Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the following facts: The Petitioner, Dennis R. Cookish, is an inmate currently incarcerated at Hendry Correctional Institution, Route 2, Box 13-A, Immokalee, Florida 33934. His inmate number is 073819. The Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission, is located at 1309 Winewood Boulevard, Bldg. 6, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. The Respondent is responsible for establishing presumptive parole release dates for all prisoners in the custody of the State of Florida who meet the requirements of 947.16, Florida Statutes. Petitioner met all of the requirements of 947.16, Florida Statutes, and was entitled to a PPRD initial interview on March 4, 1981. Petitioner was interviewed March 4, 1981, for the purpose of setting his PPRD. By action of the Respondent on March 25, 1981, Petitioner's presumptive parole release date was established. That date was set at November 27, 1984. Petitioner did not request administrative review of his presumptive parole release date pursuant to 947.173, Florida Statutes. The Respondent Commission is required under Section 947.16 and 947.172, Florida Statutes, to provide Petitioner with a presumptive parole release date. Respondent Commission is required to compute the presumptive parole release date according to Objective Parole Guidelines, under Section 947.165, Florida Statutes, (1979). Respondent Commission may use aggravating or mitigating circumstances in determining the presumptive parole release date but they must not be duplicative of the severity of offense behavior or the salient factor score pursuant to Sections 947.165(1), 947.172(2), Florida Statutes, (1979). The Commission was delegated rule making power via Section 947.07, Florida Statutes (1979). The Respondent Commission developed parole guidelines which became effective March 20, 1979. The guidelines are contained in Rule 23-19, Florida Administrative Code. The aggravation which is the subject of the instant challenge is contained in Rule 23-19.01(5), Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner was convicted of grand theft after trust on February 26, 1980, of a second count of grand theft after trust on February 29, 1980, of uttering a forged instrument on January 22, 1980, of criminal attempt (attempted robbery) on April 14, 1980, and of uttering a forged instrument on June 16, 1980; and sentenced to concurrent terms of 3 years, 3 years, 2 years, 5 years, and 3 years, respectively, and followed by 2 years probation. The depositions of David Mack and Steve Seliger are stipulated and entered into evidence as their testimony in this proceeding. The following findings are made from the evidence presented at the hearing: As a result of passage of the "Objective Parole Guidelines Act of 1978," Respondent was required to develop objective parole criteria pursuant to the Act by January 1, 1979. The Florida Research Center was hired under a Federal grant to devise such criteria. The purpose of the project was to fulfill the legislative purpose of developing objective parole guidelines under acceptable research methods to be based on the seriousness of the offense and the likelihood of favorable parole outcome. The Florida Research Center developed the required data and methods after studying the procedures followed in other states, current release data, scaling techniques, and the like. Respondent Parole and Probation Commission and its staff contributed extensively to the study. As devised, the rules promulgated as Chapter 23-19, Florida Administrative Code, provide a method of arriving at a "salient factor" score which serves as an actuarial parole prognosis aid. It is derived by considering such matters as prior convictions and incarcerations, total time served, age at first commitment and prior parole revocations or escapes. The other major facet in determining a presumptive parole release date is an "offense severity rating" which reflects the present offense of which the inmate was convicted. Offenses are characterized according to the type of offense in nine categories ranging from "Low" to "Greatest (Most Serious IV)". Each category reflects four "matrix time frames" which are the minimum and maximum number of months to be served before parole. The particular time frame for a particular offense is based on the offender's salient factor score and represents parole prognosis. (Testimony of Farris, Exhibit 20) Respondent's Rule 23-19.01(5), F.A.C., provides that if the present offense of conviction involves multiple separate offenses, the severity level shall be based on the most serious of the offenses, and the other offenses may be used as aggravating factors to be applied to both consecutive and concurrent sentences. Respondent's purpose in permitting multiple offenses to be used as aggravating factors to increase the parole matrix time frame was to recognize the proposition that there is a relationship between the numbers and types of criminal behavior which affects parole prognosis. Respondent's Rule 23-19.03, F.A.C., provides other examples of situations in which the parole decision may be either above or below the matrix time frame based upon aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In determining whether to consider multiple offenses as aggravating factors, Respondent's hearing examiners review the inmate's complete file, including presentence reports, the circumstances of the offenses, psychological reports, and his prior record to determine whether such offenses should be a basis for adding additional months to the matrix time frame when arriving at a presumptive parole release date. Each such case is considered on its individual circumstances to arrive at a subjective determination of parole risk. Aggravating factors are probably not applied in 25 to 40 percent of the cases. These normally involve first offenders with multiple offenses arising out of the same incident or which occurred close in time. In the opinion of experts at Respondent's hearing examiner and field and supervisory levels, Rule 23- 19.01(5), F.A.C., relating to aggravating factors is reasonably related to the question of parole prognosis. (Testimony of L'Hommedieu, Farris, Exhibits 9, 20) The Respondent's hearing examiners who interviewed Petitioner Cookish on March 4, 1981, to arrive at his preliminary presumptive parole release date, computed a salient factor score of 5 based on prior convictions and incarcerations, total time served in years, and age at first commitment. Utilizing the conviction for criminal attempt (attempted robbery) as the most serious of the offenses for which the Petitioner was serving a concurrent sentence, they arrived at an offense characteristic of Moderate which provided for a matrix time range of 14 to 19 months. They then considered three of four other offenses for which he had been sentenced concurrently and applied the maximum number of months according to the type of offense as aggravating circumstances for each offense for a total of 51 months. This period was added to the maximum matrix time range of 19 months for a total of 70 months to be served prior to parole. Petitioner's incarceration commenced on January 31, 1979. By adding 70 months to that commencement date, the examiners recommended a presumptive parole release date of November 27, 1984. The Respondent adopted as its own the examiners' presumptive parole release date at a commission meeting on March 25, 1981. (Testimony of Petitioner, Exhibits 4-8, 10-11) Kenneth Whittington is an inmate at the Hendry Correctional Institution who received a recommended presumptive parole release date of January 4, 1983, after being interviewed by one of Respondent's hearing examiner panels. The date was based on a salient factor score of 10 which included one point for a prior parole revocation, and an offense characteristic of Moderate based on a conviction of burglary of a dwelling which placed him in the 18-33 month matrix time range. The total time recommended to be served was 33 months. He was not serving a concurrent or consecutive sentence. (Testimony of Whittington, Exhibits 12-14) Jimmy Lee Clark is an inmate at the Hendry Correctional Institution. He is serving three concurrent sentences for battery of a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest with violence, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. He was on parole in 1977 for possession of heroin, but parole was revoked. He was on probation for aggravated battery in 1979 which was also revoked and he was thereafter sentenced. He was interviewed by Respondent's hearing examiner panel in March, 1981 to determine a presumptive parole release date. On March 24, 1981, Respondent commission concurred with the hearing examiner panel's recommendations and set his presumptive release date at September 11, 1984. The offenses for which he was concurrently sentenced were not used as aggravating factors in arriving at the presumptive date. The sentence which he is currently serving was imposed in August 1980 for a period of five years. (Testimony of Clark, Exhibits 15-18), Stewart Strickland is an inmate at the Hendry Correctional Institution currently serving a total of 8 years confinement on 6 concurrent and 2 consecutive sentences. He has had about 33 prior arrests primarily for check offenses and has spent approximately 6 years in prison. He was 18 years old at the commission of his first offense. His current convictions involve worthless check offenses and grand theft. One of his prior offenses was a federal charge involving violation of the Gun Control Act. He has had probation revoked several times in the past. He was once on parole but did not complete the same because of conviction on a bad check charge. He was interviewed by Respondent's hearing examiner panel in March 1980 to establish a presumptive parole release date. He received a salient factor score of 7 based on prior convictions, total time served, prior incarcerations, and age at first commitment. His offense characteristic was deemed Moderate for the offense of grand theft which placed him in a matrix time frame of 18 to 33 months confinement. Four of his 7 remaining concurrent offenses were used as aggravating circumstances totalling 72 months which, added to the 33 months maximum of the matrix time range, resulted in 105 months as the total time recommended by the examiner. His presumptive parole release date was established as July 18, 1987. (Testimony of Strickland, Exhibit l9)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether to grant the petition challenging the validity of Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-302.111(2).
Findings Of Fact At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was on probation and under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Petitioner obtained a form pro se motion for early termination of probation from the Leon County circuit court clerk's office. The form contained fields for Petitioner's probation officer and the assistant state attorney to object or not object to early termination and to comment. Petitioner presented the form to his probation officer, who had her supervisor fill in the probation officer's field. The supervisor indicated neither an objection nor lack of objection. She commented that she was leaving it to the court to determine if Petitioner had met the vehicle impoundment condition of his probation, but that Petitioner had met all other requirements to be considered for early termination of probation. A hearing was scheduled on Petitioner's motion in June 2013. The judge notified the assistant state attorney assigned to the case and asked her to appear at the hearing. At the hearing, the assistant state attorney objected to early termination of Petitioner's probation. At some point in time, the assistant state attorney also checked the field on the form motion indicating her objection to early termination. The judge denied the motion. Petitioner blames the denial of his motion on subsection (2) of rule 33-302.111, which states: Before a correctional probation officer considers recommending an offender for early termination of supervision, the following criteria shall be met: Completion of one-half of the supervision period; Payment in full of restitution, fines, and court costs; Cost of supervision is current; All special conditions of supervision are fulfilled; A Florida Crime Information Center/National Crime Information Center (FCIC/NCIC) records check reveals no new arrest during the course of supervision of which the sentencing or releasing authority has not been previously notified; and No violations of supervision are pending. In order for an officer to request an early termination of supervision from the sentencing or releasing authority, approval must be obtained from the officer's supervisor, the State Attorney's Office, and the victim, if the offense involved a victim. If the State Attorney's office denies the request, or the victim opposes the early termination, the department will not proceed with the early termination recommendation. The officer shall not disclose a victim's objection to the offender. The officer shall notify the offender of the judge's decision upon receipt of the judge's response. If the offender was adjudicated guilty, the officer shall review the restoration of civil rights process with the offender. He contends that subsection (2) of the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the statutory grant of rulemaking authority and enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. See § 120.52(8)(b) & (c), Fla. Stat. (2013). Specifically, Petitioner contrasts the rule with section 948.04(3), Florida Statutes, which states: If the probationer has performed satisfactorily, has not been found in violation of any terms or conditions of supervision, and has met all financial sanctions imposed by the court, including, but not limited to, fines, court costs, and restitution, the Department of Corrections may recommend early termination of probation to the court at any time before the scheduled termination date. Although on the precise subject as the rule, section 948.03(4) is not cited in the rule as either the rulemaking authority or the law implemented. Instead, the rule cites section 944.09, Florida Statutes, for both.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Agency is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been since January 5, 1981, a medical doctor licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. His license number is ME 0037656. In or about February of 1988, a complaint was made against Respondent alleging that he engaged, or attempted to engage, in the practice of medicine in this state without an active Florida license. The complaint was reviewed by the Probable Cause Panel of the Board, which disposed of the matter by issuing, on April 23, 1988, the following Closing Order: THE COMPLAINT: Complainant alleges that the Subject of the investigation practiced or attempted to practice medicine without an active license in violation of Section 458.327 (1)(a), Florida Statutes. THE FACTS: Investigation substantiated the allegations in that Subject's license to practice medicine expired December 31, 1987, and was placed in an inactive status. Subject practiced medicine with an inactive license until approximately February 5, 1988, before he took steps to renew his license. THE LAW: Based on the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that Subject violated Section 458.327(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and there- fore is in violation of Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes. However, as Subject's license was inactive for a period of less than six months, this case should be closed by issuing Subject a Letter of Guidance. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the complaint be, and the same is hereby CLOSED with a Letter of Guidance. In January of 1991, the Agency's predecessor, the Department of Professional Regulation, issued a 22-count Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that, in connection with his dealings with 11 patients in 1989 and 1990, Respondent violated subsections (1)(g)(Counts Twenty-One and Twenty-Two), (1)(m)(Counts Ten, Thirteen and Eighteen), (1)(q)(Counts Two, Five, Eight, Eleven, Fifteen and Nineteen), (1)(t)(Counts One, Four, Seven, Twelve, Fourteen, Sixteen and Twenty) and (1)(v)(Counts Three, Six, Nine and Seventeen) of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes. Proceedings on these allegations were conducted in accordance with Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. On August 24, 1992, the Board issued a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in each of the 22 counts of the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him for having committed these violations. That portion of the Final Order addressing the Respondent's punishment provided, in pertinent part, as follows: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: Respondent's license to practice medicine is REPRIMANDED. Respondent shall pay an administrative fine in the amount of $5000 to the Board of Medicine, Department of Professional Regula- tion, within 3 years of the date this Final Order is filed. Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida is placed on PROBATION for a period of 3 years, subject to the follow- ing terms and conditions: . . . f. Respondent shall not practice except under the indirect supervision of a physician fully licensed under Chapter 458 who has been approved by the Board or its Probation Committee. Absent provision for and comp- liance with the terms regarding temporary approval of a monitoring physician, as provided below, Respondent shall cease pract- ice and not practice until the Probation Comm- ittee or the Board approves a monitoring physician. Respondent shall have the monitoring physician with Respondent at the first probation appearance before the Probation Committee. Prior to the approval of the monitoring physician by the Committee, the Respondent shall provide to the monitoring physician a copy of the Administrative Comp- laint and Final Order filed in this case. Failure of the Respondent or the monitoring physician to appear at the scheduled Probation Committee meeting shall constitute a violation of this Order. Prior to the approval of the monitoring physician by the Committee, Respondent shall submit to the Committee a current curriculum vitae and description of the current practice from the proposed monitoring physician. Said materials shall be received by the Board office no later than fourteen days before the first scheduled probation appearance. The attached definition of a monitoring physician is incorporated herein. The responsibilities of the monitoring physician shall include: Submit semi-annual reports, in affidavit form, which shall include: Brief statement of why physician is on probation. Description of probationer's practice. Brief statement of probationer's comp- liance with terms of probation. Brief description of probationer's relationship with monitoring physician. Detail any problems which may have arisen with probationer. Respondent shall be responsible for ensuring that the monitoring physician submits the required reports. Be available for consultation with Respondent whenever necessary, at a frequency of at least once per month. Review 50 percent of Respondent's patient records selected on a random basis at least once every other month. In order to comply with this responsibility of random review, the monitoring physician shall go to Respondent's office once every other month. At that time, the monitoring physician shall be responsible for making the random selection of the records to be reviewed by the monitoring physician. Review all patient records of patients treated with Schedule II-V controlled substances. Receive and review copies of all Schedule II-V controlled substance prescriptions in order to determine the appropriateness of Respondent's prescribing of controlled substances. Report to the Board any violations by probationer of Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. . . Respondent shall submit semi-annual reports in affidavit form, the contents of which shall be specified by the Board. The reports shall include: Brief statement of why physician is on probation. Practice location. Describe current practice (type and composition). Brief statement of compliance with probation terms. Describe relationship with monitoring/ supervisory physician. Advise Board of any problems. . . Respondent may prescribe Schedule II-V controlled substances with the restrictions set forth below: Respondent shall utilize sequentially numbered triplicate prescriptions in the prescribing of said controlled substances. Respondent shall provide one copy of each prescription for said controlled substances to the Department's investigator within 30 days. Respondent shall, within two weeks after issuance, provide one copy of each prescription for said controlled substances to his monitoring/supervising physician. Respondent shall maintain one copy of each prescription for said controlled sub- stances in the patient's medical record. This copy may be a xerox copy. During this period of probation, semi- annual investigative reports will be compiled by the Department of Professional Regulation concerning Respondent's compliance with the terms and conditions of probation and the rules and statutes regulating the practice of medicine. . . . At a meeting held November 18, 1992, Respondent received the approval of the Probation Committee to have Oliver Anderson, M.D., serve as his monitoring physician. Both Respondent and Dr. Anderson appeared before the Probation Committee at this November 18, 1992, meeting. Dr. Anderson is in his late seventies. Like Respondent, he has a general family practice. He and Respondent have known each other for over ten years. Dr. Anderson first visited Respondent's office, in his capacity as Respondent's monitoring physician, in February of 1993. At the outset of the visit, Dr. Anderson asked for, and was given, a list of all the patients that Respondent had seen in the last two months. From the list, he randomly selected the names of 71 patients (which was one half the number of patients on the list). He then obtained from Respondent, and thereafter reviewed, the records Respondent maintained on these 71 patients. Dahna Schaublin, a Department investigator, was assigned to serve as Respondent's probation monitor. On or about February 10, 1993, she prepared and transmitted to her supervisor, Crystal Griffin, an investigative report concerning Respondent's compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation. In her report, Schaublin stated the following: A Final Order was filed on 8/24/92 regarding John Jackson, M.D. for prescribing Dilaudid to patients in 1989, violating FS. 458.331 (1)(q)(v). The Probation term is 08/24/92 to 08/23/95. Dr. Jackson was contacted and presented to the Miami BIS on 01/27/93 for an interview. He brought copies of prescript- ions for controlled drugs prescribed in Dec/ 1992-Jan/1993. Dr. Jackson did not have copies of other prescriptions with him stating he mailed one copy to the Board of Medicine and one copy to his physician monitor. Dr. Anderson, a family practitioner, is supervis- ing physician. Dr. Anderson has only been to Dr. Jackson's office on one occasion (the Order states he should review 50 percent of patient records on a random basis, and shall go to Dr. Jackson's office once every other month). Dr. Jackson decided to xerox each daily chart for each patient seen in the office and then mail Dr. Anderson a copy of the treatment chart (for that one occasion). Dr. Jackson stated that the reason he is not following the Order to the letter is because it was difficult for Dr. Anderson to review 50 percent of his patient records in person every month. We told Dr. Jackson this practice was contrary to the Final Order and we suggested he inform the Probation Committee. Dr. Jackson has not paid his $5000 yet, stating that he has 5 years to do so. Dr. Jackson has gone before the Probation Committee two times. Griffin inadvertently failed to forward Schaublin's investigative report to the Probation Committee. Accordingly, the Probation Committee took no action in response to the allegations made in the report. Respondent did not provide Schaublin with copies of prescriptions he wrote in February and March of 1993, "within 30 days," as required by paragraph 3k(2) of the Board's August 24, 1992, Final Order. It was not until April 14, 1993, that Respondent furnished Schaublin with copies of these prescriptions (which were written on numbered prescription forms). Respondent wrote prescription numbers 1041 through 1047 in April and May of 1993 (more specifically, prescription number 1041 on April 12, 1993; prescription number 1042 on April 14, 1993; prescription number 1043 on April 24, 1993; prescription number 1044 on April 26, 1993; prescription number 1045 on April 30, 1993; prescription number 1046 on May 2, 1993; and prescription number 1047 on May 12, 1993). These prescriptions were not among those that Respondent furnished copies of to Schaublin on April 14, 1993, however, none of them were written 30 days or more prior to April 14, 1993. On or about March 17, 1993, Respondent submitted his first semi-annual probation report to the Department. In the fourth paragraph of his report, Respondent asserted the following: I have complied fully with the terms of my probation. I have taken the course "Protecting your Practice" at the University of South Florida. I meet as scheduled with my monitoring physician Dr. O.D. Anderson whose letter will be Coming soon to you. We cover for each other every week taking calls on Wednesdays for Dr. Anderson and Thursdays for myself. We also alternate taking calls for each other every other weekend. We discuss patient care, as per the order, for all scheduled prescriptions written. In his report, Respondent did not indicate that there were "any problems" concerning Dr. Anderson's compliance with the provisions of the Board's August 24, 1992, Final Order which prescribed the responsibilities of Respondent's monitoring physician. Dr. Anderson submitted to the Department his first semi-annual report concerning Respondent's probation on or about June 13, 1993. In the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of his report, Dr. Anderson asserted the following: In my opinion, Dr. Jackson has been very sensitive to the Administrative Complaint and Order of the Department of Professional Regulation. This has been demonstrated by his good attitude in my visits with him, and in his compliance with providing for me duplicate copies of his Numbered Schedule II-V prescriptions. Dr. Jackson and his office personnel have been very responsive in allowing my random selection of charts for review on my visits to his office. With his wife's support, Dr. Jackson has complied well with the requirements of his probation. Although he indicated otherwise in his report, Dr. Anderson had made only one visit to Respondent's office in his capacity as Respondent's monitoring physician. It was not until September of 1993, that he next visited Respondent's office in his capacity as Respondent's monitoring physician. In conducting his review during this visit, he followed essentially the same procedure that he had followed during his February visit. In September of 1993, Respondent filed with the Board a Petition for Early Termination of Probation on the grounds of "1) hardship due to changed circumstances; and 2) fulfillment of purposes of penalty." In his petition, Respondent asserted that he had "fully complied with the requirements of probation with the exception of the fine." He did not mention that he had failed to provide Schaublin with copies of the prescriptions he wrote in February and March of 1993, "within 30 days," as required by paragraph 3k(2) of the Board's August 24, 1992, Final Order or that Dr. Anderson had failed to make the number of office visits required by paragraph 3f(3) of the Final Order. Dr. Anderson wrote a letter, dated October 21, 1993, in support of Respondent's petition. The letter read as follows: This is an interim report following the first semi-annual report dated May 19, 1993, which I submitted. I was appointed monitoring physician for Dr. Jackson at the Miami November 18, 1992, meeting of the Probation Committee of the Department of Professional Regulation. Again I have reviewed the Administrative Complaint dated January 24, 1991, and also the Notice of Right to Judicial Review, and Certificate of Service signed August 24, 1992, which were received by Dr. Jackson. He is on probation for the inappropriate prescribing of Dilaudid to eleven patients in 1989. Dr. Jackson continues his good care of his private patients, and the Insurance PPO and HMO patients here in Hialeah, Florida. In my opinion Dr. Jackson has been very sensitive to the Administrative Complaint and Order of the Department of Professional Regulation. This has been demonstrated by his continuing compliance with providing for me the duplicate copies of his Numbered Schedule II-V prescriptions. Dr. Jackson continues to be very responsive in allowing my random selection of charts for review on my visits to his office. Dr. Jackson continues to be very aware of which medications fall into Schedule II-V. We both have copies of the Drug Abuse Prevent- ion and Control Schedule II-V list. This letter is written to support Dr. Jackson's release from probation. In my opinion he is worthy of release as demonstrated by his continuing compliance. The Board considered Respondent's petition at its October 1-3, 1993, meeting. Both Respondent and Dr. Anderson addressed the Board during this meeting. Dr. Anderson told the Board that, in his opinion, Respondent had "corrected all his past difficulties very effectively." By letter dated October 6, 1993, from Crystal Griffin, Respondent was informed of the Board's action. The letter read as follows: This is to inform you that the Florida Board of Medicine, in a meeting held October 1-3, 1993, . . voted to: Terminate your probation; however, you will be required to pay your administrative fine by August, 1995 and complete 300 hours of community service per year for a period of 2 years. Furthermore, you are required to submit a plan for your community service. You should receive an Order shortly. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact the Board office at (904) 488-0595. Sometime after the Board's October 1-3, 1993, meeting, but before the Board had issued the written order promised in Griffin's October 6, 1993, letter to Respondent, Schaublin first learned about Respondent's petition and the Board's action thereon. Thereafter, on December 7, 1993, she filed an investigative report concerning Respondent's compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation from the time of her last investigative report. In her December 7, 1993, report, she stated the following: Monitoring of the Subject's Probation is impeded because Dr. Jackson's failed to comply with terms of the Probation Order. The Final Order states: "k. Respondent may prescribe Schedule II-V controlled substances with the restrictions set forth below: (2) Respondent shall provide one copy of each prescription for said controlled substances to the Department's investigator within 30 days." Dr. Jackson: Did not provide copies of controlled substances prescriptions for February/March until April 14, 1993. There are 6 missing prescription forms from numbers 1041 to 1047. Dr. Jackson has failed to provide prescriptions for October/November 1993. This investigator met with Dr. Jackson at the Miami BIS on January 27, 1993 and requested copies of prescriptions be sent to this office within the 30 day time frame as mandated in the Final Order. A U.C.F. was issued by this Investigator on 12/7/93. This Investigator spoke with Constance Campbell on December 06, 1993 regarding Dr. Jackson's lack of compliance with the terms of the Final Order. We reported on 2/10/93 that Dr. Jackson's monitoring physician was not visiting his office "every other month" and making "random selection of the record[s]" as outlined in the Final Order f.(3). We are attaching copies of prescriptions for Controlled drugs for the months February 1993 through September 1993. On May 24, 1994, the Board issued a written order terminating Respondent's probation. The order provided as follows: THIS CAUSE came on before the Board of Medicine (Board) on October 3, 1993, in Miami, Florida for the purpose of considering Respondent's request to terminate the probation imposed by the Board's Final Order filed August 2 [sic], 1992. Upon review of the request, the testimony and evidence offered in support thereof, the recommendation of the Board's Probation Committee, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Respondent's probation shall be terminated. However, Respondent is still required to pay the administrative fine of $5,000.00 imposed by the previous Final Order and said fine must be paid by August 2, 1995. Furthermore, Respondent is required to complete 300 hours per year of community service in an area where medical services are needed during each of the next two years. This Order shall take effect upon filing with the Clerk of the Department of Professional Regulation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations of subsection (1)(x) of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes, alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, with the exception of the alleged violation relating to the submission of copies of prescription numbers 1041-1047, and disciplining him for having committed these violations by fining him $2,500.00, suspending his license for a period of 30 days and placing him on probation for a period of two years (subject to those terms and conditions the Board deems appropriate) beginning immediately after the end of the suspension. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of December, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 1995.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that Petitioner, Gary N. Piccirillo, was afforded a presumptive parole release date interview on May 14, 1982. Thereafter, on June 9, 1982, Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission (FPPC), considered Petitioner's presumptive parole release date (PPRD) and set it for September 30, 1986. On June 28, 1982, Petitioner sought review of his established PPRD pursuant to Rule 23-21.12, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 947.173, Florida Statutes. In November 1983, a special parole interview was granted Petitioner, but the Commission at that hearing declined to change or modify Petitioner's PPRD. Petitioner's next biennial interview for review of his PPRD is scheduled for September 1984. However, Petitioner is currently scheduled to be released from confinement in either September or October 1984, if he is given credit for all earned gain time. Petitioner questions that portion of the rule which provides for only one review of the Commission action establishing or changing the PPRD, but apparently fails to recognize that portion which also provides for subsequent (biennial, special, or effective) establishments of PPRD, which tend to ensure at least periodic reviews of the PPRD. Petitioner attacks the validity of the rule, as amended on October 1, 1982, as it pertains to Sections (1)(e) and (2). He contends that (1)(e), which calls for verification of written or printed evidence provided directly by the inmate and notification to the proper state attorney if any of this evidence is invalid because it constitutes a threat of a penalty, which tends to inhibit the average inmate from presenting evidence he might otherwise present. Petitioner does not question the propriety of reporting false information, only the inclusion of a basis for doing so within the rule. Petitioner also contends that that portion of Paragraph (2) of the rule which provides that the Respondent will not address matters within certain categories, unless new factual information came into existence after the initial interview, is unfair, unduly restrictive, and places an unreasonable burden on prisoners who would be unprepared psychologically to present all their information at the initial interview in its best light. Petitioner contends that after the newness of incarceration wears off and the individual is more comfortable with the system, he would be better prepared to present this information again.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is presently incarcerated at Sumter Correctional Institution near Bushnell, Florida. Sumter Correctional Institution is a prison maintained by the Florida Department of Corrections. Petitioner was convicted for two separate robbery offenses based upon guilty pleas. He was sentenced to a prison term of ten years in connection with each conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. Petitioner is presently incarcerated based upon these convictions. Petitioner was interviewed by an Examiner of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of establishing a recommended presumptive parole release date on February 26, 1981. Under rules of the Parole and Probation Commission then in effect, the Examiner was to consider the gravity of the offense for which the Petitioner was sentenced, establish a "salient factor score" and consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The Examiner classified the offense as "high-robbery" and set the salient factor score at "1." Under Commission rules then in effect, the guidelines for a time range ("matrix time range") for that offense characteristic and salient factor score was fourteen to nineteen months. The Examiner recommended setting the presumptive parole release date at the longest period within the time range (nineteen months) and additionally recommended that several aggravating circumstances be considered. These circumstances were the existence of a concurrent sentence for robbery for which the Examiner recommended an additional nineteen months, the fact that a gun was used in one of the robberies for which the Examiner recommended an additional six months, and the fact that a knife was used in the other for which the Examiner recommended an additional six months. The Examiner thus recommended that the Petitioner serve a total of fifty months in prison and that his presumptive parole release date be set at March 13, 1984. Petitioner requested review of this recommendation before the Parole and Probation Commission. The Commission took final action on the review request on April 1, 1981, and affirmed the recommendation. Commission Rule 23-19.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, has been amended since it was applied to the Petitioner. The rule as it existed when the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date was established provided: If present offense of conviction involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level shall be based on the most serious of the offenses, and the other offenses may be used as aggravating factors. This shall be applied to both consecutive and con- current sentences. This rule continues to substantially affect Petitioner since it provided the basis for the setting of his presumptive parole release date. In adopting this rule, the Commission sought to develop criteria to predict the likelihood of successful parole. The presence of multiple sentences for multiple criminal behavior was considered an important factor in determining the likelihood of a successful parole experience.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Real Estate Commission operates within the Department of Business and Professional Regulation and is the entity responsible for certifying to the Department that an applicant for licensure under Chapter 475 is qualified to practice as a real estate broker or salesperson. Sections 475.02 and .181, Florida Statutes. On or about January 24, 1997, Mr. Dempsey submitted to the Commission an application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Mr. Dempsey answered "yes" to Question No. 9 on the application, which asks in pertinent part: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" He attached the details to his application. Mr. Dempsey answered "yes" to Question No. 10(a) on the application, which asks in pertinent part: "Has any judgment or decree of a court been entered against you in this or any other state, . . . in which you were charged . . . with any fraudulent or dishonest dealing?" Mr. Dempsey attached the details of a 1988 conviction for mail fraud to his application. On December 12, 1983, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, revoked Mr. Dempsey's probation and sentenced him to two years imprisonment based on his plea of guilty to three counts each of uttering a forged instrument and of second degree grand theft, one count of forgery, and one count of failure to redeliver a hired motor vehicle. On July 9, 1986, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, sentenced Mr. Dempsey to three and one-half years imprisonment based on his plea of guilty to one count of robbery, one count of aggravated battery, one count of possession of cocaine, two counts of forgery, two counts of uttering a forged instrument, and two counts of second degree grand theft. On or about May 31, 1989, Judge Roettger of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced Mr. Dempsey to three years confinement based on a guilty plea to one count of mail fraud. The court withheld imposing a sentence of confinement on Mr. Dempsey for another count of the indictment, and sentenced him to five years probation, to run concurrently with the sentence of confinement. On December 21, 1990, Judge Moreno of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced Mr. Dempsey to fifteen months' imprisonment based on his plea of guilty to one count of escape. The sentence of imprisonment was suspended, and Mr. Dempsey was placed on a three-year term of supervised release. On January 29, 1992, Mr. Dempsey appeared in the Dade County Court and pled not guilty to one count of soliciting for prostitution. He was found guilty and sentenced to attend an AIDS course and to have an AIDS test. On May 27, 1992, Judge Moreno of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida revoked Mr. Dempsey's supervised release and sentenced him to one-year imprisonment for violation of the terms of his supervised release. On July 9, 1995, Judge Roettger of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida revoked Mr. Dempsey's probation and sentenced him to imprisonment for five years for violation of the conditions of his probation. On January 14, 1997, Mr. Dempsey was paroled by the United States Parole Commission and released from the Marianna Federal Correctional Institution. His parole expires May 14, 2000. Since January 23, 1997, Mr. Dempsey has been employed by Westgate Resorts, a timeshare resort in Miami, Florida. In July 1997, he was promoted to manager. Since he was found guilty in 1988 of mail fraud, Mr. Dempsey's only criminal conviction was for the misdemeanor of soliciting for prostitution. His other offenses were violations of the terms of his supervised release on the charge of escape and of his probation on the charge of mail fraud. The evidence presented in this case is not sufficient to establish that Mr. Dempsey, at this time, is of good character and trustworthiness and has a reputation for fair dealing. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Mr. Dempsey has been convicted of crimes involving forgery, grand theft, and mail fraud.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying the application of Lloyd Robert Dempsey for licensure as a real estate salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Lloyd Robert Dempsey, pro se 5577 La Gorce Drive Miami Beach, Florida 33140-2137 Andrea D. Perkins Assistant Attorney General Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint filed May 28, 1986, Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) charged that Respondent, Theodore Riley (Riley), while employed as an adjuster by United States Fidelity and Guaranty Group, (USF&G), did wrongfully obtain the sum of $400 from a workmens compensation claimant to assure that USF&G would not contest the claim (Count I). The complaint further alleged that on September 16, 1985, Riley entered a plea of nolo contendere to an information charging a violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes, a felony of the second degree and a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the court withheld adjudication and placed Riley on 18 months probation (Count II). The Department concluded that such conduct demonstrated, inter alia, a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance; fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or permit; and, a plea of nolo contendere to a felony involving moral turpitude. Section 626.611(7),(9) and (14), Florida Statutes. At hearing, Riley entered a plea of no contest to Count II of the Administrative Complaint in exchange for the Department's dismissal of Count I of the Administrative Complaint and the Department's agreement that the penalty imposed would be limited to a suspension of his eligibility for licensure for a period of two (2) years. While not conditioning his agreement to a two year suspension, Riley did request that the Department consider crediting the time he has been on probation against the two year suspension. The evidence shows that Riley was arrested and charged with the subject offense in March 1985, that he entered a plea of nolo contendere, that adjudication of guilt was withheld, and that he was placed on probation for 18 months commencing September 16, 1985. As a special condition of probation, Riley was ordered not to apply for an adjuster's license during the term of his probationary period. Consistent with the terms of his probation, Riley has not renewed his adjusters' license. The Department's records reflect that Riley's license was last due for renewal, but not renewed, on April 1, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission, adopted revised rules of practice and procedure which became effective on September 10, 1981. Among these is Rule 23-21.09, Florida Administrative Code, which establishes "matrix time ranges" that are used in determining presumptive parole release dates for persons who are serving prison terms. In determining presumptive parole release dates, the Respondent's rules require that a "salient factor score" be determined based upon such factors as the number of prior criminal convictions, the number of prior incarcerations, total time served in prisons, the inmate's age at the time of the offense which led to the first incarceration, the number of probation or parole revocations, the number of prior escape convictions, and whether burglary or breaking and entering is the present offense of conviction. The degree or severity of the present offense of conviction is then determined. The Respondent's Rule 23-21.09 sets guidelines for time ranges for presumptive parole release dates depending upon the severity of the present offense of conviction and the salient factor score. The more severe the present offense of conviction, the longer will be the period before the presumptive parole release date. Similarly, given the severity of the offense, the higher the salient factor score the longer will be the period before the presumptive parole release date. The rule replaced a rule which set different matrix time ranges. The new rule generally sets longer time ranges, but this is not uniformly true. The Petitioner, Seimore Keith, is an inmate presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution, Polk City, Florida. Polk Correctional Institution is a facility maintained by the Florida Department of Corrections. Petitioner Keith was convicted of grand theft in July, 1980, and was sentenced to serve five years in prison. The conviction was the result of a guilty plea which was entered in accordance with a plea bargain. During plea negotiations, Petitioner Keith was advised that his presumptive parole release date under Florida Parole and Probation Commission rules would require that he serve no more than 25 months in prison. At the time that Petitioner Keith's presumptive parole release date was set by the Respondent, the new Rule 23-21.09 had come into effect, and the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date was set to require that he serve 32 months in prison. The Petitioner, Ronnie McKane, is presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution. He was convicted of the offense of armed robbery in February, 1981. Under rules in effect when he was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23-21.09, Petitioner McKane's presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rule was applied by Respondent in setting McKane's presumptive parole release date. The Petitioner, Daniel P. Hull, is presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution. He was convicted in September, 1971, of the offense of robbery and sentenced to serve ten years in prison. He was paroled in 1974, but was reincarcerated as a result of a parole violation in 1976. In 1977 he escaped, and was recaptured in January, 1981. On June 1, 1961, Petitioner Hull was convicted of the offense of escape and sentenced to serve nine months. Under the rules in effect when he was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23-21.09, Hull's presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rules were applied by Respondent in setting Hull's presumptive parole release date, and it has been set subsequent to the expiration of his sentence. Hull will therefore be released when his sentence expires in March, 1982. The Petitioner, Douglas L. Adams, was convicted of the offenses of possession of marijuana and uttering a forged instrument, and sentenced in February, 1981, to two consecutive five-year sentences. Under the rules in effect when Adams was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23- 21.09, Adams' presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rule was applied by the Respondent in setting Adams' presumptive parole release date. During 1980, the Respondent directed its staff to begin considering proposed changes to its rules of practice and procedure. Various proposals were considered, and by September, 1980, a proposed rule package had been developed. The Respondent directed its staff to submit the proposed rule package to the Governor and members of the Cabinet, various pertinent legislators, county and circuit judges, prosecutors and public defenders, superintendents of each prison in the State, and to members of the Supreme Court and the district courts. The Commission opted to conduct various workshops throughout the State, and to invite all interested persons to share their input. Notices of the workshops were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The workshops were conducted, and the Commission commenced formal rule-making proceedings. Notice of rulemaking was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, and hearings were scheduled. Notice of the formal rulemaking proceedings was also published in the St. Petersburg Times, the Pensacola Journal, the Tallahassee Democrat, the Orlando Sentinel-Star, and the Florida Times-Union. Persons who had requested specific notification were provided it. In response to this notice, the Respondent received considerable written input, and oral presentations were made at hearings that were conducted. The final hearing in the rule-making proceeding was conducted on June 19, 1981, and the rules, including Rule 23- 21.09, were thereafter adopted effective September 10, 1981. Notice of the proposed rule changes and of the formal rulemaking proceeding was not specifically disseminated to inmates at Florida's prisons. The proposed rules were for- warded to the superintendent of each facility. At some of the institutions the proposed rules were apparently posted. All persons who requested copies of the proposed rules from the Florida Parole and Probation Commission were provided them. Numerous prisoners and organizations that represent prisoners made input during the various states of the rulemaking proceeding. None of the Petitioners in this matter were specifically noticed of the rulemaking proceeding. One of the Petitioners had heard that rules were being proposed, and requested copies of them from members of the Legislature or from Department of Corrections personnel. None of the Petitioners requested copies of the proposed rules from the Respondent or anyone connected with the Respondent.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, in violation of Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional probation officer on February 1, 1991, and as a criminal justice training instructor on December 7, 1999. Her respective certificate numbers are 20851 and 205697. Respondent was first employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) on August 10, 1990. She was employed as a correctional probation officer. As a result of promotions, Respondent became a DOC Correctional Probation Specialist in February 1995, so that she was responsible for, among other things, various administrative duties, such as handling citizens' complaints of employee misconduct and coordinating training events. In April 2001, Respondent filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that DOC forced her to work in a hostile environment. On February 15, 2002, Respondent, alleging the same facts, commenced a legal action against DOC in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 02-60236-CIV. As part of the federal litigation, DOC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, in part, that Respondent's complaint failed to claim damages. In response, on March 28, 2003, Respondent, representing herself, filed a lengthy affidavit, to which she personally attested. In the affidavit, Respondent swore to the following statement: I requested assistance from management [following the departure of the other Correctional Probation Specialist from Respondent's office and DOC's failure to fill the empty position], but they refused to assign another Specialist to the office to assist me. As a result I had to work an average of five hours per week extra in overtime without pay to properly supervise this caseload to prevent from being reprimanded, suspended or terminated by [DOC]. I was not paid for this time. The evidence is clear that Respondent did not work overtime, with or without pay. The Correctional Probation Supervisor who directly supervised Respondent at the time testified at the hearing. Obviously not hostile to Respondent, the supervisor testified definitively that during the relevant period in the affidavit--March 2, 2001 through May 9, 2002--she was intimately familiar with Respondent's work, including her itinerary and travel logs. The supervisor testified that Respondent incurred no overtime whatsoever during this period, and this testimony is credited in its entirety. Respondent's sworn statement in the affidavit is false and was false at the time that Respondent made it. Respondent's sole purpose in making this false statement was to deceive the court and show an element of damages that did not, in fact, exist. DOC terminated Respondent on August 1, 2003. She has not since worked in a job that requires certification from Petitioner.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order suspending Respondent's certificates as a correctional probation officer and criminal justice training instructor for one year retroactive to August 2, 2003; placing these certificates on probation for two years from the date of the final order; and requiring Respondent to attend an ethics course approved by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Joseph S. White Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Faye E. Wright-Simpson
