Findings Of Fact Petitioner is in the land development business. Petitioner sold residential lots to various purchasers and contracted through a sister corporation to construct homes on the lots. At the time the lots were conveyed no improvements had been made. Petitioner placed documentary tax stamps and documentary surtax stamps upon the deeds reflecting the consideration for the deeds as the price of the lots. Respondent contends that stamps should have been placed on the deeds reflecting the consideration as the price of the lots plus improvements. Accordingly Respondent is proposing to assess additional stamp taxes, surtaxes, penalties and interest upon the Petitioner in the total amount of $13,002.10. The pleadings, answers to interrogatories and responses to requests for admissions establish that unless Rule 12A-4.13(22), Florida Administrative Code is invalid, Petitioner is liable for the taxes Respondent proposes to assess. The transactions which form the basis of the proposed assessment are package deals within the meaning of the Rule.
Findings Of Fact On May 8, 1986, Petitioner filed with the Department of Revenue, as agent for the Comptroller, an application for documentary stamp tax refund in the amount of $16,125.00. Subsequently, the Department of Revenue recommended that the application be denied and on November 24, 1986, the Comptroller issued an Order denying the application. Thereafter Petitioner duly requested an Administrative Hearing pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and such hearing was duly conducted by William J. Kendrick, Hearing Officer for the Division of Administrative Hearings, on April 13, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. On June 10, 1987, Hearing Officer Kendrick issued his Recommended Order in which he separately stated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and recommended that the application be approved. Copies of that Recommended Order have been furnished to all parties. Petitioner has filed no exceptions to the Recommended Order as of the date hereof, however, the Assistant Attorney General, representing the Comptroller in this matter, has filed exceptions to paragraph 5 of the hearing officer's Conclusions of Law which reads as follows. The tax imposed by Section 201.08, Florida Statutes, is levied on a written obligation to pay money, not on a security interest. Under the provisions of Section 201.09(2), a security interest (mortgage) is not subject to taxation if the written obliga- tion to pay money (promissory note) is exempt from the tax. Therefore, whether the transac- tion is exempt is dependent upon whether there was any material change in the promissory note and the renewal note, and not whether there as any material change in the mortgage. Since, in the instant case, there was no material change between the original promissory note and the renewal note, it follows that the subject transaction is exempt from the tax levied by Section 201.08, Florida Statutes. The Findings of Fact as determined by the Hearing Officer were by stipulated agreement of the parties filed with the hearing officer on June 8, 1987. Those findings are adopted as the Findings of Fact for this Order and were as follows: On February 2, 1981, a Mortgage and Security Agreement was signed by the proper corporate officers of SNW Corp. ("SNW"), PNW Corp ("PNW"), and KNW Corp. ("KNW"), all Florida Corporations securing a Note in the amount of $22,000,000.00 upon which documen- tary and intangible taxes were paid. On October 1, 1983, an Amendment to the Mortgage was signed by the appropriate corporate officers of SNW, PNW AND KNW. No documentary stamps were affixed to this document. On March 13, 1986, a Second Amend- ment to Mortgage and Security Agreement (the "Second Amendment") was signed by the appro- priate corporate officers of SNW, PNW, KNW, and Kenneth Wolofsky, Individually and as Trustee. The Second Amendment refers to the Mortgage and was intended to "secure that certain Renewal Note" from SNW, PNW AND KNW in the amount of $10,000,000.00. The Renewal Note was executed by Kenneth Wolofsky solely in his corporate capacity on behalf of KNW not individually or as trustee. Petitioner, Chicago Title Company, was acting in its capacity as agent for the borrowers and was responsible for having the Second Amendment to Mortgage and Security Agreement dated March 13, 1986, recorded. Documentary stamps were paid under protest upon recordation of the Second Amend- ment in the amount of $16,125.00. Petitioner filed an Application for Refund from the State of Florida for the documentary stamps paid on the Second Amend- ment which was denied by the Comptroller of the State of Florida. Thereafter, the Peti- tioner sought an administrative hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's request for refund in the sum of $16,125.00 be GRANTED. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1987. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact 1-6 are addressed in paragraphs 1-6, respectively. Respondent's proposed findings of fact 1-6 are addressed in paragraphs 1-6, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: Warren R. Tranzenfeld, Esquire Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 1428 Brickell Avenue Forth Floor Miami, Florida 33131 Alan Burns, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0305 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On or about January 31, 1974, the Petitioner purchased a certain tract of property from Rio Branco Corporation. As a part of the purchase price, the Petitioner executed a secured promissory note, and a purchase money mortgage. A copy of the mortgage and the promissory note were received in evidence as Joint Exhibit 1. Although the promissory note is in the form of a direct obligation for the Petitioner to pay the face amount of the note to Rio Branco Corporation, its obligations were limited. The note provides in Paragraph 12 as follows: "Mortgagor, (Petitioner] assumes no corporate liability for the payment of the debt evidenced by this note and mortgage. Mortgagee [Rio Branco Corporation] waives any corporate liability and agrees to look solely to the property securing such debt for payment thereof." Petitioner apparently defaulted on the mortgage and the promissory note, and a foreclosure suit was initiated by Rio Branco Corporation. Petitioner was named as the defendant in this suit which was filed in Sarasota County, and given case number CA-75-1107. Prior to the completion of the foreclosure action, Petitioner executed a quitclaim deed conveying its interest in the subject property back to Rio Branco Corporation. The quitclaim deed was executed in lieu of foreclosure. A copy of the quitclaim deed was received in evidence as Joint Exhibit 2. The Petitioner stipulated that, it executed Joint Exhibit 2 in order to prevent any deficiency from being entered following a judicial sale in connection with the foreclosure proceeding. Despite the stipulation it is apparent that Rio Branco Corporation could not have enforced any such deficiency against the Petitioner due to the above quoted provision of the promissory note. The quitclaim deed was apparently recorded by a representative of Rio Branco Corporation. Through a proposed notice of assessment dated September 9, 1976, the Respondent is seeking to impose documentary stamp taxes, documentary surtaxes, penalties and interest in the total amount of $745.13 upon Petitioner. It is not clear whether the Respondent is also seeking to impose the same taxes upon the grantee of the quitclaim deed, Rio Branco Corporation. Respondent contends that the Petitioner is liable for the documentary stamp taxes on the quitclaim deed, and that the amount of consideration for the deed is the amount of mortgage debt extinguished as a result of execution of the deed. Petitioner contends that as the grantor of the instrument, it has no responsibility for paying documentary stamp taxes, and that further no consideration was given for the deed as a matter of law since no debt which the Petitioner could have been forced to pay was extinguished.
Findings Of Fact The area of dispute involves an alleged insufficiency of payment of documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax, and associated penalties for the insufficiencies, in transactions which are reflected in the Exhibit "C" to the Petition. The parties did not dispute the accuracy of the computation found in the Exhibit "C" to the petition, which was prepared by an investigator of the Respondent. The Petitioner contends that he is only responsible for paying the amount of documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax on the value of the real estate which was conveyed to the several grantees shown in Exhibit "C", as opposed to paying documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax on the value of the real estate, together with the value of the home which was built on that real estate. The facts show that the Petitioner has only paid documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax on the value of the real estate which he conveyed to the several grantees in Exhibit "C". In describing the arrangement between the Petitioner and his wife with the several grantees, The Petitioner and Respondent stipulated that Petitioner's Exhibit #1 accurately represents the documents involved in the initial contact between the Petitioner and the grantee. The Petitioner's Exhibit #1 is a composite exhibit which shows a blank sales contract and installment contract prepared by the Petitioner, together with a copy of an executed sales contract and installment contract in behalf of one of the several grantees. This document has as its function providing a rough estimate in behalf of the parties on the question of the cost of a lot and home, together with the attendant tangible property items that go with the sale. This document is subject to the special conditions of the Farmers Home Administration of the United States Department of Agriculture and is not binding on the grantee. The parties stipulated that Petitioner's Exhibit #2, a composite exhibit, was utilized in the case of the several grantees in this matter. The Petitioner's Exhibit #2 is a construction contract in blank form and a form as executed in behalf of one of the grantees. This construction contract is prepared by the Farmers Home Administration, United States Department of Agriculture. This construction contract identifies the price and contains a general description of the lot which was sold by the Petitioner, and is executed after the grantee has met with the Farmers Home Administration and been approved for a loan. Prior to the execution of the construction contract, the grantees came to the place of business of the Petitioner, which is an office in the back of his home. This meeting was not pursuant to any advertising other than communication by other parties who had sought the services of Jerry W. Thomas, who is a general contractor, certified by the Farmers Home Administration to build homes which the Farmers Home Administration is financing. The grantee would come to Mr. Thomas's office and discuss the construction of a home, and, in the case of the grantees in Petitioner's Exhibit "C", it is contemplated that that home would be built on a lot which Mr. Thomas and his wife owned and would convey to the grantee. In fact, in every instance reflected in Exhibit "C" the home was constructed by Mr. Thomas and was constructed on a lot which Mr. Thomas and his wife sold to the grantee. Before the construction contract was signed, it was necessary for the grantee to be approved for financing by the Farmers Home Administration. It was also necessary under the system that was utilized in financing the matters set forth in the Exhibit "C", that the Petitioner sign an irrevocable option to purchase realty, which was executed in favor of the several grantees. A replica of this form is made a part of the record as Petitioner's Exhibit #4. The meaning of the option to purchase real property, was that the Petitioner stated a price for his real estate and he was bound by that price and must sell the real estate to the grantee, whether or not the Petitioner ever built a home on the real estate. This option to purchase real property was a precondition to the overall financing scheme which was utilized by the Farmers Home Administration. This particular method was identified as a contract method. Should the appraisal of the property as conducted by the Farmers Home Administration indicate that the asking price stated in the option to purchase real property was in excess of the appraised value, then the Petitioner could have refused to sell. In the case of all the grantees found in Exhibit "C", the price stated for the real property was acceptable and the contract was consummated. The technique for executing the contract conditions once the option to purchase real property had been completed and accepted was as follows: A closing was held at which point a warranty deed was executed by the Petitioner and his wife in favor of the several grantees. Payment for the real estate was made from a supervised account in behalf of the several grantees. The warranty deed, which form is shown in Petitioner's Exhibit #3 and is stipulated as being the form utilized in all conveyances alluded to in Petitioner's Exhibit "C" was then recorded. At the moment of recording, documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax was paid on the amount of the real property only. On the day that the warranty deed was recorded, a mortgage and note was also recorded in favor of the Farmers Home Administration for the amount financed by the grantees. Subsequent to the closing alluded to in paragraph one and two of this explanation, the grantee, at his option, had the home constructed. The option referred to, pertains to the ability to hire any contractor that he desired to construct the home on the property which had been conveyed to him. The Petitioner would not have had the right to oppose the grantees' choice of contractor. Had the several grantees desired to choose other contractors, then the Petitioner would have been required to sell his real estate at the option price and that would have concluded the contract. In all cases shown in the Exhibit "C" to the petition, Mr. Thomas not only conveyed the property but constructed the homes on the property as the chosen contractor and was paid out of the supervised account through scheduled payments and a final disbursement made at the 100 percent completion point. Subsequent to the time that the warranty deed conveying the lot, together with the mortgage and note, were recorded, an audit was performed by the Respondent and an assessment placed for the additional value reflected in the the cost of constructing the home. This assessment was for the unpaid documentary stamp tax, documentary surtax and penalties associated with those deficiency assessments.
Findings Of Fact The stipulated facts are as follow: The Petitioners are purchasers of subleasehold interests in Ocean Club III, a condominium in Indian River County, Florida. All of the Petitioners purchased their subleasehold interests from Dye and Reeves Development Company in 1973, except the Petitioner Helen Bane, who purchased her subleasehold interest from the Petitioner Richard Long in 1974. The duration of the subleases was approximately 98 years, and they were paid for with present consideration consisting of cash and mortgages. The document included as Exhibit "A", entitled Unit Sublease, represents the conveyance by which each of the Petitioners acquired his or her subleasehold. No documentary stamp taxes or surtaxes were paid on these conveyances. Prior to closing with the Petitioners, the attorney for the Dye and Reeves Development Company requested William Stanley, Chief of the Documentary Stamp Tax Bureau, Department of Revenue, to give an opinion on whether the Unit Sublease, Exhibit "A", requires documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes. Stanley, in a letter dated July 3, 1973, stated his opinion to be that no documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes were due. A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "B." On November 13, 1974, the Attorney General released an official opinion, AGO 074-350, which reversed the position earlier taken by Stanley regarding taxability of conveyances of subleasehold interests. The Department of Revenue has adopted this ruling as its own. Based upon the letter from Stanley, the Dye and Reeves Development Company assured the Petitioners that no documentary stamp taxes or surtaxes would be required on the Unit Sublease. The Petitioners had knowledge of the letter or its contents at the time they closed the transaction, but at the time of closing nevertheless requested an Indemnification Agreement, Exhibit "C" herein, in which Dye and Reeves agreed to bear the cost of documentary stamp taxes due upon the Sublease. Exhibits "A," "B," and "C" represent all the relevant documents in this litigation. The Department of Revenue has issued Proposed Notices of Assessment against the Petitioners based upon an alleged documentary stamp tax and surtax liability under the Unit Sublease. The Department of Revenue has not assessed any penalties against the Petitioners. The Petitioners are unable to recover the sums alleged to be due as to taxes and surtaxes from the Dye and Reeves Development Company because the Company has no assets. Petitioners are also barred by limitations from recovering the money from the estate of Mr. Dye, who is deceased. The Petitioners and the Department of Revenue's Tax Examiner have held an informal conference, in which the two parties were unable to resolve their differences concerning the aforementioned assessment. If the Petitioners are found to be liable for documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes, the following amounts represent the proper computation of their liability: NAME TAX SURTAX TOTAL EDWARD K. HALSEY 106.50 10.45 116.95 HELEN C. BANE 117.60 43.45 161.05 W.B. WHITAKER, et ux. 165.00 16.50 181.50 JAMES N. SKINNER 115.50 11.55 127.05 MARY GLENNAN 98.40 36.30 134.70 JOHN F. McFEATTERS, et ux. 127.50 46.75 174.25 ALLEN TOUZALIN 121.50 14.85 136.35 RICHARD LONG, et ux. 117.60 11.00 128.60 HOWARD BAIN, et ux. 103.50 7.70 111.20 JOHN MYLES DEWAR, et ux. 126.00 46.20 172.20 JOHN S. STEPHENS, et ux. 99.00 7.70 106.70 PHYLLIS T. HERMAN 103.50 10.45 113.95 CHARLES W. CHRISS, et ux. 96.00 7.15 103.15 KATHRYN LOCKWOOD, et ux. 97.50 35.75 133.25 KATHRYN LOCOD, et ux. 163.50 59.95 233.45 KATHRYN LOCKWOOD, et ux. 100.50 36.85 137.35 The sums stated above do not include any interest which may have accrued on the alleged liability. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the testimony of Howard W. Bain, a Petitioner, was offered on behalf of all of the Petitioners in this case. He testified that he purchased a unit at Ocean Club III from Dye and Reeves Development Company in early June, 1973. Prior to the closing of that purchase, he was advised by his attorney that the latter expected to be provided by the developer's attorney a letter from the Department of Revenue that would state documentary stamps were not payable on the purchase of the condominium unit. Bain would not have closed the purchase if he had had to pay documentary stamp taxes on the transaction. It was his understanding that if any taxes did become due and payable they would be paid by the developer incident to the indemnification agreement. He was unaware at the time that Dye and Reeves Development Company might go out of business in the future. (Testimony of Bain).
Recommendation That Petitioners L.L. Lockwood and Kathryn H. Lockwood, his wife; Howard H. Bain and Mary C. Bain, his wife; Richard H. Long and J. Ann Long, his wife; Edward K. Halsey; Mary Glennan; W.B. Whitaker; Allen Touzalin; and John F. McFeatters and Emily J. McFeatters, his wife, be relieved from any liability from documentary stamp tax or surtax under Chapter 201, F.S. That Petitioners Helen C. Bane, James M. Skinner, John Myles Dewar, et ux., John S. Stephens, et ux., Phillis T. Herman, and Charles W. Chriss, et ux., be held liable for the payment of documentary stamp tax, surtax, and interest thereon, pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, in the amounts set forth in the foregoing Findings of Fact. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of December, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1976.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a tax on a warranty deed is an allowable property cost, as claimed in Petitioner’s Medicaid cost report.
Findings Of Fact Venice operates Sunset Lake, a licensed nursing facility that participates in the Florida Medicaid program as an institutional provider. AHCA is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. On or about June 1, 2005, Venice (or an affiliate, which need not be distinguished from Venice for purposes of this proceeding) purchased the nursing facility that is now known as Sunset Lake from Bon Secours-Venice Healthcare Corporation. Venice filed its initial Medicaid cost report with AHCA for the fiscal period ending December 31, 2005. The initial Medicaid cost report for a nursing facility is used to set the per diem rates at which the Medicaid program will reimburse the facility, both retroactively for the initial period of operations, and prospectively until the next cost report is filed and used to set a new per diem rate. AHCA contracted with an outside auditing firm to audit Venice’s initial cost report. The auditing firm produced an audit report, which identified proposed adjustments to Venice’s cost report. The audit report was reviewed by AHCA analyst Steven Diaczyk before it was finalized and sent to Venice. Venice initially contested 17 adjustments in the final audit report. Before the final hearing, Venice withdrew its challenge to 16 of the 17 adjustments. The only remaining dispute to be resolved in this proceeding is whether audit adjustment number four, which disallowed $49,540.00 of costs in the category of “Property Taxes – Real Estate,” should be reduced by $12,203.80. The disallowed $12,203.80 represents one-half of the tax assessed pursuant to section 201.02, Florida Statutes (2005),1/ on the warranty deed conveying the Sunset Lake real property (including the land, land improvements, and the building) to Venice. Venice claimed one-half of the tax on its cost report because that is the amount paid by Venice; the other half was paid by the seller. Venice contends that this tax is an ad valorem tax and/or a property tax,2/ which is an allowable property cost on the Medicaid cost report. AHCA contends that the tax on the warranty deed is an excise tax, not a property tax, and, therefore, not an allowable property cost. The audit report did not explain the reason for disallowing the $12,203.80 tax, as part of the $49,540.00 adjustment. Instead, the audit report explained the entire $49,540.00 adjustment as necessary to “disallow unsupported costs,” suggesting a lack of documentation. However, no non- hearsay evidence was offered at hearing to prove that Venice failed to give the auditors sufficient documentation of the costs disallowed in adjustment number four. At least with respect to the disallowed $12,203.80 item, sufficient documentation was offered at hearing to support the cost as an actual cost incurred by Venice. The question is whether the documented cost is allowable as an ad valorem tax or property tax, as Venice claims. Documentation for the $12,203.80 tax on the warranty deed is found in the buyer/seller closing statement and on the face of the warranty deed. The closing statement sets forth the total purchase price of $7,500,000.00, which is also the amount of a mortgage loan from Bank of America. The closing statement allocates the total purchase price to the land ($477,000.00), land improvements ($496,500.00), the building ($2,513,250.00), FFE--furniture, fixtures, and equipment ($992,250.00), and personal property ($3,021,000.00). The closing statement also shows a separate category called credits and/or prorations, to appropriately account for items accruing over the calendar year. The first line item in this category is for “Ad Valorem Taxes.” If ad valorem taxes were due for calendar year 2005, they would have been prorated. However, the amount is shown to be zero. As confirmed at hearing, no ad valorem taxes were due for the Sunset Lake property in 2005, because as of January 1, 2005, the property was owned by a not-for-profit entity, making the property exempt from ad valorem taxes. The second line item in this category, for “Non-Ad Valorem Assessments,” for which there was no exemption, shows a total amount for 2005 of $8,235.29, which was prorated to credit the buyer for $3,270.65. The closing statement proration had the effect of charging the seller with its share of the assessments for the part of the year prior to closing.3/ A separate category on the closing statement addresses “Recording Fees.” The first line item in this category is for “Transfer Tax-snf [skilled nursing facility].” The taxable amount is shown as $3,486,800.00. The tax of $24,407.60 is split equally between buyer and seller, with $12,203.80 charged to each. The next line is for “Stamp Tax on mtg. [mortgage].” The taxable amount is shown as $7,500,000.00, the amount of the mortgage loan. The tax of $26,250.00 is charged to the buyer. Another line item is shown for “Intangible Tax on mtg.” Again, the taxable amount is shown as $7,500,000.00, and the tax of $15,000.00 is charged to the buyer. The top right corner of the warranty deed conveying the Sunset Lake property contains the following printed or stamped text in the space marked “(Space reserved for Clerk of Court):” RECORDED IN OFFICIAL RECORDS INSTRUMENT # 2005117710 7 PGS 2005 JUN 01 05:01 PM KAREN E. RUSHING CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA MMARSH Receipt#635187 Doc Stamp-Deed: 24,407.60 [Bar/Scan Code with instrument number] As Venice’s representative confirmed, the reference on the face of the warranty deed to “Doc Stamp-Deed: 24,407.60,” affixed by the clerk of the court in the official records entry, means that a documentary stamp tax on the deed in the amount of $24,407.60 was paid. Because the tax was split between buyer and seller, Venice actually paid $12,203.80. Although the closing statement shows that the tax at issue was called a transfer tax and categorized as a “recording fee,” and not an “ad valorem tax,” Venice contends here that the documentary stamp tax on the deed was an ad valorem property tax, because the tax was assessed on the value of the property. As Venice summarized its position: That irrespective of whether the transfer tax is called an excise tax, a doc stamp tax or any other type of tax, the fact that it is based solely on the value of the assets makes it an ad valorem tax, which is considered by the state of Florida in all cases under Medicaid cost reporting purposes [sic] as a property tax. (AHCA Exh. 3, p. 14). AHCA disagrees. AHCA contends that the documentary stamp tax on the deed is an excise tax, assessed on the consideration for the property transferred by the deed. The parties do agree that the documentary stamp tax rate, applied to either the value of the property or the consideration for the property, was 70 cents per $100.00.4/ The parties also agree that the “property” at issue, which was conveyed by the warranty deed, includes the land, land improvements, and the building. That being the case, it appears from the closing statement that the “taxable amount” used to determine the documentary stamp tax on the deed (referred to as the “transfer tax-snf”) was the sum of the purchase price allocations for the land ($477,000.00), land improvements ($496,500.00), and the building ($2,513,250.00).5/ The documentary stamp tax on the warranty deed was based on the consideration for the property stated in the closing statement.6/ Venice asserts that the documentary stamp tax was based on the “assessed value of the property (land, land improvements and the building) [of] $3,486.750.00[.]” (Venice PRO at ¶ 24, n. 1). However, Venice offered no evidentiary support for this assertion. The amount Venice calls the “assessed value” is actually the amount of the total purchase price allocated in the closing statement to the land, land improvements, and the building. In contrast, the “assessed value” for this property in 2005, according to the Sarasota County Tax Collector’s bill, was $3,724,300.00. The documentary stamp tax on the warranty deed was not based on the assessed value of the property. Venice also contends that subsequent action by the Department of Revenue supports Venice’s position that the documentary stamp tax on the deed was based on the value of the property and not on the consideration for the property. Venice offered in evidence portions of correspondence between representatives of Venice’s parent company with the Department of Revenue in 2008 that resulted in a determination that Venice owed additional documentary stamp tax on the Sunset Lake warranty deed. According to Venice, “the Department [of Revenue] did not agree with the value of assets that Venice had reported and paid taxes on.” (Venice PRO at ¶ 32). Contrary to Venice’s characterization, the portions of correspondence with the Department of Revenue in evidence confirm that the documentary stamp tax on the Sunset Lake warranty deed was based on the consideration for the real property (i.e., the land, land improvements, and the building). The Department of Revenue sought additional information from Venice to establish what the consideration was. The Department of Revenue “Official Request for Information” form asked for “Total Consideration (Purchase/Transfer Price)” for the property conveyed by warranty deed. The form completed on Venice’s behalf reported that the consideration was $3,486,750.00--the purchase price allocation in the closing statement to the land, land improvements, and the building. Along with the completed form, a letter of explanation on Venice’s behalf (with attachments not offered in evidence) went into great detail in an attempt to justify these purchase price allocations, and ended on the following note: We are hopeful that the enclosed documentation and the foregoing explanation of the purchase price allocations will provide sufficient information for the Department to determine that the correct amount of documentary stamp taxes was paid on each of the deeds, based in each case on the agreed consideration paid for the respective real estate assets. Thus, from the evidence offered by Venice, the focus of the Department of Revenue inquiry, as well as the Venice response to the inquiry, was entirely on the consideration paid for the property. The fact that the Department of Revenue ultimately determined that Venice owed more documentary stamp taxes on the warranty deed than was paid is not evidence that the tax was assessed on the “value” of the real property, as Venice argues. Instead, the material suggests that the Department of Revenue disagreed with what Venice contended was the total consideration and/or with Venice’s allocation of the total purchase price to the real property (the land, land improvements, and the building) and to the other assets acquired in the transaction, including furniture, equipment, and personal property. Venice also takes the position that the tax on the warranty deed is an allowable cost pursuant to two provisions in the federal Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM), which is one of the sources used to determine allowable costs. First, PRM section 2122.1 provides the “general rule” that “taxes assessed against the provider, in accordance with the levying enactments of the several States and lower levels of government and for which the provider is liable for payment, are allowable costs.” Next, PRM section 2122.2 provides in pertinent part: Certain taxes . . . which are levied on providers are not allowable costs. These taxes are: * * * C. Taxes in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations, such as taxes on the issuance of bonds, property transfers, issuance or transfer of stocks, etc. Generally, these costs are either amortized over the life of the securities or depreciated over the life of the asset. They are not, however, recognized as tax expense. Venice contends that the documentary stamp tax paid on the warranty deed must be allowed because it is a tax that meets the general rule in section 2122.1, and it is not an excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). The documentary stamp tax paid by Venice on the warranty deed satisfies the general elements of section 2122.1; AHCA does not contend otherwise. Instead, AHCA contends that the documentary stamp tax must be considered an excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). AHCA is correct that the documentary stamp tax on warranty deeds transferring real property is essentially a transfer tax. However, it is not a tax in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. An example of such a tax would be the documentary stamp tax that Venice paid on the mortgage on Sunset Lake, because it was a tax in connection with the financing for the property. Venice correctly points out that, grammatically, section 2122.2(C) suggests that the only taxes excluded under that subsection are taxes in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. The use of the phrase “such as” suggests that everything that follows that phrase must be considered an example of what precedes the phrase. AHCA acknowledges that consideration of the grammatical structure of section 2122.2(C) alone would support Venice’s interpretation. However, AHCA’s expert testified, reasonably and without contradiction, that Venice’s interpretation would render the phrase “property transfers” meaningless. As AHCA’s expert explained, a tax on a property transfer is not a tax on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. Therefore, despite the grammatical structure, taxes on property transfers must be considered a separate type of excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). As further support for this interpretation, AHCA’s expert pointed to the second sentence, providing that the excluded costs referred to in the first sentence “are either amortized over the life of the securities or depreciated over the life of the asset.” AHCA’s expert explained that taxes on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations would all be amortized, whereas taxes on property transfers would be depreciated over the life of the depreciable assets transferred (i.e., the land improvements and the building). Venice relies solely on the grammatical structure of section 2122.2(C), offering no response to AHCA’s reasoning for interpreting the subsection in a way that is contrary to the meaning suggested only by grammatical structure. Venice did not explain how a tax on property transfers could be considered a tax on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations (so as to give meaning to the phrase “property transfers”), nor did Venice explain when taxes on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations would be depreciated over the life of the asset (so as to give meaning to that phrase in the second sentence).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order disallowing $12,203.80 claimed as a property tax expense in Venice’s initial Medicaid cost report. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2014.
Findings Of Fact On December 27, 1976, Petitioner entered into an Assumption Agreement and Release of Seller, a copy of which is appended to this recommended order as Exhibit "A". The agreement contains, in writing, the obligation of Flagler Hospital, Inc., to pay Petitioner the sum of $238,464,52. The document is not a renewal of an existing obligation. On April 25, 1977, Respondent gave Petitioner notice that a penalty and interest under Section 201.08, Florida Statutes, had been assessed against it in the amount of $729.42 because the agreement constituted a note or written obligation to pay money. The agreement was executed in the State of Florida. No documentary stamp taxes have been paid regarding the agreement. The mathematical computation of the tax, penalty and interest is correct. The agreement represents the assumption of an existing debt between Petitioner and Inter-Medic Health Centers, Inc., by Flagler Hospital, Inc. The original debt is evidenced by a note and mortgage dated February 11, 1976. Documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $360.00 were paid as to the original note. No additional indebtedness was created by the agreement, but the agreement releases the original obligor, Inter-Medic Health Centers, Inc., from liability.
Findings Of Fact On January 15, 1975, Gerardo Benesch, Jitka Benesch, H. Albert Grotte, Regina Grotte, Milorad Dordevic, Catalina Dordevic, Milodrag Savovic and Marina Savovic executed an agreement associating themselves in a general partnership, Andean Investment Company. The stated purpose of the partnership was to engage in the business of real estate development, selling, renting, and dealing generally in real estate of all kinds. It was recited in the agreement that, by forming the partnership, the parties wished to reduce their prior expense of managing separate properties through separate managerial agreements. To this end, they transferred certain real estate by quit-claim deed to the partnership, and these properties represented its capital. The agreement provided in Article IV that the net profits or net losses of the partnership would be distributed or chargeable, as the case might be, to each of the partners in percentage proportions based on the amount of their investment in the partnership. The property consisted of warehouses located in Deerfield Beach and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, from which rentals were derived (Petition and Exhibits thereto). All of the properties were encumbered by mortgages of varying amounts and all but two of the quit-claim deeds transferred title subject to the mortgage thereon. Two deeds provided specifically that the partnership assumed the existing mortgage. Although Petitioner's counsel states that this was not intended and was a "scrivener's error", Petitioner partnership has, in fact, made the mortgage payments on all of the properties since their transfer under the aforesaid deeds (Composite Exhibit 1, Stipulation). Petitioner paid only minimal documentary stamp tax on the deeds. Respondent thereafter issued four proposed Notices of Assessment of Documentary Stamp Tax, Surtax, and Penalty against the Petitioner on January 6, 1976, in the total amount of $3,797.00. The tax was computed under Rule 12A-4.13(10)(c), F.A.C., based on transfers of realty (Composite Exhibit 2, Testimony of Dahlem). At the hearing, Petitioner disputed the manner in which Respondent had computed the documentary stamp tax in that each assessment dealt with a husband and wife who held individual percentage interests in the net worth of the partnership. Respondent's computation did not take into consideration the double interest in each assessment. The parties therefore agreed that a recomputation would be made by Respondent and submitted as a late-filed exhibit. This was done and the new computation reflects a total tax liability, including surtax and penalty, in the total amount of $4,053.40 (Composite Exhibit 3).
Recommendation That Petitioner's request for relief from tax liability be denied, and that Petitioner's liability for documentary stamp tax, surtax, and penalties in the total amount of $4,053.40 be sustained. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Allan F. Meyer, Esquire Suite 1500 Post Office Box 14310 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Zayle A. Bernstein, Esquire Post Office Box 14310 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral argument of the parties and the evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the pleadings, the following pertinent facts are found: On June 30, 1973, an agreement for purchase and sale was executed between Bayshore 21, Inc., as purchaser, and Arthree, Inc., as seller, for the purchase and sale of real estate commonly known as the Carriage House. This agreement was executed by Bayshore 21, Inc. in its corporate name, and not as a trustee or other representative capacity. The provisions of this agreement were individually guaranteed by Marvin Glick, the president and sole stockholder of Bayshore 21, Inc. The purchase and sale agreement discloses that the total purchase price of the property is $19,500,000, payable by taking subject to a first mortgage held by the Prudential Insurance Company with the remainder, subject to certain prorations, to be paid in cash. An earnest money deposit in the amount of $500,000.00 was placed in escrow by Bayshore at the time of execution of the purchase and sale agreement. Bayshore 21, Inc. represented and warranted in said agreement that it was a corporation duly organized and in good standing with full capacity to make and execute the agreement and to consummate the transaction embodied therein. Further, Bayshore warranted that there was no provision in its charter or bylaws, nor was it a party to any agreement, which would limit or prevent its consummation of the agreement. Also, Bayshore reserved the right to assign it's interests to any other party upon the assignee's assumptions of Bayshore's obligations or to direct Arthree, Inc. that the deed or other closing instruments would run in favor of a designated grantee other than Bayshore. Pursuant to the agreement for purchase and sale described above, Arthree, Inc. conveyed the Carriage House to Bayshore 21, Inc. by warranty deed dated August 17, 1973. There was evidence that the transaction was not closed until August 23, 1973. Bayshore 21, Inc. took title in its own corporate name, and not as a trustee or in a representative capacity. Proper documentary stamps were attached to this document. On either August 22 or 23, 1973, Bayshore 21, Inc. executed a $1,300,000.00 note and mortgage to Commercial Trading Company, Inc. and a $5,000,000.00 note and mortgage to Security Mortgage Investors. These notes and mortgages were in the corporate name of Bayshore 21, Inc. but were guaranteed by the petitioner and Marvin Glick. These guarantees contain language that the mortgagee may proceed directly against the guarantors in the event of default. There was evidence that utilization of Bayshore 21, Inc. to effectuate the loans from Commercial Trading Company and Security Mortgage Investors was required by said mortgagees because of the fact that the then prevailing interest rate levels were in excess of the noncorporate statutory interest limit. On August 23, 1973, a joint venture agreement was entered into between petitioner and Marvin Glick. This joint venture agreement provided that "The parties acknowledge that BAYSHORE 21, INC. has taken title to certain property as trustee for ZUCKERMAN-VERNON CORP. and MARVIN GLICK and, upon completion of the financing arrangements, will convey the property to ZUCKERMAN-VERNON CORP. and MARVIN GLICK, a fifty (50 percent) percent interest being conveyed to each party. The property that is the subject of this joint venture is the CARRIAGE HOUSE, located at 54th Street and Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, each party to this agreement having a fifty (50 percent) percent interest in said property." On August 27, 1973, title to the Carriage House was conveyed by quitclaim deed from Bayshore 21, Inc. to Marvin Glick and petitioner, each to have an undivided fifty percent interest. Minimal stamps were affixed to this document, which bore the notation "No documentary stamps are required on this Deed inasmuch as the Grantor took title solely as Trustee for the Grantees herein." Thereafter, the respondent Department of Revenue assessed the parties to this August 27, 1973 deed for the documentary stamp taxes due, based upon the $18,550,000.00 existing mortgages on the property at the time of the conveyance ($12,250,000.00 to Prudential, $5,000,000.00 to Commercial Trading Company and $5,000,000.00 to Security Mortgage Investors). The delinquent documentary stamp taxes were assessed in the amount of $55,649.70, and a penalty was assessed in a like amount, making the total amount due $111,299.40.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that petitioner be assessed the taxes and penalties set forth In the proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax and Penalty under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, dated April 23, 1975. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th day of January, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Paul R. Lipton, Esquire 17071 West Dixie Highway North Miami Beach, Florida Harold F.X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida
Findings Of Fact This case comes on for consideration based upon the request of the Petitioner, Fanpac Corporation, for a formal administrative hearing on the question of the propriety of the December 8, 1976 assessment, A-54, of the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue. The claimed assessment pertains to an assignment of lease, recorded at Book 4182, Page 562, Public Records, Duval County, Florida. The assessment states that documentary stamp tax is owed in the amount of $5,404.50, together with accrued interest and a penalty in the amount of the claimed documentary stamp tax. The assessment also states that documentary surtax is owed in the amount of $370.15, together with accrued interest and a penalty in the amount of the claimed documentary surtax. In furtherance of the consideration of the case, the parties have submitted a factual stipulation to be examined by the undersigned in arriving at the terms of the recommended order. Quoting from the stipulation it states:
Recommendation It is recommended that the compromise agreement entered into by the parties, that the Petitioner pay documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax and interest on those amounts in the aggregate of $6,519.06 be accepted. It is further recommended that penalties in the amount of 25 percent of $5,404.50, documentary stamp tax, together with a penalty in the amount of 25 percent of $370.15 documentary surtax, be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Paul M. Harden, Esquire Smith, Davenport, Peek and Bloom 2601 Gulf Life Tower Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Revenue The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
