The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the formal hearing and at all times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondent was licensed in the State of Florida by Petitioner as a life and health insurance agent and as a general lines insurance agent. At the time of the formal hearing and at all times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondent served as the general lines insurance agent of record for A-AAAce Insurance Underwriters (A-AAAce) of 2507 Sheridan Street, Hollywood, Florida. Nation Motor Club is an automobile club that provides towing, rental reimbursement, accidental death, and other benefits to its members. Respondent sold memberships in Nation Motor Club and earned a commission equal to 90% of the annual fee for each membership he sold. Nation Motor Club grants a member a thirty-day period following the filing of his application to cancel his membership and to receive a full refund of his membership fee. ANDERSON TRANSACTION On or about September 28, 1989, Edward A. Anderson went to the offices of A-AAAce to obtain insurance for his automobile. Mr. Anderson first met with Steve Harrison, an employee of A-AAAce who holds no licensure from Petitioner and for whose acts Respondent accepts responsibility. Mr. Anderson recalled that he wanted personal injury protection (PIP), property damage liability, and comprehensive and collision insurance for his automobile, but he could not specifically recall what types of coverage he requested from Mr. Harrison and he could not recall the details of what was explained to him by Mr. Harrison. Mr. Anderson recalled being told by Mr. Harrison the cost of his insurance coverage, but he could not recall what Mr. Harrison told him the amount would be. Following his discussion with Mr. Harrison, Mr. Anderson was presented certain documents for his execution. Respondent, who had been sitting at the adjacent desk during the conversation between Mr. Anderson and Mr. Harrison, supervised the execution of these documents by Mr. Anderson. Included among those documents executed by Mr. Anderson was a membership application for the Nation Motor Club. On this application form, Mr. Anderson designated the beneficiary in the event accidental death benefits became payable as a result of his membership. This application reflects that the annual fee for membership was $200.00. Neither Mr. Harrison or Respondent prevented or attempted to prevent Mr. Anderson from reading any of the forms presented to him for his execution. Mr. Anderson did not read the forms before he signed them. Instead, he relied on his discussions with Mr. Harrison and Respondent and signed what was put before him. Mr. Anderson had not requested membership in the Nation Motor Club and he was not aware that he was purchasing a membership in the Nation Motor Club at the time he agreed to do so. He believed that the premiums he was being charged and the papers he was signing related to the insurance coverage he had requested, and he did not understand that he was paying $200.00 for membership in the Nation Motor Club. On November 8, 1989, Florida Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher accompanied Lottie Brown, one of Petitioner's investigators, in paying a surprise inspection visit to the offices of A-AAAce. That surprise visit was prompted by a complaint unrelated to this proceeding. By happenstance, Mr. Anderson was in the offices of A-AAAce during that surprise visit. On November 8, 1989, Mr. Anderson became aware for the first time that he had purchased a membership in the Nation Motor Club. On November 11, 1989, Respondent refunded to Mr. Anderson the $200.00 membership fee he had paid and he caused Mr. Anderson's membership in the Nation Motor Club to be cancelled. Mr. Anderson would not have purchased the membership in Nation Motor Club had he understood that he was doing so. BROWN TRANSACTION On February 17, 1990, Rebecca Brown went to the offices of A-AAAce to obtain insurance for her automobile. Ms. Brown talked with Respondent and asked for minimum personal injury protection (PIP) and liability coverage. Respondent discussed with Ms. Brown the insurance coverage she wanted and quoted Ms. Brown the amount of $355.00 as being the price for the "full package" of coverage she would be receiving. Respondent told Ms. Brown the coverage he was proposing included benefits for towing, rental reimbursement, and accidental death. Ms. Brown did not understand that the quoted price included membership in the Nation Motor Club or that the annual fee for that membership was $100.00. The premium for the insurance coverage alone was $255.00. Ms. Brown signed an application for membership in the Nation Motor Club which reflects the sum of $100.00 as being the cost of membership. On this application, she inserted the name of the beneficiary who was to receive any accidental death benefits that may become payable as a result of her membership. Ms. Brown also signed a premium finance agreement which reflected the cost of the insurance she was purchasing. Respondent did not try to prevent Ms. Brown from reading the documents she was asked to sign. Ms. Brown did not read the documents because she was in a hurry to complete the transaction. Instead, she relied on Respondent's directions as to what and where to sign. Ms. Brown first became aware that she had purchased a membership in the Nation Motor Club when she was so advised by an investigator for Petitioner on March 8, 1990. Ms. Brown thereafter contacted Respondent about this membership and Respondent promptly applied the $100.00 membership fee toward payment of the other insurance she had purchased and withdrew her application for membership in the Nation Motor Club. Ms. Brown would not have purchased the membership in Nation Motor Club had she had a clear understanding that she was doing so. CANGIANELLA TRANSACTION On February 17, 1990, John Cangianella went to the offices of A-AAAce to obtain automobile insurance for his automobile. Mr. Cangianella talked with Respondent and asked for minimum personal injury protection (PIP) and liability coverage. Respondent discussed with Mr. Cangianella various options as to coverage, including membership in Nation Motor Club. Mr. Cangianella could not specifically recall the types of coverage that had been explained to him or the costs thereof. Respondent quoted Mr. Cangianella the amount of $355.00 as being the price for the coverage. Mr. Cangianella did not understand that the quoted price included membership in the Nation Motor Club or that the annual fee for that membership was $100.00. The premium Mr. Cangianella would have paid for his insurance coverage alone was $255.00. Mr. Cangianella signed an application for membership in the Nation Motor Club which reflects the cost of membership. Mr. Cangianella also signed a premium finance agreement which reflected the cost of the insurance he was purchasing. On the application, he inserted the name of the beneficiary who was to receive any accidental death benefits that may become payable as a result of his membership. Respondent did not try to prevent Mr. Cangianella from reading the documents he was asked to sign. Mr. Cangianella had been out late the night before and he did not read the documents because he was in a hurry to complete the transaction. Instead, he relied on Respondent's directions as to where to sign. Mr. Cangianella first became aware that he had purchased a membership in the Nation Motor Club when he was so advised by an investigator for Petitioner in early March 1990. Mr. Cangianella thereafter contacted Respondent about this membership. Respondent refunded the $100.00 membership fee on March 9, 1990, and withdrew Mr. Cangianella's application for membership in the Nation Motor Club prior to its submission. Mr. Cangianella would not have purchased the membership in Nation Motor Club had he had a clear understanding that he was doing so. Mr. Anderson, Ms. Brown, and Mr. Cangianella continue to do business with Respondent's agency. Respondent's licensure has not been previously disciplined by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-3, 5, 10, 13-15, 17, 19, 21- 22, and 25-27 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are rejected as being legal conclusions. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 6-9 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. These dealings were between Mr. Anderson and Mr. Harrison. While it has been concluded that Respondent was responsible for Mr. Harrison's acts, the proposed findings, as written, are unsubstantiated. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The record does not clearly reflect the amount of the premium. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12, 18, and 20 are rejected as being, in part, unsubstantiated by the evidence and, in part as being contrary to the findings made and to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 16 and 24 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 23 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 28 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, are rejected in part as being recitation of testimony, and are rejected in part as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-7, 9-14, 16, and 18 of Part I are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 of Part I are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. Respondent's Exhibit 3 is not clear as to the dates of the insurance being financed. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 15 of Part I are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 17 of Part I are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-8, 10-20, and 22 of Part II are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 6 and 21 of Part II are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 of Part II are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-17, and 19 of Part III are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael W. Moskowitz, Esquire 1500 N.W. 49th Street, #401 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Gordon T. Nicol, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Shirley Arlene Cook, is currently licensed by Petitioner as a life agent, a life and health agent, and a general lines agent, and has been so licensed since February 17, 1982, February 17, 1982, and February 13, 1980, respectively. Respondent has been employed in the insurance business since 1954. She has operated her current agency, American Family Insurors, since January 1990. During times material, Respondent engaged in the business of insurance through the corporate entity, American Family Insurors, Inc. (Family Insurors). Respondent was the sole officer and director of Family Insurors, Inc. from May 25, 1990 through February 26, 1992. As corporate officer and director of Family Insurors, Respondent was personally liable and accountable for wrongful acts, misconduct, or other violations of any provision of the insurance code committed by herself or agents who worked under her direct supervision and control. During times material, Respondent maintained a business bank account No. 1263147295 at Barnett Bank, in the name of Family Insurors. Respondent and Richard Rock were the authorized signators on the Respondent's account. Sometime in 1990, Rock was taken from the account as an authorized signator. Richard Rock was employed by Respondent as an outside producer and primarily solicited new accounts and canvassed existing accounts to pick up deposits and insurance applications which were collected by auto salesmen. He paid such salesmen ten dollars for every property damage referral that materialized into a policy with Family Insurors. Richard and his wife, Michelle Rock, who was also employed by Respondent, left Respondent's agency during June 1992. They left Respondent's agency due to personal problems stemming from Richard's drug and alcohol abuse, and when Respondent learned that he was paying referral fees to auto salesmen. Richard paid the salesmen the referral fees from Respondent's petty cash account, an account which was maintained and controlled by his wife, Michelle. Respondent was not aware of the referral fees and other gratuities which Richard would give to outside salesmen from time to time. The gratuities consisted of gift certificates to various retail establishments which were primarily restaurants. Funds received by Respondent and deposited into bank account No. 1263147295, which were received from or on behalf of consumers, represented premiums for insurance polices and were trust funds received in a fiduciary capacity. As such, they were to be accounted for and paid over to an insuror, insured, or other persons entitled thereto in the applicable regular course of business. During times material, Onyx Underwriters, Inc. (Onyx) was the sole managing general agent for Orion Insurance Company, now known as Aries, and American Skyhawk Insurance Company (American Skyhawk). On January 16, 1990, Respondent entered into an Insurance Broker's Agreement with Onyx. The broker's agreement was cancelled on March 19, 1992. While the broker's agreement was effective, all insurance placed by Respondent with Orion/Aries or American Skyhawk was pursuant and subject to the provisions of the broker's agreement with Onyx and constituted brokerage business. Pursuant to the broker's agreement with Onyx, Respondent retained agency commissions on policies issued and was responsible for forwarding the net premium to Onyx. This procedure is known in the industry as "netting authority" and is a procedure whereby the agent deducts the commissions that he or she is entitled to from gross premiums received on policies and forward the net premium to, in this case, Onyx. THE BARBARA CECIL TRANSACTION On October 13, 1990, Barbara Cecil (Cecil) purchased an automobile from Tony Taylor of Taylor Automotive in Pinellas Park. In connection with the sale, Tony Taylor, an unlicensed individual, solicited automobile insurance from Cecil on behalf of Respondent. Cecil paid Tony Taylor eighty dollars ($80.00) as the premium down payment, and Respondent later deposited Cecil's payment into her bank account. Respondent represented to Cecil that she was bound on October 13, 1990; however, the insurance documents indicate that coverage was bound for Cecil on October 27, 1990, or approximately fourteen (14) days after the date that she purchased her auto from Taylor Automotive. Cecil was, however, given a binder on October 13, 1990. Respondent later completed a policy application and submitted it to Orion Insurance Company (Orion). Orion thereafter issued a policy to Cecil for the policy period of October 27, 1990 through October 27, 1991. Orion cancelled Cecil's policy on February 6, 1991, due to the absence of photographs of her automobile. In this connection, Respondent had previously submitted a set of photographs to Orion which did not clearly depict the automobile. Therefore, a second set of photos were requested by Orion. The second set of photos was not sent to Orion prior to the cancellation date. The cancellation of Cecil's policy resulted in an unearned premium of one hundred eighty dollars and ninety-two cents ($180.92), and an unearned commission of thirty-eight dollars and seventy cents ($38.70). Cecil was without automobile insurance from February 6, 1991 to October 27, 1991, and she was informed of the cancellation. During times material, Tony Taylor was not licensed in Florida as an insurance agent, customer representative, or solicitor. THE KIMBERLEY JONES TRANSACTION On June 20, 1991, Kimberley Jones purchased an automobile from Tony Taylor of Taylor Automotive. In connection with this automobile purchase, Tony Taylor solicited insurance on behalf of Jones from Respondent's agency. Kimberley Jones paid Taylor one hundred dollars ($100.00) as the premium down payment and Taylor issued a receipt to Jones. Respondent did not bind coverage with American Skyhawk for Jones until one week later, i.e., June 27, 1991. The Jones' policy ran its full term. THE KAREN KLEIN TRANSACTION On August 26, 1991, Karen Klein purchased an automobile from Keith Rice of Car Stop Automobile Sales. In connection with this purchase, Keith Rice, an unlicensed insurance individual, solicited automobile insurance from Klein on behalf of Family Insurors. Klein paid Keith Rice approximately one hundred dollars ($100.00) as a premium down payment for issuance of an insurance policy on her newly purchased automobile, which was to be effective on August 26, 1991. American Skyhawk issued a policy to Klein for the period effective August 27, 1991 through August 27, 1992. Onyx cancelled Klein's policy on December 3, 1991, for underwriting reasons. That cancellation resulted in an unearned premium of three hundred thirty-three dollars and thirty-one cents ($333.31), and an unearned commission of seventy-three dollars and sixty-eight cents ($73.68). THE EDITH PURCELL TRANSACTION On September 27, 1991, Edith Purcell purchased an automobile from Bill Hoskins of Taylor Automotive. In connection with that purchase, Hoskins solicited automobile insurance from Purcell on behalf of Family Insurors. Hoskins advised Purcell that her coverage would be effective September 29, 1991, upon receipt of her down payment of one hundred dollars ($100.00). Purcell paid Hoskins the premium down payment on September 29, 1991, and Hoskins issued a receipt indicating Family Insurors as the recipient. Hoskins, on behalf of Family Insurors, represented to Purcell that she had full coverage for the policy period, September 27, 1991 through September 26, 1992, pursuant to binder number P91-1022. American Skyhawk thereafter issued a policy to Purcell for the period of October 3, 1991 through October 3, 1992. Purcell's policy was cancelled on December 26, 1991, for underwriting reasons. That cancellation resulted in an unearned premium of four hundred forty-two dollars ($442.00), and an unearned commission of seventy-seven dollars and thirty-five cents ($77.35). THE JOHN J. NARKIN, III TRANSACTION On October 4, 1991, John J. Narkin, III (Narkin) purchased an automobile from Bill Hoskins of Taylor Automotive. In connection with that purchase, Hoskins, an individual who was not licensed as an insurance agent, representative, or solicitor, solicited an automobile insurance policy for Narkin on behalf of Family Insurors. Hoskins requested and Narkin paid him the one hundred dollar down payment for issuance of the policy. Hoskins issued Narkin a receipt from Family Insurors for the down payment indicating full coverage for the period October 4, 1991 through October 3, 1992, pursuant to binder number N91-1059. American Skyhawk issued a policy to Narkin effective for the period of October 7, 1991 through October 7, 1992. American Skyhawk issued a notice of cancellation for nonpayment of an additional premium of fifty-four dollars ($54.00), because Narkin failed to provide proof of holding a Florida Driver's License when he was requested to do so. Respondent notified Narkin of this request by letter dated December 7, 1991. Narkin was told that he had until December 27, 1991 to remit his payment. Narkin paid Respondent the additional premium by check on December 13, 1991, which deposit was entered into Family Insuror's business bank account on December 18, 1991. The additional premium was not forwarded by Respondent to Onyx prior to the December 27, 1991 cancellation date with the result that Narkin's policy was cancelled. Narkin was without insurance from December 27, 1991 through October 7, 1992, and he had no knowledge of this fact. The cancellation of Narkin's policy resulted in an unearned premium of six hundred fifty dollars and eighty-two cents ($650.82), and an unearned commission of one hundred forty-nine dollars and sixty-three cents ($149.63). THE WENDY WARDLE TRANSACTION On May 17, 1991, Family Insurors solicited an American Skyhawk application for automobile insurance from Wendy Wardle. Wendy Wardle paid Respondent ninety-eight dollars ($98.00) as the premium down payment, and the policy was thereafter issued to Wardle. On August 19, 1991, American Skyhawk cancelled Wardle's policy for underwriting reasons, resulting in an unearned premium of two hundred dollars and fifty-seven ($200.57), and an unearned commission of sixty-one dollars and seventy-eight cents ($61.78). THE MARY ANN MAFETONE TRANSACTION On October 28, 1991, Mary Ann Mafetone purchased an automobile for her daughter, Cindy Mafetone, from John Rosa of River Auto Sales. In connection with this purchase, John Rosa, an individual who was not licensed as an insurance agent, broker, or solicitor, solicited automobile insurance for the Mafetones from Family Insurors. Mafetone paid Rosa one hundred twelve dollars ($112.00) as the premium down payment for issuance of a policy in the name of her daughter, Cindy. In exchange for soliciting insurance on behalf of or from Family Insurors, Family Insurors, through Richard Stock, paid various automobile salesmen commissions, ranging from ten dollars to twenty per transaction. These commissions were based on specific coverage being purchased by the consumer. Respondent's Position Andrew Beverly, an expert in the field of insurance, is a chartered property and casualty underwriter, a chartered life underwriter and a chartered financial consultant. He is the owner and operator of the Florida Insurance School, a statewide firm that prepares individuals for entry level positions in the insurance industry. Beverly reviewed Respondent's binder books and practices respecting the subject insureds in this proceeding. The binder book and procedures utilized by Respondent are typical industry practices for agents and agencies writing policies with nonstandard companies. In the process of taking an insurance application to an actual hard copy policy, three sets of numbers are used. They are the binder number signed by the agent in numerical sequence as customers make application for coverage, the working number which is assigned by an underwriter until the actual (hard copy) policy is issued and the policy number which is computer generated by the company. Discrepancies between the binding date and the coverage date is normal within the industry and coverage is effective as of the binder date. Thus, in all of these transactions, the insureds had coverage the instant they received binders from Respondent. Respondent's files indicate that Barbara Cecil was timely notified that the pictures taken on her vehicle were not properly developed and she needed to return to the agency with her vehicle to take new pictures to be forwarded to her insuror. Mrs. Cecil did not return in a timely manner and her policy was therefore cancelled. Respondent's records respecting Edith Purcell indicate that Purcell was given a quote, and coverage for her was bound on October 3, 1991. An application for insurance was taken and she was provided the paperwork including a copy of the premium finance agreement. Purcell was notified on November 13, 1991, that her driver license information could not be verified. On November 21, 1991, Purcell visited Respondent's office and provided the necessary information. Respondent telecopied the information to the underwriting company; however, she was not reinstated. Respondent contacted the company about the cancellation, but the company refused to rescind the cancellation and underwrite that risk. Kimberly Jones was given a quote of $276.00 for insurance coverage by Respondent and she paid a $100.00 down payment. The balance was to be paid in installments. However, during the policy period, Ms. Jones was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in an increase in her premiums. Respondent advised Ms. Jones to pay the additional premium of approximately of forty percent as required by the company and add the balance of that additional premium to her contract. Ms. Jones complied and her policy remained in effect the full term. Ms. Mafetone paid Respondent a down payment of $112.00 and Respondent notified her that an additional $32.00 was required. Ms. Mafetone erroneously remitted the additional money to the (premium) finance company instead of the insurance company. As a result, her account was not properly credited and her policy was cancelled. Respondent thereafter notified the premium finance company and found that she had been given a credit on her monthly account statement. Respondent had not been provided a statement to reflect that credit when Mafetone's policy was cancelled. A portion of Respondent's statement was telecopied to her and she immediately remitted the $212.00 to the insuror to reinstate Ms. Mafetone's policy. Ms. Mafetone's policy was reinstated and remained in full force for its term. Respondent's files respecting Wendy and Douglas Wardle indicate that Mr. Wardle did not have a valid Florida driver's license at the time his policy was purchased. Based on Mr. Wardle's failure to provide proof of a driver's license, the company cancelled his policy. Karen Klein was provided a quote by Michelle Rock. An application was prepared for her on August 17, 1991, and coverage was bound on August 27, 1991. Klein's policy was cancelled because she did not have a valid Florida driver's license. Ms. Klein was notified in writing and she did not return to Respondent to handle the matter. As a result, the company cancelled her policy. Respondent's file relating to Narkin reveals that he was given a quote of $320.00, of which he paid $100.00 as a down payment. Narkin was billed the balance of the premium. Narkin's policy was issued on October 7, 1991, and he paid the balance. Respondent notified Narkin that the company was unable to ascertain that he had a valid Florida driver's license. This problem was ultimately resolved and his policy was reinstated. However, an additional premium was required from Narkin because of his license status at the time he made his application. The additional $54.00 was remitted by Narkin to the agency and Respondent forwarded it on to the company. Narkin was cancelled for failing to timely make the payment. Although Respondent maintains that it was the insuror's obligation to notify Narkin that his policy was cancelled, the records indicate that Narkin promptly paid Respondent and the amount was not timely remitted to the company which resulted in the cancellation. Respondent therefore did not timely remit the additional premium amount paid by Narkin to his policy was cancelled. Respondent utilizes a practice of binding coverages on applications the moment a completed application is filed. In each of the above referenced transactions, Respondent timely issued binder numbers and each applicant was bound the moment their application was completed and when the binder was issued. In each instance, Respondent promptly bound each of the above referred insureds. Respondent was unaware that Michelle and Richard Rock were providing kickbacks and other gratuities to automobile salesmen who are not insurance agents, customer representatives, or solicitors. When she did discover that this activity was ongoing, she took immediate steps to terminate this practice. As a result of that activity, she terminated her relationship with Michelle and Richard Rock.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine of $500.00 to be payable to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of the entry of its Final Order for the violation derived in paragraph 50. In all other respects, Petitioner shall enter a Final Order dismissing the remaining allegations of the first Amended Administrative Complaint filed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, IN CASE NO. 93-7105 Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraph 10 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraphs 37-46 recommended order. Paragraph 56 adopted as modified, paragraphs 36 and 46 recommended order. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Respondents proposed findings are in the form of a review of the testimony and written argument on that testimony. As such, although considered, no specific rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Cowdery 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner takes exception to the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order at paragraphs 12, 19, and 27, wherein the Hearing Officer found that the evidence did not prove that the Respondent had committed the violations charged as referenced in each finding. This conclusion is not supported by competent and substantial evidence as required by section 120.57(1)(a) 10., Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer was convinced that the multitude of forms utilized by the Respondent in selling the non-insurance products (motor clubs) to Hulan Mitchell, Jenna Chester and Michele Humose demonstrated that they had given their informed consent. However, the Hearing Officer overlooked the blatant misrepresentation and false statement contained in the "premium" receipts issued to each of the insureds. Although the Hearing Officer is free to determine the credibility of the witness' testimony, the Hearing Officer cannot ignore or reject unrefuted competent and substantial evidence in the record that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the premium receipts are a misrepresentation of fact or false statement. No witness testimony is necessary to make this finding. The documents speak for themselves and were not otherwise questioned or refuted. The record unequivocally established the following: Hulan Mitchell - The "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "1") issued to Mr. Mitchell indicates a total premium of $378. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $328 with a downpayment of $98 required. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "1") This is absolutely unrefuted on the record. The premium receipt includes $50 for the cost of the motor club, which is not a policy of insurance and accordingly is not "premium". Also the downpayment required, purportedly for insurance, included $50 for the motor club ($98 + $50 = $148). Furthermore, based on clear documentary evidence in the record, Mr. Mitchell was again subject to a misrepresentation of fact (undisputed) wherein on July 9, 1993 he received a letter (Pet. Ex. "1") threatening to cancel his "insurance" policy because he did not pay a $48 balance due on the motor club. Accordingly the record clearly indicates that the Respondent has made a false or misleading statement with reference to the insurance transaction for Mr. Mitchell. The fact that the Hearing Officer held that Mr. Mitchell knew (despite his testimony otherwise) that he had purchased a motor club, does not negate the fact that the Respondent made a false or misleading statement. JENNA CHESTER - The deceptive premium receipt practice was visited upon Ms. Chester on two occasions. First on February 1, 1994 a "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "2") was issued in an amount of $670 for "total premium" due and a required downpayment of $261. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $585 with a required downpayment of $176. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "2") The "premium" receipt and downpayment included a non-insurance fee for a motor club in the amount of $85. On May 23, 1994 Ms. Chester went to the Respondent to repurchase coverage which had been cancelled. At that time, another "premium" receipt was issued to her in the amount of a "total premium" of $719 and a required downpayment of $286 (Pet. Ex. "2") The actual cost of the insurance was $619 and a required downpayment of $186. See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "2") The additional $100 was for the non-insurance motor club which was sold to Ms. Chester. Although the Hearing Officer held that Ms. Chester knew she was purchasing this motor club (despite Ms. Chester' s testimony otherwise) this does not negate the fact that the Respondent has made false or misleading statement in this insurance transaction with Ms. Chester. Michelle Humose - The unrefuted documentary evidence indicates that on May 5, 1994, Ms. Humose was issued a "premium" receipt (Pet. Ex. "3") indicating a "total premium" in the amount of $926 and a required downpayment of $348. The actual cost of the "insurance" was $826 with a required downpayment of $248 See Premium Finance Agreement (Pet. Ex. "3") The additional $100 included in the "premium" receipt was for the non-insurance motor club sold to Ms. Humose. Again despite the Hearing Officer's finding contrary to Ms. Humose's direct testimony that she did not know she was purchasing a motor club, the Respondent has clearly and convincingly made a false or misleading statement with respect to this insurance transaction with Ms. Humose. It is implicit in the Findings of Fact by the Hearing Officer that each referenced transaction took place as described herein. The Hearing Officer merely failed to explicitly state in the Recommended Order that the unrefuted documentary evidence establishes a prima facie misrepresentation of fact. Indeed, the exact factual scenario established herein was determined to constitute a misrepresentation in In the Matter of: Kenneth Michael Whitaker, Case Number 93-L-432DDH (Final Order dated July 3, 1995). It was specifically determined "that the Respondent's standard business practice of combining the costs of insurance coverages with the costs of the auto club memberships and then calling such costs "total premium" on receipts issued to customers constituted a misrepresentation and was deceptive." Also, it was further determined "that the Respondent's standard business practice of deducting all or part of the ancillary product fee up front resulted in false statements on other documents that the full downpayment for premium or financing of premium had been made, when in actuality it had not." Whitaker Final Order at pp's 9-10. The Department determined that this activity was a violation of section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes. This finding was also affirmed on appeal in Whitaker v. Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Case No. 95-2702, (21 FLW 1353, Slip Opinion dated June 13, 1996). The court upheld this violation when it summarized the practice in the opinion as follows: Appellant took all or part of the ancillary product from the required premium downpayment and gave the consumer a receipt which listed the full downpayment as "Total Premium". The receipt did not reveal that part of the "premium" went to purchase an ancillary product. Whitaker Slip Opinion at pp's 3-4. This type of fraudulent and deceptive practice also constitutes a violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive or misleading. The Hearing Officer has already considered the unrefuted facts on the record and was clearly in error to make a finding otherwise. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.57(a)(a) 10., Florida Statutes, which reads in part: The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact, including findings of fact that form the basis for an agency statement, unless the agency first determines from a review of the complete record, and states with particularity in the order, that findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law. the Department may modify the findings of fact. In this case there was no competent and substantial evidence to make a finding that the Respondent did not make a false or misleading statement with the premium receipts issued in this cause. A review of the entire record demonstrates unrefuted documentary evidence which supports the modified findings of fact contained herein. Therefore, Petitioner's exceptions to findings of fact 12, 19 and 27 are hereby GRANTED. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Petitioner takes exception to conclusions of law at paragraphs 30 and 31, based on the Hearing Officer's rejection of unrefuted facts established on the record, i.e., deceptive and misleading premium receipts. Conclusions of Law 30 and 31 are revised to reflect that the premium receipts issued to insureds constitute fraudulent and deceptive practices as well as placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading. Conclusion of Law 30 is modified as follows: In this case, the Respondent was charged with violating sections 626.611(4), 626.611(5), 626.611(7), 626.611(9), 626.611(13), 626.621(2), 626.621(6), 626.9541(1)(b), 626.9541(1)(e), 626.9541(1)(k)1., and 626.9541(1)(z), Florida Statutes. Boiled down to the essentials the Department alleged that Respondent violated the provisions listed above by unlawfully selling insureds motor club memberships without their informed consent, made false and misleading statements regarding the coverage provided and falsely represented and illegally required insureds to purchase motor club membership as part of their purchase of automobile insurance and that Respondent engaged in the prohibited practice of "sliding" additional coverages or products into the purchase of the insured without the informed consent of the insured. This revision is necessary because the Hearing Officer failed to include sections 626.9541(1)(b) and 62.9541(1)(e), Florida Statutes, as alleged violations. Conclusion of Law 31 is likewise revised as follows: The Department failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent attempted to "slide" coverage or ancillary products involved in this case. Likewise, the evidence did not clearly or convincingly demonstrate that Respondent did not obtain the informed consent of her customers prior to selling them the auto club memberships involved here. However, based on the unrefuted evidence in the record, the Respondent has violated sections 626.611(9) and 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by issuing "premium receipts" which falsely and deceptively represented "total premium" which included a fee for a non-insurance product, ie. motor club membership. Accordingly, the Respondent is guilty of three counts of violating sections 626.611(9) and 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's exceptions to conclusions of law 30 and 31 are hereby GRANTED. RULING ON EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDATION The Petitioner takes exception to the recommendation that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. The Penalty Guidelines contained in Chapter 4-231, Florida Administrative Code, should be applied in this case. There are three documented violations (one for each count) of engaging in fraudulent and dishonest practices as prohibited in section 626.611 (9), Florida Statutes, and placing before the public a representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive or misleading in violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Under the penalty guidelines, a violation of section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes, requires a suspension of 9 months per count. Under the penalty guidelines, a violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, requires a suspension of 6 months per count. Based on Rule 4-231.040, Florida Administrative Code, the highest penalty per count should be assessed, therefore the appropriate penalty is three counts at 9 months for a total suspension period of 27 months. Since the total required suspension exceeds 2 years, the appropriate sanction is the revocation of the Respondent's licenses in accordance with section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes. The violation of section 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, permits the assessment of an additional fine on top of any other administrative sanction, pursuant to section 626.9521, Florida Statutes. This section permits fines for wilful violations of up to $10,000 per violation not to exceed $100,000. The Petitioner recommends that a fine of $3,000 be assessed against the Respondent. However, insufficient grounds have been demonstrated to justify the assessment of a $3,000 administrative fine. Therefore, Petitioner's exceptions to the recommendation are hereby GRANTED, except for the Petitioner's argument for an additional sanction in the form of a $3,000 administrative fine which is hereby DENIED. PENALTY Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, prescribes the aggravating and mitigating factors which the Department shall consider and, if warranted, apply to the total penalty in reaching the final penalty. Aggravating factors in this matter, as delineated in Rule 4-231.160, Florida Administrative Code, are the willfulness of the Respondent's conduct and the existence of secondary violations established in Counts I-III of the Administrative Complaint. Only minimal mitigating factors exist which are outweighed by the aggravating factors. The existence of these aggravating factors would increase the Respondent`s total penalty, thereby resulting in a higher final penalty. Increasing the Respondent's total penalty would be pointless, however, for section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes, limits a licensee's period of suspension to a maximum of 2 years. The Respondent's 27-month total penalty already exceeds the two-year statutory limit. Consequently, the Department has determined that a revocation of the Respondent's insurance agent license is warranted and appropriate in this matter, and is necessary to adequately protect the insurance-buying pubic. IT IS THEREBY ORDERED: All licenses and eligibility for licensure held by TARA JEANNE SMITH, are hereby REVOKED, pursuant to the provisions of sections 626.611, 626.621, 626.641(2) and 626.651(1), Florida Statutes, effective the date of this Final Order. As of the date of this Final Order, the Respondent shall not engage in or attempt or profess to engage in any transaction or business for which a license or permit is required under the Florida Insurance Code, or directly or indirectly own, control or be employed in any manner by an insurance agent or agency. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Final Order pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 612 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333, and a copy of the same and the filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. BILL NELSON Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner COPIES FURNISHED: Tara Jeanne Smith 2588 Panther Creek Road, Apt. A Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5628 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley and Associates, P.A. 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Diane Cleavinger, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Stephen C. Fredrickson, Esquire Division of Legal Services 200 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Chapter 626, Florida Statues and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SunCom 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 16 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted. The facts contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 26 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted. The facts contained in paragraph 23 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen C. Frederickson, Esquire Division of Legal Services 645A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley and Associates 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Bill Nelson Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners should be allowed to establish a new point dealership for the sale of motorcycles manufactured by Taizhou Zhongneng Motorcycle Co., Ltd. (ZHNG), in Jacksonville, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On October 10, 2008, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) published a notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The notice advised that Galaxy Powersports, LLC d/b/a JCL International, LLC, intends to allow the establishment of Putnam City Motors, d/b/a PC Motors, as a dealership for the sale of motorcycles manufactured by Taizhou Zhongneng Motorcycle Co., Ltd. (ZHNG) at 7033 Beach Boulevard, Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, on or after September 29, 2008. By letter received by the Department on October 31, 2008, Respondent, Roadpower USA LLC, opposed the establishment of the dealership selling the same products as Roadpower USA, LLC, within 11 miles from its established dealership. On November 14, 2008, the Department referred this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct an evidentiary hearing. By Initial Order entered November 14, 2008, Petitioners and Respondent were required to provide certain information for the scheduling of the final hearing in this cause. None of the parties responded to the Initial Order. A Notice of Hearing by Video Teleconference was entered on December 12, 2008, scheduling this case for final hearing on May 7, 2009, at 1:00 p.m. An Order of Pre-hearing Instructions was entered that same date, which required the parties to exchange witness lists and copies of exhibits no later than seven days prior to the final hearing. Copies of the witness lists were also required to be filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. No witness lists have been filed. At 1:00 p.m. on May 7, 2009, the final hearing was convened. The only persons present were the court reporter, who was at the Jacksonville site, and the undersigned, who was at the Tallahassee site. The undersigned waited until approximately 1:25 p.m., but neither the Petitioners nor the Respondent appeared for the final hearing. The hearing was adjourned at approximately 1:30 p.m. No one on behalf of Petitioners or Respondent contacted the undersigned’s office with any explanation of their non-appearance before the hearing was adjourned, or thereafter.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED: That the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order denying Petitioners’ application for the new point dealership at issue in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael James Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32344 Leo Su Galaxy Powersports, LLC, d/b/a JCL International, LLC 2667 Northhaven Road Dallas, Texas 75229 Pete Biltoc Claudio Biltoc Putnam City Motors, Inc. 7033 Beach Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Jim Lee Road Power USA, LLC 927 North 3rd Street Jacksonville Beach, Florida 32250
The Issue The issue presented here concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Motor Vehicles, should grant the Petitioner, Crown Pontiac, Inc., a motor vehicle dealer license in accordance with Section 320.642, Florida Statutes (1979), on the basis that the Petitioners in this cause, in the face of the challenge to Crown's licensure offered by the Respondent, B & L Motors, Inc., d/b/a Bert Jackson Imports, have proven that the existing Fiat automobile dealers in the proposed territory or community for licensure are providing inadequate representation for Fiat.
Findings Of Fact On May 5, 1980, the Petitioner Fiat Motors of North America, Inc., issued a letter of intent to grant a Fiat franchise to the Petitioner Crown Pontiac, Inc., d/b/a Crown Sportscar Center to sell Fiat automobiles. (See Petitioner Fiat's Exhibit No. 13 admitted into evidence.) The Fiat dealership would be located at the sportscar facility of Petitioner Crown's overall operation which is found at 5301 34th Street North, St. Petersburg, Florida. The Respondent B & L Motors, Inc., d/b/a Bert Jackson Imports, having learned of Fiat's intentions to grant the franchise to Crown, protested Crown's licensure before the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Motor Vehicles, that protest having been made in keeping with the terms of Section 320.642, Florida Statutes (1979). 2/ After receiving the Respondent, B & L Motors' Petition in protest, the Division of Motor Vehicles forwarded the case to the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That formal hearing was held on December 4, 1980. PARTIES Petitioner Fiat is an automobile distributor that offers Fiat motorcars for sale in the United States through its several franchise retail outlets. Its model line includes two sedans; the Brava and Strada, and two sports convertibles; the X1-9 and the Spider. The Petitioner Crown Pontiac is a retail outlet for the General Motors, Pontiac automobile, JRT-British Leyland, MG, Triumph, Jaguar and Rover, Peugeot, Nissan, and Honda, through its stores in St. Petersburg, Florida. It is the intention of Crown to sell the Fiat line through the sportscar part of its operation which now handles JRT-British Leyland products. The Respondent B & L Motors, is a retail outlet for Volkswagen automobiles, Fiats and Lancias. That dealership is located in Clearwater, Florida, within Pinellas County, Florida, the county in which St. Petersburg is found. The Respondent, Division of Motor Vehicles is an agency of the State of Florida with regulatory responsibility and authority, among those duties being the requirement to approve or disapprove the application for new motor vehicle dealer licenses in Florida sought by the prospective franchisees of the various automobile manufacturers and distributors. HISTORY OF FIAT DEALERSHIPS IN PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA From 1965 through March 1, 1979, Fiat Motors of North America, Inc., had a licensed franchisee in St. Petersburg, Florida, the last of those Fiat dealers in St. Petersburg being Fifth Avenue Motors, Ltd., d/b/a International Motor Cars Limited. Notice of termination of the franchise of International was sent from Fiat on December 1, 1978, leading to the ultimate cancellation of the Florida license on March 2, 1979. Beginning 1967, Fiat has had a licensed franchise outlet in Clearwater, Florida, with B & L Motors becoming the franchise outlet in Clearwater in late 1974, and continuing to operate as a franchise outlet up through the time of the final hearing in this cause. Subsequent to the loss of the franchise by International and the cancellation of its Florida license on or about March 2, 1979, there has been no Fiat dealership in St. Petersburg, Florida. Crown had attempted to obtain the Fiat franchise by acquiring the Fiat franchise and Mercedes franchise held by Fifth Avenue Motors, Ltd., d/b/a International Motor Cars Limited. This agreement was to be consummated through an asset purchase agreement, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner Crown's Exhibit No. 2 submitted into evidence. This agreement was executed on November 1, 1978, but its terms and conditions were never carried out due to difficulty which Crown had in coming to terms with Mercedes on the purchase of that franchise. At present there is an ongoing law suit on that subject. In addition, vandalism and theft of certain parts that Crown was to purchase from Fifth Avenue has held up the contract. Fiat and Crown had begun their negotiations in October 1978 leading Fiat to make overtures to Crown to offer a franchise in early 1979, which was rejected by Crown at that time for reasons discussed above. There was contact between Crown and Fiat from March 1979 through March of 1980, and sometime in April or May Crown determined to go forward with the franchise agreement, notwithstanding the International dispute. This led to the May 5, 1980, intent to grant by Fiat and the ensuing request by Crown that the State of Florida, Division of Motor Vehicles issue a dealer license. (In connection with the question of a grant of a license to operate a Fiat dealership in St. Petersburg, the Respondent Division of Motor Vehicles had had a past policy of allowing a manufacturer to replace a dealer, within one year of the cancellation of the prior license, without entertaining protests from other competing dealers provided, further, the prior dealer lost its franchise agreement with the manufacturer. In this case, the one year grace commenced on or about March 2, 1979, and expired on or about March 2, 1980. See Joint Exhibit No. 1, affidavit of Henry C. Noxtine.) FIAT'S MARKET SHARE IN THE UNITED STATES, MAJOR MARKETS, PINELLAS COUNTY, ST. PETERSBURG AND CLEARWATER Petitioner Fiat's Exhibits Nos. 1 through 4, admitted into evidence are charts which depict the sale of import automobiles in the United States, with particular emphases on the sale of Fiat automobiles in the United States, Florida, Clearwater and St. Petersburg. Exhibit No. 1 shows the number of import auto sales as a percentage of total automobile sales in the years 1977, 1978, 1979, and the first nine months of 1980, for given market areas. From this chart, it can be seen that import automobile sales range from 17.3 percent through 18.4 percent, in 1977, depending on whether the study related to the United States, Florida, Clearwater or St. Petersburg to 27.6 percent through 28.9 percent for the first nine months of 1980, depending on which of the above referenced market areas was under consideration. Although the trend within the import market for automobiles showed an upturn as a percentage of total sales from 1977, through the first nine months of 1980, Exhibit No. 2 demonstrates that Fiat's percentage of total import sales range from a high United States percentage of 3.2 percent in 1977, to 1.6 percent in September 1980, thereby depicting a decline in overall sales of Fiat automobiles as a percentage of total imports sold in the United States. Of particular significance is the fact that the number of Fiat automobiles sold as a percentage of total imports in St. Petersburg is 2 percent in 1977, and 1.9 percent in 1978, at a time when a separate Fiat dealer was located in St. Petersburg and with the advent of the failure of the St. Petersburg dealership in 1979, the sales were 1.2 percent and in the first nine months of 1980, in which B & L was the sole Pinellas County dealer, those sales were only .5 percent in St. Petersburg. In the successive years, 1977 through the first nine months of 1980, Fiat sales in Clearwater were 2.7 percent, 2.2 percent, 2.7 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively. The figures related to Fiat sales in Clearwater in the years 1979 and 1980 and sales of Fiats in St. Petersburg in those two reporting years show a disparate break out in numbers of sales in Clearwater and St. Petersburg in those reporting years when contrasted with the 1977 and 1978 reporting years, which show the percentage of sales in Clearwater and St. Petersburg to be much closer. There are approximately 800,000 people in Pinellas County, Florida, with approximately 250,000 of those persons residing in St. Petersburg and 350,000 in the overall St. Petersburg area, which is in the southern part of the county. There is another major population center in the northern part of the county. Clearwater is the principle municipality in that area. St. Petersburg and Clearwater constitute separate and identifiable trading areas and territories within Pinellas County, Florida. In this connection, Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence shows Fiat's performance in 1979, in similar markets to that of Clearwater or St. Petersburg, outlining the Fiat registrations and the percentage of registrations of Fiat automobiles in those communities. This chart should be read in conjunction with Exhibit No. 4, which is admitted into evidence which shows the number of import sales in the St. Petersburg and Clearwater territories and the number of Fiat sales in those territories, together with the number of Fiat sales necessary to gain the 3.5 percent penetration and the increase in number of units sold to achieve that goal. There is a further hypothetical to demonstrate sales penetration at 5 percent and the number of prospective sales if the goal is achieved. Again, this is for the year 1979. Although the last reporting period, i.e., the first nine months of 1980, shows that the overall Fiat sales nationwide are 1.6 percent and the Florida sales are 2.2 percent, sales in what Fiat has called its "major markets" approximated 2.7 percent in 1979. It is within the "major markets" that Fiat intends to offer its future emphasis and these areas are felt to be crucial to the continued success of Fiat Motors. Sales in Clearwater and St. Petersburg, which are considered "major markets," range from .5 percent in St. Petersburg to 1.8 percent in Clearwater for the reporting period 1980, far below the 2.7 percent or even the national and Florida figures for 1980, when examining performance in St. Petersburg. The balance of Exhibits Nos. 1 through 4 by the Petitioner Fiat, although not discussed in this Recommended Order are found to be factually correct. COMPETITION Within Pinellas County, Volkswagen has two franchise dealers; British Leyland has two franchise dealers; Honda has two franchise dealers; Toyota has three franchise dealers; Dodge has three franchise dealers; Plymouth has three franchise dealers; Subaru has three franchise dealers; and Chevrolet and Ford have four franchise dealer outlets. Again referring to the charts Exhibits Nos. 1 through 4, they would show an increase in percentage of market share by the import automobile industry at a time when the overall numbers of automobile sales have declined, and of those automobile sales in decline, at lease two competitive import product lines, Volkswagen and British Leyland, have been part of the picture of general decline. Nonetheless, they have continued to have two franchises within Pinellas County. EFFECT OF INCREASING FIAT DEALERSHIPS IN PINELLAS COUNTY By increasing the number of Fiat dealerships from one to two, it increases the presence of the Fiat name in the territory by 100 percent. It adds a dealership with proper facilities for furnishing warranty and other repair services, by an organization that has already gained familiarity with the Fiat line; it creates the opportunity for the exchange of vehicles and parts between dealers in the county; it creates the opportunity for the public to engage in comparison shopping and it reduces the amount of time which South County owners must travel to receive factory approved service which now ranges from thirty minutes to an hour if the service is to be obtained from B & L Motors. All of these items relate to the success of Fiat and its franchisees in marketing the Fiat product. In this regard, the statistics offered in this hearing demonstrate that the Respondent B & L has continued to keep pace with Fiat's needs in the market in Clearwater, but it has failed take up the slack that occurred when International lost its franchise. The Petitioner Crown is in a position to assist Fiat in regaining this market share without undue detriment to the Respondent B & L. Crown, in its other automobile sales activities, has primarily concentrated on the southern half of Pinellas County, which is the St. Petersburg area or territory and it would use that experience in the market area in attempting to sell Fiat automobiles to the consuming public.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Crown Pontiac, Inc., d/b/a Crown's Sportscar Center, to be licensed as a Fiat dealer in St. Petersburg, Florida, be GRANTED. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February 1981.
The Issue Whether petitioner qualifies for a II-C Club alcoholic beverage license, which is issued to Nonprofit organizations or clubs devoted to promoting community, municipal, or county development or any phase of community, municipal or county development.
Findings Of Fact Code I is a nonprofit Florida corporation located at 3420-31 West Broward Boulevard, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In February, 1982, it applied for a II-C or Club alcoholic beverage license pursuant to Section 561.20(7)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1981) and Rule 7A-3.19, Florida Administrative Code. On August 3, 1982, DABT denied its application, asserting that it was not qualified for licensing under tie statute and rule. Code I was incorporated as a Florida nonprofit corporation in 1962. Ms. Bessie Walton and her former husband formed the corporation to raise funds to build a home for the elderly. With funds subsequently generated by the corporation, Tropical Home for Senior Citizens was constructed and continues to be operated in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In 1974, the corporation became inactive. According to several members of Code I, the goals and purposes of the Club are to support and make contributions to benevolent causes. This testimony, however, is based upon representations made to them by others concerning the goals and purposes of the Club. (Testimony of Troutman, Reddick) In the past, Code I has donated funds to numerous organizations or allowed them to use its facilities--without charge. These organizations, included Broward County Youth Football, Greater Bethel AME Church, Tropical Home for Senior Citizens, North Fork Elementary School, and Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity (for scholarships). It has also sponsored foster families. Code I has charged, however, some organizations $175 for the use of its facilities. (Testimony of Troutman) The articles of Incorporation of Code I state that the objectives of the organization are to provide a meeting place for recreational purposes of its members, to provide aid and comfort for its members in case of sickness or death, and to assist in any other matters pertaining to the highest orders of American Citizenship. For carrying out these purposes, the corporation is authorized to buy, hold and sell real and personal property, to invest funds, and to construct and operate social club houses. (P-1) Neither the articles nor the bylaws of the corporation explicitly, or by reasonable inference, dedicate it to promoting community, municipal, or county development. (P-1, P-4) According to its treasurer, its main purpose is to provide a facility where the public can enjoy an evening on the town in a conducive club atmosphere. Membership is open to the general public. An alcoholic beverage license would enable the Club to earn additional funds for its operations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Code I's application for a II-C Club alcoholic beverage license be DENIED, without prejudice to its right to reapply after amendment of its charter and bylaws. DONE AND ORDERED this 25th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1983.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the hearing, and at all times relevant to the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, Alan David Cottrill was licensed as a general lines property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines agent by the Department of Insurance. The Department of Insurance regulates general lines-property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines agents pursuant to Chapters 626 and 627, Florida Statutes. Lloyd Register, III, and his son, Lloyd Register, IV, operate directly or indirectly a number of insurance agencies specializing in the sale of nonstandard insurance. These agencies generally employ an agent, who is an officer of a separate corporation in which one or both of the Registers is also an officer; and the Registers own a controlling interest in the corporation or otherwise have the capacity to terminate each corporation. Alan David Cottrill started his employment with Cash Register of Arlington, Inc. in July, 1992. He was designated as the primary agent at Cash Register of Jacksonville, Inc. at the end of July, 1992, at which time he was president of the corporation. In February of 1993, he became vice president and president of Cash Register of Westside, Inc. In March of 1993, the Mr. Cottrill was again employed by Cash Register of Arlington, Inc., and was an officer of that corporation and primary agent of that insurance agency. He was the primary agent and general manager of Cash Register of Palatka, Inc., from November of 1993 until October of 1994. From February of 1993 until October of 1994, Mr. Cottrill was general manager of all Cash Register Offices in Jacksonville and Orange Park, Florida. The Respondent was again employed full time by Cash Register of Westside, Inc. in March of 1994, and became the primary agent for that agency in May of 1994. All of the Cash Register Auto Insurance agencies with which the Respondent was employed, as indicated in Paragraph 4, above, were insurance agencies regulated under the laws of Florida. Lloyd Register, IV, was an officer and director of the foregoing Cash Register Auto Insurance agencies. Colonial Touring Association, Inc., is an automobile club providing accidental death and dismemberment as an ancillary product. COUNT I, II, and III The Petitioner did not present any evidence on the allegations of Counts I, II, III, VI, VII, IX, and X in the Administrative Complaint. COUNT IV Cassie Reimer contacted Cash Register Auto Insurance of Orange Park, Inc., at 203 Blanding Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida, on January 8, 1993, regarding the purchase of automobile insurance. At the time Ms. Reimer purchased insurance from Cash Register Auto Insurance of Orange Park, Inc., the Respondent admitted he was the manager of the Orange Park office. The application executed by Ms. Reimer indicates that the Agency's name is "Cash Register Auto Insurance of Jax, Inc., 5631 University Blvd. W., Jacksonville, FL 32216," and the agent's number is 8009. Prior to going the Orange Park office of Cash Register Auto Insurance, Ms. Reimer had called and had obtained a quote for liability, collision, and personal injury protection for her automobile. Ms. Reimer advised the individual with whom she spoke on the phone that she wanted the minimum coverages necessary to satisfy the lien-holder of her automobile loan and the Florida law. Based upon the quote which she received, she went to the Orange Park office of Cash Register Auto Insurance. When Ms. Reimer arrived at the office, she was assisted by Andrew Voshell, who she knew as "Andy" and who helped her fill out the insurance applications (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 & 2) for liability, collision, and personal injury protection from American Union Insurance Company. Mr. Voshell helped her fill out the premium financing agreement, accepted a down payment in the amount of $83 from Ms. Reimer, and presented Ms. Reimer an application which she executed for Colonial Automobile Club which included additional insurance for accidental death and dismemberment (ADD) which cost $80. The transaction was memorialized in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 (the premium financing agreement), Petitioner's Exhibit 4 (cash receipt from Voshell), Petitioner's Exhibit 5 (Colonial Touring Association, Inc. designation of beneficiary), and Petitioner's Exhibit 6 (confirmation of coverage). The Confirmation of Coverage form (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) indicates that there were $2,000, $1,000, $500, and $250 deductibles for bodily injury; and that ADD coverage from Colonial was optional and cost $80. Ms. Reimer signed each of the spaces on the Confirmation of Coverage, indicating she had read and understood the policy. The Premium Financing Agreement (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) indicates that the total amount financed was $551, which included the $80 premium for Colonial Touring Association (CTA) for ADD and the $471 premium for American Union (AIB) for property damage and personal injury protection. Ms. Reimer was not advised by Mr. Voshell that she was purchasing an optional automobile club membership, and that the cost thereof was being added to her premiums and financed. Andrew Voshell was not a licensed agent at the time he dealt with Ms. Reimer. It was Mr. Voshell who acted as the agent presenting the applications and obtaining Ms. Reimer's signature and accepting payment from her; however, Alan David Cottrill knew about the transaction because he signed Ms. Reimer's applications outside her presence. COUNT V On December 10, 1992, Curtis Newton bought automobile insurance at the University Boulevard office of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Jacksonville, Inc. The Respondent was employed at that office as the primary agent at that time. Mr. Newton called the office and obtained a quote for the minimum liability and PIP coverage required by law. The Respondent completed most of Mr. Newton's application for insurance while speaking with him on the telephone. Because Mr. Newton wanted to finance the premiums, the Respondent included an auto club membership with ADD coverage in the quote. When Mr. Newton came to the agency, he dealt with Linda Palmer, an unlicensed individual, exclusively. Ms. Palmer worked at the office from September, 1992 until August, 1993 under the supervision of the Respondent. Ms. Palmer did not hold a license to transact any type of insurance business during her employment with Cash Register Auto Insurance. The Respondent permitted Ms. Palmer to take applications and receive money. The Respondent required that Ms. Palmer explain to the customer the Confirmation of Coverages form which the customer signed. This was the only explanation provided to customers of the insurance they were buying, and constituted an explanation of policies. Mr. Newton advised Ms. Palmer that he did not want to join an auto club and did not want ADD coverage. Ms. Palmer crossed off the ADD coverage on the Premium Financing Agreement; however, she had Mr. Newton execute the Coverage Confirmation which indicated $4,000 coverage for ADD, but which did not state a premium amount. There is no place under ADD to indicate "no coverage" as there is for the other optional coverages. Mr. Newton also executed a designation of beneficiary form for Auto Accidental Death Coverage, and paid a down payment of $91 to Ms. Palmer. Ms. Palmer did not advise Mr. Newton that he had executed the paperwork for ADD coverage. Ms. Palmer was required by Respondent to sell auto club and ADD coverage. The inclusion of the forms for auto club and ADD coverage was intentional. The premium financing agreement was for the amount of the liability and PIP coverage, $256, and this coverage was provided. However, the premium financing agreement indicates the down payment was $51, not $91. There is no evidence that Mr. Newton was provided with ADD coverage, which he did not want, but the $40 difference between the $51 down payment and the $91 which Mr. Newton tendered to Ms. Palmer was not refunded to Mr. Newton. There was no evidence that Mr. Newton ever made demand for this overpayment. Had the Respondent handled Mr. Newton's application, the Respondent would have known that Mr. Newton did not desire ADD coverage, and that the down payment tendered was excessive and inconsistent with the insurance being provided and the amount being financed. In filling out the applications, explaining the forms, and accepting the money from Mr. Newton, Ms. Palmer engaged in activities restricted to agents with the knowledge and consent of the Respondent. COUNT VI and VII The Department did not present any evidence regarding Counts VI and VII. COUNT VIII On October 22, 1992, Rosa Coleman bought automobile insurance at the 3796 Blanding Boulevard office of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Westside, Inc. from the Respondent who was employed at that office at that time. Ms. Coleman advised the Respondent that she wanted the minimum required coverages. Ms. Coleman came into the office on her lunch hour and executed an application (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) for bodily injury, property damage, and PIP insurance to Union American Insurance Company. Ms. Coleman executed various forms, among which were a Confirmation of Coverage form and Designation of Beneficiary form which indicated she was obtaining auto club and ADD coverage. The Respondent did not explain that there was a separate charge for auto club membership which included the ADD coverage, or that she did not have to have this coverage. The total insurance premium for the liability and PIP coverage was $291 and the charge for the auto club was $30, for a total of $321. The handwriting makes it difficult to read the two amounts; however, the ADD was for $3,000, and the premium was $10 per thousand of coverage. The receipt indicates the Respondent received $40 down payment. The remainder of the premium was financed by Ms. Coleman with Equity Premium, Inc. The application (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) the receipt (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) and designation of beneficiary form (Petitioner's Exhibit 11) indicate that insurance company was Cash Register Auto Insurance, 5631 University Blvd. West, Jacksonville, FL 32216. Although the Respondent was not the agent for the Blanding Boulevard office at the time Ms. Coleman purchased her insurance, the Respondent, who personally sold Ms. Coleman her insurance, was the primary agent for the agency listed on the application and receipt which she received from the Respondent. COUNT IX AND X The Department did not present any evidence on these two counts. COUNT XI On or about December 22, 1993, Dennis Hurlburt went into the Palatka office of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Putnam County, Inc., in Palatka, Florida, and purchased liability and PIP on his truck. At that time, the Respondent was the primary agent in the Palatka office. (Volume III, Page 345, line 19.) Mr. Hurlburt completed an application for property damage and PIP insurance from Security Insurance Company of Hartford with the assistance of Andrew Voshell, an unlicensed employee of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Putnam County, Inc. in Palatka, Florida, who was under the supervision of the Respondent. Mr. Hurlburt's premium for the coverages he applied for was $229, and he paid Andrew Voshell $75. Mr. Hurlburt financed the balance of the premiums which included PIP, property damage, automobile club, and ADD. Mr. Voshell receipted for the down payment, and signed Respondent's name on Mr. Hurlburt's application as brokering agent. The Respondent denied that he was aware of Mr. Voshell's actions; however, he was primary agent in that office during the time in question and is charged with the supervision of the office. Money was received and receipted for by Mr. Voshell, who the Respondent admits was authorized to see customers, review applications, make deposits, and keep books. At this time, the Respondent was also actively engaged as primary agent in another office. Based upon the record as a whole and credibility of the various witnesses, the Respondent's denial is rejected. GENERAL FINDINGS ON THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS Most purchasers of nonstandard automobile insurance who finance their premiums do not complete payment of the premiums; whereupon, the finance company notifies the insurance company which cancels the insurance and cancels the commission earned by the selling agent after deducting for the coverage provided. By selling the auto club memberships, which included ADD coverage, the agent receives 90 percent of the premium which protects the agent against the loss of unearned premiums charged back by insurance companies. It is for this reason that the owners and management of Cash Register had the employees of their outlets include auto club memberships in insurance contracts, particularly those with premium financing. In those cases in which a customer declines auto club membership, the Cash Register agencies refuse to finance premiums, or increase the charges for financing. The Respondent and his employees sell between 80-140 automobile insurance policies per month. The average premium has increased over time, but varied between $250 and $550 for the counts presented. The Respondent receives a commission between 15 and 17.5 percent on automobile insurance. The commission for an auto club ADD contract is 90 percent which means that the agency receives $54 of a $60 premium. This is a "guaranteed" commission because there is no refund on the auto club membership, and this permits the agency to risk the loss of unearned commission which occurs when an insured defaults on his or her premium financing agreement. The customers made a down payment, which was received by the agency, and the balance of the amount owed was financed by the customer. According to the premium financing contract, the down payment was subtracted from that total due for PIP, property damage, and ADD insurance; and the balance due was financed. Under the terms of the contract, the customer financed a portion of the ADD coverage. In actuality, the down payment was applied first to the auto club membership, which included ADD coverage, and only PIP and property damage coverages were financed. The contract for the premium financing and the explanations of what was being financed do not accurately reflect this reality. Government Employees Insurance Company markets its automobile insurance through the mail, and sends applications to the customers through the mail, which are subsequently executed by the agent when returned by the customer by mail. Prior to October 12, 1993, the Department had no rule proscribing the practice of unlicensed persons giving quotes on behalf of a licensed agent. The Department has no rule defining "solicit" and "procure" with respect to the sale of insurance. The Department has no rule which requires an agent sign an application in the presence of the insured.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent for violation of Section 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count V, and That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent for violation of Section 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count VIII, and That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent for violation of Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count IV, and That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent or impose a fine of $2,500 for violation of Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count V, and That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent or impose a fine of $2,500 for violation of Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count XI, and That the Department impose a $2,500 fine for Respondent's violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes, by including ADD coverage in a premium financing agreement as alleged in Count XI, and That the Department impose a $500 fine for violation of Section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, for improperly identifying the agency's address as alleged in Counts IV, and That the Department impose a $500 fine for violation of Section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, for improperly identifying the agency's address as alleged in Counts VIII. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX CASE NO. 94-5460 Both parties submitted proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following states where their findings were adopted or why they were rejected: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Paragraph 1 Paragraphs 3-10 Paragraph 4 Paragraph 11 Paragraph 5 Paragraphs 12,13 Paragraph 6 Paragraph 14,15 Paragraph 14 Paragraphs 16,17 Paragraph 18 Paragraph 18 Paragraph 6 Paragraph 19 Irrelevant and unnecessary. Paragraph 20 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 22,23 Paragraph 11 Paragraph 24 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 25 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 26 Paragraph 12 Paragraphs 27,28 Paragraphs 12,13,15 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 16 Paragraph 30 Subsumed by paragraph 15. (S-15.) Paragraph 31,32 Paragraph 28 Paragraph 33 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 34 Unnecessary. Paragraph 35 Paragraph 31 Paragraph 36 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 37 Paragraph 31 Paragraph 38 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 39,1st sent. Paragraph 30 Paragraph 39,remainder Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 40 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 41 Paragraph 33 Paragraphs 42,43 Paragraph 34 Paragraphs 44-47 Paragraph 35 Paragraph 48 Paragraph 18 Paragraph 49 Subsumed in Paragraph 19. Paragraph 50 Subsumed in Paragraph 22. Paragraph 51 Paragraph 21 Paragraphs 52-55,57 Paragraph 24 Paragraph 56 Paragraph 22 Paragraph 57 Subsumed in Paragraph 24. Paragraphs 58,59 Paragraph 21 Paragraph 60 Paragraph 22 Paragraphs 61,63,64 Unnecessary. Paragraph 62 Subsumed in Paragraph 23. Paragraph 65 Subsumed in Paragraph 36. Paragraphs 66,67 Paragraph 38 Paragraph 68 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 69 Irrelevant. Paragraph 70 Paragraph 39 Paragraph 71 Irrelevant. Paragraph 72 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 73 Subsumed in Paragraph 33. Paragraph 74 Irrelevant. Paragraph 75 Paragraph 37 Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 3 Irrelevant as to time. Paragraph 4 Irrelevant. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraph 17. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraph 7. Paragraph 9 Paragraphs 8,11 Paragraph 10 Paragraph 9 Paragraph 11 Subsumed in Paragraph 8. Paragraph 12 Subsumed in Paragraph 11. Paragraph 13 Subsumed in Paragraph 13 and second application is irrelevant. Paragraph 14 Subsumed in Paragraph 14. Paragraph 15 Contrary to Reimer's testimony: Vol I, pg 118. Paragraph 16 Subsumed in Paragraph 14. Paragraph 17 Subsumed in Paragraph 13. Paragraph 18 Subsumed in Paragraph 14. Paragraph 19 Irrelevant. Paragraph 20 Paragraph 20 Paragraph 21,22 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 23 Paragraph 18 Paragraph 24 Subsumed in Paragraph 19. Paragraph 25 Paragraph 19 Paragraphs 26,27 Subsumed in Paragraphs 20,21. Paragraphs 28,29 Subsumed in Paragraph 22. Paragraph 30 Subsumed in Paragraph 24. Paragraph 31 Rejected because Respondent's failure to perform the acts required of the agent lead to his mistaken belief. Paragraph 32 Paragraph 22 Paragraphs 33-35 Irrelevant. Paragraphs 36,37 Paragraph 27 Paragraph 38 Paragraph 28 Paragraph 39 True, but Respondent was the agent who dealt with Coleman and was directly responsible for his own acts. Paragraph 40 Subsumed in Paragraph 30. Paragraph 41 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraphs 42,43 Subsumed in Paragraph 30. Paragraphs 44,45 Irrelevant. Paragraphs 46,47 Paragraph 32 Paragraph 48 Paragraph 33 Paragraph 49 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraphs 50-52 Irrelevant. Paragraphs 53,54 Paragraphs 34,35 Paragraph 55 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 56 Subsumed in various paragraphs. Paragraph 57,58 Paragraph 36 Paragraph 59-69 Irrelevant or not necessary to resolution of the issues. Paragraph 70 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 71 Irrelevant. Paragraph 72 Not necessary to resolution of the issues. Paragraph 73,74 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 75-79 Irrelevant. Paragraph 80 While true, the fact asserted is contrary to the financing paper work. This is part of the misleading activities by Respondent and his employees. Paragraph 81-84 Irrelevant. Paragraph 85 Recites Hearing Officer's ruling. Paragraph 86,87 Not necessary to resolution of the issues. Paragraph 88,89 Irrelevant. Paragraphs 90,92 Paragraphs 43,44 Paragraphs 91 Irrelevant. Paragraph 93,94 Paragraph 45 COPIES FURNISHED: Allen R. Moayad, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0333 Jed Berman, Esquire Infantino and Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32790 Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent is not providing adequate representation of STAR Neighborhood electric vehicles in the Volusia County area.
Findings Of Fact On January 18, 2007, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Motor Vehicles (Department) issued Final Order No. HSMV-07-37-FOI-DMV, which provides in pertinent part: Pursuant to the requirements of section 320.642, Florida Statutes, JH Global Services, Inc. provided notice to the department of its intention to allow the establishment of Action Golf Cars, for the sale of STAR Neighborhood Electric Vehicles (NEV) at 940 N. US 1, Ormond Beach, Florida 32174. In response to the properly filed notice, the department published the required notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly on January 12, 2007. There are no other dealerships of the same line-make in Volusia County or other contiguous counties. It is therefore ORDERED That Action Golf Cars shall be granted a license at 940 N. US 1, Ormond Beach, Florida 32714, for the sale of STAR Neighborhood Electric vehicles (NEV) on or after this date, provided an application is received by the Division of Motor Vehicles, Regional Office, meeting all requirements for licensure . . . . The license for Action Golf Cars was issued by the Department May 11, 2007. On July 13, 2007, the Department issued a Notice of Publication for a New Point Franchise Motor Vehicle Dealer in a County of More than 300,000 Population, stating that JG Global Services, Inc., intended to allow "the establishment of Bellen Brook, LLC d/b/a Tee Time Golf Cars as a dealership for the sale of Star Neighborhood electric vehicles (STAR) NEV at 1510 North Highway 1, Ormond (Volusia County), Florida 32174, on or after June 18, 2007." Section 320.642(1), Florida Statutes, requires that any licensee proposing to establish an additional motor vehicle dealership within a community where the same line-make vehicle is presently represented shall give written notice of its intention to the Department. The notice shall include, among other things, the identity of all motor vehicle dealers who are franchised to sell the same line-make vehicle with licensed locations in the county or any contiguous county to the county where the additional or relocated vehicle dealer is proposed to be located. Upon publication in the Florida Law Weekly, the Department is required to mail a copy of the notice to those dealers identified in the licensee's notice. Action Golf Cars did not receive the notice contemplated by Section 320.642, Florida Statutes. On July 17, 2007, the Department issued Final Order No. HSMV-07-940-FOI-DMV, which states in pertinent part: Pursuant to the requirements of section 320.642, Florida Statutes, JH Global Services, Inc., provided notice to the Department of its intention to allow the establishment of Bellen Brook, LLC d/b/a Tee Time Golf Cars, for the sale of Star Neighborhood electric vehicles (STAR) NEV at 1510 North Highway 1, Ormond, Florida 32174. In response to the properly filed notice, the Department published the required notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly on July 13, 2007. There are no other dealerships of the same line-make in Volusia County or other contiguous counties. It is therefore ORDERED That Bellen Brook, LLC d/b/a Tee Time Golf Cars shall be granted a license at 1510 North Highway 1, Ormond, Florida 32174, for the sale of Star Neighborhood electric vehicles (STAR) NEV on or after this date, provided an application is received meeting all requirements for licensure. . . . Notwithstanding JH Global Services, Inc.'s notice to the Department regarding Tee Time, on July 25, 2007, JH Global executed an agreement with Action Golf Cars which stated that Action Golf Car's territory would be Flagler and Volusia counties, and that "JH will not sell to other dealers located in this area directly without acknowledge [sic] of Action Golf Cars." The agreement further provided that If other dealers call from these two counties, JH will refer the business to Action Golf Cars. Action Golf Cars will sell to other dealers at the price of $200.00 more than the purchasing prices plus other direct cost associated with the car. Or, with Action Golf Cars's (sic) consent, JH may sell to other dealer directly, but have to give Action Golf Cars, Inc. credit for $200.00 for the cars sold. Bill Morgan, the owner of Action Golf Cars believed that he held the exclusive dealership for STAR cars for the Volusia/Flagler Counties area. Although he had purchased cars from JH Global in 2006, he did not have a written agreement until 2007. In late July, Bill Morgan saw STAR cars on the Tee Time premises. Tee Time is approximately three miles from Action Golf Cars. Mr. Morgan called JH Global and was told by representatives of the company that the STAR cars were purchased by Tee Time from an independent distributor in Georgia. Upon further investigation, Mr. Morgan learned of the notice regarding Tee Time receiving a license and called JH Global again. He was told that Tee Time was "very persistent." After this conversation, Mr. Morgan filed his complaint on behalf of Action Golf Cars with the Department, protesting the issuance of a license to Tee Time. Once Action Golf Cars filed its protest, JH Global refused to sell any more golf cars to Tee Time, and does not currently do so. Tee Time sent some golf cars back to JH Global, at Tee Times' expense, because if it could not service the vehicles (because of the inability to purchase parts), its representative did not want to sell the remaining stock. However, Tee Time wants the ability to sell STAR cars in the Volusia County area and believes it should be allowed to do so. Tee Time purchased six STAR cars in 2007. It sold two and sent back four. STAR cars are a relatively new product in the golf car market, having been first introduced in 2006. Each car costs a dealership approximately $4,000. In 2006, Action Golf Cars purchased approximately $58,600 worth of product from JH Global. In 2007, that amount increased to $135,523. In other words, in 2006, Action Golf Cars purchased approximately 14 STAR cars for resale. In 2007, it purchased an additional 33. Given the limited amount of time the product has been on the market, the impact of allowing Tee Time to sell STAR cars cannot be readily determined.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered denying Tee Time's application for licensure. DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Jane Zhang JH Global Services, Inc. 52 Pelham Davis Circle Greenville, South Carolina 29615 Dale Sheppard Bellen Brook, LLC, d/b/a Tee Time Golf Cars 1510 North Highway 1 Ormond Beach, Florida 32174 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Bill Morgan Action Golf Cars 940 North US 1 Ormond Beach, Florida 32174 Electra Theodorides-Bustle, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Robin Lotane, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of a Recommended Order of Dismissal by Administrative Law Judge Jeff B. Clark, of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to non-compliance to the requirements set out in the Order to Show Cause-—for both parties to file responses no later than August 7, 2009 as to why this matter should not be closed based on lack of response to the Initial Order. The Department hereby adopts the Recommended Order of Dismissal as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and no license will be issued to Galaxy Powersports, LLC d/b/a JCL International, LLC and Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC to sell motorcycles manufactured by Taizhou Zhongneng Motorcycle Co. Ltd. (ZHNG) at 3311 West Lake Mary Boulevard, Lake Mary (Seminole County), Florida 32746. DONE AND ORDERED this /7“ day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. L A. FORD, Direct Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this_/D#}) day of September, 2009. - Vinayak, Dealer Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAFivlg Copies furnished: Leo Su Galaxy Powersports, LLC d/b/a JCL International, LLC 2667 Northhaven Road Dallas, Texas 75229 Jason Rupp Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC 8181 Via Bonita Street Sanford, Florida 32771 James Sursely Action Orlando Motorsports 306 West Main Street Apopka, Florida 32712 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jeff B. Clark Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by Lynne A. Quimby-Pennock, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Parties’ Settlement Agreement, a copy of which is attached, and incorporated by reference, in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, Elite Trikes, LLC, be granted a license to sell motorcycles manufactured by Hyosung Motors American, Inc. at 12395 Belcher Road, Largo, (Pinellas County), Florida 33773, upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. Filed June 28, 2013 7:57 AM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this al day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this AL day of November, 2012. os Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Eicense Adminictro*s- NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/wev Copies furnished: Pat Clark Eco Green Machine, LLC 7000 Park Boulevard Pinellas Park, Florida 33781 Tony Kim Hyosung Motors America, Inc. 5815 Brook Hollow Parkway, Suite C Norcross, Georgia 30071 Jack Lavery Elite Trikes, LLC 12395 Belcher Road Largo, Florida 33773 Matthew Mosk Elite Trikes, LLC 12397 Belcher Road, Suite 270 Largo, Florida 33773 Lynne A. Quimby-Pennock Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
