The Issue The issues in dispute in this matter are as follow: Was the Respondent, Wit Zajack, responsible for the acts of the Respondent, Home Hunters II, Inc., and its employees prior to July 7, 1981, when Zajack's registration as the corporate broker's active firm member became effective? Was Zajack relieved of responsibility for the acts of the corporate broker by appointing a manager and delegating duties to the manager? Did the Respondents use an advance fee rental contract containing information as required by Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code? Was the language used in said contract by the Respondents contrary to the intent of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and in violation of Section 475.453, Florida Statutes? Did the Respondents fail to refund advance fees upon demand in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(e) and 475.453(1), Florida Statutes? The proposed findings as submitted in this matter by the parties have been considered by the Hearing Officer. To the extent they have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Wit Zajack, is a licensed real estate broker holding License #0219881. The Respondent, Home Hunters II, Inc., was a corporate real estate broker holding License #0218141. At the time of the accounts described in the Administrative Complaint, Home Hunters was operating as a corporate real estate broker. Home Hunters was engaged in a rental service business and advertised rental property information or lists, collecting an advance fee from prospective lessees. Zajack was aware that Home Hunters was engaged in the advance fee rental business from the beginning of his association with the firm. Zajack applied for registration as the active firm member for Home Hunters on March 5, 1981. His application contained various discrepancies and was returned for correction on May 8, 1981. The application was corrected and returned after 20 days 1/ to the Board of Real Estate, whereupon Zajack was registered as the active firm member effective July 6, 1981. On or before May 6, 1981, Zajack was held out to the public as being affiliated with Home Hunters by a sign at Home Hunters' offices on Colonial Drive in Orlando, Florida. At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Zajack was an officer of Home Hunters. Home Hunters used the contract form exemplified in Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 11 from the start of its business activities until March of 1982. This form does not contain the language required by Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. At least as early as October of 1981, Zajack was aware of the fact that Home Hunters' contract did not meet the requirements of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. He directed Tom O'Toole, the manager of Home Hunters, to correct the forms around the first part of 1982, but the forms were not corrected. Zajack referred all calls and letters of complaint which he received regarding the failure of Home Hunters to make refunds to O'Toole. O'Toole was given the responsibility to deal with all disputes for Zajack. Zajack did not follow up on the complaints. During this time, Zajack resided in Fort Myers, Florida. O'Toole and Zajack's business partner, Ralph Snyder, Jr., organized and ran Home Hunters. Melissa Diehl entered into an advance fee rental contract with Home Hunters on July 1, 1981, paying Home Hunters $50 for this service Diehl did not receive information on apartments which was consistent with the specifications she had given Home Hunters, or which were available for rental. She called Home Hunters about apartments she saw listed in its advertisements in the newspaper and was advised they had been rented. Diehl located a rental on her own and requested a refund from Home Hunters. She made several demands for a refund but never received a refund. She specifically asked to speak with Zajack but was told he was not available. On June 16, 1981, Brenda Mosely entered into an advance fee rental contract with Home Hunters, paying Home Hunters $50 for its services. Mosely called Home Hunters as required by the contract but did not receive listing information which was consistent with the specifications she had stated in her contract. Mosely orally requested a refund of her money after the 21-day period. She was advised to put her request in writing, which she did. She was denied a refund by Home Hunters on the basis that she had not called for 21 days, because she had not called on weekends when Home Hunters was closed. Ralph Tropf contracted with Home Hunters on March 26, 1981, for rental information, paying a $50 fee to Home Hunters in advance for its services. None of the information he received was consistent with the specifications he had given to Home Hunters. Tropf called for the 21-day period required in the contract and found a rental on his own. On April 16, 1981, Tropf made a written request for a refund. He never received a reply from Home Hunters. Tropf reported the matter to the Better Business Bureau, which forwarded to him the reply of O'Toole which stated Tropf had not complied with the terms of the contract to call for 21 days. On April 27, 1981, O'Toole advised Tropf that Zajack was the person to whom Tropf should detail his complaints. In March of 1981, Mrs. Gwenda Eva Roe had a similar experience to those described above in attempting to obtain a refund of money paid by her minor daughter to Home Hunters for rental information services.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondents, Wit Zajack and Home Hunters II, Inc., are in violation of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and Sections 475.453 and 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the license of Wit Zajack be suspended for one year. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1982.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by using a Riviera Beach Housing Authority credit card for personal use and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a member of the Board of Commissioners of the Riviera Beach, Florida Housing Authority (Housing Authority/Board). Respondent was appointed to the Housing Authority by the mayor of Riviera Beach, Florida, and served from January 1994 until September 1996. In that public position, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. The Housing Authority is empowered to operate and make decisions relative to housing projects located in the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. The property operated by the Housing Authority constitutes an area of approximately 14.5 acres or about three city blocks. In February 1995, the Housing Authority voted to obtain and issue credit cards to its commissioners and staff members. At this meeting, it was made clear that these credit cards were to be used by commissioners and staff members exclusively for travel expenses incurred while engaged in business related to the Housing Authority. Respondent attended the February 1995 meeting at which the credit card issue was presented and approved by the Housing Authority and, also, participated in the vote on this issue. Accordingly, Respondent was aware of the intended and appropriate purpose for which these credit cards could be used. Although the Housing Authority credit cards were issued in the individual names of commissioners and staff members, they were kept at the Housing Authority office. When a commissioner or staff member needed to use the credit card, that individual had to go the Housing Authority office to retrieve the card. Prior to obtaining their credit cards, commissioners or staff members were required to sign a log, indicating the date the card was checked out. Upon completion of the Housing Authority related travel and business, the commissioner or staff member was required to return the credit card to the Housing Authority office. Individual commissioners and staff members were not required to pay the credit card bills. Rather, under procedures implemented by the Housing Authority, these credit card bills were sent to and paid by the Board. At all times relevant to this proceeding and while serving as a Commissioner of the Housing Authority, Respondent worked as a confidential informant for the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. In her capacity as a confidential informant, Respondent worked on cases in West Palm Beach as well as in Riviera Beach, Florida. Respondent was sometimes compensated by the Palm Beach Sheriff's Office for information that she provided. At all times relevant hereto, Owen Dixon was the Executive Director of the Housing Authority. In this capacity, Mr. Dixon was responsible for approving and authorizing all business related travel for commissioners of the Housing Authority. Commissioners were required to obtain prior approval for all Board related travel expenses if they wanted to use the credit cards issued by the Housing Authority and expected the Board pay the expenses. Mr. Dixon authorized Respondent to use her Housing Authority credit card to rent a vehicle for a one-day trip to conduct business associated with the Board. Based upon Respondent’s request and Mr. Dixon's authorization, the trip was to be taken on or about April 27, 1995. The reason Mr. Dixon approved use of the credit card for this one-day trip was that it was: (1) related to Housing Authority business and (2) appropriate under the guidelines established by the Housing Authority. On April 27, 1995, Respondent went to the Housing Authority office and signed out the Authority credit card bearing her name. On this same day, Respondent went to Payless Car Rental, and using her Board-issued credit card, rented a vehicle. Although Respondent's request and Mr. Owen's approval was for a one-day trip, Respondent kept the Payless rental car until May 4, 1995. During this one-week period, Respondent put 513 miles on the vehicle that she rented from Payless. On May 4, 1995, after returning the Payless rental car, Respondent rented a vehicle from National Car Rental. When Respondent rented the car from National Car Rental, she used her Housing Authority credit card. On May 4, 1995, after returning the Payless rental vehicle and renting a vehicle from National Car Rental, Respondent returned the Housing Authority credit card that had been issued in her name. Mr. Dixon never authorized Respondent to keep the Payless rental vehicle for more than the one day. Furthermore, Respondent neither sought nor obtained approval from Mr. Dixon or anyone else connected with the Housing Authority to rent a vehicle from National Car Rental on or after May 4, 1995. Moreover, there were no Housing Authority matters that required Respondent to rent a car for the period between April 28 through May 4, 1995, and any time period subsequent thereto. On June 5, 1995, the Housing Authority received a bill from Visa for charges incurred by Respondent for renting a vehicle from Payless Car Rental. The cost for Respondent's renting the Payless vehicle from April 27 through May 4, 1995, was $296.61. This total amount was charged to the Visa credit card issued by the Housing Authority to Respondent in her name. It was only after this bill was received by the Housing Authority did Mr. Dixon learn that Respondent had kept the Payless vehicle for one week, rather than the one day that he had authorized. On June 6, 1995, Mr. Dixon wrote a letter to Respondent asking her to reimburse the Housing Authority $288.70, the part of the total bill that was not attributable to Housing Authority business. In response to the letter, Respondent made partial reimbursement to the Housing Authority in the amount of $200 on June 23, 1995. Respondent fully reimbursed the Housing Authority for the Payless car rental on July 10, 1995, when she remitted $100 to the Housing Authority. Upon payment of the $100, Mr. Dixon's secretary, Marion White, told Respondent that she had overpaid by $11.30 the amount owed to the Housing Authority. Respondent then directed Mrs. White to "just hold on to" the balance. Approximately two weeks after Respondent fully reimbursed the Housing Authority for the Payless car rental, the Housing Authority received a bill from Visa, dated July 28, 1995. This Visa bill reflected charges of $188.84 incurred at National Car Rental that had been made on Respondent's Housing Authority credit card. Several days later, in a courtesy reminder dated July 31, 1995, Visa notified the Housing Authority that the credit limit on Respondent's credit card had been exceeded. The courtesy notice showed additional billing to the account of $997 from National Car Rental. Within a few days, the Housing Authority received a bill for additional charges of $214.99 from National Car Rental that had been made on Respondent's credit card. Respondent charged a total of $1,400.94 to her Housing Authority credit card for the National car rental. This amount represents the cost for Respondent's renting a vehicle from National Car Rental for approximately eighty (80) days. As of the date of the final hearing, Respondent had not reimbursed the Housing Authority for the National Car Rental bill. On or about July 4, 1995, Respondent signed up for membership in National Car Rental's "Emerald Club." Membership in the Emerald Club was available to individuals who had been or were customers of National Car Rental. Emerald Club members were entitled to discounts and express service, and were required to have a primary credit card number listed with National Car Rental. Because prospective Emerald Club members had been or were customers of National Car Rental, the primary credit card number could be obtained from the company's computer system based on credit card information acquired during prior transactions. On May 4, 1995, when Respondent initially rented a vehicle from National Car Rental, she used her Housing Authority credit card. Thereafter, Respondent's Housing Authority credit card number appeared in National Car Rental's computer system and was listed as the primary credit card for Respondent's Emerald Club membership. Respondent never used a personal credit card when she rented a vehicle from National Car Rental. The expenses incurred by Respondent as a result of renting a vehicle from National Car Rental were never billed to any credit card other than her Housing Authority credit card. Also, upon returning the vehicle rented from National Car Rental, Respondent never paid a sufficient amount in cash to prevent a balance from being billed to her Housing Authority credit card. There is no dispute that Respondent incurred the charges for car rental from National Car Rentals. In fact, at a meeting held in late July 1995, and attended by Mr. Owens, the Mayor of Riviera Beach, a Housing Authority Commissioner, the attorney for the Housing Authority Board, and a Palm Beach Sheriff's deputy, Respondent admitted that she had rented a vehicle from National Car Rental. It was during this meeting that Respondent first divulged that she was a confidential informant. According to Respondent, she had been using the car rented from National in connection with her work as an informant. However, Respondent indicated that she had paid the bills incurred as a result of the National Car Rental expenses. Despite this representations, Respondent never provided documentation that she made such payments. Prior to the meeting held in late July 1995, no one connected with the Housing Authority knew that Respondent has worked as a confidential informant. Likewise, neither Mr. Dixon nor anyone associated with the Housing Authority ever authorized Respondent to use the Housing Authority credit card for such purpose. After Respondent stated that she was using the Housing Authority credit card in her work as a confidential informant, Respondent was told that such use was improper. Nonetheless, Respondent kept the car rented from National Car Rental for several more days. Moreover, Respondent allowed these as well as the other National Car Rental expenses to be charged to her Housing Authority credit card. When Respondent returned the car to National Car Rental, because she did not pay the bill, the car rental expenses were billed to and, eventually, paid by the Housing Authority. Respondent's use of the Housing Authority credit card for car rental for personal use or travel, or for work as a confidential informant or any other private employment is contrary to the mission and public purpose of the Housing Authority. On August 4, 1995, the Board rescinded Respondent's authorization for future travel related to the Housing Authority due to her misuse of Housing Authority resources. At this meeting, Respondent again told Commissioners of the Board that she had paid the National Car Rental bills. However, again, no documentation supporting this claim was presented by Respondent. The Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office never directed nor required Respondent to rent a vehicle to conduct her work as a confidential informant. In cases where the Palm Beach Sheriff's Office determines that it is necessary for an informant to have a rental car, that agency must give prior approval for such rental. Also, any costs associated with such an authorized and approved car rental are paid by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Final Order and Public Report be entered by the Florida Commission on Ethics finding that Respondent, Delphine Gissenter, violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and imposing a civil penalty of $3000; issuing a public censure and reprimand; and requiring restitution to the Riviera Beach Housing Authority in the amount of $1400.94. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Assistant Attorney General Attorney's General's Office The Capitol, Plaza 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kerrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James Green, Esquire One Clearlake Centre, Suite 1503 250 Australian Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Suite 101 2822 Remington Green Circle Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Suite 101 2822 Remington Green Circle Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact Based upon the documentary evidence and the testimony taken at the hearing, the following relevant facts were uncontroverted: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondents National Home Realty, Inc. and Philip Marzo were licensed real estate brokers and Respondent Steve Mishkin was a licensed real estate salesman holding license numbers 0210856, 0056147 and 0151878, respectively. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, National Home Realty, Inc. was qualified by Philip Marzo, a licensed real estate broker. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, National Home Realty, Inc. was engaged in the business of negotiating rental contracts and in furnishing for an advance fee, rental information as to available residential rentals to prospective tenants. In connection therewith, the company used Service Agreements of which Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 are accurate examples. The Service Agreements do not comport with Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, which requires a specific refund notice to be placed on any such contract, nor do the contracts comply with Section 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, which provides for full refund in the event the rental information provided by the broker or salesman to a prospective tenant is not current or accurate in any material respect. In October of 1980, Grace Pasquale, as a prospective tenant, signed a rental service agreement with National Home Realty, Inc., on a form supplied by National Home Realty, and paid to National Home Realty a $65 cash advance fee for the specified rental services. During a period of approximately 25 days after the date of the contract, Pasquale was not able to locate a residential rental to meet her requirements, as set forth in her rental contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, from the list of alleged available rentals supplied to her by National Home Realty. As a result, Pasquale made written demand within 30 days of the date of the contract for 75 percent of her advance fee, all as provided for by Section 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. That on or about June of 1981, after intervention by the Department of Professional Regulation, Grace Pasquale received a refund. On or about February 16, 1981, prospective tenant Bruce Blair paid to National Home Realty a $75 cash advance fee, for agreement for rental services including a list of available rentals to meet the specific requirements of prospective tenant Bruce Blair. Only one listing was supplied to Blair and this did not meet Blair's requirements as set forth in his agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Failing and unable to obtain a rental by and through National Home Realty, Blair located a rental through his own efforts unconnected with the services of National Home Realty. Within 30 days of the date of his agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 6, Blair made written demand on National Home Realty for a 75 percent refund of his advance fee, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. In response to his demand, National Home Realty issued check number 1735, dated March 25, 1981, to the order of Bruce Blair on the account of National Home Realty, Inc. at the Barnett Bank for $18.75 being only 25 percent of the advance fee paid and, therefore, contrary to the provisions of the above stated rule. When Blair presented the check for payment, it was not honored due to the account having been closed. In April of 1981, Respondent paid Blair in cash for the balance due on his refund. Respondent Marzo, the qualifying broker who worked in the office, never personally refused a 75 percent refund to anyone who requested the same within 30 days from the date of a service contract. However, while he was qualifying broker, certain salesmen in the office ignored demands for refunds. Marzo was unaware that this was occurring until it was brought to his attention through the Department's direct intervention. When Marzo realized there was a problem with the salesmen making timely refunds, he instituted an unwritten policy that anyone who requested a refund should be given one. Despite this directive, salesmen continued to refuse or delay refunds due to the manner in which commissions were paid by the office. Respondents Marzo and Mishkin never met either Grace Pasquale or Bruce Blair. Although Respondent Mishkin never denied a refund to anyone who requested one, he would harass or make a person who asked for a refund "feel pretty bad" for doing so. (See Transcript at 37)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered revoking the license of National Home Realty, Inc., suspending the license of Philip Marzo for a period of six (6) months and dismissing the charges against Steve Mishkin. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 Kristin Building 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Brian Hal Leslie, Esquire 1795 North East 164th Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation Old Courthouse Square Building 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The Department adopts and incorporates in this Final Order the Statement of the Issues in the Recommended Order. The Department's exceptions to the Statement of the Issues in the Recommended Order are not material and are therefore withdrawn.
Findings Of Fact Kjell Bergh operates a Volvo dealership in Minnesota. He also has other business interest in the United States and abroad. In 1986, he received approval from Volvo to open a Volvo dealership in the area of Boca Raton, Florida. Boca Raton zoning makes it very difficult to locate automobile dealerships there. Mr. Bergh therefore located a suitable five acre site to build the Volvo dealership in nearby Delray Beach, Florida. The property was purchased in 1987 solely to build the automobile dealership on it. At some point Mr. Bergh also received a Volkswagen franchise, and operates both the Volvo and the Volkswagen franchises on the Delray Beach property. Title to the land was taken individually in the names of Kjell and his wife Mary Bergh, as joint tenants, on the advice of their tax counsel. The purchase price for the land was approximately one million dollars. The automobile dealership is operated by Borton Motors Incorporated, a Florida corporation organized in 1986. It is owned 75 percent by the Petitioners, Kjell and Mary Bergh, and 25 percent by the vice president and general manager, Loren Sheffer, who has also invested money in the dealership. It is common in the automobile industry for local managers to have a personal stake in automobile dealerships they manage for absentee owners. The manager, however, has only a minority interest, and the automobile manufacturer, Volvo, holds Mr. Bergh responsible for the operation of the dealership. The Berghs financed the purchase of the land and the buildings used as the automobile dealership facilities through the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. On July 23, 1987, the Berghs executed a note and mortgage for $2,000,000 in favor of the Barnett Bank for the purchase of the property along with a construction loan agreement to build the dealership facility. The rate and mortgage were modified to increase the amount borrowed to $2,250,000 in May and June of 1988. The land was then leased to Borton Motors, Inc., the legal entity which operated the automobile dealerships. As a condition of obtaining the loan from Barnett Bank, the bank required that Borton Motors, Inc., guarantee the loan which the bank had made to Mr. and Mrs. Bergh, and also required the Berghs to assign the lease to Barnett Bank. The terms of the mortgage give Barnett Bank the right to collect rents and other payments from the property, and prohibits the termination or cancellation of the lease without Barnett's permission. Barnett Bank had the right to approve the lease provisions and to set the amount of the rent so that the debt service coverage ratio would be no less than 1.2 times the amount borrowed. In connection with the loan by Barnett Bank, on July 27, 1987, Borton Motors, Inc., gave to Barnett Bank "its continuing and unconditional guarantee of the payment in full when due of any and all indebtedness of Debtor [Kjell and Mary Bergh] to Bank to the same extent as if Guarantor [Borton Motors, Inc.] were the principal debtor of the indebtedness" (Exhibit 1D). From the inception of the transaction, it was intended that the entity operating the automobile dealership, Borton Motors, Inc., would finance the purchase of the real estate on which the automobile dealership would be located, and the construction of necessary improvements. This was accomplished through the rental payments Borton Motors, Inc., would make to the Berghs, who had actually taken title to the land. Through its guarantee, Borton Motors, Inc., was as liable to Barnett Bank as were the Berghs, from the inception of the loan. The Berghs hoped to receive a return on monies they invested in the automobile dealership, whether for real estate, improvements to the real estate, inventory in the form of cars, or parts, or for payments made for labor to its sales force and service technicians. It is misleading to state that the Berghs intended to receive a return on the real estate investment they made. The return on the real estate is not the result of a separate investment made by the Berghs, it is instead a part of the overall operation of the dealership. The Berghs are not investors in real property who happened to lease property to a tenant who happens to operate a automobile dealership on that property. The Berghs do take a federal income tax deduction for interest paid on the note to Barnett Bank and report the rent received from Borton Motors, Inc., as income on their federal income tax returns. Petitioners have acquired other debt on behalf of the corporation and do not receive any money from the corporation over and above the amount of the mortgage and other indebitness. The Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County eventually sold its loan to the Berghs to Volvo Finance North American, Inc., in late April 1992. This sale has no effect on the taxation of the transaction of issue. On February 8, 1991, the Department of Revenue sent to the Petitioners a form requesting them to file a "application for Sales and Use Tax Registration" and asking them to report the rental income they had received from Borton Motors, Inc., on the dealership property for the period February 1986 through February 1991. The Berghs filed the application and supplied the rental figures to the Department, but maintained no tax was due because the "amount paid reflects the actual debt service." The Department sent the Berghs a Notice of Assessment on February 28, 1991, stating that they owed $71,043.29 in tax, penalties and interest, representing a sales tax at the rate of 6 percent upon the lease payments they had received from Borton Motors, plus penalties and interest. The Department also gave them notice of a right to protest the assessment. The Berghs did protest the assessment to the Department's Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, which sustained the assessment, but agreed to reduce the penalty involved. The Berghs paid $7,043.50 plus interest of $2,327.98 which represents the amount of payments from Borton Motors, Inc., in excess of the debt service due to Barnett Bank.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that a final order be entered withdrawing the assessment of tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2106 The following constitutes my rulings pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings: 1.-19. Adopted, though not verbatim. Respondent's Proposed Findings: 1. Accepted, excepted for last sentence which is rejected as unsupported by weight of the evidence. 2.-6. Adopted. Subordinate to hearing officer findings on this point. 8.-10. Accepted, but not verbatim. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mark T. Aliff, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Ordinance No. 06-03, as adopted by the Village of Islamorada, Village of Islands (Village), is consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development set forth in Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes (2006) (Guiding Principles).1
Findings Of Fact The Florida Keys were originally designated an Area of Critical State Concern (ACSC) by the Administration Commission in 1975 and were re-designated by the Legislature in 1986. See § 380.0552, Fla. Stat. The Legislative Intent Subsection (2) of the statute and the Guiding Principles together require an effective land use management system that protects the natural environment and character of the Keys, maintains acceptable water quality conditions, ensures adequate public facility capacity and services, and provides adequate emergency and post-disaster planning to ensure public safety. The Village's Comprehensive Plan has been adopted pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, as well as the authority of Section 380.0552(9), Florida Statutes. Provisions pertaining to vacation rentals are established in Policies 1-2.1.10, 1-2.4.7, 1-2.4.8, and 1-2.4.9. The policies allow vacation rentals but provide limits for such uses within single-family and multi-family residential properties within the Village. In addition, these policies also provide for the establishment of land development regulations (LDRs), which address enforcement and implementation of those policies. The applicable Village Comprehensive Plan Policies are as follows: Policy 1-2.1.10: Restrict Development of New Transient Units. Transient use shall be defined as any use of any structure for a tenancy of 28 days or less. Transient uses shall be considered as residential uses for the purposes of transferring development rights pursuant to conditions established in Policy 1-3.1.4 of this Plan. Islamorada, Village of Islands shall cap the number of new transient units at the number of current and vested hotel and motel rooms, campground and recreational vehicle spaces existing within the Village as of December 6, 2001. Single family and multifamily residences shall not be considered part of the above cap but instead may be used for transient rental use as provided for in Comprehensive Plan Policies 1-2.4.7 and 1-2.4.8. Policy 1-2.4.7: Limit Transient Rental Use of Residential Properties. Islamorada, Village of Islands shall continue to allow the transient rental use of 28 days or less, of single family and multifamily residential properties within the Village, including properties located within the Residential Conservation (RC), Residential Low (RL), Residential Medium (RM), Residential High (RH), Mixed Use (MU) and Airport (A) Future Land Use Map categories. Property owners located in the RL, RM, RC, MU, RH and A Future Land Use Map categories may continue transient rental subject to the following requirements: Owners of such properties shall annually register with the Village and shall demonstrate at the time of registration: That since December 6, 2001 the owner had continuously either paid or filed for all County tourist development taxes due, and paid local impact fees, for the property it wishes to register; That owner has applied for appropriate state licensure to conduct transient rental for the property it wishes to register and shall receive the license within six months of application; That the property is not registered for a homestead tax exemption pursuant to Article VII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Florida; and That the property otherwise meets all requirements of the Village Land Development Regulations. The annual registration shall allow up to a total of 331 single family and multifamily transient rental units. For each annual registration period after the initial registration period, the following shall additionally apply: No new transient rental unit shall be allowed in any Residential Medium (RM) Future Land Use Map category, in mobile home parks or in the Settler's Residential zoning district. No new transient rental unit in the RH and MU Future Land Use Map categories may be registered unless it is assessed by the Monroe County Property Appraiser at a value in excess of 600% of the median adjusted gross annual income for households within Monroe County. No new transient rental unit in the RC, RL, or A Future Land Use Map categories may be registered unless it is assessed by the Monroe County Property Appraiser at a value in excess of 900% of the median adjusted gross annual income for households within Monroe County. The priority of registration for transient rental units for all registration periods, for purpose of the 311 unit cap, shall be based upon the total number of months that the unit owner has paid the Monroe County tourist development tax, with units registered in ascending order (i.e., those licenses demonstrating the most months of payment shall be the last retired). Notwithstanding paragraph 1.a. above, if the 331 unit cap is not reached in any year by those units that have paid the Monroe County tourist development tax, new units may be given priority by registration date. Property owners permitted transient rental use pursuant to this policy shall lose their privileges and retire their licenses when ownership (in whole or in part) of the unit is transferred, through an arm's length sale of the property or the asset. If the unit is owned by a natural person, the transfer of the fee simple ownership of the unit to the owner's spouse or children shall not result in termination of the license. Policy 1-2.4.8: Enforcement and Implementation of Transient Rental Regulations. Property owners permitted transient rental use pursuant to Policy 1- 2.4.7 shall pay an annual fee to the Village as established by resolution to be used for code compliance related to transient rental uses, with any excess funds to be used to further affordable housing programs. Transient rental unit owners shall lose their privileges and their permits shall be revoked for a property being used for transient rental if the property had been found by non- appealable Final Order on two occasions to have violated the Village Code regarding vacation renal units as provided for in the land development regulations. The Village shall establish land development regulations which shall address enforcement and implementation of transient rental use, including, but not limited to, the following: conspicuous notification on transient rental properties; requiring each unit to identify the unit manager who resides within the village; regulating the number and location of watercraft and automobiles on site; lease agreements to disclose village regulatory requirements and provide for access for adequate code enforcement; advertising to require identification of state and village license numbers; notification to adjacent property owners; and fines, penalties, revocation of license for violation of the regulations including but not limited to the advertising of units that are not lawfully licensed by the Village. Policy 1-2.4.9: Affordable Housing Study. The Village, based on its 2004 Workforce Housing Study, shall analyze appropriate policy revisions to the transient rental comprehensive plan policies and prepare a report no later than December 31, 2005. The Village shall establish and support the efforts of an Affordable/Workforce Housing Citizen Advisory Committee to address the relationship between affordable housing needs and transient rental uses within the Village. The applicable Village LDR, as modified by Ordinance No. 06-03 provides the following2: Section 30-1294. Vacation rental uses permitted within certain multifamily developments. Vacation rental uses shall be permitted to continue after May 1, 2003, in properly located in the Residential High (RH) future land use category of the Village Comprehensive Plan within multifamily developments with mandatory property associations, and if the member properly owners pursuant to applicable association requirements approve vacation rental uses within such multifamily development. Registration of Existing Vacation Rental Units. The owner of a property located in the RC, RL, RM, RH, MU, and A Future Land Use Map categories may continue vacation rental use provided that the owner's use of the unit meets all of the following conditions: Since December 6, 2001, the owner had continuously either paid or filed for all County tourist development taxes due and paid local impact fees for the unit it wishes to register as a vacation rental use; The owner has applied for and received the appropriate state licensure to conduct vacation rental use for the unit; The property is not registered for a homestead tax exemption pursuant to Article VII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Florida; The unit is not a deed restricted affordable housing unit; and The property otherwise meets all requirements of the Village Land Development Regulations. The Florida Keys Principles for Guiding Development are set out in Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes: To strengthen local government capabilities for managing land use and development so that local government is able to achieve these objections without the continuation of the area of critical state concern designation. To protect shoreline and marine resources, including mangroves, coral reef formations, seagrass beds, wetlands, fish and wildlife, and their habitat. To protect upland resources, tropical biological communities, freshwater wetlands, native tropical vegetation (for example, hardwood hammocks and pinelands), dune ridges and beaches, wildlife, and their habitat. To ensure the maximum well-being of the Florida Keys and its citizens through sound economic development. To limit the adverse impacts of development on the quality of water throughout the Florida Keys. To enhance natural scenic resources, promote the aesthetic benefits of the natural environment, and ensure that development is compatible with the unique historic character of the Florida Keys. To protect the historical heritage of the Florida Keys. To protect the value, efficiency, cost- effectiveness, and amortized life of existing and proposed major public investments, including: The Florida Keys Aqueduct and water supply facilities; Sewage collection and disposal facilities; Solid waste collection and disposal facilities; Key West Naval Air Station and other military facilities; Transportation facilities; Federal parks, wildlife refuges, and marine sanctuaries; State parks, recreation facilities, aquatic preserves, and other publicly owned properties; City electric service and the Florida Keys Electric Co-op; and Other utilities, as appropriate. To limit the adverse impacts of public investments on the environmental resources of the Florida Keys. To make available adequate affordable housing for all sectors of the population of the Florida Keys. To provide adequate alternatives for the protection of public safety and welfare in the event of a natural or manmade disaster and for a postdisaster reconstruction plan. To protect the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys and maintain the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. Section 30-1294(a)(5) of Ordinance 06-03 has little to no impact on the Guiding Principles, except Principles (a), (d), (j), and (l). All it does it add to the Comprehensive Plan's vacation rental provisions authorizing properties in certain future land use categories to continued pre-existing vacation rental use the requirement those properties "otherwise meet all the requirements of the [LDRs]." In regard to Principle (a), Section 30-1294(a)(5) clearly provides further authority to the local government to regulate land use and development. The evidence also proved that this increased authority will strengthen the Village's capabilities for managing land use and development and achieving the objectives of the Guiding Principles without the continuation of the ACSC designation. Petitioners essentially make the argument that Section 30-1294(a)(5) is inconsistent with Principle (a) because "all requirements" of the Village's LDRs is too broad, too difficult to interpret, gives the planning director too much discretion to interpret the requirement, and places an impossible burden on applicants for vacation rental licenses, which ultimately will discourage compliance and undermine the vacation rental ordinance. The evidence did not prove any of those arguments. In regard to Principle (d), Section 30-1294(a)(5) further ensures the maximum well-being of the Florida Keys and its citizens through sound economic development. In regard to Principle (j), Section 30-1294(a)(5) addresses the critical need for affordable housing within the Florida Keys. With regard to Principle (l), Section 30-1294(a)(5) clearly demonstrates and provides for the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys and maintains the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. When the legislative intent behind Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, is taken in account, it is clear that Section 30- 1294(a)(5) is not the type of land use decision that Chapter 380 is most concerned with. Because this provision does no harm to the natural environment and waters of the Florida Keys ACSC, the State's interest is protected. The issue is essentially local, and deference should be afforded the Village in establishing such regulations through its police powers. Given the purpose of DCA's involvement in this matter, the legislative intent of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the evidence presented in this proceeding, it is clear that Section 30-1294(a)(5) is consistent with the Guiding Principles, considered as a whole.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order approving Ordinance No. 06-03 as consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development set out in Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2007.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference in the exercise of her rights in connection with Respondent?s regulatory actions regarding rental property owned by Petitioner, in violation of section 818 of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2011).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, an African-American woman, owns and manages a residential tri-plex rental unit located at 302 Dubs Drive, Holly Hill, Florida. Dubs Drive is zoned R-2 single-family residential. Petitioner?s tri-plex was constructed in 1955, and is grandfathered as a non-conforming use. The other houses on Dubs Drive are newer, and are all single-family homes. Petitioner purchased the tri-plex in 1998. At the time of her purchase, the tri-plex consisted of a single-story building with 3 apartments and two garages, and was configured, from south to north, as a two-bedroom apartment, a two-bedroom apartment, a one-bedroom apartment, a garage with a washer/dryer connection, and a garage with a toilet. The garages had drywall interiors, except that the ceilings lacked drywall. After she purchased the tri-plex, Petitioner hired Arthur Kowitz, a realtor, to manage the property for her. He performed management services from the time of the purchase until 2001. Mr. Kowitz is white. In 2001, Petitioner retained All-Florida Realtors to manage the property. All-Florida performed management services from 2001 to 2004. All-Florida is a white-owned company. In 2004, Petitioner retained John Benzette to manage the property. Mr. Benzette performed management services from 2004 through November 2007. Mr. Benzette is white. In 2004, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a permit to install an electric meter at the tri-plex. The purpose of the meter was not to serve the apartments -- each of which already had meters by which the tenants individually received and paid for service -- but was a “house meter” or “landlord?s meter” for exterior lighting, garage lighting and outlets, and other uses common to the tri-plex. The permit was issued, and the meter was installed. During one of the 2005 hurricanes that hit the area, the meter was knocked off of the unit by falling debris. It was not reinstalled at that time. The property managers from 1998 through 2007 were responsible for general maintenance and repair activities. Those types of activities did not require building permits. From the time she purchased the tri-plex in 1998, until 2008, the unit was not subject to any formal code-enforcement actions by Respondent. Starting in December, 2007, Petitioner began managing the tri-plex on her own. One of the first activities she performed as owner/manager was the conversion of the garage on the northern end of the building -- separated from the apartments by the other garage -- to a living space. That was accomplished by removing the garage door, constructing a block wall with a window and exterior door, completing interior drywall work, and installing a shower. Petitioner did not apply for or receive a building permit for the work. As part of the construction, Petitioner had the electric meter that was knocked off in 2005 renovated and reinstalled onto the unit. When Petitioner requested service from Florida Power & Light, Florida Power & Light contacted Respondent to confirm a legal connection. Respondent sent employees Mark Ballard and Tim Harbuck to the tri-plex. At that time, it was determined that Petitioner had performed construction without a building permit. Respondent?s employees initially thought the new living space was to be rented as a fourth apartment, an act that would have constituted an unallowable expansion of the non- conforming use of the property. Their belief was not unreasonable, as the configuration of the converted garage was conducive to its being used as a separate apartment, and since Petitioner subsequently placed a “For Rent” sign on the unit, despite the fact that she was living in apartment #3 at the time. However, Petitioner has denied that the rental of the converted garage as a separate unit was her intent, but that the converted garage was intended as an added room for apartment #3. Regardless of whether the conversion of the garage was intended to result in a separate apartment, the construction required a building permit. As a result of the determination that the construction was not permitted, the meter was removed on February 8, 2008. The requirement that the meter be removed, despite the 2004 permit, was not related to Petitioner?s race, but was related to the unauthorized construction and intended use of the converted garage. On April 25, 2008, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice to Appear at a hearing before a special magistrate. The notice provided that the purpose of the hearing was the “violation of City Ordinance Building Permit Required.” The hearing was set for May 14, 2008. Petitioner asserted that she called the telephone number printed on the notice to ascertain the purpose of the May 14, 2008, hearing. She alleged that she was told by an unnamed city employee that the hearing was to be held regarding issues pertaining to her rental license. The evidence of the call was entirely hearsay, and was not corroborated by any non- hearsay evidence. Regardless of the substance of the telephone call, the notice plainly stated that the purpose of the hearing was related to a required building permit. The hearing was held as scheduled on May 14, 2008. At the hearing, Petitioner was advised that the subject of the hearing was the unpermitted construction at the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner, claiming to have had no knowledge of the subject of the hearing, requested a continuance to retain an attorney to represent her. The request was denied. At the hearing, it was determined that, at a minimum, Petitioner removed the garage door, blocked up the front of the garage and installed a door and window in its place to convert it to living space, and installed a shower. On May 22, 2008, the special magistrate entered an Order of Non-Compliance in which he concluded that Petitioner violated the Holly Hill Zoning Ordinance requiring a building permit for the work done on the property, required Petitioner to obtain a building permit, and imposed an administrative fine of $250.00. If the corrective measures were not taken, or the fine was not paid, the Order authorized an additional penalty of $150.00 per day, and authorized Respondent to place a lien on the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner was warned that she was not to use the renovated garage as a separate dwelling unit, but could only use it as an addition to apartment #3. The action by Respondent to enforce its building code was entirely appropriate, and was undertaken with all due process rights having been afforded to Petitioner. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s reaction to Petitioner?s unpermitted construction, or that Respondent failed to enforce its building code, including permit requirements, against similarly-situated property owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Petitioner paid the administrative fine on June 2, 2008, and received the after-the-fact building permit on June 10, 2008. On September 5, 2008, Respondent placed a lien on the Dubs Drive location based on its mistaken belief that Petitioner had failed to pay the $250.00 administrative fine. The notice of lien letter was received by Petitioner on November 18, 2008. Petitioner advised Respondent that she had paid the fine. Ms. Sue Meeks confirmed that the fine was paid, and Respondent promptly recorded a satisfaction of lien. The evidence indicates that the decision to record the lien was a bureaucratic error that was immediately corrected. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race was Respondent?s motive for recording the lien. A business tax receipt is required for each of the three apartments at the Dubs Drive location in order for Petitioner to engage in the business of real estate rental. Authorization for the business tax receipt was adopted by ordinance by Respondent in July, 2000, and is applicable to all rental units in the city of the type owned by Petitioner. Prior to July 2000, Respondent did not require an owner of a small rental location to obtain a business tax receipt. The business tax receipt ordinance required Respondent to perform annual inspections of businesses within its municipal boundaries. The inspections were started in 2000 or 2001. Business tax receipts are issued for a term from October 1 to September 30 of each year. If a business tax receipt is not renewed on time, Respondent is authorized to assess a 25 percent penalty, plus additional filing fees. For 2008-2009, Petitioner timely paid the business tax receipts for apartment Nos. 1 and 2. The tax was $45.00 for each apartment. Petitioner failed to pay the business tax receipt for apartment #3 until March 2009, after the renewal date had passed. Therefore, a penalty and additional filing fees were assessed which raised the business tax receipt fee for that apartment to $70.00. Petitioner alleged that Respondent “overcharged” her for the apartment #3 business tax receipt, which she construed as evidence of a pattern of discrimination. The evidence demonstrates that the $70.00 charge was the result of Petitioner?s failure to timely renew, and was not the result of discrimination based on her race. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s assessment of late penalties and fees, or that Respondent failed to assess such late penalties and fees against similarly-situated rental apartment owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. On or about February 6, 2009, Respondent issued a violation notice alleging that Petitioner failed to renew her business tax receipt for apartment #1 and #2. The notice was posted on the doors of the apartments on February 10, 2009. The notice allowed three days to correct the violation, a period that had already passed when the notice was received. Petitioner had already paid the business tax receipt, and went to city hall to inquire about the violation notice. She was advised that her check, identified by Petitioner as check #486, had not been received. Petitioner went to Bank of America to stop payment on check #486, for which a banking fee of $30.00 was assessed. Upon her return to city hall, Petitioner was advised that a search had resulted in the discovery of check #486 on a city employee?s desk. It had not been cashed. Petitioner wrote a replacement check. Respondent credited Petitioner?s utility bill for $30.00 to reimburse her for the Bank of America stop-payment charge and the matter was resolved without further ado. Petitioner alleged that the incident was “harassment,” which she construed as further evidence of discrimination. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the violation notice was a minor bureaucratic error that was promptly corrected, and for which Petitioner was made financially whole. There is no evidence in the record that the incident was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On February 19, 2009, Petitioner wrote Respondent to express her belief that she was being overcharged for water. She had a single meter to serve the Dubs Drive tri-plex, but was being charged for three connections. In fact, Petitioner had three apartments. In such cases, Respondent bills for each unit served by a single “master meter.” The minimum bill per apartment includes 2000 gallons of water per month, with additional usage added as an additional charge. Respondent billed for three connections at the Dubs Drive location since at least 1997, prior to Petitioner?s purchase of the tri-plex. Petitioner inquired whether she could have separate meters installed for each apartment, rather than having minimum and total bills determined by the “master meter.” Respondent would not allow separate meters since the Dubs Drive tri-plex was a non-conforming use in a single-family zoned area, and the installation of separate meters would “enhance the non- conformity.” Respondent?s approach to billing for water in multi- family locations accounts for the demand created by three families versus one family. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent bills all multi-unit complexes in a manner to account for the demand of multiple family consumption on its water facilities. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s billing practice for water consumption was applied to Petitioner differently from any other multi-family facilities, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 3, 2009, as a result of an annual inspection conducted as part of the business tax receipt process, Respondent cited Petitioner for several deficiencies at the Dubs Drive tri-plex, including a lack of smoke alarms, some windows that would not open, and a lack of GFI (ground-fault interrupter) electrical outlets at one location in apartment #1, and two locations in apartment #2. GFI outlets are commonly known to prevent shocks, and are required at locations where the outlets may be exposed to water, e.g. kitchens and bathrooms. Petitioner installed the GFI outlets. There was no other sanction or penalty. There is no evidence in the record that the requirement that Petitioner install a reasonable and necessary safety feature in apartments being rented to others was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 24, 2009, during the follow-up compliance inspection of the tri-plex, one of Petitioner?s tenants advised the inspector that Petitioner had been living in the converted garage for two months, and was receiving mail in “mailbox #4” during that period. The use of the converted garage as a separate living unit would be a violation of Respondent?s zoning ordinance regarding limitations on the expansion of a non-conforming use, and would have violated the special magistrate?s Order entered at the May 14, 2008, hearing. As a result, Respondent issued violation notices to Petitioner on March 24, 2009, and March 27, 2009, each of which concerned the use of the converted garage as a separate living unit. The March 27, 2009, notice indicated that Petitioner and Respondent were “working to resolve” the issue. On March 31, 2009, Respondent provided Petitioner with a letter resolving the separate living unit issue that stated: This letter is to inform you of the requirements of Compliance in reference to 302 Dubs Ave. Your triplex must not be occupied by more than 3 separate families. The new addition on the north end of the building can be used in conjunction with #3, [b]ut can not be used as a separate unit. Mailbox #4 must be taken down within 45 Days of this date. (March 31, 2009) The letter contained nothing more than a straight-forward recitation of the terms and conditions applicable to the non- conforming residential structure. Respondent imposed no penalties or sanctions. There is no evidence to suggest that Respondent imposed terms or conditions on the use of the tri- plex different from any other similarly-situated non-conforming structure. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s response to the tenant?s statement that Petitioner was using the converted garage as a fourth apartment was either disproportionate under the circumstances, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On April 30, 2009, the tenants of apartment #2 wrote to Petitioner with a long list of complaints regarding the conditions at the apartment that, on their face, were very serious, and which included structural, electrical, plumbing, and safety issues. The couple that lived in the apartment was white. The fact that the tenants were white does not minimize the fact that their concerns were legitimate. Having received no response to their complaints, the tenants called Respondent about the living conditions. In accordance with Respondent?s routine practice regarding complaints, Ms. Meeks was dispatched to inspect the property. Her inspection of apartment #2 confirmed the tenant complaints. Ms. Meeks also inspected apartment #1 at the request of the tenants of that apartment, and noted problems with “the bottom of the walls pealing [sic.] off and has some kind of bugs that are biting the children that live there.” The tenants also provided Ms. Meeks with a list of dates on which they alleged Petitioner had been staying in the converted garage which, if true, would have indicated that Petitioner used the addition as a separate living unit for more than 50 days over a three-month period. Respondent sent Petitioner a letter detailing the problems observed during the inspection, and advising Petitioner that her issues would be taken up at a hearing before the Special Master on July 8, 2009. The letter was received by Petitioner on June 15, 2009. The time between the letter and the scheduled hearing was ample time for Petitioner to correct the problems. On June 24, 2009, Respondent served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear at the July 8, 2009, hearing. On June 25, 2009, and June 29, 2009, Respondent obtained written statements from the tenants of apartment #2 detailing the problems that they had encountered with their leased apartment. Their statements were consistent with their earlier descriptions and the results of the inspection. On July 7, 2009, Petitioner requested a continuance of the July 8, 2009, hearing due to the death of her father. The request was granted by notice dated July 15, 2009, and the hearing was continued to August 12, 2009. Respondent was directed to “bring proof of her father?s passing” to the August hearing. On July 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for the August 12, 2009, hearing. On August 12, 2009, a hearing was convened before the special magistrate. Petitioner was represented by counsel. At the hearing it was determined that the back door of apartment #2 had been replaced to the tenant?s satisfaction, though Petitioner failed to obtain a building permit for the same, and that the electrical issue with the GFI outlet and the water heater breaker had been resolved. It was ultimately determined to be in the best interest of all of the parties to have the tri-plex inspected by Respondent, and to reconvene the hearing in September, 2009. Petitioner asserted that the August 12, 2009, hearing was continued because a white tenant had not appeared at the hearing to testify against her. The record does not support that reason. An Order Continuing Case was entered on August 26, 2009. The Order noted that Petitioner had not produced evidence of her father?s death as instructed. On August 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for September 9, 2009. On August 18, 2009, Respondent conducted an inspection of the tri-plex. It was determined that some of the deficiencies identified in the June notice had been made, but others had not. The hearing was reconvened on September 9, 2009. Petitioner was represented by counsel. After considerable discussion, it was determined that Petitioner had substantially resolved the issues identified in the June notice, some more recently than others. The special magistrate assessed a $250.00 administrative fine for the initial items of non-compliance resulting in the need to have the hearings, and $300.00 for failure to make repairs within a reasonable period after the initial notice in June. Petitioner also produced a copy of her father?s obituary as proof of his death in July. An Order of Non-Compliance reciting the outcome of the hearing was entered on September 25, 2009. The Order was not appealed. Petitioner stated her belief that the requirement that she provide evidence of her father?s death to substantiate the basis for the July 7, 2009, request for continuance was imposed as a result of harassment and discrimination against her due to her race. Although the requirement that she produce an obituary or the like seems insensitive and unnecessary, there was no evidence that Petitioner?s race was the basis for the request, or that such a requirement was not imposed on all persons seeking a continuance of a code enforcement hearing, regardless of race. On November 4, 2009, the special magistrate, after having received evidence of the completion of the repairs from Respondent, entered an Order of Compliance by which he found all of the deficiencies at the Dubs Drive location had been satisfactorily resolved. Petitioner has alleged that the code enforcement actions taken by Respondent were part of a pattern of harassment and intimidation directed at her because of her race. She argued that her white property managers were not cited for violations, thus establishing evidence of racial bias. While it is true that some of the violations for which Petitioner was cited concerned issues that pre-dated Petitioner?s assumption of management duties in December 2007, e.g., the use of interior- grade doors being used as exterior doors and the lack of GFI outlets, there was no evidence that Respondent ever noticed those deficiencies, or that any tenant had ever complained. The evidence demonstrates that the triggering event that drew the attention of Respondent?s code enforcement section was not Petitioner?s race, but was Petitioner?s unpermitted conversion of the garage into living space. The other triggering event was the complaint filed with Respondent by Petitioner?s tenants that alleged crumbling infrastructure, including the very poor condition of the exterior doors. Both incidents properly resulted in thorough inspections. There was no event at the Dubs Drive location prior to December 2007, that would have resulted in increased scrutiny. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Respondent?s actions were reasonable and appropriate responses to conditions at the Dubs Drive location that were brought to its attention by the actions of Petitioner and her tenants, conditions for which Respondent would have been remiss had it failed to act. The evidence in this proceeding does not support a finding that Respondent?s actions were taken due to Petitioner?s race. The evidence produced at the hearing contained not a shred of competent, substantial evidence that would support a finding that Respondent took any action regarding the Dubs Drive tri-plex because of Petitioner?s race. Rather, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent was appropriately exercising its police powers to ensure that rental dwelling units within its jurisdiction are safe and sanitary. If anything, Respondent and the special magistrate treated Petitioner with considerable patience, restraint, and leniency given the nature of the non- compliance resulting from the unpermitted renovations, and from the delays in making necessary repairs to the property. Petitioner?s dated signature on the Housing Discrimination Complaint that forms the basis for this proceeding indicates that Petitioner filed her initial complaint of discrimination no earlier than August 31, 2010. However, the HUD Determination gives two dates on which Petitioner supposedly filed her complaint -- August 13, 2010, and September 2, 2009. Given the findings and conclusions herein that Respondent had no racial animus or bias in its actions regarding Petitioner -- going back to the December 2007 date on which Petitioner assumed her property management duties -- it is not necessary to determine which of the dates is accurate. However, to the extent it were to become an issue with regard to the application of the jurisdictional limits established by section 760.34(2), the most persuasive evidence demonstrates that Petitioner filed her Housing Discrimination Complaint on or after August 31, 2010. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent took any regulatory, utility billing, or code enforcement action regarding Petitioner, or the Dubs Drive location, in an effort to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with Petitioner in the exercise of her rights as an owner of rental housing due to Petitioner?s race. Respondent?s actions were, in each instance, a legitimate response to unpermitted building activities, a correct application of Respondent?s ordinances, or a reasonable response to complaints filed by Petitioner?s tenants. At worst, Respondent committed two minor bureaucratic errors that were quickly resolved, and for which Petitioner suffered no loss. There was no evidence that Respondent applied its code enforcement ordinances or policies in its dealings with Petitioner in a manner that was inconsistent with their application to similarly-situated persons who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Having found no evidence to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2011H0053. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2012.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent, Gary Dean Upton, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0090905. Respondent was the broker for the other Respondent herein, Dean Upton Realty, Inc., which has its offices situated at 7045 W. Broward Blvd., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. At times material herein, Respondent, Dean Upton Realty, Inc., was a corporation licensed as a real estate broker having been issued license number 0213092. On March 11, 1983, a hearing was held before an arbitration panel of the Ft. Lauderdale Area Board of Realtors in response to a complaint filed by Respondent herein, Upton, claiming a commission from another realtor based upon an exclusive rental agreement for property owned by Rex and Martha Anderson. (Tr pages 23, 28) Subsequently, the Ft. Lauderdale Area Board of Realtors filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation alleging possible perjury in connection with Upton's testimony at the hearing or forgery in connection with the exclusive listing agreement with the Andersons. Unrefuted testimony shows that during a meeting at Anderson's home in October, 1982, Rex Anderson initialed a listing brochure for the Anderson property. (Tr page 111-112; Respondents' Exhibit 3; Anderson deposition at page 9; referring to the March 22, 1983 letter at Petitioner's Exhibit 3, page 60, paragraph 3) Anderson claimed he did not intend to give Upton an exclusive listing. However, because of the strain he was under at the time the agreement was purportly executed, he could not swear that he did not initial the document. Anderson's testimony about being under a "severe strain" and unable to remember what occurred in connection with the exclusive listing agreement is not inconsistent with that of the only other eye witness who has testified regarding the transaction, Kevin Scott, a former associate of Upton who is presently involved in hotel management at the Royal Orleans Hotel in New Orleans, Louisiana. (Tr page 108) The day Upton visited the Anderson residence to obtain the listing, Rex Anderson, who had been laid off from his job as an airline pilot, appeared "very upset," and appeared to be drinking. (Tr page 110) Thereafter, Upton and Scott left the Anderson residence for a brief period. When they returned, Anderson was a "very flustered, very nervous and an agitated individual." (Tr page 114) The credible testimony of persons familiar with Upton's reputation for honesty in the community evidenced that he was not reputed to be a person who would forge someone's name on a listing agreement. (Testimony of Clemente, Apuna and Marion Upton at Tr pages 126, 143 and 145, respectively) Based on Respondent's testimony that Anderson initialed the exclusive listing agreement, Kevin Scott's testimony which was corroborative of Respondent Upton's testimony and Anderson's inability to state, without evasiveness, what occurred in connection with the exclusive listing agreement respecting the subject property, there is no competent and substantial evidence herein to establish that Respondent Upton either forged Rex Anderson's initials to the exclusive listing agreement or that he gave perjured testimony before the Fort Lauderdale Area Board of Realtors. On October 17, 1984, Respondent Upton pleaded nolo contendere to the felony offense of possession of an unlawfully issued driver's license. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5) The plea resulted in a withheld adjudication and a sentence of 18 months probation plus the payment of fines and court costs. In making the nolo contendere plea, Respondent Upton considered that such was in his best-interests; however, he felt that he was not guilty and has been a model probationer since October, 1984. (Testimony of Susan Jean Davis, Respondent Upton's correctional officer) Respondent has completed a 30-day residential treatment program for alcoholism at the Beachcomber in Delray Beach, Florida. Since that time, he has also participated successfully in the Broward County Commission of Alcoholism, Inc. DWI program. (Respondents' Exhibits 4, 5 and 8) Those persons who have had the opportunity to observe Respondent since his bout with alcoholism consider him a reformed alcoholic. (Testimony of former judge, Lawrence C. Roberts; Marion Upton and former Broward sheriff and judge, George Brescher) Kendall D. DeVeaux, Broward County's chief evaluator for the substance abuse program had the opportunity to evaluate and supervise Respondent Upton since his DWI and drug abuse offenses. DeVeaux's testimony corroborates that of Roberts and Marion Upton respecting Upton's reformation. Based on the foregoing factual findings and conclusions, and the mitigating factors introduced herein, I hereby make the following:
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent Gary Dean Upton's real estate broker's license number 0090905 be suspended for a period of six (6) months. In all other respects, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaints in Case Numbers 84-0138 be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1985.
The Issue The issue to determine in this bid protest matter is whether Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s, intended award of funding under Request for Applications 2017-113 was contrary to its governing statutes, rules, or the solicitation specifications.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Its purpose is to provide and promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Florida Housing has been designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. As such, Florida Housing is authorized to establish procedures to distribute low-income housing tax credits and to exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of these credits. § 420.5099, Fla. Stat. For purposes of this administrative proceeding, Florida Housing is considered an agency of the State of Florida. Florida Housing administers the competitive solicitation process to award low-income housing tax credits and other funding by means of request for proposals or other competitive solicitation. Florida Housing initiates the competitive solicitation process by issuing a Request for Applications. §§ 420.507(48) and 420.5087(1), Fla. Stat.; and Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.009(4). The low-income housing tax credit program (commonly referred to as “tax credits” or “housing credits”) was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. Tax credits are awarded competitively to real estate developers in Florida for rental housing projects which qualify. Typically, developers then sell the tax credits to raise capital for their housing projects. Because tax credits allow developers to reduce the amount necessary to fund a housing project, they can (and must) offer the tax credit property at lower, more affordable rents. Developers also agree to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years. The Request for Applications at issue in this matter is RFA 2017-113, entitled “Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas Counties.” The purpose of RFA 2017-113 is to distribute funding to create affordable housing developments in the State of Florida. Through RFA 2017-113, Florida Housing intends to provide an estimated $14,601,863.00 of housing credit financing. Florida Housing issued RFA 2017-113 on October 6, 2017. Applications were due to Florida Housing by December 28, 2017.6/ Florida Housing received 33 applications in response to RFA 2017-113. Five proposed developments, including FOUR6 Skyway7/ and Eagle Ridge, applied for funding for housing credits in Pinellas County. Upon receipt of the applications, Florida Housing assigned each applicant a lottery number. Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to score each application. The Review Committee reviewed, deemed eligible or ineligible, and ranked applications pursuant to the terms of RFA 2017-113, as well as Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67-48 and 67-60, and applicable federal regulations. As further explained below, the Review Committee deemed FOUR6 Skyway’s application ineligible for consideration under RFA 2017-113. Specifically, the Review Committee determined that FOUR6 Skyway’s application failed to state its housing project’s Development Location Point in “decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal point” as expressly required by Section Four, A.5.d(1), of RFA 2017-113. Conversely, the Review Committee found that Eagle Ridge’s application satisfied all mandatory and eligibility requirements for funding and was awarded 20 out of 20 total points. Eagle Ridge was assigned a lottery number of 16. On March 16, 2018, the Review Committee presented its recommendation of preliminary rankings and allocations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors. Based on the Review Committee’s recommendations, the Board of Directors (without explanation) stated that FOUR6 Skyway did not satisfy all mandatory and eligibility requirements for funding. Consequently, although FOUR6 Skyway was assigned a lower lottery number of 2, the Board of Directors selected Eagle Ridge for funding to develop affordable housing in Pinellas County. (Only applications that met all eligibility requirements were considered for selection.) The Board of Directors approved $1,660,000.00 in housing credit funding for Eagle Ridge’s housing project. FOUR6 Skyway protests Florida Housing’s selection of Eagle Ridge instead of its own housing project. FOUR6 Skyway specifically challenges Florida Housing’s determination that its application was ineligible under the terms of RFA 2017-113. If FOUR6 Skyway successfully demonstrates that Florida Housing erred in disqualifying its application, FOUR6 Skyway, by virtue of holding the lower lottery number, will be selected for housing credit financing in Pinellas County instead of Eagle Ridge. The focus of FOUR6 Skyway’s challenge is the information it provided in response to RFA 2017-113, Section Four, A.5.d., entitled “Latitude/Longitude Coordinates.” RFA 2017-113, Section Four, A.5, entitled “Location of Proposed Development” instructs, in pertinent part: The Applicant must indicate the county where the proposed Development will be located. This RFA is only open to proposed Developments located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas counties. * * * d. Latitude/Longitude Coordinates (1) All applicants must provide a Development Location Point[8/] stated in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place. In its application, FOUR6 Skyway responded to Section Four, A.5.d(1), as follows: [Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place.] N 27 43 34.215880 [Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place] W 82 40 47.887360 As shown above, FOUR6 Skyway stated its Development Location Point in a “degree/minute/second” format instead of the required “decimal degrees” format.9/ Because FOUR6 Skyway failed to comply with the Section A.5.d instruction to state the Development Location Point in decimal degrees, the Review Committee (and subsequently the Board of Directors) determined that FOUR6 Skyway’s application was ineligible for funding.10/ In arguing that its application was eligible under RFA 2017-113, FOUR6 Skyway contends that map coordinates written in a “degree/minute/second” format may be converted to decimal degrees by using the following mathematical equation: Degree + minute/60 + second/3600 = decimal degrees. Using this formula, the coordinates FOUR6 Skyway listed in its application can be converted into the following decimal degrees: Latitude: N 27 43 34.215880 equals 27.726171 decimal degrees Longitude: W 82 40 47.887360 equals - 82.679969 decimal degrees Florida Housing does not dispute that the latitude/longitude coordinates FOUR6 Skyway listed (in either the “degree/minute/second” or decimal degree formats) correspond to a map location that would have been eligible for funding under RFA 2017-113. Consequently, FOUR6 Skyway argues that Florida Housing could have, and should have, used this “simple” mathematical formula to obtain the decimal degrees of its Development Location Point. FOUR6 Skyway further claims that it included sufficient information on the face of its application for Florida Housing to pinpoint the exact location of its proposed housing development in Pinellas County. Not only did FOUR6 Skyway list the address of its development, but it attached to its application a Surveyor Certification Form which also identified its Development Location Point using the “degree/minute/second” format.11/ FOUR6 Skyway asserts that, in light of the fact that the term “decimal degrees” is not defined by statute, rule, or in RFA 2017-113, Florida Housing should have deemed its application eligible for funding based on the information it provided. Finally, FOUR6 Skyway contends that Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-60.002(6) and 67-60.008 authorize Florida Housing to waive “minor irregularities” in applications. FOUR6 Skyway maintains that Florida Housing should have exercised its discretion and waived FOUR6 Skyway’s failure to state its Development Location Point in decimal degrees as a “minor irregularity.” Therefore, Florida Housing should have found FOUR6 Skyway’s application eligible for funding under RFA 2017-113. In response to FOUR6 Skyway’s challenge, Florida Housing asserts that it properly acted within its legal authority to disqualify FOUR6 Skyway’s application. Florida Housing argues that FOUR6 Skyway, by stating the latitude/longitude coordinates of its Development Location Point in the (unacceptable) “degree/minute/second” format, failed to comply with the express terms of RFA 2017-113, thus rendering its application ineligible for funding. In support of its position, Florida Housing presented the testimony of Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s Director of Multifamily Allocations. In her job, Ms. Button oversees the Request for Applications process. Ms. Button initially explained the procedure by which Florida Housing awarded funding under RFA 2017-113. Ms. Button conveyed that Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to score the applications. Florida Housing selected Review Committee participants based on the staff member’s experience, preferences, and workload. Florida Housing also assigned a backup reviewer to separately score each application. Review Committee members independently evaluated and scored discrete portions of the applications based on various mandatory and scored items. Thereafter, the scorer and backup reviewer met to reconcile their scores. If any concerns or questions arose regarding an applicant’s responses, the scorer and backup reviewer discussed them with Florida Housing’s supervisory and legal staff. The scorer then made the final determination as to each application. For RFA 2017-113, Florida Housing assigned Karla Brown, a Multifamily Programs Manager, as the lead scorer for the “proximity” portion of RFA 2017-113, which included the Section Four, A.5.d, latitude/longitude coordinates of the Development Location Point. Ms. Brown has scored proximity points for Requests for Application for approximately ten years. At the final hearing, Florida Housing offered the deposition testimony of Ms. Brown. In her deposition, Ms. Brown testified that, upon reviewing FOUR6 Skyway’s application, she immediately noticed that FOUR6 Skyway did not use decimal degrees to record the latitude/longitude coordinates of its Development Location Point. Ms. Brown explained that Florida Housing’s mapping software required applicants to list their Development Location Points in decimal degrees in order to locate the proposed housing project. The software would not allow her to plot latitude/longitude coordinates written in the “degree/minute/second” format. Consequently, she was not able to determine the location of (or award “proximity” points to) the FOUR6 Skyway development. As a direct result, Ms. Brown determined that FOUR6 Skyway’s application was ineligible for an award of funding under RFA 2017-113. Furthermore, Ms. Brown considered whether she should waive FOUR6 Skyway’s latitude/longitude coordinates as a “minor irregularity.” She determined that waiving FOUR6 Skyway’s “degree/minute/second” coordinates was not appropriate because RFA 2017-113 expressly instructed applicants to state the Development Location Point in the distinct format used by its mapping software, i.e., decimal degrees. At the final hearing, Ms. Button elaborated on Ms. Brown’s testimony maintaining that an applicant’s use of decimal degrees for its Development Location Point was critical in Florida Housing’s review of each application. Ms. Button reiterated that Florida Housing uses the application’s Development Location Point to confirm that the proposed housing project is located in the area covered by the Request For Applications. Ms. Button explained that when latitude/longitude coordinates are submitted in the wrong format, it is impossible for Florida Housing staff to plot the Development Location Point using its internal mapping software. Regarding FOUR6 Skyway’s argument that Florida Housing should have considered its “degree/minute/second” format as a “minor irregularity,” Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing recognizes that developers occasionally make errors in their applications. In light of this possibility, the rules governing the competitive solicitation process authorize Florida Housing to waive “minor irregularities.” As provided in rule 67-60.008, [Florida Housing] may waive Minor Irregularities in an otherwise valid Application. Mistakes clearly evident to the Corporation on the face of the Application, such as computation and typographical errors, may be corrected by the Corporation; however, the Corporation shall have no duty or obligation to correct any such mistakes. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.002(6) and RFA 2017-113, Section Three, A.2.C. However, Ms. Button declared that the difference between latitude/longitude coordinates stated in “degree/minute/seconds” versus “decimal degrees” is more than just a “minor irregularity.” Converting map coordinates into decimal degrees goes beyond simply correcting a computational or typographical error. Such action requires the scorer to actually calculate the coordinate point on behalf of the applicant. Ms. Button explained that scorers are not prepared or trained on how to mathematically determine map coordinates. (In her deposition, Ms. Brown testified that she did not “even know how to begin to try to convert” a “decimal/minutes/second” coordinate to decimal degrees. She is a “scorer,” not a “surveyor.” Ms. Brown relayed that she was specifically trained to use the decimal degrees numbers, and only the decimal degrees numbers, to plot Development Location Points in the Florida Housing mapping software.) Ms. Button added that, not only would converting latitude/longitude coordinates into decimal degrees place the burden on the scorers to correctly enter an applicant’s data into the mapping software program, but, a scorer might miscalculate the plot points. This result would taint the reliability of the scoring process. Consequently, Florida Housing did not believe that it should have exercised its discretion to waive FOUR6 Skyway’s improper latitude/longitude coordinates and convert its “degree/minute/second” Development Location Point into decimal degrees. Therefore, Florida Housing fully supported Ms. Brown’s decision not to waive FOUR6 Skyway’s response to Section Four, A.5.d., as a “minor irregularity.” Finally, Ms. Button professed that transcribing latitude/longitude coordinates into decimal degrees would be contrary to competition by relieving an applicant of the minor, but real, burden of accurately plotting its project’s Development Location Point. Such a practice would allow a Florida Housing scorer to independently modify (and thus, benefit) a developer’s application, thereby enabling it to prevail over other applicants. Finally, at the formal hearing, FOUR6 Skyway presented evidence of other “minor irregularities” Florida Housing has waived in past Requests for Applications.12/ FOUR6 Skyway argues that, in light of these prior decisions, Florida Housing’s failure to waive its nonconforming latitude/longitude coordinates in this matter was arbitrary and capricious. However, FOUR6 Skyway did not offer any evidence or elicit any testimony that Florida Housing has ever waived similar coordinate formatting errors. On the contrary, Ms. Button stated that she was not aware of any other instance where Florida Housing waived an applicant’s listing of latitude/longitude coordinates in “degree/minute/seconds,” instead of decimal degrees, as a “minor irregularity.” Based on the evidence presented at the final hearing, FOUR6 Skyway did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Florida Housing’s decision finding FOUR6 Skyway’s application ineligible for funding was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Therefore, the undersigned concludes, as a matter of law, that Petitioner did not meet its burden of proving that Florida Housing’s proposed action to award housing credit funding to Eagle Ridge under RFA 2017-113 was contrary to its governing statutes, rules or policies, or the provisions of RFA 2017-113.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order dismissing the protest by FOUR6 Skyway. It is further recommended that Florida Housing Finance Corporation select Eagle Ridge as the recipient of housing credit funding under RFA 2017-113. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2018.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Gerald Schultz was a real estate broker holding License #0215135 and active firm broker for Choice Rentals and Realty Corporation (formerly Choice Rentals, Inc., and hereinafter "Choice Rentals"), which was a corporate broker holding License #0195222. Rosemary Hufcut entered into a contract with Choice Rentals on July 30, 1980, for Choice Rentals to provide her with rental information based upon criteria she gave Choice Rentals. Hufcut paid a fee of $50 to Choice Rentals for its services. Hufcut was looking for an apartment for herself and her two daughters. She specified she wanted a good neighborhood with good schools. Hufcut was given rental data by Choice Rentals and, with her father, visited a number of the apartments listed. The apartments were not suitable. On the following day, Hufcut requested a refund and submitted a written request for a refund on August 6, 1980. On August 26, 1980, Hufcut's refund request was denied by a letter from Choice Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit #6). This letter provided in part: Refusal to accept available rental properties meeting the requirements as set forth in your contract with us, does not constitute cancellation of contractual agreement. (This is pursuant to the Florida Law regarding "obtaining a rental".) note - produced available rental property meeting the requirements stated on contract. Hufcut has never received a refund from Choice Rentals. The Board introduced Petitioner's Exhibits #1 through #6, which were received in evidence.
Recommendation Having found the Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Board of Real Estate suspend the licenses of Respondents for ten years. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore J. Silver, Esquire 9445 Bird Road Miami, Florida 33165 Mr. Gerald Schultz c/o John Hume, Esquire 5100 North Federal Highway, Suite 405 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Choice Rentals & Realty 3367 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Boynton Associates, Ltd., is entitled to receive additional points for Form 5 of its application, related to local government contributions, for the Florida Housing Finance Corporation's 2001 Combined Rental Cycle and, if so, whether Petitioner qualifies for an allocation of federal low-income housing tax credits.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Boynton Associates Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnership, is the Applicant and owner of property know as Boynton Terrace Apartments located in Boynton Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida ("City" or "City of Boynton Beach"). To encourage the development of low-income housing for families, in 1987, Congress created the federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program that is allotted to each state, including Florida Tax Credits, each year. The low-income housing credits equate to a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the holder's federal tax liability. This reduction can be taken for up to ten years if the project satisfies the Internal Revenue Code's requirements each year. Each state receives an annual allotment of housing credits, primarily on a per capita basis. For the year 2001, Florida's allotment of low-income housing credits is $23,973,567, of which $20,695,689 is available for allocation. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation is the "housing credit agency" responsible for the allocation and distribution of Florida's low-income housing tax housing credits to applicants for the development and/or substantial rehabilitation of low-income housing. See Subsection 420.5099(1), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to state and federal mandates, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation has established a competitive application process for the award of low-income housing credits. Rule 67-48.004, Florida Administrative Code, as adopted on February 22, 2001, established the process by which the Florida Housing Finance Corporation evaluates, scores, and competitively ranks the applicants for the award of funds and the allocation of housing credits. Under the review and application process, staff of the Florida Housing Finance Corporation first conducts a preliminary review of the applications. Based on that review, a preliminary score is assigned to each application. After the Florida Housing Finance Corporation's preliminary review and scoring, all applicants may review the applications and challenge what they believe to be scoring errors made by the Florida Housing Finance Corporation. Any applicant alleging scoring errors must make such challenges, in writing, on a Notice of Possible Scoring Error Form (NOPSE) within ten days of the applicant's receiving the preliminary score. This form is an official form developed and provided by the Florida Housing Finance Corporation. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation then reviews each timely filed NOPSE, adjusts scores where applicable, and issues a position paper to the affected applicants informing them of the decision relative to the NOPSE. Affected applicants are then given an opportunity to submit supplemental information, documentation, or revised documents that might address challenges made in any NOPSE. Any such submission by an applicant whose scores have been challenged is called a "Cure." The Florida Housing Finance Corporation provides a Cure Form on which the challenged applicant may submit its statement of explanation addressing the issues raised in the NOPSEs. Following the submission of a Cure by an applicant whose application has been challenged, competitors are allowed to review the supplemental or corrective information which comprises the Cure. After reviewing the Cure, competitors may point out what they perceive to be errors or deficiencies on the challenged applicant's Cure. These perceived errors or deficiencies are then submitted to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation, in writing, on a form entitled, Notice of Alleged Deficiency (NOAD), that was developed and provided by the Florida Housing Finance Corporation. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation reviews the Cure submitted by the applicant whose application has been challenged and the NOADs submitted by competing applicants. Following this review, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation assigns each application a pre-appeal score. Boynton submitted an application to Florida Housing Finance Corporation for the 2001 Combined Rental Cycle ("2001 Combined Cycle") to receive annually $559,025.14 in tax credits for the rehabilitation of Boynton Terrace, a multifamily housing property. The application was submitted on February 26, 2001, the deadline for submitting applications for the 2001 Combined Cycle. Pursuant to the review and scoring procedures set forth in the 2001 Combined Cycle Application Form and Rule 67- 48.004, Florida Administrative Code, as adopted February 22, 2001, described in paragraphs 7 through 12 above, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation scored the application of Boynton. The application for the allocation of housing credits consists of several forms. However, the only form at issue in this case is Form 5, entitled "Local Government Contributions." Form 5 indicates a local government's support of the affordable housing project for which tax credits are being sought. In scoring Form 5, Florida Housing Finance Corporation awards points based on the amount of "tangible, economic benefit that results in a quantifiable cost reduction and are development specific." The maximum number of points that can be awarded on Form 5 is 20 points. To obtain the maximum number of points for Form 5, the applicant must provide evidence of a local government contribution for which the dollar amount is equal to or greater than one of the following: (1) a specified amount according to the county in which the proposed project is located, or (2) ten percent (10%) of the total development costs of the project listed in Form 4 of the application. In this case, Boynton's application indicated that the local government contribution was 10 percent of its total development costs of $5,096,789, or $509,678.90. At or near the time Boynton's application was submitted, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation determined that the application was complete and, thereafter, conducted a preliminary review of the application. Based on its preliminary review of Boynton's application, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation awarded a total of 618 points to Boynton. Of this preliminary score, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation awarded Boynton 20 points, the maximum allowed, for Form 5. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation's preliminary award of 20 points to Boynton for its Form 5 was based on local government contributions listed on the application as follows: donation of landscaping materials valued at $50,000 and donation of dumpsters during the rehabilitation of Boynton Terrace valued at $19,845; (2) waiver of tipping fees at the local landfill of $25,500 and waiver of building permit fees of $61,609; and (3) $353,196 for waiver of the requirement to construct 58 parking spaces at $6,089.60 per space. Form 5 provides that a local government contribution for a waiver of parking space requirements will not be recognized except in certain circumstances. Among the circumstances in which a waiver of parking space requirements is expressly recognized as a local government contribution are rehabilitation developments located in areas targeted for neighborhood revitalization by local governments. Once this threshold requirement is established, the local government must also verify that the existing local government code would require the additional parking, and that the parking requirements are waived specifically for the subject development. As part of the information required by Form 5, Boynton provided a letter from Mr. Michael Rumph, the Director of Planning and Zoning for the City of Boynton Beach, verifying that Boynton Terrace is a rehabilitation development located in an area targeted for revitalization by the local government. Additionally, the letter stated in part the following: In support of the [Boynton Terrace Apartments] housing development, the City of Boynton Beach has accepted and processed an application for a variance to provide relief from the City of Boynton Beach Land Development Regulations, Chapter 2, Zoning, Section 11 Supplemental Regulations, H. 16. a.(2)., requiring a minimum parking space ratio of 2 spaces per unit, to allow a reduction of 58 spaces or a 1.3 space per unit variance. The Boynton Terrace Apartments rehabilitation development is located in an area targeted for neighborhood revitalization by the local government. As such, if parking requirements are waived for the project, such waiver or variance is recognized as a local contribution. Boynton Terrace is comprised of 84 multi-family residential units. For each unit in the development, the City of Boynton Beach Land Development Regulations requires two parking spaces. Accordingly, based on the City's regulations, 168 parking spaces would be required for the Boynton Terrace development. Boynton applied for a variance to be able to construct fewer parking spaces than the 168 spaces, since much of the area currently occupied by existing parking would be encroached upon by the construction of the new clubhouse/community center, the new landscaping, and other amenities. The City Commission for the City of Boynton Beach, after a full hearing on Boynton's request, granted the variance, which obligated Boynton to provide 1.3 parking spaces for every multi-family residential unit at the property rather than two parking spaces for every such unit. As a result of the City Commission's decision, the Boynton Terrace development was required to have 110 parking spaces instead of the 168 spaces required by the City of Boynton Beach Land Development Regulations. On Form 5 of its application, Boynton indicated that the City reduced the required number parking spaces from 168 to 110. Form 5 of the application also indicated that by the City's reducing the required number of parking spaces by 58 spaces, the local government contribution with regard to parking spaces was the cost of constructing 58 parking spaces at a cost of $6,089.60 per space, or $353,196.80. An attachment to the City's "contribution letter" referred to in paragraph 21, and part of Boynton's application, indicated that as a result of the City's reducing the number of parking spaces required at Boynton Terrace, the City's contribution to the Boynton Terrace development was $353,196.80. According to the aforementioned attachment, this amount represented the cost of constructing 58 parking spaces at a cost of $6,089.60 per space. After the Florida Housing Finance Corporation issued it preliminary scores, three competing applicants submitted NOPSEs, challenging Boynton's Form 5 score of 20. According to the NOPSEs, the competing applicants believed that Boynton was not entitled to be awarded points based on a local contribution of $353,196 for a waiver or variance of the number of parking spaces required for the development. According to the NOPSEs, Boynton was only receiving a cost savings from not having to construct 11 parking spaces because 157 parking spaces already existed at Boynton Terrace. Based on these challenges, the competing applicants indicated that the local government contribution for a waiver of the City's parking space requirement should be reduced from $353,196 to $66,985.60, the cost of Boynton's constructing 11 parking spaces at $6,089.60 per space. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation reviewed and considered the NOPSEs filed by competing applicants that challenged the local government contribution of $353,196 listed on Form 5 of Boynton's application. Following its review, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation reduced Boynton's preliminary score on Form 5 from 20 points to 8.79 points. This reduction in points represented a pro rata reduction based on the Florida Housing Finance Corporation's decision that the local government contribution, with regard to parking spaces, was $66,985.60 instead of $353,196, the amount stated on Form 5 of Boynton's application. As previously noted in paragraph 10, applicants whose applications have been challenged are permitted to submit a Cure in response to NOPSES filed by competing applicants. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation's Cure Form consists, in part, of a page entitled "Brief Statement of Explanation for Revision/Addition for Application 2001- ." In addition to submitting a Cure Form, pursuant to Rule 67.48.004 (11), Florida Administrative Code, as adopted February 22, 2001, Boynton was allowed to submit additional documentation, revised forms, and other information that it deemed appropriate to address the issues raised in the NOPSEs and to any score reductions imposed by the Florida Housing Finance Corporation. In response to the NOPSEs filed by the competing applicants and the Florida Housing Finance Corporation's reduction in Boynton's Form 5 score, Boynton submitted an explanation on a Cure Form, which stated in relevant part the following: [T]he application involves substantial rehabilitation with new amenity areas, a clubhouse/community center and dumpsters. To meet the demands called for under the proposed renovation, many of the parking spaces are lost to provide for the rehabilitation and other features called for within the application. As such, because of these significant changes, the applicant would have had have [sic] new parking areas and the incurred costs in providing for the new parking. In cooperation and conjunction with the City, the applicant was able to obtain specific cost savings for the parking and has evidenced same within the application as called for. The applicant is saving the stated number of spaces and the costs associated with otherwise having to build them. According to the Cure submitted by Boynton, the application "involves substantial rehabilitation with new amenity areas, a clubhouse/community center and dumpsters." Boynton also stated that "to meet the demands called for under the proposed renovation, many of the parking spaces are lost to provide for the rehabilitation and other features called for within the application." While the Cure submitted by Boynton referred generally to "amenity areas" and a "clubhouse/community and dumpsters," Form 7 of Boynton's application noted the specific features that would be included in the Boynton Terrace rehabilitation project. Form 7 of the application listed several features that could be included in the rehabilitation project. From this list, applicants were to mark the boxes, indicating the particular features that would be included in their respective developments. Form 7 including the category, "Quality of Design," includes Sections A, B, and C. Each section lists features which the applicant may provide as part of the rehabilitation project. At the end of the "Quality of Design" category" is the following pre-printed language: IMPORTANT! CHECKING ITEMS IN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF QUALITY DESIGN COMMITS THE APPLICANT TO PROVIDE THEM. . . . On Form 7, Section B of the "Quality of Design" category, Boynton indicated that it would provide eight of the listed features. These features included the following: an exercise room, a community center or clubhouse, a playground/tot lot, a covered picnic area, an outside recreation facility for older children, and a library. After Boynton submitted its Cure Form, competing applicants filed (NOADs) with the Florida Housing Finance Corporation pursuant to Rule 67-48.004(12), Florida Administrative Code, as adopted on February 22, 2001. One NOAD indicated that no documents were submitted by Boynton to show the number of spaces that would have to be eliminated or demolished as part of the rehabilitation or how many spaces would have to be constructed as part of the rehabilitation process. Another NOAD stated that the Cure submitted by Boynton amounted to a "de facto appeal," because the initial application did not indicate that the renovation would involve the loss of parking spaces. The NOADs relied on a 1980 as-built survey to argue that Boynton Terrace already contained a parking lot with 157 spaces. Based on its review of Boynton's Cure Form and the NOADs submitted in response thereto, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation determined that Boynton should be awarded 8.79 points for Form 5. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation believes that the 8.79 points awarded to Boynton for Form 5 are appropriate based on its determination of the local government contribution listed on and substantiated by the application and the information provided on Boynton's Cure Form. In reducing Boynton's preliminary award for Form 5 from 20 points to 8.79, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation accepted and concurred with the statements expressed in the NOPSEs. According to those statements, described in paragraph 28, Boynton should receive credit for a local contribution of $66,985, the cost of building 11 parking spaces. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation does not accept that the proposed cost of constructing each new parking space is $6,089, as noted in Boynton's application, is the actual cost. Rather, it considers the proposed cost of $6,089 to be questionable. The reason the Housing Corporation questioned the proposed cost of $6,089 to construct each new parking space was that documentation reflected that during a period of less than three months, the projected cost went from $4,017.19 per space as of December 6, 2000, to $5,821 as of February 12, 2001, and finally to $6,089 as of February 23, 2001. During the time Boynton's application was being reviewed, Mr. Christopher Bushwell, a former construction manager with the Corps of Engineers and an auditor with the Florida Housing Finance Corporation, questioned the increased cost of the construction of each parking space from $4000 to $6000. Despite Mr. Bushwell's concern about the accuracy of the projected cost of construction of each parking space, no staff member of the Florida Housing Finance Corporation called to verify the figure with the City of Boynton Beach. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation produced no evidence to support its contention that the projected or estimated cost for construction of each parking space was not accurate. Yet it persisted in its belief that Boynton "back[ed] into" the parking space estimates solely for the purpose of presenting to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation a local government contribution equal to or near $353,196, a figure that would result in Boynton's being awarded the maximum of 20 points for Form 5. The projected cost of $4,017 for construction of a parking space was included on the City's Variance Review Report dated December 6, 2000. That report analyzed Boynton's request that a variance be granted that allowed one parking space per unit, or a total of only 84 parking spaces. It is unknown who arrived at this figure or how it was derived. On January 16, 2001, the City agreed to grant Boynton a variance to reduce the number of parking space by 58, thereby reducing the number of required parking spaces from two spaces per unit to 1.3 spaces per unit. After the variance was granted on January 16, 2001, on February 12, 2001, the City of Boynton Beach submitted a letter to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation stating that the variance had been granted reducing the required number of parking spaces from two spaces per unit to 1.3 spaces per unit. The letter stated that the cost for each parking space was $5,821, which would result in a local government contribution of $337,630. On February 23, 2001, the City of Boynton Beach submitted another letter to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation identical to the February 12, 2001, letter except that the attachment to the former letter indicated that the construction cost for each parking space was $6.089.60. This projected cost would result in the local government contribution of $353,196.80 for the reduction in required parking spaces. The estimates for the cost of constructing each parking space stated in the February 12 and February 23, 2001, letters were made by Jeffrey Kammerude and approved by the City's Engineering Department. Mr. Kammerude is a licensed contractor and the construction manager of Heritage Construction Company, the company that would be responsible for the renovation of Boynton Terrace. Mr. Kammerude changed the estimated cost of each parking space from $5,821 to $6,089 because at the time of the former estimate, it was his belief that the local building code required a 20-foot minimum driveway or aisle-way. However, after meeting with City officials, Mr. Kammerude was told that the 20-foot aisle-way that he had used in making the February 12, 2001, estimate was incorrect and that with the back-to-back parking that existed at Boynton Terrace, the aisle-way had to be 27 feet wide. The increased size of the aisle-way would require a corresponding increase in the required pavement and, thus, an increase in the cost of constructing each parking space. The reason given by Mr. Kammerude for increasing the estimated cost of each parking space was uncontroverted. Moreover, the greater weight of the evidence established that the estimated cost of $6,089 per parking space was not only reasonable, but was likely lower than the actual per space construction cost because it did not include the cost of curbing. In view of the credible testimony of Mr. Kammerude, the cost estimate of $6,089.60 for constructing a parking space at Boynton Terrace is reasonable. In February 2001, at or near the time Boynton submitted its application to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation, the parking lot at Boynton Terrace was in poor condition and had many potholes and cracks in the pavement. Given the condition of the parking lot, the rehabilitation of Boynton Terrace would require repaving of at least part of the parking lot. On October 31, 2001, about eight months after Boynton submitted its application, Mr. Bushnell went to Boynton Terrace to count the parking spaces and look at the parking lot. From his cursory observation, it appeared that the parking lot had been recently resurfaced and was in "excellent shape. However, Mr. Bushnell did not conduct a comprehensive inspection of the parking lot and was unable to determine the quality of the work done on the parking lot or whether the work complied with the requirements of the applicable provisions of the City of Boynton Beach Land Development Code. The City of Boynton Beach requires a permit for the repaving and/or repair of parking lots at developments such as Boynton Terrace. However, no permit was issued for the repaving and/or repair of the parking lot at Boynton Terrace referenced in the preceding paragraph. Consequently, the City never conducted an inspection of the parking lot to determine if the parking lot repairs and/or repaving at Boynton Terrace met the applicable City Code requirements. Based on the number of parking spaces that he counted while at Boynton Terrace, Mr. Bushnell questioned the cost reduction of eliminating spaces. Moreover, because Mr. Bushnell saw concrete pads in place for dumpsters, he did not believe that parking spaces needed to be eliminated in order to place dumpsters on the property. Finally, in reaching the conclusion that there would be no reduction in parking spaces, Mr. Bushnell did not consider the number of spaces that would be eliminated as a result of the addition of any of the new amenities to the property such as the clubhouse/community center, picnic areas, and mailbox kiosks, and the landscaping required under the City Code. Boynton had a site plan prepared on or near December 2000, which showed the placement of many of the new amenities to be included as a part of the rehabilitation of the Boynton Terrace development. The site plan was used as part of Boynton's submission and presentation to the City when it was seeking a parking space variance. According to the site plan, the clubhouse/community center would consume 25 to 30 parking spaces, the landscaping of the development would consume about 15 parking spaces, and the picnic area would consume about two to four parking spaces. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation did not consider that the addition of the new amenities would reduce the number of parking spaces at the property and result in the need to construct new parking spaces unless the City of Boynton Beach granted a variance to Boynton. Boynton did not include the December 2000 site plan as part of its application or Cure submitted to the Florida Housing Corporation. Moreover, Boynton did not provide information in its application or Cure regarding how many spaces would be eliminated as a result of construction of a clubhouse community center. At hearing, Boynton presented credible evidence that the clubhouse/community center would be constructed over existing parking spaces and that without a variance from the City of Boynton Beach, it would have to construct new spaces to replace those spaces lost to construction as well as to other features related to the rehabilitation of the development. Boynton also presented credible evidence that additional parking spaces at Boynton Terrace would be eliminated due to the City's landscaping requirements, the construction of a picnic area, a tot lot, and mail box kiosks. The City's Code requires 20 feet of landscaping for each parking space. However, this information was not included in the Cure submitted by Boynton to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation. The variance granted by the City of Boynton Beach amounted to a waiver of the parking space requirements applicable to the Boynton Terrace rehabilitation project which provided a tangible economic benefit that resulted in a quantifiable cost reduction that is specific to the development.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation award to Petitioner, Boynton Associates, Ltd., the maximum number of 20 points for Form 5 of the 2001 Combined Cycle, and enter a Final Order awarding Boynton Associates, Ltd., a total of 622 points for it Combined Cycle Application. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Kaplan, Executive Director Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 Elizabeth G. Arthur, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 Jon C. Moyle, Jr., Esquire Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Kollins, Raymond & Sheehan, P.A. 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
