The Issue The issue to be resolved concerns whether the Petitioner was the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to rent an apartment from the Respondents, and by being falsely informed of its non- availability, based upon her race.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an African-American female. In early January 2007, she learned of an apartment for rent, owned or managed by the Respondents. She called to inquire about the apartment and was told by the Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, that the rent would be $625.00 per month, with a one-month rent amount and security deposit due in advance. She was told that the Lessee of a neighboring apartment, Clint Cook, would have a key and would show her the apartment. She went to view the apartment, and decided that she wished to rent it. She then telephoned Ms. Lindsay, and Ms. Lindsey faxed an application to her to complete. In the conversation, she told Ms. Lindsay she would not have the required deposit money until Friday. This was on a Monday or Tuesday. Ms. Lindsay then told her securing the apartment was on a “first come-first-served” basis. The Petitioner never completed the application and never tendered the security deposit. Shortly after that telephone conversation, Ms. Lindsay was contacted by Stacey Edwards, while the apartment was still available for rent, concerning rental. Ms. Edwards, on behalf of herself and her boyfriend/husband, submitted an application to rent the apartment, together with the appropriate required deposit and rental amount on January 15, 2007. Ms. Lindsay leased the apartment to the couple. They had a planned move-in date of February 1, 2007. They are a mixed-race couple, and Ms. Lindsay was aware of that fact when renting to them. Sometime after January 15, 2007, the Petitioner called Ms. Lindsay a second time, and was told that the apartment had been rented (to the Edwards couple) and was no longer available. Testimony to this effect is corroborated by the Edwards rental application and deposit receipt, which are in evidence. The Edwards rental was documented on January 15, 2007. Later that month, the Petitioner noticed the “for rent" sign displayed, or displayed again, and she and/or her witness, Lynn Kliesch, called about the apartment’s availability. Ms. Lindsay again stated that it was rented. Indeed, it was, to the Edwards. The rental sign had been left up because the Edwards couple were not scheduled to move in until February 1, 2007. This communication between the parties occurred before Ms. Edwards informed Ms. Lindsay that they would not be moving in. Shortly before February 1,2007. Ms Edwards and her husband/boyfriend learned that his employment had ended (or he was transferred to another job location). They therefore informed Ms. Lindsay that they had to re-locate to South Florida and could not take the apartment. She charged them for the two weeks of rental, and refunded their deposit. She then placed the apartment back on the rental market. On January 31, 2007, Ms. Mari Ferguson inquired of Ms. Lindsay about the apartment’s availability. This was after Ms. Edwards had informed Ms. Lindsay that she would not be renting the apartment. Ms. Lindsay told Ms. Ferguson that the property was available and she rented it to Ms. Ferguson that same day. Ms. Ferguson and her boyfriend, who occupied the apartment with her, were also a mixed-race couple, with children. In fact, the boyfriend is the nephew of the Petitioner herein. Ms. Ferguson and family moved into the apartment. Some months later a hostile situation arose between the Respondents and Ms. Ferguson. Ms. Lindsay apparently received reports that “drug dealing” was occurring in the apartment. Ms. Ferguson and/or the other occupants were responsible for some damage, and Ms. Ferguson became several months behind on rental payments. The Respondents therefore, through legal process, had her evicted. The Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, through her firm, Elite Properties of Northwest Florida, Inc., manages some 37 rental properties in Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. She is the president and broker for the firm and has no employees or agents. Among the rental property owners she and her firm represent is her Co-Respondent, Michael Houser. Both Ms. Lindsay and Elite Properties, as well as Mr. Houser, have a significant number of minority tenants, both Hispanic and African-American. A substantial number of those, both historically, and at the time of the hearing are single, African-American females, as heads of households. There is no evidence, aside from the Petitioner’s unsubstantiated opinion, that either the Respondent has ever refused to rent to the Petitioner or anyone else, based upon race, nor that they have falsely denied availability of a dwelling for rent or sale for that reason. There is no evidence that they have refused or attempted to avoid holding out a property for rent or sale for reasons based on racial animus.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that the Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon the Petitioner's race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvia Mims 3382 Greenbriar Circle, Apt. B Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Beverly Lindsay 5252 Springdale Drive Milton, Florida 32570 Michael Houser 3533 Edinburgh Drive Pace, Florida 32571 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner because of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner Shelley M. Wright ("Wright") was a graduate student at Florida International University ("FIU") in Miami, Florida. Wright has a physical disability that affects her mobility, and, as a result, she uses a wheelchair or scooter to get around. There is no dispute that Wright falls within a class of persons protected against discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). Respondent Servitas Management Group, LLC ("SMG"), manages Bayview Student Living ("Bayview"), a privately owned student housing community located on FIU's campus. Bayview's owner, NCCD — Biscayne Properties, LLC, leases (from FIU) the real estate on which the project is situated. Bayview is a recently built apartment complex, which first opened its doors to students for the 2016-2017 school year. On November 20, 2015, Wright submitted a rental application for a single occupancy efficiency apartment in Bayview, fitted out for residents with disabilities. She was charged an application fee of $100.00, as were all applicants, plus a "convenience fee" of $6.45. Much later, Wright would request that SMG refund the application fee, and SMG would deny her request, although it would give her a credit of $6.45 to erase the convenience fee on the grounds that it had been charged in error. Wright complains that this transaction was tainted with unlawful discrimination, but there is no evidence of such, and thus the fees will not be discussed further. Wright's application was approved, and, accordingly, she soon executed a Student Housing Lease Contract ("First Lease") for a term commencing on August 20, 2016, and ending on July 31, 2017. The First Lease stated that her rent would be $1,153.00 per month, and that the total rent for the lease term would be $12,683.00. Because Wright was one of the first students to sign a lease, she won some incentives, namely $500.00 in Visa gift cards and an iPad Pro. The First Lease provided that she would receive a $200.00 gift card upon lease execution and the balance of $300.00 upon moving in. As it happened, Wright did not receive the gift cards in two installments, but instead accepted five cards worth $500.00, in the aggregate, on August 20, 2016. There were two reasons for this. One was that SMG required lease holders to appear in-person to take possession of the gift cards and sign a receipt acknowledging delivery. Wright was unable (or unwilling) to travel to SMG's office until she moved to Miami in August 2016 to attend FIU. The other was that SMG decided not to use gift cards as the means of paying this particular incentive after integrating its rent collection operation with FIU's student accounts. Instead, SMG would issue a credit to the lease holders' student accounts in the amount of $500.00. Wright, however, insisted upon the gift cards, and so she was given them rather than the $500.00 credit. Wright has alleged that the untimely (or inconvenient) delivery of the gift cards constituted unlawful discrimination, but the evidence fails to sustain the allegation, which merits no further discussion. In May 2016, SMG asked Wright (and all other Bayview lease holders) to sign an amended lease. The revised lease made several changes that SMG called "improvements," most of which stemmed from SMG's entering into a closer working relationship with FIU. (One such change was the aforementioned substitution of a $500.00 credit for gift cards.) The amended lease, however, specified that Wright's total rent for the term would be $13,836.00——an increase of $1,153.00 over the amount stated in the First Lease. The explanation was that, in the First Lease, the total rent had been calculated by multiplying the monthly installment ($1,153.00) by 11, which did not account for the 12 days in August 2016 included in the lease term. SMG claimed that the intent all along had been to charge 12 monthly installments of $1,153.00 without proration (even though the tenant would not have possession of the premises for a full 12 months) and thus that the First Lease had erroneously shown the total rent as $12,683.00. As SMG saw it, the revised lease simply fixed this mistake. Wright executed the amended lease on or about May 10, 2016 (the "Second Lease"). Wright alleges that this rent "increase" was the product of unlawful discrimination, retaliation, or both. There is, however, no persuasive evidence supporting this allegation. The same rental amount was charged to all occupants of the efficiency apartments, regardless of their disabilities or lack thereof, and each of them signed the same amended lease document that Wright executed. To be sure, Wright had reason to be upset about SMG's revision of the total rent amount, which was not an improvement from her standpoint, and perhaps she had (or has) legal or equitable remedies available for breach of lease. But this administrative proceeding is not the forum for redressing such wrongs (if any). Relatedly, some tenants received a rent reduction through the amended leases SMG presented in May 2016, because the rates were reduced therein for two- and four-bedroom apartments. As was made clear at the time, however, rates were not reduced on the one-bedroom studios due to their popularity. Wright alleges that she subsequently requested an "accommodation" in the form of a rent reduction, which she argues was necessary because she leased a more expensive studio apartment, not by choice, but of necessity (since only the one- bedroom unit met her needs in light of her disabilities). This claim fails because allowing Wright to pay less for her apartment than every other tenant is charged for the same type of apartment would amount to preferential treatment, which the law does not require. Wright makes two claims of alleged discrimination that, unlike her other charges, are facially plausible. She asserts that the handicapped parking spaces at Bayview are unreasonably far away for her, given her limited mobility. She further asserts that the main entrance doors (and others in the building) do not afford two-way automatic entry, and that as a result, she has difficulty exiting through these doors. The undersigned believes it is possible, even likely, that the refusal to offer Wright a reasonable and necessary accommodation with regard to the alleged parking situation, her problems with ingress and egress, or both, if properly requested, might afford grounds for relief under the FFHA. The shortcoming in Wright's current case is the absence of persuasive proof that she ever presented an actual request for such an accommodation, explaining the necessity thereof, for SMG's consideration. There is evidence suggesting that Wright complained about the parking and the doors, perhaps even to SMG employees, but a gripe, without more, is not equivalent to a request for reasonable accommodation. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of SMG's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Wright, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Wright. There is no persuasive evidence that SMG denied a request of Wright's for a reasonable accommodation at Bayview. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that SMG did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding SMG not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Wright no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2017.
The Issue Appellants raised several issues on appeal, including: (1) whether Appellee retroactively applied the LDC to Appellants' lawfully-established non-conforming vacation rental use; (2) whether Appellee violated Appellants' right to due process by applying Ordinance 004-1997, and its 2016 counterpart, retroactively to events which occurred and were established as a matter of record prior to 1997; (3) whether Appellants acquired vested rights when Ordinance 004-1997 was enacted, and the circuit court opinion judicially recognized those vested rights; (4) whether the Appellee erred by requiring compliance with Ordinance 004-1997, and its 2016 counterpart, in light of the doctrine of laches and equitable estoppel; and (5) whether Appellee erred, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, by not applying the circuit court opinion.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent, Gary Dean Upton, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0090905. Respondent was the broker for the other Respondent herein, Dean Upton Realty, Inc., which has its offices situated at 7045 W. Broward Blvd., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. At times material herein, Respondent, Dean Upton Realty, Inc., was a corporation licensed as a real estate broker having been issued license number 0213092. On March 11, 1983, a hearing was held before an arbitration panel of the Ft. Lauderdale Area Board of Realtors in response to a complaint filed by Respondent herein, Upton, claiming a commission from another realtor based upon an exclusive rental agreement for property owned by Rex and Martha Anderson. (Tr pages 23, 28) Subsequently, the Ft. Lauderdale Area Board of Realtors filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation alleging possible perjury in connection with Upton's testimony at the hearing or forgery in connection with the exclusive listing agreement with the Andersons. Unrefuted testimony shows that during a meeting at Anderson's home in October, 1982, Rex Anderson initialed a listing brochure for the Anderson property. (Tr page 111-112; Respondents' Exhibit 3; Anderson deposition at page 9; referring to the March 22, 1983 letter at Petitioner's Exhibit 3, page 60, paragraph 3) Anderson claimed he did not intend to give Upton an exclusive listing. However, because of the strain he was under at the time the agreement was purportly executed, he could not swear that he did not initial the document. Anderson's testimony about being under a "severe strain" and unable to remember what occurred in connection with the exclusive listing agreement is not inconsistent with that of the only other eye witness who has testified regarding the transaction, Kevin Scott, a former associate of Upton who is presently involved in hotel management at the Royal Orleans Hotel in New Orleans, Louisiana. (Tr page 108) The day Upton visited the Anderson residence to obtain the listing, Rex Anderson, who had been laid off from his job as an airline pilot, appeared "very upset," and appeared to be drinking. (Tr page 110) Thereafter, Upton and Scott left the Anderson residence for a brief period. When they returned, Anderson was a "very flustered, very nervous and an agitated individual." (Tr page 114) The credible testimony of persons familiar with Upton's reputation for honesty in the community evidenced that he was not reputed to be a person who would forge someone's name on a listing agreement. (Testimony of Clemente, Apuna and Marion Upton at Tr pages 126, 143 and 145, respectively) Based on Respondent's testimony that Anderson initialed the exclusive listing agreement, Kevin Scott's testimony which was corroborative of Respondent Upton's testimony and Anderson's inability to state, without evasiveness, what occurred in connection with the exclusive listing agreement respecting the subject property, there is no competent and substantial evidence herein to establish that Respondent Upton either forged Rex Anderson's initials to the exclusive listing agreement or that he gave perjured testimony before the Fort Lauderdale Area Board of Realtors. On October 17, 1984, Respondent Upton pleaded nolo contendere to the felony offense of possession of an unlawfully issued driver's license. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5) The plea resulted in a withheld adjudication and a sentence of 18 months probation plus the payment of fines and court costs. In making the nolo contendere plea, Respondent Upton considered that such was in his best-interests; however, he felt that he was not guilty and has been a model probationer since October, 1984. (Testimony of Susan Jean Davis, Respondent Upton's correctional officer) Respondent has completed a 30-day residential treatment program for alcoholism at the Beachcomber in Delray Beach, Florida. Since that time, he has also participated successfully in the Broward County Commission of Alcoholism, Inc. DWI program. (Respondents' Exhibits 4, 5 and 8) Those persons who have had the opportunity to observe Respondent since his bout with alcoholism consider him a reformed alcoholic. (Testimony of former judge, Lawrence C. Roberts; Marion Upton and former Broward sheriff and judge, George Brescher) Kendall D. DeVeaux, Broward County's chief evaluator for the substance abuse program had the opportunity to evaluate and supervise Respondent Upton since his DWI and drug abuse offenses. DeVeaux's testimony corroborates that of Roberts and Marion Upton respecting Upton's reformation. Based on the foregoing factual findings and conclusions, and the mitigating factors introduced herein, I hereby make the following:
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent Gary Dean Upton's real estate broker's license number 0090905 be suspended for a period of six (6) months. In all other respects, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaints in Case Numbers 84-0138 be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1985.
The Issue The issue to determine in this bid protest matter is whether Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s, intended award of funding under Request for Applications 2017-113 was contrary to its governing statutes, rules, or the solicitation specifications.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Its purpose is to provide and promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Florida Housing has been designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. As such, Florida Housing is authorized to establish procedures to distribute low-income housing tax credits and to exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of these credits. § 420.5099, Fla. Stat. For purposes of this administrative proceeding, Florida Housing is considered an agency of the State of Florida. Florida Housing administers the competitive solicitation process to award low-income housing tax credits and other funding by means of request for proposals or other competitive solicitation. Florida Housing initiates the competitive solicitation process by issuing a Request for Applications. §§ 420.507(48) and 420.5087(1), Fla. Stat.; and Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.009(4). The low-income housing tax credit program (commonly referred to as “tax credits” or “housing credits”) was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. Tax credits are awarded competitively to real estate developers in Florida for rental housing projects which qualify. Typically, developers then sell the tax credits to raise capital for their housing projects. Because tax credits allow developers to reduce the amount necessary to fund a housing project, they can (and must) offer the tax credit property at lower, more affordable rents. Developers also agree to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years. The Request for Applications at issue in this matter is RFA 2017-113, entitled “Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas Counties.” The purpose of RFA 2017-113 is to distribute funding to create affordable housing developments in the State of Florida. Through RFA 2017-113, Florida Housing intends to provide an estimated $14,601,863.00 of housing credit financing. Florida Housing issued RFA 2017-113 on October 6, 2017. Applications were due to Florida Housing by December 28, 2017.6/ Florida Housing received 33 applications in response to RFA 2017-113. Five proposed developments, including FOUR6 Skyway7/ and Eagle Ridge, applied for funding for housing credits in Pinellas County. Upon receipt of the applications, Florida Housing assigned each applicant a lottery number. Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to score each application. The Review Committee reviewed, deemed eligible or ineligible, and ranked applications pursuant to the terms of RFA 2017-113, as well as Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67-48 and 67-60, and applicable federal regulations. As further explained below, the Review Committee deemed FOUR6 Skyway’s application ineligible for consideration under RFA 2017-113. Specifically, the Review Committee determined that FOUR6 Skyway’s application failed to state its housing project’s Development Location Point in “decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal point” as expressly required by Section Four, A.5.d(1), of RFA 2017-113. Conversely, the Review Committee found that Eagle Ridge’s application satisfied all mandatory and eligibility requirements for funding and was awarded 20 out of 20 total points. Eagle Ridge was assigned a lottery number of 16. On March 16, 2018, the Review Committee presented its recommendation of preliminary rankings and allocations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors. Based on the Review Committee’s recommendations, the Board of Directors (without explanation) stated that FOUR6 Skyway did not satisfy all mandatory and eligibility requirements for funding. Consequently, although FOUR6 Skyway was assigned a lower lottery number of 2, the Board of Directors selected Eagle Ridge for funding to develop affordable housing in Pinellas County. (Only applications that met all eligibility requirements were considered for selection.) The Board of Directors approved $1,660,000.00 in housing credit funding for Eagle Ridge’s housing project. FOUR6 Skyway protests Florida Housing’s selection of Eagle Ridge instead of its own housing project. FOUR6 Skyway specifically challenges Florida Housing’s determination that its application was ineligible under the terms of RFA 2017-113. If FOUR6 Skyway successfully demonstrates that Florida Housing erred in disqualifying its application, FOUR6 Skyway, by virtue of holding the lower lottery number, will be selected for housing credit financing in Pinellas County instead of Eagle Ridge. The focus of FOUR6 Skyway’s challenge is the information it provided in response to RFA 2017-113, Section Four, A.5.d., entitled “Latitude/Longitude Coordinates.” RFA 2017-113, Section Four, A.5, entitled “Location of Proposed Development” instructs, in pertinent part: The Applicant must indicate the county where the proposed Development will be located. This RFA is only open to proposed Developments located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas counties. * * * d. Latitude/Longitude Coordinates (1) All applicants must provide a Development Location Point[8/] stated in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place. In its application, FOUR6 Skyway responded to Section Four, A.5.d(1), as follows: [Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place.] N 27 43 34.215880 [Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place] W 82 40 47.887360 As shown above, FOUR6 Skyway stated its Development Location Point in a “degree/minute/second” format instead of the required “decimal degrees” format.9/ Because FOUR6 Skyway failed to comply with the Section A.5.d instruction to state the Development Location Point in decimal degrees, the Review Committee (and subsequently the Board of Directors) determined that FOUR6 Skyway’s application was ineligible for funding.10/ In arguing that its application was eligible under RFA 2017-113, FOUR6 Skyway contends that map coordinates written in a “degree/minute/second” format may be converted to decimal degrees by using the following mathematical equation: Degree + minute/60 + second/3600 = decimal degrees. Using this formula, the coordinates FOUR6 Skyway listed in its application can be converted into the following decimal degrees: Latitude: N 27 43 34.215880 equals 27.726171 decimal degrees Longitude: W 82 40 47.887360 equals - 82.679969 decimal degrees Florida Housing does not dispute that the latitude/longitude coordinates FOUR6 Skyway listed (in either the “degree/minute/second” or decimal degree formats) correspond to a map location that would have been eligible for funding under RFA 2017-113. Consequently, FOUR6 Skyway argues that Florida Housing could have, and should have, used this “simple” mathematical formula to obtain the decimal degrees of its Development Location Point. FOUR6 Skyway further claims that it included sufficient information on the face of its application for Florida Housing to pinpoint the exact location of its proposed housing development in Pinellas County. Not only did FOUR6 Skyway list the address of its development, but it attached to its application a Surveyor Certification Form which also identified its Development Location Point using the “degree/minute/second” format.11/ FOUR6 Skyway asserts that, in light of the fact that the term “decimal degrees” is not defined by statute, rule, or in RFA 2017-113, Florida Housing should have deemed its application eligible for funding based on the information it provided. Finally, FOUR6 Skyway contends that Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-60.002(6) and 67-60.008 authorize Florida Housing to waive “minor irregularities” in applications. FOUR6 Skyway maintains that Florida Housing should have exercised its discretion and waived FOUR6 Skyway’s failure to state its Development Location Point in decimal degrees as a “minor irregularity.” Therefore, Florida Housing should have found FOUR6 Skyway’s application eligible for funding under RFA 2017-113. In response to FOUR6 Skyway’s challenge, Florida Housing asserts that it properly acted within its legal authority to disqualify FOUR6 Skyway’s application. Florida Housing argues that FOUR6 Skyway, by stating the latitude/longitude coordinates of its Development Location Point in the (unacceptable) “degree/minute/second” format, failed to comply with the express terms of RFA 2017-113, thus rendering its application ineligible for funding. In support of its position, Florida Housing presented the testimony of Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s Director of Multifamily Allocations. In her job, Ms. Button oversees the Request for Applications process. Ms. Button initially explained the procedure by which Florida Housing awarded funding under RFA 2017-113. Ms. Button conveyed that Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to score the applications. Florida Housing selected Review Committee participants based on the staff member’s experience, preferences, and workload. Florida Housing also assigned a backup reviewer to separately score each application. Review Committee members independently evaluated and scored discrete portions of the applications based on various mandatory and scored items. Thereafter, the scorer and backup reviewer met to reconcile their scores. If any concerns or questions arose regarding an applicant’s responses, the scorer and backup reviewer discussed them with Florida Housing’s supervisory and legal staff. The scorer then made the final determination as to each application. For RFA 2017-113, Florida Housing assigned Karla Brown, a Multifamily Programs Manager, as the lead scorer for the “proximity” portion of RFA 2017-113, which included the Section Four, A.5.d, latitude/longitude coordinates of the Development Location Point. Ms. Brown has scored proximity points for Requests for Application for approximately ten years. At the final hearing, Florida Housing offered the deposition testimony of Ms. Brown. In her deposition, Ms. Brown testified that, upon reviewing FOUR6 Skyway’s application, she immediately noticed that FOUR6 Skyway did not use decimal degrees to record the latitude/longitude coordinates of its Development Location Point. Ms. Brown explained that Florida Housing’s mapping software required applicants to list their Development Location Points in decimal degrees in order to locate the proposed housing project. The software would not allow her to plot latitude/longitude coordinates written in the “degree/minute/second” format. Consequently, she was not able to determine the location of (or award “proximity” points to) the FOUR6 Skyway development. As a direct result, Ms. Brown determined that FOUR6 Skyway’s application was ineligible for an award of funding under RFA 2017-113. Furthermore, Ms. Brown considered whether she should waive FOUR6 Skyway’s latitude/longitude coordinates as a “minor irregularity.” She determined that waiving FOUR6 Skyway’s “degree/minute/second” coordinates was not appropriate because RFA 2017-113 expressly instructed applicants to state the Development Location Point in the distinct format used by its mapping software, i.e., decimal degrees. At the final hearing, Ms. Button elaborated on Ms. Brown’s testimony maintaining that an applicant’s use of decimal degrees for its Development Location Point was critical in Florida Housing’s review of each application. Ms. Button reiterated that Florida Housing uses the application’s Development Location Point to confirm that the proposed housing project is located in the area covered by the Request For Applications. Ms. Button explained that when latitude/longitude coordinates are submitted in the wrong format, it is impossible for Florida Housing staff to plot the Development Location Point using its internal mapping software. Regarding FOUR6 Skyway’s argument that Florida Housing should have considered its “degree/minute/second” format as a “minor irregularity,” Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing recognizes that developers occasionally make errors in their applications. In light of this possibility, the rules governing the competitive solicitation process authorize Florida Housing to waive “minor irregularities.” As provided in rule 67-60.008, [Florida Housing] may waive Minor Irregularities in an otherwise valid Application. Mistakes clearly evident to the Corporation on the face of the Application, such as computation and typographical errors, may be corrected by the Corporation; however, the Corporation shall have no duty or obligation to correct any such mistakes. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.002(6) and RFA 2017-113, Section Three, A.2.C. However, Ms. Button declared that the difference between latitude/longitude coordinates stated in “degree/minute/seconds” versus “decimal degrees” is more than just a “minor irregularity.” Converting map coordinates into decimal degrees goes beyond simply correcting a computational or typographical error. Such action requires the scorer to actually calculate the coordinate point on behalf of the applicant. Ms. Button explained that scorers are not prepared or trained on how to mathematically determine map coordinates. (In her deposition, Ms. Brown testified that she did not “even know how to begin to try to convert” a “decimal/minutes/second” coordinate to decimal degrees. She is a “scorer,” not a “surveyor.” Ms. Brown relayed that she was specifically trained to use the decimal degrees numbers, and only the decimal degrees numbers, to plot Development Location Points in the Florida Housing mapping software.) Ms. Button added that, not only would converting latitude/longitude coordinates into decimal degrees place the burden on the scorers to correctly enter an applicant’s data into the mapping software program, but, a scorer might miscalculate the plot points. This result would taint the reliability of the scoring process. Consequently, Florida Housing did not believe that it should have exercised its discretion to waive FOUR6 Skyway’s improper latitude/longitude coordinates and convert its “degree/minute/second” Development Location Point into decimal degrees. Therefore, Florida Housing fully supported Ms. Brown’s decision not to waive FOUR6 Skyway’s response to Section Four, A.5.d., as a “minor irregularity.” Finally, Ms. Button professed that transcribing latitude/longitude coordinates into decimal degrees would be contrary to competition by relieving an applicant of the minor, but real, burden of accurately plotting its project’s Development Location Point. Such a practice would allow a Florida Housing scorer to independently modify (and thus, benefit) a developer’s application, thereby enabling it to prevail over other applicants. Finally, at the formal hearing, FOUR6 Skyway presented evidence of other “minor irregularities” Florida Housing has waived in past Requests for Applications.12/ FOUR6 Skyway argues that, in light of these prior decisions, Florida Housing’s failure to waive its nonconforming latitude/longitude coordinates in this matter was arbitrary and capricious. However, FOUR6 Skyway did not offer any evidence or elicit any testimony that Florida Housing has ever waived similar coordinate formatting errors. On the contrary, Ms. Button stated that she was not aware of any other instance where Florida Housing waived an applicant’s listing of latitude/longitude coordinates in “degree/minute/seconds,” instead of decimal degrees, as a “minor irregularity.” Based on the evidence presented at the final hearing, FOUR6 Skyway did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Florida Housing’s decision finding FOUR6 Skyway’s application ineligible for funding was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Therefore, the undersigned concludes, as a matter of law, that Petitioner did not meet its burden of proving that Florida Housing’s proposed action to award housing credit funding to Eagle Ridge under RFA 2017-113 was contrary to its governing statutes, rules or policies, or the provisions of RFA 2017-113.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order dismissing the protest by FOUR6 Skyway. It is further recommended that Florida Housing Finance Corporation select Eagle Ridge as the recipient of housing credit funding under RFA 2017-113. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Sundial is a limited partnership authorized to do business in the State of Florida and is a developer and builder of a condominium complex known as Sundial of Sanabel. In order to provide the purchasers of the condominium units with a means of renting their units when the units were not occupied by the owners, a second limited partnership was formed, Sundial Rental Partners Ltd., in which Sundial is the general partner and each of the condominium owners are limited partners. On August 1, 1973, a management agreement was entered into between Sundial Rental Partners Ltd. (hereafter Rental Partners) and Sundial whereby Sundial agreed to provide management services in connection with the operation of the condominium units as rental accommodations. The terms of this agreement provided that Sundial would be compensated for its management services in the amount of five percent (5 percent) of the gross revenue of the rental partners. On April 7, 1973, an Additional Facilities Lease Agreement was entered into between Sundial and Rental Partners. By this agreement, Sundial leased to Rental Partners additional facilities to be constructed by Sundial and used by the condominium unit owners, the persons who rent the condominium units from the Rental Partners and their guests. Compensation to Sundial is set forth in paragraph 3 of the agreement: Sundial Associates shall be paid an annual rental fee for the additional facilities equal to fifteen percent of the gross revenues of the Rental Partnership. Sun- dial Associates shall operate the additional facilities for its own account. All incom- ing profits shall inure to its benefit and the rental partnership shall have no interest in such incoming profits. The limited partnership agreement between Sundial and Rental Partners was amended on August 6, 1974. Paragraph 5.1 of the Amended Agreement provides that a total of five percent (5 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership shall be paid to Sundial for its management services and that fifteen percent (15 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership shall be paid to Sundial as rental payments for those additional facilities to be constructed by Sundial Paragraph 6.1 provides for a management deed to be paid to Sundial in the amount of four percent (4 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership and paragraph 6.4 provides that the partnership shall lease from Sundial the additional facilities at the rate of fifteen percent (15 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership. Paragraph 6.4 of the limited partnership agreement calls for the construction of additional facilities, the cost of which is to be some two million one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($2,150,000.00). During the tax period in question, the only facilities actually constructed were a lobby and registration area, the value of which is significantly less than the total value of the expected construction. Nonetheless, during the tax period in question, the Rental Partners have paid Sundial the full five percent (5 percent) management fee and the full fifteen percent (15 percent) rental payment. Sundial recorded receipt of these amounts in separate accounts in their financial records. Sundial received as income during the tax period in question, certain tennis court admission fees which DOR did not intend to include in its computation of the sales tax due from rental proceeds. Yet, the record reflects that the total of fifteen percent (15 percent) of gross sales was three hundred seventeen thousand three hundred ninety-three dollars and ninety-four cents ($317,393.94) while the total from tennis court admission fees was eighteen thousand four hundred ninety-seven dollars and sixty-seven cents ($18,497.67). The sum of these two figures is three hundred thirty-five thousand eight hundred ninety-one dollars and sixty-one cents ($335,891.61) which, when multiplied by four percent (4 percent) equals thirteen thousand four hundred thirty-five dollars and sixty-six cents ($13,435.66). This is the exact amount of the tax assessed by DOR exclusive of interest and penalties. The assessment is in error to the extent that tennis court admission fees were included in the figure purporting to reflect gross receipts of rental fees.
The Issue The issue in this appeal is whether the decision of the City Planning and Zoning Board granting Clearwater Parasail, Inc., a conditional use permit to rent four personal water craft at its business at Clearwater Pass is sustained by the evidence.
Findings Of Fact The Appellant, Aqua Wave Rental, Inc., is a lessee operating a personal water craft rental business on the Holiday Inn Sunspree property in the City of Clearwater, Clearwater Beach, just west of and immediately adjacent to the new Clearwater Pass Bridge. Personal water craft, also known as jet skis and wave runners, are designed for use by a single operator or by an operator and one passenger; they are propelled by water jets. Although small, personal water craft are capable of achieving high speeds. Currently, they can go 50 to 60 miles per hour; new models are coming out that will be able to go 95 miles per hour. Operators of these craft prefer to operate at high speeds, and many operators jump the wakes of other boats or engage in other unsafe maneuvers. Eighty percent of the 156 citations and 74 warnings to operators of water craft in Pinellas County between April 1 and December 31, 1997, were given to operators of personal water craft. Although making up only 9.3% of all water craft registered in the State of Florida in 1997, personal water craft were involved in 36.1% of all reported water craft accidents. Of 754 injuries from water craft accidents reported in 1997, 367 involved personal water craft. The Applicant/Respondent, Clearwater Parasail, Inc., is a leaseholder on the real property located at 619 Gulfview Boulevard in the City of Clearwater, Clearwater Beach. The owner of the property is William M. Shephard, Trustee for Shephard Family Trust. The property is zoned CR28 and is improved with a motel called Shephard's Resort and associated uses. It is approximately 300 yards west of the Appellant's business. Clearwater Pass separates Clearwater Beach from Sand Key and connects the Intracoastal Waterway with the Gulf of Mexico. Besides Shephard's and the Holiday Inn Sunspree, there also is an Econo Lodge and two condominium complexes between Clearwater Parasail and Aqua Wave Rental along the south shore of the Pass. Generally, the area has mixed land use comprised of hotel/motel, recreational uses such as boat rental businesses, bars/nightclubs, and multifamily residential condominiums. On April 14, 1998, Clearwater Parasail filed an application for a conditional use permit to rent four personal water craft and one flats fishing boat at its business at Clearwater Pass. When Robert Pothoff, the owner/operator of Aqua Wave Rental, Inc., became aware of the application, he approached the City's Harbormaster, William Held, because it had been Pothoff's understanding from prior dealings with Held that no additional personal water craft rental operations would be allowed in Clearwater Pass due to boat congestion and safety considerations. On his own volition, the Harbormaster convened a meeting of the City of Clearwater Marine Advisory Board (the MAB) to consider the application. Although the Harbormaster's job description does not include advising planning staff or boards regarding land use issues, Held prepared a memorandum outlining the reasons he, as Harbormaster, was recommending denial. A copy of the minutes of the MAB meeting at which it voted to recommend denial was attached to the Harbormaster's memorandum. The Clearwater Parasail application was placed on the agenda of the Planning and Zoning Board's meeting scheduled for May 19, 1998. When the Harbormaster learned of the hearing date, he requested a continuance because neither he nor any of his staff could be available for the hearing. The Staff Report to the Board recommended a continuance in order that further information could be developed. Before the May 19, 1998, hearing, Pothoff asked the Harbormaster as to the status of the application. The Harbormaster informed Pothoff that he was requesting a continuance. Thinking that there would be a continuance, Pothoff decided not to attend the hearing on May 19, 1998. At the hearing on May 19, 1998, the Applicant opposed the requested continuance, and it was denied by the Board. During the Board hearing, the Applicant's attorney argued that safety considerations were not relevant to the Board's consideration of the application. The Assistant City Attorney advising the Board stated that, while safety was not a specific criterion for approval of a conditional use, it could be a relevant consideration under general criteria concerning the general welfare of the community. One Board member testified at the final hearing and confirmed that he considered boating congestion and safety issues. While the mental thought processes of each Board member cannot be ascertained from the record, the Harbormaster's memorandum, with MAB minutes attached, was in evidence before the Board, and it seems apparent that the Board considered boating congestion and safety issues. By a unanimous vote of 7-0, the Board approved the conditional use application, subject to the following conditions: Hours of jet ski operation are limited to 9:00 a.m. to dusk, seven days per week; the flats boat may be out after dusk and before 9:00 a.m.: Jet skiers will be required to honor the No Wake Zone and will idle through the No Wake Zone to access either the beach or the Gulf of Mexico; There will be one boat or one jet ski available to act as a chase boat, respond to emergencies, or offer assistance to troubled jet skiers; With regard to experience requirements, the business operator will comply with all current state laws that regulate this industry; Buoys shall be placed to identify the jet ski starting area and designate the route jet skis may travel between open water and the beach; and The operation is limited to four (4) jet skis and one (1) flats boat. The appeal from the Board's decision does not contest the approval of the flats fishing boat, but only appeals the approval as relates to the four personal water craft. Aside from the issue of boating congestion and safety in Clearwater Pass, the evidence clearly sustains the Board's decision that personal water craft rental is a compatible use in the surrounding area and that the proposed conditional use will not impose an excessive burden or have a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities or services. A marked channel traverses Clearwater Pass, which has a strong current when the tide is flowing. Several years ago, the channel was moved towards the middle of the Pass, away from the south shore of the Pass, to relieve congestion along the south shore. There also is a "no-wake zone" in the channel. At Clearwater Parasail’s request, the Harbormaster expanded the "no wake zone" 350 yards to the west so that the "no-wake zone" now extends past Clearwater Parasail’s business. Boating congestion and safety concerns in the Pass are greatest on weekends in the area of Shephard's Resort. The complex includes Shephard's Backyard Tiki Bar and Nightclub, which extends up to the shore. Many Shephard's patrons and other boaters anchor in the Pass off the shore in front of Shephard's and wade in. The consumption of alcoholic beverages figures prominently in the activities that take place in and around Shephard's. Meanwhile, residents and patrons of other establishments along the Pass in the vicinity also use the Pass for boating, wading and swimming. The Applicant's business location is to the west of Shephard's Backyard Tiki Bar and Nightclub on the other side of a rock jetty. Under its plan of operation, the Applicant will use a chase boat to guide its renters into the Clearwater Pass through water marked with buoys for that purpose; once in the Pass, renters will be guided to the west into the Gulf. The chase boat will remain in the water to offer assistance and guidance as necessary. As planned, the Applicant's operation will not add significantly to the congestion directly in front of Shephard's. The City's Harbormaster believes that personal water craft are dangerous by nature and that Clearwater Pass is too congested with water crafts of all types on weekends (especially in front of Shephard's). As a result, from a boating safety standpoint, he would prefer no personal water craft rental businesses in or near Clearwater Pass at all, regardless of safety precautions, and he recommended denial of any conditional use permit for additional personal water craft rental businesses in the Pass. The Harbormaster did not direct his comments specifically to the Clearwater Parasail proposal. He did, however, state that Clearwater Parasail has not been a safety problem, and he had no reason to believe that the Applicant would not operate his personal water craft business in the same safe manner that he operates his parasail business. Pinellas County Deputy Sheriff David Littlejohn, who patrols the Clearwater Pass area for the County, testified to the nature of boating activity on Clearwater Pass and about the congestion of water craft in front of Shephard's on weekends. However, Deputy Littlejohn stated that he could not say whether the Applicant's four personal water craft would have an adverse impact on Clearwater Pass during the weekend. He conceded that most of the congestion was directly in front of Shephard's, not to the west on the other side of the rock jetty, where the Applicant will operate its personal water craft rental business. Florida Marine Patrol Officer Terry L. Noll had not been in Clearwater Pass for approximately the past three years. He also believes that personal water craft are dangerous. However, his primary concern is that the operators of personal water craft, whether owners or renters, are safe and well- trained. Robert Pothoff's testimony confirmed that Clearwater Parasail will operate its personal water craft rental business similar to the manner in which he operates Aqua Wave Rental. Like Clearwater Parasail, Aqua Wave Rental operates from a bar/hotel area (although it is not as busy as Shephard's.) For the safety of his renters and other boaters using the Pass, Pothoff prohibits his renters from operating in front of Shephard's. Since Aqua Wave Rental is located to the east of Shephard's, Pothoff tries to direct his renters to the east under the Clearwater Pass Bridge into the Intracoastal Waterway. Apparently not fully cognizant of the Applicant's plan of operation, it was Pothoff's incorrect assumption that the Applicant's renters would not be able to similarly avoid operating in front of Shephard's. The Applicant will have to comply with all state and local laws and regulations governing the rental and operation of personal water craft in Clearwater Pass. These now include prohibitions against wake jumping and operation by persons under the age of 14. While not currently the law, it is anticipated that renters of personal water craft soon will have to be trained in the safe operation of these craft and certified as competent before renting. Regardless of the state of the law, the Applicant plans to offer a boating safety course to its renters. The owner/operator of Clearwater Parasail, Cliff Conaster, is the holder of a 100-ton captain's license and is qualified to offer this instruction. It is found that the evidence before the Board and presented at final hearing sustains the Board's decision that personal water craft rental as proposed at this location is a compatible use in the area surrounding the proposed location and will not impose an excessive burden or have a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities or services. It also is found that the evidence before the Board and presented at final hearing sustains the Board's decision that personal water craft rental as proposed at this location is consistent with the community welfare and will not detract from the public’s convenience at this location. In 1990, the Planning and Zoning Board denied a previous application for conditional use approval for a personal water craft rental business at the same location. The applicant in that case appealed, and the Final Order in Shepard et al. v. City of Clearwater, DOAH Case No. 90-2152, sustained the decision of the Board. There, however, the applicant had no experience in running a marine rental business. In addition, the applicant wanted to rent up to ten personal water craft, plus a catamaran sailboat. Also, the applicant failed to establish that safe ingress and egress would be accomplished or that the operation would be sufficiently staffed to ensure safe operations. Those factors sharply contrast with the facts of this case.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent, Cristal Coleman, committed the violations alleged in two separate four- count Administrative Complaints filed with the Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation on April 17, 2009, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her Florida real estate associate license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (hereinafter referred to as the “Division”), is an agency of the State of Florida created by Section 20.165, Florida Statutes. The Division is charged with the responsibility for the regulation of the real estate industry in Florida pursuant to Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Cristal Coleman, was at the times material to this matter, the holder of a Florida real estate associate license, license number 693909, issued by the Division. From January 4, 2005, until March 31, 2008, Ms. Coleman was registered as a sales associate with Cristal Clear Realty (hereinafter referred to the “Realty Company”). Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC., and Ms. Coleman’s Relationship Thereto. Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC (hereinafter referred to as the “CC Rentals”), is a Florida limited liability company registered with the office of the Florida Secretary of State, Division of Corporations. CC Rentals business consisted of marketing and renting for compensation transient rental properties. CC Rentals did not engage in the sale of real estate and, therefore, was not registered with the Division as a licensed real estate broker. Ms. Coleman became the sole managing member of CC Rentals as of December 5, 2007. As a managing member, CC Rentals office manager, rental manager, and accountant reported to her on a regular basis. The Richard Bloom and Greg Sousa Rentals. CC Rentals, at the times relevant, was managing two separate properties, one owned by Richard Bloom (hereinafter referred to as the “Bloom Property”), and one owned by Greg Sousa (hereinafter referred to as the “Sousa Property”). The nature of the role of CC Rentals in managing the Bloom Property and the Sousa Property was not proved. Whatever agreements existed as to the management of these properties was not proved. Nor was any evidence presented as to whether any money, in the form of a security deposit, rental fees, or any other form, was received or in the possession of CC Rentals at the times relevant to this matter. On or about May 6, 2008, a form email was sent from Ms. Coleman’s email address to clients of CC Rentals notifing clients of the financial demise of CC Rentals (hereinafter referred to as the “Email Notice”). The Email Notice was sent to Mr. Bloom and to Mr. Sousa. In pertinent part, the Notice Email stated: We regret to advise you that Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC is no longer sufficiently solvent to continue operating. The Company has ceased trading effective May 6, 2008. We have tried to weather a very difficult season where the economic crisis in our country has seriously impacted travel and especially rentals in the Florida Keys this year. Since the Company has no funds, we need to advise Owners: The contract between you and Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC is no longer valid and is terminated. There are no funds to pay Owners any rentals collected but not yet paid to Owners through April 2008. If there are current reservations we are providing the contact details below to allow you to make direct contact with your pending guests. Since there are no funds in Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC, the Company cannot refund any security deposits to the people who made the reservation. This means that any Owner accepting the reservation directly will need to reimburse the guest out of pocket for the amount of the Security Deposit after their stay. . . . . According the specific information included in Email Notices sent to Mr. Bloom and Mr. Sousa, there were tenants in the Bloom Property and Sousa Property of a term longer than a transient rental. Ms. Coleman was not, however, aware of either rental property or the nature of any agreement with Mr. Bloom and Mr. Sousa for the management of their properties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Commission: Finding that the Division failed to prove any of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints; and Dismissing the Administrative Complaints. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Blakeman, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nicholas W. Mulick, Esquire Nicholas W. Mulick, P.A. 91645 Overseas Highway Tavernier, Florida 33070 Thomas W. O’Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N802 Orlando, Florida 32801 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: During the development stage of a condominium project, known as Lake Villas Condominium, in Altamonte Springs, Florida, First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando foreclosed on some forty (40) units of the project. At that time, approximately in November of 1975, thirty-one (31) units already had fee- simple owners or were under a lease/purchase option and they were not involved in the foreclosure proceedings. Mr. David McComb, a vice-president and mortgage loan officer with First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, was given the responsibility of assuring the completion of the remaining units, selling the units and setting up a homeowners' association for the Lake Villas Condominium. The petitioner Lake Villas Condominium Association's five-position board of directors was originally comprised of three members who were personnel of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, so that First Federal would have majority control at a time when it held the ownership to the majority of the units. In June of 1976, thirty-seven of the seventy-one units had been sold to individuals. Thereafter, the composition of the petitioner's board of directors changed and the individual-unit owners held the majority of the five positions. Mr. McComb, as a representative of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, remained on the board of directors and continued First Federal's attempts to sell the remaining unsold units. First Federal retained a sales representative who lived in one of the condominium units, operated her sales office from one of the vacant units owned by First Federal and was paid a real estate commission when she sold a unit. The sales contract on the last of the units owned by First Federal was closed on December 12, 1977. Prior to mid-1976, the Florida Power Corporation account for seven or eight common element meters was in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, doing business as Lake Villas Condominium Association, and the billing statements were mailed to the Orlando office of First Federal Savings and Loan. In June or July of 1976, after the majority of units had been purchased by individual owners and majority control of the board of directors was obtained by the individual owners, Mr. McComb of First Federal placed a telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office. The purpose of this call was to inform respondent that First Federal wanted the account name and address for the seven or eight meters changed and to inform respondent that the Lake Villas Condominium Association had taken over responsibility for the accounts. Mr. McComb spoke on the telephone to a female who handled commercial accounts for the respondent's Winter Park office and informed her that he wanted the name of First Federal Savings and Loan taken off the account and the bills to be mailed to the Lake Villas Condominium Association at a post office box in Altamonte Springs. The female to whom Mr. McComb spoke took down the information regarding the account numbers and change of billing names and addresses, and told him she would take care of it. Mr. McComb did not inquire about a rate adjustment, and no discussion was had concerning rates for the seven or eight meters. Following the June or July, 1976, discussion between Mr. McComb and a female at the respondent's Winter Park office concerning a change in billing name and address, the billing statements were sent and received at the post office address of the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. in Altamonte Springs. Approximately one year later, in mid-1977, Mr. McComb was forwarded some delinquent notices on the seven or eight meters. They had originally been sent to the petitioner's post office box in Altamonte Springs, but were thereafter forwarded to Mr. McComb's attention at First Federal. Mr. McComb noticed that, although the post office address had been changed, the accounts were still in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando. He then placed another telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office, spoke with a female in the commercial department and requested that the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando be removed from the account and that the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be inserted as the new-named customer. The female informed Mr. McComb that this request would be taken care of and that nothing further need be done. No inquiry by Mr. McComb or discussion was had concerning a rate adjustment for these seven or eight meters. Electricity for the individual living units of the Lake Villas Condominiums are separately metered. In addition, there are seven or eight separately billed meters which service the common areas of the condominium, such as the two swimming pools, the internal street and sidewalk lighting, the clubhouse and small post lamps for an open green area. From at least April of 1979 through October of 1980, no commercial activity occurred in any of the condominium units. In April of 1979, Mr. O. K. Armstrong became the manager of the Lake Villas Condominiums and was responsible for the association's financial transactions. He noticed in May of 1979 that the bills for the seven or eight subject meters contained the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, though they did list the condominium's post office box number for the address. After speaking with Mr. McComb about the matter, Mr. Armstrong telephoned a Mr. Harbour at the respondent's Winter Park office. It was during this discussion that petitioner, through Mr. Armstrong, learned that the seven or eight common element meters might qualify for a residential, as opposed to the higher commercial, rate. Thereafter, the rates for the seven or eight meters were changed by Florida Power Corporation from commercial to residential. The request of Mr. Armstrong for a retroactive application of those residential rates to January 1, 1976, which would amount to a refund of all amounts paid in excess of the residential rates from that date, was denied by Mr. Harbour, respondent's office manager in Winter Park. During the hearing, the petitioner verbally amended the request for retroactive application of the residential rate from January 1, 1976, to July of 1976.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition filed by the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Mapp Hunter, Pattillo, Marchman, Mapp and Davis Post Office Box 340 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Blair W. Clack Assistant Counsel Post Office Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Arthur Shell Public Service Commission Legal Department 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Tribble, Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
