest if Respondent did not pay the former amount within 30 days. Respondent did not make the required payment. Petitioner conducted a periodic surcharge tax audit for the period beginning on August 1, 1999, and ending on December 31, 2001. The audit was conducted on April 30, 2002, and ended on June 4, 2002. The second audit established that Respondent owed an additional statutory tax, penalties, and interest in the amount of $29,325.62. Respondent's corporate representative testified that Respondent stopped filing the surcharge tax reports after the initial audit because there was a discrepancy between Respondent's records (invoices for alcoholic beverages purchased and delivered) and the records that Petitioner relied upon to conduct the audit (wholesale distributors' invoices for alcoholic beverages sold to Respondent). Respondent did not present any documentation to support this testimony, which is not credited. Additionally, there is no competent evidence that Respondent's auditor advised Respondent to stop filing the reports until the discrepancy was resolved. Respondent's corporate representative also testified that Respondent gave away some alcoholic beverages to customers. According to the corporate representative, this occurred when Respondent charged the customers one fee at the door and allowed them to drink free of charge. Respondent did not present any documentation to support this testimony, which is not credited. Finally, the corporate representative agreed that Respondent owed the assessed surcharge tax. However, he objected to paying the statutorily assessed penalties and interest because they were more than Respondent would have owed if it had paid the tax when it was due. Respondent's argument in this regard is without merit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent owes $84,804.46 in tax, interest, and penalties and revoking its license to sell alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Sherrie Barnes, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Captain Cynthia C. Britt Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway Suite 600 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Charles E. Scantling Corporate Representative Wackos, Inc., d/b/a Wackos 3484 Charmont Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32277 Peter Williams, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts relevant to the issues in dispute are found: On March 8, 1981, the petitioner provided notice of the administrative hearing which commenced on March 25, 1981, by placing a notice on the doorknob of each resident of Century Village. Customers not residing within Century Village and commercial customers were mailed notice of the hearing on the same date. A newspaper notice of the March 25, 1981 hearing appeared on March 18, 1981. Quality of Service There are approximately 7,700 utility meters in Century Village and there has been minimal growth within the utility since the 1979 test year. Sixteen customers of the petitioner testified at the hearing. Their testimony included objections to the sufficiency of the notice they received of this rate case proceeding, the requested rate increases, the taste and smell of the water, the mineral deposits in the water, the odor from the sewage treatment plant, the billing procedures employed by the petitioner and the manner of petitioner's responses to customer inquiries and complaints. The petitioner's billing cycle is not constant. On some occasions, the bill covers a period of twenty-eight days and, on other occasions, a billing cycle of thirty-five days is used. Many customers have installed, at their own cost, water filters to alleviate the objectionable smell, taste and mineral deposits in their water. Some customers testified that their cooking pots and pans had become blackened and pitted from the mineral deposits and sediments in the water. Several customers also complained of low water pressure in their homes. None of the testifying witnesses had consulted the local health department as to the quality of the water received from petitioner. At the time of the hearing, there were no outstanding complaints against petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission's Consumer Affairs Department. Previous complaints had been resolved in a timely fashion. The petitioner's water and sewer operations presently comply with all applicable State regulatory standards for water and sewer service. There are no citations or corrective orders pending against the petitioner's water and sewer systems. Petitioner is operating under a negotiated consent order which requires it to connect its sewer system to the regional system when said system becomes available. There was evidence that this connection to the County system will result in an increased sewer charge. The County will send one monthly bill to the petitioner and the petitioner will then bill the individual customers. The bulk rate charge was speculative at the time of the hearing. Pursuant to an agreement between the County and the petitioner, the petitioner will be required to maintain its sewage treatment plant on a standby basis after it connects to the County system. Rate Base. I. Gross Plant in Service This being the petitioner's first rate increase application, no prior amount of utility plant in service for either the petitioner's water or sewer system has been established or approved by the PSC. The petitioner alleges that its utility plant in service is $2,401,436 for water and $2,711,697 for sewer, for a total gross plant in service of $5,113,133. An officer of petitioner who is a certified public accountant testified that this figure is supported by the books and records of the petitioner. The PSC staff engineer, Jim Shoptaw, attempted to verify the petitioner's alleged original cost of plant. Several methods of determining original cost are utilized by the PSC. Though not formalized by rule, the methods used to substantiate the original cost of a utility system, in order of PSC preference, are as follows: an engineer's original cost study, a review of the contracts let for individual utility construction projects and a review of invoices for materials purchased. The invoicing method of establishing original costs is considered least effective because there is no way to verify that the materials purchased were actually placed or used for the water and sewer systems. When these three methods are not available, as built drawings or plans can be utilized to determine the amount and type of materials in the ground and a unit cost study can then be performed. In this case, the petitioner did not have either an engineer's original cost study or copies of the construction contracts. The maps or prints submitted by petitioner to the PSC staff were not accurate or complete. Mr. Shoptaw thus made an on-site inspection, with advanced notice, and was provided several boxes of invoices which were not organized in a systematic manner. A review of invoices allowed Mr. Shoptaw to verify only 39 percent of what petitioner claimed in its application as the amount of plant in service. Petitioner was then requested to supply respondent with a unit cost breakdown and the amount of pipe placed in service each year. A given year was not provided by the petitioner. After calculating the length and cost of pipe utilized, Mr. Shoptaw "trended" the costs and eventually determined that the petitioner's application had overstated the water system plant by approximately $107,000 and the sewer system plant by some $147,000. The unit cost information supplied to Mr. Shoptaw by the petitioner was based upon data collected from water and sewer installations in single- family residential communities. This was a result of a misunderstanding by petitioner's employees as to what information Mr. Shoptaw desired. The "trending" and reasonableness study performed by Mr. Shoptaw was also based primarily upon a comparison with utilities serving single-family areas. There are major differences between the costs of constructing multiple-family and single-family utility distribution systems. High density housing requires larger pipes run for shorter distances and a greater number of valves, manholes, connections and other materials due to the greater number of connections per mile. There are also road and construction problems and expenses in a multifamily complex not found in an area with single-family dwellings. It is considerably more expensive per linear foot to build in a high density area such as Century Village than in an area containing single-family dwellings. Approximately three weeks prior to the commencement of the hearing in this case, the staff of the PSC was provided with additional boxes of invoices to further document the petitioner's gross plant in service. When combined with those already submitted, the additional invoices substantiated 58 percent of the claimed plant in service. Mr. Shoptaw felt that use of the invoices was not compatible with his then completed trending methodology, that the additional invoices arrived too close in time to the hearing to be of assistance and that 58 percent of documented costs was not a large enough sample from which to determine the original cost of the entire system. Mr. Shoptaw expended approximately 500 hours preparing his report in this proceeding. A reasonable amount of time to be spent on a utility of this size with good record-keeping practices would be approximately 200 hours. There is some confusion in the record as to whether the PSC staff twice removed the same items from the petitioner's claimed gross plant in service as a result of the different surveys performed by Mr. Shoptaw and the PSC's accounting staff. (T. 998-1000). This issue was never clarified during the hearing. Rate Base. II. Accumulated Depreciation. Through the end of the 1979 test year, the petitioner utilized an annual depreciation rate of approximately 6 percent on its gross water and sewer plants. During the course of preliminary discussions with the PSC staff, petitioner agreed to adopt a depreciation rate of 2.5 percent per annum for these assets. The 2.5 percent annual depreciation rate is based upon the premise that petitioner's water and sewer facilities have a service life of 40 years rather than the 16.7 year life originally applied. The issue in dispute regarding this stipulated change in the annual rate of depreciation is whether the 2.5 percent rate should be applied retroactively to the year of inception or whether it should be applied to the future only. The construction of the petitioner's water and sewer systems began in 1969. Neither the petitioner's original decision to fix the useful life of the water and sewer systems at 16.7 years nor the PSC staff's decision to fix their lives at 40 years was based upon an engineer's expert opinion after a physical inspection of the assets. There have been no significant physical changes in the assets since their installation. Under generally accepted accounting principles, different treatment is prescribed for the "correction of an error in previously issued financial statements" and a "change in accounting estimate." The "correction of an error" treatment requires a restatement or a retroactive application. This treatment is accorded errors resulting from "mathematical mistakes, mistakes in the application of accounting principles, or oversight or misuse of facts that existed at the time the financial state- ments were prepared." A "change in accounting estimate" does not require a restatement or retroactive treatment and results from "new information or subsequent developments and accordingly from better insight or improved judgment." APB Opinion No. 20, paragraph .13. The service life or salvage value of a depreciable asset is an example of the estimate required in the preparation of a financial statement. APB Opinion No. 20, paragraph .10. Were petitioner permitted to retroactively apply the new 2.5 percent depreciation rate to 1969, the date construction of the water and sewer systems began, a possible result would be the utility's double recovery of depreciation expense through its rates. The impact upon the utility of not making a retroactive adjustment of the 2.5 percent depreciation rate would be to reduce rate base by some one million dollars per year and thus substantially reduce the petitioner's cash flow. Rate Base. III. Contributions-in-aid-of-construction (CIAC) Petitioner's water and sewer tariffs on file with and approved by the PSC in 1970 include copies of a schedule of tapping fees and three developer agreements. The developer agreement between petitioner and Century Village, Inc. entered into on November 1, 1968, defines CIAC and denotes the developer's responsibility to pay CIAC for the petitioner's water and sewer systems. Other developer agreements between Century Village, Inc. and secondary developers were also discovered which make reference to the agreement between petitioner and Century Village, Inc. The PSC staff seeks to impute as CIAC over two million dollars as a result of the developer agreements and the tapping fee schedule. If this amount were imputed as CIAC, the petitioner would have a zero rate base and recover through its rates only operation and maintenance expenses and taxes. According to petitioner's president, neither the tapping fees on file with the PSC nor CIAC pursuant to the developer agreements were collected by the petitioner since he assumed the presidency in 1970. The amounts which are claimed as CIAC by the petitioner were collected prior to the time Mr. Christopher became the petitioner's president. Those portions of the developer agreements regarding CIAC were not carried out because petitioner desired to build a rate base. The petitioner's overall policy of not accepting CIAC was reflected in a letter dated May 8, 1972 by petitioner to the PSC in response to PSC Order No. 5403 which required petitioner and other regulated utilities to file a service availability policy with the PSC. Other than this May 8, 1972 letter, petitioner has made no other attempt to revise the tariffs filed with the PSC with respect to the developer agreements or the tapping fees. Auditors from the PSC staff were unable to find any evidence from the books, records or tax returns of the petitioner that tapping fees or other CIAC were ever collected by petitioner other than as reported by petitioner in this case. No significant investments were written off as cost of goods sold for tax purposes. Capital Structure and Rate of Return During the test year, petitioner's actual capital structure was comprised of 85 percent debt due to outstanding loans held by affiliated companies. The capital structure of the parent company, Cenvill Communities, Inc., during the test year was approximately 41 percent common equity, 55 percent long-term debt and 4 percent deferred taxes. For this rate application, the respondent PSC used the capital structure of the parent company in its cost of capital calculations. Subsequent to filing the rate increase application, the petitioner recapitalized its capital structure so that its debt-equity ratio approximately matched the debt-equity ratio of the parent company. Utilizing various methodologies, including an analysis of average bond yields, a discounted cash flow study, a trend line analysis and an added risk premium, petitioner has computed a range of fair return on equity at between 18.96 percent and 21.13 percent, for an average fair return of 20 percent. Using a ten-year time period, a discounted cash flow methodology and a regression analysis, the PSC staff computed a cost of equity of 16.25 percent, with a range of between 15.25 percent and 17.25 percent. Petitioner originally requested an overall rate of return of 12.83 percent. This figure was changed during the hearing to 10.38 percent. The PSC staff has computed an overall rate of return of 12.11 percent. Income Taxes Petitioner has elected to participate in the consolidated income tax return filed by its parent, Cenvill Communities, Inc. The parent routinely assesses a 46 percent rate on all its subsidiaries having a positive taxable income for the tax year. The petitioner and the PSC staff are in agreement that an appropriate federal income tax rate for petitioner is 46 percent, and an appropriate state income tax rate is 2.7 percent. The Office of Public Counsel presented testimony to the effect that a 46 percent federal income tax rate is excessive because it reflects a greater percentage tax rate than the actual consolidated tax rate. It was argued that the effective tax rate for petitioner during the 1979 test year was 21.06 percent. Unusual capital gain transactions did occur during the test year. Other Operating Expenses and Undisputed Items Petitioner had a contract which called for a meter-reading payment of 25 or 30 cents per meter. The average meter reading expense, including transportation, for the South Florida area is 17 cents per meter. Meters may be read very quickly in Century Village because of its high population density. With each building having approximately 25 meters, one could easily read 75 to 100 meters an hour. A witness presented by the intervenor Ruchlis examined petitioner's books and concluded that there was insufficient data and supporting documents to validate some of the salary and operating expenses claimed by the petitioner. The PSC staff apparently recognized this deficiency and interviewed some of the employees to determine how much of their time was actually allocated to the petitioner. It was agreed between petitioner and the PSC staff that $25,000 should be deducted from petitioner's claimed salary expenses. For the purposes of this proceeding, petitioner's working capital needs are zero. The total amount of rate case expenses for this proceeding is $35,000, to be amortized over a five year period and allocated on a 50-50 basis between the water and sewer operations. The base facility charge concept is fair to all customers and should be employed as petitioner's rate structure.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the issues in dispute in this proceeding be resolved as follows: that the quality of water and sewer service provided by petitioner to its customers be found satisfactory; that the trending methodology utilized by Mr. Shoptaw in determining the petitioner's original cost investment in plant in service be approved, with the condition that a determination first be made as to whether certain items were deducted twice from petitioner's claimed amount of gross plant in service; that the 6 percent accumulated depreciation rate be applied from 1969 through the 1979 test year and the 2.5 percent rate be applied from that date forward; that the claimed amounts of $111,612 for the water system and $554,813 for the sewer system be approved as the appropriate amounts of contributions-in- aid-of-construction; that the appropriate capital structure for petitioner include a 40 percent equity ratio; that a fair rate of return on equity capital is 16.25 percent; that an appropriate federal income tax rate for petitioner is 46 percent; that a meter reading expense of 17 cents per meter is reasonable and appropriate; by petitioner be reduced by $25,000; that petitioner's working capital needs are zero; that an appropriate amount of rate case expense is $35,000 to be amortized over a five-year period and allocated equally between the water and sewer operations; and that petitioner's rate structure utilize the base facility charge concept. Respectfully submitted and entered this 16th day of November, 1981. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1981.
Findings Of Fact FMCC is a corporation organized and existing under Delaware law. FMCC maintains its principal place of business in Dearborn, Michigan. FMCC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ford Motor Company. FMCC qualified and is authorized to do business in the State of Florida pursuant to the foreign corporation provisions of Chapter 607, Florida Statutes, and has continuously maintained a registered office and agent in this state during the audit years at issue. During the tax years 1980-1982, inclusive, FMCC and Ford filed corporate tax returns in Florida and paid the taxes due thereon under the Florida Income Tax Code; FMCC maintained 7 to 8 branch offices and employed approximately 200 people in Florida; and Ford had contractual relationships with approximately 130 to 150 authorized Ford dealers in Florida. A copy of a representative agreement between Ford and the dealers is Exhibit 3 to this Stipulation. FMCC's principal business is financing the wholesale and retail sales of vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company. During the audit period FMCC provided financing for the purchase of vehicles as authorized by Ford dealers from Ford Motor Company. FMCC also: provided financing for the purchase of automobiles by the public from the dealers; and engaged in commercial, industrial and real estate financing, consumer loan financing, and leasing company financing in the State of Florida as well as other states. Attached as Composite Exhibit 4 are sample documents utilized by FMCC in the above financing. The majority of the intangibles in question are accounts receivables held by FMCC and owned by Florida debtors in connection with the purchase of tangible personal property shipped to or located in the State of Florida. FMCC is the holder of security agreements executed by thousands of Florida debtors. These security agreements gave FMCC a lien on tangible personal property located in the State of Florida. The Florida Secretary of State's Office was utilized by FMCC during the assessment period to perfect and protect its liens created under these security agreements with Florida debtors by the filing of U.C.C. financing statements. None of the original notes are stored in Florida. During the assessment period, FMCC utilized or could have utilized the Florida Courts to recover sums due by Florida debtors on delinquent accounts receivable. In addition, FMCC utilizes the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to perfect its liens on motor vehicles pursuant to Chapter 319, Florida Statutes. In 1983, the Department conducted an audit of the FMCC intangible tax returns for tax years 1980 through 1982, inclusive. On June 3, 1983, the Department proposed an assessment of tax, penalty and interest in the total amount of $2,560,379.00. See Exhibit 5. FMCC filed a timely protest. On October 8, 1984, the Department issued a Notice of Decision. See Exhibit 2. On December 12, 1984, the Department acknowledged receipt of FMCC's timely November 8, 1984 Petition for Reconsideration. On February 18, 1985, the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration. See Exhibit 6. FMCC elected to file a Petition for Formal Proceedings, which was received on April 8, 1985. On the basis of the revised audit report, the Department of Revenue imposed the intangible tax on FMCC for the tax years 1980 through 1982, inclusive, in the following categories, and in the taxable amounts listed as follows: 1/1/80 1/1/81 1/1/82 Commercial Finance Receivables-- $342,892,615 $403,061,571 $486,412,164 Retail Commercial Finance Receivables-- 218,591,180 241,993,462 228,303,569 Wholesale Simple Interest Lease Receivables-- 66,345,902 75,978,095 71,315,777 Retail Lease Finance Receivables N/A N/A N/A Capital Loan Receivables 3,112,877 2,064,698 2,419,770 Consumer Loan Receivables 10,144,531 14,122,666 18,578,699 Service Equipment Financing--Dealer I.D. 481,869 368,186 422,108 Receivables Ford Rent-A-Car Receivables 27,825,283 26,179,377 20,362,896 Ford Parts & Service Receivables -0- 10,499,401 10,800,313 (10) Accounts Receivables--Customers & Others 3,452,194 4,581,629 4,952,234 (11) Accounts Receivables--Affiliate 1,617,880 2,914,094 4,438,849 (12) C.I.R. Receivables 23,243,257 27,387,938 24,222,621 TOTAL FLORIDA RECEIVABLES------ 697,707,588 809,151,117 872,229,000 TAX AT 1 MILL---- 697,708 809,151 872,229 LESS ORIGINAL TAX PAYMENT------ 312,703 351,976 339,142 LESS PETITION PAYMENT ON AGREED CATEGORIES------ 51,069 53,567 44,586 TOTAL REMAINING TAX ASSESSED------ $333,936 $403,608 $488,501 TOTAL TAX FOR ALL YEARS----- $1,226,045 REVISED ASSESSMENT FIGURES DOES NOT INCLUDE $1,386.18 OF THE PETITION PAYMENT At the time it filed its petition for a formal hearing, FMCC agreed to and paid the 1 mill tax, but no interest or penalty, on the following amounts. The taxability of these items is no longer in dispute, only penalty and interest. 1980 1981 1982 (8) Ford Rent-A-Car 27,825,283 26,179,377 20,362,896 Receivables (12) CIR 23,243,257 27,387,938 24,222,621 Receivables Capital Loan Receivables (item 5 of paragraph 11) reflect amounts of money owed by Ford dealers to FMCC. The obligation arises from loans made to Ford dealers located in Florida to expand showroom or other facilities and for working capital. The items located as (10) Accounts Receivable - Customers and Others and (11) Accounts Receivables - Affiliates in paragraph 11 reflect only the amount of accrued interest to which FMCC is entitled on notes from non-affiliates and affiliates, respectively, from the last settlement date prior to year end until the end of each respective year. The principal amounts owed on these notes, which are not secured by realty, are included in other categories. The Department does not assess a tax for similar interest when the amount owed is secured by realty. Wholesale and retail intangibles were created and handled in 1980, 1981 and 1982 by FMCC in the manner set forth in Exhibit 7. The Department of Revenue has imposed penalties in the amount of $543,968 composed of $330,051 as the 25% delinquent penalty imposed pursuant to Fla. Stat. Section 199.052(9)(a) (1983), and $15,886 as the 15% undervalued Property penalty imposed pursuant to Section 199.052(9)(d)(1983), Florida Statutes. The Department offered abatement of the 15% omission penalty ($198,031) imposed pursuant to Fla. Stat. Section 199.052(9)(c) (1983). The closing agreement required pursuant to Fla. Stat. Section 213.21 reflecting this reduction of penalty was not signed by petitioner. FMCC's intangible tax returns have been audited on prior occasions. The manner of reporting was identical to the manner in which FMCC reported its intangibles for tax years 1980 through 1982. The 1973-1975 and the 1976-1978 audits were "no change" audits. FMCC's method of reporting receivables generated from Florida sales was challenged by the Department of Revenue. The challenge was dropped because the Department of Revenue did not have the statutory authority to assess sales of tangible personal property with an f.o.b. point other than Florida. Chapter 77-43, Laws of Florida amended Section 199.112, Fla. Stat. to allow tangible personal property (sic) [to be taxed] regardless of the f.o.b. point of sale. This amendment applied to the January 1, 1978 taxable year. There was a 1978-1980 "no change" audit. Ford Motor Company has filed refund claims for certain categories for the tax year 1981 and 1982. Ford Motor Company claims that it inadvertently paid intangible tax on accounts receivable owned by FMCC. As presented in the Notice of Decision, no refund will be made as it will be handled as a credit against taxes due by Ford Motor Company. While not an announced policy, the Department of Revenue drafted and utilized proposed rules relating to compromising penalties. These rules are not final. Attached as Exhibit 8 are the proposed rules. A copy of these rules was provided to Petitioner by letter dated July 28, 1986. In addition, while not an announced policy the Department of Revenue utilized guidelines established by the Internal Revenue Service and federal court for compromising penalties.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Florida Welding Services Corp., is a Florida corporation doing business in the State of Florida. The Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue, is the agency charged with enforcing the taxing statutes of this State, including the Florida Income Tax Code, Chapter 220, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Chapter 220, Florida Statutes, the Petitioner is required to file a Florida Corporate Income Tax Return annually with the Respondent. The Return is due on the first day of the fourth month after the close of the tax year. The Petitioner's tax year for 1977 was April 1, 1976, through March 31, 1977. The Florida Corporation Income Tax Return for the 1977 tax year was due on July 1, 1977, and the Petitioner failed to file its Return by this date. The Petitioner's tax year for 1978 was April 1, 1977, through March 31, 1978. The Florida Corporation Income Tax Return for the 1978 tax year was due on July 1, 1978, and the Petitioner failed to file its Return by this date. In January 1977, all of the Petitioner's corporate records were seized, pursuant to a subpoena issued in the United States Federal District Court in and for the Southern District of Florida. (See Exhibit 1) The Petitioner's records were not returned to it for over a year. On September 15, 1978, the Petitioner filed a Tentative Income Tax Return and Application for Extension of Time to File Income Tax Return, wherein Petitioner requested an extension of time until November 15, 1978, in which to file its Florida income tax return for the 1977 and 1978 tax years. (See Exhibit 2) On October 5, 1978, the Department of Revenue denied the Petitioner's request for an extension of time on grounds that the request had been filed after the respective due dates of July 1, 1977, and July 1, 1978. (See Exhibit 2) On November 16, 1978, the Department of Revenue received Petitioner's Florida Corporation Income Tax Returns for the tax years 1977 and 1978. The Petitioner also remitted the tax it believed owing for each taxable year, $3,734.96 for 1977 and $6,803.56 for 1978. On February 2, 1979, the Department of Revenue, Corporate Income Tax Bureau, issued a Delinquent Notice of Tax Due to the Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the Petitioner had a balance due of $1,547.28 for the tax year ending March 31, 1977, which amount represented $933.74 penalty and $613.54 interest. (See Exhibit 3) On February 5, 1979, the Department of Revenue, Corporate Income Tax Bureau, issued a Delinquent Notice of Tax Due to the Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the Petitioner had a balance due of $1,986.43 for the tax year ending March 31, 1978, which amount represented $1,700.89 penalty and $285.54 interest. (See Exhibit 4) On March 15, 1979, Mr. Karl J. Leib, Jr., contacted the Department of Revenue on behalf of his client, the' Petitioner, requesting the Department to delay in issuing any tax warrants against the Petitioner until Mr. Leib had an opportunity to communicate with someone from the Department. (See Exhibit 5) A follow-up letter was sent by Mr. Leib to the Department on June 8, 1979. (See Exhibit 6) On April, 23, 1980, the Department of Revenue issued to the Petitioner a Final Notice and Demand for payment in the amount of $1,547.28. (See Exhibit 7) Although no Final Notice and Demand for payment in the amount of $1,986.43 was issued by the Department, the amount is still outstanding and the Department maintains that Petitioner owes this sum as well. It is the Petitioner's position that its inability to timely file its Florida Corporate Income Tax Returns was entirely due to factors beyond its control, i.e., the confiscation of its corporate records. The Petitioner maintains that it should not be assessed penalty and interest for late filing, as its failure to timely file was "due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect," as is provided for in Section 214.40(1), Florida Statutes. The Department's position is twofold. First, the Petitioner's failure to make a timely request for extension of time in which to file its return does constitute willful neglect. Second, that while Section 214.40(1), Florida Statutes, may provide the Department with some discretion in assessing penalties, there is no comparable provision for modifying interest payments and such amount is absolutely mandated by the statute for any late filed returns. In addition to the foregoing, along with the attached Exhibits, the undersigned hereby incorporate by reference and jointly offer as evidence those Exhibits attached to Petitioner's Request for Formal Proceedings. WHEREFORE, both parties respectfully request the Hearing Officer to consider the foregoing facts and exhibits, along with a Memoranda of Law to be filed by each party within 10 days of the filing of this Joint Stipulation, and to issue his Recommended Order, without the necessity of holding a formal hearing.
The Issue Whether Petitioner ("DEPARTMENT") is entitled to assess sales or use taxes, penalties, and interest against Respondent ("VOLPE") pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set out in its Notice of Proposed Assessment dated March 20, 1980.
Findings Of Fact During 1975-1977, VOLPE was a general contractor engaged in the construction of a United States Post Office and Vehicle Maintenance Facility at Miami, Florida. In connection with that construction project, VOLPE purchased materials from numerous subcontractors, including Hardware Lighting and Emporium, and Jemco, Inc. (Testimony of Alford, Danca; P.E. 2, 3) On March 8, 1979, after audit of VOLPE's records, the DEPARTMENT proposed to assess VOLPE for delinquent sales and use tax, together with interest and penalties thereon, which it claimed were due from VOLPE's purchase of materials from various subcontractors. The DEPARTMENT's proposed assessment was based on its inability to verify, to its satisfaction, that sales and use tax due from those sales transactions was paid by VOLPE to the vendors, and subsequently remitted to the DEPARTMENT. (Testimony of Alford, P.E. 3.) With the DEPARTMENT's encouragement, VOLPE then wrote its vendors in the various sales transactions requesting proof that the requisite Florida sales or use tax had been remitted to the DEPARTMENT. In response, two vendors, Ohio Medical Products and Power Wash, remitted tax vendors, (collected from VOLPE at time of sale) to the DEPARTMENT, in the amounts of $10,070 and $1,635.50, respectively. In addition, VOLPE discovered that it had not paid the requisite tax to a vendor in one transaction and remitted a payment to the DEPARTMENT in the amount of $1,442.53. (Testimony of Danca, Alford, P.E. 1.) These late tax payments made by Ohio Medical Products, Power Wash, and VOLPE in partial satisfaction of the DEPARTMENT's March 8, 1979, proposed assessment consisted only of the tax due on the individual sales, including interest thereon. No penalty payments were made because Salvatore Danca, VOLPE's comptroller involved in collecting the sales tax from the various vendors, reasonably and in good faith believed that the DEPARTMENT would waive penalties if late tax payments were promptly submitted. Although Louis A. Crocco, the DEPARTMENT's representative, by affidavit denies making such a representation, he admits that the possibility of adjusting the penalties, otherwise due, was discussed with Danca. In the absence of more explicit evidence from the DEPARTMENT concerning those discussions, or attacking the credibility of Danca's testimony, it is determined that, based on discussions with DEPARTMENT representatives, Danca reasonably and in good faith believed penalties would be waived. (Testimony of Danca; P.E. 1, 6, R.E. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.) As a result of partial payments and adjustments made to the DEPARTMENT's proposed sales and use tax assessment, the DEPARTMENT issued a fourth revision of the proposed assessment on March 20, 1980. By that revision, the DEPARTMENT asserts VOLPE, as of March 20, 1980, is liable for payment of tax, interest, and penalties as follows: Sales Transaction Sales And Use Tax Due Interest Penalties (25 Percent) Jemco, Inc., sale of mechanization equipment to VOLPE, per agreement dated December 5, 1975. $16,229.53 $4,047.88 Hardware, Lighting and Emporium, sale of finished hardware and accessories to VOLPE per VOLPE Purchase Order dated October 2, 1975. 1,556.10 389.02 Ohio Medical Products' Power Wash's, and unidenti- fied vendor's sale to VOLPE for which late payments of tax due and interest have been made. -0- 2,737.43 TOTAL: $17,856.10 $5,779.42 $7,174.33 (Testimony of Alford, Danca, 3.) Stipulation of Counsel; P.E. 1, 2, [AS TO JEMCO, INC./VOLPE TRANSACTION] By its standard Agreement dated December 5, 1975, VOLPE agreed to purchase from Jemco, Inc., of Fort Worth, Texas, post office mechanization equipment for the contract price of $347,900. Subsequent change orders resulted in an adjustment to $405,689.70. In order to minimize on-site installation problems, Jemco, Inc., was required to maximize assembly of the mechanization equipment at its out-of-state plant prior to shipping to the Miami job site. (Testimony of Danca; P.E. 2, R.E. 1.) The written sales Agreement, including attachments, between Jemco, Inc., and VOLPE expressly states, in three separate places, that the total contract sales price includes Florida sales tax. The DEPARTMENT admits that VOLPE has paid all monies due Jemco, Inc., under the contract. By virtue of its full payment of the contract price which expressly included sales tax, it must be concluded that VOLPE paid the requisite sales or use tax to Jemco, Inc. (Stipulation of Counsel; P.E. 2.) VOLPE's standard form, entitled "Subcontractor's Application for Payment" was used as a basis to make incremental payments to Jemco, Inc., pursuant to the Agreement. That form required the subcontractor to certify that, among other things, it had complied with state tax laws applicable to performance of the Agreement. (Testimony of Danca; R.E. 11.) VOLPE's actions in connection with the Jemco, Inc., sales transaction were consistent with its standard practice when entering contracts with vendors or subcontractors. That practice is to require that the sales price include the payment of necessary sales tax, the vendor or subcontractor is required to remit the required tax to the appropriate government entity. After performance of the contract, the subcontractor is required to certify that these requirements have been satisfied. The certification is in the form of a General Release which discharges VOLPE from all claims, debts and liabilities which the subcontractor may have against VOLPE because of the contract. In this case, Jemco, Inc., executed such a General Release in favor of VOLPE. (Testimony of Danca; R.E. 1.) The DEPARTMENT has not audited Jemco, Inc.'s records, thus, it does not know whether the tax it seeks to assess against VOLPE has already been remitted by Jemco, Inc. (Testimony of Alford.) The DEPARTMENT offered no affirmative evidence to contravene VOLPE's assertion that it had paid the requisite sales or use tax to Jemco, Inc. Its claim rests solely on the fact that VOLPE's evidence of payment does not contain a sales invoice or other documentation which itemizes, or separately states the amount of sales tax due from VOLPE. [AS TO HARDWARE AND LIGHTING EMPORIUM TRANSACTION] By purchase agreement dated October 2, 1975, VOLPE agreed to purchase finished hardware from Hardware and Lighting Emporium of Miami, Florida, for the contract price of $23,877, which expressly included Florida state sales tax. Each billing invoice issued by Hardware and Lighting Emporium separately itemizes and states the Florida sales tax due. In applying for payment under the agreement, Hardware and Lighting Emporium completed the VOLPE "Subcontractor's Application for Payment" forms certifying compliance with state sales tax laws in performing the agreement. VOLPE has fully satisfied its payment obligations under the purchase agreement. (Testimony of Danca; P.E. 3, R.E. 9, 10.)
Conclusions Conclusions: VOLPE established by a preponderance of evidence that it previously paid to its several vendors the sales and use tax which the DEPARTMENT now seeks. Accordingly, the proposed tax assessment, with penalties and interest thereon, cannot be sustained. Recommendation: That the DEPARTMENT's Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties, and Interest, under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, dated March 20, 1980, be DISMISSED. Background By written notice issued on March 20, 1980, Petitioner ("DEPARTMENT") proposed to assess Respondent ("VOLPE") taxes, penalties, and interest allegedly due pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In response, VOLPE claimed that it had previously paid the tax in question, and requested an opportunity to submit proof at a formal hearing. On April 17, 1980, the DEPARTMENT forwarded VOLPE's request to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and asked that the requested hearing be conducted by a hearing officer. On May 15, 1980, final hearing was set for July 18, 1980. On June 17, 1980, the DEPARTMENT filed a motion to realign the parties. As grounds, it stated that VOLPE had the burden of proof, and the duty to present a prima facie case at hearing since VOLPE requested the hearing and was the party seeking relief. At the DEPARTMENT's request, ruling on its motion was withheld until presentation of arguments at final hearing. At hearing, the DEPARTMENT's motion was denied for the reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law below. In support of its proposed assessment against VOLPE, the DEPARTMENT called Marvin P. Alford, a tax examiner, as its only witness, and offered Petitioner's Exhibits 1/ 1 through 6, inclusive, each of which was received into evidence. VOLPE called Salvatore Danca, its comptroller, and Harold G. Gregory, its branch manager, as its witnesses, and offered Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 11, inclusive, each of which was received. At the conclusion of hearing, the parties were granted the opportunity to submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and memoranda within ten (10) days after filing of the transcript of hearing. The post-hearing submittals were filed by August 21, 1980. Based on the evidence submitted at hearing, the following facts are determined:
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the DEPARTMENT's Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties, and Interest, Under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, dated March 20, 1980, be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of September, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1980.
