Findings Of Fact Respondent Albert Wade Anderson holds a business degree from Washington University and a theology degree from Princeton University. After six years, he left the ministry to sell insurance. In 1965, he was licensed to sell life insurance in Minnesota, and continued selling life insurance after he moved to Fort Myers, Florida, in 1967. Respondent is licensed in Florida as an ordinary life, including disability, insurance agent and as a general lines agent. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. In May of 1980, Mr. Anderson, newly licensed by petitioner to sell property and casualty insurance, took a job with Atlas Insurance Agency's Fort Myers office. Atlas Insurance Agency paid respondent a weekly salary of $200 plus "$6.75 per program or deal," (T. 62), i.e., per customer. Almost invariably, respondent sold a motor club membership to any customer who bought a personal injury protection policy; Mr. Anderson could not recall with certainty a single exception. (T. 66.) "A motor club is an organization which provides certain designated services to motorists, including such things as guaranteed arrest bond certificates, towing and labor for disabled automobiles, map drawing services, often accidental death benefits, and similar related services . . . [for] motorists." Deposition of Andrew M. Beverly (Deposition), p. 6. Among motor club membership benefits are many services which are not included in "standard coverage." Deposition, p. 7. Motor club membership is "an important coverage . . . [An] insured should be made aware of this coverage." Deposition, p. 9. An insurance agent "should explain the different [motor club] coverages and options to a potential insured." Deposition, p. 19. COUNT ONE Jeanne Whyte, assistant head nurse at Lee Memorial Hospital on the 11- to-7 shift, came into the Fort Myers office of Atlas Insurance Agency on June 10, 1980. Ms. Whyte graduated from high school and has attended about a year's worth of college courses from time to time, in addition to her training as a nurse. When she went to the Atlas Insurance Agency, it was with the intent to purchase the least expensive automobile insurance available. She was already a member of the American Automobile Association. Respondent Anderson persuaded her, however, that she should also purchase liability insurance to protect her home and other assets. In explaining her potential benefits, Mr. Anderson said "something about towing, but [Ms. Whyte] didn't connect it with . . . a club or anything." (T. 27.) Before she left the office, she wrote a check for $275, and signed documents, including a membership application for American Touring Association, Inc., Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Of the $275, $186 was used to purchase bodily injury liability, property damage liability, and personal injury protection, in the form of a combination automobile policy from Kenilworth Insurance Company, No. C-1-826686, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3; $75 was used to purchase a membership in American Touring Association, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4; and $14 was not accounted for by the evidence. When Ms. Whyte discovered that $75 had been used to purchase a membership in American Touring Association, she tried to obtain a refund from Atlas Insurance Agency, originally without success; but she eventually obtained a $75 refund, after contacting the Insurance Commissioner's office. This experience notwithstanding, Ms. Whyte purchased automobile insurance a year later from respondent, who by that time was employed with another insurance agency, "because [she didn't really think it was his idea to put [her] in the American Touring Club." (T. 29.) COUNT THREE When James Hanney, a high school graduate, entered Atlas Insurance Agency's office in Fort Myers, on or about August 11, 1980, he was under the impression that his parents' membership in the American Automobile Association inured to his benefit. Whether this impression was accurate was not clear from the evidence. In any case, Mr. Hanney told the woman he found in the Atlas Insurance Agency office that he wanted minimal insurance coverage. She sold him a $10,000 personal injury protection policy with an $8,000 deductible, issued by Fortune Insurance Company, No. AP 1-10-02821 with a premium of less than $50, and a membership in the Nation Motor Club for $35. Respondent and Mr. Hanney each signed the insurance policy. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Among other documents, Mr. Hanney signed an application for membership in the Nation Motor Club, Inc., Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. COUNT FIVE On or about May 17, 1980, James Allen Foster, a high school graduate, went to the Fort Myers office of the Atlas Insurance Agency to buy whatever insurance was necessary to register the car he and Barbara Gonzalez (now Foster) had recently purchased. He did not ask for a motor club membership and would not have purchased such a membership if he had known it was optional. He did, however, sign an application for membership in the American Touring Association, Inc., Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, among other documents. After telling Mr. Foster and Ms. Gonzalez about potential benefits, including "towing and lost key coverage, Mr. Anderson sold them a $10,000 personal injury protection policy with an $8,000 deductible written on the American Specialty Insurance Company, No. PA 02 03 59, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9, with a premium of $44, in addition to the membership in the American Touring Association. Howard Vogel and Kevin Cox were the principals of Atlas Insurance Agency, a Florida corporation owned by Cox, Vogel, Inc., during the time respondent Anderson worked for the agency. They instructed respondent to attempt to sell motor club memberships along with every automobile insurance policy he might sell, and told him how to go about it. The "technique was to package the benefits and quote one price," (T. 56; Testimony of Respondent), the aggregate of the motor club membership fee and the policy premium. Respondent was told by his employers "to not emphasize" the motor club memberships. Jeanne Whyte, James Hanney, and James Allen Foster each signed a form application for motor club membership, but only the application Mr. Hanney signed listed the membership fee or otherwise indicated that a separate fee or premium was being charged for the motor club membership. Respondent deliberately withheld this fact from Ms. Whyte and Mr. Foster when making his oral presentation and no document furnished to Ms. Whyte or to Mr. Foster disclosed the fact. Neither did respondent offer either of these customers a choice between memberships in different motor clubs. An insurance "agent has an absolute duty to the insured to explain to him what he is selling him and what it does for him," Deposition, p. 14, although the name of the policy is not nearly as important as the explanation of the coverage. Simply omitting the formal policy name would not fall below "the minimum standards of the business, the industry." Deposition, p. 16. "[T]he important thing is to explain to the insured he's buying something, and that what he is paying for is this." Id. Before making a sale, the insurance "agent owes it to the insured to explain each coverage and tell him he's paying for it and what the benefits of the coverage are." Deposition, p. 22. Both petitioner's recommended order to hearing officer and respondent's proposed order have been given careful consideration. Findings proposed by the parties which are not included in the foregoing findings of fact have been rejected as inconsistent with the evidence or omitted as irrelevant.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's licensure under Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (1979), for a period of sixty (60) days. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Yon, Esquire Department of Insurance 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Suite 112 1030 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Bill Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent represented to Ms. Renee Benton that she had to purchase an auto club in order to buy automobile insurance, which is not true, contrary to the law, and a violation of various statutes.
Findings Of Fact 1 On February 1, 1991, Renee Benton went to Mid County Insurance Agency in Jacksonville, Florida for the purpose of obtaining automobile insurance. At all times material hereto, Mid County Insurance Agency was a general lines insurance agency licensed by the State of Florida. Respondent, Eric Thomas Fromme, was the President and owner of Mid County Insurance Company. On February 1, 1991, Complainant, Renee Benton, purchased an automobile insurance policy from Mid County, more specifically from its owner, Eric Thomas Fromme. Complainant, Renee Benton, testified that the Petitioner told her that he could not sell her automobile insurance unless she purchased a membership in a motor club. Respondent, Eric Thomas Fromme, testified that he personally dealt with Complainant, Renee Benton, and that he did not tell Renee Benton that he could not sell her insurance without Motor Club Coverage. Complainant, Renee Benton, was in a hurry on the day and time she went to Mid County to purchase automobile insurance and as a result did not read any of the documents she signed on February 1, 1991. Renee Benton did not complain about the contract and was unaware of the matter until approached by agents of the Department. Until she reviewed the policy documents, she was unaware that she paid $100 to join the auto club. At the time of the purchase the automobile insurance policy from Respondent, Renee Benton paid Respondent $153.00 and entered into a premium finance agreement to finance a portion of the policy premium. That agreement stated that Renee Benton had paid a $53.00 down payment. (Pet. No. 4.) A fee of $100.00 for the motor club was deducted from her payment at the time she purchased the insurance and motor club. (Testimony of Renee Benton.) At the time that she purchased the automobile insurance, Renee Benton executed a form which stated that a motor club purchase was voluntary and that she was not required to purchase a motor club in order to purchase that insurance. (Pet. No. 7.) Renee Benton testified she would not have financed any of premium, had she been able to purchase the automobile insurance without purchasing a motor club. (Testimony of Renee Benton.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, recommended that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0019 The parties presented proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following findings, as indicated, were adopted, or rejected for the reason stated: Petitioner's Findings of Fact: Paragraph 1-3 Rejected in favor of Respondent's statement of these facts. Paragraph 4,5 Rejected as conflicting with more credible evidence. Paragraph 6-9 Adopted, but reordered. Respondent's Findings of Fact: Paragraphs 1-8 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Shane C. Maddox, Esquire 337-C East Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s request for withdrawal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and no license will be issued to Snyder Computer Systems, Inc. d/b/a Wildfire Motors and Family Power Sports, LLC to sell motorcycles manufactured by Zhejiang Summit Huawin Motorcycle Co. Ltd. (POPC) at 7200 Ridge Road, #108, Port Richey (Pasco County), Florida 34668. DONE AND ORDERED this Yy J of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Divisio: Motor Vehicles this day of August, 2009. les y Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Eicense Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy’ of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: Bill Shuert AC Pro-Tect, LLC 12228 US Highway 19 Hudson, Florida 34667-2001 Louis Mazzarese Family Power Sports, LLC 7012 Pin Cherry Lane Port Richey, Florida 34668 Dan Vogel ; Snyder Computer Systems, Inc., d/b/a Wildfire Motors 11 Technology Way Steubenville, Ohio 43952 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 William F, Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Jul 21 2009 15:04 Family Power Sports LLC. 7/21/08 7200 Ridge Rd. #108 - Port Richey, Fl. 34668 727-597-8553 . Case# 09-2326 To whom it may concern: Family power sports does not want to carry Huawain product line in our dealership and wish to cancel the hearing scheduled for 4, g dy) aie
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Ivy Powell, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, The Auto Club Group, based on a disability, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact The Auto Club is affiliated with the American Automobile Association (“AAA”), a national not-for-profit organization that provides its members with benefits relating to travel, emergency roadside assistance, and insurance coverage. The Auto Club hired Petitioner in March 1995, at its branch office in Melbourne, Florida. The Auto Club first employed Petitioner as a Service Clerk. Petitioner’s job changed over the years. Her last position with the Auto Club was as a Member Representative I (“MR-1”). As a MR-1, Petitioner was responsible for providing customer support services for Auto Club members. These services included greeting current and prospective members in the office, accepting members’ travel and membership payments, promoting travel and membership products, generating leads, and updating members on travel and insurance specials. Petitioner also provided travel-related services including booking car rentals, reserving hotel rooms, and preparing auto travel packages (“triptiks”). As a MR-1, Petitioner was a full-time employee in the Melbourne office. The Melbourne office was open Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. As a full-time employee, Petitioner’s normal work schedule mirrored the Melbourne office operating hours. Petitioner was allowed a one-hour lunch break. While Petitioner was employed with the Auto Club, she began to experience several medical issues. Petitioner described her conditions to include ataxia (loss of muscle control), fatigue, headaches, memory loss, and small vessel disease. Petitioner asserts that her mental and physical impairments substantially limited her major life activities including concentrating, lifting, sitting, standing, and thinking. Pertinent to her job, Petitioner explained that working longer than five hours a day caused her to become tired and lose concentration. On February 24, 2014, Petitioner presented a doctor’s note to her supervisor in the Melbourne office, Linda Hurt. The note stated, “it is medically necessary for [Petitioner] to decrease her work hours, for five hours per day, due to her medical condition.” On March 31, 2014, Petitioner produced a second note from her doctor restating her need to limit her work hours. Petitioner requested a reduced work schedule under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The Auto Club granted Petitioner’s request, and beginning in February 2014, the Auto Club reduced her work hours to five hours a day. The Auto Club initially scheduled Petitioner to work from 8:30 a.m. until 1:30 p.m. In May 2014, when Petitioner had difficulty arriving to work by 8:30 a.m., the Auto Club shifted Petitioner’s work schedule to 10:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. On October 20, 2014, the Auto Club advised Petitioner that she would exhaust her FMLA leave in early November 2014. Therefore, she would need to provide additional documentation should she desire to continue working a shortened work day beyond the expiration of her FMLA leave. The Auto Club presented Petitioner with an Interactive Process Questionnaire which she was to have a doctor complete. By the first week of November 2014, however, Petitioner had not returned the requested paperwork. Therefore, on November 11, 2014, the Auto Club informed Petitioner that her FMLA leave had expired, and she would be expected to return to a normal, full-time work schedule. On November 13, 2014, Petitioner produced the questionnaire which her doctor had completed. In the questionnaire, her doctor restated Petitioner’s need to continue to work a reduced work schedule, indefinitely, and that her restrictions were permanent. Petitioner’s doctor wrote that Petitioner “is temporarily totally disabled” and “only able to work a maximum of five hours per day to prevent an exacerbation of symptoms.” After the Auto Club received Petitioner’s paperwork, it allowed Petitioner to remain on a shortened work schedule while it evaluated her request to continue working five hours a day. As more fully detailed below, the Auto Club determined that it could not indefinitely accommodate Petitioner’s part-time work schedule. The Melbourne office’s operation needs required full-time MR-1 employees. (The Melbourne office did not employ any part-time positions.) Therefore, the Auto Club explored options to offer Petitioner to accommodate her request for a reduced work schedule. In particular, the Auto Club reviewed its workforce to determine whether any part-time positions were open within 50 miles of Respondent’s residence. On December 4, 2014, Petitioner met with Linda Hurt to discuss the status of her employment. Brenda Slupecki, the Auto Club’s Employee Relations Manager, participated in the meeting by phone. During this meeting, Ms. Slupecki explained to Petitioner that her MR-1 position was a full-time position. Therefore, the Auto Club needed an employee in her position to work full-time. Ms. Slupecki further informed Petitioner that the Auto Club’s Melbourne office could not accommodate her request to work a part-time schedule indefinitely. The Auto Club then placed Petitioner on a 90-day disability leave of absence. Ms. Slupecki suggested that Petitioner look for part-time positions within the Auto Club offices in Tampa and Heathrow, Florida. Petitioner’s last day of paid employment in the Auto Club’s Melbourne office was December 5, 2014. However, the Auto Club continued to provide Petitioner employee benefits (such as health insurance) until her official termination in May 2015. After the December 2014 meeting, following a suggestion from Ms. Slupecki, Petitioner applied for short-term disability benefits from the Auto Club’s insurance company, Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company (“Hartford”). Petitioner’s claim was denied. On March 9, 2015, Ms. Slupecki sent Petitioner a letter advising her that her 90-day disability leave of absence had expired. Consequently, the Auto Club placed Petitioner in a 30-day layoff status. The Auto Club, once again, suggested Petitioner apply for other jobs within the company. Ms. Slupecki cautioned Petitioner that the Auto Club would terminate her employment at the end of the 30-day period if she was not able to obtain another position. Petitioner did not apply for any other jobs within the Auto Club. On March 12, 2015, Petitioner appealed the denial of her claim for short-term disability to Hartford. On March 26, 2015, Hartford informed Petitioner that her appeal was not timely, and her claim would remain closed. On March 30, 2015, Ms. Slupecki sent a letter to Petitioner advising her that the 30-day layoff period would restart following Petitioner’s unsuccessful appeal to Hartford. The Auto Club once again encouraged Petitioner to search for a part-time job within the Auto Club. Petitioner did not attempt to find another position within the company. Petitioner’s 30-day layoff period ended on April 30, 2015. The Auto Club officially terminated Petitioner’s employment on May 1, 2015. The specific accommodation Petitioner requested from the Auto Club was to be allowed to work a part-time schedule of five hours a day, five days a week, for an indefinite period of time. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that the Auto Club could not offer her any other accommodation that would have allowed her to work full-time in her MR-1 position. At the final hearing, Petitioner expressed that she was a good performer for the Auto Club, and her customer surveys showed no drop in customer satisfaction during the time she worked shortened hours. She strove to complete all her tasks every day before she left work. She believed that she could perform all the functions of her MR-1 position except working eight hours a day. Petitioner also asserted that her requested accommodation would not impose an undue hardship on the Auto Club. Petitioner suggested that the Auto Club could hire a part- time employee to cover her MR-1 duties during the hours she is absent from the office. Petitioner commented that, with revenue at more than a billion dollars a year and tens of thousands of employees, the Auto Club would not be unreasonably burdened by hiring another employee to supplement her job at the Melbourne office. Petitioner explained that she did not accept a part- time position at another Auto Club office because the nearest potential vacancy (Lake Mary, Florida) was more than 50 miles from her home. She would have been required to drive at least an hour to and from this location. Adding the commute time to a part-time job would have defeated the purpose of her restricted, five-hour workday. In response to Petitioner’s claim, the Auto Club argues that creating a permanent, part-time position just so Petitioner can work five hours a day is not reasonable. Moreover, even if it was reasonable, accommodating this request would place an undue hardship on the Auto Club. Based on its goal of consistent and expedient customer service, the Auto Club asserts that working a full-time schedule is an essential function of the MR-1. Ms. Hurt became Field Manager of the Auto Club’s Melbourne office in January 2014. In her role, she oversaw the day-to-day operations of her office. She also supervised Petitioner. Ms. Hurt testified that the Melbourne office employed approximately 15 people. Three of these employees (including Petitioner) filled the position of MR-1. Ms. Hurt relayed that all employees of the Melbourne office worked full-time and were required to work during the office’s regular hours of 8:30 a.m. through 5:30 p.m. Ms. Hurt explained that, as a “front-facing” employee, the MR-1 is the Auto Club representative who welcomes customers into the business. Ms. Hurt expressed that the Melbourne office experiences a lot of “foot traffic.” It is a small office, but very busy. Ms. Hurt conveyed that the staffing needs of her office require full-time employees in each position to interact will all customers who enter the office during business hours. Ms. Hurt further asserted that the Melbourne office did not operate efficiently in Petitioner’s absence. Petitioner’s reduced work schedule caused the office to be short-staffed from 8:30 a.m. until 10 a.m. and from 3:00 p.m. until 5:30 p.m. The office was not able to complete all of the work that needed to be accomplished during business hours. Neither was it able to provide timely service to its customers. Ms. Hurt remarked that developing customer relationships is paramount to the Auto Club’s business. The Auto Club desires its offices to service customers as expeditiously as possible. The MR-1 position is designed to cultivate long-term relationships with customers by providing consistent and continuous service. Ms. Hurt recounted that in 2014, she was aware of several customers who became aggravated due to increased wait times and left the Melbourne office without meeting with any Auto Club representative. Ms. Hurt also testified that a direct consequence of having one of her three MR-1 employees working part-time was that her office did not meet its 2014 budget projections. In particular, the Motor Club, which was the specific section in which Petitioner worked, produced lower income. Ms. Hurt relayed that Petitioner’s shortened work schedule also negatively impacted the other two MR-1 employees. The remaining MR-1s were obligated to meet with all customers who arrived at the Melbourne office outside of Petitioner’s five-hour work schedule. In addition to their own workload, they were forced to divide up and complete Petitioner’s duties. For example, because Petitioner could not work past 3:00 p.m., any customer with whom she was working was transferred to another MR-1. This situation prevented the continuity of service that the Auto Club strove for as an organization. The other two MR-1s also experienced increased overtime and reduced lunch breaks due to Petitioner’s truncated work schedule. Ms. Hurt explained that the overtime the MR-1 employees worked in 2014 nearly tripled. The Melbourne office was budgeted $3,300 for overtime costs that year. However, the office’s actual overtime expense in 2014 equaled approximately $9,600. In addition, the other MR-1s were not able to attend certain training sessions or use all of their paid vacation leave in 2014. Ms. Hurt also relayed that, at one point, one MR-1 volunteered to return early from medical leave because the office could not provide adequate service for all its customers due to Petitioner’s limited availability. Ms. Slupecki testified that, based on the Auto Club’s business model, hiring a part-time employee to fill in during the work hours Petitioner missed would not be an efficient or practical option to best serve Auto Club customers. The MR-1 position requires specific experience, knowledge, and training. Ms. Slupecki did not believe that a part-time employee would be able to master the skills or obtain the required expertise required of a MR-1. Furthermore, a part-time MR-1 would not provide the expected level or continuity of customer service the Auto Club desires. Ms. Slupecki imparted that the Auto Club employs only full-time MR-1s in all of its branch offices. Based on the competent substantial evidence presented at the final hearing, the preponderance of the evidence in the record does not establish that the Auto Club discriminated against Petitioner based on a disability. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving that the Auto Club discriminated against her in violation of the FCRA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Ivy Powell, did not prove that Respondent, the Auto Club, committed an unlawful employment practice against her and dismiss her Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2017.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of a Recommended Order of Dismissal by Administrative Law Judge Jeff B. Clark, of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to non-compliance to the requirements set out in the Order to Show Cause—for both parties to file responses no later than August 7, 2009 as to why this matter should not be closed based on lack of response to the Initial Order. The Department hereby adopts the Recommended Order of Dismissal as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and no license will be issued to Galaxy Powersports, LLC d/b/a JCL International, LLC and Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC to sell motorcycles manufactured by Zhejiang Taizhou Wangye Power Co. Ltd. (ZHEJ) at 3311 West Lake Mary Boulevard, Lake Mary (Seminole County), Florida 32746. 4 DONE AND ORDERED this /2.’~ day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LA. FORD, Direct6r Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this [oth day of September, 2009. . NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: Leo Su Galaxy Powersports, LLC d/b/a JCL International, LLC 2667 Northhaven Road Dallas, Texas 75229 Jason Rupp Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC 8181 Via Bonita Street Sanford, Florida 32771 James Sursely Action Orlando Motorsports 306 West Main Street Apopka, Florida 32712 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jeff B. Clark Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeffrey Allan Azis, is licensed by the Florida Department of Insurance as a General Lines Agent and did business as the American Automobile Insurance Agency, Inc., 603 NW 10th Avenue, Gainesville, Florida, during the period of time delineated in the Amended Administrative Complaint. The Respondent transacted the sale of motor vehicle insurance and an automobile club membership to the persons identified in Counts I, II, IV and V of the Administrative Complaint. Each of the persons identified in Counts I, II, IV and V of the Amended Administrative Complaint was charged for membership in an automobile club by the Respondent or his employees. With respect to Counts I through VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint, the following findings are made: Count I James E. Rippy, Jr., purchased automobile insurance directly from the Respondent at the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc., Gainesville, Florida, on or about June 10, 1979. He requested the minimum coverage necessary to insure his vehicle to obtain a license tag. (Vol. 1, T-35) Mr. Rippy did not request motor club coverage and was not aware of what a motor club covered. (Vol. 1, T- 32) Sometime after purchasing insurance from the Respondent, Mr. Rippy discovered that his coverage included membership in a motor club. (Vol. 1, T- 33-34) At the Respondent's office, Mr. Rippy and his wife Norma, signed documents which included a membership application in Nation Motor Club with a membership fee of $25.00 [Respondent Exhibit 2(1)] and an application for coverage which included the following disclosure statement also signed by Mr. Rippy in addition to the application form: I understand the Nation Motor Club (NMC) membership applied for this date 6/30/79, through the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. is a separate item, that pays in addition to my auto insurance policy. I understand the additional charge for this coverage is included with my down payment. Applicant (signed) Mr. Rippy was not pressured by the Respondent to sign these documents and could have taken additional time to read and ask questions if he had desired. (Vol. 1, T-49-50) write and do mathematics at a basic level. Count II On or about December 4, 1979, Deborah M. Zapp purchased automobile insurance from American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. Gainesville, Florida, from an employee of the Respondent's identified as "Judy". (Vol. 1, T-17) Ms. Zapp was unclear regarding the coverage she requested from Judy, but was sure that she would not have purchased motor club membership since she regarded it as an "extra". (Vol. 1, T-18-20) While at the agency on December 4, 1979, Ms. Zapp was asked to sign various papers which she read before signing. (Vol. a, T-20) These included a membership application in Nation Motor Club (Respondent's Exhibit 1) and an application form which contained the following disclosure statement: I understand the Nation Motor Club membership applied for this date 12/4/79, though the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. is a separate item, that pays in addition to my auto insurance policy. I understand the additional charge for this coverage is included in my down payment. Applicant (signed) (Respondent's Exhibit 1) Ms. Zapp was not rushed while reading the documents presented to her for signing and could have taken as much time as she wanted to go over them. (Vol. 1, T-20) However, notwithstanding reading and signing the membership application and disclosure statement regarding the motor club, Ms. Zapp did not know she had purchased motor club coverage when she left the Respondent's office. (Vol. 1, T-21) Ms. Zapp is a graduate of Sante Fe Community College and attended a university for one year following her graduation. (Vol. 1, T-16) At the hearing on February 5, 1981, she appeared bright and fairly assertive. Count III In Count III, Petitioner alleges that the Respondent in the conduct of business under his license violated various provisions of the Insurance Code. The allegations of Count III requires an application of the facts found in Counts I and II to Sections 626.9521, 626.9541(11)(a), 626.9541(5)(a), 626.9541(15)(b), and 626.621(b), Florida Statutes. Count III is duplicated by Count VI and calls for legal conclusions which will be discussed in the conclusions of law section of this Recommended Order. Count IV The deposition of Charles D. Smith was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 10. Mr. Smith currently holds an insurance license and has a bachelor's degree. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 4) Mr. Smith purchased automobile insurance from the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. on or about May 1, 1980 (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at Appendix) Mr. Smith thought he was purchasing only Personal Injury Protection (PIP). (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 4) In order to get an auto tag, Mr. Smith requested the minimum coverage. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 5) Like Mr. Rippy and Ms. Zapp, Mr. Smith signed an application for motor club membership and disclosure statement stating he understood he was purchasing motor club coverage at the time of his application for insurance. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 7) Mr. Smith intended to purchase the minimum amount of insurance at the lowest price but did not require of either the Respondent or his employees whether motor club coverage was included in the price quoted. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 8,9) Neither the Respondent nor his employees orally explained motor club coverage to Mr. Smith. At the bottom of Mr. Smith's insurance application the following disclosure statement was signed by him: I understand the interstate membership applied for this date 5/1/79, through the American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc. is a separate item that pays in addition to my auto insurance policy. I understand the additional charge for this coverage is included in my down payment. Applicant (signed) (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at Appendix) Mr. Smith's decision to purchase from the Respondent was based solely on cost and not on any information provided by the Respondent or his employees. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 13). Count V The deposition of Richard B. Divins was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 11. Mr. Divins' testimony parallels the other witnesses in that he also signed an application for motor club membership and a disclosure statement acknowledging the purchase and price. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 11, 15, 16, 26) He purchased insurance and motor club coverage on July 13, 1979, from an employee of the Respondent at American Auto Insurance Agency, Inc., 603 NW 10th Avenue, Gainesville, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 4,5) Mr. Divins thought he was purchasing only minimum liability insurance and was unaware that he had also purchased motor club coverage. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 7,8) Mr. Divins is a senior in the School of Architecture at the University of Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 4. Count VI In Count VI, Petitioner alleges that the Respondent in the conduct of business under his license violated various provisions of the Insurance Code. Count VI requires an application of the facts found in Counts IV and V to Sections 626.9521, 626.9541 (11)(a), 626.9541(5)(a), 626.9541(15)(b) and 626.621(b), Florida Statutes. Count VI duplicates Count III and calls for legal conclusions and will therefore, be discussed in the legal conclusion section of this Recommended Order. Assuming that the witnesses who testified at the final hearing were representative of the Respondent's customers, his business was generally directed at persons who desired minimum automobile insurance coverage at the lowest possible price. (Vol. 1, T-17 and 31, Petitioner's Exhibit 11 at 7-8, Petitioner's Exhibit 10 at 8,9) An economic incentive existed to sell motor club memberships among agents whose customers desired minimum coverage due to the high commission rates associated with motor club policies. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9, Vol. 1, T-94-95, 97) Mr. Andrew Beverly was qualified as an expert witness on insurance matters and testified on behalf of the Respondent. (Vol. 1, T-29) Mr. Beverly owns the Florida Insurance School, serves as a consultant for several hundred insurance agencies and is a member of the Advisory Committee on Insurance Education of the Florida Insurance Department. (Vol. 1, T-78-79) A study by Mr. Beverly completed in 1979 for the Professional Insurance Agents Association of Florida demonstrated that insurance agents have been contacted by claimants or attorneys for claimants for failure to provide coverage or what is known in the industry as "errors and omissions." (Vol. 1, T-81-82) The Respondent is the first agent that Mr. Beverly has ever encountered who had difficulties arising from selling too much coverage. (Vol. 1, T-82-83) Mr. Beverly's conclusion concerning the value of motor club coverage and supplemental coverage generally is shared by Dr. Ronald T. Anderson, a colleague of Mr. Beverly's on the national faculty of the Society of Certified Insurance Counselors and an Insurance Commissioner of Colorado. (Vol. 1, T-83-85) In particular regard to this case, Mr. Beverly examined the application and disclosure statement signed by the witnesses for the Petitioner and responded to questions from counsel as follows: Q. Now, these documents -- if you would just take a look through those, you'll see in Respondent's Exhibits 3 and 4, I believe -- Respondent's Exhibit 1, for example, where in boldface type, the applicant for the insurance signs a statement regarding Motor Club. is that a common practice in the industry? A. It's a practice that is becoming extremely common with the careful and appropriate insurance agents to have a thorough documentation of each coverage, accepted or rejected by an injured. Q. And why is that? A. Partially because of the high incidents (sic) of Errors and Omissions insurance, claims coming in against insurance agents, and then partly so that the client himself will be completely aware of what it is that he's throwing away when he rejects a coverage so he'll know he hasn't bought that. Q. Does the type of procedure meet the standards of the industry in Florida for fire and casualty agents? A. It exceeds them. Q. Okay. What else, in your opinion, could Mr. Azis do in this type of situation other than have him sign the statements and advise him as he has testified to. A. Mr. Woods, there's nothing an insurance agent could possibly do, in my opinion, beyond explaining the coverage to the insured and then having him sign in his own handwriting. I can't believe that there is anything else that he could do. He's being as cautious as he possibly can. Q. You're not aware of any other practices or procedures that might even be better than this? A. I can't think of anything that you could do that could add to this great amount of documentation of the insurers election of what they purchased. Q. In your experience, is it common for people who have bought insurance to come back and question coverages? A. Yes, sir, it happens all the time. I have more than a hundred insurance agencies under contract at this hour, and I am constantly receiving long distance calls from agents: What do you do with this? What's the answer to it? Q. So, that's why they require the need for this documentation? A. Yes, sir. (Vol. 1, T-85-87) Mr. Beverly's testimony was not rebutted by the Petitioner and is accepted as credible. Although Respondent's license as a general lines agent in Florida expired as of August 30, 1980, he retains eligibility to become licensed for a period of two years from the date of licensure. Section 626.221(3)(f), Florida Statutes. (Petitioner's Exhibit 8)
Recommendation It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against the licensee, Jeffrey Allan Azis, be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of June, 1981. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard P. Harris, Esquire Department of Insurance 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Yon, Esquire Department of Insurance 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner, Conduces Club, Inc., is entitled to the issuance of a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Conduces Club, Inc., a nonprofit corporation incorporated in the State of Florida, has applied to the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, for the issuance of a series 11-C alcoholic beverage license. This license is described in Rule 7A-1.13, Florida Administrative Code, as a club license to sell to members and nonresident guests only. The terms and conditions for the issuance of such a license are as set forth in Subsection 561.20(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Subsection 565.02(4), Florida Statutes. The Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco has denied the application of the Petitioner premised upon the assertion that the Petitioner has failed to meet the requirements set out in the aforementioned sections of the Florida Statutes. The Petitioner has disagreed with that interpretation and a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing was scheduled and held on April 10, 1979. The crucial language to be considered in determining whether or not the Petitioner should be extended the privilege of operating under a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license is found in the Subsection 561.20(7)(a), Florida Statutes, which reads as follows: "(7)(a) There shall be no limitation as to the number of licenses issued pursuant to 565.02(4). However, any licenses issued under this section shall be limited to: Subordinate lodges or clubs of national fraternal or benevolent associations; Golf clubs and tennis clubs municipally or privately owned or leased; Nonprofit corporations or clubs devoted to promoting community, municipal, or county development or any phase of community, muni- cipal, or county development; Clubs fostering and promoting the general welfare and prosperity of members of showmen and amusement enterprises; Clubs assisting, promoting, and de- veloping subordinate lodges or clubs of national fraternal or benevolent associa- tions; and Clubs promoting, developing, and main- taining cultural relations of people of the same nationality." (Although the introductory phrase in the above-quoted Subsection makes reference to Subsection 565.02(4), Florida Statutes, as being involved in the process of issuing a license, Subsection 565.02(4), Florida Statutes, true function is the establishment of the requirement that chartered or unincorporated clubs pay an annual state license tax of $400.00, and it is this Subsection 561.20(7)(a), -- Florida Statutes, which establishes those categories of candidates who may receive a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license.) Of the possible categories for licensure, the one which appears to be the focal point of the controversy is that provision found in Subsection 561.20(7)(a)3., Florida Statutes. In support of its request, the Petitioner presented certain witnesses and items of evidence. Among those items was the testimony of Mrs. E. R. Atwater, Social worker Supervisor with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Management Division, assigned to the Blodgett Community in Jacksonville, Florida. The Blodgett Community is a housing development of some 53 acres which contains 628 housing units with a breakdown of that population containing 301 senior citizens and 1,069 juveniles, with cost of the heads of the households being female. Those persons living in the Blodgett development are described as having a poor economic circumstance. Mrs. Atwater indicated that the Conduces Club, Inc., had on occasion sponsored girls softball teams and boys basketball teams for those young persons living in the Blodgett Community and she had expressed her appreciation in the form of correspondence of January 17, 1979, which is the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. In addition, Mrs. Atwater indicated that the Conduces Club, Inc., had provided transportation for a trip for the residents of the Blodgett Community to Six Gun Territory located near Ocala, Florida. Arrangements were made for three busses; two of the busses which transported residents on July 16, 1977, and the third bus transported them on August 11, 1977. The trips involved both young people and adults as participants. The letters requesting the assistance of the Conduces Club, Inc., and the confirmation of that request may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3, admitted into evidence consecutively. The president of the Conduces Club, Inc., Mr. Cornell Tarver, testified in support of the petition. He indicated that the club had been originally formed as the Pacesetter Club but its name was changed in September, 1976, because of a conflict concerning the utilization of the name, which had been preempted by another club. The club was chartered as a nonprofit corporation by the State of Florida on September 22, 1976, under the name, "Conduces Club, Inc." A copy of the Articles of Incorporation may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Mr. Tarver indicated that the purpose of the club was to help the youth and senior citizens and principally the kids of the Blodgett Community, to include organizing softball and baseball and providing uniforms. He also testified that a certain banquet was hold for these young persons and the parents of those children were invited to attend, and enough food was prepared to food cost of the individuals who reside in the Blodgett Community. He produced certain plaques and trophies awarded to the club. The plague was given by the mothers of the children in the sports programs and the trophy was presented by an unaffiliated club that the Conduces Club had helped to organize. The witness, Tarver, indicated that the club was financed by functions such as dances, fish fries, food sales in their club house, dues of the members and fines. The club itself has twenty-seven members. Other projects the club has participated in, were the contribution of money to local churches and the donation of an organ to one of those churches. On December 16, 1977, the club contributed $500.00 to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The club house is open every day and there are certain activities through the week, to include club meetings and entertainment for the benefit of club members. The members run the club without compensation and the club does not maintain any regular employees. The official statement of the club's purposes may be found in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. This is a composite exhibit which contains part of the application for the license and a copy of the Bylaws. The objectives of the corporation may be found in Article II of the Bylaws and the activities of the corporation may be found in Article VIII of the Bylaws. Article II states: "The objectives of this organization shall be as follows: To unite fraternally all persons who the membership may from time to time take into the club. To promote brotherhood, sportsmanship, friendship and charity for the membership and their families. To strive at all times to promote and protect the welfare of every member. To promote a spirit of cooperation between its members and the public. To honor outstanding individuals in the City of Jacksonville for their achievement. To do anything necessary, including, but not limited to, the ownership of property, real and personal, for the accomplishment of the foregoing objectives, or those which may be recognized as proper and legal objectives of this club, all of which shall be consistent with the laws, the public interest and the interest of its mergers. To sue or to be sued as a natural person. To bear a seal to be placed on all of the club's official correspondence." Article VIII states: "COMMITTEES Section 1. The following standing committees and such other committees as the directors may, from time to time deem necessary, shall be appointed by the president of the association. Social Committee Athletic Committee Scholarship Committee The duties of the standing committee shall include the following, which shall not, however, prelude other activities by such committees. Section 2. The social committee shall be composed of six members. It shall be the duty of this canted to supervise the use of club room and to plan such club meetings of a purely social nature as it may deem necessary. These may include parties, picnics, and other such social or athletic events sponsored by the organization. Section 3. The athletic committee shall be composed of three members. It shall be the duty of this committee to supervise and manage all athletic activities for the association, including but not limited to management of various athletic teams sponsored by the club. Section 4. The scholarships committee shall be composed of six members. It shall be the duty of this committee to screen applicants for scholarships and deserving students in Duval County, Florida, and to make recommendations to the general membership of its findings of worthwhile recipients of scholarships, or awards." It can be seen that the Petitioner's members have a commendable concern for the community in which the club has its principal base of operation and this concern has been expressed through the activities of the club members which have been described in the course of this Recommended Order; however, it appears from an examination of the testimony in this hearing and the official statement, that is, the Bylaws of this corporation, that the principal purpose of the club is as stated by the Article II B. of the Bylaws, which language states, "To promote brotherhood, sportsmanship, friendship and charity for the membership and their families," and this attitude carries over to foster good relations between those members and the members of the general public. Therefore, the Petitioner is not perceived as being a club which meets the criterion, "devoted to promoting community, municipal or county development or any phase of community, municipal or county development." See Subsection 561.20(7)(a)3., Florida Statutes. This conclusion is reached in examining the definition of the word "devoted," as found in Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition. That definition states that to be devoted one must be, "1. vowed; dedicated; consecrated. 2. very loyal; faithful." and although the community concern of the Petitioner is very high, it does not reach the level of devotion. Consequently, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco was correct in denying the application for a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco deny the Petitioner, Conduces Club, Inc.'s request for a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jennings H. Best, Esquire 3410 North Myrtle Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Francis Bayley, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. M. Ogonowski Richard P. Daniel Building, Room 514 111 East Coast Line Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Conclusions This matter came on for determination by the Department upon submission of an Order Closing File by P. Michael Ruff, an Administrative Law Judge, of the Division of Administrative Hearings, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and no license will be issued to Galaxy Powersports, LLC, d/b/a JCL International, LLC, and Kitai Powersports, Inc. to sell motorcycles manufactured by Taizhou Zhongneng Motorcycle Co. Ltd. (ZHNG) at 228 North 3" Street, Jacksonville (Duval County), Florida 32250. DONE AND ORDERED this w)A ~day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. 'ARL A. FORD, Directo: Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Divisio pploror Vehicles this A— day of June, 2009. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: Terry Henson Scooter Boutique, Inc. 12526 Masters Ridge Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Claudio Biltoc Kitai Powersports, Inc. 143 Belmont Drive St. Johns, Florida 32259 Pete Biltoc Kitai Powersports, Inc. 13887 Sea Prairie Street Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Rm. A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 P. Michael Ruff Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
