Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Jeffrey Goldpaint, is a disabled individual as determined by the Social Security Administration and has received funds through the Social Security system for his disability, administered by the Respondent's vocational rehabilitation program. His disability is of a psychiatric nature. During and before 1976, he was enrolled in a journalism curriculum, funding for which was provided by the Respondent. In 1976, the Petitioner elected to withdraw from the program, the reason for which withdrawal is not clear, although the Petitioner remonstrated that it was unavoidable, due to illness. In any event, after negotiation with the Respondent, the Petitioner obtained additional funding from the Respondent, as administrator of the federal program for vocational rehabilitation contained in Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 361, for additional rehabilitation training. Pursuant to this second rehabilitation effort, the Petitioner successfully completed training to be a real estate salesman, passed his examination and was licensed. As a part of that rehabilitation effort, the Respondent made available to the Petitioner employment placement assistance in order to help ensure that the petitioner would obtain employment in the real estate sales field. The Petitioner refused to respond and participate in the Respondent's job placement efforts for him and ultimately sought additional funding for a third course of study from the Respondent in the area of computer science, the denial of which instigated this proceeding. The Petitioner's motivation in seeking entitlement to the subject course of study in computer science lies in his belief that, because be is disabled and because of the moribund state of the real estate market in his geographical area, that he has a right to additional vocational training. The Respondent established, however, that the Petitioner is now employable as a real estate salesman. There is a substantial likelihood of his placement in an employment position in -that field of endeavor. It was not established that his disability is a hindrance or handicap to his employability in view of his past successfully completed vocational rehabilitation training and education. The Petitioner's voluntary decision to ignore the employment placement assistance afforded him by the Respondent was the direct and proximate cause of his lack of employment in his previously chosen career field at the time of the hearing. His request to be paid for enrollment in a course of study in computer science was motivated by a subjective and personal change in his career goals and not because his disability posed any handicap to his employability as a real estate salesman. It was established by the Respondent that the Petitioner could be successfully employed in a real estate career, especially had he availed himself of the employment placement assistance offered by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the petition of Jeffrey Goldpaint be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey Goldpaint 1152 18th Ave., North Apartment #7 Lake Worth, Florida 33460 K. C Collette, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for relicensure as a mental health counselor should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was licensed as a psychologist in the State of New Jersey from May 14, 1979, until May 29, 1996. While so licensed, the Petitioner engaged in private practice as a psychologist in New Jersey where he engaged individual, family, and group therapy. On October 16, 1995, the Petitioner’s license to practice psychology in New Jersey was suspended pursuant to a Consent Order. The suspension was based on allegations of extensive insurance fraud perpetrated by the Petitioner during the course of his practice of psychology in New Jersey. Following the suspension of his license, the Petitioner continued to practice psychology in New Jersey by continuing to see patients and continuing to provide therapy. On May 28, 1996, the Petitioner pled guilty to one count of conspiracy and to one count of theft by deception in New Jersey Superior Court, Criminal Division. The criminal charges to which the Petitioner pled guilty resulted from the Petitioner’s having engaged in a scheme in his psychology practice whereby he would submit claims for payment to insurance companies, and would receive payments for those claims from insurance companies, for patients he did not see and/or for treatments he never rendered. The criminal court that convicted the Petitioner ordered the Petitioner to pay restitution in the amount of $2,793,656.70 and sentenced the Petitioner to a prison term of five years and six months. Ultimately, the Petitioner was required to serve only seven months in prison. The Petitioner has repaid a substantial amount of the restitution, but he still owes approximately $600,000.00 in unpaid restitution. On May 29, 1996, the New Jersey State Board of Psychological Examiners issued a Final Order which, among other things, revoked the Petitioner’s license to practice psychology in New Jersey. On June 27, 1996, the Superior Court of New Jersey in Case No. C-225-96 issued a Final Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction against the Petitioner. That order permanently enjoined the Petitioner from engaging in the practice of psychology in any setting and also ordered the Petitioner to reimburse the patients he had treated while his license was suspended. On May 25, 1994, the Petitioner was advised by letter that he had successfully completed the requirements to be eligible for licensure in Florida as a mental health counselor. Shortly thereafter the Respondent received his license to practice as a mental health counselor in Florida. The Petitioner was licensed in Florida as a mental health counselor from mid-1994 until July 16, 2001. On July 16, 2001, the Florida Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling entered a Final Order revoking the Petitioner’s license to practice mental health counseling in Florida. The revocation order was based on an Administrative Complaint which alleged that the Petitioner had violated Sections 491.009(2)(b) and 491.009(2)(c), Florida Statutes, by reason of the revocation of his New Jersey license to practice psychology, and by reason of his criminal conviction in New Jersey of a crime that directly related to the practice of mental health counseling. The profession of psychologist and the profession of mental health counseling are comparable professions.2 The Petitioner has not completed a minimum of three semester hours or four quarter hours of graduate level coursework on the subject of substance abuse. The Petitioner has not completed a minimum of three semester or four quarter hours of graduate level coursework on the subject of legal, ethical, and professional standards.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling enter a final order denying the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a licensed mental health counselor. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2005.
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether Coyle is eligible for vocational rehabilitation benefits. The eligibility requirements for vocational rehabilitation benefits are set forth in both federal and state law. An individual is eligible when it is certified that: A physical or mental disability is present; A substantial handicap to employment exists; and Vocational rehabilitation services may reasonably be expected to render an individual fit to engage in gainful employment. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, there is no viable dispute that Coyle would not benefit from the receipt of vocational rehabilitation services, or that a documented physical disability does not exist. The real factual issue presented is whether Coyle has a substantial handicap to his employment. Both parties submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders filed March 4 and March 15, 1983. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Michael L. Coyle, applied for vocational rehabilitation services on May 28, 1982. Coyle is a 46-year-old white male who is divorced with custody of his seven-year-old daughter. Coyle worked for 14 years as a printer/compositor for the Sarasota Herald-Tribune. This job required that Coyle stand during his entire work day. Prior to working for the Sarasota Herald-Tribune, Coyle worked as an airline ticket clerk and supervised the loading of freight for an airline. These positions required that Coyle stand during much of his work day. When Coyle applied for vocational rehabilitation services, he was on medical leave from the Sarasota Herald-Tribune on advice of his personal physician. This medical leave was for the purpose of alleviating pain in Coyle's left knee. This pain had become incapacitating. When Coyle applied for vocational rehabilitation services, his medical leave was almost over, and the condition in his left knee had not improved. Coyle's employer, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune, had no positions available in which Coyle could work seated, and Coyle could not perform his duties as a printer/compositor while seated. Coyle was required to perform his duties while standing, and no opportunity existed for Coyle to be seated periodically during his work day. Coyle's application for vocational rehabilitation services was approved, and Coyle was certified as eligible on July 1, 1982. A rehabilitative plan was not prepared for Coyle by Coyle's counselor. Before a rehabilitative plan could becompleted, Coyle applied for additional benefits, to include transportation and maintenance costs. By this time, Coyle's medical studies were completed and their results available. The physicians reported that Coyle had a degenerative and chronic joint disease in his left knee; however, Coyle was able to work if he took aspirin and alleviated the strain on his knee by not standing. Based upon these reports, Coyle's request for maintenance and transportation costs were denied. Based upon the reevaluation of the medical opinions, the agency determined that Coyle was not eligible to receive any vocational rehabilitation benefits. Coyle was notified of the agency's decision to terminate his vocational rehabilitation benefits, and Coyle timely initiated administrative review of that determination. Coyle's records do not reflect that Coyle had applied for SSI and food stamps. Coyle receives some money as an insurance payment for his disability from private insurance maintained through his former employer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Michael L. Coyle's basic vocational rehabilitation benefits should be reinstated retroactive to the date of original termination. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1983.
The Issue Whether the Respondent Entrust Recovery Corporation violated Section 493.6118(1)(n), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed and whether Respondent Patrick C. Simone violated Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and if so what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Phillip Hobbs (Hobbs), is the president of Respondent, Entrust Recovery Corporation (Entrust). Mr. Hobbs holds a Class "C" Private Investigator license; a Class "R" Recovery Agency license; a Class "E" Recovery Agent license; a Class "RI" Recovery School Instructor license; and a Class "RS" Recovery School/Training Facility license. Respondent, Patrick Simone (Simone) did not have a Class "E" Recovery Agent license or a Class "EE" Recovery Agent Intern license on January 13, 1995. On January 13, 1995, Simone was employed as a private investigator for Entrust. On January 13, 1995, at the request of Hobbs, Simone went to Jeff Paull's (Paull) residence to determine if Paull's car was there. Simone advised Hobbs by two-way radio that a white Toyota was parked in the driveway. Hobbs told Simone to wait for him to get to the residence. When Hobbs arrived, he parked his car approximately 100 feet west of Paull's house. Hobbs told Simone to go and knock on the door. Simone walked up to Paull's door and knocked to see if anyone was home. Paull came to the door, identified himself as Jeff Paull and came out of the house to speak with Simone. Simone identified himself as a representative of World Omni and told Paull that he was there to take the car, that he needed to talk to Paull about the car payments, and that World Omni would like to talk to him. Simone, using a cellular telephone, dialed World Omni's number and gave the telephone to Paull to talk to World Omni. After Paull talked to World Omni, he tossed the car keys to Simone. Paull went back into his house to get his own portable telephone and made another telephone call. While the transaction was taking place between Paull and Simone, Hobbs was down the street with a pair of binoculars and a two-way radio trying to find out what was going on. Based on the location of Paull's house, the front door and courtyard are visible only from directly in front of Paull's house. The front door area is not visible from the west because of the foliage and construction of the house. Thus, Hobbs could not have observed the interactions between Paull and Simone as he testified at the final hearing. Because Hobbs was trying to monitor the transaction from a distance with a two-way radio, he could not hear what was being said at the time it was being said and relied on Simone to tell him what was going on when Paull was not there. After Paull gave Simone the keys, Paull asked Simone if he would give him a ride to his luncheon appointment. Simone agreed to do so. Paull went back into the house to finish dressing and someone banged on the door while he was getting ready. When Paull went back outside, only Simone was present. Simone took the white Toyota and dropped Paull off on his way back to Hobbs' office. During the scenario between Paull and Simone, Hobbs did not approach Paull to speak with Paull and did not identify himself to Paul as the repossessor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Patrick C. Simone violated Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes, that Entrust Recovery Corporation violated Section 493.6118(1)(n), Florida Statutes, that an administrative fine of $150 be imposed on Patrick C. Simone, and that an administrative fine of $500 be imposed on Entrust Recovery Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 95-4238 & 95-4239 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-5: Accepted. Paragraphs 6-9: Accepted in substance. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found based on the finding that Simone told Paull that he was there to take the car. Paragraph 5: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Hobbs had directed Simone to see if the car was there. Paragraph 7: Rejected that Hobbs could observe and hear what was going on, otherwise accepted that Hobbs parked down the street from the house. Paragraphs 8-9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Accepted that Paull gave up his car. Rejected that he was given the option to wait until Monday as not supported by the record. Paull stated that he asked Omni to wait until Monday but the evidence does not support a finding that Omni agreed to wait until Monday. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson Assistant General Counsel Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station Number 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0205 Mark A. Kamilar, Esquire Penthouse I, United States Justice Building 155 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The ultimate issue in this case is whether Janna Preissig is eligible for vocational rehabilitation benefits for which she has applied on three separate occasions. 1/ Ms. Preissig contends that she is eligible. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter "the Department" or "DHRS") contends that Ms. Preissig is ineligible on the grounds that vocational rehabilitation services may not reasonably be expected to render Ms. Preissig fit to engage in a gainful occupation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following finds of fact: The Petitioner, Ms. Janna Preissig, most recently applied for vocational rehabilitation services on January 17, 1984. Ms. Preissig applied for such benefits twice before, once in 1982 and once in 1983. Both of her prior applications were denied. Ms. Preissig is a 32-year-old, single, white, female with a long history of unsuccessful efforts at employment corresponding to a long history of mental problems. Her only period of regular employment was a three and one-half year period during which she was in the U.S. Army working as a supply clerk. She has obtained numerous other jobs from time to time, but is always fired after a short period of time due to her mental condition. Since childhood Ms. Preissig has suffered from severe mental problems. As early as age thirteen she was hospitalized for psychiatric problems for approximately one year. During the hospitalization she was subjected to at least 20 electrical shock treatments. She believes that some of her current problems are the result of the electrical shock treatments. Ms. Preissig has a long history of both inpatient and outpatient treatment for psychiatric disorders since her initial hospitalization at age thirteen. In addition to her difficulties in retaining employment, Ms. Preissig also has difficulties with social adjustment. She has a long history of vagrancy. Ms. Preissig has a long history of being uncooperative with treatment plans. She has been discharged from inpatient treatment because of disruptive conduct which interfered with the treatment of other patients. She has been suspended from outpatient treatment programs for breaking rules. She has a poor attendance record at outpatient treatment programs. She also has a negative attitude towards the treatment programs she has been exposed to and does not believe she is likely to receive any benefit from the treatment programs which have been recommended for her. Due to the nature of Ms. Preissig's mental condition and her uncooperative attitude towards the treatment which has been recommended for her and made available to her, the prognosis for significant improvement in her present condition is poor. Her present condition was summarized as follows by Dr. Michael C. Berg: She is at present, and previously, quite unable to hold gainful employment because of the presence of severe mental impairment, paranoia, which is long-standing and with a poor prognosis. Not only is she unemployable, but she lacks the basic living and social skills necessary for an independent life without some supervision, structure, and assistance with accommodation. This condition will not, in my opinion, significantly improve over the next 12 months. As a result of Ms. Preissig's current mental condition, which is not expected to improve over the next twelve months (and which may last much longer if she fails to cooperate with the treatment program), she is not fit to engage in a gainful occupation. Further, because of Ms. Preissig's current mental condition, vocational rehabilitation services would not render her fit to engage in a gainful occupation. The sine qua non to her ability to engage in a gainful occupation is some significant improvement in her current mental condition.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order denying Ms. Janna Preissig's application for vocational rehabilitation services. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of October, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1984.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for exemption pursuant to Section 400.512, Florida Statutes, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact On May 21, 1990, Petitioner, Orlando Rueda (Rueda), was arrested on charges of sexual battery on a child. The charges arose from incidents which occurred in 1983. On September 5, 1991, Rueda plead nolo contendere to five counts of attempted sexual battery on a child, Sections 777.04(1) and 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, and to two counts of indecent assault, Section 800.041(1), Florida Statutes. Adjudication was withheld, and Rueda was sentenced to five years probation, the terms of which included no contact with the victim or his family, no employment involving children, and a psychological evaluation. Rueda maintains that he is not guilty of the crimes for which he pled nolo contendere but states that because of financial difficulties in continuing with his defense and of the possibility that he could be sentenced to life imprisonment if he were found guilty, he pled nolo contendere rather than go to trial. On August 27, 1993, Rueda was arrested for driving with a suspended license. On September 17, 1993, his probation officer executed an affidavit of violation of probation indicating that Rueda violated probation by driving with a suspended license and failing to file with his probation officer a full report of having been arrested for driving with a suspended license. Rueda was arrested and charged with violation of probation. On October 18, 1993, Rueda admitted to the charge of violation of probation. The court revoked Rueda's probation and sentenced him to another five-year term of probation and ordered Rueda to attend a sex offender program at R.E.A.C.H. once a week. The court modified the probation by order dated May 31, 1994, to require attendance at the Fifth Street Counseling Center in place of attendance at R.E.A.C.H. Rueda was to remain in the Fifth Street Counseling Center program until further notice from the program. The program at the Fifth Street Counseling Center was headed by William Rambo, a clinical social worker. Rueda began his treatment with Mr. Rambo in June 1994. The treatment program is for a minimum of four years. The first phase, which usually lasts a year, consists of intensive weekly therapy sessions in which the patient deals with the allegations of the original sexual offense. The second phase is designed to last a minimum of one year and is a less intensive phase with bi-weekly group sessions. The emphasis in the second phase is on current functioning and monitoring of the patient's stability. The final phase is designed for two years and allows the patient to demonstrate continued stability. On January 31, 1996, Rueda admitted to his probation officer that he had used cocaine on January 24, 1996. Rueda also admitted to the use of cocaine to a Secret Service Agent, who was questioning Rueda about an incident involving a counterfeit fifty-dollar bill. Rueda said that he had been drinking with friends when one of them went to purchase cocaine. The drug was put into a cigarette, which Rueda and his friends smoked. As a result of the incident involving his use of cocaine, on February 26, 1997, the court ordered two years of community control, followed by ten years of probation which began on April 4, 1996. Community control is a form of house arrest and sometimes involves wearing an electronic monitoring device. Rueda was required to wear an electronic monitor for one year. Barring any further violations of probation, Rueda's probation is due to expire in 2008. On May 12, 1997, Rueda wrote a letter to the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), requesting an exemption and outlining his criminal background. His letter did not include any information concerning the January 1996, cocaine- related violation. On December 8, 1997, the Agency granted Rueda an informal hearing before an informal hearing committee on his request for an exemption. During the informal hearing, the committee specifically asked Rueda to describe any special conditions of his probation. Petitioner did not volunteer that at the time of the informal hearing that he was being required to wear an electronic monitor. The informal committee had learned about the electronic monitor from Rueda's probation officer. Rueda did not reveal that he was wearing a monitor until the committee specifically asked whether he was under electronic monitoring. Rueda is still in the first phase of his treatment with Mr. Rambo. Part of the reason that he has not completed the first phase is that each time he violated probation, the probation period would begin anew, and Rueda would have to begin the first phase anew. However, based on the testimony of Mr. Rambo, Rueda has made progress in his treatment, but he has not completed his treatment program. Other than the incidents for which Rueda plead nolo contendere, Rueda has not been involved in any incidents of sexual battery or indecent assault.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Orlando Rueda's request for an exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jennifer A. Steward, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 1400 West Commercial Boulevard, Suite 110 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Kevin J. Kulik, Esquire 600 South Andrews Avenue, Suite 500 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by reason of his race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Hillsborough Corrections Institute on October 19, 1990 as a trainee and entered the Corrections Officer Academy (Academy) the following Monday, October 22, 1990. The Academy is run by Hillsborough Community College under the guidelines established by the Florida Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. Completion of the Academy is a prerequisite for certification. Section 943.13, Florida Statutes. After successfully completing the Academy the trainees are promoted to probation correction officers for nine months and assigned to a correction facility. Petitioner, while in the Academy, reinjured a military service connected injury and was unable to attend and participate in the self-defense portion of the curriculum while it was given. He presented a doctor's certificate that he should avoid walking or running exercises for a prolonged period of time (Exhibit 4). Petitioner was advised more than once that he would need to take the self-defense portion of the Academy curriculum before he could be certified and that he had six months in which to take this portion of the training. At least two and possibly three classes were available to Petitioner during the six month period following the graduation of his class in which he could have taken the Self-Defense portion of the curriculum. Petitioner attended the graduation ceremonies with his class but he did not receive a certificate that he had completed the Academy. Immediately following the graduation ceremony Petitioner received the same 10% pay raise the other trainees received. Hillsborough Correction Institute (HCI) was not aware that Petitioner had not successfully completed the Academy until May 2, 1991. At this time the personnel manager at HCI accompanied by Major Berry went to the superintendent with the problem and recommended Petitioner's dismissal. With HCI laboring under the false assumption that Petitioner had completed the Academy and was eligible for certification, he had been allowed to work in the prison compound. Since only certified correctional officers are allowed to so work, the Institute was exposed to legal liability if any injury had occurred to a prisoner or a corrections officer and Petitioner had been involved in the incident. Effective May 6, 1991, Petitioner was terminated because he had not successfully completed the Academy within the time specified. Petitioner contends that two white correction officer trainees were treated differently than he was treated, but could testify only to what he had heard from other correction officers. The two trainees referred to by Petitioner were David Collins and a Ms. Duhamel. Respondent presented evidence (Exhibit 2) that Collins had been a corrections officer in another state. His application for employment at HCI was sent to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) for review of his training. FDLE advised HCI that Collins needed only 40 hours of additional training and he was enrolled at Hillsborough Community College. Subsequent to the completion of this training, FDLE found they had made an error and Collins needed an additional 40 hours of training. He was sent back to Hillsborough Community College for this training. Ms. Duhamel received work related injuries to her back while she was taking the self-defense training and was placed on Workers' Compensation for an extended period. She was subsequently certified after successfully completing all of the hours and courses required at the Academy. Petitioner presented no evidence that his race played any part in the decision to terminate his employment. Despite this lack of evidence from Petitioner, Respondent presented evidence that all trainees who do not complete the Academy are terminated in employment and cited four specific instances in which three of the dismissed trainees were white.
Recommendation It is recommended that a final order be entered dismissing the petition for relief from an unlawful employment practice filed by Christopher Hooks against the Florida Department of Corrections. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Christopher Hooks Post Office Box 310623 Tampa, Florida 33602 Dana Baird, General Counsel Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Sec. Commission on Human Relation Department of Corrections Building F, Room 240 2601 Blair Stone Road 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Tallahassee, FL 32303 4149 Louis A. Vargas Margaret Jones, Clerk General Counsel Commission on Human Relation Department of Corrections Building F, Room 240 2601 Blair Stone Road 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Tallahassee, FL 32303 4149
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Gary M. Piccirillo ("Piccirillo"), Douglas L. Adams ("Adams"), and George Crain ("Crain") each are inmates who are presently incarcerated and within the custody of Respondent, Department of Corrections. At the time of final hearing in this cause, each of the Petitioners was incarcerated in Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida. At the time of final hearing in this cause, both Petitioner Adams and Petitioner Crain had been classified as "close custody" in accordance with the provisions of Rule 33-6.09(4), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner Piccirillo had been classified as "medium custody" in accordance with that same rule. The custody status of each of these inmates had been reviewed and established within the last six months prior to final hearing. In addition to challenging the validity of Rule 33-9.07(4), Florida Administrative Code, Petitioners also challenge the validity of Department of Corrections' Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.40 issued April 27, 1977, and revised March 10, 1982, as an unpromulgated rule. Specifically, Petitioners contend that Section IXB conflicts with certain provisions of Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and is, therefore, invalid. Specifically the Policy and Procedure Directive in the above referenced section provides that: The department will permit considera- tion for work release 18 months prior to release. However, normally such consideration will be given within the last nine months prior to the presumptive parole release date or expiration or [sic]. . . .
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled under Florida’s workers’ compensation laws to payment for professional services to an injured worker for the billings identified by the three notices of disallowance at issue in this consolidated proceeding.
Findings Of Fact The claimant, a male, was born July 21, 1961. On February 17, 1995, the claimant sustained a severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) and other injuries during the course of his employment with the City of Hollywood, Florida. At all times relevant to these proceedings, the claimant has been receiving benefits pursuant to the Florida workers’ compensation laws. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the carrier has been the workers’ compensation carrier for the employer. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the claimant has lived in a home purchased for him by the carrier. The claimant has a life estate in the home and the carrier has the remainder interest. The claimant lives in the home with his mother and has 24-hour attendant services paid for by the carrier. The carrier has purchased a van for the claimant, which his attendant uses to transport the claimant to therapy and other appointments. The claimant has a history of mental illness dating to his teenage years, when he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. As a result of his injury and his illness, the claimant acts out periodically and becomes physically resistive to those trying to care for him. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner has been a provider of rehabilitation services to various patients, including those with TBI. Dr. Marie DiCowden, a psychologist, is the founder and director of Petitioner. Dr. DiCowden described Petitioner as being a health care community that provides an integrated administration for a long continuum of care post acute rehabilitation through community reintegration using health promotion, prevention, and integrated primary care. Petitioner is accredited by two national accrediting organizations referred to by the acronyms CARF (Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities) and CORF (Commission on Outpatient Rehabilitation Facilities). Petitioner is also certified by the Florida Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (formerly housed in the Department of Labor and now housed in the Department of Education), the Florida Division of Workers’ Compensation, and by the Florida Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Program.4 As a result of his accident, the claimant was in a coma for several weeks. He was hospitalized (first in an acute care facility and subsequently in two different rehabilitation hospitals) until December 28, 1995, when he was placed in Whitehall Nursing Home. Whitehall was not an appropriate placement for the claimant because of his behavior and his need for rehabilitation services. On March 27, 1996, Yvonne Beckman, a rehabilitation nurse consultant employed by the carrier, referred the claimant to Petitioner for an evaluation. Shortly before that referral, the claimant had been evaluated by two neuropsychologists (Dr. Jorge A. Herra and Dr. Lee. H. Bukstel), who had opined that the claimant would benefit from rehabilitation services. Ms. Beckman asked Dr. DiCowden to recommend a neurologist who practiced in South Florida. In response, Dr. DiCowden gave Ms. Beckman the names of three neurologists, one of whom was Dr. Paul Wand. Ms. Beckman authorized Dr. Wand to provide services to the claimant. Dr. Wand prescribed continued rehabilitation services for the claimant at Petitioner’s facility. The services at issue in this proceeding were provided by Petitioner pursuant to prescriptions from Dr. Wand.5 Prior to accepting the claimant, Dr. DiCowden informed a representative of the carrier that Petitioner would accept the claimant as a patient in its brain injury program and estimated the annual costs to be $200,000.00. The claimant began receiving rehabilitation services from Petitioner five days a week beginning August 1, 1996. The claimant received from Petitioner’s staff physical therapy, occupational therapy, cognitive retraining, speech training, language training, psychological services, art therapy, music therapy, and yoga therapy. The claimant continued to receive those rehabilitation services from Petitioner (five days a week) from August 1996 to the date of the hearing (and presumably to date). The authorization for the provision of rehabilitation services to the claimant was periodically reviewed by the carrier. In November 1998, the carrier had the claimant examined by Dr. Richard Bailyn (a neurologist) and by Dr. Kevin Lapinski (a neuropsychologist). Those doctors opined that the claimant was not benefiting from cognitive retraining, occupational therapy, speech therapy, or language therapy at Petitioner’s facility. They further opined that the claimant required an activity program to satisfy his recreational and stimulation needs, but that such a program did not require Petitioner’s facility since the claimant’s aide could be trained to provide those services. Dr. Bailyn was of the opinion that as of November 1998 the various therapies provided by Petitioner’s facility to the claimant were not reasonable and were not medically necessary. Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes, requires a carrier to review bills by providers of medical services as follows: (6) UTILIZATION REVIEW.--Carriers shall review all bills, invoices, and other claims for payment submitted by health care providers in order to identify overutilization and billing errors, including compliance with practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in accordance with this chapter, and may hire peer review consultants or conduct independent medical evaluations. Such consultants, including peer review organizations, are immune from liability in the execution of their functions under this subsection to the extent provided in s. 766.101. If a carrier finds that overutilization of medical services or a billing error has occurred, or there is a violation of the practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in accordance with this chapter, it must disallow or adjust payment for such services or error without order of a judge of compensation claims or the agency, if the carrier, in making its determination, has complied with this section and rules adopted by the agency. As required by Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes, the carrier conducted a utilization review of the services provided by Petitioner to the claimant beginning in late 1999. The carrier retained Dr. Thomas G. Hoffman to review the claimant’s medical records and to express opinions pertaining to the services provided to him by Petitioner. On April 10, 2000, Dr. Hoffman submitted a report that included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant has severe, residual deficits as a result of his accident. He requires 24-hour attendant care. There is no reasonable expectation for further improvement. The therapy he was receiving at that time (and still receives) was not reasonable or medically necessary. The therapy was excessive in frequency and duration. Dr. Hoffman’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. The carrier retained Dr. Victor B. Robert to review the claimant’s medical records and to express opinions pertaining to the services provided to him by Petitioner. On June 19, 2000, Dr. Robert submitted a report that included several conclusions, including those that follow. The treatment rendered by Petitioner was excessive in frequency and duration. The claimant reached an improvement plateau in early 1997 and therapy was thereafter needed only for maintenance reasons. Dr. Robert’s testimony was consistent with his written report. The carrier retained International Assessment Systems, Inc. (IAS), a professional association of various medical practitioners, to conduct an independent neurological, neuropsychological, and psychological examination of the claimant. On September 22, 2000, IAS submitted a report (Intervenors’ Exhibit 8) based on the examinations of claimant and the review of his medical records by Dr. Kenneth C. Fischer, Dr. Alan J. Raphael, and Dr. Charles J. Golden. The report included several observations and conclusions, including those that follow. The testimony of Drs. Fischer, Raphael, and Golden was consistent with the written report they prepared for IAS. Pages 12-13 of the IAS report contain the following: [The claimant] was oriented to person, but not to place or time. He did not know the current day, date, month, or year. His sensorium was significantly impaired. His mood was volatile, ranging from normal to agitated. His affect was similarly labile, at times he was placid, laughing, and able to converse at a basic level, however he was also quite violent. Attention and concentration were significantly impaired. His receptive, expressive and fluency language capabilities were similarly impaired, although, as noted, he was capable of basic/functional [sic] communication. There were no direct indications of hallucinatory or delusional phenomena, however, based on his behavior, it is likely that some hallucinatory or delusional phenomena were present. His reality testing and insight were significantly impaired. During his repeated fits of anger, he often uttered suicidal and homicidal threats, however there was no evidence of actual intent or plan. He showed no ability to monitor his own safety. Page 15 of the IAS report contains the following: From a neuropsychological and psychological perspective, there were gross impairments noted in his cognitive abilities and emotional functioning. . . . He has been afforded considerable time to maximize his cognitive recovery at this point. It is clear that he has plateaued with regard to cognitive improvement. He will not benefit from continued rehabilitation efforts, although he will require continued stimulation to avoid further cognitive decline. His mood and labile affect may also be benefited by continued stimulation in terms of recreational activities to provide appropriate quality of life.6 Page 17 of the IAS report contains the following under the heading “Neurologic Impression”: . . . I [Dr. Fischer] would recommend that he be placed in a supervised residential setting which will give better protection for him and his caregivers than his present home setting. As the patient is four and a half years status post-injury, specific rehabilitative and therapeutic endeavors will have no benefit and are unwarranted. This would relate to hyperbaric oxygen and cognitive rehabilitation was well as any form of physical, occupational, or speech therapies. Page 19 of the IAS report contains the following: [The claimant] was certainly aided by initial removal from the nursing home and receiving cognitive and physical therapies at Biscayne. However, he has long since reached a plateau in his improvement and no further improvement can be expected at this time. Maximum medical improvement should have been reached within 18 to 24 months post-injury. Any treatment after that time would be palliative or maintenance-oriented (sic). Therefore, the treatment prescribed by Dr. Wand became unreasonable and medically unnecessary several years ago. Page 20 of the IAS report reflects the opinion that while the treatments at Petitioner’s facility were excessive in all respects, the claimant does require maintenance rehabilitation services. It is opined that cognitive retraining is no longer appropriate, but that cognitive tasks and games are appropriate in a recreational setting. By letter dated October 27, 2000, the carrier, through its counsel, advised Petitioner that based on its Utilization Review investigation, it had concluded that as to the identified dates of service “. . . there has been overutilization and/or misutilization since the treatment has been excessive and not medically necessary.” This Letter of Disallowance was the first of a series of letters sent by counsel for the carrier to Petitioner, and frames the issues for all of the disallowances at issue in this proceeding. Thereafter, Petitioner timely disputed the carrier’s basis for disallowing its services to the claimant and petitioned the Respondent to resolve the dispute. The total amount disallowed and at issue in this consolidated proceeding is $615,587.00. Respondent employed four Expert Medical Advisors (EMAs) to perform peer review and assist it in resolving the dispute involving the rehabilitation services provided the claimant by Petitioner. Respondent employed Dr. Fernando G. Miranda, Dr. Jorge Villalba, Dr. Gerard P. Garcia, and Dr. David McCraney to serve as EMAs.7 Each of these doctors prepared a report following his review and each sat for deposition. Dr. Miranda’s report, dated September 17, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 17). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The referral for intensive multi-disciplinary treatment at Petitioner’s facility is no longer medically necessary. The services provided by Petitioner are excessive in frequency and duration and he will not further improve with speech therapy, cognitive retraining, occupational therapy, or individual psychotherapy. Maintenance physical therapy is recommended. Dr. Miranda testified in his deposition that the recommended physical therapy could be performed by the claimant’s attendant. Dr. Miranda’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. Villalba’s report dated October 15, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 19). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant reached maximum medical improvement between February 1996 and October 1997. Dr. Villalba described the services provided by Petitioner to claimant “clearly not medically necessary” after October 1997. He also opined that the claimant will require maintenance physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech and language therapy on a continuing basis. Dr. Villalba’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. Garcia’s undated report was prepared during the second week of October, 2001, and is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 16). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant should be on a maintenance program and Petitioner’s treatment was excessive. The claimant is unlikely to make further neuropsychological improvement, but he should be treated by a psychiatrist for his schizophrenia. Dr. Garcia’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. McCraney’s report dated November 18, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 18). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. While the care provided Petitioner appears to be excellent, the claimant is far beyond the point where Petitioner’s therapies would be reasonable or medically necessary. Dr. McCraney’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. DiCowden testified at length about the various services her facility provides the claimant and the records her staff generates as a result of those services. Dr. DiCowden testified that her staff is well-trained in assessing the functional status of rehabilitation patients using nationally recognized assessment methodologies. FIN-FAM, acronyms for “Functional Independence Measures” and “Functional Assessment Measures” is one assessment measure used by Petitioner’s staff. The FIN-FAM measure purports to quantify a patient’s progress or lack thereof and can be used by staff as a tool in developing treatment strategies. Dr. DiCowden presented a chart of the FIN-FAM scores for the claimant for the periods at issue in this proceeding. The chart, prepared for this litigation, reflects steady functional improvement of the claimant. Dr. DiCowden further testified that Petitioner’s staff uses a scale of cognitive functioning developed by a rehabilitation facility known as Rancho Los Amigos Hospital, which measures a patient’s response to stimuli on a scale of Ranch Level I (no response) to Ranch Level VII (appropriate response). She asserts that the measurement of the claimant’s status using the Rancho methodology reflect that the claimant has improved over the years. In support of its position that the claimant steadily progressed while undergoing therapy at its facility, Petitioner presented the testimony of Drs. Antonio Puente, Vernando Batas, and Richard Kishner who observed the claimant at Petitioner’s facility on June 23, 2003, September 13, 2003, and February 24, 2004, respectively. Each of these witnesses had the subjective impression that the claimant was benefiting from therapy at Petitioner’s facility. Petitioner asserts that the FIN-FAM scores, the Rancho Levels, and the testimony of its experts establish that the claimant is benefiting from therapy. That assertion is rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the credible evidence. The FIN-FAM scoring and the Rancho scale depend on the subjective impressions of the various therapists who treat the claimant at Petitioner’s facility and the record reflects that the scoring was done on an irregular basis.8 Dr. DiCowden adamantly disagreed with the contention that the rehabilitation services provided by her facility is not reasonable or medically necessary. All evidence presented by Petitioner, including Dr. DiCowden’s testimony, has been carefully considered by the undersigned in resolving the conflicts in the evidence. At best, Petitioner established that the claimant made some unquantified amount of progress in the highly structured therapeutic setting at Petitioner’s facility. Intervenors’ experts clearly established that any progress made by the claimant in therapy did not transcend that therapeutic setting to the real world. Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the rehabilitation services it provided the claimant were appropriate and medically necessary. To the contrary, the greater weight of the credible evidence established that at all times relevant to this proceeding the rehabilitation services provided by Petitioner to the claimant have been excessive and that those excessive services have been neither reasonable nor medically necessary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a final order that sustains the disallowances at issue in this consolidated proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes, when it discharged Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Cardio-Pulmonary Center of Bethesda, Inc. (Center), operates a Health and Fitness Center in conjunction with Bethesda Memorial Hospital located in Boynton Beach, Florida. On or about December, 1988, three separate business entities operated at the Health and Fitness Center: the Cardio-Pulmonary Center, a Fitness Department open to the general public, and a Sports Medicine and Back Care Center. Petitioner, Diane H. Cramer (Cramer), was hired by the Center as a secretary/receptionist on or about December 19, 1988. Cramer suffers from chronic depression caused by a chemical imbalance. When she is not in crisis she is highly functional; however when she is in crisis, there is criteria for a major depressive disorder which affects her ability to function normally in her day-to-day activities. For the entire length of Petitioner's Employment with the Center, Randy Colman (Colman) held the position of Director of the Cardio-Pulmonary Center. Colman was Cramer's immediate supervisor from December 1988 through September, 1991. In approximately August 1989, Cramer was promoted to the newly-created position of Office Manager based on her good job performance. Her duties included supervision of the office staff of the Cardiac Rehabilitation Department and the Sports and Back Care Center. Cramer's work performance continued to be satisfactory until early January, 1990. She broke up with her boyfriend and began to experience bouts of depression in which she would feel sad and angry and would isolate herself from others. She had contemplated suicide and told her co-workers about her suicidal thoughts. She would put her head down on her desk. When Colman would ask her to do something, she would look at him as if to say "why are you asking me to do this." Her emotional behavior had escalated to the point that it was affecting the performance of her co-workers. On January 19, 1990, Colman gave Cramer a memorandum outlining his concerns. He suggested that she speak to someone who was qualified in crisis management and depression and that she take a few days off. In response to Cramer's complaints to Colman that she lacked private space and private time at work, he suggested that she try a different work schedule which would allow her some privacy in her current work space. Additionally, he advised her that if she could not become more considerate and cordial to her co-workers that he would require her to take some time off and visit the employee health nurse before returning to work. Colman discussed these concerns as well in a conversation with Cramer on January 19, 1990. Cramer followed Colman's suggestion and took some leave time. When she returned from leave, she had improved and her work performance was satisfactory. Cramer did try the different work schedule suggested by Colman in his January 19, 1990 memorandum but she went back to her old work schedule. She did not seek any counseling in January, 1990. In June, 1990, Cramer experienced another bout of depression. On June 25, she had told Ken Goby (Goby), a co-worker, that she was depressed and that if she did not come into work the next day, it would be because she had killed herself. Goby relayed his conversation with Cramer to Colman. On June 26, Colman met Cramer at the entrance of the building and told her that he was concerned about her well-being. He gave her a memorandum which outlined his expectations of her work performance. Additionally, he advised her that she was suspended without pay until such time as she saw the employee health nurse, Ruth Tillman. He gave her an appointment time with Ms. Tillman. If she chose not to see the nurse, she was advised to sign the resignation form which was included with the memorandum. Cramer did see Nurse Tillman. As a result of her conversation with the nurse, Cramer went to see her endocrinologist, who referred her to Dr. Tomelleri. She saw Dr. Tomelleri on July 5. Cramer began taking medication and returned to work. Colman spoke with Nurse Tillman after her visit with Cramer and he was satisfied that Cramer could return to work. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that when Cramer returned to work she did not advise either Colman or Kathy Vredenburgh that she had seen a doctor, that she was diagnosed as being depressed, or that she was taking medication. However, the evidence is clear that Colman knew that Cramer was having emotional problems, which he judged to be depression. From the time she returned to work in July, 1990 until the early part of January, 1991, Cramer's work performance was satisfactory. Her mood swings were no different from any of the other employees at the Center. In the fall of 1990, Cramer received a seven percent merit increase and a .5 percent bonus raise. Beginning in January, 1991, Cramer began to come to work in a bad mood several times a month. She had a "snitty" way of dealing with her co-workers and the patients. She did not make any suicide threats. 15 In January, 1991, Cramer complained to Ken Goby that Colman was giving all his work responsibilities away and that they were doing all his work. Mr. Goby told Colman what Cramer had said. Based on Dr. Tomelleri's notes, Cramer had quit taking her medication sometime in January, 1991. She went back on her medication in late January, 1991. She was doing well when she next saw Dr. Tomelleri in March, 1991. Based on Dr. Tomelleri's notes, Cramer would do well as long as she continued to take her medication. In September, 1991, Colman was granted additional managerial responsibilities at the Center, and Kathy Vredenburgh was made Cramer's immediate supervisor. Colman and Ms. Vredenburgh conducted a performance evaluation of Cramer in September, 1991. Cramer was given a low rating. In November, 1991, one of Cramer's co-workers was having personal problems and asked Cramer if she could use the telephone in Cramer's office for a personal phone call. Cramer let her use the telephone; however, the co- worker's conversation dragged on and Cramer asked her to get off the phone so that Cramer could get back to her desk. Cramer got angry and threw a piece of paper. On November 29, 1991, Cramer received a reprimand for the incident and was cautioned that emotional outbursts, visible sulking, and performance of non- work related functions was not acceptable behavior and would not be tolerated. Prior to the issuance of the reprimand, Colman and Ms. Vredenburgh discussed Cramer's behavior. Based on Ms. Vredenburgh notes, it is clear that she was not aware that Cramer was currently being seen by a psychiatrist. In December of 1991 or January of 1992, Cramer got into an argument with a patient over some medical records. Cramer raised her voice at the patient. In April of 1992, Kent Goby became Cramer's immediate supervisor. Cramer was certified to teach SALSArobics, which is modified low impact aerobic exercises set to Latin music and movements. In October, 1991, she approached Colman with a proposal to introduce the program at the Center. By memorandum dated November 15, 1991, she followed up a meeting with Colman concerning her proposal and addressed several questions that he had concerning the program. Colman gave her his written comments on November 25, 1991. Cramer wanted to be the instructor of SALSArobics. On June 5, 1992, Goby and Cramer had a conversation concerning the SALSArobics. Cramer told Goby that Colman had been very negative about the program. She stated that if Colman did not appreciate all the work and research that she had done then, "The hell with him." On the following Monday, June 8, Goby again spoke with Cramer about SALSArobics. Goby told Cramer that he would be meeting with the Center's exercise instructor to discuss the possibility of starting the program. Cramer told Goby that she felt that the fitness center probably was worried about her influencing members from existing aerobic classes and that she would not want anyone else to teach SALSArobics. She told Goby "screw them." On June 9, Goby relayed his conversations with Cramer about SALSArobics to Colman. Based on the Center's records, and notes of Goby, Cramer was late three times in March, 1992, and twice in May, 1992. It is not clear why she was late in March. Her tardiness in May resulted from oversleeping on one occasion and a back ache caused by her bed on the other occasion. Cramer came to work late on June 9, 10, and 11. The evidence did not establish that she was late on these days because of her depression. Sometime during the week of June 9, 1992, Cramer made comments to Colman regarding her tardiness. Once she told him that she could not understand "how people get to work on time." On another occasion, when he observed her walking in late, she told him that she was "always" late. She did not advise Colman that her tardiness was due to her depression. Cramer's employment was terminated on or about June 11, 1992, due to "inappropriate job performance, i.e. tardiness, emotional outbursts, and general attitude towards the center and [her] co-workers." Cramer was not in a crisis situation during the time of the occurrence of the circumstances which led to her discharge. Based on the medical records prepared by Dr. Tomelleri, Cramer saw him in March, 1992 and did not visit him again until July 17, 1992. Cramer's claim for unemployment compensation benefits was refused by an Appeals Referee. The Appeals Referee concluded that Cramer was terminated for misconduct connected with her work. The decision of the Appeals Referee was affirmed by the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission and by the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. Cramer filed a timely charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Cramer's charge alleged that she was "laid off" because of a perceived handicap, severe depression.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Cardio-Pulmonary Center of Bethesda, Inc. did not commit an unlawful employment practice and that Diane H. Cramer's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1260 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted. Paragraphs 4-5: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: The second half of the first sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 7-12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: The first sentence is accepted in substance. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I reject the second sentence. Paragraphs 14-17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 17: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Cramer was deliberately excluded by her co-workers. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, the evidence established that Cramer had been invited to go to lunch but had declined because of lack of money. Paragraphs 18-20: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 21: Having judged the credibility of Cramer, I reject the first part of the sentence as not credible. The second part of the sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that Cramer did have episodes of depression. Paragraph 22: Having judged the credibility of Cramer, I reject this paragraph as not supported by credible evidence. Paragraph 23: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 24: Accepted in substance to the extent that it refers to the time of discharge. The evidence is clear that Cramer had received warnings during her employment with the Center concerning her tardiness and her dealings with co-workers and clients. Paragraphs 25-31: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 32-41: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 42-44: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 45: Accepted to the extent that the statement is generally true. Rejected to the extent that it implies that the tardiness that resulted in part in Cramer's discharge were caused by her depression. Paragraphs 46-48: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 49-53: Accepted in substance to the extent Ms. Vredenburgh felt that Cramer had emotional problems which should be addressed in counseling. Paragraph 54: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 55-61: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 62: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 63: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. No Paragraph 64 Paragraphs 65-71: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 72: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 73-75: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 4-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The second sentence is rejected to the extent that it implies that Colman did not perceive that Cramer had emotional problems. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 12-19: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 20-21: Rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 22-28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 30: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 31: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 32-39: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 40: The first and third sentences are rejected. Based on Colman's memoranda, I find that he did know that she had some emotional problems. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The last sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that there was no competent substantial evidence to indicate that Goby did have knowledge of Cramer's condition, psychiatric visits or medication. Paragraph 41: Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth S. Syger, Esquire Michael W. Casey, III First Union Financial Center, Suite 3600 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2338 Gary A. Isaacs, Esquire One Clearlake Centre 250 Australian Avenue South Suite 503 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
