The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, is liable to Petitioner, Miriam Lara, M.D., for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the amount of attorney's fees and costs Petitioner should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency"), is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for the administration of the Federal government's Medicaid program in Florida. Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. One of the duties imposed upon states in order to participate in the Medicaid program is the duty to terminate any approved Medicaid provider where the provider has been "convicted" of certain types of crimes. See Social Security Act, Section 1128(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. Section 1230a-7. In particular, 42 U.S.C. Section 1230a-7(a)(1) requires the mandatory exclusion from the Medicaid program of any individual or entity that has been "convicted" of a program- related crime: Any individual or entity that has been convicted of a criminal offense related to the delivery of any item or service under subchapter XVII of this chapter or under any State health care program. For this purpose, the term "convicted" is defined to include "participation in a . . . deferred adjudication, or other agreement or program where judgement of conviction has been withheld." 42 U.S.C. Section 1230a-7(i)(4). Petitioner, Dr. Miriam Lara, is a licensed medical doctor and an approved Medicaid provider in the State of Florida. On January 20, 1998, Dr. Lara was indicted for "Organized Fraud and Medicaid Fraud." A copy of the Arrest Warrant, Respondent's Exhibit 9, was provided to the Agency shortly after Dr. Lara's arrest putting the Agency on notice of the charges against her. On or about November 30, 1998,1 Dr. Lara entered into a "Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Speedy Trial Waiver" (hereinafter referred to as the "DPA") which was filed in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County. Dr. Lara agreed, in part, to the following in the DPA: I, [sic] understand that I have been tentatively accepted as a participant in the Pretrial Diversion Program, and that the charges against me will not be prosecuted so as [sic] long as I am a program participant in good standing and that my case will not come to trail during that time. While it is clear from the DPA that the charges against Dr. Lara were not to be prosecuted so long as she participated in the program, the DPA does not specifically state that the charges would be dropped if she completed the program. Although the DPA is not specific, the Office of the Statewide Prosecution and Dr. Lara intended, when they entered into the DPA that the charges would be completely dropped if Dr. Lara completed the Pretrial Diversion Program. On April 20, 1999, after Dr. Lara successfully completed the pretrial program,2 the Office of Statewide Prosecution nolle prossed all charges pending against her. In early 1999 the Agency became aware that Dr. Lara had entered into and completed some type of "pretrial program." Ellen Williams, a Medicaid/Healthcare Program Analyst for the Agency, was notified that Dr. Lara had completed what Ms. Williams understood to be a "pretrial intervention program." The Agency, through Ms. Williams, also became aware of the disposition of Dr. Lara's case some time during 1999. Ms. Williams was provided with a copy of a disposition record for Dr. Lara's case from the Clerk of the Circuit and County Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. That disposition record, Respondent's Exhibit 11, states that the charges against Dr. Lara had been "NOLLE PROS . . ." on April 20, 1999. The Agency, through Ms. Williams, believed that all pretrial programs involved a program through which an individual charged with a crime could, by participating in the program, avoid being adjudicated "guilty" of the charged offense. Because the information contained on the disposition record provided to Ms. Williams indicated that the charges had been nolle prossed and, this appeared to be inconsistent with the Agency's belief that all pretrial programs result in adjudication being withheld, Ms. Williams attempted to find out precisely what had happened to the criminal charges against Dr. Lara. Ms. Williams first telephoned and spoke with Assistant Attorney General Hugo Acebo, whom she understood to be an attorney, about the matter. Ms. Williams was told by Mr. Acebo that Dr. Lara had entered into some type of pretrial program and that she had successfully completed the program. Ms. Williams did not recall being told by Mr. Acebo that the charges against Dr. Lara had been dropped. Nor did she recall being told that any plea had been entered by Dr. Lara or adjudication on the charges had been withheld. Consistent with the Agency's belief about the nature of pretrial programs, Ms. Williams assumed that Dr. Lara, by successfully completing the pretrial program, had merely avoided being adjudicated guilty of the offenses for which she had been charged. Ms. Williams did not understand that the charges against Dr. Lara had been dropped. On October 12, 1999, a Case Closing Report on Miriam Lara, M.D. (hereinafter referred to as the "Closing Report"), Case No. 04-96-03-0016, was issued by the Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, Fort Lauderdale Bureau. In pertinent part, the Closing Report states the following: According to Assistant Attorney General Hugo Acebo, Dr. Lara entered into a pretrial intervention (PTI) program, which she successfully completed in April 1998. The charges against her were then dropped. . . . (Emphasis added). Ms. Williams received a copy of the Closing Report. The Agency, therefore, had actual notice that the charges against Dr. Lara had been dropped, but Ms. Williams continued to incorrectly believe that, because the Closing Report indicated that Dr. Lara had entered into a "pretrial intervention (PTI) program, which she successfully completed . . . " she had been "convicted" of a criminal offense that is Medicaid program- related, consistent with the Agency's incorrect understanding of pretrial programs. Marie del Carmen Calzone, Esquire, who represented Dr. Lara at the time, spoke to Ms. Williams at least three times after the charges against Dr. Lara had been dropped. Ms. Calzone explained to Ms. Williams that the charges had been nolle prossed or dropped, that Dr. Lara had not entered any adverse plea to the charges, that "adjudication had not been withheld," and that Dr. Lara had not, therefore, been "convicted." Ms. Williams, however, incorrectly insisted that, because Dr. Lara had engaged in a pretrial program and successfully completed it, she had been "convicted" as that term is defined for Medicaid purposes. Based upon Ms Williams' understanding of the Agency's interpretation of the pertinent law, Ms. Williams drafted a letter notifying Dr. Lara that her participation in the Florida Medicaid program was being terminated (hereinafter referred to as the "Termination Letter"). The Termination Letter indicates that the decision to terminate Dr. Lara's participation in the Medicaid program was based upon the following: The Agency for Health Care Administration has received information from the Attorney General, Office of Statewide Prosecution that indicates the following: You were indicted on January 20, 1998, for Organized Fraud and Medicaid Fraud. On November 20, 1998, you entered into a pretrial intervention program, which resulted in a nolle prosequi of the charges. The Social Security Act at section 1128(a)(1) provides for the mandatory exclusion from participation in the Medicaid program of any individual or entity convicted of a criminal offense that is program-related. Section 1128(I)(4) defines convicted to include "when the individual or entity has entered into participation in a first offender, deferred adjudication, or other arrangement or program where judgment of conviction has been withheld." Section 1902(p)(1) of the Social Security Act provides for state authority to take action to exclude providers from the Medicaid program for the reasons cited in section 1128. The Termination Letter was signed on or about April 13, 2001, almost two years after the charges against Dr. Lara had been nolle prossed. The Termination Letter was provided to Dr. Lara. Dr. Lara disputed the Agency's proposed action to terminate her participation in the Medicaid program and filed a Petition for Formal Hearing Pursuant to Section 120.569, Fla. Stat. (2001) and Petition for Other Relief Under Fla. Stat. and F.A.C. (hereinafter referred to as the "Petition for Formal Hearing"). The Petition for Formal Hearing was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearing on July 13, 2001. The matter was styled Miriam Lara, M.D. vs. Agency for Health Care Administration, and designated DOAH Case No. 01-2789. On September 18, 2001, realizing that Dr. Lara had not been "convicted" of any charges, the Agency filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Final Agency Action in the Underlying Case. Consequently, an Order Closing File was entered the same day, canceling the scheduled final hearing of the Underlying Case and closing the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings. As stipulated to by the parties, the Agency is an "agency" as defined in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes; the Agency initiated an administrative proceeding against Dr. Lara; the Agency was not a nominal party; and Dr. Lara, a "small business party" as defined in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, was the "prevailing party" in the Underlying Case by virtue of the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal of Final Agency Action. The amount of reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Dr. Lara in the Underlying Case exceed $15,000.00. On November 26, 2001, Dr. Lara filed a Renewed Petition to Determine Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to Section 57.111, Fla. Stat. (2001) and Other Relief Under Fla. Stat. and F.A.C. (hereinafter referred to as the "Renewed Petition"). An Attorney Fee Affidavit has been attached to the Renewed Petition in which it is represented that attorney's fees in the amount of $18,279.50 were reasonably incurred in the Underlying Case, but also recognizing that fees and costs are capped at $15,000.00 under Section 59.111(4)(d)2., Florida Statutes. The Renewed Petition was designated Case No. 01-4669F. The pertinent information available to the Agency at the time it sent the Termination Letter to Dr. Lara included the following: Dr. Lara had been charged with criminal offenses that are program related in January 1998; Dr. Lara entered into a "Deferred Prosecution Agreement" in November 1998; Dr. Lara successfully completed the pretrial diversion program. At no time did she enter any plea to the charges and, therefore, there was no adjudication on the charges; and As a consequence of having completed the pretrial diversion program, all charges against her were dropped in 1999. All information necessary to determine that Dr. Lara had not been "convicted" of charges related to the Medicaid program was available to the Agency before action was taken to terminate her participation in the Medicaid program.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Utopia Home Care, Inc. (Utopia or Petitioner), is entitled to payment of $38,432.71 for the services it provided to Medicaid recipients during the period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Utopia was an authorized Medicaid provider in the State of Florida. Pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement, Utopia was authorized to provide home and community-based services to Medicaid recipients. The Agency is charged with the administration and oversight of the Medicaid Program and funds throughout the State of Florida. One of the Agency's responsibilities is to monitor the provision of Medicaid services and make payments to providers for services which have been appropriately provided and for which claims have been correctly processed. During the period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2000 (the audit period), Utopia rendered services to Medicaid recipients who receive home care services through the Medicaid Program. The cost of these services, for which Utopia has not received payment, is $38,432.71. There is no dispute that these services were authorized and provided by Utopia. Robert Fritz is vice president of Utopia and works in Utopia's St. Petersburg, Florida, office. In or about February 2002, while Mr. Fritz was participating in an accounts receivable project, he discovered that Utopia had not been paid for some of the services it had provided to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. Mr. Fritz contacted the Agency soon after he discovered that Utopia had not received payment for the services it rendered during the audit period. Over a period of several months, Utopia, through Mr. Fritz, provided the Agency with documentation that the services were authorized and had been invoiced at or near the time the services were provided. Additionally, at the request of the Agency, Utopia completed numerous 081 Forms, Request for Payment Forms for the Florida Medicaid Program, to establish a baseline as to what claims were unpaid. Utopia completed the 081 Forms for the services which were provided during the audit period and for which it had not received payment in or about February 2002. In addition to the completed 081 Forms, dated February 2002, Utopia also provided to the Agency documentation generated from Utopia's computer system in Florida. The documents, created by the computer system on a weekly basis, included payroll checks for employees and invoices for services rendered. As part of Utopia's contractual requirements with the lead agency, which oversees the Medicaid Program at the local level, a monthly Medicaid Expenditure Tracking Report (Expenditure Tracking Report) is created by Utopia's St. Petersburg, Florida, office. The Expenditure Tracking Report lists anticipated expenditures from the Medicaid system to Utopia for services rendered in a particular month. Many of these documents were provided to the Agency in seeking to establish that the services had been provided during the audit period and to obtain payment for the services. The documents created by Utopia's computer system and discussed in paragraph 6 above were created at or near the time services were rendered. Due to the documentation provided by Utopia, the Agency stipulated that Utopia provided authorized services to Medicaid recipients and that the cost of these services was $38,432.71. Nonetheless, the Agency has refused to pay Utopia for the services because the claims were not filed in accordance with Medicaid procedures, as established in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, Non-Institutional 081 (Reimbursement Handbook). Based on the Agency's review of its records, it determined that Utopia had not filed the claims within 12 months of the services being rendered. The procedures for filing claims for Medicaid payments are outlined in the Reimbursement Handbook, which is referenced and incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-8.200(6). Also, for purposes of this case, the Reimbursement Handbook sets forth the applicable Medicaid requirements for processing claims. The Reimbursement Handbook, pages 6-2 and 6-3, provides in relevant part the following: Medicaid providers should submit claims timely so that any problems with a claim can be corrected and the claim resubmitted before the filing deadline. * * * A clean claim for services rendered must be received by the agency or its fiscal agent no later than 12 months from the date of service. * * * The date electronically coded on the provider's electronic transmission by the Medicaid fiscal agent is the recorded date of receipt for an electronic claim. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Consultec was the company responsible for receiving claims from and paying those claims to Medicaid providers in the State of Florida. The Reimbursement Handbook indicates that the processing time for claims "under normal circumstances" is within 10 to 30 days after the claim is filed. The Reimbursement Handbook also provides that a "remittance voucher" is mailed each week if Consultec processed any claims or put any claims in "Suspend" status. With regard to the remittance voucher, the Reimbursement Handbook, page 8-4, states in relevant part the following: The remittance voucher plays an important role in communications between the provider and Medicaid. It tells what happened to the claims submitted for payment--whether they were paid, suspended, or denied. It provides a record of transactions and assists the provider in resolving errors so that denied claims can be resubmitted. The provider must reconcile the remittance voucher with the claim in order to determine if correct payment was received. Utopia filed all its claims electronically. Therefore, to determine whether Utopia was entitled to payment for services rendered during the audit period, the Agency searched its data warehouse. The data warehouse allows the Agency to review claims that have been electronically filed and the status of those claims. Based on the Agency's review, which compared claims filed by Utopia in February 2002 for services rendered during the audit period, the Agency found that 36 claims had been submitted by Utopia and paid and 108 claims had not been paid. With regard to the 108 claims that were not paid, the Agency found no evidence that the claims had ever been filed. Utopia's St. Petersburg, Florida, office provided the services in question. Staff members in that office generate and enter data into the computer system that creates the documents described in paragraph 6 above and provide billing information to the local lead agency. Utopia provides this information to the local lead agency, Neighborly Senior Services (Neighborly), pursuant to a contractual arrangement which authorizes Utopia to provide services to Medicaid recipients. Utopia's staff at the St. Petersburg, Florida, office prepares and compiles billing information regarding the services it has provided and electronically transmits the information to Utopia's corporate office in Kingsburg, New York. The practice of Utopia is that the corporate office in New York then finalizes the billing information and transmits the claims to the entity designated by the Agency to process and pay claims. At all times relevant to this proceeding, that entity was Consultec. Once the St. Petersburg, Florida, office transmits the billing information to the corporate headquarters in New York, it has no further responsibility or control over the billing information sent to Medicaid. Utopia's St. Petersburg, Florida, office also has no responsibility to reconcile the services actually billed to Medicaid by the corporate office with the services provided in Florida. At this proceeding, no evidence was presented to establish that Utopia's corporate office in New York ever filed claims for the services during the audit period for which no payment has been made. Likewise, Utopia never provided the Agency with documentation or evidence that claims for the services provided during the audit period were ever filed within 12 months of the services being provided. Similarly, no such evidence was ever produced at this proceeding. The Reimbursement Handbook provides for exceptions to the 12-month time limit if the claim meets one or more of the following conditions: (1) original payment voided, (2) court or hearing decision, (3) delay in recipient eligibility determination, (4) agency delay in updating eligibility file, (5) court ordered or statutory action, and (6) system error on a claim that was originally filed within 12 months from the date of service. Upon consideration of the applicable provisions of the Reimbursement Handbook, the Agency properly determined that Utopia did not file the claims within 12 months from the date of the service and that none of the conditions were present which warranted granting an exception.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order finding that the disputed claims were not filed within the required 12-month period and denying reimbursement of those services. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffries H. Duvall, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Station 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Robert C. Fritz Utopia Home Care, Inc. 215 Second Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the a l ah, of fiderd , 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. 4% ‘ CA kh fo ELIZABETH DUDEK, SECRETARY Agency for Health Care Administration 1 Filed June 26, 2012 2:18 PM Division of Administrative Hearings A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Jeffries H. Duvall Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel (Interoffice) CYNTHIA A. MIKOS, ESQ. Allen Dell, P.A. 202 S. Rome Ave. - Suite 100 Tampa, FL 33606 cmikos@allendell.com (Electronic Mail) J.D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Mike Blackburn, Bureau Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance and Accounting Health Quality Assurance (via email) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail, Laserfiche or electronic mail on this the ZS" day of c JA » 2012. Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630/FAX (850) 921-0158 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 11-5089MPI CI. NO. 11-1553-000 HILLSBOROUGH ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS, INC., Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (‘AHCA” or “the Agency”), and Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. (“PROVIDER”), by and through the undersigned, hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 1. The two parties enter into this agreement to memorialize the resolution of this matter. 2. PROVIDER is a Florida Medicaid provider, provider number 024102498 and was a provider during the audit period, January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009. 3. In its Final Agency Audit Report (constituting final agency action) dated September 2, 2011, AHCA notified PROVIDER that review of Medicaid claims by the Division of Medicaid, Office of the Deputy Secretary, and Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI), Office of the AHCA Inspector General, indicated certain claims, in whole or in part, had been inappropriately paid. The Agency sought recoupment of this overpayment in the amount of $34,317.55. In response, PROVIDER filed a petition for formal administrative hearing. It was assigned DOAH Case No. 11-5089MPI. Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.l. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 4. Subsequent to the original audit, in preparation for trial, AHCA re-reviewed the PROVIDER’s claims and evaluated additional documentation submitted by the PROVIDER. As a result of the additional review, AHCA determined the overpayment should be adjusted to $27,078.51, plus $5,415.70 in fines and $674.38 in costs for a total due of $33,168.59. 5. In order to resolve this matter without further administrative proceedings, PROVIDER and the AHCA agree as follows: (1) —AHCA agrees to accept the payment set forth herein in settlement of the overpayment issues arising from the captioned audit. (2) The amount in dispute that is now being resolved is twenty-seven thousand seventy eight dollars and fifty-one cents ($27,078.51) on the indebtedness, five thousand four hundred fifteen dollars and seventy cents ($5,415.70) in fines, plus six hundred seventy four dollars and thirty-eight cents ($674.38) in investigative costs for a total of thirty three thousand one hundred sixty eight dollars and fifty- nine cents ($33,168.59). PROVIDER will make an initial payment of eight thousand dollars ($8,000) and the remaining balance to be paid in 6 equal monthly installments. This amount due will be offset by any amount already received by the Agency in this matter. Furthermore, PROVIDER is advised that pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes, failure to pay in full, or enter into and abide by the terms of any repayment schedule set forth by the Agency may result in termination from the Medicaid program, withholding of future Medicaid payments, or other such remedies as provided by law. Any outstanding balance accrues at 10% interest per year. Full payment will fully and completely settle all claims in these proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.1. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 6. (DOAH Case No. 11-5089MPI). Should the provider’s enrollment with Medicaid be terminated, the full amount owed will be due within 30 days of termination. (3) In the event any interim payments are received or withheld, by whatever means, prior to the entry of the Final Order, Medicaid Accounts Receivable shall make the adjustment to credit such amounts, dollar for dollar, as quickly as is practicable. (4) Compliance with this repayment agreement fully and completely settles all claims in these proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH Case No. 11-5089MPI). Should the provider’s enrollment with Medicaid be terminated, the full amount owed will be due within 30 days of termination. (5) PROVIDER and AHCA agree that full payment, as set forth above, resolves and settles this case completely. It will release both parties from any administrative or civil liabilities or claims arising from the findings in audit C.I. 11-1553-000. (6) PROVIDER agrees that it will not rebill the Medicaid Program in any manner for claims that were not covered by Medicaid, which are the subject of the audit in this case. Questions regarding procedures for submitting payment should be directed to Medicaid Accounts Receivable, (850) 412-3901. The C.I. number listed on the first page of this agreement must be legibly entered on the check to assure proper credit. Please mail payment to: AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION Medicaid Accounts Receivable — MS # 14 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. 2, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.1. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 7. PROVIDER agrees that failure to pay any monies due and owing under the terms of this Agreement shall constitute PROVIDER’S authorization for the Agency, without further notice, to withhold the total remaining amount due under the terms of this agreement from any monies due and owing to PROVIDER for any Medicaid claims. 8. AHCA reserves the right to enforce this Agreement under the laws of the State of Florida, the Rules of the Medicaid Program, and all other applicable rules and regulations. 9. This settlement does not constitute an admission of wrongdoing or error by either party with respect to this case or any other matter. 10. Each party shall bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs, with the exception that the Respondent shall reimburse, as part of this settlement, $674.38 in Agency costs and $5,415.70 in fines. This amount is included in the calculations and demand of paragraph 5(2). 11. The signatories to this Agreement, acting in a representative capacity, represent that they are duly authorized to enter into this Agreement on behalf of the respective parties. 12. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the provisions of the laws of Florida. Venue for any action arising from this Agreement shall be in Leon County, Florida. 13. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between PROVIDER and AHCA, including anyone acting for, associated with or employed by them, concerning all matters and supersedes any prior discussions, agreements or understandings; there are no promises, representations or agreements between PROVIDER and the AHCA other than as set forth herein. No modification or waiver of any provision shall be valid unless a written amendment to the Agreement is completed and properly executed by the parties. Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.1. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 14. This is an Agreement of settlement and compromise, made in recognition that the parties may have different or incorrect understandings, information and contentions, as to facts and law, and with each party compromising and settling any potential correctness or incorrectness of its understandings, information and contentions as to facts and law, so that no misunderstanding or misinformation shall be a ground for rescission hereof. 15. | PROVIDER expressly waives in this matter its right to any hearing pursuant to sections 120.569 or 120.57, Florida Statutes, the making of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Agency, and all further and other proceedings to which it may be entitled by law or rules of the Agency regarding this proceeding and any and all issues raised herein. PROVIDER further agrees that it shall not challenge or contest any Final Order entered in this matter which is consistent with the terms of this settlement agreement in any forum now or in the future available to it, including the right to any administrative proceeding, circuit or federal court action or any appeal. 16. This Agreement is and shall be deemed jointly drafted and written by all parties to it and shall not be construed or interpreted against the party originating or preparing it. 17. To the extent that any provision of this. Agreement is prohibited by law for any reason, such provision shall be effective to the extent not so prohibited, and such prohibition shall not affect any other provision of this Agreement. 18. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding on each party’s successors, assigns, heirs, administrators, representatives and trustees. 19. All times stated herein are of the essence of this Agreement. Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. C.|. 11-1553-000 - Settlement Agreement 20. This Agreement shall be in full force and effect upon execution by the respective parties in counterpart. ROUGH ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS, INC. Dated: “A727 L ZZ 2012 py. UO CW “CCL FECL (Print name) ITS: SP OPC B22 20 Revi OLN 7 AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, FL 32308-5403 ‘ Dated: G/al 2012 Miller Inspector General Dated: bl f .2012 William H. Roberts Dated: Z f_,2012
The Issue The issues in the case are whether certain provisions of the Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) that exclude non-emergent services rendered in the emergency room from covered Medicaid outpatient services and require revenue Code 451 to be billed with CPT Code 99281 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Subsection 120.56(3), Florida Statutes (2010).1
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the Medicaid agency for the State of Florida as provided under federal law. § 409.901(2), Fla. Stat. “'Medicaid agency' . . . means the single state agency that administers or supervises the administration of the state Medicaid plan under federal law." § 409.901(15), Fla. Stat. AHCA must administer the Medicaid program pursuant to a state plan that is approved by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 and 1396a(a). AHCA reimburses Medicaid providers in accordance with state and federal law, according to methodologies set forth in rules promulgated by AHCA and in policy manuals and handbooks incorporated by reference in the rules. AHCA has adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.030, which incorporates by reference the Florida Title XIX Outpatient Hospital Reimbursement Plan, Version XIX (the Outpatient Plan), with an effective date of July 1, 2009. Reimbursement to participating outpatient hospitals, such as Petitioners, is to be provided in accordance with the Outpatient Plan. AHCA has issued the Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. The Handbook is incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160. The Outpatient Plan and the Handbook identify those outpatient hospital services that are covered by the Medicaid program by revenue code. Only those revenue codes listed in Appendix A of the Outpatient Plan (Appendix A) and Appendix B of the Handbook (Appendix B) are covered outpatient services. Petitioners have challenged the following provisions of the Handbook: Handbook at page 2-7: EMTALA Medical Screening Exam The federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) requires emergency rooms to conduct a medical screening exam on any patient presenting to the emergency room for medical services . . . . If the medical screening exam determines that no emergency medical condition exists, Florida Medicaid reimburses only for the screening and the ancillary services required to make the determination (e.g., lab work or x-rays). Medicaid policy does not provide for reimbursement of non-emergency services beyond the medical screening exam required by EMTALA. Handbook at page 2-40: Non-Emergency Care in the Emergency Room Medicaid policy does not provide for reimbursement of non-emergency services beyond the medical screening exam required by Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA requires emergency rooms to conduct a medical screening exam on any patient presenting to the emergency room for medical services. The purpose of the medical screening exam is to determine if an emergency medical condition exists. If the screening determines that an emergency medical condition exists, the provider must either stabilize the condition or appropriately transfer the patient to a facility that can stabilize the condition. If the medical screening determines that no emergency medical condition exists, Florida Medicaid reimburses only for the screening and the ancillary services required to make the determination (e.g., lab work or x-rays). Recipients are responsible for a coinsurance on such claims. Handbook, Appendix B at pages B-6 and B-7: EMERGENCY ROOM 0450 General Classification Use General Classification code 0450 when recipients require emergency room care beyond the EMTALA emergency medical screening services. Code 0450 cannot be used in conjunction with 0451 (99281). All other appropriate and covered outpatient revenue codes can be billed with 0450 to reflect services rendered to the patient during the course of emergency room treatment. No MediPass authorization is required when billing 0450, if the type of admission in Form Locator 19 on the claims is "1" (Emergency). MediPass authorization is required when the condition of the patient is not an emergency. 0451(99281) EMTALA Emergency Medical Screening Services (Effective 7/1/96) Report the EMTALA Medical Screening code 0451 (99281) when, following the screening and exam, no further emergency room care or treatment is necessary. If ancillary services are not necessary to determine whether or not emergency or further treatment is required, report the ancillary charges using the appropriate revenue center codes in conjunction with code 0451 (99281). Note that 0451 (99281) cannot be used in conjunction with 0450. Effective 10/16/03, HCPCs code 99281 replaces code W1700, used prior to 10/16/03, when billing revenue code 0451. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.160 provides that the specific authority for the promulgation of the rule is Section 409.919, Florida Statutes, and the law implemented is Sections 409.905, 409.908, and 409.9081, Florida Statutes. Petitioners are acute care hospitals that are and were enrolled as Medicaid providers of outpatient service in Florida at all times material to this proceeding.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or Petitioner), is entitled to a recoupment for a Medicaid overpayment to Respondent, Humane Minority, Inc. (Humane or Respondent), in the amount of $177,581.26.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As part of its duties, Petitioner attempts to recover Medicaid overpayments from Medicaid providers. At all times material to this case, Humane was licensed to provide various health care services to Medicaid recipients under a contract to AHCA as a Medicaid provider. As provider number 255724000, Humane participated in the Medicaid program from January 1, 2005, to February 8, 2006 (audit period). As a Medicaid provider, Respondent was subject to audit. This case arose when the Discovery Unit of Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI) identified that during the audit period Humane billed 1.5 times as much for one week as compared to ten other weeks, which is an indicator of billing irregularities. As a result, the Discovery Unit of MPI recommended a comprehensive audit of Humane. Gary Mosier, a Registered Nursing Consultant employed by AHCA in the bureau of MPI, initiated the audit of Humane after receiving the Discovery Unit’s File #47650 Recommendation memo dated May 19, 2006, referring Humane for a comprehensive audit. On or about June 13, 2006, MPI requested 30 random Medicaid patients' records from Humane’s entire Medicaid patient group for the audit period. Humane complied with the request and supplied records. The submitted medical records included a Certificate of Completeness of Records from Humane stating the documents supplied constituted all of the Medicaid-related records for the 30 patients during the Audit period. After Humane provided the requested medical records to Mosier, he forwarded the records to three physician consultants: Machado, a general practitioner; Edgar, a psychiatrist; and Reisman, an urologist. Each physician consultant reviewed Humane’s records relevant to his area of expertise and filled out agency worksheets detailing why claims should be disallowed. MPI reviewed Humane’s records provided and the worksheets filled out by the three physician consultants and determined that overpayments were made to Humane due to numerous services in whole or in part not being covered by Medicaid, which violated various Medicaid policy guidelines set forth in both the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook (General Handbook)1 and the Florida Medicaid Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Physician Services Handbook).2 Humane violated policy by providing documentation that supported a lower level of office visit than the one for which Humane billed and received payment. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payments for some services that were not documented. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payment for services rendered by a practitioner who was not a member of Humane’s group. Humane violated policy by billing for procedure codes that have time requirements but not documenting the time spent providing the service. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payment for services performed by another practitioner who was not enrolled in Medicaid at the time the services were rendered. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payment for services for which the medical records, when reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant, indicated that the services provided did not meet the Medicaid criteria for medical necessity. Humane violated policy by billing for radiology services when the reading and interpretation was done by a radiologist outside of the physician’s group. Humane violated policy and was paid for billing and received payment for portable x-ray services where Humane performed only the technical component and an independent interpreter performed the professional component. Humane violated policy and received payment when Humane did not bill according to the current procedural terminology guidelines in certain instances. On March 13, 2007, MPI issued its Preliminary Audit Report (PAR). The report detailed the Medicaid policy violations, overpayment amounts, and provided Humane the opportunity to submit an explanation or additional documentation demonstrating that some or all of the claims were properly paid. The report also notified Humane that a Final Audit Report (FAR) would be issued identifying the amount of overpayment due. Humane did not respond to the PAR. Consequently, on April 27, 2007, MPI issued a FAR, that included the amount of $177,581.26 that Humane received from Medicaid that was not authorized to be paid. This grand total of $177,581.26 constitutes an overpayment that Humane must return to the agency. A Final Audit Report-Corrected Copy was issued on May 22, 2007, correcting the total amount due.3 In addition to the overpayment amount, Petitioner also seeks a fine in the amount of $3,000.00. The fine is a calculated amount as authorized by rule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Humane to repay the Agency for the principal amount of $177,581.26 together with an administrative fine of $3000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2009.
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether certain provisions of the Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan, as adopted in Rule 59G-6.010, Florida Administrative Code, which are relied upon by the AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION to apply a fair rental value system of property reimbursement to Petitioner are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1995). Petitioner also asserts a state and federal constitutional equal protection challenge to the existing rule provisions. (Petitioner’s constitutional issues are preserved, but are not determined in this proceeding.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, CONSULTING MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATION, INC., d/b/a GULF COAST NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER (CME), is the licensed operator of a 103-bed nursing home in Clearwater, Florida, which is presently known as GULF COAST NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER (GULF COAST). CME participates in the Florida Medicaid Program as an enrolled provider. Respondent, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (AHCA), is the agency of the State of Florida authorized to implement and administer the Florida Medicaid Program, and is the successor agency to the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pursuant to Chapter 93-129, Laws of Florida. Stipulated Facts Prior to 1993, the GULF COAST nursing home facility was known as COUNTRY PLACE OF CLEARWATER (COUNTRY PLACE), and was owned and operated by the Clearwater Limited Partnership, a limited partnership which is not related to CME. In 1993 CME agreed to purchase, and did in fact purchase, COUNTRY PLACE from the Clearwater Limited Partnership. Simultaneous with the purchase of COUNTRY PLACE, CME entered into a Sale/Leaseback Agreement with LTC Properties, Inc., a Maryland real estate investment trust which engages in the financing of nursing homes. The Purchase and Sale Agreement between Clearwater Limited Partnership and CME was contingent upon the Sale/Leaseback Agreement and the proposed Lease between CME and LTC Properties, Inc. On September 1, 1993, CME simultaneously as a part of the same transaction purchased COUNTRY PLACE, conveyed the facility to LTC Properties, Inc., and leased the facility back from LTC Properties, Inc. As required, CME had notified AHCA of the proposed transaction. AHCA determined that the transaction included a change of ownership and, by lease, a change of provider. CME complied with AHCA's requirements and became the licensed operator and Medicaid provider for COUNTRY PLACE. Thereafter, CME changed the name of the facility to GULF COAST. After CME acquired the facility and became the licensed operator and Medicaid provider, AHCA continued to reimburse CME the same per diem reimbursement which had been paid to the previous provider (plus certain inflation factors) until CME filed its initial cost report, as required for new rate setting. In the normal course of business, CME in 1995 filed its initial Medicaid cost report after an initial period of actual operation by CME. Upon review of the cost report, AHCA contended that the cost report was inaccurate and engaged in certain "cost settlement" adjustments. During this review, AHCA took the position that CME's property reimbursement should be based on FRVS methodologies rather than "cost" due to the lease. In November of 1995, CME received from AHCA various documents which recalculated all components of Petitioner's Medicaid reimbursement rates for all periods subsequent to CME's acquisition of the facility. In effect, AHCA placed CME on FRVS property reimbursement. The practical effect of AHCA's action was to reduce CME's property reimbursement both retroactively and prospectively. The retroactive application would result in a liability of CME to AHCA, due to a claimed overpayment by AHCA. The prospective application would (and has) resulted in a reduction of revenues. CME is substantially affected by AHCA's proposed action and by Sections I.B., III.G.2.d.(1), V.E.1.h., and V.E.4. of the Florida Medicaid Plan. Additional Findings of Fact The Florida Medicaid Plan establishes methodologies for reimbursement of a nursing home's operating costs and patient care costs, as well as property costs. The dispute in this matter relates only to reimbursement of property costs. CME as the operator of the GULF COAST nursing home facility is entitled to reimbursement of property costs in accordance with the Florida Medicaid Plan. CME as the operator of the GULF COAST facility entered into a Florida Medicaid Program Provider Agreement, agreeing to abide by the provisions of the Florida Medicaid Plan. The Sale/Leaseback Agreement entered into by CME and LTC Properties Inc. (LTC) specifically provides for a distinct sale of the nursing home facility to LTC. LTC holds record fee title to GULF COAST. LTC, a Maryland corporation, is not related to CME, a Colorado corporation. The Florida Medicaid Plan is intended to provide reimbursement for reasonable costs incurred by economically and efficiently operated facilities. The Florida Medicaid Plan pays a single per diem rate for all levels of nursing care. After a nursing home facility's first year of operation, a cost settling process is conducted with AHCA which results in a final cost report. The final cost report serves as a baseline for reimbursement over the following years. Subsequent to the first year of operation, a facility files its cost report annually. AHCA normally adjusts a facility's reimbursement rate twice a year based upon the factors provided for in the Florida Medicaid Plan. The rate-setting process takes a provider through Section II of the Plan relating to cost finding and audits resulting in cost adjustments. CME submitted the appropriate cost reports after its first year of operation of the GULF COAST facility. Section III of the Florida Medicaid Plan specifies the areas of allowable costs. Under the Allowable Costs Section III.G.2.d.(1) in the Florida Title XIX Plan, a facility with a lease executed on or after October 1, 1985, shall be reimbursed for lease costs and other property costs under the Fair Rental Value System (FRVS). AHCA has treated all leases the same under FRVS since that time. AHCA does not distinguish between types of leases under the FRVS method. The method for the FRVS calculation is provided in Section V.E.1.a-g of the Florida Medicaid Plan. A “hold harmless” exception to application of the FRVS method is provided for at Section V.E.1.h of the Florida Medicaid Plan, and Section V.E.4 of the Plan provides that new owners shall receive the prior owner’s cost-based method when the prior owner was not on FRVS under the hold harmless provision. As a lessee and not the holder of record fee title to the facility, neither of those provisions apply to CME. At the time CME acquired the facility, there was an indication that the Sale/Leaseback transaction with LTC was between related parties, so that until the 1995 cost settlement, CME was receiving the prior owner’s cost-based property method of reimbursement. When AHCA determined that the Sale/Leaseback transaction between CME and LTC was not between related parties, AHCA set CME’s property reimbursement component under FRVS as a lessee. Property reimbursement based on the FRVS methodology does not depend on actual period property costs. Under the FRVS methodology, all leases after October 1985 are treated the same. For purposes of reimbursement, AHCA does not recognize any distinction between various types of leases. For accounting reporting purposes, the Sale/Leaseback transaction between CME and LTD is treated as a capital lease, or “virtual purchase” of the facility. This accounting treatment, however, is limited to a reporting function, with the underlying theory being merely that of providing a financing mechanism. Record fee ownership remains with LTC. CME, as the lease holder, may not encumber title to the facility. The Florida Medicaid Plan does not distinguish between a sale/leaseback transaction and other types of lease arrangements. Sections IV.D., V.E.1.h., and V.E.4., the “hold harmless” and “change of ownership” provisions which allow a new owner to receive the prior owner’s method of reimbursement if FRVS would produce a loss for the new owner, are limited within the Plan’s organizational context, and within the context of the Plan, to owner/operators of facilities, and grandfathered lessee/operators. These provisions do not apply to leases executed after October 1, 1985. Capital leases are an accounting construct for reporting purposes, which is inapplicable when the Florida Medicaid Plan specifically addresses this issue. The Florida Medicaid Plan specifically addresses the treatment of leases entered into after October 1985 and provides that reimbursement will be made pursuant to the FRVS method. The Florida Medicaid Plan is the result of lengthy workshops and negotiations between the agency and the nursing home industry. The Florida Medicaid Plan complies with federal regulations.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a Medicaid provider, committed the violations alleged in the agency action letter dated March 14, 2011, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been a provider with the Florida Medicaid Program and has had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid Program. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was subject to all applicable federal and state laws, regulations, rules, and Medicaid Handbooks. Respondent is required to comply with the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook (the General Handbook). The General Handbook requires a provider to have medical documentation that justifies the necessity of services provided to a recipient. The General Handbook advises that sanctions may be imposed if appropriate documentation is not kept. Respondent is an "Assistive Care Services" provider under the Florida Medicaid Program and is required to comply with the "Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitation Handbook" (ACS Handbook). The ACS Handbook requires that each recipient of Assistive Care Services from the Florida Medicaid Plan have a RSP, and provides, in relevant part (at Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 39): Every [Assistive Care Services] recipient must have a service plan completed by the [Assistive Care Services] service provider. . . . The ALF [is] responsible for ensuring the service plan is developed and implemented. The ACS Handbook further requires (at Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 40): The Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services (AHCA-Med Serv [sic] Form 036) must be completed within 15 days after the initial health assessment or annual assessment, be in writing, and based on information contained in the health assessment. . . . The ACS handbook further provides (at Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 40), that both the recipient (or the recipient's guardian or designated representative) and the ALF administrator (or the person designated in writing by the administrator) must sign and date the RSP. The RSP is considered complete as of the last date signed by either party. The provider (in this case Respondent) is responsible for timely completing the RSP for each Medicaid recipient in its facility. Inspector Marie Josue conducted an on-site visit to Respondent's premises on February 1, 2011. At the time of that inspection, Respondent reviewed a sample of ten RSPs for ten residents who received Assistive Care Services from the Florida Medicaid Program. Two of those ten RSPs had been timely signed and dated by the resident (or the resident's guardian or designee) and by Respondent's administrator (or the administrator's designee). The remaining eight RSPs had been timely signed and dated by the resident (or the resident's guardian or designee), but each had not been signed or dated by Respondent's facility administrator (or the administrator's written designee). Each RSP pre-dated February 1, 2011, by more than 15 days. The respective health assessments that formed the basis for each RSP occurred between March 23 and December 25, 2010. Respondent subsequently provided Ms. Josue with certain records that she had requested, including copies of the eight RSPs at issue in this proceeding. When she reviewed those records, Ms. Josue discovered that Respondent's administrator had signed and dated each previously unsigned RSP on February 1, 2011. Those signings by the administrator were untimely. Ms. Josue forwarded the results of her investigation to Mr. Dozier with a recommendation that Respondent be sanctioned for violating the provisions of section 409.913(15)(e), Florida Statutes, by the imposition of a $1,000.00 fine for each of the eight violations pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e). When she made her recommendation, Ms. Josue understood that the cited rule required a minimum fine of $1,000.00 per violation. Mr. Dozier accepted that recommendation and prepared the agency action letter dated March 14, 2011. Mr. Dozier consulted with two of his fellow administrators before concluding that the fine recommended by Ms. Josue was appropriate. He testified that he could have charged Respondent with violating section violating section 409.913(15)(d), which could have resulted in an administrative fine in the amount of $20,000.001/ Mr. Dozier considered an administrative fine in the amount of $8,000.00 to be more appropriate. Based on services provided to Medicaid patients pursuant to approved RSPs, Respondent submits claims to the Florida totaling between $6,450.00 and $9,200.00 per month. Petitioner routinely pays those claims. Each RSP at issue in this proceeding complied with the ACS Handbook except for the failure of the facility administrator (or designee) to timely sign the eight RSPs. RSPS are the guides to the services that will be provided by Respondent and reimbursed by the Medicaid Program by Petitioner. The requirement that the administrator (or designee) sign each plan is an effort to combat fraud. There was no evidence that the failure to sign the eight plans at issue in this proceeding was more than an error. Specifically, there was no evidence of fraud. There was no allegation that the lack of the administrator's signature on the eight plans at issue had any effect on the care provided to the eight Medicaid patients. Ms. Pace has been Respondent's administrator for over 13 years. Ms. Pace is familiar with RSPs and the rules and regulations governing the Florida Medicaid Program. Ms. Pace knew that the RSPs must be completed within 15 days of the assessment by a physician. Ms. Pace knew that the patient (or designee) and the administrator (or designee) must sign the RSP for it to be complete. Ms. Pace acknowledged that the eight RSPs at issue in this proceeding were not signed by anyone on behalf of the provider until February 1, 2010. Ms. Pace had designated a subordinate to sign the eight PSAs at issue in this proceeding on behalf of the provider. She had no explanation why those RSPs were not timely signed by anyone on behalf of the provider.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding La Hacienda Gardens, LLC, guilty of the eight violations of section 409.913(15)(e) alleged in the agency action letter dated March 14, 2011. It is further recommended that the final order impose administrative fines in the amount of $1,000.00 per violation for a total of $8,000.00. S DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2012.
Conclusions 1. The STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (“AHCA”), was notified by Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services that the Medicare billing number for the above-referenced provider was revoked April 28, 2010. 2. In accordance with Section 409.913(14) if a provider has been suspended or terminated from participation in the Medicaid program or the Medicare program by the Federal Government or any other state, the agency must immediately suspend or terminate, as appropriate, the provider’s participation in the Florida Medicaid program for a period of no less than that imposed by the Federal Government or any other state, and may not enroll such provider in the Florida Medicaid program while such foreign suspension or termination remains in effect. 3. On April 13, 2012, AHCA issued a letter to Respondent, terminating the Respondent’s participation in the Medicaid program. See ATTACHMENT A. AHCA v. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1. No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 1 of 4 Filed September 25, 2012 3:12 PM Division of Administrative Hearings A & 33 4. On May 14, 2012, C.A.D.C. CORP., d/b/a MIRACLE REHAB CENTER, (“Respondent”), filed The Request for a Formal Hearing concerning Miracle Rehab Center, with the Division of Administrative Hearings. See ATTACHMENT B. 5. On June 18, 2012, Respondent received a favorable CMS revocation appeal decision. As such, the underlying cause of action which precipitated Florida Medicaid to terminate Respondent is moot, or the revocation was overturned on appeal. See ATTACHMENT C. 6. On July 12, 2012, AHCA issued a letter to Respondent, rescinding the sanctions in the above-styled matter. See ATTACHMENT D. 7. Based on the foregoing, this file is hereby CLOSED. DONE AND ORDERED on this ao* day of opheol , 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. ; lizabeth ee Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration AHCA v. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1. No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 2 of 4 A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Christopher A. Parelia, Qualified Representative The Health Law Offices of Anthony C. Vitale, P.A. 2333 Brickell Avenue Suite A-1] Miami, Florida, 33129 Telephone: (305) 358-4500 Facsimile: (305) 358-5113 Email: CParrella@vitalehealthlaw.com (Via Facsimile and Email) Tracie L. Hardin, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration Bureau of Finance and Accounting 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Bureau of Health Quality Assurance 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 9 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Mike Blackburn, Bureau Chief Medicaid Program Integrity 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (interoffice Mail) Eric W. Miller, Inspector General Medicaid Program Integrity 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (Via U.S. Mail) Florida Department of Health Medical License #299992712 (Via Email Only) AHCA v. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1. No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 3 of 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by facsimile and email, or the method designated, on this the Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630 AHCA vy. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1, No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 4 of 4
