The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner should be permitted to take the examination for licensure as a real estate sales associate.
Findings Of Fact In September 2003, the Petitioner filed an application for licensure by the State of Florida as a real estate sales associate. In an application section titled "Background Information" question 1 asks in relevant part, "[h]ave you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . ." to which the Petitioner responded in the affirmative. "Background Information" question 4 in relevant part asks, "[h]as any license, registration, or permit to practice any regulated profession, occupation, vocation, or business been revoked, annulled, suspended, relinquished, surrendered, or withdrawn . . ." to which the Respondent replied in the affirmative. Question 1 directs an applicant who responds in the affirmative to disclose the full details of the incident(s) by completion of "form 0050-1." Question 4 directs an applicant who responds in the affirmative to disclose the full details of the termination(s) by completion of "form 0060-1." The disclosure forms completed by the Petitioner (if any) are not in the Respondent's files and are unavailable for review. The Petitioner's application package was presented to the Commission on December 16, 2003. After considering his presentation, the Commission denied his application and instructed him to return with additional information related to the disclosed charges. The Petitioner apparently sought reconsideration, and his application package was again presented to the Commission on March 17, 2004. After reconsidering the Petitioner's background, the Commission again denied his application. The Petitioner then sought an administrative hearing to challenge the denial of his application. On or about July 26, 2000, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with stalking. The Commission's records indicate that the Petitioner completed a pretrial program and was sentenced to 50 hours of community service. At the administrative hearing, the Petitioner testified that he was placed on probation for six months, and had to complete a six- month psychological evaluation. The stalking charge was nolle prossed. At the hearing, the Petitioner stated that at the time of the stalking charge, he was working at a retail establishment. The object of his attention was a 16-year-old female who was working in the vicinity. The Petitioner was approximately 36 years old. The Petitioner asserted that he did not know the female was 16 years old at the time. He denied that he "stalked" the female, but stated that he merely spoke to her a few times in person and attempted to contact her once by telephone. He continued to express surprise at the stalking charge. On or about June 6, 2001, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, a felony, and criminal mischief. He was sentenced to two years of probation, six months of psychological evaluation, and was required to pay court costs. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. At the hearing, the Petitioner stated that he went to the home of an ex-girlfriend to collect a $500 debt she allegedly owed to him. He testified that he knocked on her door and got no response. As he left her residence, he saw that her automobile was unlocked. He opened the hood of the ex- girlfriend's vehicle and ripped out the spark plug cables. He asserted that he "didn't steal anything" because he threw the cables away and didn't keep them. On or about September 5, 2001, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, entered an order based on the Petitioner's stipulation, revoking his Class "D" Security Officer's License, based on the burglary charge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Alfonso Santana, Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Fernando Freire 5242 Millenia Boulevard, No. 304 Orlando, Florida 32839 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Watkins, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802 North Orlando, Florida 32808-1900
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate should be granted.
Findings Of Fact On or about February 9, 2005, Ms. Gonzalez made application (Application) to the Division of Real Estate for a real estate sales associate license. At the time of the application, she was 50 years of age and was 51 years of age at the time of hearing. The Application contains a "Background Information" section, which poses several questions. Question 1 provides in pertinent part: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to, even if you received a withhold of adjudication? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including felony, misdemeanor and traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled, or pardoned. . . . Ms. Gonzalez responded yes to Question 1. She disclosed that, in 1992, she was charged with credit card fraud in another state and the disposition was a fine; that on January 22, 1993, she was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and failure to appear, and the disposition was 108 months in prison for the conspiracy and 21 months for the failure to appear to run consecutively with the 108-month sentence; and that on July 20, 1994, she was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and the disposition was 121 months in prison, with this charge and the former charge running concurrently. Ms. Gonzalez does not know if the credit card fraud was a felony but admits that the other two crimes were felonies. Ms. Gonzalez admits that she pled guilty to her crimes and accepts full responsibility for her actions. At hearing, Ms. Gonzalez testified that her troubles began in 1993 when her husband was involved in a tragic car accident, which left him in a vegetative state. She experienced financial difficulty and suffered emotionally, resulting in her making poor decisions. Furthermore, Ms. Gonzalez disclosed that she served a total of eight years and two months in prison for the conspiracy charge of July 20, 1994. No disciplinary actions were taken against her during her time in prison, and she took courses to improve herself. Ms. Gonzalez was released from federal prison in April 2004. She is currently on supervised released for the conspiracy charge of January 22, 1993, and has three years remaining on her supervised probation. Her probation officer is aware of her application for licensure as a real estate sales associate and supports her licensure. As a term of her probation, Ms. Gonzalez is required to perform community service hours, which she does by working with handicapped children. She finds working with the children rewarding and intends to continue working with them when her community service hours have been completed. Ms. Gonzalez is currently working in the mortgage business as a mortgage loan processor and has been for the past two years. She is in a position of trust and interacts with the public on a daily basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional, Division of Real Estate enter a final order denying the application of Lilia A. Gonzalez for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 1020 Verona Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Thomas Barnhart, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Michael E. Murphy, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination dated June 2, 1998, alleges that Respondent discriminated against him because of his age and in retaliation for opposing illegal behavior. FCHR received the Charge of Discrimination on June 18, 1998. For purposes of this Recommended Order of Dismissal, it is assumed that the Charge of Discrimination was timely filed with FCHR. As of December 15, 1998, 180 days after Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination, FCHR had not assigned an investigator to investigate Petitioner's complaint or taken any other action related to the complaint. As of January 19, 1999, 35 days after December 15, 1998, Petitioner had not requested an administrative hearing. By letter dated June 2, 1999, Petitioner requested FCHR to forward his complaint to the Division of Administrative Hearings. FCHR received the request for an administrative hearing on June 7, 1999. This request was filed 354 days after June 18, 1998, 174 days after December 15, 1998, and 139 days after January 19, 1999. Petitioner does not argue or present any facts to support a finding that the doctrines of equitable tolling or excusable neglect apply in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, admissions made by Respondent, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He holds license number 0265883. In March of 1990, Ulrich Wingens, by and through his attorney, Charles Burns, entered into a written contract to purchase from Jupiter Bay Shoppes Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "JBS") certain commercial property located in Palm Beach County. Respondent brokered the sale. The sale contract provided that JBS was responsible for payment of Respondent's broker's fee of $50,000.00 and that such compensation was to "[t]o be due and payable only if closing occur[red]." Respondent received a $20,000.00 earnest money deposit from Wingens in connection with the sale. The sale contract provided that the $20,000.00 was to be held in the Jim Towns Realty escrow account. The sale did not close. Litigation between Wingens and JBS ensued. During the pendency of the litigation, the parties instructed Respondent to continue to hold Wingens' $20,000.00 earnest money deposit in escrow until they advised him to do otherwise. Wingens and JBS settled their dispute before the case was scheduled to go to trial. On November 14, 1991, the judge assigned to the case, Palm Beach County Circuit Court Judge Edward H. Fine, entered an order directing Respondent "to immediately transfer to Fleming, Haile & Shaw, P.A. Trust Account the escrow deposit in the amount of $20,000.00 and any accrued interest thereon." Respondent did not comply with the order. He had appropriated the $20,000.00 for his own personal use and benefit and was not holding it in escrow. This was contrary to the instructions he had received from Wingens and JBS. At no time had Wingens or JBS authorized Respondent to take such action. Wingens' attorney, Burns, brought the matter to the attention of the Department. The Department assigned one of its investigators, Terry Giles, to the case. As part of her investigation, Giles interviewed Respondent. During the interview, Respondent admitted to Giles that he had closed his real estate office in October of 1991 and had not at any time prior to the interview notified the Department of the closure. At the time he closed his office, Respondent's real estate broker's license was still in active status.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III and IV of the Administrative Complaint and revoking his real estate broker's license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of August, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE IN CASE NO. 93-1315 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "findings of facts" proposed by the Department in its post-hearing submittal: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. First sentence: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Accepted as true, but not incorporated because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 3-13. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. 14-15. Accepted as true, but not incorporated because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. Accepted as true, but not incorporated because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Legal Section, Suite N 308 Hurston Building, North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Mr. James C. Towns 7101 Smoke Ranch Road #1007 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Section 11B(3) of the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2004 Second Edition, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The petitions filed by FFVA and TIC challenge the validity of Section 11B(3) of the 2004 Manual,4/ which prior to October 1, 2007, was adopted by reference as part of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1) was amended effective October 1, 2007, to adopt by reference the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition ("the 2006 Manual"). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1), as it existed when the petitions were filed and as it currently exists, adopts by reference the 2006 Manual, not the 2004 Manual. The 2004 Manual is no longer adopted by reference as part of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501, or any other rule. AHCA applied the 2004 Manual in the reimbursement dispute initiated by HRMC against FFVA under Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the determination letter issued by AHCA on October 24, 2007, which was attached to FFVA's petition. The reimbursement dispute is the subject of the pending DOAH Case No. 07-5414. AHCA applied the 2004 Manual in a reimbursement dispute involving TIC under Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the determination letter issued by AHCA on January 9, 2008, which was attached to TIC's petition. The reimbursement dispute is the subject of the pending DOAH Case No. 08-0703.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (''FCHR''), and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner began working for Respondent as a part-time Self-Checkout Host on February 1, 2017. Upon hiring, her initial rate of pay was $9.00 per hour. After three months of employment, Petitioner’s pay was increased to $10.00 per hour in May of 2017. Subsequently, Petitioner received pay increases raising her hourly rate to $11.00, and then $11.50. In April of 2018, Petitioner was promoted to the full-time position of Customer Service Manager (''CSM''). Along with the promotion, Petitioner also received a raise, bringing her rate of pay to $13.65 per hour. In April of 2019, Respondent gave Petitioner another raise, resulting in hourly pay of $13.90. Respondent maintained a Statement of Ethics, of which Petitioner was aware. The Statement of Ethics explained that Respondent’s overall operations were guided by four core Beliefs, which were: Respect for the Individual; Service to our Customers; Striving for Excellence; and Act with Integrity. Based on what she heard from her coworkers, Petitioner believed that she was entitled to a market-adjustment pay increase in April of 2019. She sought information about the pay increase from her store manager and others. Petitioner reported her belief that she was entitled to a pay increase, which she had not received, to Respondent’s Associate Relations Department (''Department''). After what was described as a thorough review of Petitioner’s concerns, the Department closed the matter. Petitioner testified that a white male named Chance was making more money than she, based on conversations between Petitioner and Chance. Chance worked as a Money Manager Associate, a position that Petitioner never held during her employment with Respondent. Ms. Durocher testified that Chance was not paid more than Petitioner. In 2019, there were ten individuals who held the position of CSM at the store where Petitioner worked. In addition to Petitioner, those who worked in CSM positions included multiple African-American females and one African-American male. Petitioner did not present any evidence to suggest or establish that any male, or non-African-American, employee was paid more than she was for performing similar work. On October 26, 2019, Petitioner discussed the problem she perceived with her rate of pay with Ms. Durocher. During their conversation, Petitioner raised her voice and the interaction escalated to the point that another employee went to enlist the assistance of the Store Manager. When the Store Manager arrived, he joined the conversation with Petitioner and Ms. Durocher. Ms. Durocher expressed to Petitioner that she believed that Petitioner was being paid commensurate with her skills and duties; and that her rate of pay had been investigated and was determined to be appropriate. Throughout the conversation, Ms. Durocher perceived Respondent’s conduct to be disrespectful. Ms. Durocher and the Store Manager repeatedly encouraged Petitioner to calm down, but their attempts were unsuccessful. On the same day, Petitioner’s employment was terminated by Respondent for violating the core Belief of Respect for the Individual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2021. Jamie Rotteveel, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Jeruscha Toussaint 5835 Northwest Lomb Court Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 Allison Wiggins, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Littler Mendelson, P.C. 2301 McGee Street, 8th Floor Kansas City, Missouri 64108 Kimberly Doud, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nancy A. Johnson, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The primary issue in this disciplinary proceeding is whether Respondent, which operates a convenience store and sells alcoholic beverages on the premises under a license issued by Petitioner, permitted a sale of drug paraphernalia to occur in the store, in violation of the statutes governing holders of beverage licenses. If Petitioner proves the alleged violation, then it will be necessary to consider whether penalties should be imposed on Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Respondent Moti's, Inc., d/b/a Continental Market ("Continental"), has held a license to sell alcoholic beverages at retail. Consequently, Continental is subject to the regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction of Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division"). On December 12, 2006, two undercover agents of the Division, together with a detective from the Broward County Sheriff's Office, conducted a "sting" operation at the convenience store that Continental owns. The sting was arranged in response to complaints that the Sheriff's Office had received regarding sales of drug paraphernalia (specifically "crack pipes" used for smoking crack cocaine), which were allegedly taking place at this store. The purpose of the sting was to purchase a "crack pipe" and arrest anyone involved in the sale. Pursuant to the plan, Special Agent Ralius Thompson entered the store in an undercover capacity. He was wearing a "wire" (concealed microphone) and a hidden camera. These devices, which were monitored by the other agent and the detective (both of whom remained outside the store), allowed the ensuing transaction to be recorded on a videotape. Once inside, Thompson headed first to the cooler, where he took a six-pack of beer from the shelf. He then proceeded to the counter, to purchase the beer. As the clerk, Aziar Baig, was ringing up the sale, Thompson whispered, "Got any pipes? Got any pipes?"i Baig reached down behind the counter and pulled up a "love rose." (A love rose is a trinket, a tiny fake flower encased in a thin glass tube, which latter is about 4 inches long. Though the tube containing a love rose can be used as a pipe, love roses are not necessarily drug paraphernalia; they can be legally sold, purchased, and possessed.) "You're talking about here?" Baig asked, displaying a love rose. "Yeah, smoke my crack in, man, smoke my crack in," replied Thompson. "A pipe——got a stem?" "Huh?" said Baig. "A stem," repeated Thompson. (According to the evidence, the term "stem" is street talk for filter. Filter material is inserted in one end of the pipe to prevent the user from inhaling the burning cocaine "rock.") "This one?" Baig inquired, holding up a Chore Boy® copper scrubber. (Chore Boy® scrubbers are clearly legal merchandise having an obvious, non-nefarious purpose. According to the evidence, however, the metal in these pot scrubbers can be used illicitly as a crack pipe filter.) "Yeah," said Thompson, who then paid $6.75 for the items. Shortly after making this sale, Baig was arrested on the charge of delivering drug paraphernalia, which is a third- degree felony under Section 893.147(2), Florida Statutes. The evidence presented in this case is sufficient, for present purposes, to support the inference——which the undersigned draws——that Baig either knew or reasonably should have known that his customer (Thompson) intended to use the love rose and copper scrubber to fashion a makeshift crack pipe.ii Thus, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Baig committed the crime of delivering drug paraphernalia. There is, on the other hand, no persuasive evidence (or any evidence of any quality, for that matter) establishing that the corporate licensee (as opposed to its employee Baig) committed any misconduct, e.g. negligent failure to train or supervise employees; failure to exercise due diligence in attempting to prevent unlawful sales; or fostering or condoning such sales, for which the Division could impose discipline against Continental pursuant to Section 561.29(1), Florida Statutes. It is determined, therefore, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Continental is not guilty of the pending charge, namely permitting the sale of drug paraphernalia on the licensed premises.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order finding Continental not guilty of the instant charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.stae.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2007.
