The Issue Has the applicant, Grove Isle, Ltd. provided reasonable assurances and affirmatively demonstrated that its proposed marina is clearly in the public interest and will not lower the existing ambient water quality of Biscayne Bay, a designated outstanding Florida water?
Findings Of Fact On March 13, 1978 an application was made to DER for a water quality control permit to construct a wet-slip marina on the west side of Grove Isle, formerly known as Fair Isle and Sailboat Key. The original plan for the marina, which was initially objected to by the Department of Environmental Regulation, was modified to protect a bed of seagrasses extending about 30 feet wide in a band along the west side of the island. While the plans were being modified and consultations with other government permitting agencies were in progress, the application was "deactivated" from September 27, 1978 until March 30, 1979. As a result of its investigation and review, DER on October 23, 1979, issued a letter of intent to grant the permit to Grove Isle, Inc. The permit if granted, would allow the applicant to construct six concrete fixed piers, five "T" shaped, one "L" shaped, with a boat docking capacity of 90 pleasure boats. The piers will extend a maximum of 165 feet offshore from an existing concrete bulkhead. The width of the piers will be 8 feet from the bulkhead to a point 41 feet offshore, and then increased to a width of 10 feet. A sewage pump-out facility is also proposed. Attached to that letter of intent were the following conditions: Adequate control shall be taken during the construction so that turbidity levels outside a 50 foot radius of the work area do not exceed 50 J.C.U's, as per Section 24-11, of the Metropolitan Dade County Code. During construction, turbidity samples shall be collected at a mid-depth twice daily at a point 50 feet up stream and at a point 50 feet down stream from the work area. The contractor shall arrange to have turbidity sample results reported to him within one hour of collection. Turbidity monitoring reports shall be submitted weekly to DER and to the Metropolitan Dade County Environmental Resources Management (MDCERM) If turbidity exceeds 50 J.C.U's beyond a 50 foot radius of the work area, turbidity curtains shall be placed around the work area and MDCERM notified immediately. Turbidity samples shall be collected according to condition two above, no later than one hour after the installation of the turbidity curtain. It turbidity levels do not drop below 50 J.C.U's within one hour of installation of the curtain all construction shall be halted. Construction shall not be resumed until the contractor has received authorization from MDCERM. No live-a-board vessels (permanent or transient) shall be docked at this facility unless direct sewage pump-out connections are provided at each live-a-board slip. A permanent pump-out station shall be installed and maintained for further removal of sewage and waste from the vessels using this facility. Compliance with this requirement will entail the applicant's contacting the Plan Review Section of MDCERM for details concerning connection to an approved disposal system. Boat traffic in the shallow 30 foot wide dense seagrass area which parallels the shoreline shall be restricted by the placement of wood piles on 6 foot centers along the entire shoreline facing the marina. The channel from this marina to deeper water in Biscayne Bay shall be marked to prevent boats from straying into adjacent shallow areas. This will prevent habitat destruction. A chemical monitoring program shall be established to determine the effect of this marina on the water quality of this section of Biscayne Bay. Surface and mid-depth samples shall be collected at three points in the project area and at one background station. Parameters shall include, but not be limited to dissolved oxygen, pH, salinity, temperature, total coliform and fecal coliform and fecal streptococci bacteria, oil and grease, biochemical oxygen demand, and turbidity. Background samples shall be collected prior to construction and quarterly for a minimum of one year after 90 percent occupancy of the marina. In addition to the chemical monitoring program, a benthic community monitoring program is to be established. Samples of the benthic seagrass community within and adjacent to the project area are to be collected prior to construction and quarterly for a minimum of one year after 90 percent occupancy of the marina. Should either monitoring program detect dissimilar changes at its monitoring and control stations, DER and MDCERM shall be notified of the results. The monitoring programs shall be reviewed and approved by DER and MDCERM prior to implementation. Monitoring reports shall be submitted to DER and MDCERM and the United States Corps of Engineers on regular basis. Warning signs shall be posted in the marina area to advise marina users that manatees frequent the area and caution should be taken to avoid collisions with them. With the foregoing conditions imposed, the Department concluded that no significant immediate or long term negative biological impact is anticipated and state water quality standards should not be violated as a result of the proposed construction. Grove Isle, Inc., has agreed to comply with all the conditions established by the DER letter of intent to grant the permit. Grove Isle is a spoil bank in Biscayne Bay located approximately 700 feet east of the Florida mainland. It is linked to the mainland by a two-lane concrete bridge. The island is currently under development for a 510 unit condominium community with associated facilities such as a restaurant, hotel, and the proposed marina. The island is surrounded by a concrete bulkhead constructed many years ago. No changes in the bulkhead line are proposed. Grove Isle, Inc., proposes constructing the marina on concrete piles driven into the Bay bottom from a shallow draft barge. During construction there would be some turbidity caused from the disruption of the Bay sediment. This can however be adequately controlled by the use of turbidity curtains during construction. The construction will not require any dredging or filling. In the immediate marina site the most significant biota are a 30 foot wide bed of seagrasses. There are no other important biota because at one time the area was extensively dredged to create the island. There are no oyster or clam beds nearby. While lobsters may have once frequented the area, they too are no longer present. The water depth in the area ranges from 1 foot near the island bulkhead to 12 feet offshore to the west of the island. This particular seagrass bed consist primarily of turtle grass (thalassia, testudinum) with some Cuban Shoal Weed (Halodule, Wrightii). Protection for these grasses will be provided by a buffer zone between the island and the boat slips. The grassy zone will be bordered by a row of dolphin piles to exclude boat traffic. Because the grass requires sunlight for photosynthesis and therefore life, the six piers will have grated walkways where they pass over the grass. This will allow sunlight to reach below. In addition to the small grass bed on the west of the island there are extensive beds to the northeast, east and south of the island that extend several hundred yards from the island in water depths of three to ten feet. If boat traffic in the vicinity is markedly increased due to the existence of the marina, it is conceivable that the number of propeller scars in these shallow beds could increase. At the present time the beds are already traversed by boats, some of which are owned by Petitioner's members. There are already for example, approximately 50 crafts which operate from the nearby mainland or from Pelican Canal directly to the north of the island. Propeller scars take up to fifteen years to heal yet the number of scars in the Grove Isle area is insignificant and even a tripling of them from an additional 90 boats would still be de minimus. Potential damage to the seagrasses on the north side of the island will be minimized by the planned installation of navigation markers by Grove Isle. These markers will channel boats into water of a navigable depth and lessen the number of groundings and near groundings which cause the scarring. There is evidence that pleasure boats by their very existence and operation in the water are potential pollution sources. For instance, various maintenance chemicals such as anti-fouling bottom paint and wood cleaner have the ability, if used in sufficient quantity, to harm marine life. The fueling of engines and sewage discharge from boats are additional pollution sources. There was however, no showing that the location of up to 90 pleasure and sport fishing craft at the proposed marina site would in any way cause a degradation of water quality below the acceptable standards for Class III waters. At the present time, the marina site has adequate flushing to disburse those pollutants which may be generated by the marina operations. While a hydrographic survey was not requested by DER or provided by Grove Isle at the time the permit application was made, the testimony of Dr. Echternacht at the time of the Hearing provided adequate assurances respecting the hydrographic characteristics of the proposed site. The proposed marina will have no fueling or maintenance facilities. No live-a-board craft will be allowed at the marina. Both Mr. Wm. Cleare Filer and David A. Doheny live close to Grove Isle. Mr. Doheny's residence is on the mainland facing the proposed marina site and Mr. Filer's house is on Pelican Canal. They use the waters of Biscayne Bay around Grove Isle for recreation. If the quality of the water in the proposed marina site were lessened their substantial interest would be affected. Biscayne Bay is classified as a Class III water and is in the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve. Careful considerations has been given to each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. To the extent that they are not contained in this Order, they are rejected as being either not supported by competent evidence or as immaterial and irrelevant to the issues determined here.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, determining that the requested water quality control permit and certification be issued subject to the conditions contained in the Notice of Intent to Issue Permit and that the Relief requested by the Petitioners be denied and their Petitions be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Doheny, Esquire 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Wm. Cleare Filer 3095 Northwest 7th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Joel Jaffer 2479 Southwest 13th Street Miami, Florida 33145 Randall E. Denker, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry S. Stewart, Esquire Frates, Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Richmond & Greer One Biscayne Tower 25th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION BAYSHORE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 79-2186 79-2324 STATE OF FLORIDA, 79-2354 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, and GROVE ISLE, LIMITED, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact This application is a request for a consumptive water use permit for six wells at the following locations: LATITUDE LONGITUDE 28 degrees 20' 50" 82 degrees 41' 36" (hereinafter referred to as Garden Terrace No.1) 28 degrees 20' 50" 82 degrees 41' 35" (hereinafter referred to as Garden Terrace No.2) 28 degrees 20' 55" 82 degrees 39' 11" (hereinafter referred to as Parkwood Acres No.1) 28 degrees 21' 20" 82 degrees 39' 11" (hereinafter referred to as Parkwood Acres No.2) 28 degrees 21' 49" 82 degrees 38' 56" (hereinafter referred to as New Well No.1) 28 degrees 21' 50" 82 degrees 38' 56" (hereinafter referred to as New Well No.2) Although included in the application, it appears from the record of this proceeding that Garden Terrace No. 1 is to be abandoned by applicant upon completion of its new facilities and therefore is not intended for inclusion in any consumptive water use permit issued pursuant hereto. Further, it appears from the records that the applicant intends to use Garden Terrace No. 2 as an emergency standby supply well only and therefore its average daily withdrawal as reflected on the application is not intended to be included in a consumptive water use permit issued pursuant hereto. Therefore, with those amendments the application seeks, from a total of five wells, a maximum daily withdrawal of 1,501,000 gallons and an average daily withdrawal of 650,000 gallons. The use of this water is for public water supply and appears to be a reasonable, beneficial use consistent with the public interest and not interfering with any legal use of water existing at the time of the application. Further, according to testimony of the staff of the Southwest Florida Water Management District it does not appear that any of the matters set forth in Subsection 16J-2.11(2), (3) or (4), F.S., exist so as to require the denial of this permit. The staff recommendation is that this permit be granted for a maximum daily withdrawal of 1.50 million gallons per day and an average daily withdrawal of .650 million gallons per day. The staff recommendations are subject to the following conditions: That all individual connections to the system be metered. That the permittee shall install totalizing flow meters of the propeller driven type on all withdrawal points covered by this permit with the exception of those wells which are currently gaged together using a single meter. That the permittee shall submit to the District a record of his pumpage for each meter. Said pumpage shall be read on a monthly basis and submitted quarterly to the District by April 15, July 15, October 15, and January 15, for each preceding calendar quarter. That the permittee have water samples from all wells permitted analyzed for chloride on a monthly basis and results submitted to the District by April 15, July 15, October 15 and January 15 for each preceding calendar quarter. That to promote good water management and avoid salt water intrusion that the water be withdrawn at an average of .217 million gallons per day from each of the three following wells: Parkwood Acres Well No. 1, Parkwood Acres Well No. 2, and New Well No. 1. New Well No. 2 shall be operated only to meet peak demand. That Garden Terrace Well No. 2 be used only as an emergency standby well. The applicant entered no objections to the conditions set forth above nor were there any objections from members of the public to the issuance of this consumptive water use permit.
Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that a consumptive use permit be issued for the five subject wells for the withdrawal of 1.30 mgd maximum daily withdrawal and .65 mgd, average daily withdrawal subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 4 above. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District P.O. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Delmar Water Corporation 731 West Main Street New Port Richey, Florida 33552
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Mark Bartecki has submitted an application to the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) for a permit to construct a dock 155 feet waterward of the mean high waterline of waters of the State and 35 feet landward of that mean high waterline through a jurisdictional wetland area. The dock would he a total of 190 feet in length and 8 feet wide, with an 80 by 8- foot L-shaped extension on the seaward end of the dock, which would incorporate nine mooring pilings and eight boat slips, for a total area of 1,520 square feet of dock area. It was uncontroverted that the construction of the dock in the jurisdictional wetland area landward of the mean high waterline would have no significant impact on the water quality or biological resources of the bay. Mark Bartecki and associates are in the process of seeking various governmental approvals for construction of a 50-unit duplex housing development on 25 lots on the shore of Cudjoe Bay, which development is known as "Spoonbill Sound." As part of its development plan, the permit applicant seeks to construct the dock and boat slips. The applicant initially sought mooring facilities for as many as 25 boats, but through negotiations with the Department amended the application to provide that no more than eight boat slips and eight boats will be accommodated, should the permit be granted. The proposed dock is located in the Class III waters of the State, which are designated for recreation and the propagation and management of well- balanced fish and wildlife, populations, with such recreational purposes being allowed as swimming, water skiing, fishing, snorkeling, and diving. The proposed dock site is also within Outstanding Florida Waters inasmuch as Cudjoe Bay is an Outstanding Florida Water within the Key Deer National Wildlife Refuge. The bottom substrata of Cudjoe Bay in the area where the dock is to he placed consists primarily of hard rock and pulverized coarse-grained rock sediment. There are some areas of fine, silty sediments associated with turtle grass beds (Thalassia) The bottom of Cudjoe Bay in the vicinity of the dock is occupied by benthic organisms, including algae; corals; seagrasses such as Thalassia testudinum (or turtlegrass); and other attached and mobile organisms. Marine life in the area occurs most densely in the patches of turtlegrass, which serve as a nursery and feeding area for various marine organisms, such as larval and juvenile crustacea and juvenile fishes, as well as juvenile spiny lobsters, blue crabs, snapper and grunts. Important fish species which occupy a position at the base of the food web are abundant in the turtlegrass areas of the bay in the vicinity of the proposed dock, including hardhead silverside, gold spotted killifish and longnose killifish. The offshore bay bottom, over which the dock is supposed to be constructed, supports a dominance of seagrasses (Halodule wrightii and Thalassia testudinum) for a distance of approximately 40 feet waterward of the shoreline red mangroves, which in turn protrude waterward of the approximate mean high waterline for some 20 to 30 feet. Further waterward of the seagrasses in the vicinity of the end of the proposed dock, the bottom is characterized by less sediment and a hard, rocky bottom or coarse rock sediments. The biological community changes in that area and is characterized by red algae (Laurencia sp. is dominant) and scattered green algaes (Penicillus sp. and Acetabularia sp.), as well as a significant number of sponges and soft corals (Gorgonia) Scattered hard corals also occur in this area. The turtlegrass beds occur in this area in scattered patches with coarse rocky sediment areas occurring in between such grasses, which are characterized by less profuse marine biota (chiefly sponges and some algaes). Various forms of finger coral, including an uncommon purple form called "Porites furcata," occurs in the project area, chiefly in the turtlegrass patches or beds, which are characterized by finer, more easily suspended sediments. The turtlegrass, in addition to its function as a nursery area for various forms of marine life, accomplishes a filtration function for water in that it removes sediments suspended in the water and deposits it within the grass beds as fine, bottom sediment. The coarser grained, rocky substrate sediments are less easily suspended by turbulence in the water than those sediments occurring in the grass beds. Expert witnesses testifying for the applicant and the Department established that the actual installation of the dock itself will have minimal impacts on water quality in that the method of construction, augering the holes for the pilings from a barge and then hand construction of the remainder of the dock, will cause only minor and transitory turbidity of bottom sediments. Damage to grass beds caused by shading or partial blocking of light by the dock will be minimized by the final location or surveying of the dock site, which the applicant stipulated would be done in conjunction with representatives of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Environmental Regulation so as to avoid grass beds where at all possible to prevent damage caused by light shading or propeller turbulence. A more significant concern regarding shading of light and resulting adverse effects on turtlegrass beds is related to the mooring sites for eight boats to be constructed at the seaward end of the dock. It is possible for eight boats moored closely together to provide sufficient shading of the bottom to gradually kill any turtlegrass growth beneath those mooring sites. Accordingly, the permit applicant should he required, and has agreed, to locate the mooring sites at the end of the dock so as to avoid encompassing any grass beds in the boat mooring area. Water at the seaward end of the proposed dock site varies somewhat in depth due to tidal and wind conditions. Witness Curtis Kruer of the Army Corps of Engineers, a biologist who has observed the area numerous times and snorkeled in the area, found the depths to range from 2-1/2 feet to 3 feet at the same location. Testimony by residents who have visited the area regularly and evidence by the Petitioners in the form of a photograph showing water approximately knee deep -- that is, 2 feet or less -- do not definitely relate those reported and depicted depths to the subject area where the boat slips' and boat maneuvering area will be. Thus, the testimony of expert witness Kruer is accepted in this regard; to the extent of his findings that the depth at mean low water at the seaward end of the proposed dock site, in the area of the boat slips, is from 2-1/2 to 3 feet. The water depth for operation of outboard motor-powered boats is marginally acceptable in the area of the end of the proposed dock. Marginally acceptable, that is, in terms of likelihood of significant damage to marine grasses, algae, corals and other organisms caused by "prop dredging," that is, bottom contact or wash from boat propellers. Captain Ed Davidson was accepted as an expert witness in the areas of assessment of damage to coral reefs and marine resources, caused by the operation of motor boats, and in the area of marine resource planning and navigation. He has served in various capacities: as a consultant for the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, Looe Key Reef Resource Inventory; Vice President for Operations for the Florida Reef Foundation; a consultantship with the U.S. Department of Interior, Continental Lands Act Enforcement in the "Florida Reef Tract"; and in previous litigation as an expert witness on the protection of coral reefs. It was established that, in the area of the Florida Keys, generally in order to avoid damage to routine biota caused by propeller or lower unit contact or turbulence and turbidity resulting from moving propellers in close proximity to the bottom substrates, that a minimum of 12 inches clearance between the bottom of the propeller and the bottom of a water body is required to avoid significant disruption and damage to the bottom sediments and marine life in the path of a boat propeller. The bottom substrate in the area proposed for the dock and in the area through which ingress and egress of boats would be conducted is of a coarse, rocky nature, however, the sediments consisting largely of rock particles, which characteristically settle out of the water when suspended at a very rapid rate, causing little sustained turbidity. The site, as found above, is also characterized by relatively barren rocky bottom portions interspersed with grass beds, where the majority of the marine biota are located, including the uncommon coral forms mentioned above. Thus, if ingress and egress of boats is conducted over a carefully surveyed and marked lane between such grass beds and marine productive areas, prop wash or prop dredging damage to marine grasses, corals, algae and other organisms will be minimized. There is no question that some damage to marine life will occur, but it will be minimized by confining boat traffic to such a marked ingress and egress lane, by limiting the number of boats permissibly using the dock, as well as the speeds at which they operate. Restriction of the speed at which boats can leave the immediate area of the mooring slips will prevent the settling of the stern and the lower units of outboard motors or outdrives, caused by sudden acceleration to high speeds, thus maintaining more clearance between the propeller and lower units of motors and the bottom. Thus, if the dock is permitted a prominent notice should be posted thereon limiting boats using the slips to a speed slow enough to prevent the formation of a wake. A condition should be imposed on a grant of the permit to this effect, as well as to the extent that the permit applicant should be required to mark out a channel through the water from the seaward end of the dock to the 3-foot bottom contour depth (which all parties agreed is safe for boat operation), which channel should be marked so as to reasonably avoid any of the subject grass beds in the bay. In order to discourage numbers of boats in excess of eight from using the dock, so as to minimize damage caused by "prop dredging," the eight boat slips should be permanently assigned to residents of the planned development, with no other persons being authorized to use the slips. Further, the portions of the dock landward of the boat slips themselves should be enclosed by railings of a sufficiently solid nature to prevent the mooring of boats along any of the sides of the dock in a landward direction. The applicant has agreed to the majority of these conditions. If these conditions on permitting are observed, only transitory degradation of water quality caused by turbidity during the actual augering of the holes for placement of the pilings will occur. Since this is a large bay with adequate turnover and mixing of its waters, such violations of water quality parameters for clarity or transparency within the immediate proximity of the dock will be very short-lived. If these conditions on construction and use of the dock are enforced, no other significant degradation of water quality will result for purposes of the legal authority cited below. The proposed construction will not eliminate valuable marine resources in Cudjoe Bay and will have no immediate or long-term adverse impact on the quantity or quality of the State's natural marine resources through loss of habitat within the Cudjoe Bay area. The proposed project, if these conditions are imposed upon any grant of a permit, will not cause such damage as to interfere with the conservation of marine wildlife and other natural resources to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interest. It will not result in destruction of clam beds and marine productivity, natural habitat or grass flats suitable for nursery or feeding grounds for marine life. It will not result in the destruction of natural shoreline processes to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interest provided the conditions found above are imposed upon any permitting, especially those relating to railings placed on the landward portions of the dock to prevent mooring and use of boats in conjunction with the dock in excessively shallow water and provided the dock and the marked lane for boat traffic are located so as to avoid grass beds constituting nursery or feeding grounds for marine life and marine soils capable of producing plant growth useful as nursery or feeding areas. The open water area of Cudjoe Bay below the mean high water line is currently not occupied by any docks or piers of the size contemplated in this application. Most marine access to the waters of the bay occurs by way of a canal system and an "alongshore" channel on the east side of the bay, which system was dredged during the 1950s. The shoreline in the vicinity of the proposed project is essentially undisturbed. The proposed dock would be the first structure of its type permitted by the Department of Environmental Regulation on Cudjoe Bay, an outstanding Florida water. The proposed dock and boat slips will be restricted in use to the residents and owners of the residences to be constructed by the permit applicant on his property. Public use of the proposed facility would not be allowed. There has been no provision made for such use. The interest of the public in navigating the waters of Cudjoe Bay has been served for years by the "alongshore" channel canal system on the west side of the bay. This allows members of the public living in the vicinity of the bay to have access to the Atlantic Ocean or Florida Strait off the mouth of Cudjoe Bay. It has not been established that there is any current need for an additional channel, dockage or means of navigating across other areas of Cudjoe Bay, including the subject area near the midpoint of the bay shoreline, thence across the remaining area of the bay not in close proximity to the presently existing channel. Since the proposed project would be restricted in use, insofar as boating is concerned, to eight residents of the applicant's proposed development, since members of the general public would not enjoy the beneficial use of the dock and slips, and since there has been demonstrated no current need for additional boat dockage or navigational facilities in Cudjoe Bay, it has not been affirmatively demonstrated how construction of the proposed project would benefit the public. The members of the Sacarma Bay and Cudjoe Ocean Shores Property Owners' Associations and the Intervenor, Florida Audubon Society, own property on the shore of Cudjoe Bay and regularly utilize the waters where the dock is proposed to be constructed for swimming, nature study, fishing and other lawful recreational activities. The waters where this recreation occurs are waters lying over sovereign lands owned by the State of Florida. In this connection, Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, requires a permit to be issued by the Department of Natural Resources for use of the proposed sovereign state land. It is undisputed that the permit has not yet been approved and obtained by the permit applicant. The obtaining of such permit from the Department of Natural Resources would have to be an additional condition imposed upon the grant of any permit by the Department of Environmental Regulation.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, deny the application of Mark Bartecki for a dock construction permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel L. Beardsley Route 2, Box 441 Summerland Key, Florida 33042 Charles G. Stephens, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Joel L. Beardsley 2600 Blair Stone Road 100 Dudley Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Old Seybrook, Connecticut 06475 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Mr. Charles Lee Department of Environmental 1101 Audubon Way Regulation Maitland, Florida 32751 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Ray Allen, Esquire 618 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 ================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION ================================================================= IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA MARK BARTECKI, Appellant, v. NO. AZ-332 DOAH CASE NO. 83-1532 JOEL L. BEARDSLEY and DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION Appellees. / Opinion issued June 25, 1985. Permit applicant appealed from order of the Department of Environmental Regulation denying application for permission to construct a dock adjacent to his property, in state waters. The District Court of Appeal, Mills, J., held that the denial, based upon applicant's failure to show that the project was clearly in the public interest requirement regarding issuance of construction permit for stationary installation not involving discharge of waste into state waters was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Reversed and remanded. Health and Environment 25.5(6) Denial by the Department of Environmental Regulation of permit to construct a dock adjacent to applicant's property, based on applicant's failure to show that the project was clearly in the public interest, was erroneous, as reflected in contemporaneous case in which imposition of such a public interest requirement prior to issuance of construction permit for stationary installation not involving the discharge of waste into state waters was an invalid exercise of delegated authority. James T. Hendrick of Albury, Morgan & Hendrick, P.A., Key West, for appellant. Joel L. Beardsley, pro se. Charles G. Stephens, Asst. General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Department of Environmental Regulation. MILLS, Judge. Bartecki appeals from the entry of a final administrative order denying his application for permission to construct a dock, adjacent to his property, in the waters of Cudjoe Bay in Monroe County, Florida, an Outstanding Florida Water. We reverse and remand for entry of an order not inconsistent with Grove Isle, Ltd. v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 454 So.2d 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), reh. den. In August 1982, Bartecki was notified by appellee Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) that, in the absence of any petition for a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, it intended to issue a permit allowing him to construct the dock. Appellee Beardsley and other parties not involved in the appeal filed such a petition. The hearing was held in September 1983 and the recommended order was issued in December of that year. Despite finding that Bartecki had "affirmatively demonstrated reasonable assurances that the project, as it would actually be constructed, would be environmentally palatable," the hearing officer recommended denying the permit because Bartecki had not shown that the project was "clearly in the public interest" pursuant to Rule 17-4.-242, Florida Administrative Code. While DER was considering the recommended order, this Court decided Grove Isle, supra, which held that "to the extent it requires an applicant to meet a 'public interest' requirement prior to the issuance of a construction permit for a stationary installation not involving the discharge of waste into waters within the state," Rule 17-4.242 was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Bartecki brought the decision to DER's attention, but the agency declined to consider it because a motion for rehearing was pending and the decision was therefore not final. DER denied the permit, adopting the recommended order in toto. Bartecki contends on appeal that, since the denial of his permit was based solely on his failure to demonstrate "public interest," and that requirement has been stricken, this court should reverse the denial and require issuance of the permit. DER agrees that Grove Isle mandates reversal based on the agency's reliance on the invalid rule to deny the permit, but points out that it cannot grant the permit sought by Bartecki until he "receive[s] from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund . . . consent authorizing the proposed use and exhibits it to [DER]." Section 253.77, Florida Statutes 91983). Bartecki had received the consent required by the statute, but it was withdrawn prior to the formal hearing held by DER. We agree that, based on Grove Isle, DER's denial of the permit based on Bartecki's failure to comply with rule 17-4.242, F.A.C., was erroneous and its final order so holding is reversed. The case is remanded for entry of an order not inconsistent with Grove Isle and Section 253.77, Florida Statutes (1983). Reversed and remanded. SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the District should approve FRI's consumptive use permit application, no. 2-019-0012AUR, pursuant to Chapter 40C- 2, Florida Administrative Code The FRI is seeking permission to withdraw an annual average daily rate of million gallons per day (mgd) of water and 762.85 million gallons per year of ground water for hydraulic dredging, cleaning and purification of sand at the Goldhead Sand Mine. Subject to certain limiting conditions to be set forth in the FRI's consumptive use permit, the water is proposed to be produced from three Floridan aquifer wells. District proposed to grant the permit application which was challenged by LBCA, resulting in the formal administrative proceeding. LBCA challenged the issuance of the permit to FRI on the basis of the FRI's alleged failure to comply with the applicable requirements of Chapter 3V3, Florida Statutes (E.S.), and Chapter 40C-2, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), and other applicable law. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT LBCA Exception Number 1 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 2 that a necessary component of FRI's operation is its withdrawal of approximately 2.09 mgd of ground water for the production of sand. The 2.09 mgd is the average daily usage rate to who the parties stipulated prior to the hearing. The maximum daily usage rate is 3.75 mgd. However, FRI cannot exceed 762.5 million gallons for the year which is an average of 2.09 mgd. (Prehearing Stip. pp. 1,9). In the LBCA Proposed Recommended Order paragraph 25, the LBCA states that the operation "necessitates FRI's pumping allocation of an average daily 2.09 million gallons of water from the Floridan aquifer." Additionally, LBCA acknowledges in its Exception No. 2 that it is "known that approximately 2 mgd are pumped into the system." If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry v. Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). This exception is rejected because the finding is supported by competent substantial evidence. (T. 41-42, 104, 913-914). LBCA Exception Number 2 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 8 and 28 that the receiving water from the mine site is primarily the surficial aquifer which recharges the downgradient lakes and that the surficial aquifer recharge will result in a positive or immeasurable effect on the lakes. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. It is improper for this Board to retry the case after the hearing has concluded by altering findings supported by evidence and reweighing evidence. Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 376 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The decision to believe one expert over another is left to the hearing officer, and the decision cannot be altered absent a complete lack of competent substantial evidence from which the finding could be reasonably inferred. Fla. Chapter of Sierra Club v. Orlando Utility Comm., 436 So.2d 383, 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Freeze v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 556 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Fla. Stat.; Berry v. Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). This exception is rejected because the findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. (T. 105, 120-129, 146, 170, 187-190, 208-209, 235, 248, 256-257, 972-973, 1085-1093, 1139). LBCA Exception Number 3 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 11 that the aquifer characteristics in the Floridan aquifer beneath and around the mine site are relatively uniform. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 180, 926-927). LBCA Exception Number 4 The LBCA takes exception to a mischaracterization of the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 13 regarding lake leakance by stating that the hearing officer found that some of the lakes at issue do not have leakance to the Floridan aquifer. In fact, it is contextually clear that the Hearing Officer was referring to "many of the lakes within the region." This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 77-80). LBCA Exception Number 5 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 16 that very little, if any, of the groundwater flowing into the Floridan aquifer beneath Lake Brooklyn flows toward the mine site. In making its argument, LBCA inaccurately attributes testimony to FRI witness Fountain when the referenced testimony was testimony of LBCA witness Boyes. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 1145-1146). LBCA Exception Number 6 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 22 and 55 that the data collection effort of FRI and the District was far more extensive than is normally conducted for a mine of this size and that sufficient site-specific information was developed to be able to determine the effects of the proposed use of water at the mine operation. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The findings are supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 103, 201, 238, 918-919; FR Ex. 5). LBCA asserts that FRI did not evaluate the "worstcase" scenario in order to establish permit entitlemet LBCA provides no legal citations to support its exception. LBCA's assertion lacks legal as well as factual support. LBCA has criticized FRI's aquifer performance test and modeling effort without presenting the elusive "worstcase scenario" which presumably would show impacts greater than those modeled by FRI. LBCA seeks to impose a burden of proof which is insupportable in law. It is not FRI's burden to show a violation of the criteria in Chapter 40C-2, Fla. Admin. Code, is a scientific impossibility, only to show that the non-occurrence of such violation is reasonably assured by the preponderance of the evidence in the proceeding. The Corporation of the President v. SJRWMD and City of Cocoa, Case Nos. 89-828, 89-751 (SJRWMD Dec. 13, 1990), aff'd, 590 So.2d 427 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). An agency cannot assume the worst-case scenario unless that condition is reasonably foreseeable. Florida Audubon Society, supra..; Rudloe and Gulf Stream Specimen Co. v. Dickerson Bayshore, Inc., 10 F.A.L.R. 3426 (Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, June 8, 1988). As delineated in FRI's response to this exception, FRI and the Distract presented evidence of numerous investigations regarding this application, including testing and analyses of the impact of withdrawals at greater than the average and maximum daily pumping rates. (See Record citations on pp 17-20 of FRI's Response to Exceptions; T. 115-116, 126, 176-177, 918- 920). LBCA failed to present any citation to the record where it presented testimony evincing that another scenario which would result in greater impacts than those predicted by the applicant were reasonably like to occur. LBCA's speculation that another undefined scenario of pumping would show greater impacts was rejected by the hearing officer. The applicant has provided reasonable assurances with regard to the effects of the proposed withdrawal. LBCA Exception Number 7 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's purported inference in Finding of Fact 23 that the aquifer performance test (2T) measured impacts significantly greater than could be expected to occur under "worst case" conditions as a result of the mining operation. The finding actually states "the (aquifer performance) test measured effects of pumping from the mine production wells for periods ranging from 78 hours to 108 hours at approximately twice the average rate of 2.09 mgd." As discussed in the ruling on exception no. 6, LBCA's assertion of a "worstcase scenario" has factual support in the instant case. The applicant is required to provide reasonable assurance that the proposed use is reasonable, beneficial, will not impact existing legal uses and is consistent with the public interest. The applicant is not required to evaluate LBCA's unspecified worst case scenario or prove the use will not cause any impacts. Florida Audubon Society, supra..; Rudloe, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 113-115, 141, 920). LBCA Exception Number 8 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 23 that no changes in the lake levels are attributable to the pumping at the mine. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. In Finding of Fact No. 24, the hearing officer found that the effects of pumping were not distinguishable from the declines which occurred before and after the ADT test. Therefore, his conclusions are not inconsistent as alleged by the LBCA. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 120-130, 146, 759, 928- 933, 942, 944- 948, 1015-1016, 1122-1123, 1168; Dist. Ex. 5). LBCA Exception Number 9 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 24 that the actual effects of the pumping will be approximately one half of the observed amounts of the 2T test on an average pumping day. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 113-117, 923-996; Dist. Ex. 5). LBCA's claim that this finding is irrelevant since only a "worstcase" scenario is pertinent is likewise rejected. Initially, it is noted that LBCA cites no legal support for its arguments. Furthermore, there is no requirement in the District's rules governing consumptive use which mandates consideration of only "worstcase" scenarios. Furthermore, an agency cannot assume worst case scenarios unless they are reasonably foreseeable, which determination is a case by case factual issue. See Florida Audubon Society, supra., Rudloe, supra.. LBCA Exception Number 10 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 26 that Dr. Stewart testified that the Floridan aquifer is rarely completely homogenous and isotropic but that he and other modelers regularly make that assumption. This Board cannot judge credibility of witnesses or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 738). LBCA Exception Number 11 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 27 that the maximum drawdown in the Floridan aquifer under normal pumping conditions is modeled to be 0.1 to 0.2 feet beneath White Sands Lake. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 129, 182). For the same reasons stated in the ruling on exceptions no. 9 and 7, the LBCA's claim regarding irrelevancy is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 12 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 28 that a decrease in lake levels will be less than that of the decrease in the Floridan aquifer, depending on the rate of leakance and that the drawdown effect will not accumulate over time, but rather will remain constant after reaching steady state conditions. The LBCA is simply rearguing their case. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 118-120, 129, 237, 706-708, 758). LBCA's irrelevancy argument is rejected for the reasons stated in the ruling on exceptions no. 9 and 7. LBCA Exception Number 13 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 42 through 54 as being conclusion of law rather than findings of fact. The LBCA does not cite to the record or make legal argument to support the exception as required by Rule 40C-1 .564, F.A.C. Without said citation or argument, the exception is rejected. Corporation of the President, supra.. The hearing officer's recitation of the individual criteria of Rules 40C-2.301 (2), (4) and (5), F.A.C., serve as introduction to and reference for the specific findings with regard to each criterion to provide clarity in the order. To the extent that expert witnesses presented testimony on the criteria and how the applicant satisfied the criteria through proof, the elements are findings or fact. These additional reasons also serve as ground for rejection of the exception. LBCA Exception Number 14 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 56 that LBCA's referenced exhibits do not correlate with normal conditions when compared with longer periods of time. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. In addition, the hearing officer ultimately did not admit the exhibits and therefore, the Finding of Fact becomes irrelevant. (T. 1152-1168, 411-416, 930- 933, 948, 969; FR Ex. 50A, SOB). Contrary to Rule 40C-1.564(3), F.A.C., LBCA fails to state wish particularity citations to the record or legal basis as required by Rule 40C-1.564, F.A.C., in support of its attack on finding 56 and its inferential attack on findings 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and conclusions 62 and 63. The entire exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 15 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 66 that LBCA's exhibits 61, 64, 65, 71, 75, 76, 78-80, 82 and 83 have limited probative value to the extent it is predicated on FRI's rebuttal testimony. The LBCA argues that the rebuttal testimony is of low probative value. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and, therefore, the exception is rejected. (T. 1152-1168, 411-416, 930-933, 948, 969). Exception is also taken to Findings of Fact Nos. 32, 36, and 56 and Conclusion of Law 62 because LBCA argues that the testimony on which they are based exceeded the scope of direct examination and the LBCA was not given the opportunity to object. The correct time to object was when the alleged improper testimony was elicited. The LBCA did not object to preserve the record and therefore, has waived the objection. Section 90.104(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Finally, LBCA asserts that it was denied the opportunity to present rebuttal testimony in violation of Section 120.57(1)(b)4., Fla. Stat. To the contrary, LBCA was not denied the opportunity to present rebuttal testimony but failed to request surrebuttal and consequently failed to preserve any denial of that request by an objection on the record. (T. 1188-1190). Since LBCA never requested surrebuttal, the hearing officer never denied that request and, therefore, LBCA's argument is without merit. Furthermore, pursuant to the order of presentation under Rule 40C- 1.5434(1), F.A.C., which is followed in a permitting proceeding (applicant, petitioner, district), LBCA's entire case tended to be in the nature of rebuttal to the applicant's case. While the hearing officer did state that he did not ordinarily allow surrebuttal (T. 1169) before the rebuttal testimony was concluded, LBCA never affirmatively requested to present surrebuttal evidence or testimony nor did LBCA proffer any such evidence or testimony. Since no proffer was made of any relevant surrebuttal testimony which LBCA contends was excluded, and no objection was made in the record to LBCA's belief that it was prohibited from adducing surrebuttal evidence, it is now precluded from complaining about this perceived adverse ruling. King v. Estate of King, 554 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Holmes v. Redland Construction Co., 557 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990); Roberts v. Hollway, 581 So.2d 619 (a. 4th DCA 1991); Diaz v. Rodriguez, 384 So.2d 906 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). The exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 16 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 52 and 55 and Conclusions of Law 62 and 63. Findings of Fact 18, 19, 21, 52 and 55 and Conclusions of Law 62 and 63 are discussed in subsequent exceptions and therefore arc not addressed in this ruling on exceptions. LBCA's exception to Finding of Fact 20 fails to state with particularity any supporting citations to the record or legal argument as required by Rule 40C- 1.564 (3), F.A.C., and is therefore, rejected. LBCA takes exception to Finding of Fact 17 that the hearing officer incorrectly refers to three distinct water quality studies. In fact, the hearing officer actually refers to "numerous analyses" LBCA also objects to the reference to "unknown persons" in the finding and apparently to the statement: "They include analyses conducted by the District in 1989 and 1992, including sampling of water quality and an analysis of the background levels of certain parameters, and an assessment of data from HRS testing in March 1989 and May 1992." Clarification that HRS personnel conducted sampling in 1989 and 1992 is provided; however, since these personnel were never specifically named, to that extent the hearing officer's reference to "unknown persons" is accurate. (T. 1035, 379). The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 102-103, 130- 133, 451, 1023-1037, 1041- 1048, 1151-1152). LBCA Exception Number 17 The LBCA takes exception to that part of the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 18 that states: "This theory was predicated on... an assumption that a chemical reaction was occurring because herbicides were used in the dredge pond." LBCA fails to prove any supporting transcript citations in violation of Rule 40C- 1.564 (3), F.A.C. In Finding of Fact 18, the hearing officer reached the conclusion that none of the water quality samples taken from the mine site indicate a violation of state water quality standards. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. It is improper for this Board to retry the case after the hearing has concluded by altering findings and reweighing evidence. Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc., supra.. This Board cannot judge credibility of witnesses or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and the exception is rejected. (T. 133, 575, 1024-1025). LBCA Exception Number 18 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 19 by arguing that water quality on the mine site says nothing about off site impacts and positing that the finding is predicated on certain speculation. LBCA offers no helpful record citations supporting these allegations. Expert testimony established that water quality sampling by FRI and the District of the surficial aquifer at the locations chosen was where water quality impacts would be most likely to be revealed and consequently was a conservative approach. (T. 133, 144, 1029-1030, 1061, 1073). This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 130-139, 141-144, 575-576, 1028-1031, 1061-10 65, 1073, 1136-1139). LBCA Exception Number 19 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 21 by stating that it misleadingly implies that 212 homes were tested for water quality by HRS. To the contrary, the hearing officer's finding states "12 out of 212 homeowners" (emphasis added) south of the mine site were tested, not 212. In addition, the exhibits referenced do not reflect the testing of 212 homes. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and the exception is rejected. (T. 167-168, 379, 990, 1036-1037, 1041, 1048-1050, 1052-1053). LBCA Exception Number 20 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 21 on the basis that it is a legal conclusion which misrepresents and misapplies the state water quality standards. However, LBCA cites no authority or record citation for the argument as required by Rule 40C-1.564(3), F.A.C. The finding actually states "with the exception of one well... the water from the homeowners' wells did not exceed background water quality for iron and manganese"; clearly, this is a factual statement. This exception, under the guise of an unsupported legal argument, goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial, and uncontroverted, evidence which, incidentally, includes explanation and citation to the relevant exception/standard. Furthermore, the parties stipulated that official recognition was taken of chapter 17-520, F.A.C. The exception is rejected. (T. 1034, 1041, 1077-1078; Prehearing Stip. p 12; Rules 17- 520.420(2) and 17-520.200(11), F.A.C.) LBCA Exception Number 21 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 21 that the 1989 water quality samples by HRS were unreliable because of the uncertainty regarding the sampling technique protocol. This exception erroneously states there was no evidence of sampling protocol used by HRS. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 1039-1049). LBCA Exception Number 22 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 52 that the receiving body of water will not be seriously harmed, by characterizing the finding as being predicated on an unproven theory that the surficial aquifer receives all groundwater discharged from one site. LBCA has failed to read the entire finding which clearly reveals that the hearing officer did not confine his consideration to the surficial aquifer. He found that water quality standards would not be violated in the surfical aquifer, where the highest concentrations of any potential contaminants would appear, then they would not be violated in any intermediate aquifer similarly, no violations would occur in one Floridan aquifer. The decision to believe one expert over another is the role of the hearing officer, and the decision cannot be altered absent a complete lack of competent substantial evidence from which the finding could be reasonably inferred. Fla. Chapter of Sierra Club, supra.. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 105, 141-142, 1025-1030, 1034-1035). LBCA Exception Number 23 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 55 that water quality sampling was collected to evaluate a water budget for the dredge pond. In their responses to this exception, FRI explicitly notes it has no response to this exception and District counsel concedes that although water quality samples were taken from the dredge pond and a water budget was calculated for the dredge pond, these two procedures were not linked to one another. The testimony of FRI witnesses is that water quality sampling and data to determine the water budget for the dredge pond were performed. (T. 76, 103). Counsel for FRI and the District have stipulated that the testimony does not support the finding that the water quality samples were used to evaluate the water budget. Since, as stipulated, this portion of the hearing officer's finding is not supported by any evidence in the record, the exception is accepted. LBCA Exception Number 24 The LBCA takes exception to the nearing officer's Finding of Fact 55, arguing that the applicant did not perform an environmental assessment of Lake Brooklyn, and thus cannot fairly draw any conclusions about its operation's impact on that lake. The Finding of Fact describes the site-specific information which supports the application. The pertinent part of the finding states: "FRI conducted an assessment of the environmental impacts to the wetland and wildlife resources of the area lakes, including White Sands, Spring and Gator Bone Lakes." To the extent Lake Brooklyn is encompassed by use of the term "area lakes", the existence of an assessment of the impacts to Lake Brooklyn is supported by expert testimony. (T. 281, 899). Additionally, the finding is otherwise supported by competent substantial evidence. (T. 266-280). The exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 25 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 31 which states in pertinent part: "petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart opined that there is insufficient data to determine whether any impacts to lake levels are occurring." LBCA is essentially complaining that the entirety of Dr. Stewart's testimony should be credited not just a portion. The role of the hearing officer is to consider and weigh all the evidence, resolve conflicts and judge credibility of the witnesses. The hearing officer apparently did not view all of Dr. Stewart's testimony in the same manner as LBCA's attorney; such is his legal prerogative. If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry, supra.. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 784-786, 145- 146, 232-233, 285-286, 288-289, 897-898, 1085). LBCA Exception Number 26 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 24 that the rate of decline (in Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes) during the APT test was not distinguishable from the declines which occurred before or after the test. LBCA provides no record citations to support its argument that since the hearing officer rejected its use of certain APT data in an attempted correlation between pumping and Lake Brooklyn levels, that all the APT data was entirely discredited and could have no value in an analysis regarding Spring, White Sands or Gator Bone Lakes. If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 941-948, 1015-1016, 1123, 1168). RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW LBCA Exception Number 1 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 62 and 63 and Findings of Fact 42 through 54 (which LBCA alleges should be conclusions of law) that FRI has established its entitlement to the permit. LBCA argues that the applicant failed to present sufficient information about conditions at Lake Brooklyn. LBCA's numerous "factual" statements in this exception are unsupported by record citations. The burden of proof in an administrative hearing falls initially upon the party asserting the affirmative of an issue, i.e. entitlement to a permit. Rules 40C-1.545 and 40C-2.301(7), F.A.C.; Capeletti Brothers v. Department of General Services, 432 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The party must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Florida Audubon Society v. South Florida Water Management District, 13 F.A.L.R. 4169 (undated). The applicant's burden is to establish reasonable assurances that the proposed use is a reasonable-beneficial use, will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of water, and is consistent with the public interest. Section 373.223, Fla. Stat. The burden of reasonable assurances is not one of absolute guarantees. City of Sunrise v. Indian Trace Community Dev. Dist., 14 F.A.L.R. 866 (January 16, 1992). The impacts which are reasonably expected to result from issuance of the permit must be addressed, not potential impacts or those that might occur Hoffert v. St. Joe Paper Co., 12 F.A.L.R. 4972 (December 6, 1990); Chipola Basin Protective Group Inc. v. Florida Chapter of Sierra Club, 11 F.A.L.R. 467 (Department of Environmental Regulation, December 29, 1988); Florida Keys Citizen Coalition v. 1800 Atlantic Developers, 8 F.A.L.R. 5564 (Department of Environmental Regulation, October 17, 1986). Once the party asserting the affirmative, FRI, has presented its prima facia case, the burden shifts to the LBCA to present contrary evidence. 1800 Atlantic Developers, supra.; Hoffert, supra.. LBCA cites Booker Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Mobil Chemical Co., 481 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) in support of the exception. In Booker Creek, the Court held that additional testing, beyond that offered by the applicant, should have been done before the permit could be issued. Booker Creek was limited to its unique set of facts by the case of Berry v. Dept. of Env. Regulation, 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). The Berry Court, in dealing with a dredge and fill permit, refused to extend the Booker Creek holding to such permits, noting that the permit under consideration in Berry, was not a pollutant discharge permit. The permit in issue here also is not a pollutant discharge permit. More importantly, like the applicant in Berry, FRI offered evidence of extensive testing and analysis regarding where water comes from and goes to at the mine site and in the surrounding vicinity. Finding of Fact No. 55. LBCA incorrectly argues that the modeling information submitted by FRI has no applicability to impacts at Lake Brooklyn, because the model "did not include Lake Brooklyn". Particularly, in view of findings of fact 23, 28, 31-36 (exceptions to which have been previously rejected), it is apparent that the hearing officer rejected LBCA's view of the "facts" stated in this exception. While the model boundary (which is based on water level data for Floridan wells in the region (T. 164)) is between Lake Brooklyn and the pumping wells at the mine, the drawdown at the model boundary is based on a distance-drawdown relationship that relates to the pumping rate at the mine. The 1991 transient model showed that within the 9 square mile boundary, the impacts at the boundary were no more than 0.1 feet. (T. 129, 178). The reduced boundaries in the 1992 model accurately predicted what was happening at the mine site. (T. 178). The distance-drawdown relationship established by the model shows that the drawdown contour ceases before the model boundary is reached and therefore, before Lake Brooklyn is reached. (FR Exs. 5, 22). Impacts to Lake Brooklyn were also assessed through the review of water levels in the Floridan aquifer well (C- 120) between 1960 and 1992. (T. 928-933). The data showed that water levels in the well at Lake Brooklyn actually continued to rise when the 1989 and 1991 pump tests were conducted. (T. 411-412, 931-933; SJRWMD Ex. 13). In addition, when the pumping wells at the mine were turned off, the water level in the well at Lake Brooklyn did not recover. This indicates that there were outside influences for the fluctuation in the well. (T. 415, 933). The data does not show impacts from the pumping at the sand mine. (T. 942). LBCA also erroneously states that groundwater in the Floridan aquifer beneath Lake Brooklyn flows toward the mine. (See ruling on LBCA's factual exception 5). As listed in responses to LBCA's factual exceptions, particularly those regarding exceptions 8 and 12, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the bindings regarding no adverse impact to Lake Brooklyn. The hearing officer found that the applicant met its burden or proof in Conclusion of Law 62. In Conclusion of Law 63, the hearing officer concluded that the LBCA did not meet its burden of presenting contrary evidence that the withdrawals at the sand mine correlate with the decline in water levels at Lake Brooklyn. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. This exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 2 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 63 that additional permit conditions in the case of a water shortage or a shorter permit duration are not necessary. The LBCA is reargue their case in the exception. The District has authority to require FRI to reduce its water use during a water shortage within the seven year life of the permit. Sections 373.175 and 373.246, Fla. Stat., and Rules 40C-2.381(2)(a)2. and 40C-21.271, F.A.C. Rule 40C-2.381(2)(a)2., F.A.C., which is incorporated into the permit as a limiting condition, states: Nothing in this permit should be construed to limit the authority of the St. Johns River Water Management District to declare a water shortage and issue orders pursuant to section 373.175, F.S., or to formulate a plan for implementation during periods of water shortage, pursuant to section 373.246, F.S. In the event a water shortage, is declared by the District Governing Board, the permittee must adhere to the water shortage restrictions, as specified by the District, even though the specified water shortage restrictions may be inconsistent with the terms and conditions of this permit. (emphasis added). Rule 40C-21.271, F.A.C., General Water Use Restrictions, specifies the restrictions which may be imposed during a water shortage on all water users and states, in pertinent parts: The Board may order use of general water use restrictions and the water use restrictions specified in Part VI for the appropriate water shortage phase for each affected source class. Further, the Board may order any combination in lieu of or in addition to the restrictions specified in Part VI of the restrictions described in Subsection (3), by use or method of withdrawal class, within each source class, if necessary to achieve the necessary percent reduction in overall demand. (emphasis added). General water use restrictions which may be imposed include provisions that facilitate the right of water users in an area to make voluntary agreements among themselves, with the concurrence of the Board or the Executive Director, providing for the mutual reduction, sharing, or rotation of use; restrictions on the total amount of water that may be used, diverted, impounded, extracted, or withdrawn during any day, month, or year during the declared shortage; restrictions on the timing of use, diversion, impoundment, extraction, or withdrawal of water; restrictions on pumping rates and schedules or diversion rates and schedules; or such other provisions or restrictions as are necessary to protect the water resources from serious harm. With the above cited authority, the District can require the withdrawals at the sand mine to be reduced during periods of water shortage within the seven year term of the permit by reducing the total amount withdrawn, controlling the schedule of withdrawals or "by other restrictions which arc necessary to protect the water resources." The hearing officer's conclusion is consistent with the rules and statutes which govern the Board. The exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 3 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 63 and Finding of Fact 47 that FRI satisfied the criteria regarding water conservation measures. See Rule 40C-2.301(4)(e), F.A.C. The LBCA reargues the facts which the hearing officer found to support the conclusion. However, the LBCA offered no evidence to rebut the testimony of FRI. In addition, the LBCA cites no authority that the hearing officer's conclusion is contrary to law. Florida Audubon Society v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 9 F.A.L.R. 565 (October 31, 1986). LBCA also renews its attack on the allocation amount, essentially iterating its factual exception which is rejected for the reasons set forth therein. It is improper for this Board to retry the case after the hearing has concluded by altering findings and reweighing evidence. Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc., 376 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). LBCA's exception lacks any record citations or legal authority in support of this exception. The conclusion and finding are supported by competent substantial, and uncontroverted, evidence and the exception is rejected. (T. 43-52, 106, 234- 237, 988-989, 1103- 1104, 1111, 1132-1133) LBCA Exception Number 3 (sic). The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 63, by arguing that the use of water from the surficial aquifer requires a separate permit. Section 40C-2.051, F.A.C., states: No permit shall be required under the provisions of this rule for the following water uses: Withdrawals of ground or surface water to facilitate construction on or below ground surface ..., in the following circum- stances: ground water may be withdrawn if it is recharged on site to the aquifer from which it was withdrawn by either infiltration or direct injection; surface water may be withdrawn only from wholly owned impoundments or works which are no deeper than the lowest extent of the uppermost water bearing stratum and which have no surface hydrologic connection off site, and the surface water must be recharged on site to the uppermost water bearing stratum by either infiltration or direct injection. This exemption from permitting is applicable here, and therefore, no additional permit is required. An agency's interpretation of its rules is afforded great weight. Franklin Ambulance Service v. DHRS, 45 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). LBCA offered no auth-orty or evidence that the District's interpretation is contrary to established law. This conclusion is supported by competent substantial evidence. The exception is rejected. (T. 38-39, 105, 249, 972, 1101-1102). RULINGS ON EXCEPTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONTAINED IN POST- HEARING EVIDENTIARY RULING LBCA excepts the hearing officer's rulings in Finding of Fact No. 56 and Conclusion of Law No, 66 excluding LBCA exhibits nos. 61, 64, 71, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82 and 83 as inadmissible for failure of LBCA to comply with subsection 90.956, Fla. Stat., regarding use of summaries of evidence. LBCA takes exception to FRI's objection post-hearing alleging that the exhibits had been admitted. In fact, the exhibits were not admitted at hearing. The LBCA's citation to the transcript is not the hearing officer's ruling on the exhibits. The hearing officer did not admit the ten exhibits on the record, as he did with every other exhibit that he admitted. The LBCA's assertion that it believed the exhibits were admitted is belied by LBCA's failure to list them as admitted in its Proposed Recommended Order on page 3. Therefore, LBCA's claim that FRI's continuing objection was a surprise is without merit. LBCA asserts that FRI cannot make a post-hearing objection to the exhibits in its Proposed Recommended Order and infers gnat FRI's objection to the admission of the exhibits was not preserved at hearing. Rule 40C-1.561, F.A.C., provides for the submission of legal briefs along with proposed findings of fact and conclusions or law. For matters that remain pending at the close of a hearing, a party may file a legal brief in support of its position. FRI did not object to the opinion testimony of the LBCA expert witness, only to the graphic depictions of such testimony. (T. 356). LBCA stated at hearing that the excluded exhibits were simply graphic depictions of the expert's opinion testimony. (T. 354). The record is abundantly clear that FRI preserved its objection to the exhibits and the hearing officer reserved ruling on their admission until the recommended order was issued. (T. 353, 358, 360, 363, 369, 370, 375, 377, 524, 531, 537, 1079-1080, 1178). LBCA essentially asserts that the exhibits are not "summaries" and therefore not subject to subsection 90.956, Fla. Stat., which, of course, the fact-finder found otherwise. LBCA's reliance on Marks v. Marks, 576 So.2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) is misplaced. Marks did not hold that expert testimony is not subject to subsection 90.956, but only that an expert is not required to utilize subsection 90.956 when presenting underlying data relied on for his opinion. The hearing officer found that the hydrographs were summaries and the underlying information was not indicated on the summary. The hearing officer allowed FRI time to review the data and present rebuttal. The fact-finder is entitled to great latitude in admitting or excluding summary evidence. Wright v. Southwest Bank, 554 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1977)(trial court without jury is entitled to great latitude covering the admission or exclusion of summary evidence). LBCA has failed to show that the hearing officer abused this discretion in excluding the exhibits. LBCA also takes exception that LBCA was denied rebuttal, or surrebuttal, on FRI's rebuttal case. As discussed in the ruling on LBCA's Exception 15, LBCA failed to request rebuttal of FRI's case. The hearing officer allowed cross-examination and LBCA did not offer any additional evidence from LBCA witnesses. Since the LBCA never requested to offer rebuttal testimony, then the hearing officer could not and did not deny that request. It is well-settled that an objection must be preserved during an administrative proceeding or it will be deemed waived. DeMendoza v. First Federal Savings and Loan, 585 So.2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)(even if mistake was made in trial, party's waived its right to appeal the issue since it failed to call the deficiency to the court's attention during trial); Yachting Arcade, Inc. v. Riverwalk Condominium Assoc., 500 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)(party's failure to object to matters at administrative hearing made those matters unreviewable, even though party claimed fundamental procedural errors, it failed to show how it was prejudiced by any such action or omission; National Dairy Products, Corp. v. Odham, 121 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1959). Therefore, LBCA's exception based on the denial of rebuttal is rejected. LBCA argues that-the proper vehicle for the objection was a motion for rehearing. LBCA does not cite authority for its assertion. Since the hearing officer never ruled on the admissibility, there was no order on which to base a motion for rehearing. Nevertheless, the alleged error, if any, of excluding the exhibits, was harmless. Sims v. Brown, 574 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1991)(exclusion of manual was harmless since experts testified to the same matters in the manual); Little v. Banker's National Life Insurance Co., 369 So.2d 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)(harmless error to exclude letter since witnesses otherwise testified at length as to its contents and conclusions). The LBCA expert testified extensively regarding the basis of each excluded exhibit and the information it depicts in relation to the conclusions of his expert opinion which the hearing officer weighed in rendering his factual findings and conclusions. (T. 346, 349, 351, 352, 358, 359, 364, 366, 371, 373, 411, 456, 457, 458, 481, 486, 501, 504, 507, 509, 511, 512, 516, 517, 518, 519, 542). The hearing officer concluded that even if the exhibits had been admitted it would not have altered his factual findings stating that they had limited probative value. (Conclusion of Law No. 66). Therefore, the exception is rejected. RULING ON RECOMMENDED ORDER'S COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 120.59(2), FLA. STAT. LBCA asserts that the hearing officer failed to comply with subsection 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., by not providing a sufficiently explicit ruling on each of the parties' proposed findings of fact. Section 120,59(2), Fla. Stat., requires "a ruling upon each proposed finding" The Appendix to the Recommended Order does not contain an omnibus "blanket" ruling on all of LBCA's proposed findings which the courts have found inadequate. Cf. Island Harbor beach Club v. DNR, 476 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Health Care Management, Inc. v. DHRS, 479 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The Appendix clearly contains a ruling upon each of LBCA's proposed findings. Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., requires no more. LBCA relies on Island Harbor Beach Club v. DNR, 476 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), to support this argument. Island Harbor Beach Club, differs significantly from this case. The order Island Harbor Beach Club did not individually address each specific proposed finding as the Recommended Order in this case does. The only reference to proposed findings made in the Island Harbor Beacon Club order was a single paragraph which stated: The parties proposed findings of fact have been considered and where unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, cumulative, or subordinate. This differs from the Recommended Order in the instant case which specifically addresses each proposed finding and specifies where (by paragraph) in the Recommended Order that proposed finding is addressed. It is elementary to then read the paragraph referred to in the Recommended Order to determine what portion of the proposed finding was accepted. More applicable to this case is the case of Schomer v. Department of Professional Regulation, 417 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The order in Schomer did not contain specific rulings on each proposed finding submitted by the Appellant. The substance of the final order, however, demonstrated that each finding had been considered and ruled on. The Court noted that, for purposes of complying with Section 120.59(2) Fla. Stat., It would not elevate form over substance." An agency need not Independently quote verbatim each proposed finding and independently dispose of that proposed finding; rather, it is sufficient that the agency provide in its decision a written foundation upon which the reviewing court may assure that all proposed findings of fact have been consider and ruled upon and not overlooked or concealed. Id. at 1090. The Court held that it could discern from the substance of the order that each of the proposed findings were addressed, and to the extent the technical requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., were departed from, the departure did not materially impair the fairness or correctness of the proceedings. Id. at 1091. LBCA merely has to compare the hearing officer's findings with its proposed findings to discern those portions accepted. Therefore, the exception is rejected. RULING ON MOTION FOR REMAND Pursuant, to Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., LBCA has filed a Motion for Remand asserting that newly discovered evidence establishes that a finding by the hearing officer is inaccurate because of allegedly false testimony by District expert witness, Dr. Larry Lee. The hearing officer found that Lake Brooklyn had been in a period of decline before and after the 1989 aquifer pump test and that due to rainfall deficits Brooklyn Bay was separated from the main body of Lake Brooklyn for at least 18 to 24 months before and during the 1989 aquifer performance test. The hearing officer determined that the rate and character of declines during the pumping were not distinguishable from the declines occurring before and after the test. Thus, he found that impacts to Lake Brooklyn water levels from the pumping were indistinguishable from the declines due to drought. (Finding of Fact No. 30). LBCA asserts that a newly discovered Department of Transportation (D.O.T.) survey, dated October 11, 1988, shows that Brooklyn Bay was not segregated from the remainder of the lake due to drought conditions prior to the 1989 aquifer pump test as testified by Dr. Lee and seeks the Board to remand the issue to the hearing officer for consideration of this new evidence. The only reasons for remand regarding fact finding are if an erroneous legal conclusion by a hearing officer warrants taking of evidence on the issue, or if a factual issue was never ruled upon by the hearing officer. See Miller v. Dept. Envt'l Reg., 5504 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(agency's modification of legal conclusions necessitated factual findings on issue which hearing officer had initially disregarded as irrelevant) and Cohn v. Dept. of Prof. Reg., 477 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)(when the hearing officer fails to find a specific fact, agency must remand to the hearing officer to do so). Clearly, neither of these reasons have any application to Petitioner's arguments. Although subsection 40C-1.512, F.A.C., provides that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to District administrative proceedings to the extent not inconsistent with Chapter 120 or Chapter 40C-1, the applicability of Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., is problematic and inconsistent with a subsection 120.57 proceeding. First, the civil procedure rule only applies to final judgments and in this subsection 120.57 administrative proceeding LBCA is attempting to apply the civil procedure rule to a nonfinal recommended order. Second, LBCA has not expressly excepted Finding of Fact No. 30 as not supported by competent substantial evidence or that a Board rule or policy has been incorrectly interpreted /1 , but actually seeks the Board to allow LBCA to supplement the record after remand with new facts for the hearing officer to weigh in applying those facts to the applicable District rules. Thus, unlike a trial court, Finding of Fact No. 30 cannot be altered by this Board if supported by any competent substantial evidence. Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Fla. Stat.; Freeze v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 556 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); School Board of Leon County v. Weaver, 556 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The Board may only consider whether the findings actually made by the hearing officer are sustained by the evidence, and whether, if so, they support the recommended legal conclusions. Cohn v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 477 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Unlike a judge with plenary and equitable powers in a judicial setting, this Board, under Chapter 120, cannot authorize fact- finding after a hearing's conclusion except in the most narrow circumstances, none of which are applicable to the motion before the Board. Cf. Manasota 88, Inc. v. Tremor, 545 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(may remand if hearing officer makes erroneous legal interpretation); Cohn, supra.. (may remand if a necessary factual issue was not determined by the hearing officer); Friends of Children v. DHRS, 504 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(may remand if hearing officer makes erroneous evidentiary ruling). In effect, LBCA wants to utilize a civil procedure rule for the Board to authorize additional fact-finding on a matter already considered by the hearing officer regarding a finding supported by competent substantial evidence. Section 120.57, Fla. Stat., simply does not authorize the Board to take such action. Section 120.57(1)(b)10, Fla. Stat.; Dept. of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)(chapter 120 does not allow additional or cumulative evidence on matters already considered and the APA does not envision a never-ending process). Consequently, the application of Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., is inconsistent with Chapter 120 and LBCA is free to raise any alleged error at hearing on appeal of the final order. Even assuming Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., is applicable to this subsection 120.57 proceeding, LBCA has failed to clearly establish the extraordinary circumstances warranting the granting of its motion. The material issue of whether FRI's proposed pumping would impact the area lake levels already effected by a rainfall deficit was expressly raised by LBCA in its initial petition for hearing as far back as August 1992 and was also an issue stipulated in the Prehearing Stipulation prior to the February 1993 hearing. (Petition for Administrative Hearing paragraph f. 2, 3, 4.; Prehearing Stip. paragraphs B. 2, G. 1). Consequently, LBCA had over five months prior to hearing to elicit all relevant evidence to that Issue. If Rule 1.540(b) was applicable, LBCA's burden would be to clearly establish the following to receive relief: (1) it must appear that the evidence is such as will probably change the-result if a new trial is granted; (2) that it has been discovered since the trial; (3) that it could not have been discovered before one trial by the exercise of due diligence; and (4) that it is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching. City of Winter Haven v. Tuttle/White Construction Inc., 370 So.2d 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); King v. Harrington, 411 So.2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), rev denied, 418 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 1982). The predicate for LBCA's motion is that Dr. Lee's testimony regarding the lake separation was false, therefore LBCA could not have exercised due diligence in discovering the alleged new evidence. LBCA has filed no express exception with record support establishing that Finding of Fact No. 30 is not supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the Board by law cannot alter that factual finding. Section 40C-1.564(3), F.A.C.; Section 120.37(1)(b)10., Fla. Stat.; Freeze, supra.. Consequently, Dr. Lee's testimony is not false. Importantly, Dr. Lee's testimony was not the only evidence supporting this finding. LBCA's own witness, the president of the association, testified that Brooklyn Bay had been segregated for four or five years from the main part of the lake and that he had been able to walk across the lake without getting wet for the last four or five years. (T. 863, 870). Likewise, LBCA's own expert stated that Lake Brooklyn's condition between 1989 to 1991 had receded to such an extent as it was no longer a continuous lake. (T. 317). Accordingly, the predicate for LBCA's motion is factually inaccurate and misplaced. Furthermore, LBCA must clearly establish that even though the exercise of due diligence before the hearing, it would not have discovered the 1988 D.O.T. survey. Brav v. Electric Door-Lift Inc., 558 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(movant's burden to establish due diligence); Plisco v. Union Railroad Co., 379 F.2d 15 (3d DCA 1967)(motion for new trial on newly discovered evidence is granted only where extraordinary circumstances are present). Even though the effects of FRI's proposed pumping on lake levels in time of rainfall deficit was an issue dating back to August 1992, LBCA asserts that it could not have obtained the survey prior to hearing in February 1993 "because of the logistics of requesting public records and the delay in delivery of same." LBCA could have reasonably anticipated that witnesses would testify regarding the disputed issue, particularly its own witnesses, and obtained the survey with the exercise of due diligence. LBCA offers no basis why D.O.T. would not have supplied the survey as required by law or that LBCA could not obtain it and, in fact, the public records law contains a provision for obtaining immediate relief if a request for records is denied. See subsection 119.11, Fla. Stat. In Florida Audubon Society v. Ratner, 497 So.2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), a 1981 judgment had been entered finding that limestone mining would be inconsistent with the water management purposes of a water management district's flowage easement on platiff's property. Plaintiff sought a new trial because of newly discovered opposing evidence in a 1980 Corps of Engineers report on the effects of limestone mining. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court agreed finding that the granting of such motions was disfavored and that the report was prepared in September 1980 well before the trial and judgment in June 1981 and could have been discovered prior to the with the exercise of due diligence. Likewise in this proceeding, the proffered D.O.T. survey was prepared in October 1988, nearly four and one-half years before the February 1993 hearing and LBCA has failed to show that due diligence would not have discovered the survey prior to the administrative hearing in this proceeding. See also, Morhaim v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 559 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(no new trial granted based on post-judgment affidavits regarding evidence on known issue that could have been discovered prior to trial). LBCA also asserts that Dr. Lee misrepresented the contents of Clark's "Report of Investigations No. 33-Hydrology of Brooklyn Lake Near Keystone Heights, Florida" regarding its conclusions and his opinion concerning the separation of Brooklyn Bay from Lake Brooklyn and thus prejudiced LBCA's case. LBCA argument is an attack on the weight of the conflicting evidence which is the job of the hearing officer to resolve. An expert witness is not required to disclose the facts and data underlying his opinion. Marks v. Marks, 576 So.2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). LBCA could have cross examined Dr. Lee regarding the separation. LBCA was aware of the "Clark Report" (T. 844) and even anticipated testimony regarding water levels in its case in chief (T. 846). Indeed, the report was listed by LBCA as its Exhibit 13 in the Prehearing Stipulation, although LBCA chose not to introduce it into evidence during the hearing. Dr. Lee testified not once but twice about the location of the staff gauge (T. 946 and 962-966). On cross, LBCA did not inquire about the location of the staff gauge or the lack of water beneath the bridge. (T. 991-1017). It was LBCA's burden to challenge the factual basis for Dr. Lee's opinion. City of Hialeah v. Weatherford, 466 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). An insufficiency in the expert opinion offered, if any, should have been addressed in cross-examination by LBCA, not by a post-hearing motion. LBCA alleges that the outcome would be different if the DOT survey were part of the evidence. The Board cannot accept new evidence or rule on the admissibility of evidence which was not presented to the hearing officer. The Finding of Fact to which LBCA refers states six reasons why the correlation between the pumping at the sand mine and its effects on Lake Brooklyn water level were not established. See Recommended Order, Finding of Fact 32. The location of the staff gauge in Brooklyn Bay rather than Lake Brooklyn was one of those six. LBCA's error was in not knowing the location of the staff gauge (T. 418-420) rather than the testimony of Dr. Lee. Therefore, LBCA's allegation that but for the testimony of Dr. Lee, the hearing officer would have found differently is unfounded. The mere chance that the hearing officer might have found differently is insufficient to remand the hearing for additional fact finding. Cluett v. Dep't of Professional Regulation, 530 So.2d 351, 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The courts look with disfavor on motions based on newly discovered evidence because to look with favor would bring about a looseness in practice and encourage counsel to neglect to gather all available evidence for a first trial by speculating upon the outcome, and then, being defeated, become for the first time duly diligent in securing other evidence to cure the defects or omissions in their showing upon the first trial. Rushing v. Chappell, 247 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); Henderson Sians v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 397 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). It is well-settled that no abuse of discretion occurs on the part of an agency by refusing to direct a remand to receive evidence which could have been introduced during the course of the original proceedings. Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) LBCA has failed to clearly establish a right to relief and therefore the motion is denied. RULING ON MOTION FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION AND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD LBCA has filed a Motion for Official Recognition and to Supplement the Record seeking the Board to accept into evidence the October 11, 1988 D.O.T. survey which was the subject of LBCA's Motion for Remand and also the U.S.G.S. publication "Report of Investigations No. 33-Hydrology of Brooklyn Lake Near Keystone Heights, Florida", by Clark, also referenced In LBCA's Motion for Remand. The Board is not a fact-finder in this subsection 120.57 proceeding and it is reversible error for the Board to supplement the record through post-hearing evidence. Section 120.57(1)(b)10, Fla. stat., Marks v. Northwest Florida Water Management District, 566 So.2d 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)(court refused to take judicial notice of factual matter based on records that could have been offered at administrative hearing); Nest v. Dept. of Professional Regulation 490 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Shongut v Mark, 173 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)(Where matters raised on motion for relief from judgment could have been available to movant during trial proceedings, denial of motion was not abuse of discretion); Weaver, supra.. Moreover, the Motion for Remand has been denied. LBCA's post- hearing motions will be available as part of the record of this proceeding for purposes of any appeal which may be pursued. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: The Recommended Order dated June 4, 1993, attached hereto as Exhibit A, is adopted in its entirety except as modified by the final action of the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District (Ruling on LBCA Exception 23). Florida Rock Industries' application for consumptive use permit no. 2-019-0012AUR is hereby granted under the terms and conditions as provided herein. The post-hearing Motion for Remand, Motion for Official Recognition and Motion to Supplement the Record filed by LBCA are hereby denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of July 1993, in Palatka, Florida. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT By: JOE E. HILL CHAIRMAN RENDERED this 14th day of July 1993. By: SANDRA L. BERTRAM ASSISTANT DISTRICT CLERK
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Respondent, Florida Rock Industries (FRI or applicant), a Florida corporation, operates a nine hundred and eighty acre sand mine known as the Goldhead Sand Mine (Goldhead) in Clay County, Florida. The mine is located approximately six miles northeast of Keystone Heights and fifty miles southwest of Jacksonville. FRI has operated the mine since 1958. With the exception of eighty acres of land owned by FRI, the remainder of the land on which the mine is located is owned by Carroll-Phillips Investors and has been leased to FRI since 1973. The mine lies within the jurisdictional boundaries of respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District (District), a special taxing district created by the legislature and charged with the responsibility for administering and enforcing permitting programs for consumptive uses of water. FRI is accordingly subject to the District's regulatory authority. As a necessary component of its operation, FRI withdraws approximately 2.09 million gallons per day (MGD) of groundwater from the Floridan Aquifer which is used in the production of sand. This use of water is made pursuant to a consumptive use permit (no. 2-019-0012U) issued to FRI by the District on December 11, 1984, and which allows it to consume 762.85 million gallons per year of groundwater for hydraulic dredging, cleaning and purification of sand at the Goldhead mine. The permit was issued for seven years. In order to continue groundwater withdrawal and use, FRI has applied to the District for a seven-year renewal of its permit with no request for an increase in allocation. That request, which has been identified as application no. 2-019-0012AUR, is the subject of this proceeding. After conducting a review of the application, making site inspections, and performing various studies and analyses, on July 28, 1992, the District, through its staff, gave notice of its intent to approve the application with certain conditions. Thereafter, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, Lake Brooklyn Civic Association, Inc. (petitioner), a nonprofit corporation made up of property owners in adjacent areas of Clay County, filed a petition under Subsection 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, seeking to contest the proposed action. Petitioner is a citizen of the state and has an interest in activities that may injure or harm the state's water resources. Thus, it has standing to bring this action. As twice amended, the petition generally alleged that the consumptive use would (a) cause an unmitigated adverse impact on adjacent land uses, including a significant reduction in water levels in Lake Brooklyn and Spring, Gator Bone, and White Sands Lake, which lie generally to the south and southwest of the mine site, (b) cause a deterioration in water quality, (c) cause economic or environmental harm, and (d) be for purposes other than operating a sand mine. The broad three-pronged test to be used in determining whether the permit should be issued is whether the proposed consumptive use is a reasonable- beneficial use, whether it will interfere with presently existing legal uses of water, and whether it is consistent with the public interest. In addressing this test, the parties have presented extensive expert testimony involving highly technical subject matter. As might be expected, the experts reached different conclusions as to whether the criteria have been met. In resolving these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive evidence, and this accepted testimony is recited in the findings below. The Mining Site Operations The entire mine site is around 7,000 feet east to west, about one mile north to south in a rectangular shape, and lies within the lake region of northeast Florida. The mine's product is silica sand used for concrete and masonry mortar for construction throughout northeast Florida. As such, it produces an economic benefit to the region. The mine is located on one of the few sites in the northeast Florida area with deposits suitable for construction purposes and is the closest sand mine to the Jacksonville market. In 1958, FRI installed three ten-inch diameter production wells in the center of the mine site. One well is 450 feet deep while the other two are 460 feet deep. The 1984 permit authorizes withdrawals of 762.85 million gallons of water per year, an average rate of 2.09 MGD, and a maximum rate of 3.75 MGD. This rate is consistent with the amount of water used at other mines in north Florida and is based on FRI's projected maximum annual use. The use is industrial commercial for sand mining while the source is the Floridan Aquifer, the lowest acceptable water quality source available capable of producing the requested amount of water. Water use withdrawal from the three wells is monitored by in-line flow meters installed in 1991 as a water control and conservation measure. The pumping rate depends on the number of fixtures and valves open in the system at the time of pumping. However, the actual rate of water production cannot be varied at any of the pumps since the wells are connected to "on or off" pumps. The need for water in the dredge pond and processing plant dictates how long FRI will have a pump in operation. Water from the wells is first discharged into a dredge pond, twenty feet deep, which is an approximately 155-acre excavation lake located in the southwest portion of the mine site. In periods of low water, the water is used to float the dredge, which requires some three feet of water to float, and in conjunction with a bulldozer, to wash sand down from the bank toward the dredge. After the dredge sucks up sand and water from the bottom of the pond, this mixture is slurried to an on-site processing plant where more water is added to sort and wash the sand. The end product (silica sand) is then loaded onto trucks which haul the product to the market. After processing, the moisture content of the sand product is only 5 percent. The tailings (unusable waste product) and wash water are then routed by a slurry pipe to settling areas and eventually recirculated through a system of ditches, canals and water control structures back into the dredge pond. No chemicals are used in the operation. Although FRI's contract with the lessor of the property requires it to maintain the dredge pond elevation at a specified elevation, this requirement cannot be fulfilled during drought conditions. The mining operation is a closed system to the extent there is no point source (surface water) discharge from the system. Even so, a significant amount of water loss occurs during the process, mainly through percolation into the ground. Other water loss occurs through evaporation. The receiving water from the site is primarily the surficial aquifer which recharges the downgradient lakes, including Gator Bone, White Sands, and Spring Lakes. Water may also travel through the surficial aquifer into the sinkholes on site and thence to the Floridan Aquifer. However, not all water is lost to sinkholes in the settling area because they are filled with fine materials. This is confirmed by the fact that water returns to the dredge pond. The mining operation has not affected this pattern. The lakes in the region are replenished solely by rainfall, either by direct rain on the lakes or through water seeping through sands. FRI plans to mine approximately thirty additional acres at the Goldhead Site during the next seven years. To this end, it has secured a management and storage of surface waters permit from the District which allows construction of this additional acreage. It also has acquired an industrial waste water discharge permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation. It is expected that within the next two to four years, FRI will abandon the current dredge pond and start a new one on the north side of the property to accommodate mining operations, or in the alternative, extend the current pond to the north. Water conservation A water conservation plan has been submitted by FRI. Measures already implemented include (a) using in-line flow meters to monitor amounts of withdrawal, (b) not pumping for more than seventeen hours per day to prevent exceeding the maximum allotment per day, (c) regularly monitoring withdrawals to ensure allocations as not being exceeded, (d) extending the plant discharge further past the sinkholes in the settling area to maximize return water to the dredge pond, (e) raising water levels in the settling area to facilitate flow back to the dredge pond, (f) during periods of drought using bulldozers instead of water spray to break loose sand formations, (g) curtailing production when further production would cause the plant to exceed allocations, (h) replacing water-cooled bearings in plant machinery with bearings that do not require water, and (i) restricting dredge mobility to allow operation in shallower water. No other water conservation measures are economically, environmentally or technologically feasible. Hydrogeologic characteristics at the mine site The mine site, which is located within the Upper Etonia Creek surface water drainage basin, generally slopes from 200 feet NGVD on the north to 120 feet NGVD on the south, and is underlain, in order, by approximately 10 to 50 feet of sand (known as the surficial aquifer), 200 feet of dense, moist clay (known as the Hawthorn Formation), and then a highly transmissive limestone formation (known as the Floridan Aquifer). The surficial aquifer flows from north to south across the site while water falling on the site primarily moves downgradient through the surficial aquifer. There are five sinkholes on the site, all having predated the mining activities, which may provide a conduit for recharge from the surficial aquifer to the Floridan aquifer. Except where the Hawthorn formation, a confining unit to the Floridan aquifer, is breached, recharge through the Hawthorn formation is very slow because of the dense clays of that formation. Aquifer characteristics within the Floridan aquifer beneath the site and immediately adjacent thereto are relatively uniform. As noted earlier, 5 percent of the water leaves the mine site as moisture in the sand product. The remaining 95 percent of water is immediately recharged on site to the surficial aquifer through various impoundments, and after entering the surficial aquifer, that portion of the water which is not recirculated to the dredge pond for reuse in the mining process moves either vertically into the Hawthorn formation, vertically into the Floridan aquifer through a sinkhole, downgradient through the surficial aquifer to one of the lakes south of the mine, or evaporates. It is noted that notwithstanding the mining operations, the flow in the surficial aquifer system still parallels the topography as it existed prior to mining, and the same saturated thickness within the surficial aquifer exists on site as existed before mining occurred. Hydrogeologic Characteristics of the Region The region in which the mine is located is very high in topographic altitude indicating that it is a groundwater recharge area. Like the mine site, the region has three distinct geologic units underlying the surface, including sands and clayey sands (surficial aquifer), thick clays (Hawthorn formation) and limestones and dolomites (Floridan aquifer). The Hawthorn unit serves as a confining unit or semi-confining unit between the surficial aquifer, or water table, in the upper unit and the Floridan aquifer in the lower unit. When solution channels develop within the limestones in the lower unit, the openings can cause the overlying units to collapse, forming sinkholes. Thus, when the Hawthorn formation is breached by the development of a sinkhole, water can move rapidly through the overlying units to the Floridan aquifer. Many of the lakes within the region exist over collapsed features within the limestone units beneath them and are referred to as sinkhole lakes. The rate of recharge from each lake depends on the rate of leakance into the Floridan aquifer. Some lakes leak fast, others not at all. For example, Lake Brooklyn fluctuates about two feet, Lake Johnson about thirteen feet, and Pebble Lake about thirty feet. Lake Brooklyn, which lies several miles to the southwest of the mine, is the fourth lake in a chain of lakes consisting of Blue Pond, Sand Hill Lake, Lake Magnolia, Lake Brooklyn, Keystone Lake, Lake Geneva, Oldfield Pond, and Half Moon Lake. All of these lakes are in a different surface water drainage sub-basin within the larger Upper Etonia Creek Basin than the mine site. The lakes above Lake Brooklyn in the chain are at higher elevations than Lake Brooklyn, and when rainfall is sufficient, water flows from Blue Pond to Sand Hill Lake, to Lake Magnolia, and then to Lake Brooklyn through Alligator Creek. Direct rainfall and surface water inflows from Alligator Creek represent the most significant sources of water to Lake Brooklyn. Other pertinent lakes in the area are Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes, which lie almost directly along the mine site's southern boundary and are each less than a mile from the mine's dredge pond. During the period records have been maintained for water levels in Lake Brooklyn, it has fluctuated over a range of slightly more than twenty feet. Although average rainfall within the Upper Etonia Creek Basin is approximately fifty-one inches per year, during the period from 1974 through 1990 the basin experienced a continuing period of below normal rainfall resulting in a cumulative deficit of rainfall for this period of minus seventy-eight inches. Since 1988, the lake region has experienced a severe drought. Because the lakes in the region have risen or fallen in correlation with periods of below normal or above normal rainfall, lake levels have fallen dramatically in recent years. Water levels in Lake Brooklyn began declining in 1974 at the same time the period of below normal rainfall began and continued declining until 1991, a year in which the region experienced above normal rainfall. These low water levels were exacerbated by the cessation of surface water inflows from Alligator Creek in late 1988 which continued until late 1992 when such flows resumed. The cessation of surface water flows into Lake Brooklyn during the period from 1988- 1992 were a direct consequence of the extended period of below normal rainfall in the region. Finally, very little, if any, of the groundwater flowing in the Floridan aquifer beneath Lake Brooklyn flows toward the mine site. Water Quality Impacts Numerous analyses have been conducted to determine water quality of the site, water quality in nearby homeowners' water systems, and water quality impacts of the proposed consumptive use. They include analyses conducted by the District in 1989 and 1992, including sampling of water quality and an analysis of the background levels for certain parameters, and an assessment of data from HRS testing in March 1989 and May 1992. In addition, FRI conducted water quality sampling on site in eight wells, the dredge pond and a settling pond. Finally, petitioner reviewed water quality samples from off-site private water supply wells taken on March 1, 1989, and on July 22, 1992, by unknown persons. As to this latter sampling, petitioner had no knowledge of the protocol used in obtaining the 1989 samples and offered no evidence of reliability of the 1992 data. Thus, the reliability of its assessment is in doubt. None of the water quality samples taken from the mine site indicate a violation of state water quality standards. However, petitioner posits that a chemical reaction is likely occurring at the deeper levels of the dredge pond, possibly causing undissolved iron in sediments to become dissolved, and then traveling in solution through the clays of the Hawthorn formation into transmissive units and finally to off-site homeowners' wells which may be in those units. This theory was predicated on the results of 1989 HRS sampling which revealed some wells near White Sands Lake experienced elevated levels of iron and manganese, and an assumption that a chemical reaction was occurring because herbicides were used in the dredge pond. However, only one application of a herbicide occurred, and that was in 1990, or one year after iron was detected in the off-site homeowners' wells. Petitioner agreed that the 1990 application of herbicide could not have affected the 1989 sampling. It also agreed that these reactions were less likely to be occurring in a pond with water flowing through it. In this case, water is circulated through the dredge pond by being pumped into it, pumped out of it, and allowed to flow back into the pond. FRI determined that no state water quality standards were exceeded for iron, manganese, zinc, turbidity, total dissolved solids, chloride and nitrate in the surficial aquifer and Hawthorn formations at the site. The wells used for monitoring water quality were installed and sampled using standard quality assurance techniques. Water quality from the surficial aquifer was emphasized because if iron or manganese were present in the water, it would most likely be detected in wells in the surficial aquifer because they are detected in wells immediately downgradient of the source. If the chemical reaction is occurring, water leaving the dredge pond is contaminated, and such water will follow the path of least resistance by going either to the Hawthorn formation or the surficial aquifer. Because of the geologic properties of the Hawthorn, this path is the surficial aquifer. At least 70,000 gallons per day enter the surficial aquifer from the bottom of the dredge pond. Since contaminated water would receive water quality treatment by absorption of the Hawthorn but not in the surficial, water in the surficial aquifer represents the worst case scenario as to the possible presence of contaminated water. The chemical reactions which petitioner believes may be occurring in the deeper portions of the dredge pond require the presence of an acidic environment and reduced oxygen levels in the water. FRI's water quality testing indicates that water in the dredge pond is not acidic, but rather is neutral. Therefore, any reaction which might be occurring could not be on a large enough scale to affect water quality. Moreover, even if the reactions were occurring, it was established that the clays in the Hawthorn formation would absorb iron, and such absorption would not take place in the surficial aquifer. Therefore, it is found that there would be no adverse impact to groundwater including the surficial aquifer and that water quality standards will be met. Although petitioner presented evidence that in 1989 HRS testing of 12 out of 212 homeowners south of the mine site indicated that three homeowners had iron concentrations in excess of state drinking standards and two had manganese concentrations in excess of state drinking water standards, this is insufficient to prove that the mining operation has an adverse impact on water quality. To begin with, some of the wells sampled were thirty to fifty years old even though the life expectancy of a well is fifteen to twenty years. Some were constructed of galvanized steel pipe, and those wells also indicated high turbidity levels. High turbidity levels are caused by a number of unrelated factors and will result in increased iron levels that are not representative of the quality of the groundwater in the formation, but rather of the iron-laden sediments in the formation, or from the casing material. With the exception of one well (the Sutton well), the water from the homeowners' wells did not exceed background water quality for iron and manganese. The elevated iron and manganese concentrations in the Sutton well are caused by a number of factors other than the mine. Then, too, a proper sampling technique may not have been followed during the 1989 sampling event thus rendering the results unreliable. Finally, properly constructed monitoring wells should be used to assess the quality of the groundwaters, and the wells sampled in 1989 and 1992 were not of that type. The Mine's Impact on Water Levels Perhaps the issue of primary concern to members of petitioner's organization is whether the mining operations have contributed to the decline in water levels of nearby lakes, including Lake Brooklyn. This is because of serious declines in the levels of those water bodies over the past years, and a concomitant decrease in the value of homes which surround the lakes. In an effort to resolve this and other water level issues, the parties made numerous studies of the current and anticipated water level impacts from the site. This data collection effort was far more extensive than is normally conducted for a mine of this size. They included aquifer performance tests by FRI and the District, steady state and transient computer modeling of impacts on the Floridan and surficial aquifers by FRI, an analysis of correlations of pumping and water level changes in lakes and aquifers by FRI and petitioner, photolinear and fracture trace analyses of structural conditions by FRI and petitioner, a stratigraphic analysis of a geologic core retrieved from the site by FRI, installation of deep and shallow wells for groundwater monitoring by FRI, groundwater flow mapping by FRI, review of literature by all parties, review and analysis of rainfall data by all parties, analysis of evaporation data by the District and petitioner, and an analysis of geophysical logs from wells by FRI and the District. Aquifer performance tests Aquifer performance tests, which enable hydrologists to reach conclusions regarding the characteristics of the aquifers tested, were conducted in January 1989 by the District and June 1991 by FRI. In a typical pump test, an aquifer production well pumps at a constant rate, while water levels are monitored in observation wells at specified distances from the pumping well. In this case, the tests measured effects of pumping from the mine production wells for periods ranging from 78 hours to 108 hours at approximately twice the average rate of 2.09 MGD. The zone of influence of pumping was measured at wells placed at the property boundaries, at Gold Head State Park, east of the mine, as well as wells to the south of the mine for the 1989 tests. During the 1989 tests, lake levels for Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes were recorded. The effects of pumping were approximately equal for wells spaced approximately equal distances along the east, south and west. Thus, for purposes of analysis, the Floridan aquifer was considered isotropic and homogeneous. This is consistent with assumptions commonly made by geologists in Florida. Computer models were calibrated with actual results of these tests to account for variations caused by this assumption. The District has concluded, and the undersigned so finds, that no changes in the levels of the lakes are attributable to pumping. Further, the aquifer itself will not be harmed by the use of the amount of water requested in the application. The tests indicate the maximum amount of drawdown in the Floridan aquifer from pumping at twice the average rate is 0.1 to 0.6 foot in neighboring wells. Effects of actual pumping will be approximately one-half the test observed amounts on an average pumping day. For example, based on the 1989 test results, drawdowns in the Floridan aquifer at the boundary of the FRI property during an average day of pumpage should not exceed 0.2 to 0.3 feet while drawdowns beneath Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes to the south of the mine should be less than 0.2 feet. The tests provide actual measurements of the effects of pumping. Indeed, all three lakes were declining before the 1989 test began and continued to decline after the test was ended. However, the rate of decline during the seventy-eight hours of the test was not distinguishable from declines which occurred before or after the test. Computer modeling As a supplement to the aquifer performance tests, FRI performed computer modeling to determine effects of the water withdrawal and use on the Floridan and surficial aquifers. These models are used by hydrologists to predict impacts associated with a particular source of stress, such as pumpage, to an aquifer and, in this case, occurred in three phases. The first was an impact model which determined the drawdown in the Floridan aquifer. The second occurred as a result of questions raised by residents of the sand mine area and included a "steady state" model simulation of impacts of the Floridan and surficial aquifers. The third occurred as a result of questions raised by petitioner and included new data along with both a "transient state" and "steady state" simulation. All three phases of modeling were consistent in finding that the effects of pumping are non-existent or negligible, that is, a predicted drawdown in various locations of the Floridan aquifer of from less than 0.1 to 0.3 feet on an average pumping day, and they corroborated the drawdowns observed during both the 1989 and 1991 aquifer performance tests. Petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart criticized FRI's 1992 "steady state" computer modeling on the grounds FRI had insufficient data to conduct the modeling, the constant head boundaries were set too close to the pumping, a transient model should have been run, and the modelers assumed that the Floridan aquifer is isotropic and homogeneous. However, Dr. Stewart failed to review or consider (a) any technical data or information gathered since September 10, 1992, (b) the 1991 transient model, (c) the December 1992 transient model, (d) the computer disc for the July 1992 steady state model, (e) the December 1992 steady state model, (f) the December 1992 calibration, (g) the basis for setting the constant head boundaries, or (h) the data from the 1989 and 1991 pump tests. All of this data was part of the evidence FRI's experts used in formulating their opinions. Dr. Stewart agreed that he could not form any conclusions on this data and that the Floridan aquifer is rarely completely homogeneous and isotropic, but that he and other modelers regularly make that assumption. The modeling was calibrated to replicate actual subsurface and pumping conditions. Maximum drawdown in the Floridan aquifer under normal pumping conditions is modeled to be 0.1 to 0.2 feet beneath White Sands Lake. This is drawdown with no replacement, although there will be leakance back to the Floridan aquifer through sinkholes on the site and surcharge to Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes through the surficial aquifer. The impact to the Floridan is minor compared to normal water level fluctuations in that aquifer of 3 to 5 feet per year. In fact, barometric pressure changes can cause water level changes of up to one foot per week. Lake levels Because many of the lakes in the area leak downward, water levels in the lakes could be affected by the changes in levels in the Floridan aquifer. Indeed, for lakes connected to the Floridan aquifer, changes in the level of the potentiometric surface (or pressure) in the Floridan aquifer can have an impact on the level of the lakes. However, a decrease in lake levels will be less than that of the decrease in the Floridan aquifer, depending on the rate of leakance. Consequently, even if Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands or Spring Lakes do leak to the Floridan aquifer, the amount of decline in lake levels attributable to pumping at the mine will be less than the 0.1 to 0.2 foot modeled by FRI. This drawdown effect will not accumulate over time, but rather will remain constant after reaching steady state conditions. Even if levels in Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes are affected by drawdowns in the Floridan aquifer, that effect will be more than offset by surcharge to the surficial and Floridan aquifers from the dredge pond. The net effect to the lakes would be either positive or immeasurable. This is confirmed by the computer modeling results. Lake stage and precipitation data for Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes indicates that these lakes, like other lakes in the region, rise and fall in correlation with precipitation patterns. For example, in 1991, a year with above normal rainfall, Spring Lake rose 4.1 feet in elevation, White Sands Lake 2.9 feet in elevation, and Gator Bone Lake rose 3.5 feet in elevation. Similarly, water levels were monitored before, during and after the 1989 aquifer performance test in a portion of Lake Brooklyn known as Brooklyn Bay. Because of low rainfall, Brooklyn Bay was separated from the main body of Lake Brooklyn for at least eighteen to twenty-four months before and during the 1989 aquifer performance test. The lake had been in the midst of a long term decline both before and after the test, and the rate and character of declines during the period of pumping were not distinguishable from the declines occurring before or after the test. It is accordingly found that the impacts on water levels in Lake Brooklyn, if any, as a result of pumping from the Floridan aquifer are immeasurable. According to petitioner's witness Boyes, activities at the mine have an influence on water levels in Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes by "increasing the rate of decline". However, the witness could not quantify the degree of impact but stated the impacts during the 1989 aquifer performance tests were a decline of .03, .03 and less than .03 foot, respectively, for each lake. The witness also opined that, based on District staff guage readings during the 1989 aquifer performance testing, pumping at the mine resulted in a .04 foot decline in lake level for Lake Brooklyn during the 1989 testing period. This decline had a net result of .8 acre decrease in the previously 600 acre plus Lake Brooklyn. By comparison, the drought caused a decline of 162 acres in 1989 and an additional 158 acres in 1990. It is noted that the decline in each lake would be less during average pumping conditions, or about one-half of the .04 foot decline, since average pumping is one-half of the aquifer performance test pump rate. Finally, petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart opined that there is insufficient data to determine whether any impacts to lake levels are occurring. It is found, however, that these drawdowns are less than the .1 to .2 foot modeled by FRI and should have no significant adverse impacts on water levels. Preferential flow theory Petitioner presented evidence of a purported correlation between pumping at the mine and water levels in a Floridan aquifer well located on the southwest side of Lake Brooklyn, 4.3 miles from the mine, and lake levels in Brooklyn Bay, 3 miles from the mine. According to petitioner, this serves as proof of a "preferential flow pattern" in the Floridan from Lake Brooklyn to the mine, and that this preferential flow results in a .04 to .05 foot drawdown in the Floridan aquifer at Lake Brooklyn. However, this correlation is deemed to be incorrect for several reasons. First, if a true correlation existed, recovery from pumping effects would occur after pumping ceased, but the Lake Brooklyn well showed recovery in the Floridan aquifer prior to cessation of pumping, and did not recover when pumping stopped at the end of the 1989 aquifer performance testing. Second, if the premise is correct, impacts from pumping would occur in wells closer to the pumping earlier than in wells farther away, but the Lake Brooklyn well, 4.3 miles from pumping, showed drawdown began before that of the Goldhead well, only 1,000 feet from pumping. Third, levels for the Lake Brooklyn well should have declined during both the 1989 and 1991 aquifer performance tests but the levels rose during the 1991 tests. As to the water level changes in the well during the 1989 test, witness Boyes believed these may reflect declines due to hydrologic conditions rather than the pump test. Fourth, if a true correlation existed, impacts would be experienced following the same hydrographic pattern as pumping, but the Lake Brooklyn well's hydrographics did not correlate to the pumping schedule at all times of the year. It should also be noted that at least two other large scale water users are withdrawing water from wells within 1.25 miles from the Lake Brooklyn well and may affect that well's water levels. Further, the variations in the well may be explained by many other variables, such as barometric pressure changes, diurnal fluctuations in water levels, rainfall, and pumping from closer wells. Finally, Brooklyn Bay is now physically separated from Lake Brooklyn, and it was improper for petitioner to rely on lake level information from Brooklyn Bay to support its theory regarding Lake Brooklyn. To further support its hypothesis that a preferential flow path exists between the mine and Lake Brooklyn, petitioner utilized a "photo linear analysis" or "fracture trace analysis", which is based on an interpretation of surface topographic features to determine the presence of subsurface hydrogeologic features such as solution channels in the limestones of the Floridan aquifer. However, without extensive subsurface testing, which is not present here, such analyses are only interpretative to determine what, if any, subsurface features are present and their hydrogeologic effect. It is noted that subsurface fractures are present less than 50 percent of the time, and if present, the features may be hydrologic barriers as well as preferential flow paths. According to witness Boyes, a photolinear feature (fracture) exists from Lake Brooklyn through Spring Lake and across the mine property to Goldhead State Park. If such a feature did exist, however, the drawdown during the aquifer performance tests and other pumping would be greater adjacent to Spring Lake than adjacent to Lake Brooklyn. This was not observed. Moreover, petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart thought the photolinear was only inferred and had a lower degree of confidence that it exists. FRI's witness Fountain established that elongated surface features are more likely to demonstrate linear subsurface features. Both witness Boyes and Dr. Stewart agreed with this conclusion. That being the case, the postulated Lake Brooklyn-mine photolinear is not demonstrated, and continuation of the elongated axis of Lake Brooklyn and Brooklyn Bay would bypass the mine site altogether. Because no investigations have been conducted to demonstrate that these postulated photolinear features exist, and the more reliable results of the aquifer performance tests indicate otherwise, the preferential flow path theory is deemed at best to be highly speculative. If the Lake Brooklyn-mine photolinear feature offered a preferential flow path as opined by witness Boyes, the resulting drawdown would be elongated with a zone of influence extending from the mine westward toward Lake Brooklyn. Therefore, areas closer but not on the feature would experience less drawdown than areas farther away which are on the feature, the zone of influence would extend from the mine's wells through Spring Lake toward Lake Brooklyn causing declined water levels along the feature, and areas closer to the pumping wells, such as Spring Lake, would experience a greater decline than areas farther away, such as Lake Brooklyn. However, evidence offered by petitioner shows that the water levels between Lake Brooklyn and the mine are actually higher than in surrounding areas. Finally, even if petitioner's preferential flow path theory were true, there is no evidence that the pumping from the mine is resulting in significant and adverse impacts as required by District rules. Therefore, it is found that the sand mine does not cause significant and adverse impacts on the water levels in the Floridan aquifer or on the water levels of Lake Brooklyn or Gator Bone, White Sands or Spring Lakes. Rather, the lake levels in each of the four lakes in issue here are directly or indirectly a function of rainfall. Intermediate and surficial aquifers Whether an intermediate aquifer is present beneath the mine site is subject to dispute. All parties agree that, on a regional scale, the Hawthorn formation contains some discontinuous water-bearing lenses that in some places produce water in quantities sufficient for household use. The lenses occur in carbonate deposits in the formation, although not all carbonate deposits or all water bearing units will necessarily transmit water. The evidence is less than persuasive that the Hawthorne formation contains carbonate units which are present on the sand mine site as transmissive beds. This finding is based on FRI's review of on-site core boring information and other data from the site. In addition, this finding is corrorborated by District witness Lee, who concluded that water from the site is not discharging into the Hawthorn, but rather into the surficial aquifer. This is because clays comprising the Hawthorn have low permeability, causing water to flow laterally through the surficial aquifer rather than into the Hawthorn. With respect to impacts to the surficial aquifer, FRI presented evidence that during mining operations, the surficial aquifer will be surcharged by up to five feet. When mining operations cease, water levels will return to natural conditions. This evidence was not contradicted. Impacts on Property Values and Recreation Testimony regarding the property values for lake front properties on Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes was offered by petitioner's witness Price. He established that values have declined since mid- 1989 as a result of a loss of recreational value suffered as water levels have receded. However, witness Price stated that he would not expect a 0.1 foot drop in lake levels to negatively affect property values. Since the declines predicted by petitioner are far less than a 0.1 foot drop, it is apparent that FRI's water use will not result in harm to property values in the area. Similarly, while it is true that declining water levels have impaired recreational uses of Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes, FRI's water use cannot be blamed for such impairment. Environmental Impacts The anticipated impacts of the water use on the wetlands and wildlife resources of the area were addressed by FRI witnesses Peacock and Lowe. According to Peacock, who analyzed the wetland vegetation, the dominant species and their adaptions, the wildlife resources and their adaptions, and the general ecology of the area, the water levels in the adjacent lakes have historically fluctuated greatly, and wildlife that use the lakes have adapted to these fluctuations. His opinion that the mine's water use will not have any significant adverse impact on the environment of Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, Spring or White Sands Lakes is hereby accepted. Based upon witness Lowe's inspection of the three downgradient lakes, his past knowledge of Lake Brooklyn, the aquifer performance tests, and Dr. Lee's conclusion that the maximum drawdown in the lakes would be 0.1 foot, Lowe opined that the proposed water withdrawal will not cause environmental harm. In addition, such a drawdown will not adversely affect off-site vegetation or cause unmitigated adverse impacts on adjacent wetlands or other types of vegetation. These conclusions were not contradicted and are hereby accepted. Compliance with rule criteria To obtain a consumptive use permit, an applicant must give "reasonable assurance" that the proposed water use is a reasonable beneficial use, will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of water, and is consistent with the public interest. These broad criteria are further explained by criteria enunciated in Rule 40C-2.301(3)-(6), Florida Administrative Code, and sections 9.0 et seq. and 10.0 et seq. of the Applicant's Handbook adopted by reference in Chapter 40C-2, Florida Administrative Code. Findings as to whether these criteria have been satisfied are set forth below. To obtain a renewal of a consumptive use permit, an applicant must first give reasonable assurance that the proposed use of water is a "reasonable beneficial use". For a use to be considered reasonable beneficial, the criteria enumerated in Rule 40C-2.301(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code, must be satisfied. First, paragraph (4)(a) of the rule and section 10.3(a) of the handbook require that the water use must be in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization, and the quantity requested must be within acceptable standards for the designated use. The evidence shows that FRI has used a reasonably low amount of water necessary to continue operations at the mine, it has implemented some water conservation methods and tried or considered others that proved to be inefficient or not economically feasible, and the requested amount of water is within acceptable standards for sand mines operating within the District. Then, too, some ninety-five percent of the water pumped from the wells is recirculated for reuse in the mining process or is recharged back into the surficial and Floridan aquifers on site. Finally, there is no surface discharge of water outside the mining site. Accordingly, it is found that this criterion has been satisfied. Paragraph (4)(b) of the rule and section 10.3(b) of the handbook require that the proposed use be for a purpose that is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest. The proposed use of the water is to produce sand used in construction materials. This is a reasonable use of water and results in an economic benefit to the region by producing a valuable product. Accordingly, it is found that the use is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest. All parties have stipulated that the Floridan aquifer is capable of producing the requested amounts of water. This satisfies paragraph (4)(c) of the rule and section 10.3(c) of the handbook which impose this requirement. The next criterion, paragraph (4)(d), as amplified by section 10.3(d) of the handbook, requires that "the environmental or economic harm caused by the consumptive use must be reduced to an acceptable amount." The evidence shows that during mine operations, the surficial aquifer is being surcharged by up to five feet. When they cease, the water levels return to natural conditions. The maximum drawdown anticipated in the Floridan aquifer at the property boundary was 0.3 feet and less than or equal to 0.1 feet for most of the area outside the mine site. At most, this equates to a maximum lake level decline of 0.04 feet at Lake Brooklyn, 0.03 feet at Gator Bone and White Sands Lakes, and less than 0.03 feet at Spring Lake. Thus, FRI's usage of water has had, and will have in the future, little, if any, immediate or cumulative impact on the levels of the area lakes. Further, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that these lowered lake levels or aquifer levels will not result in environmental or economic harm to the area. In addition, the District has proposed to incorporate into the permit a condition that FRI implement a detailed monitoring plan which will detect any overpumping causing lake level changes and a concomitant adverse impact to off-site land uses. Therefore, this criterion has been satisfied. Paragraph (4)(e) and section 10.3(e) require the applicant to implement "all available water conservation measures" unless the applicant "demonstrates that implementation is not economically, environmentally or technologically feasible." The rule goes on to provide that satisfaction of this criterion "may be demonstrated by implementation of an approved water conservation plan as required in section 12.0, Applicant's Handbook: Consumptive Uses of Water." Because FRI's water conservation plan insures that water will be used efficiently, as required by section 12.3.4.1. of the handbook, this criterion has been met. The next paragraph provides that "(w)hen reclaimed water is readily available it must be used in place of higher quality water sources unless the applicant demonstrates that its use is either not economically, environmentally or technologi-cally feasible." Since the unrebutted testimony establishes that reclaimed water is not readily available to the mine site, it is found that paragraph (4)(f) has been satisfied. Paragraph (4)(g) of the rule and section 10.3(f) of the handbook generally require that the lowest acceptable quality water source be used. Since the evidence shows that the Floridan aquifer is the lowest acceptable quality water source, this requirement has been met. Paragraphs (4)(h) and (i) provide that the consumptive use "should not cause significant saline water intrusion or further aggravate currently existing saline water intrusion problems" nor "cause or contribute to flood damage." The parties have stipulated that these requirements are not in dispute. The next paragraph provides that the "water quality of the source of the water should not be seriously harmed by the consumptive use." The uncontradicted evidence shows that the source of the water for the proposed use will not be seriously harmed from either saltwater intrusion or discharges to the Floridan aquifer. Paragraph (4)(j) and section 10.3(g) have accordingly been met. Paragraph (4)(k) and section 10.3(k) require that the water quality of the receiving body of water "not be seriously harmed" by the consumptive use. In this case, there is no surface water discharge from the mine site. Thus, the only relevant inquiry here is whether the receiving water (surficial aquifer) will be "seriously harmed" by the consumptive use. To determine compliance with this criterion, the District compared water quality samples from the mine site and surrounding areas with the DER monitoring network to ascertain whether state water quality numerical standards and natural background levels were exceeded. The relevant standards are found in Rule 17-520.420, Florida Administrative Code. Monitoring data from eight wells and from the dredge pond indicate there are no water quality violations resulting from the sand mine operations. Petitioner has contended that water from the dredge pond provides a significant source of water to an intermediate aquifer, which would also be a receiving body of water. However, the evidence shows that any contaminants resulting from the dredge pond flowing into an intermediate aquifer will also be contained in the surficial aquifer. The clays of the Hawthorn formation would absorb and filter out iron and manganese as they traveled to a water transmissive zone. Therefore, the concentrations sampled in the suficial aquifer downgradient from the dredge pond represent the highest concentrations. Since the concentrations in the surficial aquifer do not violate water quality standards, the same finding as to concentrations in the intermediate aquifer can be made. Further, the rule criteria require consideration of the future water use's effect on water quality, and if the intermediate aquifer is in fact a receiving water as contended by petitioner, the reactions which could cause water quality violations are presently occurring. There is no reason to believe they would cease if the mine ceases operation, and the mining operation adds oxygen to the water, which reduces the possibility of the reaction described. Therefore, this criterion has been satisfied. The parties have stipulated that the requirements of paragraph (4)(l) have been fulfilled. Finally, rule 40C-2.301(5)(a) provides that a proposed consumptive use will not meet the criteria for issuance of a permit if such proposed water use will significantly cause saline water encroachment or otherwise cause water flows or levels to fall below certain minimum limits set forth in the rule. The evidence shows that, to the extent these criteria are applicable and in dispute, they have been satisfied. Miscellaneous The contention has been made that insufficient site-specific information was submitted by the applicant to determine the effects of the proposed use of water at the sand mine. In this regard, the evidence shows that FRI consultants installed monitoring wells, performed core borings, and took soil samples at the site. The geology of the site was verified by core boring, review of geologic logs and drilling wells. Slug tests were performed to measure the hydraulic conductivity of the material in which the monitor wells were set, and a step drawdown analysis was performed to measure hydraulic conductivity. A number of monitoring wells to measure water levels data were installed before and after running the 1991 aquifer performance tests, and groundwater modeling in both the transient and steady state modes were run using data that was collected in the field. In addition, water quality samples were collected to evaluate a water budget for the dredge pond, and FRI conducted an assessment of the environmental impacts to the wetland and wildlife resources of the area lakes, including White Sands, Spring and Gator Bone Lakes. Besides this submission and analysis, the District reviewed United States Geological Survey (USGS) topographic maps, potentiometric maps and aerial photographs of the area, water levels of the surrounding lakes, potentiometric surfaces in Floridan and intermediate aquifer wells, geophysical logs for wells, rainfall records, the core generated by FRI consultants, and scientific literature relied upon in making consumptive use permitting assessments. It also monitored the 1991 aquifer performance test and reviewed the resultant model. Before and after submission of the application, the District conducted aquifer performance testing at the site and evaluated the 1991 aquifer performance test conducted by FRI consultants. Finally, the District assessed water quality impacts of the sand mine in 1989 and in the present by site visit, sampling of the Floridan production well and dredge pond, and reviewing sampling data from both monitor wells and homeowner wells. It also reviewed information on water quality data gathered from other sand mines and applied data from the DER background monitoring network. Therefore, the contention that insufficient site-specific information was submitted and considered is rejected. Petitioner has offered into evidence petitioner's exhibits 61, 64, 65, 71, 75, 76, 78-80, 82 and 83. A ruling on the admissibility of the exhibits was reserved. The exhibits, which are based on data collected by the District and the USGS, are hydrographs showing water levels from lakes and monitoring wells during so-called "normal mine operations" on selected dates in 1988, 1989 and 1991. Although FRI was given copies of the exhibits ten days prior to hearing, it was not informed of the source of the data until final hearing. As it turned out, petitioner's witness had reviewed records over an extensive period of time and selected two or three days out of that time period as being representative of "normal" conditions. However, FRI established that, when longer periods of time were reviewed, the correlations alleged to exist by the graphs did not in fact exist and thus they did not represent normal conditions. Attorney's fees and costs FRI has requested an award of attorney's fees and costs on the theories petitioner interposed various papers and brought and participated in this action for "an improper purpose" within the meaning of Subsections 120.57(1)(b)5. and 120.59(6), Florida Statutes. In addition, petitioner has filed a motion for sanctions on the ground four motions filed by FRI were filed for an improper purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes. It may be inferred from the totality of the evidence that petitioner did not intend to participate in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Likewise, the same inference may be made with respect to the four motions filed by FRI. Therefore, fees and costs (sanctions) are not warranted for either party.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the District granting application number 2-019-0012AUR as proposed by the District in its notice of intent to approve the application issued on August 6, 1992. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 4th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5017 Petitioner: 1-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 5-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 7. Rejected as being unnecessary. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 10-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6 and 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 15-16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 17-18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 25. Partially accepted in findings of fact 7 and 8. 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 27-28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 31-33. Partially accepted in findings of fact 14-16. 34-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 36-42. Partially accepted in findings of fact 14-16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. Rejected as being irrelevant. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 52-53. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive evidence. See finding 23. 57-58. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 59-61. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 64-71. Partially accepted in findings of fact 32-36. 72. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 73-74. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 75. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 76-77. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 11. Rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive evidence. See finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. 83-120. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. 121-139. Partially accepted in findings of fact 25-27. 140-144. Rejected since even if true, the impacts are not significant. 145. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 146-158. Partially accepted in findings of fact 18-20. 159-171. Partially accepted in finding of fact 39. 172-177. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40 and 41. Respondent (District): 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 2-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in findings of fact 1, 3 and 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 17-18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 19-22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. 24-40. Partially accepted in findings of fact 12-16. 41-51. Partially accepted in findings of fact 11. 52-59. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. 60-64. Partially accepted in finding of fact 25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. 67-69. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 72-73. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 74-77. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. 80-81. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. 82-83. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29. 84. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 85. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. 86-90. Partially accepted in finding of fact 30. 91. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. 92-94. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. 95. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. 96. Partially accepted in finding of fact 36. 97-100. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 101. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 102-103. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 104-121. Partially accepted in findings of fact 19 and 20. 122-130. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 131-133. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 134-138. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40 and 41. 139. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. 140-141. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 142. Partially accepted in finding of fact 48. 143. Partially accepted in finding of fact 49. Respondent (FRI): Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in findings of fact 3 and 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6 and 7. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. 22-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 35. 29-30. Partially accepted in finding of fact 36. 31-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 38. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 40-41. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 42-45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 40. Partially accepted in finding of fact 41. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40 and 41. 49. Partially accepted in finding of fact 39. 50-51. Partially accepted in finding of fact 42. 52. Partially accepted in finding of fact 43. 53. Partially accepted in finding of fact 44. 54. Partially accepted in finding of fact 45. 55. Partially accepted in finding of fact 46. 56. Partially accepted in finding of fact 47. 57-58. Partially accepted in finding of fact 49. 59. Partially accepted in finding of fact 51. 60. Partially accepted in finding of fact 52. 61. Partially accepted in finding of fact 54. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, cumulative, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry Dean, Executive Director St. Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Patrice Flinchbaugh Boyes, Esquire Post Office Box 1424 Gainesville, Florida 32602-1424 Peter B. Belmont, Esquire 511 31st Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 Wayne E. Flowers, Esquire Jennifer L. Burdick, Esquire Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Marcia Penman Parker, Esquire Emily G. Pierce, Esquire 1301 Gulf Life Drive Suite 1500 Jacksonville, Florida 32207
The Issue The issue is whether ADR of Pensacola should be issued a wetland resource permit and sovereign submerged lands authorization allowing the construction of a 30-slip docking facility on Big Lagoon, Escambia County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this environmental permitting dispute, Petitioner, Michael L. Guttmann, who lives less than one mile from the project site, has challenged the proposed issuance by Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (Department), of a Wetland Resource Permit (permit) and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization (authorization) which would allow Respondent, ADR of Pensacola (applicant), to construct a 30-slip docking facility on Big Lagoon, Escambia County, Florida. The facility will be part of a condominium project to be constructed on the upland portion of the property. As grounds for contesting the permit, Petitioner contended that the Department failed to consider "the long term health of Big Lagoon," navigational hazards created by the project, or public safety; failed to impose an adequate "monitoring program"; did not provide for a "contingency plan for hurricane activity"; failed to consider that the activity will degrade a nearby Outstanding Florida Water [OFW]; and failed to take into account "existing unused marina slips close by." The petition further alleged that the foregoing concerns constituted violations of Section 373.414, Florida Statutes (2000), and Rules 62-4.242, 62-302.300, 62-302.700, and 62- 312.080, Florida Administrative Code. The cited statute identifies "additional criteria" for issuing a permit while the first three rules pertain to OFWs. The last rule contains general standards for the issuance or denial of a permit. Petitioner raised no issues concerning the issuance of the authorization in his initial pleading. Until April 2000, the upland property was owned by the applicant. It was then sold to Harbour Pointe of Pensacola, Inc., which has subsequently entered into an agreement with the applicant allowing the applicant to construct the dock, operate the permit, and purchase a condominium unit. If the application is approved, applicant intends to construct a 442 feet x 4 feet access pier with seventeen 30 feet x 1.5 feet finger piers, thirteen 40 feet x 1.5 feet finger piers, and a 74 feet x 1.5 feet terminal platform, to form a 30-slip docking facility at 10901 Gulf Beach Highway on Big Lagoon, a Class III water in Escambia County, Florida. Approval to use the submerged lands is found in the authorization. The dock will be located in a "fairly pristine area" in Big Lagoon a few miles southwest of Pensacola, Florida. That body of water is six miles in length and is separated from the Gulf of Mexico by a slender coastal barrier island known as Perdido Key, which lies approximately one statute mile south of the project. Continuing west along the shoreline next to the project site are a string of single-family homes with small dock facilities, most of which are less than 1,000 square feet in size and thus exempt from Department permitting requirements. To the east of the undeveloped property are more undeveloped lots and a private yacht club with extensive docking facilities. The facility being challenged here will not be a public marina; rather, it will serve the residents of a proposed upland condominium (consisting of two buildings) to be constructed at the same location. The project is more commonly referred to as the Harbour Pointe Marina. It is fair to infer that Petitioner and adjoining property owners object not only to the dock, but also to the condominium project. The application and project When the application was originally filed with the Department in July 1995, it contained plans for a longer dock and more slips. Due to a reduction in the length of the pier and number of slips to conform to Department rules, other technical changes, and various requests by the Department for additional information, the draft permit was not issued by the Department until May 2000. The Department considers this a "major project" with "major [hydrographic and water quality] issues connected with it." In reviewing the application, the Department considered whether reasonable assurance had been given by the applicant that water quality standards would not be violated, and whether the additional criteria in Section 373.414(1)(a)1.-7., Florida Statutes (2000), had been satisfied. The Department concluded that water quality standards would not be degraded, and that the project, as designed and permitted, was not contrary to the public interest. In making the public interest determination, the Department typically assigns a plus, minus, or neutral score to each of the seven statutory factors. In this case, a neutral score was given to historical and archaeological resources [paragraph 373.414(1)(a)6.] since there were none, while the permanent nature of the project [paragraph 373.414(1)(a)5.] caused it to be rated "a little bit on the minus side"; all other factors were given a plus. Department witness Athnos then concluded that on balance the project "was a plus because it will not adversely affect any of these things." The access pier (dock) runs perpendicular from the shoreline and stretches out some 442 feet to where the water reaches a depth of seventeen feet, which is the deepest point in Big Lagoon. The unusual length of the dock is required so that the boat slips will begin past the seagrass colony (which lies closer to the shore), to prevent boat propeller blades from cutting the top of the seagrass, and to reduce the amount of sedimentation stirred up by the boat propellers. Aerial photographs confirm that when completed, the dock will probably be the largest in Big Lagoon, and much larger than the neighboring docks to the west. The use of boat slips will be limited to condominium owners. Only 19 slips will be constructed initially, since the applicant has secured approval at this time for only the first phase of the condominium project. When approval for the second phase is secured, the applicant intends to add an additional 11 slips. Water quality In his initial pleading, Petitioner made a general allegation that the Department failed to consider "the long term health of Big Lagoon"; there were no specific allegations regarding water quality standards. In his Proposed Recommended Order, however, he argues that the [a]pplicant failed to provide reasonable assurances that water quality standards would not be violated." Assuming arguendo that the issue has been properly raised, Petitioner has still failed to substantiate his allegation. That portion of Big Lagoon where the project will be located is a Class III water of the State. Studies on metals, greases, oils, and the like submitted by the applicant reflected that the "water quality [in that area] did not exceed the standards in Rule 62-302." To provide further reasonable assurance regarding water quality standards, the applicant has voluntarily agreed to use concrete piling and aluminum docks. Unlike wooden piling and docks, these types of materials do not leach toxic substances such as arsenic, copper, and acromiom into the water. In addition, special permit conditions require that sewage pumpout equipment be located at the site so that boats will not discharge raw sewage into the waters. Liveaboards are prohibited, and fueling will not be available at the facility. Finally, the cleaning of fish is not allowed, and boat owners cannot scrape their boat bottoms while docked at the facility. All of these conditions are designed to ensure that water quality standards will not be violated. Enforcement mechanisms for the above conditions are found in either the permit itself or Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. Also, one of the conditions in the draft permit expressly states that the applicant is not relieved of liability for harm or injury to humans, plants, or property caused by the construction of the dock. However, if a permit is issued, Condition 9 of the permit should be modified to require that trained personnel be available twenty-four hours per day, rather than just during standard business hours, to assist boaters with, and ensure that they use, the sewage pumpout equipment. Any permit issued should also require that boats be placed on lifts while using the docking facilities. This will prevent any leaching of paint from the boat bottoms into the waters. Otherwise, the paint would cause a degradation of the water. The more persuasive evidence supports a finding that, with the additional conditions, reasonable assurance has been given that the state water quality standards applicable to Class III waters will not be violated. Outstanding Florida Waters In his complaint, Petitioner has contended that "the proposed activity will degrade an [OFW] as a result of its close proximity to the Gulf Islands National Seashore," and that the"[D]epartment has made no analysis of this project['s] impact on the [OFW] which is adjacent to the proposed activity." The record discloses that the southern portion of Big Lagoon has been designated as an OFW. This area includes the waters around Gulf Islands National Seashore and Big Lagoon State Park; they begin approximately 650 to 700 feet south of the end of the dock. As noted earlier, the project is located within Class III waters. Because the Department found that no violation of state water quality standards in those waters would occur, it likewise concluded, properly in this case, that the project would have no impact on any OFW, even though such waters begin some 650 or 700 feet away. Under these circumstances, there would be no reason to assess the water quality in the OFWs or the projected impacts on those waters, as Petitioner suggests. In the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, it is found that the project will not adversely impact an OFW. Hydrographic characteristics If a dock has more than ten boat slips, the Department routinely conducts a hydrographic (flushing) study to determine whether the structure will adversely affect the flow of the water in the area or cause erosion or shoaling on adjacent properties. In the summer of 1999, a Department engineer conducted a hydrographic study using a dye tracer and concluded that flushing characteristics were excellent and that there would be no adverse effects caused by the project. This conclusion has not been credibly contradicted. Therefore, it is found that the dock will not adversely affect the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. Navigational issues In his initial pleading, Petitioner raised a contention that the project will create "navigational hazards" because the dock "extends nearly into a navigation channel which routinely carries commercial towboats transporting hazardous material, the spill of which would adversely affect Big Lagoon." He also alleges that the rupture of a vessel could impact public safety. Channel markers placed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Intracoastal Waterway (of which Big Lagoon is a part) define a navigational channel for boats approximately 400- 500 feet south of the end of the proposed dock. That channel is used by both recreational and commercial traffic, including barges and other large watercraft which regularly haul oil, chemicals, and other products through the Intracoastal Waterway to and from Pensacola, Panama City, and St. Marks, Florida. The water in the marked channel is only thirteen feet deep. Because the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction over the maintenance of the marked channel, the Department defers to that entity's judgment in determining whether a proposed structure will impede navigation in the marked channel. The proposed dock ends near the deepest part of the natural channel where the water reaches a depth of seventeen feet. Because of the deeper water to the north, which allows the boat captain to "get better steerage," the commercial boat traffic sometimes tends to follow the natural channel, rather than the marked channel formed by the navigational aids. When they do so, however, they are straying from the so-called "legal" channel. Petitioner's expert, a retired tugboat captain, opined that in a storm or squall, a commercial boat using the natural rather than the marked navigational channel might be blown extremely close to the dock or even strike it, thus causing a hazardous situation. He acknowledged, however, that he was not predicting more accidents because of the construction of the dock; he also admitted that the dock would not cause ships to "sudden[ly] have problems navigating that Big Lagoon." The location of the proposed dock was shown to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Florida Marine Patrol, and there were no adverse comments regarding this issue by either agency. In the absence of any negative comments by those agencies, and the acknowledgement by Petitioner's own witness that the dock will not cause accidents or create navigational problems for other boaters, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that the project will not adversely affect navigation or public safety in Big Lagoon. Seagrass and monitoring Petitioner has alleged that Big Lagoon "is the healthiest body of water in Escambia County with a white sand bottom and abundant seagrass," and that the proposed project will adversely affect its "long term health." He also alleges that the Department has failed to provide a "remedy or punishment should the results [of the Department's monitoring plan] indicate that the seagrass has been harmed"; that the Department's monitoring plan is not "of sufficient duration to reasonably report the long-term effect of concentrated mooring and traffic" or "sufficiently specific to insure usable data"; and that the data relied upon by the Department [such as photographs] were not "sufficient" to determine the existing health of the seagrass. The evidence reflects that a "nice, healthy seagrass community" is found in the area where the dock will be constructed. It stretches out several hundred feet from the shoreline to where the water reaches a depth of around six feet. The Department considers seagrass to be a "most important resource" which should be protected. This is because seagrass is essential for "binding" the shoreline and stabilizing the sediments, and it serves as a nursery area for juvenile fish and shellfish. Indeed, due to these beneficial effects, far more species of shellfish are found in areas where seagrass thrives than in areas where no seagrass exists. To protect the seagrass, the dock has been extended out 442 feet from the shoreline so that the first boat slip begins at a depth of seven feet, or just past where the seagrass ends. This will prevent the scarring of the grass by boat propellers and reduce turbidity that is typically caused by propeller dredging and boat wakes. Thus, at least theoretically, no boat activity by condominium owners is contemplated in waters of less than seven feet. Because seagrass requires as much light as possible to survive, educational signs will be posted in the area to warn boaters that seagrass is found closer to the shoreline, and that mooring in that area is prohibited. There is, however, no enforcement mechanism to ensure that condominium owners or nonresidents comply with these warnings. Under the draft permit, the Department is allowed to access the premises at reasonable times for sampling or monitoring purposes. A special section of the draft permit includes a number of requirements pertaining to the monitoring of turbidity levels during dock construction while another section requires the applicant to take photographs of the existing seagrass beds at numerous locations before, during, and after construction of the dock. Condition 14 requires that the permittee maintain "records of monitoring information" for at least three years. The evidence supports a finding that if a permit is issued, a mapping of the seagrass should be made prior to construction of the dock and during the height of the growing season (September and October). When the photographing of the area is performed, the applicant should use a sampling protocol that is based on a scientifically determined method. Also, both affected and unaffected areas should be monitored to compare the effect of the additional boat traffic on the seagrass after the dock is constructed. All of these conditions should be incorporated into any issued permit. According to Dr. Heck, a marine biologist who specializes in the study of seagrass and testified as an expert on behalf of Petitioner, seagrass beds in Big Lagoon have been "shallowing up" or thinning out in recent years due to decreasing water clarity. In other words, as the water becomes cloudier from more and more boat activity, the sunlight cannot penetrate and the seagrass will not thrive. The seagrasses most susceptible to disappearing are those that are found at the deepest depth. Doctor Heck attributed the decline in seagrass to increased human activity in the area. This activity is related not only to the existing homeowners in the area, but also to the non-resident boaters (both recreational and commercial) who use the waters in that area. A Department study conducted in 1995 confirmed that the only seagrass area in North Florida "significantly affected" by propeller scarring was an area in Big Lagoon known as Scallop Cove, near Spanish Point. This study is consistent with those studies performed by Dr. Heck in the late 1990's, and one as recently as last year, that support a finding that seagrass in Big Lagoon is on the decline due to both propeller scarring and increased turbidity caused by wakes from larger recreational boats. For this reason, Dr. Heck concluded that the addition of thirty boats at the project site, some of which would be as large as 30 feet or so, would have a "negative effect" on the seagrass colony. This in turn will cause a negative effect on the marine productivity in the area, as well as the conservation of fish and their habitat. Doctor Heck's testimony on this issue is found to be the most persuasive. Other concerns Petitioner further contends that the Department failed to provide a "meaningful contingency plan for hurricane activity." This matter, however, is beyond the permitting jurisdiction of the Department. Petitioner has also contended that the Department failed to take into account "existing unused marina slips close by" which could be used by the condominium owners. Like the prior issue, this matter is not a consideration in the permitting scheme. Another issue raised by Petitioner, albeit untimely, was that the construction of this dock could lead to further development in Big Lagoon. There was, however, no evidentiary support for this contention. Indeed, there is no evidence that future permit applications with impacts similar to this application can reasonably be expected in the area. At hearing, Petitioner raised for the first time a contention that the applicant no longer owns the upland property and thus a permit/authorization cannot be issued to that entity. Aside from this issue being untimely, the fact that a permit holder does not own the upland property is not unusual. If this occurs, permits and authorizations (leases) are routinely transferred to the new owner once the Department receives the necessary title information. It is not a ground to defeat the application. Petitioner also raised for the first time at hearing a contention that the site plan approval for the condominium has expired under a provision of the Escambia County Land Development Code and therefore the permit should be denied. Again, the issue is untimely; more importantly, it should be addressed in another forum since the Department has no jurisdiction over this issue. Likewise, a legitimate concern by an adjoining property owner, witness Hobgood, and an area realtor, that Hobgood's single-family property would probably decline in value if the project is built is nonetheless beyond the Department's jurisdiction. Finally, a contention that the Department improperly calculated the maximum number of boat slips for an 88-unit condominium project has been rejected. The record contains a lengthy explanation by witness Athnos which shows that the Department's calculation under Rule 18-21.004(4)1., Florida Administrative Code, was correct. Those calculations are also detailed in Respondents' Exhibit 14.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying the application of ADR of Pensacola for a wetland resource permit and sovereign submerged lands authorization. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael L. Guttmann, Esquire 314 South Baylen Street, Suite 201 Pensacola, Florida 32501-5949 Charles T. Collette, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David A. Sapp, Esquire 1017 North 12th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32501-3306 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact The CLDD was established pursuant to Chapter 298, Florida Statutes, on August 4, 1967. Its purpose was to "reclaim" or render the land within its boundaries usable for agricultural purposes. The land comprising the CLDD consists of approximately 3,500 acres in Lee County, mostly planted in citrus trees. Pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 298, Florida Statutes, a "Plan of Reclamation" was prepared by consulting engineers for the CLDD's Board of Supervisors in August, 1967. That plan contains provisions for reclaiming lands within the CLDD's boundaries and for managing and controlling surface water within CLDD. The method of water control outlined in the 1967 reclamation plan included a dike and ditch system around the boundaries of CLDD with a series of interior canals to carry excess water away from the citrus trees. The land in the north part of he CLDD is higher than the south and water generally, naturally flows from north to south. The interior canals were designed to carry water in accordance with existing contours of the land and eventually discharge excess surface water to the rim ditches on the north and east sides of Spoil Area "M," which is south of the CLDD and which was then owned by the C&SFFCD, the predecessor agency to SFWMD. The system of drainage delineated in that 1967 plan, inaugurated pursuant to Chapter 298, Florida Statutes, was put into effect substantially as described therein. CLDD's 1967 plan was altered somewhat because of an agreement entered into on September 30, 1971, between the CLDD and neighboring landowner Kenneth Daniels. Pursuant to that agreement, the two parties agreed to extend the dike on the west side of the CLDD property and construct a ditch from a point 50 feet north of the northwest corner of the Petitioner Mellor's property, which new ditch was to run southwest across the Daniels' property and connect with Spanish Creek. That ditch or canal would thus connect the western rim ditch of the SFWMD's Spoil Area "M" with Spanish Creek and have the result that surface waters could be discharged from CLDD lands through the western rim ditch of Spoil Area "M" thence through the "Daniels' Ditch" finally discharging into the lower reaches of Spanish Creek. (see Exhibits 1 and 11) Because the western side or western rim canal of the SFWMD's Spoil Area "M" had not been used under the original plan of reclamation approved by the C&SFFCD, CLDD sought permission from C&SFFCD to use this western rim canal for the purpose stated pursuant to the agreement with Daniels. Thus, CLDD's proposed use of the rim canal of Spoil Area "M" would be confined to the western, northern and eastern perimeter canals and not the southern boundary canal. All affected landowners, Kenneth Daniels as well a Jake and Lilly Lee, agreed to those proposed installations and uses. The resulting agreement between CLDD and C&SFFCD was entered into on October 12, 1972, and describes the flood control District land to be used by CLDD as a 100 foot wide strip running along the west, north and east sides of Spoil Area "M," also know as "Aspic." This 100 foot wide strip of land running thusly is co-extensive with the rim ditch of Spoil Area "M." The CLDD was mandated by this agreement to install 72- inch pipes in the rim ditch at the southwest corner of the spoil area, just north of the Mellor property, giving a point of discharge from the western rim ditch into the Daniels' Ditch with similar pipes connecting that Daniels' Ditch with Spanish Creek, such that the canal between these two points could carry water from the west rim ditch to Spanish Creek. The easement incorporated in this agreement was to last for five years with an option for a five-year renewal, which option was exercised. At the end of this 10-year period, SFWMD, successor to C&SFFCD, notified CLDD that because its statutory authority had since changed, the easement could not be renewed and that CLDD would have to seek the subject permit so as to be authorized to use works and lands of the District. The requirements to be met by an applicant for a right-of-way permit such as this one are set out in Rule 40E-6.301, Florida Administrative Code, and SFWMD's permitting information manual, Vol. V, Criteria Manual for Use of Works of the District, July, 1981, which is incorporated by reference in that rule. In that connection, the permit at issue, if granted, would not cause an interference with the "works" of the District, that is dikes, ditches, flood control structures arid drainage structures because it would merely renew the pre-existing authorized use. The permit will not be inconsistent with an comprehensive water use plan developed by the District. Further, the permit applicant owns or leases the land adjacent to the portion of the "works of the District" involved herein that is the east, north and west rim ditches of Spoil Area "M," the Daniels' Ditch and the pipes at either end of it coupled with the water control structures at the southeast corner and southwest corners of Spoil Area "M," which control water entering the south rim ditch. CLDD has a surface water management permit, issued in August, 1980, which is a prerequisite to the granting of the subject right-of-way permit. It remains in full force and effect. That surface water management permit authorizes "operation of a water management system serving 3,642 acres of agricultural lands by a network of canals and control structures, with a perimeter dike and canal discharging into Cypress Creek." The "surface permit" authorized the system of drainage and discharge in existence at the time of its issuance, May 8, 1980. The system of drainage, at the day of the hearing, consisted of the same basic water flow and discharge pattern that existed for approximately 10 years, and this permit would allow that to be continued, thus, there will not be any additional effect on environmentally sensitive lands occasioned by an issuance of the subject right-of-way permit. The surface water management permit, by its terms, refers initially to the operation of a water management system" . . . discharging into Cypress Creek." The reference to "Cypress Creek" was an administrative error. The express language on the face of the permit authorization incorporates by reference the application, including all plans and specifications attached thereto, as addressed by the staff report, and those materials, including the staff report, are a part of the permit. The complete permit, including all those documents incorporated by reference, makes it clear that the authorization of the surface water management permit was that the system of drainage in existence at the time of permit issuance (1980) was that which was being approved, and that included discharge to Spanish Creek and not Cypress Creek. Discharge of water to Cypress Creek as an alternative was never recommended or authorized by that surface water management permit. This is clearly the intent expressed in the permit in view of the language contained in a special condition of that surface water management permit imposed by the SFWMD as a condition for issuance which stated as follows: Within 45 days of the issuance of this permit the permittee shall submit for staff approval a proposal and schedule for the elimination of the adverse impacts being created by the operation of the permittee's water management system, which can be legally and physically accomplished by the permittee. Adverse impacts are considered herein to be reduced flows to Spanish Creek and increased flows to Cypress Creek. Thus, it is obvious that the authorization of the surface water management permit was designed to provide for discharge into Spanish Creek and to enhance the flows to Spanish Creek pursuant to a required proposal which the permittee submitted to SFWMD. Thus, the right-of-way permit applied for herein is consistent with the valid surface water management permit held by the permit applicant in this proceeding. Petitioners William H. and Patricia H. Mellor are co-owners of parcels of property lying some distance south of Spoil Area "4" in the vicinity of the Caloosahatchee River. This property does not abut the spoil area at any point. Spanish Creek does cross their property several thousand feet south of the south boundary of the spoil area. In the past, particularly in 1982, water flowing from the south rim ditch of the spoil area through a break in the dike of that south rim ditch, has flowed through a ditch known as Dry Creek in a generally southerly direction under S.R. 78 and has washed out an access road constructed by William Mellor which leads from Highway 78 to his property. He had this washout repaired at his own expense in 1982. The washout was caused by water from CLDD flowing into the south rim canal of Spoil Area "M," that is, the ditch that traverses (and defines) the southerly boundary of the spoil area. Mr. Mellor admitted, however, that SFWMD had at least partially plugged the opening in the south rim ditch which had allowed flow down the Dry Creek ditch and wash out his road. If closed water control structures are maintained at the southwest and southeast corners of the spoil area ditches, then no water could flow into the south rim canal and no such injury could again be caused. Petitioner's Jim English and Patricia Mellor are co-owners of a 45- acre parcel of land located in the southwest corner of Spoil Area "M." The five acres forming the extreme southwest corner of the spoil area do not belong to these Petitioners, but are owned by one Lynwood Brown, who is not a party to this proceeding. The English/Mellor property forms a part of the spoil area, but does not adjoin or constitute any part of the spoil area which is sought to be used by CLDD through the proposed right-of-way use permit (as clarified by CLDD's stipulation). The south rim ditch, either part of, or adjoined by their property, has been used for water storage in the past (they maintain illegally) 1/ Mr. Tom Pancoast has observed Spanish Creek frequently over a nine- year period starting in approximately 1973. He has often used those waters during that period for fishing. During the early years of his use and observation of Spanish Creek, the water flowed out of Spanish Creek into the Caloosahatchee River. Beginning in about 1976, the water appeared to be flowing in the opposite direction, from the river into Spanish Creek. Contemporaneous with this hydrologic change, the creek has become increasingly characterized by siltation and hyacinth growth. Mr. William Mellor owns property along the course of Spanish Creek. He has used the stream for recreational purposes, picnicking where the stream traverses his property. In recent years there has occurred a marked increase in the growth or profusion of aquatic plants of unidentified types in the creek, reduced clarity and reduced flows or volumes of water in the creek. Witness English has made a similar observation. Witness James English has a substantial degree of training by formal education and experience in water management and drainage practices and methods, particularly as they relate to citrus grove development and management in southwest Florida. Mr. English has observed Spanish Creek regularly for most of his life, including the region of its headwaters in the "Cow Prairie Cypress," a remnant wetland cypress strand lying within the CLDD immediately north of Soil Area "M." The chief adverse impact of the CLDD water management system is reduced flow to Spanish Creek, especially its upper reaches since the advent of the "Daniels' Ditch" as a drainage route and discharge point into lower Spanish Creek. However, the only special condition on the issuance of the surface water management permit approving CLDD's extant water management system was the requirement that CLDD should submit a plan for eliminating that adverse effect, which it did (as Petitioner English admits). Beyond the submission of such a plan, no concrete action designed to restore historic flows to Spanish Creek has yet begun, however. The restoration of historic flows, adequate in volume and quality, to the entire creek system would require discharging water from CLDD's system to the Cow Prairie Cypress area at the headwaters of the creek rather than substantially further downstream at the present Daniels' Ditch site. The Petitioners' complaints (aside from the issue of adequacy of flows in Spanish Creek), although meritorious, are, because of stipulations asserted by CLDD during the course of this proceeding, now rendered moot. CLDD stipulated that it only seeks a permit to use the west, north and eastern spoil area ditches. It does not seek and stipulated that it will not use, at any time, the south rim ditch and will maintain water control structures so to block water from entering that ditch. This will alleviate the problem of potential storage of water on Petitioners English and Patricia Mellor's property and the erosion problem on Petitioners William and Patricia Mellor's property south of the spoil area. It was thus established that the issuance of the right-of-way permit will not cause the injuries these Petitioners have suffered in the past because of use of the south rim ditch for water drainage and storage.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the South Florida Water Management District grant the County Line Drainage District's application for a permit for utilization of works and lands of the District. Subject to the following special condition: Issuance of this right-of-way permit does not relieve the Respondent CLDD from the responsibility of complying with special condition number 1 of the surface water management permit number 36-00184-S. Respondent CLDD shall, within 30 days of date of permitting, submit a design to the satisfaction of the SFWMD staff which will prevent the ability of CLDD to discharge to the southern rim ditch, described above. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Application No. 75-00196 is a request by the Standard Sand and Silica Company, for a consumptive water use permit. This application is for an existing use involving withdrawal from one well. The application seeks an average daily withdrawal of 1.6925 million gallons per day and a maximum daily withdrawal of 2.16 million gallons per day. The sought-for withdrawal will not exceed the water crop as defined by the district, with the withdrawal consumptively using only 35 percent of the water crop. The water will be used on site for the washing of sand. Mr. Clifton W. Golden is an adjacent landowner who testified that he was afraid of salt water intrusion and that a sink hole might develop because of the vast quantities of water taken from the aquifer by the applicant. He does not feel that the issuance of a permit would be consistent with the public interest. He presented no hydrological data showing that issuance of the permit would adversely affect his property. Mary Fausteen Thompson is a property owner adjacent to the site from which the water will be taken. She has had problems in the past with Standard Sand and Silica Company apparently discharging excess water on to her property. She thinks those problems may be occurring again, causing some of her property to be flooded. The sought-for consumptive use will not significantly induce salt water intrusion. Except as otherwise noted in the findings of fact, none of the conditions set forth in Subsection 16J-2.11(2), (3) or (4), F.A.C., will be violated. Several letters of objections have been received in addition to the objectors noted above. The Southwest Florida Water Management District's staff recommends issuance of the subject permit in the amounts requested with the following conditions: That no off-site runoff be permitted by the applicant. That flowmeters be placed on the well and quarterly reports made to the district.
Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that Application No. 75-00196 be granted with the conditions set forth in paragraph 7 above. ENTERED this 28th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District P.O. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Eugene W. Harris Standard Sand and Silica Co. P.O. Box 35 Davenport, Florida 33837 Mrs. Mary Fausteen Thompson Box 82-C, Evans Road Polk City, Florida Mr. Clifton W. Golden 800 Oriole Drive Virginia Beach, Florida 23451 Mr. John C. Jones Executive Director Florida Wildlife Federation 4080 North Haverhill Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33407
Findings Of Fact Respondent/applicant, James L. Carpenter (applicant or Carpenter), is the owner of upland property bordering on and contiguous to a man-made lagoon in Vaca Key near Marathon, Florida. The property is also adjacent to an artificial man-made canal which connects the lagoon to the open waters of Florida Bay. The lagoon and canal are classified as Class III waters of the State while Florida Bay is a Class III Outstanding Florida Water. A more precise location of the property is Section 9, Township 66 South, Range 32 East, Monroe County, Florida. By application dated June 23, 1987 applicant sought the issuance of a dredge and fill permit from respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (DER), authorizing the construction of an "L" shaped 125'x8' commercial dock with a 10'x8' access walkway waterward of mean high water (MHW) in the canal. The dock and walkway will be located on the property described in finding of fact 1. According to the application, Carpenter owns several "landlocked residences" in the vicinity of the proposed dock and desires to provide dockage for residents who rent his houses. Because of DER concerns that shading might affect photosynthetic capabilities in the vicinity of the project, applicant agreed to revise his application. This revision was made on December 21, 1987 and reduced the dock size to 102'x6' while the access walkway was increased slightly to 12'x8'. Thus, the dock will extend eight feet into the canal beyond the MHW. On January 5, 1988 DER's district office issued an Intent to Issue a permit subject to seven specific conditions incorporated in the permit. This prompted the filing of a petition by petitioner, Lillian Berdeal (Berdeal), who owns upland property bordering on and contiguous to the lagoon, canal and Florida Bay. She operates a commercial seafood business directly across the canal from Carpenter. According to her petition, Berdeal asserts that Carpenter's dock would adversely affect navigation in the canal and the health, safety and welfare or the property of others. The water body in question is a man-made canal facing to the north and providing an outlet for the lagoon to Florida Bay. The lagoon, which measures approximately 150'x100', is fairly well developed. On the east and southeast side of the lagoon lie an outdoor restaurant and Carpenter's boat rental business. Petitioner's seafood processing operation lies on the west and southwest sides of the lagoon and lagoon entrance. Photographs of the area have been received in evidence as DER exhibits 1 and 2 and petitioner's exhibit 1. Presently, there are five finger piers (docks) in front of Berdeal's property at the narrowest point of the canal. These piers are directly across the canal from Carpenter's proposed dock addition. They extend out eight feet perpendicular to the shoreline and are now used by commercial fishermen for docking purposes while using Berdeal's facility. Approximately thirty or forty boats use the finger piers during fishing season (August - May) while up to twenty may use them in the off-season (June - July). Berdeal described those boats as ranging from thirty to forty-five feet in length and having beams up to, but not exceeding, sixteen feet. However, vessels at petitioner's facility on the day of DER's inspection had an average beam of ten feet. The evidence is conflicting as to the canal's width at its most narrow point. According to DER's expert, the minimum width is seventy-six feet, and this figure is accepted as being more credible than Berdeal's own measurement of sixty-three feet. If the project is constructed, Carpenter's dock, together with a boat having a ten foot beam, would use around eighteen feet of the channel at its most narrow width while Berdeal's facility, if used by the largest boat, would take up another twenty-three feet. This would still leave around thirty-five feet of channel for navigation purposes between the two docks at the canal's most narrow point. According to applicant's expert in navigation, James J. Morrison, who has piloted boats in the area for over thirty years, a boat may safely operate in the canal if it has five feet of water on each side. This margin of safety is sufficient in all weather conditions up to and including a small craft warning. If the project is approved, the necessary margin of safety would be available. It is noted also that there are no significant currents in the canal that would adversely affect navigation, and under normal weather conditions, the canal and basin are easily navigable. Petitioner presented the testimony of a commercial fisherman, Leonard Quasney, who expressed concerns that northerly winds periodically drive aquatic weeds and grasses into the lagoon and canal thereby impairing the ability of a boat to safely operate. These weeds are shown in photographs received as petitioner's exhibit 1. It was Quasney's contention that, coupled with the periodic influx of weeds, the addition of a dock at the canal's most narrow point will make navigation more hazardous. However, this theory was discounted by expert witness Morrison who pointed out that, while it is true that floating mats of weeds affect the ability of a person to handle a boat by making the boat's rudder and propeller action less responsive, they do not affect the ability to navigate the canal. In other words, as long as the margin of safety is available in the canal, the presence of the weeds would not hinder a ship's ability to enter and exit the lagoon. This testimony is accepted as being more credible on the issue, and it is found that the new dock will not create a navigational hazard as a result of the weeds. Berdeal is concerned also that the new dock would make it more difficult for fishermen to access her property and therefore cause economic harm to both her and the fishermen. However, this contention was not substantiated. The parties have stipulated that, with the following special conditions proposed by DER at hearing regarding limitations on commercial use, liveaboards and scraping boat bottoms, all water quality standards will be met: All temporary and permanent use of liveaboard or liveaboard type vessels for residential use is prohibited. All on site fueling activities are prohibited. All major vessel repair, such as hull scraping and painting, with the boat in the water is prohibited. Only private use of the dock is permitted. All double parking or rafting of boats along the dock is prohibited. General conditions common to all dredge and fill permits. The parties have stipulated that the "public interest" criteria in Subsection 403.918(2)(a)2. and 4.-7., Florida Statutes (1987), have been satisfied. In addition, a registered engineer has certified that the dock's construction and use will not have an adverse effect on the public health, safety and welfare or the property of others. Petitioner has applied for the issuance of a permit allowing the construction of additional docks at her facility. If the application is approved, these docks will be used for commercial purposes. The proposed impact of this project, and its cumulative impact on the area, was considered by DER in its evaluation of Carpenter's application. However, conditions to be included in Berdeal's permit will minimize any water quality or navigation impacts of the project, even on a cumulative basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of James L. Carpenter for a dredge and fill permit be granted subject to those specific, special and general conditions imposed by the agency. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1988.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This controversy began on July 9, 1990, when petitioners, David and Victoria Page, filed an application with the district office of respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (DER), seeking the issuance of a permit authorizing certain construction activities (including the erection of a seawall) on their residential lot located at 3108 Gulfwinds Circle, Hernando Beach, Florida. The property faces west on the Gulf of Mexico, a water body designated as a Class III water in the State. The application was eventually deemed to be complete on October 24, 1990. After conducting a review of the application and an on-site inspection of the property, on January 18, 1991, DER issued its notice of permit denial. The notice identified the reasons for the denial as being petitioners' failure to give reasonable assurances that water quality standards would not be violated and that the project would be in the public interest. Also, DER cited expected adverse cumulative impacts if the application was granted. The notice provided further that if petitioners agreed to locate their seawall landward of the jurisdictional line, the project would be approved. In July 1991, petitioners amended their application to propose that the seawall be constructed even further seaward of the jurisdictional line. When efforts to resolve the case were unsuccessful, petitioners requested a formal hearing on January 17, 1992, to contest the agency's decision. Petitioners purchased their property in 1989. It lies within Unit 2 of Gulf Coast Retreats, a residential subdivision in Hernando Beach, Florida. The property is identified as lot 20 on Gulfwinds Circle and fronts the Little Pine Island Bay (Bay), which is a part of the Gulf of Mexico. Access to the Gulf is provided by a channel (six feet in depth) in the Bay in front of lot 20 and which eventually runs into the Gulf several miles south of petitioners' lot. It is undisputed that in 1985 Hurricane Elena passed offshore causing erosion to lot 20 and other adjacent lots. Consequently, the upland portion of the lot is now smaller than before the hurricane. However, petitioners purchased their property in that state of condition. Lots 19 and 21 are on the south and north sides of petitioners' property and are owned by the Steins and Budricks, respectively. Both neighbors have constructed vertical concrete seawalls in front of their homes. Budrick was issued a permit to construct a seawall on December 28, 1989, while Stein constructed his without a permit. However, Stein has subsequently filed an after-the-fact permit application and was recently advised by DER that the application was complete. At hearing, a DER representative expressed the view that the Stein application will probably be approved since his wall is landward of the DER jurisdictional line. It is noted that the Stein and Budrick seawalls sit back from the original property lines because of the erosion suffered during the 1985 hurricane and correspond to the jurisdictional line established by DER on their property. Another application for a permit to construct a seawall was filed by the owner of lot 18 in March 1992. Like Stein and Budrick, that owner proposed to construct his wall on the landward side of the jurisdictional line. Petitioners, who live in Kansas, desire to construct a home on their lot. They have proposed to place one hundred cubic yards of fill (limerock) on 1,065 square feet of intertidal wetlands on the western end of their lot and construct a 110-foot vertical seawall up to thirty feet seaward of the jurisdictional line. Thus, there will be dredge and filling activities in the Gulf of Mexico, a class III water of the state, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of DER. By law, DER is required to establish a jurisdictional line to show the landward extent of waters of this state, including the Gulf of Mexico. Such extent is normally defined by species of plants or soils which are characteristic of those areas subject to regular and periodic inundation by the waters of the state. As a general practice, using a prescribed plant or species indicator list, DER makes an on-site inspection of the property to determine what vegetation, if any, is found on the property and is subject to regular and periodic inundation by the waters. In this case, the dominant vegetation found on lot 20 was paspalum distichum, a plant on the species list subject to regular and periodic inundation by the Gulf waters. Accordingly, DER observed where the vegetation ended and used that point for the placement of the jurisdictional line. As a cross check, DER also noted the rack line, which is indicative of the landward extent to which the high tides rise, and found it to correspond to the vegetation line. It should be noted that the jurisdictional line established on petitioners' property corresponds with the line drawn on lots 18, 19 and 21, and if that line is used to construct the seawall on lot 20, the seawalls on all four lots would run in a straight line. Although petitioners objected to the jurisdictional line as established by DER, they offered no credible evidence to show that it was improper or should have been placed at a different location. On January 9 and 15, 1991, Richard W. Pugh, a DER field environmental specialist, conducted an on-site inspection of the property and adjacent waters. He also was responsible for establishing the jurisdictional line. Finding numerous adverse environmental effects that would occur if the permit was granted as proposed, Pugh recommended that the application be denied. This recommendation was accepted by the deputy assistant secretary for DER's Southwest District Office and a notice of permit denial was accordingly issued. The bases for the denial were that (a) reasonable assurances had not been given by petitioners that water quality standards would be satisfied; (b) a cumulative adverse impact on the area would occur if the permit was approved, and (c) petitioners had failed to give reasonable assurances that the project was in the public interest. In order to prove entitlement to a permit, petitioners must give reasonable assurance that water quality standards will not be violated and that the project is in the public interest. In this respect, they offered no evidence to provide these assurances. This in itself supports a finding that no entitlement to a permit has been shown. Even so, the agency elected to present evidence on these issues after petitioners' case-in-chief was concluded. Findings of fact drawn from that evidence are set forth below. On April 6, 1992, a DER marine biologist, Dr. George H. Farrell, visited the site and conducted a biological evaluation of the composition of the benthic community in the intertidal and subtidal wetlands which would be impacted by the project. Based on his tests and observations, Dr. Farrell concluded that the project as proposed would have an adverse impact on marine and wildlife resources in the area. This is because the area has very good water quality, contains a high species diversity, performs an integral part in the food web, and serves a valuable nursery function for estuarine dependent juvenile fish species and a corridor function for migrating estuarine dependent fish species. This testimony was not challenged by petitioners and is hereby accepted. 1/ In granting or denying a water resource permit, DER is also required to consider certain statutory criteria found in Subsection 403.918(2), Florida Statutes, to determine whether a project is in the public interest. Although petitioners did not address these criteria, and thus failed to give any assurances that the project is in the public interest as required by law, testimony adduced by DER established that under petitioners' proposal, there will be a permanent loss of 1,065 square feet of intertidal wetlands due to filling activities. These wetlands are now used by fish and wildlife habitat and will no longer be available for use. In addition, the same area is used as a nursery area by a variety of fish species. As such, the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife and their habitats and will adversely affect the fishing values and marine productivity in the vicinity. Second, because petitioners' proposed seawall will jut out from their neighbors' walls by as much as thirty feet, and the corners of the seawall in that configuration will result in erosion or shoaling depending on whether the waters are moving north or south, the project will cause harmful erosion or shoaling. Third, because the wall is being constructed of concrete and steel and is not temporary, the project will be of a permanent nature and thus have a permanent adverse impact. Finally, the ecological functions being performed in the immediate vicinity of the project are extremely important and the elimination of this zone will significantly impair those functions. Collectively, these considerations support a finding that the project is not in the public interest. DER has a policy of not granting a permit if adverse cumulative impacts may be expected as a result of granting that permit. This policy is derived from a statute (s. 403.919, F.S.) requiring such impacts to be considered in the permitting process. In the case at bar, DER reasonably predicts that if it granted petitioners' application and authorized them to construct a seawall which jutted out up to thirty feet beyond their neighbors' walls, it would be obligated to grant similar permits to property owners on adjacent lots. Because petitioners' application will have an adverse impact on the water quality and is contrary to the public interest, the granting of additional permits would exacerbate those impacts. When an applicant proposes to fill (destroy) wetlands, and the applicant is unable to meet the public interest criteria set forth in subsection 403.918(2), DER shall consider measures proposed by or acceptable to the applicant to mitigate the adverse effects caused by the project. In this case, no mitigative measures were proposed by petitioners. At hearing, petitioners' representative asserted that in June 1991, the Cabinet (presumably sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund) implemented a new "policy" which allows property owners to "recover and bulkhead" land previously lost due to avulsion and erosion. He further represented that such requests were to be filed within five years after the event (hurricane). Although petitioners were not the property owners when the event occurred, and more than five years has elapsed, in July 1991 petitioners filed a request with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to reclaim and bulkhead their property and that request remained pending as of the date of hearing. A copy of the policy itself (or rule, if any, implementing the policy) was not made a part of this record. Even so, there was no evidence to establish that the granting of that application would require DER to grant a water resource permit, and DER takes the position that the request has no bearing on the issue of whether a water resource permit should be issued to petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying petitioners' application for a water resource permit. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The subject application requests a water use permit from the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District (FCD) for the supplemental irrigation of 145 acres of citrus lands located in Orange County. Received into evidence at the hearing were the public notice of hearing appearing in the Sentinel Star, permit application number 21424 with an attached report and the Staff Report of the FCD, prepared by Nagendra Khanal. The applicant requested an annual allocation of water in the amount of 120.15 acre-feet or 9.94 inches per year, for a period of twenty (20) years. The Staff Report recommends the issuance of a permit for said amount, with maximum monthly pumpages not to exceed 49.8 acre-feet or 4.13 inches, the permit to expire on January 15, 1978. Several further special provisions were recommended on pages 4 & 5 of the Staff Report, which report is attached hereto. There is no dispute between the applicant and the FCD over the technical aspects of the Staff Report. The protests of the applicant center around the length of the permit and some of the special provisions recommended in the Staff Report, which the applicant feels are vague and ambiguous. Mr. James A. Hinson, the applicant's corporate secretary, felt that the FCD had sufficient data and statistics as to the water resources and agricultural usage within the area to sustain the granting of a twenty year permit. It was further felt that the issuance of a two-year permit for the purpose of gathering information as to the quantity of use would tend to prompt higher usage and even lead to falsification of pumpage records on the part of agricultural users so as to assure the issuance of future permits. The applicant was also concerned with the costs of applying for another permit in two years. Mr. Nagendra Khanal, a hydrologist with the FCD, explained that the purpose of the two-year permit was to obtain information from agricultural users in the area as to the amount of water used and the effect of such usage on the Florida aquifer system. Since the outset of regulatory provisions, the FCD has set the same termination date for each permit for agricultural use within each of the basins. At that expiration time, the pumpage records for all users in the area will be established and present experimental estimates can then be compared with actual usage. Little is known by the FCD about how the Florida aquifer system operates and the data presently in use are experimental. Since all permits within each basin will expire on the same date, the entire basin can then be evaluated at one point in time. It was felt that if falsification of pumpage records were to occur, it could probably be detected by data currently available to the FCD. It was further opined by Mr. Khanal that at, the expiration date of all permits issued in each basin, an automatic conversion into new permits would occur at little or no cost to the applicant. With regard to the special provisions recommended in the Staff Report, Mr. Hinson expressed concern over the manner of compliance. Specifically, he desired more information on the type of equipment or devises required by the FCD when it calls for "minimum head pressures", and "a measuring device on each of the three wells." He also desired information as to the times of year the water quality analyses were to be performed. Mr. Khanal explained that no regulatory criteria had been established by the FCD with regard to pumpage and that the minimum type of measuring device, such as a time clock, on each of the wells would suffice. Further specifications will be supplied to the applicant upon request. It was explained by Khanal that the water quality analyses should be performed once before the rainy season (at the end of May) and once after the rainy season (at the end of October). There was some confusion over the inclusion of the parameter of "specific conductivity" within the definition of a standard complete water quality analysis. Finally, Mr. Khanal listed two amendments to be made in the Staff Report. On page 2, under "B. Existing Facilities", "3,500 gpm" should read "3,600 gpm." The last item on the chart on page 3 of the Staff Report should read "2 in 10 Year Drought" in lieu of "1 in 10 Year Drought."
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that Application No. 21424 be granted and that a permit be issued in accordance with the recommendations and provisions set forth in the Staff Report, as amended. Due to the apparent confusion over the inclusion of "specific conductivity" as a parameter to be included within the definition of a standard complete analysis, it is further recommended that the Staff make further inquiry into its necessity. If the Staff then concludes that "specific conductivity" is necessary to obtain a complete water quality analysis, it is recommended that it remain on the list of parameters. Respectfully submitted this 5th day of March, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1976 COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas C. Garwood, Jr., Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt, Eidson and Wharton 17th Floor CNA Building Orlando, Florida Stephen A. Walker, Esquire Post Office Box V West Palm Beach, Florida 33402
