The Issue The issue presented here concerns the jurisdiction of the Respondent State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, to pass on the issue of whether the Petitioner, John Jackson, meets the definition of sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes; it having been determined that the Department has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner. Secondarily, this Recommended Order considers the question of whether the Petitioner can, through the process of this administrative hearing, controvert the clinical summary dated October 13, 1980, by challenging the findings of that report, even if it has been determined that the Department has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner and the Department is without jurisdiction to enter a final order on the question of whether the Petitioner meets the definition of sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes. Of particular interest on the secondary issue is that part of the report which indicates that the Petitioner still meets the definition of sex offender.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the Petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 5, 1981. Specifically, the Petition asked that a Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing be conducted to consider the question of whether the Respondent State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner John Jackson, who was enrolled in one of the Respondent's sex offender programs at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida. The prayer for relief offered by the Petitioner was in keeping with the language of Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977), which states: . . . if the department returns an offender to the court because the department has determined that it has exhausted all treatment of the offender, the court shall remove the offender from the custody of the department. A continuance of the formal hearing scheduled for January 30, 1981, was granted and the final hearing was eventually held on March 3, 1981. At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the Petitioner promoted a substantial change to the Petitioner's claim for relief. That change was one which conceded the dispute fashioned in the details of the "Petition for Administrative Hearing," in that the Petitioner and Respondent agree that the Respondent had exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the programs for sex offenders offered in the State of Florida. The Petitioner then attempted to amend his Petition to request that a final order be entered by the Secretary, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services which decided if the Petitioner continued to meet the definition of sex offender found in Chapter 917, Florida Statutes. Additionally, the Petitioner, in the person of his counsel, attempted to amend the Petition to attack the details of the staff report of October 13, 1980, dealing with the status of the Petitioner's condition with particular emphasis on the finding that Jackson continued to he a sex offender. The Respondent was opposed to the amendment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Respondent to consider these claims, it having been determined that the Respondent had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner and moreover, the Respondent objected to the change in the Petition which did not grant the Respondent sufficient notice to prepare to defend against the accusations. The Respondent's position was found to be meritorious and the reasons for that decision will be discussed in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.
The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Christopher S. Allsup, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 10, 1980. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for January 30, 1981, but was not conducted until April 2, 1981, to allow Petitioner to be examined by an independent physician. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf. The Respondent called as witnesses Alison Dowling, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital and Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 was admitted as evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the order of court and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, the Respondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. The principal treatment modality in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in the group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization but no significant change in his behavior has been observed during this period. His condition has been diagnosed as antisocial personality. Persons who carry this diagnosis have a consistent pattern of antisocial behavior involving the violation of rights of others. In the Petitioner's case, this has lead to offenses of breaking and entering and other forms of theft, together with sexual crimes, substance abuse and fighting. In spite of the efforts at treating his condition, the Petitioner has made no significant progress and continues to be dangerous. The Petitioner has participated in group therapy, recreational therapy, vocational rehabilitation and band and music. The Petitioner has done well in recreational therapy having been interested in athletics as a young man. In addition, he has made progress in vocational rehabilitation in the typing and accounting courses which he has participated in and has shown satisfactory interest in band and music. Notwithstanding the progress in these areas, his progress in group therapy, the primary treatment modality, has not been satisfactory, and without progress in that area, his achievement in the adjunctive therapies will not lead to a satisfactory result related to his underlying diagnosis. He simply has not used the group therapy sessions as a vehicle for self discovery which is needed to identify his problems and to clarify the deficiency in his personality. In the group therapy sessions, he has presented minimal information about himself and when asked to discuss his problems, he has been guarded and occasionally hostile. Without opening up, it has been impossible to identify the reason for his sexually deviant behavior which is a symptom of his underlying difficulty. The Petitioner was referred to Alcoholics Anonymous within the Hospital unit, but he has not participated in that program in a significant way. This program would have assisted the Petitioner in view of his problem with substance abuse. In the summary of 1980, an informal staffing conference was held to discuss the Petitioner's progress and he was told that the staff did not feel that he was participating freely and that he was not discharging sufficient information to achieve progress. The Petitioner did not agree and felt that he had been doing what was necessary. In an effort to try to assist the Petitioner, the staff gave him another chance before they decided that treatment had been exhausted. In addition, an agreement was made with him in which the Petitioner was to refrain from acting out; to be more open in group therapy; to write nightly self-reports to the therapist and to learn to deal with authority figures. The effort by staff to assist the Petitioner in achieving progress was not successful and on November 18, 1980, in the formal staff session, it was determined that the staff had exhausted all available treatment for the patient. It was also determined that he still met the definition of sex offender. (It should be noted that some attempts have been made to deal with the patient through individual therapy, but this form of treatment is not the most beneficial approach with a person who has an antisocial personality and who tends to be manipulative with his therapist.) On January 26, 1981, the Petitioner was presented to a screening committee constituted of the program administrators in the various sex offender programs within the State of Florida, and it was the determination of those individuals that treatment had been exhausted for the Petitioner in any program that might be available in the State of Florida. In summary, although the Petitioner has made improvement, it is not sufficient enough to cause the Respondent to continue to exert effort in remedying his problems. He continues to be guarded and withdrawn and to impart little information about himself. The Petitioner feels that in his twenty-six (26) months stay in the program, that he has made progress in the area of impulse control and judgment and accepting authority figures and acting more responsibly. He feels that he used to be "hot tempered" and easily intimidated and involved in lots of fights. In this program he has been in only one fight. If allowed to remain, the Petitioner says he could improve and could work in the future, notwithstanding, problems being open around others and a tendency to hesitate in dealing with others. He feels that he has accepted the responsibility for his criminal act and is not proud of it and is in fact ashamed of what he has done and could control himself in the future. His feeling of guilt has slightly placed a burden on his discussing the problem, according to the Petitioner. As he states it, he can relate to the group what happened, he can not relate why he did the act. Finally, the Petitioner says that the group sessions have been beneficial and although he has not "put" his "all in it" he has progressed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Christopher S. Allsup, and that said Christopher S. Allsup be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: David T. Young, Esquire Post Office Box 563 Rockledge, Florida 39255 Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
Findings Of Fact Prior to his termination, Petitioner had been employed as a Correctional Officer by the Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Glades Correctional Institute for approximately two years. On April 3, 1987, Petitioner signed a written statement acknowledging that he was immediately responsible for reading the rules of the Respondent. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Mr. Edward Minor, Correctional Officer Supervisor at Glades Correctional Institute. Mr. Chester Lambdin is the Superintendent of Glades Correctional Institute. Although he felt ill, Petitioner reported to work on January 25, 1989 before his scheduled eight hour work shift was to begin at midnight and continue through January 26, 1989. Petitioner left work due to his illness before the end of his January 26, 1989 shift. Petitioner did not report to work after he left on January 26, 1989. On January 26, 1989, Petitioner contacted his supervisor, Mr. Minor, and informed him that he was ill; that he would not report to work for about two days and that he had a doctor's excuse for his absence. Mr. Minor excused Petitioner for two days, January 27, 1989 and January 28, 1989. Petitioner's doctor's excuse covered the period of January 27, 1989 through January 30, 1989. Petitioner gave the excuse to a fellow worker and requested the associate to deliver the excuse to Mr. Minor. Before February 2, 1989, Mr. Minor did not see the excuse. Petitioner did not contact Mr. Minor until the afternoon or evening of February 2, 1989. Petitioner was not scheduled to work on January 30 or January 31, 1989. Petitioner stated that he knew he should contact his supervisor before each work shift if he were ill and would not report to work, but he stated that most of his fellow workers did not follow the procedure and were not penalized for failure to make the required report. Notice before an absence is the standard policy of the Respondent. Petitioner was on unauthorized leave on January 29, 1989, February 1, 1989 and February 2, 1989. On February 3, 1989, Mr. Lambdin drafted a letter to Petitioner, which was posted by certified mail, informing Petitioner that he had been deemed to have abandoned his position as a Correctional Officer I at Glades Correctional Institution and to have resigned from the career service system.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration issue a final order that the Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of May 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1189 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. The Respondent was the sole party who submitted Proposed Findings of Fact. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2; rejected in part as not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Rejected as conclusion of law. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. As to first sentence, rejected as irrelevant. As to the remainder, adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Lynne Winston, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Mr. Lewis C. Stewart 692 Waddel Way Pahokee, Florida 33476 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Varga, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
The Issue Whether Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact A. Standing. The Petitioner, Peter B. Dolinger, is not incarcerated by the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is, therefore, not subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Petitioner is an independent paralegal who owns and operates a sole proprietorship specializing in prisoner related issues. The intended scope of the Petitioner's business is to include research and pleading preparation for licensed members of the Florida Bar; agency representation before state agencies, in a qualified non-attorney representative status. The Petitioner, while representing an inmate in an unrelated administrative proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings, Archie White v. Parole and Probation Commission, DOAH Case No. 92-2392RXP, sought the release of the inmate's records from the Respondent. The request was denied by the Respondent pursuant to Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code. Archie D. White v. Parole and Probation Commission, DOAH Case No. 92- 2392RXP, is no longer pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. A Final Order was entered in that case in June, 1992. The Respondent. The Respondent is the state agency required to adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (9) When it is reasonably believed that a party may divulge information contained in the files of the department to an offender, the department shall restrict release of any information to that party. The Petitioner has alleged that Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, "facially fails to establish an adeqaute [sic] standard for agency decisions. In other words, a person of common intelligence may imply the utilization of a 'reasonable' etst [sic] or standard thstb [sic] differs in totality from thst [sic] of another, most notably in the absence of definition, guidelines or policy on the standard to be applied."
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Bobby Jones, for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner would be allowed to return to work as a unit treatment rehabilitation specialist in a unit for developmentally disabled adults at Florida State Hospital (FSH). Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on an unknown date, a DCFS committee denied the request. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of a disqualifying offense which occurred on June 4, 1989. On that date, Petitioner was arrested for the offense of "battery- domestic," a misdemeanor under Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). According to Petitioner, the victim in the incident was his former wife. Thus, the offense constituted domestic violence as it subsequently became defined in 1994 by Section 741.28, Florida Statutes. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of "battery" on August 10, 1989. He was fined $75.00, and he was placed on probation for a period of "up to 9 months." In addition, the court retained jurisdiction "to [o]rder rest[itution]," and Petitioner was required to complete a mental health counseling program. Petitioner successfully completed all terms of his probation, including the counseling course which lasted around "six to nine months." In October 1989, Petitioner began working at FSH as a human services worker in a unit for developmentally disabled adults. Eventually, he attained the position of unit treatment rehabilitation specialist, a position involving supervision of developmentally disabled adults. Due to a change in the law, in 1996, he was required to undergo a background screening. That screening uncovered his 1989 offense, and on July 14, 1997, he was disqualified from working in a position of special trust with developmentally disabled adults. Petitioner was then offered a temporary assignment effective July 24, 1997, without any "direct care duties." Most recently, however, he has been employed at a Wal-Mart store in Tallahassee, Florida. Because of his desire to return to his former position, he has applied for an exemption from disqualification. Since the disqualifying incident in 1989, Petitioner worked continuously at FSH for almost eight years. Since leaving FSH, he has been steadily employed by Wal-Mart. Petitioner was described by a former supervisor at FSH as being "dependable," "very good" with residents, and someone who got along well with other staff. Three former co-workers echoed these comments. A present co-worker at Wal-Mart also described Petitioner as friendly, helpful, and courteous with customers. Except for the fact that a former wife was the victim, the circumstances surrounding the incident for which the exemption is sought are not of record, and the "harm [if any] caused to the victim" is unknown. Despite the glowing comments of other workers, the adverse testimony of a former supervisor at FSH must be taken into account. In December 1995, she found Petitioner engaged in a verbal confrontation with another worker. She then directed that Petitioner report to her office. On the way to the office, he told her that the other employee was "going to make [Petitioner] put a board on his ass." At the ensuing meeting, Petitioner became extremely upset and told the supervisor that he wished she were dead, that she would get killed in a traffic accident on the way home, and that he would "spit on her grave." Petitioner subsequently received a written reprimand for using "Threatening and/or Abusive Language" towards his supervisor. In another incident that occurred on May 22, 1997, Petitioner was observed by the supervisor "horseplaying with another employee" in the dining room. When told by the supervisor that such conduct was inappropriate for the workplace, Petitioner stated in a loud, hostile manner, in the presence of both co-workers and clients, that he "would choke the motherfucker out." For this conduct, he received another written reprimand for "Threatening and/or Abusive Language," and he was suspended from work for three days. According to the same supervisor, Petitioner has an "explosive" temper, and she would not want him returning to her unit. Given this testimony, it is found that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he will not present a danger if continued employment is allowed. Besides the disqualifying offense, Petitioner has a long string of misdemeanor convictions beginning in 1979 and continuing through 1992. The specific crimes are described in Respondent's Exhibits 1-7 and 9-31 received in evidence. Petitioner himself acknowledged that he has been convicted of passing worthless bank checks approximately thirty times. Most recently, he was convicted for the offense of disorderly conduct in November 1992. In addition, he was convicted for the offense of simple battery on a former wife in October 1990. These convictions, by themselves, are not disqualifying offenses, and many are so old as to be arguably remote and irrelevant. They do, however, establish a continuing pattern of misconduct, especially since Petitioner has at least eight convictions for various misdemeanors since the disqualifying offense in 1989. Given these circumstances, it is found that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of rehabilitation since the disqualifying event. This being so, his request for an exemption should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949
The Issue This cause came on for consideration before the Hearing Officer on Respondent's motion to dismiss this proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner lacks standing to maintain this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, asserting that Petitioner is net a "party" within the meaning of Section 120.52 (10) Id), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On May 28, 1980, Petitioner, Charles E. Roberts, Jr., pleaded guilty to a lewd and lascivious act in violation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes. His conviction occurred in Case No. 79-9480B, in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Hillsborough County, Florida. Thereafter, on May 30, 1980, Petitioner was adjudged guilty and sentenced to five years in the State prison system. Subsequently, Petitioner, in keeping with the terms and conditions of Section 917.012, Florida Statutes, was evaluated by the State of Florida, Department of Corrections, and the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and was placed in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, by transfer from his confinement in the prison system to Florida State Hospital. At the time of the hearing in this cause, Petitioner was in residence at Florida State Hospital awaiting transfer back to the State prison system. By this proceeding, Petitioner seeks to contest Respondent's determination that all appropriate treatment modes for Petitioner have been exhausted.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and whether disciplinary action should be taken as a result.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Petitioner on February 5, 1993, and was issued Correctional Certificate No. 134881. The Petitioner is charged with the administration of criminal justice standards and training for all law enforcement officers, corrections officers, and correctional probation officers throughout Florida, pursuant to Sections 943.085 - 943.255, and is authorized to discipline individuals licensed thereunder who violate the law. On November 28, 2002, Lake City Correctional Facility Correctional Officer Martha Escobar was approached by Inmate Aaron Smiley concerning his allegations of having fallen down the stairs the previous day as the result of his having been forced by the Respondent to carry six chairs up and down the stairs as a disciplinary measure. The alleged incident had taken place nearly 24 hours before Inmate Smiley reported it to Officer Escobar. Officer Escobar reported the statement on an incident report that she gave to her supervisor. Officer Escobar believed that Inmate Smiley was telling the truth about the incident. Inmate Smiley confirmed the facts previously stated to Officer Escobar to Captain Ruth Shaw who also completed a supervisory report. Lake City Correctional Facility Inspector Paul French interviewed numerous correctional officers under oath and prepared a written report concerning the alleged chair-carrying incident. Inspector French’s report covered the investigation of two charges: that the Respondent threatened Inmate Smiley with bodily harm if he told anyone about the alleged incident; and that the Respondent was untruthful in his responses as to what occurred during and following the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. No inmates who were listed as witnesses by Inspector French in his report were present to testify at the hearing. Officer Escobar had personally witnessed inmates carrying chairs up and down the stairs for disciplinary purposes under the Respondent’s watch in the past. Officer Escobar did not personally witness the alleged incident concerning Inmate Smiley. Officer Escobar had never reported to her supervisors in the past that inmates had been forced to carry chairs up and down the stairs for disciplinary reasons. Correctional Officer Joyce Joseph, who serves as a “mini warden” supervising the unit in which the alleged incident took place and another unit, spoke with the Respondent on one occasion about an incident involving an inmate under his watch carrying chairs up and down the stairs for disciplinary purposes. Officer Joseph neither reported the chair-carrying incident involving the Respondent to her superiors nor did she personally write-up the Respondent for the incident. Officer Joseph did not personally witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. Travis Smith, the Lake City Correctional Facility Recreation Director, had been told in the past by an inmate that the Respondent had ordered him to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline. Mr. Smith never reported to his superiors the inmate’s statement that he had been disciplined by having been forced to carry chairs up and down the stairs. Mr. Smith did not personally witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. Captain Ruth Shaw received a report from her lieutenant, Phillip Mobley, that had been made by Officer Escobar concerning the alleged incident with Inmate Smiley on November 27, 2002. Captain Shaw has a close personal relationship with the Respondent. Captain Shaw had never witnessed the Respondent ordering inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline. Captain Shaw did not witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. Captain Shaw reported that Inmate Smiley told her he had tripped and fallen over chairs while carrying them up and down the stairs. Correctional Officer Maurice Gardner had previous discussions with the Respondent concerning the Respondent’s disciplining of inmates by requiring them to carry chairs up and down the stairs. Officer Gardner does not discipline inmates by having them carry chairs up and down the stairs. Officer Gardner had witnessed inmates in the past carrying chairs up and down the stairs for discipline when he came on his shift immediately following the Respondent’s shift in the correctional facility. Officer Gardner did not witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. Officer Gardner and the Respondent were friends when they worked together at the correctional facility. Sometimes inmates report incidents that are not true. Inspector French interviewed the Respondent once not under oath and a second time under oath. Under oath, on December 31, 2003, the Respondent stated to Inspector French that he had never ordered inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline. The Respondent was well respected at the Lake City Correctional facility prior to the alleged incident. If the Respondent had been found to have ordered inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline he most likely would have received a PSN, a “problem solving notice,” which is a mild form of discipline. The Respondent had never received a PSN or any form of discipline for having required inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline since no such incidents had ever been reported as to the Respondent in the past. The Respondent and all correctional officers at Lake City Correctional Facility had received instruction in the past about the importance of not lying under oath. The senior staff at the correctional facility instruct the correctional officers concerning how serious an infraction the Florida Department of Law Enforcement considers lying under oath. The Respondent had never been untruthful to Inspector French in the past. Sergeant Donna Murphy was aware that Officer Escobar went from cell to cell after the alleged incident of November 28, 2002, seeking statements about the incident from inmates. Inmate Smiley is a small individual who would have had a difficult time carrying six chairs up and down the stairs. Sergeant Murphy had never witnessed the Respondent requiring inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline. Sergeant Murphy did not witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. The Respondent believes that the witnesses who testified against him were forced to make the statements concerning his past disciplinary practices. The Respondent and Officer Escobar have experienced working relationship problems in the past. During his tenure at the Lake City Correctional Facility, the Respondent received one of the highest officer’s evaluations for 2002, and he was recommended for and completed four instructor’s courses: firearms instructor, defensive tactics instructor, instructor techniques, and chemical agents instructor. The Respondent has suffered personally as the result of losing his position at Lake City Correctional Facility. He has been forced to take a low-paying position as a youth counselor at a local community center in order to keep up with his child support payments and living expenses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order as follows: The Respondent violated Section 837.02(1), Florida Statutes, and, as a result, failed to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes; That his certification be suspended for two years from January 16, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Laurie B. Binder, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael A. Kelly Route 7, Box 517 Lake City, Florida 32055 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on September 12, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. In the Petition Rule 33-3.00125, Florida Administrative Code, and I.O.P. #P2-89.10 were challenged. The Challenged Rule is titled "Inmate Telephone Use." The Challenged Rule sets forth the "minimum telephone privileges that shall be granted inmates. . . ." The I.O.P. apparently deals with the same general subject as the Challenged Rule. The Petition includes the use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 4, Affected Interest of the Petitioner, Second Amended Petition, provides the following: 4. That the (Petitioner) is affected by the Agancy [sic] promulgation of 33-3.00125 et. seq. that materially fail to follow the applicable rulemaking procedure setforth [sic] in 120.54. And, establish adequate standards for the Agency decision making as needed June 6th, 1990, August 13th, 1990 that exceed it [sic] grant of authority and fail [sic] to include the requirements of (consistancy) [sic] in delegating to I.O.P. P2-89.10 as 33-1.007(1), (3), (4) mandate and the unbridle [sic] discretion exercised by the Agency to deny (telephonic communication) needed for judicial reason [sic] as requirements of the court in Case # 90- 2968-23 Horton v. Florida Federal S.B. as not being available for judicial needs. [Emphasis in original]. This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition, the First Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. Although it contains some "legalize", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of several employees of the Respondent relating to several alleged incidents involving attempts by the Petitioner to use a telephone. In the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition, paragraphs 13-20 pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in December, 1989, paragraphs 21-42 pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in May and/or August, 1990, paragraphs 43A-48A pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in August, 1989, and paragraphs 52A-59A pertain to an incident which allegedly occurred in January, 1991. These events are further referred to in other portions of the Petition and throughout the First and Second Amended Petitions. Paragraph 24, Statement of the Facts, of the First Amended Petition is fairly typical of the allegations concerning specific actions complained of by the Petitioner: 24 That the (Petitioner) has repeatively [sic] been subjected to the (practices) arbitrary, capriociously [sic], exercise pursuant to 33-3.00125 et. seq. F.A.C. as by Florida State prison administrators as T.L. Barton, L.E. Turner, P.C. Decker, and dates of July 23rd, 1988; June 5th, 1990, August 13th, 1989 and as setforth [sic] herein; [Emphasis in original]. The alleged incidents complained of by the Petitioner have allegedly been the subject of unsuccessful grievance proceedings. Having failed to obtain a favorable response to his grievances, the Petitioner is seeking through this process to have the particular incidents reviewed. The Petitioner's allegations concerning the alleged incidents involving his attempts to obtain use of the telephone are not merely allegations intended to prove the Petitioner's standing to institute this proceeding. The Petitioner is complaining about, and seeking review of, actions of the Respondent in denying him the use of a telephone on the dates raised by the Petitioner in his Petition and his First and Second Amended Petitions. 9 The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rule and the I.O.P. See paragraphs 6, 11-12, 17, 20, 44A, 50A and 60A of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition. The Petitioner also mentions constitutional provisions in numerous other parts of the Petition, the First Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rule or the I.O.P. is unconstitutional. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the specific requirements or provisions of the Challenged Rule and the I.O.P. are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition, the First Amended Petition and the Second Amended Petition. On November 18, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. On December 6, 1991, a pleading titled "Petitioner [sic] Amended Petition Pursuant to Order Issued Nov. 18th 1991 According [sic] Opportunity to Amend" was filed by the Petitioner. The First Amended Petition is very similar to the Petition and suffers from the same deficiencies. The First Amended Petition is devoid of a sufficient statement of the alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the First Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rule and the I.O.P. are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On December 9, 1991, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered dismissing the First Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders. On December 12, 1991, the Petitioner filed a document titled Petitioner's Motion to File a Second and Final Amendment" and a Second Amended Petition. The Second Amended Petition does nothing to correct the deficiencies of the Petition or the First Amended Petition. The motion to file the Second Amended Petition was denied by Order entered December 18, 1991.
