The Issue Whether Petitioner may purchase retirement credit for the period of time from his suspension date to his reinstatement date as creditable service in the Florida Retirement Service.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Philip J. Cobb, was employed by the Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners (County) in May 1985, as a property manager. As a permanent employee of the County, Petitioner was enrolled as a member of the regular class of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). In order to vest and be eligible to receive retirement benefits under state law, Petitioner needed to complete ten years of creditable service. Petitioner continued to work for the County until he was terminated on August 1, 1992. The reason Respondent terminated Petitioner was because he allegedly failed to support his supervisor and was insubordinate. At the time Petitioner's employment with the County was terminated, he had earned approximately seven years and two months of creditable service and was thirty-four months short of vesting in the FRS. Petitioner challenged his termination by instituting legal proceedings against the County, alleging that his termination was illegally motivated by age discrimination. The lawsuit, Case No. 94-1054-CIV-T-21C, was filed in June 1994, in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, and sought Petitioner's reinstatement to his former position. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was sixty-seven years old, and at the time of this proceeding he was one day shy of being seventy-three years old. After discovery had been undertaken and prior to the case being set for trial, the Court ordered the parties into mediation. During settlement negotiations, the parties specifically discussed the importance of Petitioner purchasing credit in the FRS as necessary for vesting. In light of this consideration, before of the Agreement was finalized, counsel for Petitioner contacted Respondent regarding the cost of Petitioner's purchasing the service credit required to vest in the FRS. In a letter dated November 30, 1995, from Maurice Helms, Chief, Bureau of Retirement Calculations, to counsel for Petitioner, Mr. Helms noted that Petitioner had only 7.25 years of creditable service in the FRS, not the ten years required to vest. Nevertheless, the letter stated, "If [Petitioner] were eligible to purchase the service credit required to vest and then retire, we estimate the cost would be $30,273.69". This projected amount was considered in negotiations and was represented in the settlement amount. In January 1996, as a result of the mediation, Petitioner and the County entered into a Settlement Agreement, Release and Disclaimer (Agreement), in exchange for Petitioner's dismissing his lawsuit. Paragraph Two of the Agreement provides that the County would make a lump sum payment distribution of $64,000.00 to Petitioner. Of the total amount, $34,000.00 was designated as back pay and liquidated damages. The remaining $30,00.00 was for "fees and other costs associated with the above-captioned case." Further, the County agreed to rescind Petitioner's termination, convert the termination to a suspension without pay, and reinstate Petitioner to his former position. Finally, the Agreement included a provision that Petitioner would resign from that position on the date he was reinstated. Paragraph Three of the Agreement provides that the $64,000.00 is not a "mere recital, but is the cash consideration for this Agreement and the full and final release affected thereby." Notwithstanding the provision in the Agreement that the $34,000.00 is for back pay and liquidated damages, Paragraph Three of the Agreement expressly states that the settlement amount paid by the County and accepted by Petitioner was not to compensate Petitioner for back wages, benefits, or other forms of compensation. Rather, the settlement amount was part of the compromise to settle and compromise the matter. In this regard, Paragraph Three of the Agreement provides in pertinent part the following: ...The parties hereto recognize that substantial questions of law and of fact exist as to any possible claim or claims by Cobb for any compensation, back pay, forms of compensation, benefits or damages, liquidated/compensatory or otherwise, interest and any other claim for relief; therefore, [this settlement is being made purely on a compromise basis in order to avoid further trouble, litigation and expense, and the settlement amount is considered to be a part of the compromise, paid by Defendant and accepted by Cobb not to compensate Cobb for back wages, benefits or other forms of compensation, but to settle and compromise the matter relative to the trouble, interference, damage, and expense which would have been and would otherwise continue to be claimed and/or associated therewith]. [Emphasis supplied.] Paragraph Eleven of the Agreement addresses changes in Petitioner's employment status and delineates the method by which the County would accomplish these changes. That paragraph provides the following: The parties hereto further agree that, without any waiver of the sufficiency of the grounds and cause for Cobb's termination, and [in settlement of all claims of Cobb as set forth hereinabove, a personnel action form will be prepared changing Cobb's termination action on July 31, 1992, to a suspension without pay through the date this Agreement is signed. Additionally, a personnel action will be issued reinstating Cobb to paid status effective the date this Agreement is signed.] Cobb agrees to sign and submit the attached letter of resignation, effective the date he signs this Agreement, and further agrees to waive any pay and/or benefits to which he may be entitled from Defendant since July 31, 1992. [Emphasis supplied.] After the Agreement was executed and pursuant to the terms thereof, the County prepared and processed the required paperwork which effectively rescinded Petitioner's termination, changed the termination to a suspension without pay, and reinstated Petitioner to paid status. Petitioner did not return to work with the County, but resigned on the day he was reinstated. Petitioner's resignation was consistent not only with the terms of the Agreement, but with Petitioner's intentions at the time he was being considered for employment by the County. At or near the time Petitioner was initially employed by the County, he indicated to County officials that he was committed to remaining with the County for ten years so that he could vest in the FRS. Based on his understanding of the Agreement, Petitioner did not intend to return to work with the County after the Agreement was executed. Petitioner believed that the County's action of rescinding his termination, changing his status to suspension without pay, and reinstating him provided him with more than the thirty-four months he needed to vest in the FRS. Had Petitioner not been terminated by the County, he would have vested in the FRS in May 1995, and would have thereupon retired. Although the Agreement provided that Petitioner would resign, there is no indication that the County was opposed to Petitioner's returning to work. In fact, one of the negotiators for the County, testified that "I am not sure that Pinellas County didn't want Mr. Cobb to return to employment. We wanted to settle the lawsuit that was pending. " After the Agreement was finalized, in a letter dated February 12, 1996, Petitioner provided Respondent with a copy of the executed Agreement and "copies of personnel actions completed in accordance therewith." The letter requested that Respondent do the following: (1) reinstate Petitioner in FRS in accordance with Section 121.011(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 60S-2.016, Florida Administrative Code; and (2) provide Petitioner "with the amount of his required contributions for retirement credit for his period of suspension up to and including the date of his vesting." Petitioner was prepared to pay into the State Retirement Fund the contribution required to receive retirement credit. On March 5, 1996, Respondent issued a letter to Petitioner denying him the right to make contributions for retirement for the period of suspension without pay, July 31, 1992, through the date of his reinstatement, January 22, 1996. The denial letter stated that the purported "reinstatement" did not occur. As rationale for its position, Respondent found that: (1) after being "reinstated", Petitioner never performed work in a regularly established position and, therefore, was not compensated for services or work performed; (2) the County never intended to reinstate Petitioner "to employment with pay, nor was there an expectation of Petitioner to be "made whole" by the County; and (3) Petitioner and the County never intended to "enter into an employer and employee relationship retroactively for the period in question." Respondent stated that the purported reinstatement of Petitioner "was more in the nature of a ruse or sham to achieve a goal other than gainful employment." Moreover, Respondent believed that "neither the member nor the employer intended to enter into a regular employer and employee relationship." Respondent thus concluded that the reinstatement was not "bona fide" and was solely for the purpose of allowing Petitioner to vest in FRS and obtain retirement benefits. Respondent also objected to the form of Petitioner's reinstatement of employment with the County, declaring that it was not a "bona fide" as signified by his failure to receive back pay for the period of suspension and his failure to enter into an employer-employee relationship with the County for the equivalent of one calendar month. Respondent acknowledged that once Petitioner's termination was changed to a suspension without pay Rule 60S-2.016, Florida Administrative Code, applies to the case. This rule is interpreted by Respondent to require that for reinstatement to occur, an individual must work in a regularly established position for at least one calendar month following the suspension. Respondent admits that the "one calendar month" requirement is not contained in either Section 121.011(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), or in Rule 60S-2.016, Florida Administrative Code, both of which govern retirement credit for periods of suspension without pay. Nevertheless, Respondent's interpretation of Rule 60S-2.016, Florida Administrative Code, is that a person must work thirty days after a suspension without pay to be deemed "reinstated". Respondent derives this interpretation by applying language from the rule that governs granting credit for leaves of absence. Respondent's interpretation of "reinstatement," as it relates to members who have been suspended without pay, is not evident from the language of the applicable statute or rule and may be ascertained only upon reviewing individual member files. The Florida Retirement System currently has 600,000 active members and 140,000 retirees, for a total of 740,000 files.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order that awards Petitioner retirement credit for the period of time from his date of suspension to his date of reinstatement subject to his purchasing retirement credit for that period of time. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CARLOYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-647 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. McKee, Esquire Kelly and McKee, P.A. 1718 East Seventh Avenue, Suite 301 Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Paul A. Rowell General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has enough creditable service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(17)(a), Florida Statutes (2009),1 to be "vested" and, therefore, eligible for a retirement benefit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is not currently an employee of any FRS employer. Petitioner was an employee of several different FRS employers during the 1970's and 1980's. Petitioner proved that he had creditable earnings from three FRS employers. The creditable earnings were from Hillsborough County from October 1977 through April 1978, Pasco County from August 1987 through December 1987, and Hernando County from March 1988 through August 1989. Petitioner has 3.09 years of creditable service in the FRS. The creditable service is not sufficient to vest Petitioner and does not entitle Petitioner to retirement benefits. Petitioner was employed with the City of Largo, Florida, for some time. However, that municipality was not an FRS participating employer during the period of employment. Petitioner worked for the U.S. Postal Service for some time. That agency is not an FRS participating employer. Petitioner was a student on work study at both the University of Florida and Florida State University. Paid student positions at state universities were not positions which were included in the FRS during that time. Petitioner also seeks to purchase his military time of approximately 22 months. Members of the FRS are allowed to purchase certain military service after they vest in the FRS. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has sufficient years of service to vest in the FRS and then purchase military service. Petitioner was employed in some state positions prior to 1975. Until 1975, the FRS was a "contributory" system. Employers withheld contributions to the retirement system from the wages of participating members and forwarded the withheld amounts to the Division. It is undisputed from Petitioner's testimony that no retirement contributions were ever withheld from his wages during the period that FRS was a contributory system.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2010.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Earl L. Barnwell, is employed as a uniformed officer of the Florida Highway Patrol. He was sworn into the Highway Patrol in October of 1953, and remained in this employment until November 30, 1956. In November of 1956, because of the death of his father and resulting family hardships, the Petitioner requested emergency leave from his employer, which was refused by his supervisors. Petitioner Barnwell then tendered his resignation in November of 1956, but became re-employed March 1, 1957, after having exhausted his accumulated leave and having been off the state payroll for the months of January and February of 1957. After Petitioner's re-employment and the customary one year's probationary period, he again achieved permanent status and repaid the retirement contributions which had been refunded to him upon his resignation. His retirement credit was reinstated for the period he had worked prior to his resignation. In December of 1970, Petitioner Barnwell transferred from the Highway Patrol Retirement System under Chapter 321, Florida Statutes, to the Florida Retirement System under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. On March 1, 1973, Petitioner was notified by the State Retirement Director that "no [retirement] credit was given for the two (2) months, January and February, 1957, when you were not on the payroll. There is no statute which would allow credit for these two (2) months. Therefore, since you were not on the payroll for these two (2) months, this would constitute a break in service, and your continuous service would begin March 1, 1957." On January 5, 1979, Petitioner Barnwell wrote to the Respondent Division requesting a hearing regarding the break in service in the retirement matter, stating "I am in total disagreement with the past information I have received and strongly feel an administrative resolution of my problem may well favorably be reached in its conclusion." The Respondent Division requested the assignment of a hearing officer to consider the case. The Respondent Division submitted a proposed recommended order, and Petitioner Barnwell submitted documentation relative to his statements made at the hearing. These instruments were considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in, or are inconsistent with, factual findings in this order they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Petition of Earl L. Barnwell to be eligible to retire after completion of twenty-five (25) continuous years of creditable service regardless of age be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of November, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Earl L. Barnwell 575 Seventh Street, South Safety Harbor, Florida 33572
Findings Of Fact On July 30, 1984, Richard Herring, the Petitioner, became a member of the Senior Management Service Personnel System within the State of Florida. He remained in that personnel system until March 2, 1987. His employer while a senior manager was the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Respondent in this cause. Petitioner determined to leave the position held with the Respondent based upon a concern that he might be dismissed from that position by the incoming secretary to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In fact, the new secretary deemed it appropriate to make some personnel change in senior managers within his agency in the early part of 1987. On March 3, 1987, Petitioner undertook his new employment with the Florida House of Representatives. With this timing, Petitioner effectively transferred from one state agency to another. The new employer, the Florida House of Representatives, operated under a separate personnel system from that associated with senior managers. This meant that the treatment of annual leave credits by the Respondent agency and as addressed by the Florida House of Representatives was unique to those employers and that Petitioner, if he was entitled to the payment for any annual leave hours within his account upon his resignation from Senior Management with the Respondent, must be paid by the Respondent. Conversely, any annual leave hours which he transferred to an account with the Florida House of Representatives must be in accordance with that agency's personnel rules or policies. From the inception of his association with the Senior Management Service, Petitioner saw the annual leave hours he earned and the flexibility afforded him in their use as an important factor in his employment circumstance. When Respondent recruited the Petitioner he was led to believe that as many as 480 annual leave hours could be converted into payment upon the resignation from the Senior Management Service, without regard for whether that resignation led to a transfer to another state agency or the outright termination as a state employee. In confirmation of his understanding when recruited, a letter was addressed to the Petitioner on August 3, 1984, referring to the ability to cash- in accrued annual leave that did not exceed 480 hours. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. It is addressed to Petitioner from Vivian Pyle, the central personnel officer for the Respondent. The remarks made to him in the recruitment phase and as confirmed in the correspondence are a correct depiction of the rights which the Petitioner had at the beginning of his employment as a senior manager. These rights were established in Rule 22SM-1.112(3), Florida Administrative Code. That rule became effective on March 16, 1981. It called for the payment of unused annual leave upon separation, not to exceed the amount of 480 hours. Separation meant the resignation from the position of a senior manager to transfer to another state agency or to terminate from state government entirely. At the time that the Petitioner took his appointment as a senior manager, the rule pertaining to attendance and leave while still employed by the Respondent agency was Rule 22SM-1.09, Florida Administrative Code. It called for the accumulation of 176 hours per year of annual leave upon the appointment and upon each anniversary date beyond that initial appointment. It also described the retention and credit of leave brought with the new appointee at the time of appointment, subject to the approval by the employer or agency head. It allowed for the payment of the leave time which the new appointee brought into the system when the ultimate decision was made by that employee to terminate from Senior Management. Termination in this instance refers to leaving Senior Management, not leaving state government. In accordance with Rule 22SM-1.09, Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner was allowed to bring into the system a balance of 205 annual leave credits and was assigned 176 additional annual leave credits on July 30, 1984, giving him a total of 381 annual leave hours at that point in time. On his anniversary date of July 30, 1985, he received an additional 176 hours which brought his total annual leave hours at that point to 470. In those instances wherein the annual leave hours had been granted to the Petitioner upon his appointment, existing hours brought with him had been credited and upon the first anniversary date of his employment as a senior manager, additional hours had been granted, those annual leave credit hours were available for use by the Petitioner from that date forward or as a cash holding that could be exercised upon his separation from Senior Management. On May 29, 1986, the personnel rules of the State of Florida, Department of Administration, as described in the preceding paragraphs, changed. A new Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, did not carry forward provisions which allowed for the payment upon separation of leave brought into Senior Management and leave earned while a senior manager. This finding pertains to those senior managers, like the Petitioner, who were already employed with the advent of the change in rules on May 29, 1986. The new rule chapter did continue to allow for the accumulation of 176 hours of annual leave upon the anniversary date of an appointment, pertaining to existing senior managers at the point at which the new rule became effective. The new rule chapter by its language described a circumstance pertaining to appointees who came into the position of senior manager upon the effective date of the new rule chapter or thereafter, discussing the payment for an annual leave balance above 240 hours which had been transferred to the Career Service. This speaks to a transfer from Senior Management to Career Service and the idea of transferring 240 hours to the Career Service Personnel System and paying for the balance of annual leave over 240 hours. It also called for the proration of this payment of annual leave upon appropriate accrual rates for Career Service. It spoke to the payment of annual leave upon termination of a senior manager who had come into the System on May 29, 1986, or thereafter, termination meaning someone who had left the state payroll for at least 31 calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. See Rule 22SM- 3.007(6)(c), Florida Administrative Code (May 29, 1986). By contrast, Chapter 22SM-3 effective May 29, 1986 does not describe in any fashion what happens to annual leave credits for those persons who had been senior managers prior to the effective date of the rules chapter when the senior manager decides to separate from Senior Management Service. The Petitioner had 371.5 annual leave hours upon his anniversary date of July 30, 1986, and was given an additional 176 hours of annual leave credit as contemplated by Rule 22SM-3.007(2), Florida Administrative Code (May 29, 1986). On February 1, 1987, amendments to Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, were enacted. Unlike the May 29, 1986, version of this chapter, the amended rule specifically addressed the circumstance of all Senior Management employees, those who were in that personnel system before February 1, 1987, and those who would be appointed from that date forward. This speaks to the issue of disposition of annual leave credits held by senior managers upon their separation from employment as a senior manager. At Section 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), senior managers who transfer to a state government position outside of the Senior Management Service were not entitled to be paid for annual leave credits, they could only transfer those hours subject to the rules governing the system into which the member may transfer. In addition, that provision indicated that the transfer of annual leave credits would be prorated dating back to the most recent anniversary date for service. A companion section, Rule 22SM-3.007(6), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), indicated that if the employee terminated from state government, that is the employee was not on any state payroll for at least 31 calendar days following the separation from Senior Management Service, then the annual leave credit held at the point of separation would be cashed. At Rule 22SM-3.007(3), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), the language was to the effect that upon the appointment and on each anniversary date after that time there was an increase in credit hours assigned to each Senior Management employee from 176 hours to 240 hours per annum. When the Petitioner determined to leave his position, he had prepared material pertaining to his termination, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 admitted into evidence. In the form authorization for disposition of his annual leave was called for by K. Davis, the Deputy Assistant Secretary within the Respondent agency. This form indicates the election on the part of the Petitioner to gain payment for all unused annual leave, excepting 24 hours. A subsequent audit of his employment records revealed that the Petitioner had 432 hours of annual leave upon his separation from Senior Management, without regard for any proration of the July 30, 1986 - 176 annual leave hours installment. Payment for annual leave hours was not forthcoming and after making some attempts at ascertaining the reason why and gaining no satisfaction in these discussions, the Petitioner wrote to Vivian Pyle, the director of the central personnel services for the Respondent agency, on April 23, 1987 to inquire about this matter. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 3. In the course of the correspondence the Petitioner indicates that his new employer, the Florida House of Representatives, had given him a computer print-out effective April 17, 1987, in which it was indicated that a substantial number of hours had been transferred to the Florida House of Representatives as opposed to having been paid to the Petitioner as he requested. By way of response, Ms. Pyle wrote to the Petitioner on April 28, 1987, and she referenced Rule 22SM- 3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), pertaining to the fact that the Respondent did not believe that the Petitioner was entitled to be paid for his annual leave and that the leave could be transferred subject to the rules within the receiving agency. In this instance, that refers to the Florida House of Representatives. Having been disappointed in the attempt to gain the payment for his annual leave credits, excepting the 24 hours which he wanted to have transferred, the Petitioner filed a petition for formal administrative hearing with the Respondent agency, received by the Respondent on May 15, 1987. That case was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of the hearing which has led to the entry of this recommended order. The Petitioner also challenged rules within Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, in its May 29, 1986 language and its February 1, 1987 language. See DOAH Case No. 87-2172R supra. The outcome of that challenge was to the effect that the language within Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), which prohibits the payment for annual leave credits upon the transfer from Senior Management Service to another position in state government was stricken as an invalid enactment. The State of Florida, Department of Administration has appealed that decision. The State of Florida, Department of Administration has also enacted a Rule 22SM-3.0l3(1), Florida Administrative Code, which corresponds to the most recent amendments to Chapter 225M-3, Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987). Rule 22SM-3.013, Florida Administrative Code, indicates that Senior Management Service employees who were on board on January 31, 1987 will keep their anniversary dates and shall be credited additional amount of annual leave credits, as well as sick leave credits. The rate of that annual leave credit is 5.333 hours monthly or 2.46 hours biweekly for each pay period or portion thereof. When the July 30, 1986 annual leave credits are prorated for the partial service year completed by the Petitioner in the full months of August, 1986 through February, 1987 and the portions of July, 1986 and March, 1987, as envisioned by Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), they total 141.85 annual leave credits. When the prorated formula described in Rule 22SM-3.013(1), Florida Administrative Code, is applied for the full month of February, 1987 and the two days within March, 1987 during which time the Petitioner was still employed an additional 5.505 annual leave credits are assigned. With these adjustments, that makes the annual leave credit balance for the Petitioner upon his transfer 403.355 annual leave hours. Within this figure, of the credits assigned on July 30, 1986, Petitioner's anniversary date, following the proration adjustment, there remained only 26.35 hours which had not been used as annual leave during the period July 30, 1986 through March 2, 1987.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional retirement benefits for her years of service between September 1966 and December 1974.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a retired member of the FRS. She began working for the Duval County Juvenile Detention Center (DCJDC) in August 1966. However, Petitioner's name was not placed on the payroll until September 1966 because of the time she was absent. As an employee of the DCJDC, Petitioner was a county employee but also a participant in the FRS. She made contributions in the amount of $1,850.78 to the FRS from September 1966 through December 1974. The FRS became non- contributory for all state and county employees in January 1975. Petitioner terminated her employment with Duval County on June 20, 1977. At that time, Petitioner requested a refund of her accumulated contributions to the FRS. Petitioner acknowledged in her request for refund that she waived her interest in FRS for the refunded service. On or about February 22, 1978, Respondent issued Voucher #273254 and Warrant #0364356 made payable to Petitioner in the amount of $1,850.78. Petitioner's testimony that she never received the refund is not credible. On or about October 16, 1981, Petitioner returned to work at DCJDC. After receiving several promotions, Petitioner transferred to a position at the Department of Health. Petitioner terminated her employment at the Department of Health on November 13, 1998. In August 2000, Petitioner filed an Application for Service Retirement. The application includes the following sworn statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. Respondent sent Petitioner an Acknowledgment of Service Retirement Application dated August 10, 2000. The acknowledgment indicated that Petitioner's retirement date was June 2000 and that she could purchase credit for refunded service from September 1966 through December 1974 by paying Respondent $7,918.46. The acknowledgment made it clear that Respondent required written notification if Petitioner did not intend to purchase this service. In March 2001, Petitioner executed an Option Selection for FRS Members. She selected Option 1, which provides her a monthly benefit for her lifetime. In a letter dated March 27, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that she did not intend to buy back any time. Additionally, she stated as follows: I would like for my retirement application to be accepted/processed as is. The rate quoted was at $517.00. However, if this amount is incorrect, I would like to know as soon as possible. Based upon Petitioner's statement in the letter, Respondent began paying and Petitioner began receiving her retirement benefits effective June 1, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to any additional retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Veronica P. Holt 230 East First Street, Apartment 1313 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was convicted of specified criminal offenses, requiring the forfeiture of all of her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of accumulated contributions.
Findings Of Fact At the time of her arrest in March 2002 on criminal charges relating to the alleged acceptance of a bribe, Petitioner Martha G. Byrd ("Byrd") was employed as a clerk in the Miami-Dade County Property Appraiser's Office. As a public employee, she became a member of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), which is administered by Respondent Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement ("Division"). All told, Byrd earned approximately 21 years of creditable service in the FRS. On March 8, 2004, Byrd pleaded nolo contendere in the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, to three crimes, namely: solicitation or acceptance of unlawful compensation for an official act as proscribed in Section 838.016, Florida Statutes (2002); solicitation or acceptance of a bribe, as prohibited under Section 838.015, Florida Statutes (2002); and grand theft of the third degree, as proscribed in Section 812.014(c), Florida Statutes (2002). Based on the plea, the court found that Byrd had committed the crimes charged and sentenced her to probation with special conditions; adjudication of guilt was withheld, however, with regard to each charge. The Division learned about the criminal prosecution of Byrd upon receiving notice thereof from the Commission on Ethics. After reviewing the court file, the Division determined that Byrd had been convicted of "specified offenses" (a legal term that will be discussed below) and concluded that, consequently, she must forfeit all her rights and benefits as a member of the FRS. By letter dated August 22, 2007, the Division notified Byrd of its preliminary decision regarding the forfeiture of her retirement benefits and offered her an opportunity to request a formal administrative proceeding to contest the determination. Byrd timely requested a hearing. Byrd maintains her innocence of the crimes for which she was sentenced. She insists that she was a good employee who never took any money in exchange for a corrupt act. Byrd pleaded no contest to the criminal charges, she says, because she had no way of proving that the government's principal piece of evidence against her——a tape recording made by an undercover agent——had been altered; thus, she feared being convicted at trial, on the strength of the surreptitious recording, and sent to prison.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order determining that Ms. Byrd forfeited all her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of any accumulated contributions, when she pleaded no contest to "specified offenses" committed prior to her retirement from public service. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.stae.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2008.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for retirement credit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner previously worked for the Sheriff's Office for DeSoto County, Florida. It is undisputed that the Sheriff's Office is a qualified Florida Retirement System ("FRS") employer and that Petitioner was, during all times relevant hereto, an FRS eligible employee. In the instant case, it is undisputed that in October 2006, Petitioner sustained a work-related injury while in the course and scope of her employment with the Sheriff's Office. Petitioner, from the time of her injury through approximately September 11, 2007, received temporary total disability workers' compensation benefits for her employment- related injuries. The precise dates when these benefits were received by Petitioner are not at issue in the instant dispute. On September 12, 2007, Petitioner returned to work at the Sheriff's Office with light-duty work limitations. Also on this date, Petitioner resumed receiving payroll wages from the Sheriff's Office. Petitioner continued to receive temporary partial disability wage payments through December 2008 and received workers' compensation medical benefits through October 2010. When Petitioner returned to work on September 12, 2007, she was still receiving medical treatment from the workers' compensation physician and attended regular sessions with the physician throughout the duration of her employment with the Sheriff's Office. The visits to the workers' compensation physician often occurred during times when the Sheriff's Office scheduled Petitioner to work, thus, resulting in her absence from work on these days. The Sheriff's Office terminated Petitioner's employment on December 12, 2007. Between the dates of September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, Petitioner was on the Sheriff's Office payroll and received wages as follows: For the period September 23, 2007, through October 6, 2007, she received payroll wages for 14 days; For the period October 7, 2007, through October 20, 2007, she received payroll wages for five days; and For the period October 21, 2007, through December 12, 2007, she received payroll wages for 14 days. No evidence was presented at the hearing explaining Petitioner's work schedule for the period September 13, 2007, through October 5, 2007. Between the dates of September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, Petitioner worked and received payroll wages from the Sheriff's Office for a total of 34 days. Although the 34 days that Petitioner worked were dispersed throughout the months of September, October, November, and December, Petitioner, nevertheless, received a paycheck from the Sheriff's Office for wages for each pay period following her return to work. There was no testimony offered at the hearing as to the total number of days that Petitioner was scheduled to work between September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007. However, Petitioner testified that any scheduled work days that she missed during this period occurred as a result of her having to attend medical appointments with the workers' compensation physician. Respondent offered no evidence to the contrary as to this point. Given the severity of Petitioner's work-related injury, which apparently resulted in her being away from work for nearly a year, coupled with the fact that she continued to receive workers' compensation medical benefits through October 2010 (some four years after the date of her injury), the undersigned accepts as credible Petitioner's testimony that any scheduled work days that she missed between September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, resulted from her having to attend medical appointments with the workers' compensation physician. On April 4, 2008, Petitioner submitted correspondence to the Division and stated therein the following: Sir, I am writing this email in regards to my retirement. Under the florida [sic] retirement system, a member is entitled to retirement credit for periods of eligible workman [sic] comp[ensation]. The member must return to FRS covered employment for one month. Creditable workman [sic] comp[ensation] includes all periods that workman [sic] comp[ensation] are made. FRS employers are required by Section 121.125, Florida Statutes, and Section 60S-2012, Florida Administrative Code, to report the period covered by workman [sic] comp[ensation] on the monthly retirement report. D.C.S.O. stated I worked intermittently but where is it written in the Florida State Statutes or Administrative Code, how many days during the month you are allowed to miss and it would not be credible service or considered a break in service. [sic] Sir, I was still active [sic] employed with D.C.S.O. upon returning to work on Sept[ember] 12, 2007. The days I missed was [sic] due to medical appointmentts [sic] for my workman's [sic] comp[ensation] injury I sustained at D.C.S.O. I always provided documentation from the physician. I was not terminated until December 13, 2007 when Capt. McClure of D.C.S.O. called me at 8:21 A.M. [sic] on my scheduled day off. The three months I was allowed to work and the period on workman [sic] comp[ensation] should be credible service towards retirement. Sir, my question is when the other employees at D.C.S.O. take off more than a couple of days, during the month, for various reasons, without medical documentation[,] do[es] it count for credible service towards retirement or is it a break in service. [sic] On April 7, 2008, Doug Cherry, on behalf of the Division, responded to Petitioner's inquiry of April 4, 2008, and stated the following: Ms. Leonard, as I explained in our phone conversation, for periods of workers' compensation (temporary partial or temporary total) to be eligible for retirement credit there must be a return to active employment for one complete calendar month. The attached letter from the Sheriff of DeSoto County shows that from your scheduled date of return in September 2007, your employment was not active for the required month. This letter states you worked intermittently until your termination of employment in December 2007. To satisfy the one calendar month of active work, you needed to be consistently working through October 31, 2007. You indicated in our conversation that the information from the Sheriff was incorrect. If so, you would need to contact that office to resolve any discrepancy. I [have] also attached the appropriate Florida Statute (121.125) and the Florida Administrative Code (60S-2.012) which states [sic] this requirement. The law does not provide for exceptions or a combination of active and non-active employment during the one calendar month. Regarding your question about active members taking off days during the month, the requirements for earning service credit are different than the eligibility requirement for periods of workers' [sic] compensation. In your own account, you did earn credit for the months of September, October, November and December 2007 for the time you did work and earn salary. However, as stated above, for the period of workers' compensation to be creditable for retirement, the requirement is active employment for the full calendar month, not to earn service credit after such period. You also indicated that you were going to provide your attorney with this information. If your attorney would like to give me a call (850-488-9623), I will be glad to discuss this issue with him or her. I hope this information will help clarify this issue for you. On January 7, 2011, Respondent wrote Petitioner and informed her of the following: Dear Ms. Leonard: This will respond to your request for retirement credit for the period of time you received Workers' Compensation (WC), that was submitted to the State Board of Administration (SBA). Because this is an issue of creditable service, the SBA forwarded the request to the Division of Retirement since the Division is the proper agency to address such an issue. Information you and your agency provided indicates that you were out on WC October 2006 through September 2007 at which time your employer, the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office, sent you a letter dated September 6, 2007 requiring you to return to work within two weeks or be terminated from employment. The Division has not received any documentation from the Workers' Compensation carrier to substantiate the actual periods of WC or the date maximum medical improvement was reached. Therefore, this letter cannot address periods of possible eligibility for retirement credit but will address whether your employment from September 2007 met the return to work requirement for such eligibility. The Sherriff's [sic] office provided us with documentation of your time worked in September, October, November, and December 2007. During these months, you worked intermittently and did not have a full calendar month of active employment before your employment was terminated by your employer on December 12, 2007. * * * You did not consistently work during any of those calendar months until your employment was terminated by your employer on December 12, 2007. Therefore, starting in September 2007, you did not meet the return to actively performing service requirement of the above provision to establish eligibility for possible retirement credit. Petitioner's failure to return to active employment status was the only reason given by the agency when denying Petitioner's claim. Andy Snuggs has worked as a benefits administrator for the Division for approximately the last 20 years. The Division offered, and the undersigned accepted, Mr. Snuggs as an expert in matters related to the Act. Mr. Snuggs testified that in the exercise of the agency's discretion, the agency defines the phrase "active employment," as it relates to section 121.125, to mean that an employee must work each scheduled work day in a regularly established position for at least one calendar month following the employee's return to work and that no allowances are made for any absences, excused or otherwise. Mr. Snuggs did not offer any testimony explaining why the Division selected the particular definition that it did for the term "active."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Irene Leonard, met the return-to-work requirements necessary to receive retirement credit for workers' compensation payment periods. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2011.
The Issue Whether the Division properly denied Petitioner's request to change Petitioner's retirement in the Florida Retirement System from an early retirement service benefit to disability retirement.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner worked for Miami Dade Transit from August 1990 to March 2004, and was a member of FRS while employed there. Afterwards, Petitioner went to work as an auditor with a private employer, Robert Half, in New York. In 2007, Petitioner sustained an injury while working for Robert Half. In 2008, the Division generated an Estimate of Retirement Benefits for Petitioner detailing what her benefit amounts would be if she decided to retire. In February or March 2009, Petitioner informed the Division by telephone that she could no longer work and wanted to retire. Subsequently, the Division mailed Petitioner a retirement application. On April 13, 2009, the Division received Petitioner's filled-out application for service retirement. Directly above Petitioner's signature, the application stated: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. Petitioner's application was incomplete and could not be processed upon receipt. On or about April 17, 2009, the Division sent Petitioner an Acknowledgment of Service Retirement Application requesting that Petitioner send "birth date verification of your joint annuitant" if she chose Option 3 or 4 and "The Option Selection for FRS Members, Form FRS-11o" to finalize the application. The acknowledgment stated at the bottom: ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD SERVICE CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR RETIREMENT DATE, CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT OR ELECT THE INVESTMENT PLAN. RETIRMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED. In April 2009, the Division generated a second Estimate of Benefits for Petitioner, which she received. On or about May 8, 2009, Petitioner completed her retirement application by providing the Division the option selection form, which notified the Division that she selected Option 2. Directly above Petitioner's signature, the selection form FRS-11o stated: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. When Petitioner received the estimate and saw the early retirement benefit amount, she called the Division to question what she considered a small amount. It was explained to Petitioner that she lost a certain percentage because she was retiring early and that her retirement was either "being processed, or it was processed." Petitioner's application for retirement was approved by the Division and Petitioner was awarded the Option 2 retirement benefit she requested with the effective date of May 1, 2009. Petitioner's first retirement check was dated April 23, 2010, and was cashed by Petitioner on July 28, 2010. Petitioner's retirement status was final when she cashed her benefit payment. On June 6, 2011, Petitioner contacted the Secretary of Division of Management Services by email and requested that she receive disability retirement for the first time.1 On, June 23, 2011, the Division informed Petitioner by letter that her retirement status was final when she cashed or deposited a benefit payment and that the request to change her retirement from regular service retirement to disability retirement could not be honored. On or about July 19, 2011, Petitioner requested a hearing regarding the issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request to change her early service retirement benefit to disability retirement. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2012.
The Issue May Petitioner be excluded from participating in the Florida Retirement System for the academic/fiscal year 1978-1979?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by the University of Florida in 1975 and has been employed with the University of Florida from 1976 to the present. Petitioner believed himself to be a member of the Florida Retirement System from 1976 to the present. There is no dispute that he is entitled to Florida Retirement System benefits from 1976 to 1978 and from 1979 to the present, during which years Petitioner was paid from State salaries allocations and worked in a regularly established State position. Petitioner was paid during the years 1976-1980 with a combination of funds from several sources: the State salary budget, the federal Veterans Administration (VA), and a University of Florida practice funding account. The allocation of these funds in the year 1978-1979 created the current problem. During the years 1976-1980, Petitioner performed work for both the University of Florida (State of Florida) and the VA. The Federal Retirement System was a defined plan from 1976 to 1980. Petitioner was an employee of the VA from 1976 to 1980. Petitioner was a participant in the Federal Retirement System as an employee of the VA from 1976 to 1980. Petitioner received retirement credits in the Federal Retirement System as an employee of the VA from 1976 to 1980. Petitioner's employment during the State fiscal year 1978-1979 included job duties and work performed as an employee of the University of Florida (State of Florida) and did not change from previous years. Petitioner's salary during the State fiscal year 1978- 1979 should have included an allocation from State funds. Due to an administrative error, Petitioner's entire salary was paid only with federal VA funds for the State fiscal year 1978-1979. State funds did not contribute to Petitioner's salary during the State fiscal year 1978-1979 solely due to the administrative error in the allocation of funds for Petitioner's salary, and even though the State presumably benefited from his labor. For the 1978-1979 fiscal year, Petitioner received retirement credits in the Federal Retirement System and none have been taken away. Contributions were made to the Federal Retirement System on Petitioner's behalf as an employee of the VA from 1976 to 1980, and Petitioner received retirement credits in the Federal Retirement System as a VA employee for that period. Petitioner earned $2,072.50, in federal retirement contributions in 1977; $2,256.52, in federal retirement contributions in 1978; and $1,931.56, in federal retirement contributions in 1979. When Petitioner discontinued work for the VA in 1980, his federal contributions were paid to him in a lump sum by the federal government. Petitioner placed this money in a private retirement account.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order which: Finds Petitioner was a federal employee during the 1978-1979 academic/fiscal year and at this time is not entitled to credit therefor in the Florida Retirement System; Provides for his participation in the Florida Retirement System for the 1978-1979 academic/fiscal year if he elects to participate pursuant to Rule 60S-2.007(3) Florida Administrative Code; and Establishes, pursuant to the formula provided in Rule 60S-3.008(3), Florida Administrative Code, the amount by which Petitioner may "buy back" that year of State service, if he elects to do so. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Esteban F. Scornik, Esquire McDonough & Wieland, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1991 Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Ron Poppell, Interim Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief Legal Counsel Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Bruce Hoffman, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") have been forfeited as set forth in the Notice of Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits dated August 26, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, on the stipulation of the parties, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Division is the state agency charged with the responsibility of managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Department of Management Services. The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. It provides benefits to local and state employees, including teachers, state legislators, and local public officials. Mr. Childers was employed as a school teacher in Escambia County from 1955 to 1957, and this employment continued for approximately two and one-half years. During this time, Mr. Childers was a member of the Teacher Retirement System, which later became part of the FRS. His two and one-half years of service as a teacher is credited service under the FRS. In November 1970, Mr. Childers was elected to serve as a member of the Florida Legislature, and he continued to serve as a state legislator until November 2000, when he left office as a result of term limits. As a state legislator, Mr. Childers was a member of the FRS class of State Elected Officials, and his 30 years of service is credited service under the FRS. In November 2000, Mr. Childers was elected to serve as a member of the Escambia County Board of County Commissioners. In this position, Mr. Childers was a member of the FRS class of County Elected Officials, and his years of service as a County Commissioner is credited service under the FRS. On or about June 17, 2002, Mr. Childers was charged by indictment with one count of money laundering, a second-degree felony pursuant to Section 896.101(3)(a)1. and 2.a. and (5)(b), Florida Statutes (2002)1; one count of bribery, a third degree felony pursuant to Section 838.015, Florida Statutes2; and one count of receipt of unlawful compensation or reward for official behavior, a third degree felony pursuant to Section 838.016(1), Florida Statutes.3 The charges in the June 17, 2002, indictment were based solely on activities allegedly occurring subsequent to November 2000 and arising out of Mr. Childers's service as a member of the Escambia County Board of Commissioners. Mr. Childers was tried and found guilty by a jury of two counts in the indictment, bribery and unlawful compensation or reward for official behavior.4 On or about May 16, 2003, Mr. Childers was adjudicated guilty of these two crimes and was sentenced to 42 months in prison, to be followed by 18 months probation. Mr. Childers has not, to date, applied for retirement benefits under the FRS. Mr. Childers was a public officer who was adjudicated guilty of two offenses specified in Chapter 838, Florida Statutes, which arose out of his service as a member of the Escambia County Board of Commissioners. None of the actions related to his service as a state legislator or as a teacher in Escambia County.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that W.D. Childers committed specified offenses, as defined in Section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes, prior to his retirement from public service and ordering that, pursuant to Section 112.3173(3), Florida Statutes, W.D. Childers forfeit all his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of any accumulated contributions. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2007.
