The Issue Whether the proposed rules, 60Z-1.026 and 60Z-2.017, Florida Administrative Code, published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 7, 2003 (Volume 29, No. 10, at pages 979-80), constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Florida League of Cities, Inc. (“League”), is a not-for-profit Florida corporation located at 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 300, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. The League is a wholly owned instrumentality of its 405 member cities. The League’s purpose is to work for the general improvement of municipal government and its effective administration in this state, and to represent its members before the legislative, executive and judicial branches of Florida’s state government on issues pertaining to the welfare of its members. The League’s members include 175 cities with pension plans for firefighters established pursuant to Chapter 175; and 184 cities with pension plans for police officers established pursuant to Chapter 185. Petitioner Casselberry maintains a local law pension plan for its firefighters and police officers pursuant to Chapters 175 and 185. Casselberry’s pension plan was in effect on October 1, 1998. Casselberry’s pension plan meets all the minimum benefit requirements of Chapters 175 and 185. Casselberry’s police/fire pension plan provides benefits in addition to or greater than the pension benefits it provides to general employees that cost as much or more than the total amount of premium taxes received by the City of Casselberry. Petitioner Deerfield Beach maintains a local law pension plan for its police officers pursuant to Chapter 185, Florida Statutes. Deerfield Beach’s pension plan meets all the minimum benefit requirements of Chapter 185. Further, Deerfield Beach’s police pension plan provides benefits in addition to or greater than the pension benefits it provides to general employees that cost as much or more than the total amount of premium taxes received by the City of Deerfield Beach. Petitioner Greenacres maintains a local law pension plan for its firefighters and police officers pursuant to Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Greenacres’ pension plan meets all the minimum benefit requirements of Chapters 175 and 185. Greenacres’ police/fire pension plan provides benefits in addition to or greater than the pension benefits it provides to general employees that cost as much or more than the total amount of premium taxes received by the City of Greenacres. Petitioner Kissimmee maintains a local law pension plan for its firefighters pursuant to Chapter 175. Kissimmee’s firefighter pension plan meets all the minimum benefit requirements of Chapter 175. Kissimmee’s firefighter pension plan provides benefits in addition to or greater than the pension benefits it provides to general employees that cost as much or more than the total amount of premium taxes received by the City of Kissimmee. Petitioner New Port Richey maintains a local law pension plan for its firefighters pursuant to Chapter 175. New Port Richey’s firefighter pension plan meets all the minimum benefit requirements of Chapter 175, and provides benefits in addition to or greater than the pension benefits it provides to general employees. These benefits cost as much or more than the total amount of premium taxes received by the City of New Port Richey. Chapters 175 and 185, govern the establishment and operation of defined benefit retirement plans for municipal police officers and firefighters employed by cities and special districts. These Chapters also contain a revenue sharing program that allows participating cities and districts to receive a portion of the state excise tax on property and casualty insurance premiums collected on policies covering property within each jurisdiction. In order to qualify for the annual distribution of premium tax revenues provided by Chapters 175 and 185, the local government pension plan must comply with the applicable provisions of those statutes. Sections 175.351(1) and 185.35(1), respectively, of those Chapters were amended in 1999 by Chapter 99-1, Laws of Florida. The two Sections are virtually identical and can be treated interchangeably for the purposes of this proceeding. Section 175.351(1), in pertinent part, reads as follows: PREMIUM TAX INCOME.--If a municipality has a pension plan for firefighters, or a pension plan for firefighters and police officers, where included, which in the opinion of the division meets the minimum benefits and minimum standards set forth in this chapter, the board of trustees of the pension plan, as approved by a majority of firefighters of the municipality, may: Place the income from the premium tax in Section 175.101 in such pension plan for the sole and exclusive use of its firefighters, or for firefighters and police officers, where included, where it shall become an integral part of that pension plan and shall be used to pay extra benefits to the firefighters included in that pension plan; or Place the income from the premium tax in Section 175.101 in a separate supplemental plan to pay extra benefits to firefighters, or to firefighters and police officers where included, participating in such separate supplemental plan. The premium tax provided by this Chapter shall in all cases be used in its entirety to provide extra benefits to firefighters, or to firefighters and police officers, where included. However, local law plans in effect on October 1, 1998, shall be required to comply with the minimum benefit provisions of this chapter only to the extent that additional premium tax revenues become available to incrementally fund the cost of such compliance as provided in Section 175.162(2)(a). When a plan is in compliance with such minimum benefit provisions, as subsequent additional premium tax revenues become available, they shall be used to provide extra benefits. For the purpose of this chapter, ‘additional premium tax revenues’ means revenues received by a municipality or special fire control district pursuant to Section 175.121 that exceed that amount received for calendar year 1997 and the term ‘extra benefits’ means benefits in addition to or greater than those provided to general employees of the municipality. Local law plans created by special act before May 23, 1939, shall be deemed to comply with this chapter. (Underscored language was enacted by Chapter 99-1, Laws of Florida.) The above-quoted underscored language of Sections 175.351 and 185.35 became effective March 12, 1999. The Division of Retirement advised all cities and districts that they could use additional premium tax revenues received in excess of the amount received for 1997 solely to pay for new extra benefits adopted after March 12, 1999. The additional premium tax revenues could not be used to pay for extra benefits adopted before March 12, 1999. Consequently, responsibility for the cost to local governments for extra benefits adopted prior to March 12, 1999, is not defrayed by additional premium tax benefits and must be absorbed by the particular local government. As established by testimony of Respondent's Actuary, Charles Slavin, along with Article X, Section 14 of the Florida Constitution and Part VII, Chapter 112, governmental pension plans must be funded on a “sound actuarial basis.” A plan is actuarially funded when funded by contributions which, when expressed as a percent of active member payrolls or a fixed dollar amount, will remain approximately level from year to year and will not have to be increased in the future, in the absence of benefit improvements. Actuarial funding is based on reasonable assumptions, predictable events and variables so that all the funds necessary to pay employees' future benefits are accumulated by the expected date of benefit payments. A pension plan is funded on a sound actuarial basis when a funding program has been established which, with the payment of level contributions and investment returns over the lifetime of the participants, will fund the difference between the value of expected promised benefits and the available assets. Although pension benefits increase in future years from increased salaries and other facts, pension plans are usually funded on a constant level percentage of payroll. Such funding pays the normal fiscal cost and amortizes unfunded liabilities as required by Chapter 112, Part VII. Payroll growth helps pay for increases in the cost of benefits because employee contributions, based on a level percentage of payroll produce increased funding. Liability increases are offset by payroll growth. Extra benefits for firefighters and police officers in excess of those provided general employees, that were enacted by local governments, prior to or after March 12, 1999, were required by law to be funded on a sound actuarial basis. Premium tax revenues to the local governments are not within the control of those local governments since the amount of tax levied is set by the legislature through statutory enactment. Accordingly, inclusion of future revenues in future years from the premium tax is not a proper actuarial assumption in the funding of extra benefits. Some local governments, despite this categorization of the premium tax revenue, enacted special benefits in reliance upon possible future increases in revenues from the tax to fund special benefits. All local government Petitioners in the present proceeding meet the minimum benefit requirements of Sections 175.162 and 185.16. The cost of extra benefits enacted by Petitioners prior to the effective date of Chapter 99-1 (March 12, 1999), generally exceeded the amount of the premium tax received by Petitioners. Respondent's requirement that Petitioners set aside additional premium tax revenues to fund solely future benefit increases prevented the reduction of future funds for future benefits. Respondent's proposed rules, 60Z-1.026 and 60Z-2.017, are identical with exception that one is applicable to Sections 175.351(1) and 185.35(1), respectively, and read as follows: Use of premium tax revenues: For pension plans that were in effect on October 1, 1998, that have not met the minimum benefit requirements described in Section 185.16, benefits shall be increased incrementally as additional premium tax revenues become available. For pension plans that were in effect on October 1, 1998, that provide benefits that meet or exceed the minimum benefits described in Section 185.16, increases in premium tax revenues over the amount collected for calendar year 1997, must be used in their entirety to provide extra benefits in addition to those benefits provided prior to the effective date of Chapter 99-1, Laws of Florida. For plans that were not in existence on October 1, 1998, premium tax revenues must be used in their entirety to provide extra benefits. Respondent interprets "additional premium benefits" as defined in Sections 175.351 and 185.35 to mean premium tax benefits greater than those received in 1997 and distributed to cities in 1998, prior to enactment of Chapter 99-1. "Extra benefits" means benefits greater than those afforded general employees and in addition to or greater than those benefits enacted prior to the effective date of Chapter 99-1. These definitions presume that amendments in Chapter 99-1 are to be applied prospectively, or after the effective date of that legislative enactment. Extra benefits enacted prior to that date must be funded from premium tax dollars received prior to that date. No evidence was presented by Petitioners of legislative intent that "additional premium tax revenues" should or could be used to fund existing extra benefits enacted prior to Chapter 99-1.
Findings Of Fact John E. Livingston applied for energy assistance on November 16, 1983. From the income shown on his application, Petitioner would be eligible for $84 in benefits. On December 28, 1983, Respondent mailed a letter to Petitioner requesting he present additional evidence to verify the VA compensation shown on his application. Due to some mix-up in the mail, this letter was not delivered to the mailing address of Petitioner until February 28, 1983. The letter was mailed to the address given by Petitioner as his mailing address. This address is the church at which Petitioner is assistant pastor and to which he goes daily. By notice dated February 1, 1984, Petitioner was notified that his application for assistance was denied because he had failed to present the additional information requested within 10 working days as required by rule. Petitioner then submitted his request for hearing.
The Issue Whether the University can require that Mr. Haywood repay $7,487.52?
Findings Of Fact Jim C. Haywood is a Certified Public Accountant and has several years experience in financial and administrative positions. Mr. Haywood has earned a Masters in Accounting Degree. From 1959 through April, 1968, Mr. Haywood served as the Director of Financing and Accounting for the Florida Board of Regents. From April, 1968, through September, 1969, Mr. Haywood served as the Associate Director of Planning and Evaluation and the Budget Administrator for the State University System under the Florida Board of Regents. From September, 1969, through August, 1970, Mr. Haywood served as Comptroller of the University. From August, 1969, through January, 1986, Mr. Haywood served as Dean, Associate Vice President or Vice President and as head of administrative affairs at the University. Mr. Haywood was employed by the University from September 1, 1969, through August 30, 1987. Mr. Haywood is familiar with the policies of the Florida Board of Regents concerning accrued annual leave and the payment therefore upon retirement. In August and September of 1987, Mr. Haywood refamiliarized himself with these policies. Mr. Haywood retired from the University in August of 1987. Prior to his retirement, Mr. Haywood met with Art Cozart, University Classification and Pay Coordinator. Mr. Cozart provided Mr. Haywood with a certificate (hereinafter referred to as the "Certificate") which described the amount of accrued annual and sick leave Mr. Haywood was entitled to payment for upon his retirement. The Certificate provided, in pertinent part, the following: This is to certify that Mr. Jim C. Haywood, S.S.#252-52-7270, has a leave balance with the University of North Florida as follows: Annual Leave: 352.0 hours $7,458.96 Sick Leave: 2,328.50 hours $14,599.62 The stated amount will be laid upon termination of service with the University. [Emphasis added]. The total amount to "be paid upon termination of service" according to the certificate is $22,058.58. This is the gross amount of pay attributable to Mr. Haywood's accrued leave. The actual amount Mr. Haywood was entitled to receive, the net amount payable, was $22,058.58 less twenty percent federal income tax withholding. The Certificate does not, however, distinguish between the gross amount of pay and the net amount which Mr. Haywood was to receive. Nor did Mr. Haywood and Mr. Cozart discuss whether the amounts on the Certificate were gross amounts or net amounts to be paid to Mr. Haywood. Mr. Haywood was provided a Leave Payment Clearance Form dated September 14, 1987, indicating that Mr. Haywood was entitled to payment for only 240 hours of annual leave. Mr. Haywood used the Certificate to obtain a thirty-day loan of $22,893.00 from a private institution. Mr. Haywood borrowed this amount because of the amount listed on the Certificate. Mr. Haywood intended to use the money he received for his accrued leave to repay this loan. Mr. Haywood intended to use this money for living expenses between his retirement and the time when his retirement benefits were to begin. On September 25, 1987, Mr. Haywood received two checks from the Florida Office of Comptroller. One check was in the amount of $5,939.15 and the other was in the amount of $5,990.02. There was no indication on the checks as to what they were in payment for. On October 8, 1987, Mr. Haywood received a check from the Florida Office of Comptroller in the amount of $11,831.00. There was no indication on the check indicating what the payment was for. The total amount of the three checks received by Mr. Haywood on September 25, 1987, and October 8, 1987, was $23,760.17. The total amount Mr. Haywood received was consistent with what Mr. Haywood expected to receive because it was similar to the amount listed on the Certificate. What Mr. Haywood expected, however, was the gross amount he was entitled to before federal income tax withholding. The amount of the three checks Mr. Haywood received, however, was the net amount payable on a gross amount of $29,764.00. One of the two checks received by Mr. Haywood on September 25, 1987, constituted the net amount owed to Mr. Haywood for annual leave. The other check received on September 25, 1987, was an overpayment of accrued annual leave. This overpayment was made in error by the University. Mr. Haywood was paid twice for annual leave. The evidence failed to prove why there was a discrepancy in the amounts of the two checks or which check constituted the overpayment. The W-2 form provided to Mr. Haywood for the 1987 tax year included the amount of gross income for which Mr. Haywood received an overpayment. Mr. Haywood therefore, included $7,487.52 in his gross taxable income for federal income tax purposes for 1987, attributable to the overpayment of accrued annual leave he received. As a result of the inclusion of the overpayment in Mr. Haywood's taxable income, approximately $2,665.00 of federal income taxes attributable to the $7,487.52 of gross income and its effect on taxable income were paid by Mr. Haywood. Mr. Haywood has not filed an amended federal income tax return for 1987. Nor has Mr. Haywood communicated with the Internal Revenue Service concerning this matter. Mr. Haywood has not been provided with an amended W-2. In April of 1988, the University determined that Mr. Haywood had been overpaid for accrued annual leave. On May 3, 1988, the University notified Mr. Haywood of the overpayment of accrued annual leave and demanded reimbursement. On May 12, 1988, Mr. Haywood disputed the amount of the overpayment and requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Mr. Haywood has not repaid any amount of the overpayment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the University's demand for repayment of $7,487.52, from Mr. Haywood be denied until the University determines from the Department of Banking and Finance the amount of the gross overpayment which should be refunded by Mr. Haywood. It is further RECOMMENDED that, once the University determines from the Department of Banking and Finance what amount of the gross overpayment should be refunded, the University should demand payment of the refund from Mr. Haywood and Mr. Haywood should pay the refund to the University. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Norman R. Haltiwanger Director, Office of Human Resources University of North Florida 4567 St. Johns Bluff Road South Jacksonville, Florida 32216 John E. Duvall, Esquire Post Office Box 41566 Jacksonville, Florida 32203 Stephen K. Moonly, Esquire Suite 2501, Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The University's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 4-6 and 8. 2-3 Hereby accepted. 4 11. 5 16. 6 See 23. 7 21. 8 22. 9 17. 10 See 18. 11-12 19. Irrelevant. Speculative. Argument and not totally correct. 15 23. Hereby accepted. 1-7. The eighth, ninth and tenth sentences are irrelevant. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Mr. Haywood's testimony did not lack credibility. 19 9. 20 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Certificate did not indicate that Mr. Haywood was entitled to payment for only 240 hours of annual leave. 21-22 12. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 11. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. 27-28 Hereby accepted. 29-31 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection See 6. See 9. 3-4 16. 5 21. 6 22. 7 23. 8 8. 9 20.
The Issue Whether the proper period of time was used by the Florida Department of Transportation in arriving at the Appellant's, Joseph A. Salem, entitlement to payment under The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act, as implemented by 175-009 Procedure, State of Florida Department of Transportation.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that Mr. Salem, a relocatee, relocated from a federal aid highway project, is entitled to "in lieu of moving expenses". It was stipulated that it was impossible to relocate Mr. Salem inasmuch as there was no other suitable area for relocation. The Appellant, Mr. Salem, had asked that the years 1971 and 1972 be used as an income guideline rather than the years that were used, 1974 and 1975. Mr. Salem commenced the operation of his store in 1968 on Timuquana under a lease providing for a monthly installment of Ninety Dollars ($90.00) per month. The lease was for a term of six (6) years ending on April 30, 1974 and a renewal was commenced on those terms for a six (6) year period. Notice to vacate was given and Mr. Salem sought to relocate and found that there was nothing in the area that he could afford to operate as a one-owner grocery, so it was necessary for him to close out his business as of June 1, 1976. Mr. Salem sought to have the Florida Department of Transportation use the income for the years 1971 and 1972 in considering the amount of relocation expense due Mr. Salem inasmuch as Mr. Salem had an illness in 1973 so that his income for 1973, 1974 and a portion of 1975 did not properly reflect his earning capacity and earnings from the business at the time of the taking in 1976. He contended that when he was properly and fully operating the store in 1971 and 1972 was more realistic than his actual income in the years 1974 and 1975 when he was working at a reduced speed because of an illness in 1973. The Florida Department of Transportation in figuring the benefits based its final computation for payment under the Relocation Assistance Act on average of the last two (2) years earnings prior to the date that he was required to vacate. The average annual net income during those years was Two Thousand Three Hundred Eighty Dollars and Nine Cents ($2,380.09). This figure was offered "in lieu of" payments and Mr. Salem's claim was paid for Two Thousand Three Hundred Eighty Dollars and Nine Cents ($2,380.09) plus that amount required to make the payment Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) which is the minimum amount paid for relocation assistance under the Uniform Relocation Act. Mr. Salem applied for an exception based on his illness so that his income for the year 1971 and 1972 could be used rather than the years 1974 and 1975. The exception was denied inasmuch as the payment was the minimum payment under the Relocation Act and the rules and regulations only allow an exception to use other years than the two (2) next preceding the taking of the property when the construction project itself causes the vacating of the store's clients. The Florida Department of Transportation determined that the construction did not cause the loss of income but the illness of Mr. Salem caused his loss of income and therefore there could be no exception to using the two (2) years income previous to the taking.
Recommendation Dismiss the appeal. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John Paul Howard, Esquire Post Office Box 7189 Jacksonville, Florida 32210
Findings Of Fact In 1975 the Florida Legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Reform Act, Chapter 75-9, Laws of Florida, now codified in Chapter 768, Florida Statutes. Part of this legislative package included the creation of the Fund. This legislation was passed in response to a medical malpractice insurance crisis which arose when the primary underwriter for the Florida Medical Association sought to stop issuing medical malpractice policies in Florida, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for physicians or hospitals to obtain medical malpractice insurance coverage at reasonable rates. As a result of this problem, many physicians began to practice defensive medicine, curtail or abandon their practices or practice without coverage of any kind. The Fund is a private not-for-profit organization, participation in which is totally voluntary for its member-health care providers. Insofar as Petitioners are concerned, membership in the Fund is but one of several options available to provide legally required evidence of financial responsibility in order to obtain licensure as a hospital facility in Florida. Physicians, hospitals, health maintenance organizations and ambulatory surgical centers who become members of the Fund must maintain at least $100,000 in primary professional liability insurance. Membership in the Fund grants to each participant a limitation of liability above the $100,000 in primary coverage. To the extent that any settlement or judgment exceeds the primary coverage of the participant, it is paid by the Fund without limitation. The Fund is operated subject to the supervision and approval of a board of governors whose membership is required by law to consist of representatives of the insurance industry, the legal and medical professions, physicians' insurers, hospitals, hospitals' insurers and the general public. The Department is charged by statute with certain regulatory functions concerning the Fund. As the law existed in 1980 a base fee for Fund membership was set by statute at $500 for physicians, after an initial $1,000 enrollment fee for the first year of participation, and at $300 per bed for hospital members. The statute required the Department to set additional fees based upon the classifications of health care providers contained in the statute. In the event that base fees are insufficient to pay all claims asserted against the Fund for a given fund year, the Department is empowered, upon request of the Board of Governors of the Fund, to order assessments against Fund participants to meet any such deficiency. Under the original legislation, all classes of health care providers could be assessed unlimited amounts to make up any deficiencies. As a result of legislative amendments which became effective July 1, 1976, the amount which participants, other than hospitals, could be assessed was limited to the amount each Fund member had paid to join the Fund for that particular coverage year. 1976 legislative amendments also required that each fiscal year of the Fund, which runs from July 1 through June 30, be operated independently of preceding fiscal years, and further required that occurrences giving rise to claims in a particular fund year be paid only from fees or investment income on those fees collected for that particular year. Thus, it is entirely possible for the Fund to experience deficits in a given year, and yet hold surplus funds for other years. On March 14, 1983, the Department of Insurance issued a "Notice of Assessment for 1980-81 Fiscal Fund Year" (hereinafter called the "Notice of Assessment). (exh. 20) Notice of this Notice of Assessment was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, March 25, 1983, Vol. 9, no. 12. The Notice of Assessment announced that the Insurance Commissioner intended to levy and authorize the Fund to collect an assessment in the amount of $23,684,511 from those health care providers that were members of the Fund in fund year 1980-81 (exh. 20). Each of the hospitals named as Petitioners in the Petition for Administrative Proceedings in Case Dos. 83-1067 and 83-1068 were members of the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund during the fund year 1980-1981. (exh. 40; P.H.S. V 1) The chart below contains the following information concerning fund year 1980-81: the amount of the total proposed assessment described in the Notice of Assessment (dated March 14, 1983); the amount of the losses experienced by doctors and hospitals, respectively; the amount of the fees originally paid by doctors and hospitals; and the amount of the proposed assessments for doctors and hospitals; 1980-1981 Fund Year - Total Assessment $23,684,511 DOCTORS HOSPITALS Losses $19,086,800 Losses $29,798,500 Fees Paid 4,299,117 Fees Paid 6,015,827 Assessments 4,322,233 Assessments 18,734,918 (P.H.S. V 9) The Department computed the portion of the assessment to be paid by the different classes of health care providers for the 1980-1981 fund year based upon an "indicated rate method." This method is represented by the following formula: The Department started with the actuarially indicated rate for each class of health care provider as described in the October, 1981 Actuarial Report prepared by Tillinghast, Nelson, et al. This is called the "indicated rate by class." The Department then applied the following formula for each class: Indicated Rate by Class x No. of Members in the Class = Total indicated fees by Class Total Indicated Fees by Class divided by total Indicated Fees for ALL Classes = Percentage of Indicated Fee by Class Percentage of Indicated Fee by Class x Total Expected Loss for ALL Classes = Expected Loss by Class (Expected loss is ALL losses for the fund year including claims previously paid, reserves established on claims asserted and IBNR [incurred but not reported].) (P.H.S. V 12) The "indicated rate method" for allocating assessments among the various classes of health care providers was selected by the Department as the method which most fairly reflected the classifications prescribed in Section 768.54(3)(c), Florida Statutes. The record in this proceeding establishes that this method is the most feasible mechanism for fairly reflecting classifications established by statute, and, at the same time, providing immediate funds necessary to meet all claims against the Fund. (P.H.S. V 13) The difference between the results derived by the "indicated rate method" and the amounts reflected in the Notice of Assessment is due to the application of the statutory cap on assessments against physician members, as applied by the Department of Insurance. (P.H.S. V 14) Exhibit #17 shows (a) the calculations utilized by the Department in spreading the assessments for the 1980-81 fund year, (b) the amount each class would have paid under the "indicated rate method" for the fund year 1980-81 and (c) the amount actually described in the 1980-81 Notice of Assessment of the Department of Insurance. The Notices of Assessment issued by the Department of Insurance for fund years 1980-1981 allocated the "excess assessments" (which could not be applied to physician members because the 768.54(3)(c)'s limitation on the amount physicians could be assessed) among the other classes of health care providers based upon their percentage of "expected losses." (P.H.S. V 16) The amounts of the assessments sought by the Fund, and described in the Notices of Assessment, were calculated by the Fund by using the following formula: Total fees paid during the Fund Year + Investment Income attributable to the Fund Year Expenses allocated to that Fund Year Amount paid on claims for that Fund Year Amount reserved for all known claims for that Fund Year. (P.H.S. V 17) The fees ordered by the Department of Insurance and collected by the Fund plus the interest income generated by such fees for fund year 1980-81 are inadequate to cover claims against the Fund for that year. (P.H.S. V 19) Petitioners, for purposes of this proceeding, do not contest: (a) the method by which the Fund establishes reserves; (b) the amount of the reserves established for any individual claim file; or (c) the amount of the total deficit described in the Notices of Assessment dated March 14, 1983 for fund year 1980-1981. Nonetheless, Petitioners do not concede that the Fund needs all of the money described in the Notice of Assessment dated March 14, 1983 at this time. (P.H.S. V 33,34) The record in this cause establishes that as of March 14, 1983, there existed a deficiency in the Fund's account for the 1980-1981 fund year of at least $23,684,511 for the payment of settlements, final judgments and reserves on existing and known claims. Approximately $19,405.00 of this deficit is directly attributable to one judgment - Von Stetina v. Florida Medical Center. This was a malpractice judgment against a hospital which has been affirmed on appeal by the First District Court. An appeal has been filed in the Florida Supreme Court. (exh. nos. 1, 2, 18, 19, 26, 27 and 38) In view of the statutory cap on the amounts that may be assessed against physician members of the Fund, the foregoing dollar amounts for assessments for the 1980-81 fund year, and the manner in which they are proposed to be allocated among the remaining classes of health care providers are appropriate. The original fees for the 1980-1981 fund year were set in June of 1980. The Fund by letter dated April 21, 1980 requested that the Department approve an increase in membership fees for physicians and surgeons in the amount of twenty-five (25) percent and a redefinition of rate classes that would move eighteen (18) percent of the physicians and surgeons from Class 3 to Class 2. The Department published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly and notified interested parties on its mailing lists that a public hearing was to be held on June 2, 1980. This hearing was held pursuant to 627.351, 768.54, and Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The purpose of the hearing was identified as "to afford the Fund an opportunity to present evidence and agreement in support of its filing and, further, to afford any affected person an opportunity to present evidence and argument relating to the filing." A hearing was in fact held on June 2, 1980. The Fund presented evidence and argument in support of its request for twenty-five (25) percent increase in fees. No parties argued or presented evidence contending that the fees should have been higher. Subsequent to the hearing, the Department notified the Fund by letter dated June 12, 1980 that its request was approved. Acting on the Department's approval, the Fund sent all prospective members of the Fund for the 1980-81 year membership forms. These forms notified each health care provider what the fees for membership for all health care providers would be. In order to join the Fund each health care provider was required to fill out and sign these forms, thereby agreeing to pay the membership fees and any future assessments which might be levied. Both Petitioners and Respondent have submitted proposed findings of fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact are not included in this Recommended Order, they have been specifically rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues involved in this cause, or as not having been supported by evidence of record.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, a corporation headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina, is in the business of operating movie theatres both within and without the State of Florida. At these theatres Petitioner Operates concession stands which sell both candy items and drinks in various sizes at different prices to persons who frequent the theatres. For the period of time from September, 1985 through May, 1985, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue sales tax on the total taxable value of all taxable items sold at its concession stands in all of its Florida theatres, in accordance with the presumptive effective rate of tax of 5.63 percent contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code. As a result of an audit for a previous period dated October 1, 1982, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue the amount of $10,637.00 for sales tax on taxable items sold at its concession stands during this audit period in accordance with the presumptive effective tax rate of 4.5 percent as contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code during the audit period. On August 15, 1985, Petitioner filed with the Department of Revenue, as agent for Respondent, two (2) applications for sales tax refund in the amount of $16,876.52 and $10,637.00. The applications were dated August 13, 1985, and were timely filed. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner: (a) posted and charged flat prices for the various items offered for sale, which prices included sales tax (b) kept records of daily and weekly sales of taxable items at each of its Florida theatres (c) kept records of daily attendance at each movie shown by each Florida theatre and (d) kept records of weekly calculations, through inventory analysis, of sales of drinks and candy items, including the number, size and price of each item sold at each of its Florida theatre. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner did not maintain cash registers at its concession stands in its Florida theatres and did not maintain records made contemporaneously with the sale of taxable items from the concession stands which separately itemized the amounts of sales tax collected on each sale transaction occurring at the theatres' concession stands. Rather, Petitioner chose, for its own convenience, to operate a "cash box" operation at each of its concession stands in its Florida theatres and willingly remitted sales tax to the Department of Revenue pursuant to the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code for the relevant periods. In April, 1985, Petitioner placed computerized cash registers in each of its Florida theatre concession stands. These cash registers provided tapes of each individual transaction each day, specifically recording each taxable and nontaxable sale and the amount of sales tax due on each taxable sale with a daily summation on each tape at each theatre. Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code, requires concessionaires such as Petitioner to remit sales tax at a rate of 5.63 percent of taxable sales under the present 5 percent statutory sales tax schedule and at 4.5 percent of taxable sales under the previous statutory sales tax schedule unless a concessionaire, through its records, shows another effective rate by "proof to the contrary". Petitioner produced an effective tax rate of 5.13 percent for the month of April 1985, for all its Florida theatres by dividing the total sales tax collected during April, 1985 by the total taxable sales during April, 1985, as evidenced by the cash register tapes from all of Petitioner's concession stands in Florida. Petitioner then used that tax rate as a base to retroactively reconstruct an effective tax rate for the refund periods by assuming that the product sales mix (product mix of products sold) and the transactional sales mix (the number of items purchased together in a single transaction by a customer) experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the month of April, 1985. There was no competent evidence that the product sales mix or the transactional sales mix experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the nonth of April, 1985. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support Petitioner's reconstructed effective tax rates that were used to calculate the refunds. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show "proof to the contrary" that its reconstructed effective tax rates are correct or that the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code were incorrect for the refund periods at issue in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Comptroller enter his final order DENYING Petitioner's refund applications. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1986.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, as the managing member of PNC, LLC (PNC), is personally liable for a penalty equal to twice the total amount of the sales and use tax owed by PNC to the State of Florida.1/
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes. PNC is a now-dissolved Florida limited liability company that did business under the name "CHEAP" at 309 South Howard Avenue, Tampa, Florida. PNC was registered as a business and filed its Articles of Organization with the Secretary of State on June 16, 2010. Until the company was dissolved by the Secretary of State in 2018 for failure to pay the 2017 annual filing fees, Mr. Scott served as its managing member and had administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes. Verna Bartlett was PNC's controller. PNC was registered with the Department as a dealer pursuant to section 212.18, Florida Statutes, and was issued Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration 39-8015401140-8. A certificate of registration requires the taxpayer to file sales and use tax returns and pay to the Department all taxes owed as they are received. After making numerous attempts to collect delinquent sales tax owed by PNC for tax reporting periods in 2013 and 2014, the Department filed this action seeking to impose a personal penalty assessment against Mr. Scott, the managing member of the company. Section 213.29, Florida Statutes, provides that any person who has administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes and who willfully fails to pay the tax or evades the payment of the tax shall be liable to a penalty equal to twice the amount of tax not paid. The penalty is based only on the taxes owed, and not the interest and fees that have accrued. The statute provides that if the business liability is fully paid, the personal liability assessment will be considered satisfied. On January 18, 2018, the Department issued a NAPL against Mr. Scott after PNC failed to pay the sales and use taxes owed the State for the reporting periods from February 2013 through October 2014. The outstanding taxes, exclusive of interest or penalties, total $79,325.75. The NAPL imposes a total penalty of $158,647.50, or twice the amount of sales tax owed by PNC. No payments have been made on the account since the issuance of the NAPL, and, PNC, now closed, currently has a total liability in excess of $200,000.00. During the relevant time period, Mr. Scott was personally responsible for collecting PNC's sales tax and remitting it to the Department; he had the authority to sign checks on behalf of PNC; he made financial decisions as to which creditors should be paid; he made the decision to use the sales tax collected for the business and for stipulation payments; and he made the decision not to remit the sales tax that was collected. This was confirmed by PNC's controller, Ms. Bartlett, who responded to the Department's Requests for Admissions. Mr. Scott also confirmed to a Department tax specialist that the admissions provided by Ms. Bartlett were accurate. Mr. Scott either never remitted payment or did not remit payment timely on behalf of PNC for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January through October 2014. Tax warrants were issued and judgment liens were recorded for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January, February, and April through October 2014. Resp. Ex. 5 and 6. All warrants and liens relate to reporting periods that fall within the personal liability assessment period. A Notice of Jeopardy Finding and Notice of Final Assessment (Notice of Jeopardy) dated June 18, 2014, was issued to PNC pertaining to the April 2014 reporting period. Resp. Ex. This notice was issued after Mr. Scott ceased making regular tax payments, the estimated deficiency was substantial, and the Department determined that collection of the tax would be jeopardized by further delay. A Notice of Jeopardy and Notice of Final Assessment dated August 7, 2014, also was issued to PNC pertaining to the April, May, and June 2014 reporting periods. Resp. Ex. 12. Because PNC reported more than $20,000.00 in sales tax each year, unless a waiver was obtained, Mr. Scott was required to file and pay PNC's sales tax electronically for all reporting periods within the personal liability period. See § 213.755(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 12-24.003. Despite having obtained no waiver, Mr. Scott never filed returns or paid PNC's sales tax electronically. And even though he never remitted a payment electronically, Mr. Scott indicated on at least six sales tax returns during the relevant time period that sales tax for the reporting period was remitted electronically. The only conclusion to draw from this action is that Mr. Scott filed or directed the filing of these returns knowing them to be false. The record shows that, dating back to 2011, Mr. Scott has a long-standing history of failing to abide by the tax laws of the state as it relates to PNC. For example, on September 15, 2011, Mr. Scott was referred for criminal investigation by the state attorney for his failure to pay taxes. Also, numerous returns were filed without a payment. This is prima facie evidence of conversion of the money due. § 212.14(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent's Exhibit 1 summarizes numerous contacts by the Department's Tampa District Office with Mr. Scott regarding collection notices, telephone calls, emails, assessment letters, warrant letters, and the like in an effort to secure compliance with tax laws. It is fair to find that Mr. Scott willfully attempted to evade or avoid paying sales and reemployment taxes during the relevant period. To prevent its Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration from being revoked, PNC entered into a compliance agreement on July 10, 2013, to pay past due sales tax and reemployment tax totaling $65,789.25. The agreement required PNC to: (a) accurately complete all past due tax returns and reports no later than July 10, 2013; (b) remit all past due payments in accordance with the attached schedule, which required 11 monthly payments of $4,000.00 beginning on August 10, 2013, and a final balloon payment on July 10, 2014; (c) accurately complete and file all required tax returns and reports for the next 12 months; and (d) timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months. A $15,000.00 down payment also was required to be paid on or before July 10, 2013. An addendum to the agreement (added by Mr. Scott) provided that "[a]ll payments, including the $15,000.00 down payment, shall first be applied to Sales and Use Tax." Although the down payment was made timely, the agreement was breached the first month (August) because Mr. Scott did not make the payment electronically. However, the agreement was not voided by the Department until October 12, 2013. Therefore, any payments made on or after October 12, 2013, were not considered compliance payments and are not subject to the addendum in the agreement. A somewhat confusing aspect of this dispute concerns Mr. Scott's contention, by way of cross-examination, that contrary to the addendum, the Department incorrectly applied his $15,000.00 down payment and subsequent compliance payments to the reemployment tax account, rather than the sales tax account, and that his sales tax liability should be reduced by that amount. As noted above, the addendum governs only the payments that predate October 12, 2013, which are the down payment ($15,000.00) and the August and September payments -- $4,000.00 each month. This issue was not raised by Mr. Scott until the Department issued a NAPL on April 13, 2017. The NAPL issued on April 13, 2017, indicated that the outstanding tax owed by PNC through October 31, 2014, was $90,808.17, and the personal assessment was twice that amount. In response to Mr. Scott's request, the Department acknowledged that it incorrectly applied the down payment to the reemployment account. Also, it took a second look at the two payments made in August and September, which predate the voiding of the agreement. The August installment payment consisted of two separate checks: $3,390.00 for sales tax and $610.00 for reemployment tax, and these amounts were applied in that manner. The September payment, $4,000.00, submitted in one check, was applied in the same manner as the August payment, with $610.00 going to the reemployment tax and the remainder to sales tax. Therefore, only $1,220.00 was incorrectly applied to the reemployment tax during those two months. On July 3, 2017, the Department reapplied a total of $16,551.00 from the reemployment tax account to the sales tax account for the relevant reporting periods. Mr. Scott contends the reapplication of the $16,551.00 to sales tax should reduce the amount of sales tax due by that amount. However, section 213.75(2) dictates that if a lien or warrant has been filed against the taxpayer, as is true here, the payment shall be applied in a priority order spelled out in the statute. Thus, the Department applied that amount in the following order: against the costs to record the liens against PNC; against the administration collection processing fee, if any; against any accrued interest; against any accrued penalty; and against any tax due. Under this priority order, the penalty/interest/fees categories totaled $5,066.58, while the tax liability category totaled $11,484.42. A detailed breakdown of this allocation is found in Respondent's Exhibit 29. Therefore, the total tax liability on the 2017 NAPL ($90,808.17) is reduced by $11,484.42, resulting in a total tax liability of $79,323.75, as shown on the updated 2018 NAPL. In the same vein, in his PRO, Mr. Scott argues that he was not given credit for payments of $9,110.24, $2,688.53, $178.28, and $1,321.80, which reduce his sales tax liability to $66,024.90 and the personal assessment to $132,049.80. See Pet'r Ex. 10. However, all of these payments (some of which are bank levies) were made after the compliance agreement was voided and do not apply to the reporting periods in this case. By way of cross-examination, Mr. Scott also contends that he was never given an accounting of what PNC owes despite "multiple requests" for the same. The record shows otherwise. On April 13, 2017, the 2017 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09, a computer-generated form which lists, in detail, a taxpayer's outstanding taxes owed by reporting period. A second copy of a ZT09 was faxed to him the following day. In his May 3, 2017, letter protesting the 2017 NAPL, Mr. Scott alleges that payments were not applied properly. In response, the Department sent a fax to Mr. Scott on May 10, 2017, listing checks that were not honored by the bank and requesting information concerning which payments PNC contends were not applied properly. In his response on May 12, 2017, Mr. Scott did not provide the requested information. On January 17, 2018, the 2018 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09. Finally, on April 12, 2018, per Ms. Bartlett's request, the Department mailed a ZT09 with the outstanding amounts due. Finally, in its PRO, the Department points out that after the hearing ended, it discovered that it made an error, in Mr. Scott's favor, in calculating his sales tax liability for the relevant reporting periods. Had it correctly calculated the amount of payments made by PNC, the sales tax liability for the relevant period would be increased from $79,323.75 to $84,444.35, which in turn would increase the personal assessment. However, the Department consents to the lower tax and assessed penalty amount, as reflected on the 2018 NAPL.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, is liable to the Department for a penalty of $158,647.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2019.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner should be subjected to a penalty pursuant to Section 395.5094, Florida Statutes (1987), or Section 407.51, Florida Statutes (1989)?
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, the Health Care Cost Containment Board, is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of regulating hospital budgets. The Office of the Public Counsel is authorized pursuant to Section 407.54, Florida Statutes, to represent the general public in budget review proceedings before the Respondent. The Petitioner, Centro Asturiano Hospital, is a 144-bed acute care hospital located in Tampa, Florida. During all times relevant to this proceeding, the Petitioner's fiscal year was the calendar year. During 1984, 1985 and 1986, the accounting firm of Peat, Marwick and Main (hereinafter referred to as "Peat") prepared financial statements and Medicare reports for the Petitioner. Peat also performed audits of the Petitioner during 1984, 1985 and 1986. During all times relevant to this proceeding, the Petitioner's comptroller, Hilda Smith, prepared reports filed with the Respondent on behalf of the Petitioner. For the fiscal year 1987, the Respondent had approved the Petitioner's budgeted gross revenue per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "GRAA") of $7,536.00 and net revenue per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "NRAA") of $4,913.00. Based upon the Petitioner's audited actual experience for fiscal year 1987, the Petitioner's actual NRAA exceeded its budgeted NRAA. Therefore, the Respondent proposed to impose a penalty (hereinafter referred to as the "Main Penalty") on the Petitioner pursuant to Section 395.5094, Florida Statutes (1987), and Rule 10N-1.062, Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated May 12, 1988, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that it was imposing a Main Penalty on the Petitioner for 1987. A second letter dated August 15, 1988, was sent by the Respondent to the Petitioner revising the amount of the penalty. In calculating the revised penalty the Respondent took into account the Petitioner's case-mix and outlier activity. The total recommended penalty was $609,218.00. The penalty consists of a budget reduction to net revenue of $566,938.00 with a corresponding reduction to gross revenue of $854,425.00, and a cash fine of $42,280.00. The reason for imposing the Main Penalty was explained in the Respondent's letter of August 15, 1988, as follows: Preliminary findings indicated that an excess of net revenue per adjusted admission in the amount of $381.00 had occurred. These findings are based upon a comparison [sic] of the previous year's audited actual experience inflated by the MARI, and the Board approved budget for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1987. The total excess has been adjusted by case-mix and outlier activity and results in a total recommended penalty of $609,218. . . . The proposed penalty could have been avoided if the Petitioner had sought a budget amendment for 1987 or if the Petitioner had modified its operations during 1987 when it learned that its actual experience would exceed its approved budget. The Petitioner believes that the difference in the Petitioner's actual experience for 1987 and its approved budget for 1987 was caused primarily by an adjustment to Medicare contractual allowances. When a hospital treats a patient eligible for Medicare payment for the patient's services, the hospital records the gross amount of the hospital's charges for the patient's services. Medicare, however, only pays a portion of the total charges. The difference between the hospital's charges and the amount actually paid by Medicare is referred to as "Medicare contractuals." For example, if a patient is charged $1,000.00 by a hospital for services but Medicare will only pay $800.00 for those services, the $200.00 difference is referred to as a Medicare contractual. If the $200.00 is not paid from some other source it must be deducted from gross revenue to arrive at net revenue on the books of the hospital. The Petitioner receives a substantial portion of its revenue for Medicare reimbursed services. Therefore, Medicare contractuals constitute a significant item in the Petitioner's budget. An adjustment to the Petitioner's Medicare contractuals could have a significant impact on the Petitioner's budget. During April, 1987, Peat notified the Petitioner's comptroller, Ms. Smith, that the Petitioner's Medicare contractuals needed to be adjusted by $488,000.00. This adjustment was the result of Peat's audit of Petitioner's 1986 financial records and was related to Medicare cost reports for 1983, 1984 and 1985. Peat also determined that an additional $200,000.00 adjustment was required. The Petitioner knew that the adjustments were material. The net effect of Peat's 1986 audit was that the Petitioner was required in 1987 to reduce 1986 Medicare and other contractual deductions from gross revenue by $688,000.00. This amount was a significant amount. The $688,000.00 adjustment was reported by Peat to the Board of Directors of the Petitioner and accepted by the Board in April, 1987. Between June, 1987, and July, 1987, Ms. Smith, the Petitioner's comptroller, prepared a Current Year Actual and Estimated Interim Report (hereinafter referred to as the "1987 Interim Report"). In the 1987 Interim Report the Petitioner compared actual GRAA for the first 6 months of 1987 and projected GRAA for the last 6 months of 1987 with 1987 budgeted GRAA. Based upon this computation it was apparent that the Petitioner was operating in excess of the Petitioner's budget for 1987 as approved by the Respondent. The Petitioner, therefore, could have sought a budget amendment or modified its operations. Ms. Smith testified that she believed that the excess of actual GRAA and NRAA over budgeted GRAA and NRAA had been caused by the Medicare contractual adjustment recommended by Peat for 1986. The Petitioner failed to prove what the cause of the excess actually was. Ms. Smith testified that the Petitioner did not realize what the affect of the contractual adjustment was until the 1987 Interim Report was prepared. The Petitioner, however, could have determined in April of 1987 what affect the Medicare contractual adjustment would have on its 1987 budget. Therefore, if the Medicare contractual adjustment was the cause of the excess of its actual experience over its budget, the Petitioner could have taken steps as early as April, 1987, to seek a budget amendment for its 1987 fiscal year or to modify its operations. In July, 1987, Ms. Smith contacted staff of the Respondent. She spoke with Pete Pearcy and Bill Summers. She also spoke to these staff members in September, 1987. Ms. Smith contacted the Respondent because of her concern about the excess of the Petitioner's actual 1987 experience over its 1987 approved budget. She contacted the Respondent seeking assistance in determining what steps the Petitioner should take to resolve the potential problem the excess in the Petitioner's actual experience over its approved budget could cause. The Petitioner failed to prove that Ms. Smith's explanation of the problem adequately informed the Respondent what the Petitioner's problem was. Generally, the Respondent's staff will consult and/or counsel hospitals concerning matters within the Respondent's responsibilities. The Respondent's policy prohibits staff from advising hospitals, however, as to whether a budget amendment should be filed; that decision is left up to each individual hospital. Consistent with the Respondent's policy, staff of the Respondent attempted to assist Ms. Smith. During September, 1987, Ms. Smith asked Mr. Summer of the Respondent's staff whether the Petitioner should file a budget amendment. Mr. Summer responded "amend what?" This response was based upon the inability of Ms. Smith to explain to Mr. Summer what exactly the Petitioner believed it needed to amend or exactly how the Medicare contractual adjustments affected the Petitioner's 1987 budget. Mr. Summer did not specifically recommend to Ms. Smith that the Petitioner file or not file a budget amendment. Nor did anyone else on the Respondent's staff advise the Petitioner that a budget amendment should or should not be filed. Mr. Summer asked Ms. Smith to send him information concerning the problem. Mr. Summer told Ms. Smith that he would review the material before discussing the problem further. Mr. Summer did not, however, contact Ms. Smith. Nor did Ms. Smith attempt to contact Ms. Summer before the end of the Petitioner's 1987 fiscal year. The Petitioner was aware of the fact that any budget amendment for its 1987 fiscal year had to be filed before the end of the 1987 fiscal year. The Petitioner was also familiar with the manner in which a budget amendment was to be filed since the Petitioner had obtained approval of a budget amendment for its 1986 fiscal year. The Petitioner did not file a budget amendment for its 1987 fiscal year. The Petitioner was aware that it was required to operate within its 1987 approved budget. Ms. Smith indicated that she believed that the Respondent's staff would have warned her if the Petitioner had been in danger of having a penalty imposed. The Petitioner, however, was not informed by the Respondent that the Main Penalty would not be imposed upon it for its 1987 fiscal year. The Petitioner's actual GRAA for 1987 was $8,096.00 and its approved GRAA was $7,536. Therefore, the Petitioner's actual GRAA for 1987 exceeded its approved GRAA by 7.4%. The Petitioner's actual NRAA for 1987 was $5,294.00 and its approved NRAA was $4,913.00. The excess of actual NRAA over approved NRAA was 7.7%. The percentage of excess of actual GRAA and NRAA over budget is almost the same. Therefore, it is possible that whatever caused the Petitioner's excessive GRAA also caused its excessive NRAA. GRAA is not affected by Medicare contractual adjustments. NRAA is affected by Medicare contractual adjustments. Therefore, since the Petitioner's percentage excess in GRAA (7.4%) and NRAA (7/7%) for 1987 was almost the same, it is questionable whether the Petitioner's Medicare contractual adjustments were the sole cause for the excess of the Petitioner's actual experience over its budget for 1987. It is more likely that the excessive GRAA and NRAA were caused by the same problem. The Petitioner, therefore, failed to prove that its discussions with the Respondent about the Medicare contractual adjustment would have helped the Petitioner avoid the penalty proposed in this proceeding. The Petitioner filed its 1988 budget and the 1987 Interim Report with the Respondent on or about September 29, 1987. The 1987 Interim Report includes information concerning the Petitioner's actual experience for the first 7 months of 1987 and projections for the remaining 5 months of 1987. The 1987 Interim Report was submitted for informational purposes. For the first 7 months of 1987 the Petitioner's actual gross revenue was $10,171,658.00. Gross revenue for the last 5 months of 1987 was projected at $7,265,470.00. The Petitioner's estimated adjusted admissions for 1987 were 1,221 for the first 7 months and 873 for the last 5 months. Gross revenue divided by adjusted admissions for 1987 yields GRAA of $8,337.00 for the first 7 months and projected GRAA of $8,322.00 for last 5 months. Based upon the information contained in the 1987 Interim Report, the Petitioner's GRAA for the entire 1987 fiscal year was projected to be $8,331.00. The Petitioner's approved GRAA, which was included in the 1987 Interim Report, was only $7,536.00. Therefore, the Petitioner should have been aware that it would very likely exceed its approved 1987 budgeted GRAA by approximately $795.00 (approximately 10.5%) in June of 1987. Accordingly, the Petitioner should have taken steps in September of 1987 to amend its budget or to modify its operations. The Petitioner had sufficient information during 1987 (April, June and September, 1987) to warn it that its actual experience would exceed its approved budget. Although the Petitioner's comptroller did discuss what she believed to be the cause of the Petitioner's problem (the Medicare contractual adjustment) with the Respondent, the evidence failed to prove that it was reasonable for the Petitioner to wait for the Respondent to take some action while the Petitioner took no action on its own behalf to rectify the problem.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent issue a final order dismissing the Petitioner's petition. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 3. 1 and hereby accepted. hereby accepted. 2 and hereby accepted. 5 4. 6 15. 7-8 16. 9 17. 10-11 Hereby accepted. 12-13 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 14 7. NRAA was $4,913.00 and not $4,938.00. 15 19. 16 33. 31 and hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 19 22. 20 24. Hereby accepted. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 22 and 25. Several of the contacts with the Respondent took place after 1987 and are not relevant to this proceeding. The second sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 3. 2 4. 3 5-6. 4 8-9. 10 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. 7 11. 8 8 and 11. 9 13 and 20. 10 16. See 21. 18 and hereby accepted. See 22. See 25. 15 27. 16 Hereby accepted. 17-18 Although true, not relevant to this proceeding. 19-21 Hereby accepted. 22 21. 23 See 21. 24 19 and 33-36. 25 11. Not relevant. See 21. Incorrect conclusion of law. Ms. Smith testified what she was told. Her testimony about what she heard is not hearsay. 29 14. 30-32 Hereby accepted. 33 33-34. 34 35 and hereby accepted. 35 36. 36 32 37 Cumulative. 38 12. 39 31-32. The Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 3. 2 4. 3 6. 4 5 and hereby accepted. 5 5-6. 6 hereby accepted. 7 7. 8 14. 9-10 15. 11 16. 12-13 17. 14 16. 15 18. 16 16. Hereby accepted. See 21. Hereby accepted. See 16. 21-22 Hereby accepted. 23-24 Not relevant. 25 Hereby accepted. 26 27. 27 21. First contact with the Respondent was in July, and not August. 28 19. 29 19-20. 30 Cumulative. 31 22. 32-33 24. 34-35 Hereby accepted. 36-37 25. 38 30. 39 Hereby accepted. 40 29. Not relevant. Hereby accepted. 43-44 Not relevant. 45 31-32. 46 33. 47-51 36. 52-54 19. 55-57 31. 58-59 32. 60 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 61-62 Hereby accepted. 63 31-32. 64 Hereby accepted. 65 9. 66 10-11. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia P. Forrester Senior Attorney Health Care Cost Containment Board Building L, Suite 101 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 David D. Eastman, Esquire Patrick J. Phelan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel David R. Terry, Associate Public Counsel Peter Schwarz, Associate Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Street, Room 801 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400 Stephen Presnell, General Counsel Health Care Cost Containment Board Woodcrest Office Park 325 John Knox Road Building L, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner owes sales tax of $15,230.15 plus interest from October 15, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a sole proprietorship organized in this state and doing business at 851 Monterey Road, Stuart, Florida. Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for administering the state sales tax in accordance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.1 In 1992, other businesses located at Petitioner's address reported to Respondent that they paid rent to Petitioner. However, Petitioner did not collect and remit sales tax on the rental income and was not registered as a dealer. On February 3, 1992, Respondent mailed a Notice of Intent to Audit Petitioner's books and records ("Notice of Intent to Audit") for the tax period February 1, 1987, through January 31, 1992. The Notice of Intent to Audit included a detailed list of the books and records needed for Respondent to conduct a detailed audit. The Notice also requested that Petitioner provide Respondent with a date on which it would be convenient to begin the audit. On February 11, 1992, Respondent had not heard from Petitioner. The auditor contacted Petitioner to schedule a date on which the audit could begin. At that time, Petitioner stated that he would not provide the auditor with any books and records. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1990 through 1992 because Petitioner incorrectly suspected that Respondent maintained a secret "blacklist." Petitioner based his suspicion, in part, on the fact that he had refused to respond to a questionnaire Respondent had mailed to taxpayers throughout the state prior to the Notice of Intent to Audit. Petitioner also based his suspicion on the erroneous assumption that Respondent's audit was part of a criminal investigation by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") into Petitioner's federal taxes for 1987 and 1988. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1987 through 1989 because those records were in the possession of the IRS. Petitioner maintained that the proposed audit was illegal. Respondent sent Petitioner copies of its statutory authority to audit Petitioner and made numerous attempts to arrange a mutually convenient time to begin the audit. Respondent did not commence the audit until March 10, 1993. On March 10, 1993, the auditor and audit group supervisor met with Petitioner and Mr. Eugene Nail, Petitioner's paralegal. Petitioner stated that he did not have the books and records Respondent needed to conduct a detailed audit because the IRS had confiscated them in connection with the pending criminal case. Respondent conducted the audit using the information Petitioner made available to the auditor. Petitioner made available: sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992 grouped together by calendar month; sales and use tax return booklets; resale and exemption certificates; and commercial lease agreements. No journals and ledgers were available. Respondent determined Petitioner's tax deficiency by sampling the available information. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, the auditor used a six month sample period. The auditor explained to Petitioner that she would use Petitioner's invoices during the sample period to determine tax- exempt sales. She compared the invoices to resale certificates and calculated an error ratio based on discrepancies between the sales invoices and the resale certificates. Respondent determined the actual deficiency in sales tax during the six month sample period based on actual invoices that did not have a resale certificate and for which no sales tax was remitted. Respondent estimated the additional deficiency in sales tax by applying the error ratio to the balance of the audit period. Respondent examined only those invoices provided by Petitioner and previous sales tax returns filed by Petitioner. On April 9, 1993, the auditor conducted a meeting with Petitioner and discussed the audit procedures, results, applicable law, and abatement rules. On June 15, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $45,469.05 ("Notice of Intent"). The Notice of Intent included a copy of all audit exhibits and workpapers. On August 30, 1993, Petitioner provided additional invoices to Respondent in a meeting with the auditor and audit group supervisor. On October 15, 1993, the auditor adjusted certain items in the audit file, reduced the proposed assessment, and issued a Revised Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $37,417.45 ("Revised Notice of Intent"). Petitioner requested additional time to provide more information, including additional resale certificates. However, Petitioner failed to provide the additional information. By letter dated December 9, 1993, the audit group supervisor notified Petitioner that she was closing the case and sending it to the Tallahassee office as a contested case. On December 23, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner assessing Petitioner for $37,417.45 in tax, penalty, and interest through October 15, 1993. On February 21, 1994, Respondent received Petitioner's written protest dated February 10, 1994. Respondent revised the audit figures again. On January 20, 1995, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision reducing the assessment against Petitioner to $15,230.15. The Notice of Decision assessed Petitioner for taxes of $8,900.55, penalties of $2,225.14, and interest of $4,104.46 through October 15, 1993. Interest accrues at the per diem rate of $2.93 until paid. On March 16, 1995, Petitioner timely appealed the Notice of Decision by filing a Petition for Formal Hearing with Respondent. Inadequate Records Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records within the meaning of Sections 212.12(6), 212.13(2), 212.35, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.093(2) and (5).2 Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records for the five year audit period prescribed in Section 213.34(2). Petitioner failed to maintain general ledgers and journals for the five year audit period. The only records Petitioner maintained were sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Petitioner was unable to produce adequate records for 1987 through 1989. Petitioner asserted that the IRS had those records and that Petitioner could not obtain the records required by Florida law. The federal tax case has been pending against Petitioner since 1990.3 During those seven years, Petitioner was unable to obtain copies of any records in the possession of the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1987 and 1988 were maintained on computer floppy disks. Petitioner asserts that the floppy disks were lost. Petitioner asserts that his attorney kept the books and records for 1989 in an out-of-state location to avoid producing those records for the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1990 though 1992 are in the possession of Petitioner's accountants. Petitioner did not produce those records during the audit or at the administrative hearing. Petitioner could have requested the journals and ledgers for 1989 through 1991 from his attorney and accountants, respectively, but chose not to do so. Petitioner made available to Respondent only sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Without the general ledgers and cash journals to cross- reference the sales invoices, Respondent could not corroborate the financial records available for audit. Respondent was required by applicable law to conduct the audit by sampling Petitioner's available records. Exempt Sales: Resale Certificates Certain exempt sales claimed by Petitioner during the six month sample period were not supported by resale certificates. Respondent disallowed the exempt sales that were not supported by resale certificates and allowed the invoices that were supported by resale certificates. For the six month sample period, Respondent assessed an actual sales tax deficiency for those sales that did not have a corresponding resale certificate.4 Respondent prepared audit schedules for the six month sample period that listed the invoices with a sales tax deficiency due to the lack of a resale certificate. Based on the audit schedules, Respondent determined an error ratio and applied the error ratio over the five year audit period to determine the estimated tax deficiency.5 Respondent conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted audit procedures and with applicable state law. Disallowed exempt sales were listed individually by invoice, name of vendor, and the date and amount of the sale. Disallowed exempt sales were listed for each of the six months in the sample period. Additional Taxable Sales Sales invoices for the six month sample period showed that Petitioner collected more sales tax than he reported to Respondent on his monthly sales tax returns. Respondent treated the collected, but unremitted, sales tax as "additional taxable sales" rather than as an unremitted sales tax. Respondent assessed Petitioner for the sales tax paid on Petitioner's invoices but not remitted to Respondent by Petitioner. The deficiency existed for May and June, 1990, and for January and February, 1991. Taxable Rent Respondent reviewed lease agreements relating to property rented by Petitioner at his business address. Respondent determined that Petitioner failed to collect and remit sales tax on the rental of his property. Respondent assessed Petitioner for sales tax Petitioner failed to collect and remit on taxable rent. Petitioner does not contest that portion of the assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and therein UPHOLD Respondent's assessment of $15,230.15 plus interest statutorily due from October 15, 1993, until paid.RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1997.
