The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a 47-year old resident of Hollywood, Florida. He is married and has a five-year old step-daughter. His wife's father is the minister of the First Methodist Church in Hollywood. Petitioner is an active member of his father-in-law's church. In recent years, he has volunteered a significant amount of his time to perform tasks on behalf of the church. Petitioner is now, and has been since June of 1997, employed as a salesperson by Rex Yacht Sales (Rex) in Fort Lauderdale. As a salesperson for Rex, he sells new boats and he also sells used boats that are 32 feet or less in length.3 Approximately, 75 percent of the sales he makes are of used boats. Petitioner specializes in the sale of sailboats. He possesses a considerable amount of knowledge concerning sailboats as a result of the years (since he was a young child) that he has devoted to sailing. Petitioner owned, lived aboard, and captained a sailboat named the "Wave Dancer" from 1975 until the late 1980's. He acquired the "Wave Dancer" in return for his participation in an illicit drug smuggling operation. In 1975, when he was still living in his hometown of Port Washington, New York, Petitioner was approached by a childhood friend, Dan Locastro. Locastro advised Petitioner that he (Locastro) and his associates wanted to buy a sailboat to use to transport marijuana from St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands to the New England coast. Locastro promised Petitioner that, if Petitioner were able locate a sailboat for them to purchase and if he thereafter successfully captained the newly purchased sailboat on its journey to and from the Virgin Islands, Petitioner could keep the sailboat. Approximately a month later, Petitioner notified Locastro that he had located a sailboat for Locastro and his associates. The sailboat was the "Wave Dancer." Locastro and his associates subsequently purchased the "Wave Dancer." They purchased the boat in the name of Richard Harrison. Following the purchase of the "Wave Dancer," Petitioner, accompanied by Locastro, sailed the boat to an island near St. Thomas. There, 500 pounds of marijuana were loaded onto the "Wave Dancer." Petitioner then sailed the boat to the New England coast, where he delivered the marijuana. Petitioner participated in this illicit smuggling operation because he wanted his own sailboat. He was neither arrested, nor charged, for having participated in this operation. As promised, Petitioner was allowed by Locastro and his associates to keep the "Wave Dancer" after the conclusion of operation. The boat was subsequently titled in Petitioner's name. For approximately 12 or 13 years, Petitioner (who was then single) lived in the Caribbean aboard the "Wave Dancer." He earned a living by taking tourists (usually one couple at a time) out in the water on his boat. In the late 1980's, Petitioner decided to return to the United States to live with and care for his parents, who, because of their advanced age, required his assistance. Before moving back to the United States, Petitioner put the "Wave Runner" up for sale. He was unsuccessful in his efforts to sell the boat. He discussed with a friend of his, Ken Fish, the possibility of Fish purchasing the boat for $50,000.00, but no sale was consummated. Petitioner was still the owner the "Wave Runner" when he flew to the United States and moved in with his parents (in their home). He left the "Wave Runner" behind in the Virgin Islands in the care of his friend Fish. Approximately nine months after he left the Virgin Islands, Petitioner received a telephone call from Fish, who indicated that he was having financial difficulty and that he wanted to use the "Wave Runner" in a "marijuana scheme." Approximately six months later, Fish again telephoned Petitioner. This time he told Petitioner that he wanted "to do a cocaine smuggling venture with [the "Wave Runner]." At first, Petitioner told Fish that he (Fish) was "out of his mind." Later during the conversation, however, Petitioner relented and agreed to allow Fish to use the "Wave Runner" in the proposed "cocaine smuggling venture." Petitioner gave his permission without receiving any promise from Fish that he (Petitioner) would receive anything in return. The "cocaine smuggling venture" was unsuccessful. The "Wave Runner" was seized by authorities in Martinique. In the spring of 1991, in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR- HIGHSMITH, Petitioner was criminally charged by the United States government for his role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. Petitioner's role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" was limited to permitting Fish to use the "Wave Runner" to transport cocaine into the United States. After his arrest in May of 1991, Petitioner agreed to, and he subsequently did, cooperate with federal authorities by participating in federal undercover drug enforcement operations under the supervision of federal agents. At times during these operations, he was required to place himself in situations where his personal safety was compromised. In or around January of 1994, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91- 349-CR-HIGHSMITH to one count of conspiracy to import cocaine. On January 30, 1995, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of said crime and, as punishment, placed on probation for five years and fined $17,500.00. Such punishment constituted a substantial downward departure from the range provided in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge explained that he was "constrained to substantially modify the sentence in this case downward" because of the risks Petitioner had taken to assist federal authorities in their drug-fighting efforts. Although under no legal obligation to do so, Petitioner continued to provide similar assistance to federal authorities (at a substantial personal risk) after his sentencing. In September of 1996, Petitioner filed with the Department an application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. Question 13 on the application form read as follows: CRIMINAL HISTORY: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? NOTE: This question applies to any violation of the law of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. Yes No The application form instructed those applicants whose answer to Question 13 was "Yes" to "attach [their] complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or [were] pending." On the application form that he submitted to the Department, Petitioner answered "Yes" to Question 13, but he did not attach the required signed statement. He merely appended to the application form a copy of the judgment entered in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On or about October 1, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioner: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Section of General Regulation is in receipt of your application for a yacht Salesman. A review of your application has disclosed the following deficiencies: You answered Yes to question 13 which asked "Have you been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" The paragraph under question 15 further states "If your answer to question 13, 14, 15 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." You will need to submit a signed statement of the charges and facts, within twenty-one (21) days to this office before your application can be checked for form. Should you have any questions, please contact me. After receiving the Department's October 1, 1996, letter, Petitioner telephonically requested additional time to respond. By letter dated December 13, 1996, Petitioner's attorney, John J. Lynch, Esquire, responded on Petitioner's behalf to the Department's October 1, 1996, letter. Lynch's letter, which was received by the Department on December 17, 1996, read as follows: I represent the Applicant, Richard E. Parker. In response to concerns raised by Richard Parker's application's disclosure of charges and crimes and the results thereof, please consider the following as part of the application process: The subject matter was limited to involvement in a conspiracy to import controlled substances. Mr. Parker voluntarily entered a guilty plea in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami, Florida, in an action entitled, "United States v. Richard Parker" Criminal No. 91-349-CR- Highsmith. Upon being aware of potential liability, he cooperated fully with the U.S. Government. During a four-year period, he provided extensive assistance to the U.S. Government in ongoing investigations and provided training and resources to special agents. Mr. Parker's participation as a Government agent put him at considerable risk. His case remains under court seal to protect information which may be used by the Government in future criminal prosecutions. I cannot provide a complete transcript of the court proceedings without jeopardizing Mr. Parker's safety. To appreciate Mr. Parker's significant assistance to the U.S. Government, a portion of the Honorable Judge Highsmith's sentencing comments has been enclosed. Pages 11, 12, 14 and 15 of the sentencing memorandum specify the efforts made by Mr. Parker, and recognized by the Court to rectify his prior conduct. (Note: All individuals, other than Mr. Parker, have been redacted to preserve a measure of safety since the matter remains under court seal). In recognition of [his] assistance, Mr. Parker was placed on probation for five years and fined on January 30, 1995. The fine was paid and probation has commenced. I trust this supplemental response answers concerns regarding this unfortunate episode in Mr. Parker's life. As his attorney asserted in the foregoing letter, as of the date of the letter, Petitioner had paid the $17,500.00 fine imposed in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On January 17, 1997, the Department issued its Notice of Intent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure. On February 12, 1997, Petitioner requested a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the matter. On August 12, 1997, Petitioner filed a motion in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH requesting that "his period of probation [be reduced] from a term of 60 months to a term of 32 months thereby terminating his probation on September 30, 1997." In support of his motion, he stated the following: On January 30, 1995, Richard Parker was sentenced by this Court to five years probation for his participation in a cocaine conspiracy. The Court imposed this lenient sentence because of the extraordinary cooperation Richard Parker had rendered (a transcript of the sentencing is attached hereto as Exhibit A). As part of his cooperation Parker had gone to Columbia in a sailboat, at great personal risk and with no protection from law enforcement, and developed a case involving significant arrests, convictions, and seizure of cocaine. Since sentencing Parker has remarried and complied with all terms of probation. Parker had promised the agents and the Court that his cooperation would continue regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. True to his word, following sentencing, at the request of the DEA, Richard Parker traveled alone to Columbia and negotiated the location in the Caribbean Sea for an air drop of 300 kilos of cocaine. Parker then captained a sailboat and traveled to Dominica and Barbados, St. Kitts and the British Virgin Islands with DEA agents on board and participated in the recovery of the 300 kilos of cocaine as it was dropped from a plane in 50 kilogram packages. Parker received no payment for this cooperation. Parker rendered substantial assistance to the Government after sentencing because of his moral commitment to cooperation as a form of restitution, because of his sense of obligation and gratitude, and because he had given his word to the Government and this Court. It is now over 2 1/2 years since Parker was sentenced. Parker has complied fully with all conditions of probation. Parker has committed himself to building a productive law-abiding life. The Count may well recall that Parker's marriage ended during his cooperation and sentence. Parker has recently married again becoming the father of a four-year old in the process. Parker has spent his life working on and sailing boats. Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a license to be a yacht salesman. The issuance of these licenses in Florida is regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR). The DBPR has denied Parker's request for a license citing Parker's conviction as irrefutable proof of moral turpitude as a basis for denial. Parker has petitioned for review and a hearing before an administrative law judge is scheduled for October 14, 1997. Undersigned counsel has been advised that the hearing scheduled for October 14, 1997, will be the final hearing regarding Parker's petition for a license to sell boats in the State of Florida. Regarding this issue, undersigned counsel has become aware of an administrative decision where an application for a license as a yacht and ship salesman was granted by DBPR to an applicant who had been convicted of a drug felony, sentenced to probation and had been terminated from probation. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes v. Orr, Docket No. YS95025 (Final Order No. BPR-95-03991, 7/20/95). It is respectfully submitted that evidence of successful completion of probation by Parker prior to the time of final hearing on October 14, 1997, will either result in the DBPR rescinding their denial of Parker's application or a reversal of DBPR's denial by the administrative law judge. Assistant United States Attorney John Schlessinger has conferred with the United States Probation Officer Anthony Gagliardi regarding this motion and has authorized undersigned counsel to state that the United States has no objection to a reduction of probation from 60 months to 36 months. Richard Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a yacht salesman license so that he can support himself and his family. Richard Parker, through his cooperation, has rebutted any presumption of moral turpitude that attached to his conviction and has affirmatively and courageously demonstrated good moral character; Richard Parker has honored and will continue to honor his pledge to the United States and to this Honorable Court never to break the law again. . . . The Final Order in the Orr case, which was referenced in Petitioner's Motion to Modify Probation, contained the following "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law":
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1997.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at the Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. In accordance with plea arrangements, Petitioner was convicted of numerous charges of robbery, burglary, sexual battery, and false imprisonment in Circuit Courts in Dade and Broward Counties, Florida. He received numerous and various prison sentences, all of which were to run concurrently with a 99- year sentence. Assuming that Petitioner is eligible for statutory gain time for good behavior, his sentence would expire sometime prior to the year 2080. During July, 1981, Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of establishing a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under Parole and Probation Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the severity of the offense committed by the Petitioner, calculate a "salient factor score" and apply various aggravating or mitigating circumstances in determining a recommended PPRD. The examiner classified the offense as "greatest (most serious III);" determined a salient factor score of nine based upon prior convictions, total time served, the existence of burglary as a present offense of conviction, the number of prior incarcerations, and the Petitioner's age of first commitment; and applied numerous aggravating circumstances based upon the nature of various of the charges that had been lodged against Petitioner. The examiner recommended a PPRD of March 4, 2092. On August 26, 1981, the Parole and Probation Commission considered the examiner's recommendation and affirmed it. Petitioner is now pursuing a review of the PPRD before the Commission. In promulgating the rules which were in effect when Petitioner'S PPRD was determined, the Parole and Probation Commission sought to isolate factors that would predict the probability of a successful parole outcome. There is no perfect predictive device on a case-by-case basis. An inmate's past behavior and statistical relationships that can be isolated provide the best predictive devices. The Commission's C utilization of a system which first classifies the offense characteristics, then applies a salient factor score and aggravating or mitigating circumstances is designed to set a presumptive parole release date based on an inmate's past behavior and based upon the statistical relationships that have been found to exist. The evidence does not establish that the guidelines adopted by the Commission in its rules which were applied to the Petitioner are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The Parole and Probation Commission has amended the rules which were followed in the setting of the Petitioner's PPRD. The Petitioner continues to be affected, however, by the rules as they existed prior to the amendments because those rules provide the basis for his PPRD.
The Issue Whether Petitioner suffered retaliation and reverse discrimination committed by the Department of Corrections in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male who was a probation officer at the Department. He worked in the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit for the first ten years of his career and then transferred to the Seventh Judicial Circuit, based in Daytona Beach, Florida, where he had been employed for about eight and one-half years at the time of the hearing. The Department, in accordance with Section 20.315, Florida Statutes, is the state agency charged with protecting the public through the incarceration and supervision of offenders and the rehabilitation of offenders through the application of work, programs, and services. In early July 1999, Petitioner was working in the Department's probation office on Palmetto Avenue, in Daytona Beach, Florida. He was living with a woman named Tanya Folsom who worked for the Department in its probation program, but not in the same office. He was also romantically involved with a woman named Frances Fredericks, who he later married. At this time, Ms. Fredericks was married to one Mr. Anderson, and was known as Frances Anderson. This triangular relationship became known in the office in which Petitioner worked. Someone in Petitioner's office, who has never been identified, wrote a letter to Ms. Folsom, revealing to Ms. Folsom Petitioner's ongoing relationship with Ms. Frances Fredericks. The letter was written on stationery that was the Department's property, placed in an envelope that was the Department's property, and transmitted to Ms. Folsom via the Department's internal mailing system. Using Department resources for personal business, is contrary to Department policy. When Ms. Folsom received the letter a number of ugly consequences ensued. Ms. Folsom reacted with extreme hostility to the information she received, even though Petitioner claimed that their relationship had devolved into a mere friendship. She evicted Petitioner from the quarters they had been sharing. At a subsequent time, one Mr. Anderson, then Ms. Frederick's husband, confronted Petitioner in the parking lot adjacent to the office in which Petitioner worked, and in the presence of Petitioner's office supervisor, Mr. Seltzer, socked Petitioner in the jaw. The probation officer community, in which Ms. Folsom and Petitioner worked, suffered disruption. Morale amongst the workers was impaired. Petitioner blamed the occurrence of these unpleasant events, not on himself, but on Officer Michael Gallon, a probation officer who worked directly in the court system, and Ms. Velma Brown, his immediate supervisor. He attributed blame to them because he believed that they had rifled his desk and found gifts destined to be given to Frances Fredericks, and believed that one or both of them were responsible for the letter to Ms. Folsom. Both Officer Gallon and Ms. Brown are black. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department demanding an investigation into the use of the Department's stationery that was of a value of about a "half cent," according to Petitioner. He also complained that court officers, both black and white, were underemployed, and suggested that black court officers were afforded advantages not given to white officers. He asked his superiors to investigate the complaint regarding both the letter and the court officer matter. He prevailed upon the office manager to take action and when the office manager declined to open an investigation, he brought the matter to the attention of the circuit administrator, Robert Gordon, and ultimately to the attention of those in the chain- of-command all the way to the Department's Inspector General. Mr. Gordon, in response to the turmoil precipitated by the letter, reassigned Petitioner to DeLand, Florida, a distance of about 30 miles, for 60 days. Petitioner, who referred to his new post in the pejorative, "Dead Land," believed that officers who were moved there, "never came back." Mr. Gordon told Petitioner that he moved him because Petitioner needed a "change of venue." This reassignment occurred the end of July, 1999. Article 9, Section 3, of the Agreement between the State of Florida and Florida Police Benevolent Association (Agreement) states that a transfer should be affected only when dictated by the needs of the agency and only after taking into consideration the needs of the employee, prior to any transfer. Mr. Gordon complied with that requirement, and in any event, did not transfer Petitioner. The Agreement states at Article 9, Section 1 (C), that a move is not a "transfer" unless an employee is moved, " . . . in excess of fifty (50) miles." Petitioner was "reassigned" as that term is defined in Article 9, Section 1 (C), of the Agreement. In any event, Mr. Gordon did not move Petitioner because he was white. He moved him to a different post because Petitioner had created turmoil in the probation officer community in Daytona Beach. In any event, as will be discussed below, whether or not Mr. Gordon complied with the Agreement is immaterial to this case. Notwithstanding Petitioner's beliefs with regard to the outcome of his move to DeLand, he was reassigned back to the Daytona Beach area at the end of 60 days and resumed his regular duties. This occurred around early October, 1999. Petitioner continued to press for an investigation into his allegations. He brought the matter to the attention to Harry Ivey, the regional administrator for the Department and above Mr. Gordon in the chain-of-command. He discussed the matter with a Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Ivey's deputy and believed subsequent to that conversation, that an investigation would occur. In fact, no one in the Department displayed any interest in Petitioner's allegations about the de minimis use of the Department's time and property in the preparation and transfer of the letter, or in his beliefs about the workload problems of the court officers, or his claims of favorable treatment in the case of Officer Gallon and Ms. Brown. In December 2000, Petitioner was assigned to the Ormond Beach Office, which was about six miles from the Palmetto Avenue Office. The Ormond Beach Office had lost a supervisor position due to reorganization and it was determined that Petitioner possessed the skill and experience to replace that senior leadership. The decision to relocate Petitioner was made by Mr. Gordon. In February 2001, Petitioner was transferred back to his old office. A few months later he was promoted to Correctional Probation Senior Officer and moved to another office. Between February 2000 and February 2001, the operative period, over 30 Correctional Probation Officers, Correctional Probation Supervisor Officers, and Correctional Probation Supervisors in the Seventh Circuit, were reassigned. Of these, six were black, four were Hispanic, and 20 were white. Although the four reassignments experienced by Petitioner may have inconvenienced him, Petitioner presented no evidence of any damages. The facts reveal that Petitioner's misfortunes were precipitated by his unwise amorous activities within his workplace. They were not the result of any effort by the Department to retaliate against him or to discriminate against him because he was white.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Amended Charge of Discrimination be dismissed because it was not timely filed. Dismissal on its merits if the June 25, 2001, Charge of Discrimination is determined to have been timely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gayle S. Graziano, Esquire 244 North Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Ernest L. Reddick, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by engaging in unsolicited and unwanted sexually or romantically oriented behavior toward a subordinate female employee, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Gary D. Latham (Latham), began serving as a member of the Florida Parole Commission (Parole Commission) on July 24, 1992. At the time of the final hearing, he was continuing to serve as a parole commissioner. Claretha Billingslea Walker started to work for the Parole Commission on May 1, 1991, as an administrative secretary to the general counsel's office. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, she was known as Claretha Billingslea and will be referred to in this recommended order as Ms. Billingslea. Effective May 27, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of executive secretary to Commissioner Judith Wolson. On July 1, 1994, Ms. Wolson became Chairman of the Parole Commission. Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of senior executive secretary to the chairman. When a potential opening arose, Latham and Ms. Billingslea discussed the possibility of Ms. Billingslea accepting a position as Latham's executive secretary since Latham had previously interviewed Ms. Billingslea for an executive secretary position in his office approximately two years before. Ms. Billingslea was interested in coming to work for Latham because a number of her duties had been eliminated when Ms. Wolson was made chairman, but she was concerned about making such a move because she had been with Chairman Wolson's office such a short time. Latham discussed with Chairman Wolson and her administrative assistant, Gene Strickland, the possibility of transferring Ms. Billingslea to Latham's open position. Both Chairman Wolson and Mr. Strickland agreed that it would be a good opportunity for Ms. Billingslea to learn more about the duties in a commissioner's office because the work in the chairman's office was more administrative than the work in a commissioner's office. Neither Mr. Strickland nor Chairman Wolson was dissatisfied with Ms. Billingslea's work. Prior to hiring Ms. Billingslea, Latham also discussed the hiring with his future administrative assistant, Brenda Henry, and with his wife. Effective August 5, 1994, Ms. Billinglea was reassigned to the position of executive secretary to Latham. Because there is only one position of senior executive secretary at the Parole Commission (the chairman's secretary), this reassignment was nominally a demotion. It did not act as a demotion, however, because Ms. Billingslea's salary and benefits remained unchanged. In her capacity as Latham's executive secretary, Ms. Billingslea reported directly to Latham. As a career service employee, Ms. Billingslea could not be unilaterally fired by Latham, but as her direct supervisor Latham could set the wheels in motion for her termination. Ms. Billinsglea understood that the chairman would have to approve her termination. Latham had the authority to assign tasks to Ms. Billingslea and to grant or deny her leave or flex time. From the start of Ms. Billingslea's employment in Latham's office, Latham engaged in comments and behavior of questionable propriety. He told her that he would not be able to get any work done with such a pretty secretary. Ms. Billingslea took this as a joke. On another occasion, one of Ms. Billingslea's male friends complained to her that Latham had been rude to him when he called. She thought Latham might have been upset that she was receiving too many personal calls, but when she asked Latham about it, he told her no and said, "I guess I'll just have to get used to guys calling all the time with such a pretty secretary." Latham often stared at Ms. Billingslea, looking her up and down. In describing these looks, Ms. Billingslea stated, "The way he looks at me, it is really weird. And it makes me feel uncomfortable, the way he kind of stares and looks me up and down. It will be almost as if he's going to say something but he never said anything." Once when he was looking at her in this strange way, Ms. Billingslea asked him whether there was something he wanted to say, to which he responded, "No, that was my sexy look." At this time she took it as a joke. One day Latham told Ms. Billingslea that he had been on his way to a friend's house and had gotten lost and ended up on her street. He said that he had gone by her house and that she had a nice place. He asked her why she kept her blinds closed so tightly. When the Parole Commission denies parole, a report referred to as a 947.18 report is completed, justifying the decision not to grant the parole. Procedurally, the Parole Commission will make a decision to grant or deny parole at a meeting. The case is then assigned to a commissioner to prepare a 947.18 report. The report is prepared in the office of the commissioner, and two weeks after the initial consideration the case is placed back on the agenda for review and acceptance. At its meeting on September 21, 1994, the Parole Commission denied parole for an inmate who had been convicted of sexually abusing his daughters. Latham was assigned to prepare the 947.18 report. Ms. Henry drafted the report for Ms. Billingslea to type. The report was very sexually explicit. After the report was typed, Ms. Billingslea took it to Latham for his review. Both Latham and Ms. Billingslea commented that it was an interesting case. Latham closed his eyes and in a low voice began to describe the graphic details of the sexual abuse to Ms. Billingslea. Ms. Billingslea later asked Ms. Henry if the file contained any pictures. On September 27, 1994, Latham went into Ms. Billingslea's office and sat down in front of her desk. He informed her that he had "the hots" for her. He told her that she had done nothing to make him approach her in this way but that he did not know what had come over him lately; he had been attracted to a lot of young pretty women, and she was just "such a doll." He told her that he had nasty thoughts about her while he taught Sunday School. When she told him that she could not work for him if she were to be with him sexually, he responded that she would not be working for him but that he would be working for her. When she told him that she was not interested, he became defensive, stating that he had a lot of political power. His last words to her in that encounter were, "I might not be able to keep my hands to myself." Later that same day, as Ms. Billingslea was preparing to leave work, Latham asked her to stay late. Over and over, he asked her to stay and "be with him," initially standing behind her chair and preventing her from pushing back. Ms. Billingslea took Latham's remarks and actions on September 27 as an invitation to a sexual or romantic relationship, which she had neither solicited nor encouraged. Ms. Billingslea did not misunderstand Latham or his intentions. Ms. Billinsglea was afraid that her rejection of Latham's advances would cost her her job. She believed that Latham could cause her to be fired. On September 28, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was ill. She called her doctor's office and requested that the doctor call in a prescription for her to a local pharmacy. The doctor's office did call in a prescription. Ms. Billingslea advised Latham that she felt ill, to which Latham responded that she had just "better be to work." Ms. Billingslea took this remark as an admonishment not to take sick leave. On October 3, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was late for work. She tried to call the office to advise that she would be late, but no one answered the telephone. On October 3, 1994, Latham expressed concern to Ms. Billingslea that she was abusing or not accurately reporting her leave time. Ms. Billingslea perceived that Latham's attitude toward her became cool after their conversation on September 27. Latham had never said anything to Ms. Billingslea about being tardy or being absent from work prior to September 27 because he did not think that it was a big deal. After Ms. Billingslea spurned his advances, he began to voice his dissatisfaction with her work hours. Ms. Billingslea went to the Parole Commission's personnel officer, Frank Trueblood. She wanted to take time off from work to look for another job and asked Mr. Trueblood if there was any type of leave request that she could make which could not be denied by Latham. Mr. Trueblood questioned Ms. Billingslea about the underlying nature of her problems, and she told him about Latham's actions. Ms. Billingslea did not want to create a problem but wanted to find another job. Mr. Trueblood told Ms. Billingslea that she could file an informal complaint against Latham and that it would remain confidential. On October 5, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed an informal complaint against Latham. About 5:00 p.m. that day she met with Chairman Wolson, Mr. Strickland, and Clay Phillips to discuss the situation. Chairman Wolson told Ms. Billingslea that she would be transferred to another section. Ms. Billinglea did not display eagerness to file a formal complaint against Latham. Latham saw Ms. Billingslea in Chairman Wolson's office, and after Ms. Billingslea left, he asked to speak with Chairman Wolson. Latham wanted to know what was going, on but Chairman Wolson would only tell him that Ms. Billingslea was being transferred to Clemency and that Murlene Amison would be transferred to his office as his secretary. At first Latham was upset at the news of the transfer and told Chairman Wolson that it would be setting a dangerous precedent to make the transfer. Latham told Chairman Wolson that he would like to "save face" in the matter and be the one who would offer the transfer to Ms. Amison. Latham then became exuberant about the transfer, closing his fist, punching it up with a victory signal and saying, "Yes." He left Chairman Wolson's office. A few minutes later, Latham returned to Chairman Wolson's office and told her that he thought he had figured out what had happened. He said that Ms. Billingslea had been sexually harassing him and that he had talked with her and explained that he did not want to have an affair with her. This was the first time anyone at the Parole Commission had heard Latham's claim of sexual harassment by Ms. Billingslea. On October 6, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed a formal complaint against Latham. Latham tried to find out from Mr. Trueblood whether Ms. Billingslea had filed a sexual harassment complaint against him, but Mr. Trueblood would not tell him. Effective October 7, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was transferred to the position of executive secretary in Clemency. On October 7, 1994, Latham called Mr. Strickland to his office and thanked Mr. Strickland for the personnel move, indicating that it had "sav[ed] his butt." Latham asked Mr. Strickland to close the door and then told him that he had been attracted to Ms. Billingslea but nothing had happened, and now, because of the move, nothing would happen. Latham wanted to know what was on the paperwork regarding the transfer. Mr. Strickland told him that it indicated a lateral transfer. Latham knew that it was wrong for a supervisor to invite a subordinate employee into a sexual or romantic relationship. Since she has been at the Parole Commission, Ms. Billingslea has never received formal discipline relevant to any fact or issue in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Gary D. Latham violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and recommending a civil penalty of $4,000 be imposed, as well as a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Advocate Florida Commission on Ethics Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1997. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Gary D. Latham, pro se 4622 The Oaks Drive Marianna, Florida 32446 Mark Herron, Esquire Akerman, Senterfit & Eidson, P.A. 216 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-0503 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Kerrie J. Stillman, Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida. As of the date of final hearing in this cause, Petitioner Durham was classified as "close" custody pursuant to Rule 33-6.09, Florida Administrative Code. Although Petitioner Durham's reclassification questionnaire score was initially five points, which would have qualified him for classification as "medium" custody, Respondent used the override provision contained in Rule 33-6.09 to classify Petitioner Durham as "close" custody by virtue of his poor institutional adjustment. Petitioner Adams was likewise classified as "close" custody at the time of final hearing. Petitioner Adams' numerical score on the inmate reclassification questionnaire would have classified him as "medium" custody, but the override provisions of Rule 33-6.09 were utilized in Mr. Adams' case to reclassify him as "close" custody by virtue of the fact that his sentence expiration date is 1990, and at the time of his reclassification he had not served 20 percent of his sentence. Petitioner Piccirillo was classified as "medium" custody at the time of final hearing. His numerical score on his inmate reclassification questionnaire was three points, which would have qualified him for "minimum" custody had this score not been overridden by virtue of the fact that Petitioner Piccirillo escaped from Department of Corrections custody on November 17, 1979, while in a minimum custody setting. Petitioner Farrell was classified as "minimum" custody at the time of final hearing in this cause, and his presumptive parole release date is set for July 24, 1984. It was stipulated at final hearing in this cause that none of the policy and procedure directives challenged in this cause had been promulgated by Respondent as rules, pursuant to the requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. It is also apparent from the face of the various challenged policy and procedure directives that they have statewide applicability at all institutions administered by the Department of Corrections. On or about May 6, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.22, which was subsequently revised on November 30, 1979. This directive is entitled "Reclassification and Progress Reports," and purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in various sections of Chapters 921, 944, 945, and 947, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge two sections of this directive as unpromulgated rules. The first of these is contained in Section X, entitled "Sources of Information," which provides as follows: It is essential that Progress Reviews Reports be accurate, concise and usable. Compiling up-to-date information to go into the report is as important as writ- ing the report. The following source of information should be utilized by the Classification Team in compiling information for the report. Various evaluation Reports (verbal or written) to include work super- visors, medical, dental, education, recreation, quarters, religious, per- sonal observations, etc Nowhere in either the cited chapters of the Florida Statutes or Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, are there any specific requirements for information to be considered by the Classification Team in compiling an inmate progress report. Department personnel utilized the above quoted section of the challenged directive in preparing reports on inmate progress. The second section of Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.22 challenged in this proceeding is XVI, entitled "Recommendations for Parole or Pre-Parole Work Release," which provides as follows: The Department may in selected cases recom- mend to the Florida Parole and Probation Commission that an inmate be placed on parole or pre-parole work release. How ever, note should be made of an inmate's Presumptive Parole Release Date(PPRD) when considering such possibilities. If it is felt that such significant progress has taken place since the setting of the PPRD that it should be moved forward to an earlier date, then such recommendations should be made to the Parole Commission in a full Progress Report setting forth the basis for recommending a change in the PPRD. If at the time of the Progress Review/Report the team does not see the justification in recommending the PPRD be changed then no comment will be required. All reports contaning [sic] parole or pre-parole work release recommendations will be reviewed and signed by the Classification Supervisor and forwarded to the Superintendent for his concurrence or disapproval. The Superintendent will indicate his decision by placing his signature on the appropriate line of the block to be added at the close of the Progress Report format. Upon approving a parole or pre-parole work release recommendation, the Superintendent will prepare a cover letter of endorsement which will be attached to the normal distribution of the Progress Report and for warded directly to the Parole Commission. The above-quoted language from Section XVI of Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.22 is virtually identical to the language contained in Rule 33-6.09(7)(m) , Florida Administrative Code. On or about September 30, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.31, entitled "Community Study and Volunteer Service." This directive purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge as rules the following provisions contained in Section III, entitled "Selection": C. The Classification Team should determine if the inmate meets criteria for eligi- bility described in the Program Directive Community Services Programs. When com- parable study programs are available at the institution, community study should not be considered. On-the-job training programs which are limited in scope are not considered comparable. The educational personnel of the Depart- ment should be Particularly involved in referring inmates for community study since they are in a position to evaluate the inmate's desire, ability, and past performance in the education program. The educational personnel will ensure the availability of the requested course of study or training prior to Classification Team action. Inmates considered for community study must have financial assistance from one or more of the following sources for tuition, books and clothing: Vocational Rehabilitation Veterans benefits Personal finances Committed support by the inmate's family Approval for a government grant Proof of financial support must accompany each application. Inmates are not to borrow money from any university, college or private organiza- tion for the purpose of financing their education. Nowhere in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, or Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code, are the above-cited requirements of Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.31 contained. On or about April 27, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.40, which was subsequently revised on March 10, 1982. This directive, entitled "Community Work Release general Policies and Procedures" purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge as an umpromulgated rule Section IXB of the directive which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The Department will permit consideration for work release 18 months prior to release. However, normally such consideration will be given within the last nine months prior to the presumptive parole release date or expiration or[sic] sentence. Should special cases arise which warrant attention prior to the nine months remaining, consideration will be given on an individual basis when there appears[sic] to be appropriate reasons for such. Special cases must be recommended by the Classification Team, approved by the Superintendent and Regional Director, and then forwarded to the Central Office where a Special Review Committee will make the final decision. . . . (Emphasis added) The underlined portion of Section IXB quoted above appears nowhere in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, or in Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. On or about November 30, 1979, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07-90, entitled "Inmate Participation in Outside Activities." This directive purports to be issued pursuant to authority contained in Section 945.21, Florida Statutes. Petitioners in this cause challenge as an umpromulgated rule Section IV of the directive, entitled "Distance Limitations," which provides as follows: The following distance limitations are established as maximums but may be reduced by the Superintendent: Travel to attend civic or religious meeting except the annual statewide meetings will be limited to 100 miles one way. Travel for fund raising projects will be limited to 35 miles one way. Travel to all statewide meetings will be approved by the Regional Director with concurrence of Assistant Secretary of Operations. Nowhere in Section 945.21, Florida Statutes, nor in validly adopted rules of Respondent do the specific requirements contained in Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.90 appear. On or about January 25, 1980, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.42, which was subsequently revised on February 26, 1982. This directive, entitled "Furlough Procedures," purports to be issued pursuant to authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33.9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge the entirety of this directive as an unpromulgated rule. The directive establishes a special review team to review furlough applications; makes Florida furlough procedures applicable to federal inmates in interstate compact cases placed with the department; establishes types of furloughs which may be granted; establishes eligibility criteria for selecting inmates for furloughs; sets time and distance limitations for furloughs; establishes the maximum number of furloughs for which inmates may be eligible; establishes verification requirements; establishes clothing requirements while inmates are on furlough; establishes types of transportation available for inmates on furlough; establishes release and check-in procedures; and, finally, establishes a procedure for termination of furloughs in the event of a violation of a furlough agreement. None of the specific requirements contained in Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.42 are contained in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code, or any other properly promulgated rule of the Department of Corrections.
The Issue The primary issue for determination is whether Dr. Jones violated provisions of Chapter 458, F.S. by violating terms of his probation, more specifically, those terms requiring attendance at Grand Rounds and monitoring by a local, Board certified pediatrician. If those violations occurred, an appropriate disciplinary action must be determined.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dr. Jones, is now, and has been at all relevant periods, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0017104. His practice is located in Seminole, Florida. On April 21, 1986, a Final Order was entered by the Board of Medical Examiners, resolving by an amended stipulation, a twenty-count Administrative Complaint that had been filed against Dr. Jones on December 1, 1983. Pertinent provisions of the Final order included: Placement on probation for a period of five years commencing with the effective date of the order; Attendance at Grand Rounds weekly during probation at both All Children's Hospital in St. Petersburg, Florida and the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida; and, Monitoring by a local Board-certified pediatrician, John H. Cordes, Jr., M.D., who was to make visits to Dr. Jones' office every two weeks and to randomly select 15 percent of Dr. Jones' medical charts to verify appropriateness of care and thoroughness of record-keeping. Dr. Jones was out of the country, in Antigua, when the order arrived, and it was in his office when he returned on May 4, 1986. Approximately two weeks later, around May 19th, Dr. Jones tried to call Dr. Cordes, the designated monitoring physician, and was told he was out of town. When he reached Dr. Cordes in early June, Dr. Cordes told him that under no circumstances would he serve as his monitoring physician and that he had written a letter to DPR advising them of such. After making some unspecified and unsuccessful efforts to locate a substitute, Dr. Jones contacted Lewis A. Barness, M.D., Chairman of the Department of Pediatrics at the University of South Florida. In a letter to Dr. Jones dated July 11, 1986, Dr. Barness agreed to review "about ten or fifteen percent of your charts on a biweekly basis." (Petitioner's exhibit #4) Dr. Jones was out of the country again the last two weeks of July, and the monitoring by Dr. Barness began on August 15, 1986. Dr. Barness was approved by the Board of Medical Examiners as a substitute on August 2, 1986. Dr. Jones continues to be monitored by Dr. Barness at Dr. Barness' office at the University. Dr. Jones brings his appointment book (although Dr. Barness never reviews it) and his charts, and Dr. Barness pulls, at random, fifteen to twenty percent of the charts and reviews them. Grand Rounds, lectures on pediatric medical topics, are held at 8:00 A.M. on Fridays at the University of South Florida Medical Center, and at 12:30 P.M. on Fridays at All Children's Hospital. Between his receipt of the Final Order and June 15, 1986, (the date specified in the amended complaint) Dr. Jones never attended Grand Rounds at the University of South Florida. He attended once, June 6th, during this period at All Children's Hospital. The basis for non-attendance is specified for each Friday session during the relevant period as follows: May 9, 1986 (the first Friday after Dr. Jones returned and saw the Final Order)--Dr. Jones' van was broken. His wife, a part-time employee at an interior design shop, was called in for work that day, so he did not have transportation. Further, he met with the mother of one of his patients at noon on this date. May 16 and 23, 1986--Dr. Jones' recently-widowed mother was visiting, and since she was also quite ill, he spent time with her. Further, Grand Rounds were cancelled at the University of South Florida on May 16th. May 30, 1986--Dr. Jones' van was again broken and his wife was called to work leaving him without transportation. June 6, 1986--Dr. Jones awoke with gastroenteritis, so he did not attend the morning session at the University of South Florida; he did attend the session at All Children's Hospital. June 13, 1986--Grand Rounds were cancelled at the University of South Florida on this date. Dr. Jones decided to take his children to Disney World as they lived out of state and were leaving the next day. June 15, 1986 was the close of the relevant period regarding attendance at Grand Rounds, according to the Administrative Complaint, as amended. From the testimony and evidence, I am unable to determine conclusively whether Dr. Jones has attended regularly since that date. Except for weekends and the trips out of country, Dr. Jones continued to practice medicine as a pediatrician between April 21, 1986 and July 1986, the date of the Administrative Complaint. He stipulated that he understood the terms and conditions of the Board's Order regarding probation. His testimony at the hearing revealed that he was thoroughly familiar with the details of the order. Nevertheless, he violated the terms of probation. Although he knew that the Board had approved the Stipulation in January 1986, and that the stipulation specified Dr. Cordes as the monitoring physician, he waited until the last minute (two weeks after he received the order) to contact Dr. Cordes about commencing the monitoring. While Dr. Cordes' refusal to participate is not attributable to Dr. Jones, the delay in obtaining a substitute could clearly have been eliminated with better planning by Dr. Jones. Technically, the monitoring conducted by Dr. Barness does not comply with the terms of the probation order, as Dr. Jones brings the charts to him for review. Dr. Barness has impressive credentials and is understandably unable to visit Dr. Jones' office every two weeks. However, Dr. Jones admitted that he never asked the Board to modify the terms of his probation in that regard. Dr. Jones' lack of judgment regarding the terms of probation is also reflected in his uncontroverted excuses for non-attendance at Grand Rounds. With the obvious exception of the cancellation of the lectures, the excuses fail to mitigate the violations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Respondent, Archbold M. Jones, M.D. violated subsections 458.331(1)(h) and (x) F.S.. Suspending Dr. Jones' license for three months (conforming to the approximate period that he practiced without supervision). Requiring Dr. Jones to appear before the Board with Dr. Barness to outline the details of the monitoring process and insure that proper review can be made at Dr. Barness' office, rather than Dr. Jones' office. Providing for Dr. Jones' immediate notification to the Board in the event Dr. Barness is unable to continue with monitoring consistent with the Board's direction. Outlining specific guidelines for excused non-attendance at Grand Rounds and providing for notification by Dr. Jones to the Board each time he fails to attend, and the reason for such failure. Providing that future violations will result in nullification of the stipulation and immediate proceeding on the original multi-count complaint. Providing that all other terms and conditions of the April 21, 1986 Order remain in full force and effect. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 6th day of July, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3920 The following constitute my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph #1. 2. Rejected as unnecessary. 3. Adopted in substance in paragraph #2. 4. Rejected as unnecessary. 5-6. Adopted in substance in paragraph #2. 7-8. Adopted in paragraph #7. 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph #4. 10-11. Adopted in paragraph #9. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph #1. 2-3. Adopted in substance in paragraph #2. The closing date is addressed in paragraph #7, however the June 15, 1986, date relates only to attendance at Grand Rounds and not to the period during which monitoring did not occur. (See motions to amend complaint.) Adopted in paragraph #3. Adopted in paragraph #6. 7-15. Adopted in substance in paragraph #7. However, the characterization of a "medical emergency" in paragraph #9 is unsupported by the record, as are the characterizations, "justification" for not attending Grand Rounds and "legitimately prevented" from attendance. Respondent was not unable to attend Ground Rounds, except when the rounds were cancelled. He chose rather not to attend for various reasons which to him were more important than his attendance. Adopted in paragraph #4. Adopted in paragraph #5, except however the "diligence" of the search was not established by competent credible evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph #5. 19-27. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. The "diligence" is unsupported by competent credible evidence. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Michael I. Schwartz, Esquire Suite 100, Capitol Office Center 119 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301