Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: As of the hearing date of March 15, 1982, the commission had not prepared subject-matter indices of its Orders entered after January 1, 1975 resulting from: petitions for rulemaking; hearings held pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. determinations relating to presumptive and effective parole release dated (parole grants) or parole revocations; petitions for a declaratory statement issued prior to approximately July of 1981, or other final orders not otherwise defined. Other than as referred to in paragraph 2 of these Findings of Fact, the Commission has not produced indices of its current 1981 orders. (TR. 9) Neither the Commission's General Counsel nor the Planning and Evaluation Director, both of whom receive their assignments of duties and responsibilities from the Commission, have been directed by the Commission to prepare a subject- matter index of final Commission orders issued pursuant to hearings held under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, or petitions for rulemaking. (TR. 34, 35, 37 & 104) The Commission's General Counsel and Planning and Evaluation Director would prepare such indices only if directed to do so by the Commission. (TR. 35 & 104) The General Counsel's office has been directed by the Commission to prepare an index of declaratory statements issued by the Commission. With the aid of an assistant counsel, the Commission's General Counsel has prepared a subject-matter index of declaratory statements purportedly issued as of September 30, 1981. (Appellant's Exhibit 3) This index utilizes key words or topics, without further citation to statutes or rules. It includes all declaratory statements issued by the Commission during the approximately ninety- day period prior to September 30, 1981. The General Counsel, who has been in that position since March of 1980, was aware of no other declaratory statements issued by the Commission or petitions for a declaratory statement submitted to the Commission. (TR. 108) A draft of an update to the subject-matter index for declaratory statements issued after September 30, 1981 has been prepared and was expected to be in final form within thirty days of March 15, 1982. The Office of General Counsel will prepare and produce an updated subject-matter index of declaratory statements on at least a quarterly basis. (TR. 101-103) As indicated by the opinions rendered in the case of Turner v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 379 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1980) aff'd, 389 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1980), and various issues of the Florida Administrative Weekly, 1/ petitions for a declaratory statement have been received and ruled upon by the Commission prior to July 1, 1981. As noted above, the witnesses presented by the Commission to testify in this proceeding had not been assigned the task of preparing subject-matter indices for orders on petitions for rulemaking, orders following hearings conducted pursuant to section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and other final agency decisions which are equivalent to "orders". Involved in the preparation such indices would be a review of the file and a development of a subject heading or headings for each such order. The Commission presented no further evidence regarding the practicability or cost of preparing such indices or any lack of public benefit to be derived from access to such indices. Absent such evidence, it is specifically found that it would not be impracticable, unduly time- consuming, or cost-prohibitive for the Commission to prepare or produce subject- matter indices of its Orders resulting from petitions for rulemaking, Section 120.57 hearings or other final agency decisions which are equivalent to "orders." Whatever inconvenience such indices cause the Commission in terms of time and costs of preparation are far outweighed by the public benefit to be derived from accessibility to the Commission's interpretations of the law and development of agency practice and incipient policy. The Commission has failed, without sufficient justification, to comply with the Court's mandate and Order dated September 3, 1981, to "forthwith prepare and report that it has prepared indices of its declaratory statements and of petitions to the Commission for rulemaking" and has further failed to comply with its own approved proposal to produce induced of current 1981 orders on or before November 30, 1981. Because of a change in the statutes effective January 1, 1979, with respect to the granting of parole and the establishment of presumptive and effective parole release dates, orders of the Commission entered prior to that date have no relationship to orders entered after that date. Therefore, the public would gain no present benefit from an index of parole granting orders entered prior to January 1, 1979. The appellant, Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. , has withdrawn its request to have the Commission index parole granting orders issued from January 1, 1975 through December 31, 1978. (TR. 12 & 13) As to the period between January 1, 1979 through December 31, 1980, it would be beneficial to the public to have access to an index of only those parole granting orders which contain a reference to a constitutional provision, statute or rule, since such orders may contain the agency's interpretation of the law or incipient policy. The parole revocation process has not changed since 1975. It would be beneficial to the public to have access to all those parole revocation orders of the Commission entered since 1975 which contain a reference to a constitutional provision, statute, or a rule. Jay D. Farris, the Commission's Planning and Evaluation Director, has been appointed by the Commission to be in charge of the indexing project as it relates to parole granting orders (which includes Commission determinations on presumptive and effective parole release dates) and parole revocation orders. This assignment is in addition to his other duties which include the drafting of all legislation for the Commission, lobbying, acting as a part-time clerk of the Commission, preparing complex case analysis for the Commission, the drafting of proposed rules, holding public hearings for proposed rules and training Commission hearing examiners when there are rule changes. Mr. Farris has only a secretary on his staff. (TR. 28, 29) Since the District Court entered its opinion on November 26, 1980 (petition for rehearing denied on January 8, 1981) reported at 391 So.2d 247, the Commission, through Mr. Farris, has conducted an investigation into the number of Commission actions which could possibly fall within the parameters of the Court's ruling regarding the prepartion of subject-matter indexing. It was determined that a minimum of 600 actions per week would fall under the purview of that decision. A private indexing firm would charge approximately $1.00 per action to review the data and produce an index. (Tr. 16) Determining that this cost would be prohibitive, Mr. Farris has been working with the Bureau of Management Information Systems (MIS) of the Department of corrections to prepare a computer program which would meet the Commission's indexing requirements. By statute, the department of Corrections maintains the sole offender-based information and records system for the joint use of the department of Corrections and the Commission. Section 20.315(20) Florida Statutes. The function of the Bureau of Management Information Systems of the Department of Corrections is the automation of departmental records for ease of retrieval and management information. To accomplish this function, the Department of Corrections shares a computer with the Supreme Court of Florida, with the Department owning 67 percent and the supreme Court owning 33 percent of the computer. The computer itself is located in the basement of the Supreme Court, but the Department of Corrections has approximately 40 terminals located in its headquarters in Tallahassee and in excess of 100 terminals located throughout the State. The computer maintains a complete offender record of each Florida inmate. This record includes the inmate's date of birth, race, sex, the offense for which he or she is incarcerated, other offenses, gain time accrued, presumptive, projected and current release dates and FDLE and FBI numbers. Without the prior preparation of a specific program by the Bureau of MIS, it is not possible to retrieve from the computer any generic information on Florida inmates. For example, while the computer presently has the ability to produce a screen view of the record of any particular inmate, it cannot search through its entire data base and produce screen printouts of the names of all those inmates meeting any particular criteria, such as those serving a mandatory 25-year capital life sentence. (TR. 91-94) The records of 53,700 offenders are presently contained in the computer's data base, with some 24,000 records being for active inmates. (TR. 93) In December of 1981, the Commission, through Mr. Farris, entered into discussions with Reynold L. Ferrari, the Chief of the Bureau of MIS for the Department of Corrections, and his staff regarding the subject of utilizing the computer system to produce and maintain a subject-matter index for Commission orders concerning the granting and/or revocation of parole. A basic technical problem presently exists in the computer program utilized by the Department of Corrections. The computer is only designed to handle single actions taken by the Commission on any particular day. Often, multiple separate actions by the Commission are taken in one day on a particular inmate, and the present computer programming does not allow multiple entries at one point in time. This problem is one of systems design and involves more than reprogramming. It involves a definition of a new data base that will have to be created for the Commission, and then programming it to provide the input capability to add additional data and defining the output reports that are required. (TR. 90) Once a systems design is accomplished and all the relevant data is in the computer, it will take about three weeks or less to produce a program that would result in a printout format similar to that developed and utilized by the Commission in its declaratory statement index. (Appellant's Exhibit 3, TR. 79, 84, 85) The Commission has not specifically or formally requested the Department of Corrections to resolve the multiple-action problem. It has simply asked the Department to look into the problem and estimate the length of time it would take to accomplish certain results. (Appellee's Exhibit 2) Mr. Ferrari has informed the Commission that he would need an exact and specific definition of the output required by the Commission and would work with the Commission and its staff in achieving the desired goals. (Appellee's Exhibit 3, TR. 89, 90) The answer to how long it would take to redesign the system is dependent upon a detailed definition of the information needed by the Commission. (TR. 98) A detailed statement of what is required by the Commission has not been provided to the Bureau of MIS. (TR. 99) The only evidence adduced by the Commission as to its time frame for providing the format the Commission requires was the statement of Mr. Farris that "I would like to have had it done some time ago, but just as soon as I possibly can. This has received a great deal of priority, I must say." (TR. 72) The Commission did make a budget request for two new positions--a data entry operator and a clerk typist III--in order to comply with indexing requirements and to augment their data input ability. (TR. 74, Appellee's Exhibit 4) Presently, the only information being provided by the Comission to the computer data base is current, single Commission action regarding presumptive parole release dates (PPRD) and the inmate's next interview date. Included within the PPRD information presently being put into the computer is a code which makes reference to aggravating factors contained in the Commission's rules. (TR. 69, 70) Prior Commission's actions regarding PPRDs have not been put into the computer data base. The manner in which this information will be retrieved or the printout format has not been developed yet. (TR. 52, 53) It is expected that the format will be similar to that developed for the index of declaratory statements. (Appellant's Exhibit 3). The Commission has not requested the department of Corrections to produce any particular format for a subject-matter index of parole granting or parole revocation orders (TR. 53, 54) and no evidence was tendered as to when such a request would be made. Mr. Farris, the person responsible for such indices, could give no specific date for the production of such indices (TR. 38) While the Commission has not prepared a final proposed style of indexing for Commission actions regarding presumptive and effective parole release and parole revocations, it is expected that such indices would be broken down by topic similar to that prepared by the Commission for declaratory statements. It is not known whether such indices will include citations to constitutional provisions, statutes or rules. (TR. 64) According to Mr. Farris, "the specification of the nature of the index is yet to be determined." (TR. 66) RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COURT The undersigned, as the appointed commissioner of the Court, has been charged with the responsibility to take evidence and report recommendations to the Court with respect to a determination of the following issues: The practicability of the Commission preparing indices of its orders entered from 1975 through 1980; and The reasonableness of the schedule proposed by the Commission in light of the proposed contents of the indices, the cost of preparation, and the public benefit to be gained therefrom. Prior to addressing those issues, it must first be noted that, with the exception of preparing a subject-matter index for a portion of its declaratory statements, the evidence adduced at the hearing illustrates that the Commission has made absolutely no effort to produce indices of its current 1981 orders. This action is contrary to the Court' s original mandate as well as Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Court's Order entered on September 3, 1981. There has been absolutely no evidence adduced in the proceedings before the undersigned as to a legitimate reason or justification for such noncompliance with the Court's directives. Indeed, the evidence illustrates that the Commission has simply not directed its attention to this important matter. Any problems attendant to the computer system utilized by the Department of Corrections should have absolutely no effect upon the ability of the Commission to immediately prepare subject- matter indices for all its Orders resulting from petitions for a declaratory statement, hearings conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, petitions for rulemaking or other matters which result in the issuance of the functional equivalent of an "order" as it is defined in Section 120.52(9). Florida Statutes. Turning now to the issues addressed in Paragraph 3 of the Court's September 3, 1981 Order, it is concluded from the evidence adduced at the hearing that it would not be impracticable or cost-prohibitive for the Commission to immediately prepare indices, whether arranged by subject matter and/or citations to constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions, for its Orders entered from 1975 through 1980 in those matters arising from: petitions for a declaratory statement, proceedings conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, petitions for rulemaking, and cases, such as the instant proceeding, which result in the functional equivalent of an "order" as defined in Section 120.52(9), Florida Statutes. The public benefit to be gained from such indices is obvious since such Orders are indicative of an agency's interpretation of the laws under which it operates and can indicate incipient agency policy as developed on a case-by-case basis. The Commission has made no good-faith effort or diligent attempt to comply with its own schedule for the accomplishment of the preparation of indices for the Orders listed above and neither the contents, costs, or practicability of preparing such indices justify the time frame proposed. With respect to the remaining Orders issued by the Commission between 1975 and 19890--those involving parole grants and parole revocations--it is concluded that an index of Orders on parole grants entered prior to 1979 would not be beneficial to the public due to the drastic change in the law which became effective on January 1, 1979. It is further concluded that only those post-1974 Orders concerning parole parole grants which contain a reference or citation to a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision would contain information beneficial to the public. Therefore, an index limited to such Orders would satisfy the requirements of Section 120.53(2)(c), Florida Statutes. The Commission has failed to adduce evidence that the preparation of a subject-matter and/or citator index for its Orders entered after January 1, 1975 involving parole revocation and its Orders entered after January 1, 1979 involving parole grants would be either impracticable or cost-prohibitive. While the computer system will need to be redesigned to accomplish multiple- entries in cases where the Commission takes more than one action on the same date regarding a single inmate, it is possible to make this change. The Bureau of Management Information Systems stands ready and able to effectuate such a design change and is simply waiting for a specific and detailed definition of the information sought to be retrieved by the Commission. Again, from the evidence adduced at the hearing, it appears that the Commission has simply made no diligent or good-faith effort to determine the format of the required indices or the information it desires to accomplish the indexing task. In summary, it is concluded that the Commission, along with the joint assistance and efforts of the Department of Corrections, presently has or can quickly obtain the capability of preparing indices of all Orders entered from 1975 through the present date. The Commission presented no evidence that the preparation of such indices would be cost-prohibitive, or that, other than its lack of attention to the matter, the contents of the indices would make the task unduly time-consuming or would otherwise render the indexing requirement prohibitive. With the exception of pre-1979 parole granting Orders and Orders granting or revoking parole which contain no reference to a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, the public will benefit from an index of, and consequently access to, all Orders of the Commission. In order to accomplish the indexing task, the Commission need only render a determination of the format for each index and provide the staff to either review the files containing the Commission Orders or provide the necessary input to the computer system so that the required information can be retrieved from the computer. The evidence presented by the Commission illustrates that not only has the Commission failed to adhere to its own proposed schedule of compliance with the law, the schedule proposed is unreasonably lengthy in terms of the contents, cost and information presently available, as well as the public benefit to be derived from the production of the indices. Respectfully submitted and entered this 4th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1982.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the following facts: The Petitioner, Dennis R. Cookish, is an inmate currently incarcerated at Hendry Correctional Institution, Route 2, Box 13-A, Immokalee, Florida 33934. His inmate number is 073819. The Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission, is located at 1309 Winewood Boulevard, Bldg. 6, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. The Respondent is responsible for establishing presumptive parole release dates for all prisoners in the custody of the State of Florida who meet the requirements of 947.16, Florida Statutes. Petitioner met all of the requirements of 947.16, Florida Statutes, and was entitled to a PPRD initial interview on March 4, 1981. Petitioner was interviewed March 4, 1981, for the purpose of setting his PPRD. By action of the Respondent on March 25, 1981, Petitioner's presumptive parole release date was established. That date was set at November 27, 1984. Petitioner did not request administrative review of his presumptive parole release date pursuant to 947.173, Florida Statutes. The Respondent Commission is required under Section 947.16 and 947.172, Florida Statutes, to provide Petitioner with a presumptive parole release date. Respondent Commission is required to compute the presumptive parole release date according to Objective Parole Guidelines, under Section 947.165, Florida Statutes, (1979). Respondent Commission may use aggravating or mitigating circumstances in determining the presumptive parole release date but they must not be duplicative of the severity of offense behavior or the salient factor score pursuant to Sections 947.165(1), 947.172(2), Florida Statutes, (1979). The Commission was delegated rule making power via Section 947.07, Florida Statutes (1979). The Respondent Commission developed parole guidelines which became effective March 20, 1979. The guidelines are contained in Rule 23-19, Florida Administrative Code. The aggravation which is the subject of the instant challenge is contained in Rule 23-19.01(5), Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner was convicted of grand theft after trust on February 26, 1980, of a second count of grand theft after trust on February 29, 1980, of uttering a forged instrument on January 22, 1980, of criminal attempt (attempted robbery) on April 14, 1980, and of uttering a forged instrument on June 16, 1980; and sentenced to concurrent terms of 3 years, 3 years, 2 years, 5 years, and 3 years, respectively, and followed by 2 years probation. The depositions of David Mack and Steve Seliger are stipulated and entered into evidence as their testimony in this proceeding. The following findings are made from the evidence presented at the hearing: As a result of passage of the "Objective Parole Guidelines Act of 1978," Respondent was required to develop objective parole criteria pursuant to the Act by January 1, 1979. The Florida Research Center was hired under a Federal grant to devise such criteria. The purpose of the project was to fulfill the legislative purpose of developing objective parole guidelines under acceptable research methods to be based on the seriousness of the offense and the likelihood of favorable parole outcome. The Florida Research Center developed the required data and methods after studying the procedures followed in other states, current release data, scaling techniques, and the like. Respondent Parole and Probation Commission and its staff contributed extensively to the study. As devised, the rules promulgated as Chapter 23-19, Florida Administrative Code, provide a method of arriving at a "salient factor" score which serves as an actuarial parole prognosis aid. It is derived by considering such matters as prior convictions and incarcerations, total time served, age at first commitment and prior parole revocations or escapes. The other major facet in determining a presumptive parole release date is an "offense severity rating" which reflects the present offense of which the inmate was convicted. Offenses are characterized according to the type of offense in nine categories ranging from "Low" to "Greatest (Most Serious IV)". Each category reflects four "matrix time frames" which are the minimum and maximum number of months to be served before parole. The particular time frame for a particular offense is based on the offender's salient factor score and represents parole prognosis. (Testimony of Farris, Exhibit 20) Respondent's Rule 23-19.01(5), F.A.C., provides that if the present offense of conviction involves multiple separate offenses, the severity level shall be based on the most serious of the offenses, and the other offenses may be used as aggravating factors to be applied to both consecutive and concurrent sentences. Respondent's purpose in permitting multiple offenses to be used as aggravating factors to increase the parole matrix time frame was to recognize the proposition that there is a relationship between the numbers and types of criminal behavior which affects parole prognosis. Respondent's Rule 23-19.03, F.A.C., provides other examples of situations in which the parole decision may be either above or below the matrix time frame based upon aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In determining whether to consider multiple offenses as aggravating factors, Respondent's hearing examiners review the inmate's complete file, including presentence reports, the circumstances of the offenses, psychological reports, and his prior record to determine whether such offenses should be a basis for adding additional months to the matrix time frame when arriving at a presumptive parole release date. Each such case is considered on its individual circumstances to arrive at a subjective determination of parole risk. Aggravating factors are probably not applied in 25 to 40 percent of the cases. These normally involve first offenders with multiple offenses arising out of the same incident or which occurred close in time. In the opinion of experts at Respondent's hearing examiner and field and supervisory levels, Rule 23- 19.01(5), F.A.C., relating to aggravating factors is reasonably related to the question of parole prognosis. (Testimony of L'Hommedieu, Farris, Exhibits 9, 20) The Respondent's hearing examiners who interviewed Petitioner Cookish on March 4, 1981, to arrive at his preliminary presumptive parole release date, computed a salient factor score of 5 based on prior convictions and incarcerations, total time served in years, and age at first commitment. Utilizing the conviction for criminal attempt (attempted robbery) as the most serious of the offenses for which the Petitioner was serving a concurrent sentence, they arrived at an offense characteristic of Moderate which provided for a matrix time range of 14 to 19 months. They then considered three of four other offenses for which he had been sentenced concurrently and applied the maximum number of months according to the type of offense as aggravating circumstances for each offense for a total of 51 months. This period was added to the maximum matrix time range of 19 months for a total of 70 months to be served prior to parole. Petitioner's incarceration commenced on January 31, 1979. By adding 70 months to that commencement date, the examiners recommended a presumptive parole release date of November 27, 1984. The Respondent adopted as its own the examiners' presumptive parole release date at a commission meeting on March 25, 1981. (Testimony of Petitioner, Exhibits 4-8, 10-11) Kenneth Whittington is an inmate at the Hendry Correctional Institution who received a recommended presumptive parole release date of January 4, 1983, after being interviewed by one of Respondent's hearing examiner panels. The date was based on a salient factor score of 10 which included one point for a prior parole revocation, and an offense characteristic of Moderate based on a conviction of burglary of a dwelling which placed him in the 18-33 month matrix time range. The total time recommended to be served was 33 months. He was not serving a concurrent or consecutive sentence. (Testimony of Whittington, Exhibits 12-14) Jimmy Lee Clark is an inmate at the Hendry Correctional Institution. He is serving three concurrent sentences for battery of a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest with violence, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. He was on parole in 1977 for possession of heroin, but parole was revoked. He was on probation for aggravated battery in 1979 which was also revoked and he was thereafter sentenced. He was interviewed by Respondent's hearing examiner panel in March, 1981 to determine a presumptive parole release date. On March 24, 1981, Respondent commission concurred with the hearing examiner panel's recommendations and set his presumptive release date at September 11, 1984. The offenses for which he was concurrently sentenced were not used as aggravating factors in arriving at the presumptive date. The sentence which he is currently serving was imposed in August 1980 for a period of five years. (Testimony of Clark, Exhibits 15-18), Stewart Strickland is an inmate at the Hendry Correctional Institution currently serving a total of 8 years confinement on 6 concurrent and 2 consecutive sentences. He has had about 33 prior arrests primarily for check offenses and has spent approximately 6 years in prison. He was 18 years old at the commission of his first offense. His current convictions involve worthless check offenses and grand theft. One of his prior offenses was a federal charge involving violation of the Gun Control Act. He has had probation revoked several times in the past. He was once on parole but did not complete the same because of conviction on a bad check charge. He was interviewed by Respondent's hearing examiner panel in March 1980 to establish a presumptive parole release date. He received a salient factor score of 7 based on prior convictions, total time served, prior incarcerations, and age at first commitment. His offense characteristic was deemed Moderate for the offense of grand theft which placed him in a matrix time frame of 18 to 33 months confinement. Four of his 7 remaining concurrent offenses were used as aggravating circumstances totalling 72 months which, added to the 33 months maximum of the matrix time range, resulted in 105 months as the total time recommended by the examiner. His presumptive parole release date was established as July 18, 1987. (Testimony of Strickland, Exhibit l9)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether to grant the petition challenging the validity of Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-302.111(2).
Findings Of Fact At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was on probation and under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Petitioner obtained a form pro se motion for early termination of probation from the Leon County circuit court clerk's office. The form contained fields for Petitioner's probation officer and the assistant state attorney to object or not object to early termination and to comment. Petitioner presented the form to his probation officer, who had her supervisor fill in the probation officer's field. The supervisor indicated neither an objection nor lack of objection. She commented that she was leaving it to the court to determine if Petitioner had met the vehicle impoundment condition of his probation, but that Petitioner had met all other requirements to be considered for early termination of probation. A hearing was scheduled on Petitioner's motion in June 2013. The judge notified the assistant state attorney assigned to the case and asked her to appear at the hearing. At the hearing, the assistant state attorney objected to early termination of Petitioner's probation. At some point in time, the assistant state attorney also checked the field on the form motion indicating her objection to early termination. The judge denied the motion. Petitioner blames the denial of his motion on subsection (2) of rule 33-302.111, which states: Before a correctional probation officer considers recommending an offender for early termination of supervision, the following criteria shall be met: Completion of one-half of the supervision period; Payment in full of restitution, fines, and court costs; Cost of supervision is current; All special conditions of supervision are fulfilled; A Florida Crime Information Center/National Crime Information Center (FCIC/NCIC) records check reveals no new arrest during the course of supervision of which the sentencing or releasing authority has not been previously notified; and No violations of supervision are pending. In order for an officer to request an early termination of supervision from the sentencing or releasing authority, approval must be obtained from the officer's supervisor, the State Attorney's Office, and the victim, if the offense involved a victim. If the State Attorney's office denies the request, or the victim opposes the early termination, the department will not proceed with the early termination recommendation. The officer shall not disclose a victim's objection to the offender. The officer shall notify the offender of the judge's decision upon receipt of the judge's response. If the offender was adjudicated guilty, the officer shall review the restoration of civil rights process with the offender. He contends that subsection (2) of the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the statutory grant of rulemaking authority and enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. See § 120.52(8)(b) & (c), Fla. Stat. (2013). Specifically, Petitioner contrasts the rule with section 948.04(3), Florida Statutes, which states: If the probationer has performed satisfactorily, has not been found in violation of any terms or conditions of supervision, and has met all financial sanctions imposed by the court, including, but not limited to, fines, court costs, and restitution, the Department of Corrections may recommend early termination of probation to the court at any time before the scheduled termination date. Although on the precise subject as the rule, section 948.03(4) is not cited in the rule as either the rulemaking authority or the law implemented. Instead, the rule cites section 944.09, Florida Statutes, for both.
Findings Of Fact Ernest Brown is a registered real estate salesman holding a registration issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Brown received notice of the instant hearing as required by the statutes and rules. His probation officer testified she had contacted him and he had advised her that he would not attend the proceedings. Brown was placed on probation with an adjudication of guilt withheld by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, on January 25, 1989 (see Exhibit 2). Paragraph 10 of the conditions of probation requires that Brown serve 180 days in the Pinellas County Jail on weekends from 7:00 p.m. Friday until 7:00 p.m. Sunday. Because of the appeal of his case, Brown did not begin serving this jail term until August 24, 1989. He has served 72 of the 180 days according to the records of his probation officer. Brown is currently in the custody of the State's probation department.
Recommendation The Board's counsel advised the Hearing Officer after hearing that Respondent had surrender his license. This constitutes an ex parte communication of which notice is hereby given to all parties. This fact is immaterial to consideration of the matter at hand. The Board has long taken the position, quite correctly, that surrendering of a license did not impair jurisdiction to consider violations of its statutes by a licensee while licensed. Similarly, surrender of a license cannot terminate the Hearing Officer's consideration of the matter after hearing. The instant case was duly heard and the Recommended Order prepared prior to receipt of any pleadings relative to surrender by Brown of his license. At this point, the Board may accept surrender of the license and dismiss the Administrative Complaint, in which case Brown would be considered not to have had any disciplinary action against him, or the Board may enter its final order based upon the record and this Recommended Order. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the license of Ernest Brown. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Ernest B. Brown 2027 Thirteenth Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33172
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, in violation of Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional probation officer on February 1, 1991, and as a criminal justice training instructor on December 7, 1999. Her respective certificate numbers are 20851 and 205697. Respondent was first employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) on August 10, 1990. She was employed as a correctional probation officer. As a result of promotions, Respondent became a DOC Correctional Probation Specialist in February 1995, so that she was responsible for, among other things, various administrative duties, such as handling citizens' complaints of employee misconduct and coordinating training events. In April 2001, Respondent filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that DOC forced her to work in a hostile environment. On February 15, 2002, Respondent, alleging the same facts, commenced a legal action against DOC in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 02-60236-CIV. As part of the federal litigation, DOC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, in part, that Respondent's complaint failed to claim damages. In response, on March 28, 2003, Respondent, representing herself, filed a lengthy affidavit, to which she personally attested. In the affidavit, Respondent swore to the following statement: I requested assistance from management [following the departure of the other Correctional Probation Specialist from Respondent's office and DOC's failure to fill the empty position], but they refused to assign another Specialist to the office to assist me. As a result I had to work an average of five hours per week extra in overtime without pay to properly supervise this caseload to prevent from being reprimanded, suspended or terminated by [DOC]. I was not paid for this time. The evidence is clear that Respondent did not work overtime, with or without pay. The Correctional Probation Supervisor who directly supervised Respondent at the time testified at the hearing. Obviously not hostile to Respondent, the supervisor testified definitively that during the relevant period in the affidavit--March 2, 2001 through May 9, 2002--she was intimately familiar with Respondent's work, including her itinerary and travel logs. The supervisor testified that Respondent incurred no overtime whatsoever during this period, and this testimony is credited in its entirety. Respondent's sworn statement in the affidavit is false and was false at the time that Respondent made it. Respondent's sole purpose in making this false statement was to deceive the court and show an element of damages that did not, in fact, exist. DOC terminated Respondent on August 1, 2003. She has not since worked in a job that requires certification from Petitioner.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order suspending Respondent's certificates as a correctional probation officer and criminal justice training instructor for one year retroactive to August 2, 2003; placing these certificates on probation for two years from the date of the final order; and requiring Respondent to attend an ethics course approved by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Joseph S. White Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Faye E. Wright-Simpson
