Findings Of Fact The sole witness for the Petitioner, Dorothy J. Faircloth, established that the Respondent, Dr. Thomas K. Thomas, M.D., was licensed by endorsement by the Board on May 8, 1979. On-March 19, 1982, Witness Faircloth, as Executive Director of the Board, sent a letter to the Respondent, Dr. Thomas, indicating that the records of her office showed that he was licensed by endorsement on the above date and that he had not complied with Section 458.313, Florida Statutes, by demonstrating to the Board that he had actively engaged in the practice of medicine in Florida within a three year period after issuance of the license by endorsement, provided for in that Section, nor that he had continued that practice in Florida continuously for a minimum period of one year. That letter further informed him that if the establishment of his Florida practice was postponed due to the necessity of obtaining additional training or because of military service, then he should submit proper documentation in affidavit form or properly certified to establish that he was in an approved training program at the time of receiving his license, until a date certain, or was in the military service. The letter informed him that in order to avoid cancellation of his license by endorsement he should submit proper documentation in affidavit ford or properly certified to the effect that he had been actively engaged in the practice of medicine within the three-year period after issuance of that license and that he had continued his practice for a minimum of one year. This letter was elated March 19, 1982, and an identical letter pursuant to the Board's procedure was sent one month later on April 19, 1982, which constitute two written warnings sent to the Respondent's last known address and which indeed was shown to be the address from which the letter requesting this proceeding was posted. The doctor failed to demonstrate in the requested manner that he had complied with Florida practice requirements for his licensure by endorsement and accordingly on June 10, 1982, an order was entered by the Board of Medical Examiners declaring his licensure by endorsement void and of no force or effect. By his letter of June 21, 1982, the doctor petitioned for a formal proceeding, in which petition he acknowledged that he had not been able to come to Florida to practice medicine within the three years of acquiring his license by endorsement due to "circumstances beyond my control." This letter was admitted into evidence as a part of Exhibit One. The cause was then transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal proceeding, the hearing being held on the above date. Dr. Thomas failed to appear at the hearing. It was established that Dr. Thomas has not practiced in Florida since his licensure by endorsement on May 5, 1979.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the evidence in the record, it is therefore RECOMMENDED: That license number ME00345I6 issued to Dr. Thomas K. Thomas, M.D., on May 5, 1979, be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 10983. COPIES FURNISHED: Chris D. Rolle, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas K. Thomas, M.D. 842 Moorland Grosse Point Wood, MT 48236 Dorothy J. Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Should the certificate of registration of Petitioner, Professional Pain Management, Inc., License No. PMC 296, as a privately-owned pain management clinic, be revoked?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Professional Pain Management, Inc., License No. 296, is a pain management clinic (PMC) subject to the requirements of sections 458.3265 and 459.0137, Florida Statutes (2010).1/ PMC 296 is not wholly-owned by medical doctors (M.D.s), osteopathic physicians (D.O.s), or a combination of M.D.s and D.O.s. PMC 296 is not a health care clinic licensed under chapter 400, part X, Florida Statutes. PMC 296 has three equity shareholders. Their names and percentages of ownership interests are: Robert Ciceles (20 percent); Terra Hom (40 percent), and Erez Cohen (40 percent). None of the three equity shareholders is a physician, M.D. or D.O. Erez Cohen is, and at all pertinent times, has been president of PMC 296. He is not an M.D. or a D.O. Since at least August 2010, the owners and officers of PMC 296 were aware of the requirement that it be wholly physician-owned, effective October 1, 2010. PMC 296 was, at all times pertinent to this proceeding, not wholly-owned by physicians, M.D.s, D.O.s, or a combination of M.D.s and D.O.s. A dispute among the shareholders arising out of a dissolution of marriage proceeding has prevented PMC 296 from establishing ownership by a M.D., a D.O. or a combination of M.D.s and D.O.s. Management of PMC 296 plans to transfer ownership to physicians at an unspecified future date once the shareholder dispute is resolved. There was no evidence of any exemption from the operation of sections 458.3265 and 459.0137 presented at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health issue a final order revoking the certificate of registration of Professional Pain Management, Inc., License No. PMC 296. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2011.
Findings Of Fact The parties to this proceeding, through their counsel, have stipulated to the following facts: On December 21, 1982, Petitioner submitted by mail an application for licensure by endorsement to the Board. The application was received by the Board on December 28, 1982. Sometime between December 28, 1982, and January 19, 1983, the Board requested additional information from Petitioner relating to his professional activities during the period from June 1967, to June 1968. Petitioner responded to this inquiry by letter dated January 19, 1983, and therewith provided the Board with the requested information. This letter was received by the Board on January 24, 1983, which date constitutes the date on which the ninety-day period within which Petitioner's application must be approved or denied commenced running. By use of a form dated February 23, 1983, the Board made another request for information from Petitioner relating to two omissions in his application. Petitioner responded to this inquiry by letter dated March 15, 1983, providing the requested information. This letter was received by the Board on March 21, 1983. Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement is based upon his previously obtained FLEX certification. Petitioner took the FLEX, a three-part examination, incidental to applying for medical licensure by examination in the State of Illinois. Petitioner sat for the FLEX examination in Illinois on June 13, 14, and 15, 1972, and on December 5, 6, and 7, 1972. Following conclusion of each examination, Petitioner's responses to the examination questions were forwarded to the National Board of Medical Examiners for evaluation and scoring. On or about January 17, 1973, the National Board of Medical Examiners completed its evaluation and scoring of Petitioner's responses to the December 1972 examination, and on or about January 19, 1973, the scores achieved by Petitioner were forwarded to the State of Illinois. On February 7, 1973, Petitioner was licensed by the State of Illinois, based upon the scores obtained by Petitioner on the June and December 1972 FLEX. The weighted average of the scores achieved by Petitioner on which licensure was granted to the Petitioner by the State of Illinois was 75. This weighted average was computed by assigning a one-sixth weight to the basic science portion of the FLEX examination taken by Petitioner on June 13, 1972; assigning a two-sixth weight to the clinical science portion of the FLEX examination taken by Petitioner on December 6, 1972; and assigning a three-sixth weight to the clinical competence portion of the FLEX examination taken by Petitioner on December 7, 1972. By letter dated March 1, 1983, Willie J. Burch, a Staff Assistant of the Board, notified Petitioner that she would not be able to recommend favorable approval of Petitioner's application to the Board for reason that Petitioner had not obtained a score of 75 percent or above at one sitting of the complete examination. The same letter further informed Petitioner that his application would be presented to the Board for consideration at its April 9-10, 1983 meeting, and that Petitioner would be notified of the Board's final decision within approximately fifteen days from the date of that meeting. On April 10, 1983, the Board at a regularly noticed public meeting considered the Petitioner's application. Petitioner's undersigned attorney then appeared before the Board and addressed the Board on behalf of Petitioner. After considering the information, argument, and legal authority presented by Petitioner's attorney, and the advice and information presented by its staff, the Board, through its chairman, declared that Petitioner's application was not filed with the ten-year period required by Section 458.313(d), Florida Statutes. Further, the Board maintained that Petitioner had failed to comply with Rule 21M-29.01(2), Florida Administrative Code, a newly enacted rule interpreting the statutory phrase "has been certified by licensure examination of . . . (FLEX) to mean that an applicant must not only have been certified by licensure examination of FLEX, but must have scored a FLEX-weighted average of 75 percent or better during only one complete sitting of the FLEX. As of April 25, 1983, neither Petitioner nor his attorney had received any written decision from the Board. On May 23, 1983, Petitioner's attorney filed on behalf of Petitioner, a Request to Issue License, notifying the Board of its failure to comply with the requirements of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes. On May 24, 1983, the Board mailed to Petitioner's attorney a document entitled NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY ENDORSEMENT LICENSURE bearing a certificate of service signed by Dorothy J. Faircloth as the Board's executive director, stating that a copy of such notice had been furnished to Petitioner by mail on May 4, 1983. Said notice expressed the Board's decision to deny Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement. On May 27, 1983, Petitioner's attorney received a copy of such notice. On May 27, 1983, Petitioner's attorney filed on behalf of Petitioner, a PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to review the Board's denial of Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a medical doctor, in his treatment of Patient M.A., failed to keep legible medical records in violation of section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2007); prescribed or administered inappropriate or excessive quantities of controlled substances in violation of section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes (2007); committed medical malpractice by practicing below the standard of care in violation of section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2007); failed to perform a statutory or legal obligation placed upon a licensed physician in violation of section 458.331(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2007); and violated any provision of chapter 458 or chapter 456, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto in violation of section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2007), as Petitioner alleges in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint; if so, whether (and what) disciplinary measures should be imposed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Paul M. Goldberg, M.D., violated sections 458.331(1)(g) and (nn), Florida Statutes, as charged in Counts IV and V of the Complaint; Dismissing Counts I-III of the Complaint; Imposing $20,000 in administrative fines; issuing a reprimand against Dr. Goldberg's medical license; requiring Dr. Goldberg to complete the "Laws and Rules" Course; suspending Dr. Goldberg's medical license until such time as Dr. Goldberg undergoes a "UF CARES" evaluation; and placing Dr. Goldberg's license on probation for three years under indirect supervision with 100 percent chart review of cosmetic surgery patients and 25 percent chart review of all other patients. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2015.
The Issue Whether the Respondent properly denied the Petitioner’s request to be a “recognizing agency” within the parameters of Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Chelation therapy is the introduction of a man-made amino acid into a patient’s vein. It has been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and is used for the treatment of heavy medal toxicity and the removal of lead. American Board of Chelation Therapy (ABCT) is an autonomous organization that provides education and certification to any physician who wishes to become knowledgeable in Chelation therapy. ABCT was established in 1982 for the purpose of establishing the criteria necessary for certification in the area of Chelation therapy. The Board of Medicine is a statutory entity, established by Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as the primary regulatory authority for the practice of allopathic medicine in the State of Florida. Pursuant to section 458.301, Florida Statutes, the legislature recognizes that the practice of medicine is potentially dangerous to the public if conducted by unsafe and incompetent practitioners. The section further provides that the primary legislative purpose in enacting the medical practices act is to “ensure that every physician practicing in this state meets minimum requirements for safe practice.” In keeping with the legislative mandate to ensure that purpose of the medical practices act, the legislature created the Board of Medicine and authorized the Board to create administrative rules for the purpose of implementing chapter 458. Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code, is the advertising rule of the Board of Medicine.3 The rule codifies provisions of section 458.331(1)(d), Florida Statutes, and provides criteria for identifying false, deceptive, or misleading advertising. In particular, the rule governs advertising on physician letterhead and limits the use of the term “specialist” unless the specialty is recognized by (1) a specialty board of the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) or (2) a board that meets the requirements of Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code. For those specialties recognized by organizations that do not meet the requirements of the rule, the physicians may still advertise their specialty so long as they provide a disclaimer. By rule the disclaimer must state the following “The Specialty recognition identified herein has been received from a private organization not affiliated with or recognized by the Florida Board of Medicine.” ABMS is generally recognized in the United States as the agency that approves allopathic medical specialty boards and the Board of Medicine has historically relied upon ABMS and its standards and, as reflected in the current rule, continues to rely on ABMS and its standards for approving recognizing agencies. On July 17, 1995, the Petitioner, ABCT submitted an application to Florida Board of Medicine for the purpose of being certified as a “recognizing agency” pursuant to rule 59R-11.001. ABCT is not a specialty board of the ABMS. Because ABCT is not a member board of the ABMS, the Board of Medicine looked to the requirements of rule 59R- 11.001(2)(f) to determine whether ABCT met the criteria enunciated in the rule and whether it is therefore a “recognizing agency” capable of bestowing specialty status on a physician. Rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), Florida Administrative Code, provides that non-ABMS Boards may seek recognition as “recognizing agencies” if they meet the following criteria: The recognizing agency must be an independent body that certifies members as having advanced qualifications in a particular allopathic medical specialty through peer review demonstrations of competence in the specialty being recognized. Specialty recognition must require completion of an allopathic medical residency program approved by either the Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada that includes substantial and identifiable training in the allopathic specialty being recognized. Specialty recognition must require successful completion of a comprehensive examination administered by the recognizing agency pursuant to written procedures that ensure adequate security and appropriate grading standards. The recognizing agency, if it is not an ABMS board, must require as part of its certification requirement that each member receiving certification be currently certified by a specialty board of the ABMS. The recognizing agency must have been determined by the Internal Revenue Service of the United States to be a legitimate not for profit entity pursuant to Section 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The recognizing agency must have full time administrative staff, housed in dedicated office space which is appropriate for the agency’s program and sufficient for responding to consumer or regulatory inquiries. The recognizing agency must have written by-laws, and a code of ethics to guide the practice of its members and an internal review and control process including budgetary practices, to ensure effective utilization of resources. However, a physician may indicate the service offered and may state that practice is limited to one or more types of services when this is in fact the case; On April 15, 1996, the Board of Medicine issued an order denying the ABCT’s application for specialty status. As basis for the denial, the order stated that the application of the ABCT failed to establish compliance with the requirements for approval as set forth in Rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the order stated: The requirements for diplomat status in ABCT do not require advanced qualifications in a particular allopathic medicine specialty; specialty recognition given by ABCT does not require completion of an allopathic medical residency program approved by the ACGME or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada that include substantial and identifiable training in the allopathic specialty being recognized; specialty recognition provided by the ABCT does not require successful completion of a comprehensive examination pursuant to written procedures that ensure adequate security and appropriate grading standards in that ABCT requires only a score of 60% to pass the examination, the examination consists of true false questions and answers, and the examination is not a medically comprehensive examination; ABCT is not an ABMS board and does not require that each member it certifies be currently certified by an ABMS board; and ABCT has not provided evidence that it is a legitimate not-for-profit entity pursuant to Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code as determined by the Internal Revenue Service. Each of the requirements of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f) were addressed at the administrative hearing. With regard to criteria (1) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), advanced qualifications in a particular allopathic medical specialty through peer review, the ABCT does not require an advanced qualification in a particular allopathic medical specialty. Furthermore, ABCT admitted that it does not meet the requirement of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f)(1). Criteria (2) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f) provides that the specialty recognition must require completion of an allopathic medical residency program approved by either the Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada. The ACGME is generally recognized as the organization that sets criteria for graduate medical education in the United States. The Board of Medicine has incorporated that recognition in the rule by requiring that the advanced education component of the rule be ACGME approved. The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada is ACGME’s counterpart in Canada. With regard to criteria (2) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), ABCT does not require completion of an allopathic residency program approved by either the ACGME or the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada. In fact, ABCT has no requirement for a residency program. ABCT reasoned that a there is no need for a residency program for Chelation therapists because Chelation therapy does not require overnight hospital stay. The only requirement remotely relating to residency is an ABCT requirement that applicants for diplomat status administer a minimum of 1000 Chelation treatments. There is no requirement that these treatments be supervised and no requirement for verification that the minimum number of treatments were administered. With regard to criteria (3) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring successful completion of a comprehensive examination, ABCT does not require all applicants for diplomat status to complete a written examination in order to obtain certification. Specifically, some candidates are grandfathered in without being required to complete the written examination. For those applicants that are required to submit to an examination, Dr. Arthur L. Koch testified that the examination is composed of approximately sixty percent true/false questions. In addition, Dr. Koch testified that another ten percent of the test is not medically oriented but rather addresses the history and politics of Chelation therapy in the United States. At the hearing, ABCT submitted its Spring 1994 examination as an exhibit. That examination contained a majority true/false questions and a few multiple choice questions. To pass the ABCT diplomat examination, the candidate is required to achieve a score of 62.5 percent. In contrast, the Board of Medicine generally requires a passing score of at least 75%. The Board of Medicine expressed concern about the low passing score accepted by ABCT on its certification examination. The Board of Medicine also expressed concern over the large number of true/false questions used in the example examination submitted by ABCT. Uncontroverted testimony was presented at the hearing to support a finding that an examination consisting of a majority of true/false questions is not a viable method of testing knowledge. With regard to criteria (4) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring members of non-ABMS boards to also be certified by a specialty board of the ABMS, the ABCT does not require that each physician seeking diplomat status be currently certified by an ABMS specialty board. Furthermore, ABCT admitted that it does not meet the requirement of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f)(4). With regard to criteria (5) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), that the recognizing agency must be a legitimate not for profit entity under the Internal Revenue Code, evidence was presented to verify that ABCT is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization. With regard to criteria (6) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring the recognizing agency to have full-time administrative staff sufficient to respond to consumer or regulatory inquiries, no evidence was presented at the hearing relating to this criteria. With regard to criteria (7) of rule 59R-11.001(2)(f), requiring the recognizing agency to have written by-laws and a code of ethics to guide the practice of its members, ABCT submitted its Constitution and Bylaws as adopted in March of 1982 and subsequently amended. The Constitution and bylaws, however, did not include a written code of ethics and therefore did not fully comply with the requirements of the rule.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that in Case No. 96-3173, the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order denying ABCT’s application for approval as a “recognizing agency” pursuant to Rule 59R-11.001, Florida Administrative Code.DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1997.
Findings Of Fact An Administrative Complaint was issued against Respondent on January 25, 1982, charging various violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, which pertain to licensure of medical doctors in the State of Florida. The thrust of the complaint is as set forth in the statement of issues. Respondent did not agree with the allegations and requested a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing and that hearing was conducted on the aforementioned date. Humberto Munoz, M.D., holds a medical license to practice medicine in the State of Florida, which license was issued by the Petitioner in the person of the Board of Medical Examiners, and he has held that license at all times pertinent to these matters. By way of background, Dr. Munoz received his medical degree from Havana University, School of Medicine, Cuba, in October, 1943, and practiced in that country until 1952. He received postgraduate medical training in the United States and practiced in Georgia between the years of 1966 and 1971. His license to practice in the State of Florida was obtained in 1971 and he practiced in Miami Beach, Florida, between the years 1971 and 1975. He then undertook the practice of medicine in Georgia and remained there until February, 1976, at which time he returned to Miami, Florida. In February, 1976, Respondent executed an affidavit on a form provided by the Board of Medical Examiners. The purpose of this affidavit was to assist Maury Braga in his attempt to become a licensed physician in the State of Florida. The affidavit may be found as Hearing Officer's Exhibit No. 1 and a copy of that exhibit may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 which is a composite of the application for licensure which was submitted by Maury Braga to the Florida Board of Medical Examiners in 1976. The Munoz affidavit, in its particulars, which entries were made by Munoz, states that Munoz, by personal knowledge, knew that Braga attended and graduated from Faculdade de Ciencias Medica de Santos, a medical school in Brazil, and lawfully practiced medicine in Brazil during the years 1967 through 1972, and that Munoz had also practiced medicine in Brazil. This affidavit was signed by Dr. Munoz and the matters reported in this paragraph were sworn to and subscribed before a licensed notary public in the State of Florida. In fact, Munoz did not have personal knowledge that Maury Braga attended and graduated from the educational facility alluded to, nor did he have knowledge that Braga practiced medicine in Brazil during the years 1967 through 1972. Finally, Munoz had not practiced medicine in Brazil prior to the production of the affidavit. Respondent's knowledge of Braga followed his introduction to Braga in the home of another physician and the presentation of certain documents by Braga about his past; Braga's facility in discussing medical science, and discussions which Munoz had with other acquaintances on the topics of Dr. Braga's life and that of Respondent and medical practice in general. This formed the basis of Munoz' information about Braga at the time Respondent signed the affidavit. In addition to having no personal knowledge about Maury Braga on the subject of Braga's medical training and practice of medicine, facts upon which petitioner and Respondent agree and which are accepted, establish that Maury Braga did not attend and graduate from Faculdade de Ciencias Medica de Santos and that he did not practice medicine in Brazil during the years 1967 through 1972. The Munoz affidavit, together with other affidavits found in the 1976 application of Braga (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2) were in keeping with the procedural requirements for licensure of foreign physicians in the years 1976 and 1977. The affidavits were to be utilized by the Board of Medical Examiners' staff in satisfying themselves that the applicant had graduated from a medical school recognized by the World Health Organization of the United Nations and that the applicant had practiced medicine in the other country for a period of five (5) years. Braga was tardy in filing his 1976 application and it was necessary for him to resubmit an application for licensure in 1977. The details of that submittal may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. On that occasion, the affidavits by physicians and the format of the Munoz deposition did not include his affidavit. It is unclear which body of material was used in arriving at the decision to license Maury Braga as a medical practitioner in the State of Florida, i.e., the 1976 application materials or 1977 application materials or a combination of both; however, both application forms have been submitted to the Board of Medical Examiners in furtherance of Braga's license request and have remained on file with that agency.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Jorge Macedo, M. D., has been licensed as a medical doctor under the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent graduated from medical school in Brazil in 1954, and practiced in Brazil for one year thereafter. He then came to the United States, where he has practiced from 1956 until the present date. On February 13, 1976, Maury Braga came to Respondent's office in Hialeah, Florida. Respondent had never before met Braga and had never heard of him. Braga advised Respondent that he was a medical doctor from Brazil, that he had attended and graduated from the Faculdade de Ciencias Medicas de Santos, Brazil, that he had practiced the profession of medicine in Brazil during the years of 1967 through 1972, that he was in the process of obtaining his medical license in Florida, and that to complete his Florida medical application he needed statements from local doctors acknowledging that Braga was a Brazilian medical doctor. Braga showed to Respondent documentation concerning his education and practice, including his medical diploma. Based upon his interview of Braga and his examination of Braga's documents, Respondent signed a form utilized by Petitioner, which form is entitled "Affidavit" and which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: I, Jorge Macedo, M. D., of 1060 E. 4th Ave., Hialeah, Florida, do hereby swear and affirm by my personal knowledge, that Maury Braga attended and graduated from Falcudade de Ciencias Medicas de Santos and did lawfully practice the pro- fession of medicine, in Brazil during the years of 1967 through 1972, and that I also practiced the same profession in Brazil. When Respondent signed the "affidavit," it was not notarized. Respondent had no personal knowledge regarding whether Braga had ever attended or graduated from medical school or regarding whether Braga had ever practiced medicine in Brazil. Respondent relied totally on the information contained in the documents Braga showed to him and upon what Braga told him. After Braga left Respondent's office, he had the "affidavit" signed by Respondent notarized. He attached the "affidavit" to an Application for Examination and Course in Continuing Medical Education, which application he then submitted to the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. On February 26, 1976, the same day that Braga's application was received, the Executive Director of the Board of Medical Examiners wrote to Braga advising him that his application was received after the deadline of January 26, 1976, and was therefore rejected. The application was not returned to Braga, but rather was placed in a file opened under Braga's name to be retained in the event that Braga again applied within the next three years to take the course in continuing medical education and the examination for licensure. On January 17, 1977, Braga filed a second application to take the course in continuing medical education which would then qualify him to take the examination for licensure. The second application included "affidavits" from medical doctors other than Respondent. One of Braga's two applications was approved; Braga completed the course in continuing medical education; Braga took and passed the examination for licensure; and Braga was licensed as a medical doctor in the State of Florida on March 10, 1978. Maury Braga did not attend or graduate from the Faculdade de Ciencias Medicas de Santos, and did not lawfully practice the profession of medicine in Brazil during the years 1967 through 1972. Braga's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida has been revoked. At least prior to the revocation of his license, Braga's file with the Petitioner contained both the application he filed in 1976 and the application he filed in 1977. No evidence was introduced to show which application was reviewed when Braga's application to take the educational course and examination for licensure was approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the violation charged in Count Two of the Administrative Complaint, dismissing Counts One, Three and Four of the Administrative Complaint, and placing Respondent's license on probation for a period of one year, subject to terms and conditions set forth by the Board. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee7 Florida 32301 Jack E. Thompson, Esquire Ingraham Building, Suite 516 25 SE Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy J. Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 82-114 JORGE MACEDO, M.D. License Number: 10095 Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dr. Winifred Chambers received a master's degree in religion and art in 1957, a second master's degree in 1968 in philosophy with a specialization in ethics and social philosophy and a Ph.D. (with honors) in 1975 in the philosophy of science, all from the University of Chicago. While working on her dissertation, she studied at the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis. After working around hospitals and conducting classes and workshops on medical ethics for medical personnel, Petitioner decided to attend medical school. Because her educational training did not include extensive background in certain scientific areas, Petitioner was concerned with her ability to score well on the MCATS, which are the entrance examinations required by all medical schools in the United States. In addition, Petitioner's age (she was in her mid 40's at the time) was considered a negative factor by many medical schools in the United States. As a result, she inquired about attending certain foreign medical schools. She was limited in the schools that she could consider because she did not speak Spanish. Medical Education In 1979, Petitioner applied to the American University of the Caribbean (AUC). AUC taught its medical courses in English and Petitioner was only required to make up a few undergraduate science courses (including physics) in order to enroll in the medical school. Petitioner enrolled in classes at AUC in May of 1980. She actually started classes a few days after the semester began. She completed the first two semesters from May to December 1980 and then went home during the Christmas break. During the break, Petitioner learned that she had received an F in her course in neurosciences. Petitioner met with the professor from that course to discuss the failing grade she received and also met with the President of AUC. As a result of these meetings, it was her understanding that the grade was changed to a passing grade. In January of 1981, Petitioner visited CETEC (another Caribbean medical school located in the Dominican Republic,) and met with officials of the school to discuss transferring from AUC to CETEC. Petitioner applied to CETEC during her visit and, prior to leaving, was informed of her acceptance into medical school at CETEC. Petitioner returned to AUC and completed her third semester at the school. In May of 1981, she officially enrolled at CETEC by initiating clinical rotations at Sharp Hospital in San Diego, California. Even though Petitioner had only completed three semesters at AUC, she was granted status as a fifth semester medical student. She contends that she was granted this status based upon CETEC'S evaluation of her transcript and the number of hours she took at AUC. Prior to her enrollment at CETEC, Petitioner provided CETEC with a transcript indicating she had passed neurosciences at AUC and CETEC gave her credit for the course. From May 4, 1981 to June 6, 1982, Petitioner participated in clinical rotations at Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego, California as part of her medical education at CETEC. During this time period, Petitioner also participated in a clinical rotation at Children's Hospital in San Diego, California (from 12/28/81 to 2/20/82). Beginning in 1983, the media and some state licensing agencies began challenging the validity and/or authenticity of the credentials and training of some CETEC medical graduates. CETEC medical school was ultimately closed in 1984. The Dominican Republic government formed an agency to verify and certify the transcripts of CETEC graduates. This agency was called the "Counsel For Superior Education" also referred to by the acronym of CONES. CONES verified and certified the legitimacy of higher education credentials from all Dominican schools submitted to other countries. As part of her pending Florida Application, Petitioner has submitted a certification from CONES dated October 15, 1987 attesting to Petitioner's graduation from medical school at CETEC on June 12, 1982. Petitioner has also submitted a second certification from CONES dated July 8, 1988 confirming her graduation on June 12, 1982. Included as part of the documents submitted by Petitioner from CONES is a Certification of Clinical Rotations dated July 14, 1987 (the "CONES Report") and an academic transcript dated July 14, 1987 (the "CONES Transcript.") The "Education Commission For Foreign Medical Graduates" ("ECFMG") provides a certification of the education of applicants from foreign medical schools who seek licensure in the various United States and offers an examination required by some state licensing boards for licensure of applicants graduating from foreign medical schools. Petitioner passed the ECFMG examination and was certified by the ECFMG in 1982. However, after the CETEC scandal began in 1983, the ECFMG started an investigation of graduates of CETEC (including Petitioner) for the purpose of reverifying their medical training. The ECFMG required clearance from CONES of Petitioner's CETEC education before reverifying her ECFMG certificate. The ECFMG reinstated Petitioner's ECFMG certification on June 26, 1987. The earliest certification from CONES that has been submitted by Petitioner is dated July 14, 1987, approximately two and a half weeks after the ECMFG certification. It is not clear what the ECFMG relied upon in reissuing a certification to Petitioner. While Petitioner contends that CONES had originally certified her CETEC transcript shortly after her graduation in June of 1982, no competent evidence was presented to establish when or if an earlier CONES certification was issued. In any event, Petitioner currently holds a valid ECFMG certificate. In certifying Petitioner's medical degree from CETEC, CONES gave Petitioner credit for courses taken and work done at non-medical schools (i.e., the University of Chicago) prior to entering medical school. These credits are discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 17. Although the ECFMG has apparently accepted CONES' certification of Petitioner's medical education at CETEC, there are several inconsistencies on the face of the CONES Report. The CONES Report states that during the period from May 4, 1981 to June 6, 1982, Petitioner completed fifty six (56) weeks of clinical rotations. However, in reaching this total the CONES Report provides one week of credit for a rotation (from 5/24/82 to 5/28/82) in obstetrics and gynecology which overlapped with another rotation (from 5/10/82 to 6/5/82) in obstetrics and gynecology. It it also provides double credit for a single two week clinical rotation (from 5/4/81 to 5/16/81) in obstetrics and gynecology. In addition, there are two periods of time (from 2/21/82 to 3/14/82 and from 4/25/82 to 5/9/82, which total approximately five (5) weeks), during which no clinical rotations were taken. Since the period between May 4, 1981 and June 6, 1982 consisted of approximately fifty seven (57) weeks, it does not appear that Petitioner actually completed fifty six (56) weeks of rotations as listed. Deleting the double credit received for the 5/4/81 to 5/16/81 clinical rotation, the CONES Report only appears to certify completion of fifty four (54 weeks) of clinical rotations. Moreover, those fifty four (54) weeks of rotations include one week of credit for five (5) days in obstetrics and gynecology (from 5/24/82 to 5/28/82) which directly overlapped a separately listed clinical rotation in obstetrics and gynecology, and one (1) week of credit for six (6) days in obstetrics and gynecology from 6/1/82 to 6/6/82. Thus, on the face of the CONES Report it appears that Petitioner actually completed only fifty three (53) weeks of rotations at most. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, according to the CONES Report, there were approximately five (5) weeks of the fifty-seven (57) week period during which no clinical rotations were taken. Petitioner contends that the CONES Report fails to take into account a five (5) week clerkship in family medicine which she completed at Sharp Hospital and which was accepted by the ECFMG when Petitioner applied for licensure in California. This clerkship is reflected in the CETEC Transcript even though it is not reflected in the CONES Report. It is not clear why this rotation was not included in the CONES Report However, the evidence did establish that Petitioner completed the rotation. One of the five weeks of this family medicine rotation overlaps with an OB/GYN rotation (from 5/4/82 -5/8/82). The time frame of the family medicine rotation roughly coincides with the period of time during which no rotations are reflected in the CONES Report. Thus, this rotation would only add four more weeks to the clerkship total listed on the CONES Report. Even if this four week rotation is added to the fifty three (53) weeks certified in the CONES Report, the Report would still only indicate that Petitioner completed a total of fifty seven (57) weeks of clinical rotations. According to the boiler-plate language on the CONES Report, sixty (60) to seventy-two (72) total weeks of clinical rotations had to be completed by CETEC students who took their clinical rotations outside of the Dominican Republic. Thus, the CONES Report does not reflect completion of the required weeks of clinical rotations even though CONES has issued a certification that purports to certify successful completion of the degree requirements. This discrepancy has not been adequately explained. The CONES Report does not reflect any clinical rotations by Petitioner in psychiatry. However, the CETEC Transcript does indicate that Petitioner was granted eight hours credit for her graduate studies at the University of Chicago from 1971-1973. Petitioner contends she is entitled to at least four hours of clerkship in psychiatry for those studies. However, it appears from the CONES Transcript that the credit she received was applied towards classes in Human Conduct which were a part of the curriculum during the first two years of medical school. There is no evidence to indicate that CETEC or CONES granted or should have granted Petitioner credit for clinical rotations in psychiatry based upon her graduate studies at the University of Chicago. During a three week period (between her second and third semesters at AUC) from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981, Petitioner participated in an OB/GYN clinical rotation at Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego, California (hereinafter this rotation will be referred to as the "Unsanctioned Rotation.") This rotation is usually not done until after a student completes the third semester of medical school. Petitioner's participation in this Unsanctioned Rotation was not authorized by any medical school and was not a part of any medical school program. Petitioner contends that she satisfied the required sixty (60) clerkship weeks if the Unsanctioned Rotation at Sharp Hospital from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981 is added to the undisputed clinical rotations and the family medicine rotation discussed in Findings of Fact 15. However, the Unsanctioned Clerkship was not accepted by CONES and Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that it should be counted towards her required clinical rotations. Although CETEC had previously granted Petitioner credit for the neurosciences course at AUC, CONES was not able to verify that Petitioner passed the course and CONES required Petitioner to retake the course in order to obtain the 1987 certification from CONES. Petitioner attended Northwestern University during the spring quarter of 1987 and completed a four credit hour course (based on a quarter system) in neurosciences. This neurosciences course was apparently given five hours ex post facto credit by CONES to fulfill the neurosciences requirement for Petitioner's 1982 CETEC medical diploma. From December, 1987 to March, 1988, Petitioner attended Xochicalco Medical School in Ensenada, Mexico in order to take additional coursework in partial fulfillment of a requirement by the California licensing board in a stipulated agreement for additional medical training before licensure. (Petitioner's stipulation with the State of California is discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 47-50.) The courses taken at Xochicalco were approved by the California licensing agency and included clinical pathology, pharmacology (two courses) and physiology (two courses). Petitioner successfully passed all of the courses. However, no evidence was presented as to the accreditation status of this school. Petitioner completed a five week rotation in emergency medicine at Cruze Roja Hospital in Mexico in 1988 while she was completing the remedial science classes required by the California Licensing Board. Post-Graduate Training Petitioner completed one year of post graduate training from July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1983 in the family medicine residency program at Holston Valley Community Hospital through East Tennessee State University's Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine. Petitioner has presented a certificate verifying succcessful completion of her first post graduate year of training in this program. Petitioner performed her residency at two hospitals which are part of the East Tennessee State University Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine: Kingsport Family Practice Center and Holston Valley Community Hospital. She saw patients at the Kingsport Family Practice Center for 7 months, one afternoon each week under the supervision of various physicians. The rest of Petitioner's residency was performed at the Holston Valley Community Hospital. Dr. Lee S. Hyde was the program director of the Kingsport Family Medicine Center. Petitioner's contact with Dr. Hyde was limited, but she did have several consultations with him about patients. In an evaluation submitted to the Florida Board of Medicine in connection with Petitioner's application for licensure, Dr. Hyde evaluated Petitioner's diagnostic ability and relationships with patients as poor. He also stated that Petitioner came to the program with a "poor fund of knowledge, clinical habits, and basic medical education". Although he felt Petitioner made progress during the residency program, he did not think it was sufficient. However, his overall evaluation was to recommend with reservations. Dr. Hyde's evaluation of Petitioner to the Board was received by the Board on July 18, 1983. Dr. Hyde noted on the back of the evaluation form that Petitioner was not ready to begin a second year of unsupervised practice. Petitioner was not and would not have been offered a contract for a second year in the residency program. Dr. Hyde also commented that Petitioner demonstrated poor judgment by once going "AWOL" from the program. While Petitioner did take a three (3) day leave over a weekend while assigned to a particular rotation with another physician contrary to the rules of the program, she did so with the permission of her supervisor at the time. Prior to the negative evaluation submitted by Dr. Hyde in July of 1983, Dr. Hyde had previously written a letter dated March 24, 1983 to the Florida Board of Medicine recommending Dr. Chambers for licensure stating that she was in good standing with the program and of reasonable professional competence and excellent moral character. Leslie P. Reynolds, Jr., M.D., was a professor of Family Medicine, assistant Dean, and Director of Medical Education at the Holston Valley Hospital during Petitioner's year of residency. In a June 29, 1983 evaluation form submitted to the Florida Board, Dr. Reynolds, gave an evaluation of Petitioner's performance during the family medicine residency and recommended her as an outstanding applicant. Dr. Reynolds subsequently submitted an affidavit to the Florida Board of Medicine dated October 21, 1987 attesting that Petitioner earned the respect of both her instructors and fellow residents and that the hospital's records suggest that she performed well on all her services and that she was very helpful to other residents. Several other physicians who served as clinical supervisors during Petitioner's residency at Holston Valley have submitted letters of recommendation and virtually all other evaluations of her work were positive. Aside from the letter from Dr. Hyde, (Dr. Hyde did not testify and his letter is hearsay,) no other evidence was presented to demonstrate that Petitioner is incapable of practicing medicine with reasonable skill and safety. The weight of the evidence established that Petitioner is capable of practicing with reasonable skill and safety. Numerous letters from the physicians who have worked with Petitioner over the last several years corroborate to her ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. Petitioner was employed as a house physician at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami from July 11, 1983 to October 31, 1983. Her position was under the supervision of the Department of Family Medicine in the Ambulatory Care Unit of the Emergency Room Department and the Family Medicine Clinical Faculty from the University of Miami. However, the position was not an advanced residency program and the nature of the supervision and training that Petitioner received has not been fully explained. Furthermore, the evidence did not establish the exact nature of her duties and functions. From October 1984 to March 1985, Petitioner participated in a series of clinical rotations at the Wesley Medical Center which is affiliated with the University of Kansas. The exact nature of Petitioner's position is not clear. The position at the Wesley Medical Center was a non-paying position during which Petitioner completed an eight week rotation in Internal Medicine, twelve weeks in General Surgery and four weeks in psychiatry functioning in each rotation at the level of a first-year resident. Petitioner was not officially enrolled as a resident in this program. However, she did receive evaluations from the attending physicians and her evaluations by the supervising physicians in that program were acceptable. In 1988, Petitioner completed an eight month internship at Universal Medical Center in Plantation, Florida Universal Medical Center is an osteopathic teaching institution. This internship was undertaken to satisfy a requirement of the California licensing authority for eight months of "remedial" clinical work. See, Findings of Fact 50. Petitioner was evaluated as performing in a competent and professional manner in this program. At the Universal Medical Center, Petitioner completed thirty three (33) weeks of clinical rotations. The program extended from March 21, 1988 through November 3, 1988. Her duties and responsibilities were similar to other interns in the program. In sum, Petitioner has successfully completed several additional science courses and completed at least thirty eight (38) additional weeks of clinical training beyond her medical school rotations and first post-graduate year residency. Those weeks of training include thirty three (33) weeks at Universal Medical Center which is an approved osteopathic medical training program that was accepted by the California Licensing Agency for purposes of Petitioner's remedial clinical work. Licensure Applications Petitioner passed the FLEX exam in June, 1982 with a score of 78. She also passed the ECFMG exam in January, of 1982 with a score of 76. In addition, she passed an oral examination administered by the California State Licensing Board in 1988. After graduating from CETEC in June 1982, Petitioner initiated efforts to obtain licensure in several states. In her initial attempts at licensure, Petitioner submitted several misleading applications which have backfired into a morass of complications and confusion. In 1982, Petitioner knowingly submitted a fraudulent application to the State of Oregon. Petitioner filed the application with the Oregon licensing authority in order to take the Federal Licensing Examination known as the FLEX. Oregon was one of the few states which allowed applicants to take the FLEX examination prior to graduation and also granted applicants some choice in the location of the exam. Petitioner took the FLEX in the Virgin Islands in June of 1982. This was the nearest location to the Dominican Republic where she was attending graduation ceremonies at CETEC around the same time. On the application to take the FLEX exam filed with Oregon, Petitioner falsely stated that she attended AUC from May, 1979 to April, 1981. She actually attended AUC from May, 1980 through April, 1981. In the early part of 1983, Petitioner submitted applications for licensure to South Carolina, California, Georgia, New Mexico, and Florida. South Carolina determined that Petitioner was not eligible for licensure in that state because she had not completed the required post-graduate training. Her application for licensure in that state was returned without action. In her applications to Georgia, California and Florida in 1983, Petitioner misrepresented her attendance at CETEC as having commenced in May, 1979 rather than reporting attendance at AUC starting in May, 1980 and ending in May, 1981 when she transferred to CETEC. Petitioner admits that she falsely stated that she began her medical education in May, 1979 on the Oregon FLEX application, as well as the California, Georgia and 1983 Florida applications. In an attempt to justify these false statements, Petitioner points out that the Dean from CETEC had issued a letter to these licensing agencies stating that Petitioner had completed eight (8) semesters at CETEC from 1979 to 1982. Petitioner claims she completed the misleading applications because she wanted her statements to be consistent with the CETEC Dean's certification of attendance. It would appear that an additional motivation for falsifying the applications was to avoid having to explain that she had received medical education credit for some of her non-medical course work at the University of Chicago approximately ten years earlier. It is unclear why the Dean's certification letters were not accurate. While no evidence was presented to directly link Petitioner to the issuance of these incorrect Dean's letters, the shady circumstances surrounding her involvement with Pedro de Mesones around this same time period (discussed in Findings of Fact 87-95 below) leads to an inference that Petitioner was at least indirectly responsible for these misleading letters. In her February 1983 application to New Mexico, Petitioner accurately stated the dates and locations of her medical school education. No adequate explanation was given as to why the correct dates were listed on this 1983 application but not the other applications filed around the same time in Georgia, Florida and California. Petitioner listed the correct dates of attendance at AUC and CETEC on her 1984 Florida application and the 1988 filing which are discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 69-72 below. Georgia and New Mexico granted Petitioner licensure based upon the 1983 applications. California initially denied her licensure. However, as described in Findings of Fact 47-51 below, Petitioner challenged that decision. Florida permitted Petitioner to withdraw her 1983 Application rather than go to hearing on the Board's intent to deny licensure. See Findings of Fact 67-68. Petitioner's application for licensure in California was filed in the Spring of 1983. Petitioner received a letter in April of 1983 returning her application without action. Petitioner requested reconsideration of her application which, eventually, resulted in a proposed order of denial dated June 9, 1986. Petitioner requested a hearing on that proposed denial. The proposed denial was resolved without hearing by a stipulation between Petitioner and the California licensing agency in an order dated November 5, 1987 (the "California Stipulation"). The stipulated findings of fact in the November 5, 1987 California Stipulation recognize that the application filed by Petitioner in March, 1983 remained pending without action until the 1987 California Stipulation was entered. The California Stipulation notes that the proposed denial of her application in 1986 was based on the grounds that: (a) Petitioner had not listed on her application her attendance at AUC; (b) she had falsely stated under oath that she began her medical education at CETEC beginning in May, 1979; and (c) her medical education did not conform to California requirements. The California Stipulation provides that it supersedes the reasons set forth in the 1986 proposed denial so long as Dr. Chambers abides by the terms of the Stipulation. The California Stipulation makes no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner. The California Stipulation provides that Petitioner would be issued a license to practice medicine in California upon completion of remedial medical education specified in the Stipulation, completion of an additional academic year of clinical training before September, 1990, satisfactory proof of certification by CONES, and passage of an oral examination. The California Stipulation also provides that Petitioner shall take forty (40) hours of continuing medical education within the first two (2) years of licensure in addition to the continuing education classes statutorily required for licensure in California. Petitioner was issued her license to practice medicine in California on November 11, 1988 demonstrating that she satisfied the requirements of the November 1987 California Stipulation. In her application to the State of Georgia in June of 1983, the Petitioner specifically represented that she attended CETEC from May of 1979 to April 1980, attended AUC from April, 1980 to May, 1981 and CETEC again from April 1981 through June, 1982. The Dean of CETEC certified to the Georgia licensing agency that Petitioner enrolled in the school of medicine in May, 1979 and attended eight semesters of 4.2 months each. As discussed in Findings of Fact 43, the basis for this certification by the Dean is unclear. Petitioner obtained a license to practice medicine in Georgia based on her 1983 application and did in fact practice medicine in that state from January, 1984 to August, 1984. On August 17, 1984 the Georgia State Board of Medical Examiners issued a Notice of Hearing to Petitioner setting forth charges against her including failure to meet the standards for licensure and/or intentionally making false statements in obtaining a license to practice medicine. The charges also included an allegation that Petitioner "was denied a license by the Board of Medical Quality Assurance of the State of California based on evidence of making false statements on a sworn application and submitting false and/or inaccurate certificates of education to obtain a license to practice in that state." In fact, in 1984 the California licensing authority had not formally denied Petitioner's application for licensure. The proposed denial of Petitioner's California application was pending, but not acted upon. Indeed, a formal denial of her California application was never finalized. Instead, the issues were resolved by the California Stipulation in November, 1987. On September 22, 1984, Petitioner executed a "Voluntary Surrender" which was approved by the Georgia State Board of Medical Examiners and served as the final order of that agency with respect to the Notice of Hearing discussed in Findings of Fact 54. By voluntarily surrendering her license to practice medicine in Georgia, Petitioner waived her right to a hearing on the charges contained in the Notice of Hearing. The first paragraph of the "Voluntary Surrender" states: "I hereby acknowledge that this surrender shall have the same effect as revocation of my license, and I knowingly forfeit and relinquish all right, title and privilege of practicing medicine in the State of Georgia, unless and until such time as my license may be reinstated, in the sole discretion of the Board." Notwithstanding this language, Petitioner contends the "Voluntary Surrender" should be distinguished from a revocation because she did not admit to any wrongdoing and because she was allowed to seek reinstatement upon application and demonstration of the ability to safely practice medicine. The Voluntary Surrender of the Georgia license contains no specific findings of fact or conclusions of law that establish any wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner. The "Voluntary Surrender" states that Petitioner did not admit to any wrongdoing and it allows Petitioner to seek reinstatement. The Executive Director of the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners of Georgia certified to the Florida Board of Medicine on August 2, 1988, that Petitioner's Georgia license had been issued in 8/83, surrendered in 9/84 and that license had not been "suspended or revoked." Thus, while disciplinary action was clearly initiated against Respondent in Georgia, her license was not revoked. Petitioner was licensed to practice medicine in the State of New Mexico in November, 1983. On January 10, 1985, the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners served on Petitioner a Notice of Contemplated Action notifying her of charges including having made misrepresentations in applying for and procuring a license to practice medicine in New Mexico and having her license in Georgia revoked. The New Mexico case was referred to a hearing officer who considered argument and briefs by the parties regarding the nature and effect of Petitioner's surrender of her Georgia license. By an order of the New Mexico State Board of Medical Examiners, Petitioner's New Mexico medical license was revoked in January, 1986. The New Mexico order of revocation treated Petitioner's voluntary surrender of her Georgia medical license as the functional equivalent of a revocation for purposes of the New Mexico licensing statute. In reaching this determination, the New Mexico Board relied upon the wording of the Voluntary Surrender and the Georgia Statutes which both indicate that a voluntary surrender shall have the same effect as revocation. No other specific grounds were cited by the New Mexico Board in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order. As indicated above, Petitioner's initial application to the Florida Board of Medicine (the "Board") for licensure was filed March, 1983. When the Board proposed denial, Petitioner requested a formal hearing. Prior to hearing, the Board obtained leave from the hearing officer to amend the basis for denial to include grounds relating to information presented to the Board by U.S. Postal Service investigators regarding Petitioner's truthfulness on her application form and the validity of certain documents she utilized in her attempt to obtain a Florida medical license. The Board was granted leave to amend as requested by order dated February 20, 1984. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed with the hearing officer a motion to withdraw her application because of the new information presented from the "federal investigation." The Board granted the request to withdraw the 1983 Application in an order rendered May 29, 1984. The Board's proposed denial of Petitioner's 1983 Application was on the basis that the Board had reason to believe that Petitioner, "as a graduate of CETEC, was not capable of safely engaging in the practice of medicine as a result of a report of the California Board of Medical Quality Assurance which indicated gross irregularities in the degree granting process of CETEC University and which raised serious doubts about the adequacy of medical education certified by CETEC." Petitioner filed with the Board a second application for licensure in Florida in December of 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the 1984 Application.) In response to a request for additional information from the Board regarding this second application, Petitioner executed a waiver of the requirement that the Board act upon the application within 90 days. As a result, the 1984 Application was left pending. The 1984 Application was for licensure by endorsement based upon Petitioner's license in New Mexico. As discussed in Findings of Fact 62-66, action was initiated against that New Mexico license in January, 1985 ultimately leading to the revocation of the license in January, 1986. After her New Mexico license was revoked, Petitioner did not hold a valid license to practice medicine in any other state until California issued her a license in November, 1988. On August 1, 1988, Petitioner filed another application with the Board as an update to the 1984 Application. (This August 1988 application is referred to as the "1988 Filing.") In her 1988 Filing, Petitioner included a recertification from ECFMG. At the time she filed her 1984 Florida application, Petitioner's original ECFMG certification had been placed on hold because of the CETEC scandal. Petitioner was required to provide a revalidation of her medical education by ECFMG in order to obtain consideration of her application in Florida. This revalidation was not provided until the 1988 Filing. On September 12, 1988, Petitioner filed a supplement to the 1988 Filing. On November 2, 1988 the Board requested additional information relating to the application. On December 12, 1988 Petitioner filed a response to this request. The Board issued an Order of Intent to Deny on March 3, 1989 stating as grounds for denial in Paragraph 2: You have had licenses in Georgia, New Mexico and California acted against by the licensing bodies of those states. See, Subsections 458.331(1)(b) and 458.311(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1988). The only year of training you received was in 1982-1983 at Holston Valley Community Hospital and the Kingsport Family Practice Center through the auspices of East Tennessee State University Quillen-Dishner College of Medicine. You were recommended less than favorably by both hospitals and you were not permitted to return for a second year of residency training by the College of Medicine. Your poor performance in your only year of medical training evidences your inability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. See, Sections 458.301 and 458.331(4), Florida Statutes (1988). There are material discrepancies between answers and information provided in your 3 different applications and supporting documents submitted to the Board; and you have provided fraudulent information and misrepresented or concealed information regarding your medical education. See Subsections 458.311(1)(c) and 458.331(1)(a) and (hh), Florida Statutes (1988). Inconsistencies in the Application There are several discrepancies between Petitioner's 1983 Florida Application, her 1984 Application, and her 1988 Filing. On the 1984 Application, Petitioner reported her participation in the Unsanctioned Rotation at Sharp Memorial Hospital from December 20, 1980 to January 10, 1981 as part of her clinical clerkships. The Unsanctioned Rotation is not listed on the 1988 Filing. Petitioner contends that it was not until after submission of the 1984 Application that she found out that CONES refused to recognize the clerkships taken in 1980 because Petitioner was not enrolled as a student at CETEC at the time. Therefore, Petitioner deleted those unapproved clerkship weeks from the 1988 Filing. However, while specific reference to the clerkship was deleted in 1988, Petitioner admitted at the hearing that she counted the Unsanctioned Rotation as part of sixty (60) weeks of clerkships claimed in the 1988 Filing. The 1988 Filing states Petitioner completed sixty (60) weeks of clinical clerkships as part of her medical education at CETEC. However, as discussed in Findings of Fact 13 through 18, Petitioner's submitted a CONES verification of clinical rotations that only details fifty six (56) weeks (including duplicate and overlapping credit) of clinical clerkships. In the 1988 Filing, Petitioner did report the actions taken against her medical licenses in Georgia and New Mexico and mentioned her problems obtaining licensure in California. On the 1984 Application, Petitioner responded to the question "Have you ever been notified to appear before any licensing agency for a hearing on a complaint of any nature, including, but not limited to, a charge or violation of the medical practice act, unprofessional or unethical conduct?" by stating "after my voluntary surrender, notice of hearing in Georgia, [sic] charging denial and Flafalse documents re licensure (both false)." Both the Notice of Hearing and the Voluntary Surrender in Georgia were issued prior to the completion of Petitioner's 1984 Florida Application. Thus, while Petitioner did disclose the voluntary surrender, she only provided a brief and somewhat misleading explaination. The 1984 Application does not mention Petitioner's application in South Carolina (which was returned without action) nor does it discuss Petitioner's licensure difficulties in California other than to say she had been denied a license because of "informal deficiencies." The 1984 Application also omits Petitioner's licensure problems in New Mexico which is understandable since the Notice of Contemplated Action in that case was not filed until January, 1985. The application form requires the applicant to list all universities or colleges where the applicant "took classes/received training." Petitioner listed her training at the University of Kansas, Wesley Medical Center under the medical education section of her 1984 Application. In the 1984 application, she refers to it as a "externship". That position is also listed in the medical education section of the 1988 Filing with an explanation indicating that she was not actually a resident. As discussed in Findings of Fact 30, her position at the Wesley Medical Center is not easily described due to the unusual circumstances that led to her participating in the program. She was repeating clerkships in certain areas in accordance with the stipulation reached with the California licensing agency. Although Petitioner was not officially enrolled in classes or a residency program in that position, she considers it as part of her medical education and training and, therefore, listed it as such. In her 1984 Application, Petitioner listed time spent at Jackson Memorial Hospital (University of Miami) and Wesley Medical Center (Unversity of Kansas) on a sheet entitled graduate and post-graduate education. On her 1988 Filing, she listed both positions as post-graduate training. Both of these positions were actually house staff positions rather than part of the training programs of the affiliated medical schools. In the 1984 Application, Petitioner listed her dates of training at the Wesley Medical Center as October, 1984 to April 1985 (which was her projected completion date.) The 1984 Application was filled out and filed with the Board in December 1984, four months prior to the projected completion date of the Wesley position. In the 1988 Filing, Petitioner listed her actual completion date of March, 1985, which was approximately two weeks earlier than the projected completion date referred to in the 1984 Application. From January 1984 to August 1984, Petitioner worked for Spectrum Emergency Care in emergency rooms and free-standing clinics in Georgia. Petitioner listed different dates of service with Spectrum on the 1984 Application and the 1988 Filing. Petitioner contends the differences are due in part because the 1988 Filing included employment at Spectrum in New Mexico in December 1984 and January 1985 after submission of the 1984 Application. However, the 1988 Filing states that Petitioner was continuously employed by Spectrum from January 1984 - January 1985. In fact, she was not employed during the months of August, September, October and November, 1984. Moreover, her employment with Spectrum in New Mexico in December, 1984 and January, 1985 overlaps with her "externship" at the Wesley Medical Center/University of Kansas which took place from October, 1984 through March, 1985. Apparently, this overlap was possible because her work for Spectrum in December, 1984 consisted of one weekend and a holiday and in January, 1985 consisted of one weekend. In sum, the 1988 Filing significantly overstates her actual experience with Spectrum. The 1988 Filing contains several inconsistent statements regarding Petitioner's employment as a ship's physician. Under the practice/employment section of that Filing, she states she was a ship's physician for SeaEscape from April, 1985 to September, 1985 and a ship's physician for Commodore Cruise Lines from February, 1986 to September, 1986. Later in the application, under postgraduate medical training and work experience, she states she was a Chief Medical Officer for cruise ships from April, 1985, through September, 1986. However, according to the previously cited information, for at least a four month period during that time frame, she was not employed. In another portion of her application, Petitioner lists under clinical medicine that she worked on the two ships from April, 1985 through September, 1987. Even assuming that there is a typographical error and Petitioner meant September, 1986 as indicated in the other listings, by deleting any reference to the four months that she was not employed, an impression is created that Petitioner has more clinical experience than was actually true. There is a conflict between the AUC transcript that Petitioner submitted with the 1988 Filing and earlier versions of the transcript that appear in her records. The course titles are consistent in the transcripts, but the numbers of some of the courses are different. Only the last digit of the course numbers are different. Whether a course is listed in the 100 series, 200 series and 300 series is consistent in all of the transcripts. The series numbers reflect first semester, second semester and third semester courses respectively. The AUC transcript submitted with the 1988 Filing was the most recent one obtained by Petitioner from AUC. That transcript was prepared in June, 1986 and reflects a failing grade in the neurosciences course. However, as discussed in Finding of Fact 4, that grade was changed to a passing grade as reflected in a 1981 transcript from AUC which was submitted to CETEC when Petitioner transferred to that school. No adequate explanation has been given to explain why the 1986 AUC transcript is not consistent with the earlier one. Postal Investigation The confusing circumstances surrounding Petitioner's medical education are further complicated by her involvement with Pedro de Mesones. The circumstances surrounding her involvement with Pedro de Mesones have not been fully explained. While Pedro de Mesones' exact status or position is unclear, Petitioner believed him to be a representative of CETEC. He has subsequently been convicted of mail fraud in connection with selling medical diplomas and has been sentenced to a federal prison term. Between July, 1981 and January, 1982, while Petitioner was conducting her clinical rotations in San Diego, she attempted to get information and documentation from CETEC, but she had trouble getting responses to her repeated telephone calls, letters and telegrams. Petitioner sought the help of Pedro de Mesones in getting cooperation and/or responses from CETEC regarding transcripts and other documents necessary for the loan applications and residency applications which she had to file prior to her anticipated medical school graduation date of June, 1982. Another reason Petitioner hired Pedro de Mesones was to get confirmation that CETEC would give her credit towards her medical degree for her prior work on her Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. These credits were necessary for Petitioner to graduate in June of 1982 as she anticiapted. Petitioner was advised by others familiar with the school that Pedro de Mesones could help her in her dealings with CETEC. She first contacted Pedro de Mesones by telephone in February, 1982. She agreed to pay him a total of more than $8,000 for his services. Petitioner explains her payments to Pedro de Mesones as a $3000 fee, plus the next two (2) semester's tuition payments totaling an additional $5000.00 plus a $100.00 graduation fee. Pedro de Mesones advised Petitioner that she had to pay CETEC's tuition totalling $5,000 for two (2) additional semesters even though she did not have to take any classes at CETEC because she was given credit for her work at the University of Chicago. At one point during her dealings with Pedro de Mesones, Petitioner signed a false transcript from a Mexican medical school at Pedro de Mesones' request. This transcript reflected work which Petitioner never completed. No adequate explanation was given as to why these false transcripts were ever prepared. While Petitioner contends that she asked Pedro de Mesones not to use the false Mexican transcript for any purpose, it appears that these transcripts were prepared in the event that Petitioner could not secure two semesters credit from CETEC for her Ph.D. work at the University of Chicago. Ultimately, CETEC decided to give her credit for some of the Ph.D. course work she completed at the University of Chicago. As a result, Petitioner was able to graduate in June of 1982 from CETEC without having to use the false Mexican transcripts. It does not appear that the fraudulent Mexican transcript were ever used by Petitioner in any of her applications. Petitioner provided Pedro de Mesones with two false transcripts regarding her AUC medical education. It is clear that she intended for him to use those transcripts, if necessary, to get a dean's certification from CETEC. One of the false AUC transcripts she prepared made its way into the records of CETEC. It is not clear how CETEC obtained that transcript. Because Petitioner was given credit for her graduate work at the University of Chicago, she did not need the extra credits reflected on the false AUC transcripts. Petitioner subsequently wrote the Dean of CETEC requesting removal of the false AUC transcript after she saw it in her CETEC records during a visit to CETEC to obtain a letter from the Dean showing her to be in good standing. Petitioner asked Pedro de Mesones to provide her with letters signed by the CETEC Dean showing her to be in good standing and on track for graduation in June, 1982. She intended to use these letters in applying for licensure for residency programs. Petitioner felt that she was on track to graduate and indicated to Pedro de Mesones that because of time pressures, she felt it would be acceptable for him to forge the signature of the Dean on the letters required by the various state licensing agencies. However, there is no indication that he did so. While none of the false transcripts prepared by Petitioner were directly submitted by her in any of the applications for licensure filed with any state licensing authorities, it is clear the Dean's certification letters included in Petitioner's 1983 Applications in some of the states were false. See Findings of Fact 39-44. No direct connection has been drawn between the false Dean's certification letters submitted with Petitioner's applications in Georgia and California and Pedro de Mesones. However, the circumstances surrounding Petitioner's dealings with Pedro de Mesones raise a question as to how the certifications were obtained. More importantly, it is clear that Petitioner was aware that the representations contained in the Dean's certifications and the dates of attendance at medical school listed on her 1983 Applications were false. Nevertheless, she still submitted the applications. Petitioner's dealings with Pedro de Mesones ended on June 14, 1982, two days after her graduation ceremonies at CETEC. Practice Experience Petitioner has at various times practiced medicine in Georgia and New Mexico prior to surrendering or losing her license in those states. She has also worked on cruise ships as a ship's doctor for several months. She is currently licensed and practicing in California. She has been licensed in that state since November, 1988. She has practiced emergency medicine at various hospitals and has been practicing as a primary care physician for Castle Air Force Base in California since December 1988. There is no indication that she has been deficient in carrying our her professional duties in any of these positions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medical Examiners enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a physician in the State of Florida subject to a probationary period of two years upon such terms and conditions as the Board deems appropriate. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of July, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. To the extent that the proposed findings of fact can be isolated, they are addressed below. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37, 46-50 and 67. 2. Aubored in substance in Findings of Fact 67 and 68. 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 70. 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 71. 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 72. Adopted in substance in the preliminary statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2-4 and 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. Suborindate to Findings of Fact 6 and 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 96. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11 and 33. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87 and 88. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 88. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 89. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 90-94. The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 94. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 95. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 36 and 39- 42. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 45. The first sentence is adopted in Findings of Fact 87. The remainder is rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-66. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 50. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 51. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 54. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 55. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 57, 59-60. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 58. Suborindate to Findings of Fact 61. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 62-66. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20-30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22 and 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25-26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24 and 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 74. See proposed findings 26-30 above. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 79-80. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 81. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 82-83. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 83. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 77. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 84. Addressed in Findings of Fact 12-18. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12-19. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 18. Subordinate to indings of Fact 35. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44. Subordinate to Fndings of Fact 46-52 and 67- 68. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78. Subordinate to Findings of 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 70. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76, 77 and 78. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 71. Adopted in substance in Findings of 72. 26. Adopted in substance in the preliminary statement. 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. 28. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 54. 30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 56. 31. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 78. 32. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 63. 33. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 65. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-51. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24-26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 25. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 31 and 79- 81. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12 and 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87-95. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 97. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87-95. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47-68. Rejected as constituting argument. Rejected as constituting argument. Copies furnished: Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire Attorney at Law 1355 Mahan Drive P. O. Box 31 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1602 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
