Findings Of Fact In 1975 the Florida Legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Reform Act, Chapter 75-9, Laws of Florida, now codified in Chapter 768, Florida Statutes. Part of this legislative package included the creation of the Fund. This legislation was passed in response to a medical malpractice insurance crisis which arose when the primary underwriter for the Florida Medical Association sought to stop issuing medical malpractice policies in Florida, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for physicians or hospitals to obtain medical malpractice insurance coverage at reasonable rates. As a result of this problem, many physicians began to practice defensive medicine, curtail or abandon their practices or practice without coverage of any kind. The Fund is a private not-for-profit organization, participation in which is totally voluntary for its member health care providers. Insofar as Petitioners are concerned, membership in the Fund is but one of several options available to provide legally required evidence of financial responsibility in order to obtain licensure as a hospital facility in Florida. In fact, of the approximately 260 hospitals in Florida, only 125 satisfy their financial responsibility requirement via membership in the Fund. Physicians, hospitals, health maintenance organizations and ambulatory surgical centers who become members of the Fund must maintain at least $100,000 in primary professional liability insurance. Membership in the Fund grants to each participant a limitation of liability above the $100,000 in primary coverage. To the extent that any settlement or judgment exceeds the primary coverage of the participant, it is paid by the Fund without limitation. The Fund is operated subject to the supervision and approval of a board of governors whose membership is required by law to consist of representatives of the insurance industry, the legal and medical professions, physicians' insurers, hospitals, hospitals' insurers and the general public. The Department is charged by statute with certain regulatory functions concerning the Fund. The base fee for Fund membership is set by statute at $500 for physicians, after an initial $1,000 enrollment fee for the first year of participation, and at $300 per bed for hospital members. The statute requires the Department to set additional fees based upon the classifications of health care providers contained in the statute. In the event that base fees are insufficient to pay all claims asserted against the Fund for a given Fund year, the Department is empowered, upon request of the Board of Governors of the Fund, to order additional assessments against Fund participants to meet any such deficiency. Under the original legislation, all classes of health care providers could be assessed unlimited amounts to make up any deficiencies. As a result of legislative amendments in 1976, however, the amount which participants, other than hospitals, could be assessed was limited to the amount each Fund member had paid to join the Fund for that particular coverage year. 1976 legislative amendments also required that each fiscal year of the Fund be operated independently of preceding fiscal years, and further required that occurrences giving rise to claims in a particular Fund year be paid only from fees or investment income on these fees collected for that particular year. Thus, it is entirely possible for the Fund to experience deficits in a given year, and yet hold surplus funds for other years. The dispute in these consolidated proceedings arises from assessments for deficits incurred for the Fund years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979. Each of the hospitals named as Petitioners in the Petition for Administrative Proceedings in Case No. 82-776 were members of the Fund during the Fund year 1977-1978. Each of the hospitals named in the style and listed on Exhibit "A" to the Amendment to Petition for Administrative Proceedings in Case Nos. 82-530 and 82-571 were members of the Fund during the Fund year 1978-1979. On October 31, 1981, the Fund certified to the Department a deficiency in the amount of $1,350,672 for the Fund year 1977-1978. On January 18, 1982, the Fund certified to the Department an additional deficiency for the Fund year 1977-1978 in the amount of $1,759,591. On January 18, 1982, the Fund certified to the Department a deficiency of $13,935,927 for the Fund year 1978-1979. On January 13, 1982, the Department issued an "order" assessing various classes of health care providers the deficiency originally certified by the Fund for the Fund year 1977-1978. The "order" of January 13, 1982, was amended by the "order" of February 1, 1982, for the Fund year 1977-1973. The amended order contained the same dollar amount of assessments, but altered the amount charged to various classes of Fund members. On February 17, 1982, the Department issued its "order" granting the second assessment for the Fund year 1977-1978. On January 22, 1982, the Department issued its "order" granting the assessment for the 1978-1979 Fund year. The Department has not promulgated any rules pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, pertaining to its regulation of or duties in conjunction with the Fund under Section 768.54, Florida Statutes. As members of the Fund, each of the Petitioners' interests are substantially affected by the Orders of January 13, 1982; January 22, 1982; February 1, 1982; and February 17, 1982. For the Fund year 1977-1978 the total assessment ordered by the Department is $3,110,263. The total assessment for the Fund year 1978-1979 is $13,935,972. For the Fund year 1977-1978, physicians and professional association members are proposed to be assessed $1,730,207. During the Fund year 1977-1978, hospital members paid into the Fund, exclusive of interest earned on the fees, the amount of $5,292,498. For the Fund year 1977-1978, physicians and professional association members paid into the Fund the sum of $2,326,541. For the Fund year 1978-1979, hospital members paid into the Fund, exclusive of interest earned on their fees, the sum of $5,627,553. Interest earned through December 31, 1981, on these fees is $1,725,845. For the Fund year 1978-1979, physicians and professional association members paid into the Fund, exclusive of interest earned on their fees, the sum of $2,411,205. Interest earned through December 31, 1981, on the fees contributed by physicians and professional associations is $739,463. For the Fund year 1977-1978, the proposed assessments against hospital members of the Fund is $1,374,827. For the Fund year 1978-1979, the Fund retained the services of an independent actuarial firm to study and recommend appropriate additional fees to charge its members. The following table reflects the statutory base fees, the fees recommended by the actuary, the fees sought by the Fund and the fees ordered by the Department of Insurance for the 1977-1978 Fund year. Base Fees Actuary's Additional Additional Paid Recommended Fees Fees Pursuant Additional Requested Ordered to Stat. Fees by FPCF By DOI Class I Physicians $ $ $ $ Dade/Broward Co. 500.00 2,233.00 2,233.00 -0- Rest of State 500.00 l,749.00 1,749.00 -0- Class II Physicians Dade/Broward Co. 500.00 4,420.00 4,420.00 -0- Rest of State 500.00 3,549.00 3,549.00 -0- Class III Physicians Dade/Broward Co. 500.00 12,619.00 12,619.00 -0- Rest of State 500.00 10,297.00 10,297.00 -0- Hospitals (per occupied bed) 300.00 222.00 222.00 -0- Ambiatory Surgical Centers -0- 22.00 22.00 -0- (per 100 patients) Health Maintenance Organizations -0- 150.00 150.00 -0- (per 100 subscribers) Professional -0- 20 percent of additional (SAME) -0- fee to be paid by each individual member For the Fund year 1978-1979, the Department made no independent actuarial study of the recommended fees proposed by the independent actuary employed by the Fund, and no member of the Casualty Actuarial Society evaluated the Fund's recommendations on behalf of the Department. The independent actuary employed by the Fund was the only actuary who presented any evidence at the hearing conducted by the Department on the Fund's fee increase request for the Fund year 1978-1979. Each year since the Fund year 1977-1979 the Fund has employed the services of an actuary who, among other things, projected the expected losses above the claims previously paid and reserves established for known claims. These expected losses are reported as IBNR ("incurred but not reported") for each Fund year. The IBNR projected by the actuary employed by the Fund in the most recent report (October 1981) for the Fund year 1977-1978 is $6,306,036, and for the Fund year 1978-1979 is $15,965,324. The Department computed the portion of the assessment to be paid by the different classes of health care providers for the Fund year 1977-1978 based upon an approach known as the "indicated rate method." It is concluded from the record that this method is the most feasible of all suggested alternatives under existing law for reflecting the statutory classifications and, at the same time, providing immediate funds necessary to meet all claims against the Fund. This method is represented by the following formula: The Department started with rates which should have been charged each class in 1981-1982. This is called the "indicated rate by class." (The indicated rates were taken from the October, 1980 report by the Fund actuary.) The Department then applied the following formula for each class: Indicated Rate by Class x Number of Members in the Class = Total indicated fees by Class Total Indicated Fees by Class - Total Indicated Fees for ALL Classes Percentage of Indicated Fees by Class. Percentage of Indicated Fee by Class x Total Expected Loss for ALL Classes Expected Loss by Class. (Expected loss is all losses for the fund year included claims previously paid, reserves established on claims asserted and IBNR (incurred but not reported) Expected Loss by Class - Actual Fees paid by Class = Potential Loss Assessment by Class. Potential Loss Assessment by Class - Potential Loss Assessment for ALL Classes Percentage of Potential Loss Assessment by Class. Percentage of Potential Loss Assessment by Class x Total Assessment to be Ordered by the DOI = Amount of Assessment by Class. The following chart shows the amount each class would have paid under the "indicated rate method" for the Fund year 1977-1978, and the amount actually proposed to be assessed in the "orders" of the Indicated Rate Assessment Department: Actual Assessment a) Class I Physicians $ 146,487.00 $ 138,000.00 b) Class II Physicians 213,502.00 438,297.00 c) Class III Physicians 2,195,383.00 813,048.00 d) Hospitals 521,560.00 1,374,827.00 e) HMO 614.00 Surgical Centers 1,381.00 79,953.00 Professional Associations 28,336.00 Based upon the "indicated rate method" and based upon the application of Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, employed by the Department, assessments for the Fund year 1977-1978 which would otherwise be attributable to physician members of the Fund in the approximate amount of $1,500,000 were not charged to any class of physician. Based upon the "indicated rate method" and based upon the application of Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, employed by the Department, assessments for the Fund year 1978-1979 otherwise attributable to physician members of the Fund in the approximate amount of $9,000,000 were not charged to any class of physicians. The assessments described in the "orders" of the Department for the Fund year 1977-1978 which could not be applied to physician members, based upon the Department's interpretation of Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, were spread among the other classes of health care providers based upon their percentage of "expected losses." The Petitioners in this case, each of whom are members of the Fund, consist of 30 government hospitals, 43 private, nonprofit hospitals, and seven private, for-profit hospitals. During the Fund years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979, the Fund consisted of the following classes and numbers of members: 1977-1978 1978-1979 a) Class I Physicians 1392 1516 b) Class II Physicians 814 971 c) Class III Physicians 1584 1690 d) Hospitals 120 130 e) HMO 2 3 f) Surgical Centers 11 14 g) Professional Associations 572 855 The "orders" of the Department dated January 13, 1982; January 22, 1982; February 1, 1982; and February 17, 1982, were the first time any member of the Fund has been assessed under Section 768.54, Florida Statutes. The fees paid into the Fund; the investment income earned through December 31, 1981, on such fees; the expenses incurred through December 31, 1981; the amounts paid on claims through December 31, 1981; reserves established through and the IBNR for each Fund year for 1975-1976 through 1980-1981 are reflected on the table on page 10a. (IBNR figures are projections of future losses prepared by the Fund's actuary in October 1981.) The rates applicable to physicians and hospital members of the Fund for the years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 were the base fees provided in Section 768.54, Florida Statutes. No additional fees were set for those Fund years. The rate order for the 1978-1979 year entered by the Department on June 9, 1978, was not appealed. The Fund in fact experienced deficits in both Fund years in controversy in this proceeding. The Fund certified to the Department the amount of its projected deficit for the years in question. The amount of money ultimately certified by the Fund to the Department accurately reflects the amounts derived from the following formula: FUND YEAR: 1975-1976 1976-1977 1977-1978 FEES PAID $2,928,672 $6,303,257 $7,467,605 INTEREST EARNED 1,475,41 3,000,118 2,592,179 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES (54,846) (95,002) (148,113) NET FUNDS AVAILABLE 4,349,227 9,208,373 9,911,671 TO PAY LOSSES LOSSES PAID TO DATE (3,004,273) (6,869,395) (8,271,696) INDEMNITY EXPENSES (300,334) (343,433) (391,858) RESERVED LOSSES (971,733) (4,249,604) (3,663,348) RESERVED EXPENSES (57,584) (111,466) (172,869) PRESENT SURPLUS/DEFICIT (14,697) (2,365,525) (2,588,100) LOSSES INCURRED NOT YET REPORTED (IBNR) (AS OF 6/30/81) (1,189,136) (3,878,887) (7,970,235) FUND YEAR: 1978-1979 1979-1980 1980-1981 FEES PAID $8,060,374 $9,836,157 $11,225,275 INTEREST EARNED 2,543,698 2,589,547 1,882,319 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES (128,556) (279,838) (406,641) NET FUNDS AVAILABLE 10,475,506 12,145,866 12,700,953 TO PAY LOSSES LOSSES PAID TO DATE (9,760,650) (3,410,358) (37,500) INDEMNITY EXPENSES (532,197) (206,616) (32,619) RESERVED LOSSES (13,782,271) (6,445,000) (3,750,000) RESERVED EXPENSES (267,932) (342,787) (114,417) PRESENT SURPLUS/DEFICIT (13,867,544) (1,741,105) (8,766,417) LOSSES INCURRED NOT YET (14,979,237) (28,295,428) (51,500,564) REPORTED (IBNR) (AS OF 6/30/81) FUND YEAR: TOTALS FEES PAID $45,821,340 INTEREST EARNED 14,083,262 ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES (1,113,006) NET FUNDS AVAILABLE 58,791,596 TO PAY LOSSES LOSSES PAID TO DATE (31,353,872) INDEMNITY EXPENSES (1,837,057) RESERVED LOSSES (32,861,956) RESERVED EXPENSES (1,067,055) PRESENT SURPLUS/DEFICIT (8,328,344) LOSSES INCURRED NOT YET (107,813,487) REPORTED (IBNR) (AS OF 6/30/81) Total fees paid during the Fund Year + Investment Income attributable to the Fund Year Expenses allocated to that Fund Year Amount paid on claims for that Fund Year Amount reserved for all known claims for that Fund Year. The Department entered orders levying the assessments on January 13, 1982; January 22, 1982; February 1, 1982; and February 17, 1982. The parties to this proceeding stipulated that the assessments entered by the Department for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 are to be considered to be proposed agency action as to such parties. The Department limited the amount assessed against any physician member to an amount equal to the annual membership fee paid by the physician for the year giving use to the assessment. According to the "orders" of the Department for the Fund year 1977- 1978, Class III physicians' share of the assessment, based upon the assessment formula utilized, was in excess of the amount of membership fees paid by that group, and the balance was spread over the rest of the classes of health care providers. According to the "orders" of the Department for the Fund year 1978- 1979, Class I, II, and III physicians' share of the assessment, based upon the assessment formula utilized, was in excess of the amount of membership fees paid by those groups, and the balance was spread among those health care providers described in Section 768.54(1)(b)l.,5.,6., and 7., Florida Statutes. The Department, by order dated June 9, 1978, denied the Fund's request for additional fees for the year 1978-1979. In April 1981, at the request of the Department, the Fund filed a "Retrospective Rating Plan." This plan provided that at such time as the Fund dropped below 25 percent of the original fees paid in any fund year an assessment would be triggered. The plan further provided for the assessment to be based upon all settlements or final judgments entered but unpaid at the time of the assessment, and all reserves established by the Fund at the time of the assessment. This "Retrospective Rating Plan" was approved by the Department, but not adopted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Although the Fund sought to amend the plan both before and after the assessments now at issue, the original plan remained in effect at all times material to this cause. Although Petitioners have not disputed the amount of the reserves set by the Fund, such reserves constitute a substantial portion of the assessment amounts requested by the Fund. The Department has not made any evaluation of the accuracy of the case reserves, nor has the Department made any analysis of the method employed by the Fund in setting case reserves. There was some evidence that the cash shortages experienced by the Fund for the Fund years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 may have been caused in part by the manner in which the Fund has paid claims. In 1976 the Florida Legislature limited the amount which the Fund could payout on claims to $100,000 per person, per year. In addition, the law provides that reasonable attorneys' fees and costs shall be paid to a successful claimant within the first 90 days following a judgment or settlement. In most instances, the Fund does not inquire into the fee arrangement between plaintiffs and their attorneys. Moreover, no claim for attorneys' fees is required to be submitted to the Fund or the trial court to set a reasonable percent fee for such services. The Fund has indicated that for claims paid for the Fund years 1977-1978 and 1978-1979, the Fund simply assumed that attorneys' fees and costs equalled 40 percent of the amount of the settlement or judgment. In most cases, the Fund does not consider any portion of the attorneys' fees as having been paid by the primary insurance carrier. In some instances, it appears that payments made by the Fund may have disregarded the $100,000 per person, per year payout limitation, and in other instances the Fund has been ordered to pay amounts in excess of the statutory limit and has not pursued an appeal of such orders. In still other instances the Fund has purchased annuities to fund settlements or judgments, the cost of which annuities exceeded the $100,000 payout limitation. The Fund does not consider such payments to be subject to the payout limitation although no rights of ownership in the annuities are retained by the Fund. It is possible that the cumulative effect of these practices has been significant. Petitioners adduced evidence estimating "excess payments" by the Fund for 1977-1978 over the statutory limit could be as high as $2,684,737. For the Fund year 1978-1979 these "excess payments" could be as high as $4,827,690. Under the Department's application of Section 768.54, Florida Statutes, no physician member will again be assessed for the Fund years 1977- 1978 and 1978-1979. Yet, based upon the latest estimates by the Fund's consulting actuary, additional claims for those two years which have not yet been reported could reach as high as $22,949,472. Under the Department's construction of the statute, hospital members will have to pay all of these additional losses, if the actuary's projections prove correct.
Findings Of Fact In March 1988 Ilene Lieberman (Lieberman) was elected Mayor of the City of Lauderhill (City). She defeated the incumbent mayor, David Kaminsky (Kaminsky), in a very hard fought election. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Lieberman served as the City's mayor. On or about December 31, 1991, Kaminsky filed an ethics complaint ("Complaint") with the Commission on Ethics (Commission) against Lieberman, alleging that she violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. The Complaint consisted of the following four parts: Kaminsky claimed that Lieberman had expended over $40,000 for "personal legal fees to defend herself" in an action brought before the Commission by Michael Arciola. Kaminsky alleged that the expenditure of these funds was in violation of Sections 19-51(b)(2) and (h) and 2-141(b) of the City Code of Ordinances ("City Code"). Kaminsky claimed that Lieberman violated Article III, Section 3.05, of the City Charter by sponsoring and passing Ordinance Nos. 89-197 and 91-90 which granted ten percent increases in compensation for the City Council. Kaminsky claimed Lieberman violated Article V, Section 5.02(d), of the City Charter by passing Ordinance No. 91-109, which provides sick leave and vacation pay for the mayor. Kaminsky claimed that Lieberman used City stationery and City personnel for correspondence that did not deal with City business. On or about February 27, 1992, Kaminsky filed an amendment to the Complaint which restated and clarified the portion of the Complaint which dealt with the issue of use of City stationery for letters unrelated to City business. Kaminsky stated that the letters were dictated, typed and reproduced on City time and using City equipment. He also indicated that the letters were typed by a City employee, Rusty Roberts. On or about April 14, 1992, Kaminsky filed a second amendment to the Complaint concerning the ordinance increasing the pay for the City Council and the ordinance providing sick and vacation pay for the mayor. With regard to the two ten percent pay increases for the City Council, Kaminsky stated, "whereas the Charter . . . specifically limited a compensation increase to the 'U.S. Consumer Price Index for the month prior to the preparation of the annual budget' . . . at the time Ordinance No. 89-197 and Ordinance No. 91-90 were passed, the controlling C.P.I.'s were below 10 percent, being 4.7 in 1989 and 3.7 in 1991." With regard to the mayor's vacation and sick pay, Kaminsky stated that the City Charter provided that no ordinance increasing the salary of the mayor shall take effect unless it has been one year since the last salary increase and that no ordinance shall increase the mayor's salary more than ten percent. Kaminsky further stated that on March 4, 1991, the mayor had received a ten percent salary increase and that on April 8, 1991, the mayor was authorized to receive sick pay and vacation pay "which effectively surpasses the 10 percent maximum salary increase in any one year." Along with the second amendment, Kaminsky provided the Commission with the two letters purportedly typed by City personnel on City time. On June 30, 1992, Kaminsky filed two additional amendments to the Complaint. In the third amendment, Kaminsky advised the Commission that on January 27, 1992, the City had enacted Ordinance No. 92-106, which revised Section 19-51(b) of the City Code. Kaminsky claimed that this section was previously used as authority to hire a private attorney to represent Lieberman in the Arciola ethics complaint. In the fourth amendment, Kaminsky advised that on May 26, 1992, the City passed on second reading Ordinance No. 92-143, revising Section 19-51(h) of the City Code to state that the employment of outside counsel pursuant to that section would not be subject to City Council approval as required in Section 2-141(b) of the City Code. Kaminsky alleged that this amendment clearly indicated that Lieberman knew that she was violating the City Code when outside counsel was hired in the Arciola matter. Furthermore, Kaminsky alleged that Lieberman further violated that City Code when outside counsel was hired to represent her in an elections complaint on May 11, 1992. LEGAL FEES IN THE ARCIOLA CASE In 1990 Lieberman was notified that Michael Arciola had filed an ethics complaint against her. When Lieberman presented the Arciola complaint to the City Attorney, he advised her that he could not represent her in the matter because he would likely be a material witness in the case due to his role in the City's investigation of Arciola. Lieberman advised the City Attorney that she wished to maintain confidentiality relating to the ethics complaint. Her desire to maintain confidentiality was based on legal advice. She was not "anxious to keep the expenditure from the City Council" as alleged by Kaminsky. At the time Kaminsky filed the Complaint, Section 19-51 of the City Code provided as follows: There is hereby created a fund of the city which shall be known as the insurance services fund. The purpose of this fund is to provide a source of funds to pay all costs of insurance coverage, insurance-related services required by the city and the settle- ment of claims against the city which are not otherwise covered by policies of insurance which shall be purchased by the city from time to time. The city may purchase insurance which shall provide coverage for those services enumerated in subsection (b) herein, which shall be in excess of coverage provided by the city. The insurance services to be provided by this fund shall be as follows: Damage to personal property or real estate owned by the city. Liability for property damage, personal injury and other tort claims against the city or any elected official, department head, official, member of an advisory board or employee thereof when acting in the scope of his or her employment or official duties and subject to the conditions of section 2-20, Indemnification of city officers and employees. Worker's compensation. Monies in this fund may be expended for all costs of insurance coverage, all insurance-related services required by the city and all settlements of claims against the city, as well as for the purchase of any policies of insurance and the payment of any insurance premiums. * * * * (h) All claims against the city which are insured by the city and which result in litigation shall be referred to the city attorney immediately upon service of the summons and complaint. The city attorney shall represent the city in all litigation unless the decision is made to employ outside counsel upon consultation with the mayor. For claims covered by Section 19-51 of the City Code, the City is self-insured for the first $50,000 and maintains excess insurance for coverage for all expenses over $50,000. The City Attorney advised Lieberman that he interpreted Section 19-51 of the City Code to mean that outside counsel could be retained pursuant to that section to provide legal defense of an ethics claim against the mayor without requiring approval from the City Council. It was also the City Attorney's opinion that this interpretation maintained the confidentiality of the Complaint. The City Attorney hired Samuel Goren to represent Lieberman in the Arciola matter. The City spent less than $35,000 in defending Lieberman in her official capacity against the ethics complaint filed by Michael Arciola. At the August 26, 1991 City Council meeting, there was a discussion of the legal fees which had been incurred in the Arciola ethics complaint. In a memorandum dated August 29, 1991, the City Council president, Jim O'Brian, questioned the City Attorney's interpretation of the City Code as it related to the retaining of Samuel Goren to represent Lieberman in the Arciola ethics complaint. Kaminsky read the memorandum from O'Brien to the City Attorney. Kaminsky never spoke to the City Attorney concerning the City Attorney's interpretation of the City Code as it related to the Arciola matter. If Kaminsky had inquired, the City Attorney would have explained the basis for his interpretation. On May 12, 1992, the Commission on Ethics entered its Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate, finding that Kaminsky's complaint as to the retention of the law firm of Josias & Goren to represent Lieberman in the Arciola ethics complaint was legally insufficient. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 19 OF CITY CODE On January 27, 1992, the City Council passed Ordinance No. 92-106, which amended Section 19-51(b) of the City Code to read: (b) The insurance services to be provided by this fund shall include any lawsuit, complaint, or claim of any kind, whether through the courts or any administrative procedure, wherein, the City, any employee thereof, or any official thereof, whether elected or appointed, shall be a subject of the complaint or claim. Notice of the complaint or claim shall be sufficient to authorize the utilization of this section. On May 11, 1992, and May 26, 1992, the City Council passed Ordinance 92-143, on first and second reading, respectively. This ordinance amended Section 19-51(h) of the City Code to read: All claims against the city which are insured by the city and which result in litigation shall be referred to the city attorney immediately upon service of the summons and complaint. The city attorney shall represent the city in all litigation unless the decision is made to employ outside counsel upon consultation with the mayor. The employment of outside counsel pursuant to this section shall not be subject to approval of the City Commission as might otherwise be required in Section 2-141(b) of the Code or any other section thereof. If the Mayor or any commissioner is the subject of a criminal complaint or a complaint by an administrative agency, the elected official who is the subject of the complaint may designate outside counsel to represent that elected official in that matter. On May 11, 1992, Lieberman authorized the retention of outside counsel to represent her in an elections Complaint filed against her by Kaminsky. Kaminsky had alleged in an amendment to the Complaint that Lieberman was guilty of an ethics violation by retaining such outside counsel. On August 4, 1992, the Commission on Ethics issued Amendment to Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate, finding that the allegations in Kaminsky's Amendments to the Complaint concerning the passage of Ordinance Nos. 92-106 and 92-143 were legally insufficient to indicate a possible ethics violation by Lieberman. Additionally, Kaminsky's allegations concerning Lieberman's retention of outside counsel on May 11, 1992, were deemed legally insufficient to indicate a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. CITY COUNCIL SALARY INCREASE On November 13, 1989, pursuant to Section 3.05 of the City Charter, the City Council passed Ordinance No 89-197 which increased the City Council members' salaries from $330 per month to $363 per month. On November 12, 1991, the City Council passed Ordinance 91-90 which increased the City Council members' salaries from $363 per month to $399 per month. Both ordinances passed unanimously. Lieberman did not vote on the ordinances. The City Charter authorizes the mayor to vote only when there is a tie. The City Charter provides that the mayor may veto any ordinance passed by the City Council within three working days of the effective date of the passage of the ordinance. An ordinance which has been vetoed may be overridden by a four-fifths vote of the City Council. An ordinance not vetoed within the three day period becomes effective without the signature or approval of the mayor. Lieberman did not veto Ordinance Nos. 89-197 and 91-190. At the time Ordinance Nos. 89-197 and 91-90 were passed, Article III, Section 3.05 of the City Charter provided: The council may, through the passage of an ordinance passed by the minimum of a four- fifths (4/5) of all council members, determine the annual salary of the council members at the time they adopt each fiscal budget. But in no event shall any such ordinance which increases the salary of council members currently serving in office become effective until said council has served at least one full year of the term of office for which they were elected. Any increase in the council members' salary shall be based upon the U.S. Consumer Price Index for the month prior to the preparation of the annual budget; but in no event shall any increase exceed ten (10) per cent of the current salary. And further, in no event shall there be more than one raise during one elective term of the council members. The City Attorney interpreted Article III, Section 3.05, to mean that the words "based upon" did not limit a salary increase to the amount of the U.S. Consumer Price Index not to exceed ten percent but rather provided that the Consumer Price Index was the starting point to calculate the salary increase which could not exceed ten percent. His interpretation was based on a definition of "based upon" found in Black's Law Dictionary which stated "an initial or starting point for calculation." Kaminsky did not speak to the City Attorney concerning the City Attorney's interpretation of the section. Kaminsky interpreted Article III, Section 3.05, to mean that a salary increase was limited to the U.S. Consumer Price Index or ten percent, whichever was lower. The City Charter did not state which Consumer Price Index was to be used. Kaminsky's complained that Lieberman should not have presented the ordinances to the City Council for passage and that she should have vetoed the ordinances once they were passed. The City's mayor is the "default sponsor" of any proposed legislation emanating from one of the departments of the City and not from a specific council member. Proposed ordinances coming from the finance department are automatically assigned sponsorship by the mayor. Based on the transcript of discussions by the City Council members during the budget workshop meetings which occurred prior to the ordinances being placed on the agenda for a vote, the City Council members had determined that they wanted a ten percent salary increase. Thus, the idea for ten percent salary increases came from the City Council and not from Lieberman. Kaminsky did not file an ethics complaint against any of the City Council members who voted on the salary increases. He felt that Lieberman was more culpable than the City Council members. Lieberman did not gain any personal benefit from the enactment of Ordinance Nos. 89-197 and 91-190. Kaminsky did not know of any personal benefit that Lieberman may have gained from the passage of the ordinances but merely speculated that she may have gained some political IOU's. Kaminsky never had any personal knowledge that Lieberman thought the ordinances were in violation of the Charter. He felt that because he interpreted the City Charter to mean that the raises were limited by the U.S. Consumer Price Index that she should have come to the same conclusion. His investigation of the issue consisted of reading the ordinances and the City Charter. On May 12, 1992, the Commission on Ethics issued a Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate, finding that allegations concerning the salary increases for the City Council members were legally sufficient to indicate a possible violation of Sections 112.313(6) and 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes. This finding was based on the Commission's belief that Lieberman had voted on the salary increases. On November 20, 1992, the Report of Investigation was issued finding that Lieberman did not vote on the salary increases. On December 15, 1992, the Advocate's Recommendation was filed with the Commission, recommending that no probable cause of a violation of Section 112.3143(3) be found because Lieberman did not vote on the increases and that no probable cause of a violation of Section 112.313(6) be found because the Report of Investigation did not reveal that Lieberman received any personal benefit from the ordinances. On February 2, 1993, the Commission issued a Public Report finding there was no probable cause to believe that Lieberman violated Sections 112.313(6) and 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, concerning the pay increases for the City Council members. MAYOR'S SICK AND VACATION PAY On April 8, 1991, the City Council passed Ordinance 91-109 which created Sections 2-17(c) and (d) of the City Code to read: The Mayor shall receive all benefits relating to sick pay, vacation pay and health insurance as are received by department heads with maximum senority; and shall be defined as a general employee for purposes of Chapter 2, Article II, Division 3, Retirement, of the Code. The retirement benefits as provided for herein, to the extent that, after January 1, 1977, they have been funded and determined to be actuarially sound, are ratified and confirmed effective November 1, 1973. Because the ordinance dealt in part with retirement benefits, Lieberman instructed the City Attorney to contact former mayors, Cippoloni and Kaminsky, prior to the enactment of the ordinance and inform them that the ordinance would not diminish or affect in any way the pensions that the mayors were receiving from the City. The City Attorney explained the ordinance to Kaminsky; thus, Kaminsky had an opportunity to discuss the ordinance with the City Attorney and to ask any questions and make any objections that he might have prior to the enactment of the ordinance. Kaminsky never asked the City Attorney any questions concerning the ordinance prior to filing the Complaint. Kaminsky argues that the ordinance violated Article V, Section 5.02(d), of the City Charter which provided: The salary of the mayor shall be set by the city council through the passage of an ordinance. No ordinance shall be effective to reduce or increase the salary of the mayor by more than ten (10) percent of the then existing salary for the office of the mayor. Further, no salary increase and/or decrease for the office of the mayor shall be effective unless it has been at least one year since the last ordinance setting forth a salary adjustment. Kaminsky reasoned that because Lieberman could cash in her sick and vacation leave she was in effect getting an increase in her salary above the annual ten percent increase authorized in the City Charter. Lieberman did not vote on Ordinance 91-109 and she did not veto the ordinance. The ordinance was passed by a unanimous vote of the City Council. Prior to Lieberman becoming mayor, the practice of the City had been to pay the mayor's salary whether the mayor was sick or on vacation. The administrative policy was to have the mayor indicate on the time sheet that the mayor was present even if the mayor was sick or on vacation. Thus, the mayor would receive his salary whether he worked or not. Kaminsky participated in this practice when he was mayor. It had been the practice of the City Council to grant by ordinance a salary increase to the mayor and to City Council members and to grant a separate fixed amount for expenses. The mayor and City Council members were not required to account for expenses which they incurred. The mayor and the City Council members received the allocated amount for expenses regardless of whether the actual expenses incurred were greater or lesser than the allocated amount. This was a way that the mayor and City Council members could receive a salary increase in excess of the ten percent authorized by the City Charter. Kaminsky had participated in and approved of this practice when he was mayor. Kaminsky had received information from someone that Lieberman had drawn down salary and vacation pay in excess of a ten percent increase of her annual salary. He did not know who gave him the information and he did not verify the information. He could not tell when Lieberman was supposed to have cashed in her leave nor could he tell what amount had been received by Lieberman. He assumed it was in excess of ten percent of her annual salary. Kaminsky alleged in the Complaint that "no one keeps track of when the mayor arrives at her office, when she leaves or where she is when she is not in her office." Lieberman's secretary, Ms. Roberts, had the responsibility of keeping track of Lieberman's attendance at her City Hall office. Ms. Roberts maintained public records of Lieberman's attendance. On May 12, 1992, the Commission on Ethics issued a Determination and Order finding that the allegations in Kaminsky's Complaint concerning sick leave and vacation benefits were legally insufficient to indicate a possible violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. CITY STATIONERY Kaminsky alleged that Lieberman used City stationery for correspondence unrelated to City business, and that such correspondence was typed by Rusty Roberts on City time and using City equipment. Kaminsky attached two letters to an amendment to his Complaint, alleging that they were prepared in violation of the Code of Ethics. One letter was from Lieberman to Nova University, transmitting two draft letters dealing with a fund raiser. The other letter was from Lieberman to then Governor Bob Martinez, advising him of her views on additional legislation restricting abortion rights. She copied members of the City Council, members of the Broward Legislative Delegation, and the National Organization of Women with the letter to Governor Martinez. At the bottom of both letters were stamped the words, "Not Paid for With City Funds." On the letter to Nova University, below the signature of Lieberman appeared the notation, "IL/rr." Kaminsky surmised from this notation that the letter had been dictated by Lieberman and typed by Rusty Roberts on City time and using City equipment. Had he made an inquiry concerning the letter, he would have learned that the letter was typed by Lieberman at her home and on her personal time and that Ms. Roberts had given Lieberman permission to place her initials on the letter. The letter was not prepared by City employees on City time using City equipment. The letter to Governor Martinez was typed by Ms. Roberts on City time and using City equipment. Ms. Roberts inadvertently duplicated the letter on Lieberman's personal stationery rather than City stationery. The letter did serve a public purpose. Kaminsky never spoke with Lieberman or the City Attorney about the stationery issue prior to filing the Complaint. If he had he would have been advised that the use of this type of stationery by Lieberman had been previously raised and resolved by the Commission on Ethics in an ethics Complaint which had been filed against Lieberman. Prior to filing the Complaint, Kaminsky made no investigation or inquiry to learn the circumstances in which the letters were prepared. On May 12, 1992, the Commission on Ethics issued a Determination and Order finding that Kaminsky's allegations concerning the two letters were legally insufficient to indicate a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS After Kaminsky filed the Complaint against Lieberman, City Attorney Dick Michelson retained Samuel S. Goren of the law firm of Josias & Goren to represent Lieberman in the proceedings. Thereafter, the City hired Stuart Michelson to replace Samuel Goren as Lieberman's attorney because Kaminsky's attorney had indicated that Mr. Goren would be a material witness in the fee proceedings. Samuel Goren and Stuart Michelson charged $125 per hour for their services, and Stuart Michelson billed $50 per hour for paralegal time. The $125 rate was below the market rate for such services in the community. Dick Michelson billed the City at the rate of $100 per hours for 8.5 hours of service from July 20, 1992 through September 24, 1992. He billed the City at the rate of $125 per hour for 1.8 hours of service from December 2, 1992 through January 27, 1993. From March 5, 1993 through October 19, 1993, he billed the City for 21.5 hours at $125 per hour. The rate of $125 per hour for the services which were provided for services rendered from March 5, 1993 through October 19, 1993 was a reasonable rate and 21.5 hours was a reasonable amount of time spent for the services provided during this time period. The rate of $125 per hour is a reasonable rate for the services provided by Samuel Goren in his representation of Lieberman in relation to the Kaminsky Complaint and this fee proceeding and 61.5 hours is a reasonable number of hours spent by Mr. Goren in relation to the Kaminsky Complaint and this fee proceeding. The rate of $125 per hour is a reasonable rate for the services provided by Stuart Michelson in his representation during this fee proceeding. The rate of $50 per hour is a reasonable rate for paralegal services provided by Stuart Michelson's paralegal in this fee proceeding. It was reasonable for Stuart Michelson to spend 104.3 hours for services provided through March 7, 1994. It was reasonable for a paralegal to spend 106.8 hours for services provided through March 7, 1994. Stuart Michelson spent 37.5 hours at the final hearing in this proceeding which is a reasonable amount of time for the services provided at the final hearing. Mr. Jeffery Pheterson testified as an expert witness in this case on behalf of Lieberman. He billed the City at the rate of $125 per hour for 25.4 hours of service rendered as an expert witness. The costs billed to the City by Goren and Stuart Michelson relating to this case were $665.89 as of March 8, 1993. Those costs are reasonable. ILL WILL AND HOSTILITY After Lieberman defeated Kaminsky in 1988, Kaminsky in referring to Lieberman told Al Geraffi, the mayor of Lauderdale Lakes, that the "G D bitch, f ing beat me. She isn't worth a shit." Kaminsky made similar remarks about Lieberman to Mayor Geraffi on three different occasions. On the day of the 1988 mayoral election, Kaminsky had a heated discussion with the president of the firefighter's union concerning campaign literature that was derogatory to Lieberman. Kaminsky wanted to know why the union members were not being allowed to pass out the campaign literature. During the conversation, Kaminsky referred to Lieberman as a bitch. Shortly after the 1988 election, Lieberman contacted Kaminsky to set up a meeting to discuss projects that Kaminsky had initiated as mayor. Kaminsky told her that he harbored ill will toward her and had harsh feelings, thus, he did not want to meet with her. Senator Matthew J. Meadows, who was a former City Commissioner, heard Kaminsky refer to Lieberman as the "f g bitch and the f g broad" before, during and after the 1988 mayoral election. Senator Meadows did not understand the remarks to have been made jokingly. Kaminsky did not think that it would serve any purpose for him to know whether Lieberman relied on legal advice regarding the issues in the Complaint because he felt that she dictated the City Attorney's legal opinions. KAMINSKY'S RELIANCE ON LEGAL ADVISE Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Kaminsky informally discussed the Complaint with his brother-in-law, Joseph Pardo, prior to filing the Complaint. The discussions took place in Mr. Pardo's and Kaminsky's homes. When Kaminsky was asked at his deposition whether he formally retained Mr. Pardo or just consulted with him informally, Kaminsky replied: "Just very informally. We visit. We are family." Kaminsky knew that Mr. Pardo, an attorney, was not experienced in matters dealing with Chapter 112, Part III of the Florida Statutes, and had no experience practicing before the Florida Commission on Ethics. Mr. Pardo was not familiar with the City Code and Kaminsky knew it. Kaminsky told Mr. Pardo what the code was and let Pardo read portions of the code. Kaminsky told Pardo what he felt was occurring and told Pardo that he intended to file an ethics complaint. Mr. Pardo advised Kaminsky that he thought Kaminsky was following the proper procedure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED Ilene Lieberman be awarded attorney's fees and costs of $37,280.89. It is further recommended that jurisdiction not be retained by the Division of Administrative Hearings to determine fees incurred after March 8, 1993. The recommended amount includes Stuart Michelson's actual time spent at hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1181EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 8-10: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: The last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: The second sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 13: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 14-15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: The first two sentences are rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 19-20: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 21: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 22: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 23: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 24-25: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 26: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 27-37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 39: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 40: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 41-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 47-58: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 59-62: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 63: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 64-67: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 68: Accepted to the extent that that is what he testified but rejected to the extent that that is what is reflected in Lieberman's Exhibit No. 20. Paragraph 69: Rejected to the extent that he testified that the amount reflected costs and fees. Paragraph 70: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 71: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 72: Accepted that that was his testimony but rejected to the extent that that number of hours is not reflected in the invoices submitted in evidence. Paragraphs 73-77: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 78: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 79-83: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 84: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 85-87: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 88-91: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 92-93: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 94-96: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 97: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 98-99: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 100-103: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 104-110: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 111: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 112-113: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 114-118: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 119: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 120-122: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 123: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 124-125: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 126-128: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 129-130: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 131-139: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 140-141: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 142: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 143: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 144. Accepted in substance. Paragraph 145: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 146: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 147: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 148: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 149-152: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 153-170 Accepted in substance. Paragraph 171: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 172: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 173-174: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 175: Accepted in substance. 68: Paragraph 176: Rejected as unnecessary. 69 Paragraphs 177-178: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 179-184: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 185-186: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 187-188: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 189-191: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 192-201: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 202-209: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 210-212: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 213-218: Rejected as constituting argument. Complainant's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance to the extent that Kaminsky may have thought that Lieberman violated the City Code and Charter but rejected to the extent that such statement implies that Lieberman did violate the law. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance to the extent that Kaminsky believed when he filed the Complaint that Lieberman violated the City Code and Charter for her own personal benefit with the exception of the allegations relating to the salary increases for the City Council members. Rejected to the extent that the statement implies that Lieberman did violate the law for her personal benefit. Paragraph 4: Accepted to the extent that Ms. Striker and Mr. O'Brien had voiced their objections to the payment of the legals fees related to the Aricola ethics complaint. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance to the extent that Kaminsky talked informally with his brother-in-law who was an attorney pertaining to the Complaint. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, rejected that Pardo reviewed all the materials pertaining to the Complaint. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance with the exception of the allegations as to personal benefit relating to the City Council salary increase. However, rejected to the extent that such a statement implies that Kaminsky's belief was reasonably based on fact or law. Paragraph 7: Rejected to the extent that Mr. Stracher's opinion is based on competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 8: Accepted to the extent that there were ordinances passed but rejected to the extent that such ordinances allowed for the expenditure of legal fees and the salary increases which were previously prohibited prior to the passage of the amendments. The ordinances merely clarified City's existing policy and interpretation relating to the unamended ordinances. Paragraph 9: Having judged the credibility of Kaminsky, the paragraph is rejected. Paragraph 10: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 12-14: Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial and credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Stuart R. Michelson, Esquire 1111 Kane Concourse, Suite 517 Bay Harbor Islands, Florida 33154 Anthony J. Titone, Esquire 7471 West Oakland Park Blvd., Suite 110 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33319 Kerrie Stillman Clerk & Complaint Coordinator Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0006 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, including June 28, 1993, through January 27, 1994, an employee of the Department working in the economic services unit of the Department's District XI (hereinafter referred to as the "District"). In 1990, Petitioner occupied a PAS (Public Assistance Specialist) I position that, in or around June of that year, was one of 182 such positions in the District to be reclassified to a PAS II position as part of the Department's implementation of the new FLORIDA computer system. 2/ Those employees occupying these reclassified positions (hereinafter referred to as the "upgraded employees") whose salaries were below the minimum salary for a PAS II received a salary increase to raise their salary to the minimum. Petitioner was among the employees who received such a salary increase. Such action was taken in accordance with the following Department policy set forth at page 11 of HRSP 60-1: When an employee is promoted, a salary increase to at least the minimum salary of the higher level position will be made. How- ever, an increase of up to ten percent above the current base salary or ten percent above the minimum for the new class may be approved. An increase of up to ten percent of the current base salary is normally used when the employee's salary is the same or nearly the same as the minimum for the new class. An increase of up to ten percent above the minimum for the new class may be granted when an employee possesses training or experience substantially above the minimum training and experience required for the higher class and it is determined that the employee is exceptionally well qualified for the position. These increases must be approved by an assistant secretary or district administrator. Because of funding constraints that existed at the time, no other salary increases were given to the upgraded employees. Funds for such additional salary increases became available toward the end of the 1992-1993 fiscal year. The increases were approved at both the Department and District level. Petitioner and the other upgraded employees were advised of the increases by a memorandum dated July 7, 1993, from the District XI District Administrator. The District Administrator's memorandum read as follows: Your position has been identified as one which was upgraded as a result of the FLORIDA implementation in 1990/1991. At the time, our records indicate that you received a partial increase, or none at all, because of budgetary constraints. Due to the identification of available monies prior to the end of the Fiscal Year, we are pleased to inform you that you will be receiving a pay increase in your salary war- rant on July 9, 1993. The amount of the in- crease will be either 10[percent] or the difference between what you received in 1990/1991 and 10[percent], and was effective June 28, 1993. Should you have any questions about this in- crease or how it was calculated, please call Arelis Valero at 377-5197. Your continued dedication and service to HRS is sincerely appreciated. District personnel miscalculated the amount of Petitioner's approved salary increase (which was "the difference between what [she had] received in 1990 . . . and 10[percent]" of her pre-reclassification base salary). As a result, following June 28, 1993, the effective date of the increase, for the pay periods ending January 27, 1994, Petitioner was overpaid a total of $769.39. The District discovered the error and revised its payroll records to reflect Petitioner's correct salary. In addition, by memorandum, it notified Petitioner of the mistake that had been made and advised her that it was her responsibility to repay the amount she had been overpaid. By letter dated November 1, 1995, the District XI District Administrator informed Petitioner that the overpayment would be recovered through payroll deductions beginning January 12, 1996, amounting to "10[percent] of [her] gross salary each pay period, unless [she] prefer[red] a single lump sum, until the balance [was] paid." The letter further provided, in part, as follows: If you do not dispute the overpayment, but feel that the repayment schedule of 10 [percent] of your gross salary per pay period is overly burdensome, please call Thomas Franklin at 377-5055 Number135 and he will review with you what must be documented and submitted to the Comptroller's Office (Capitol Building, Suite 1201, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350) to request a modification. While the total amount eventually repaid to the State cannot be adjusted, the Comptroller may be convinced to lengthen the repayment schedule by lessen- ing the percentage withheld each pay period. If you do not agree that you were overpaid this amount, you have the right to an adminis- trative hearing under 120.57(1) or (2), Florida Statutes, and Rules 10-2.036 and 28-5, Florida Administrative Code. You may request a formal or an informal hearing. If a request for a formal hearing is made, your petition must be in compliance with Rule 28-5.021, Florida Administrative Code. Please note that Rule 28-5.201(2) specifies that your petition should contain a concise discussion of the specific item in dispute. Informal hearings are governed by Rules 28-5.501-503, Florida Administrative Code. Your request for either a formal or informal hearing must be received by this office, attention Thomas Franklin, within thirty (30) days of your receipt of this letter, in accordance with Rule 10-2.036, Florida Administrative Code. Failure to request a timely hearing shall be deemed a waiver of your right to hearing. By letter dated November 6, 1995, Petitioner advised the Department that that she was not in agreement with the "content" of the District Administrator's November 1, 1995, letter, and that she desired to have a hearing on the matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department: find that, from June 28, 1993, until January 27, 1994, Petitioner was overpaid a total of $769.39; notify the Department of Management Services of this finding; and refer the matter to the Comptroller so that the Comptroller may take appropriate action to recover these moneys owed to the state. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of April, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1996.
The Issue The issues are whether any Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that he timely submitted a request to purchase "Additional Accrual Service" (AAS) credit to the Board of Trustees (Board) of the City of Hallandale Beach Police Officers' and Firefighters' Pension Plan (Plan) in writing or at a public meeting and whether the Board prohibited such Petitioner from purchasing the requested AAS credit.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has maintained city police and fire departments.3 Respondent sponsors the Plan to provide defined benefits, mostly on retirement, to members of the Plan, who are current and former city police officers and firefighters. Respondent primarily documents the Plan in ordinances that it enacts from time to time--as relevant in this case, in 2008 and 2011.4 Changes to the Plan may result from negotiations between Respondent and the police and firefighters unions, and the collective bargaining agreement may document the new provision until it is enacted by ordinance. The relevant agreement is the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Respondent and the Hallandale Beach Professional Fire Fighters Metro Broward Local 3080 District 10 for October 1, 2005 through September 30, 2008, as executed on October 3, 2006 (CBA).5 The Plan and the funds associated with the Plan are "under the exclusive administration and management" of the Board.6 The "responsibility for the proper effective operation of the … Plan and for making[7] the provisions of this Ordinance is vested in [the] Board."8 The 3 Subsequent to the timeframe at issue, the city fire department merged with the Broward County fire department. 4 For most of the time in question, the relevant Plan was documented in City of Hallandale Beach Ord. Nos. 2008-29 and 2011-11. Provisions material to this case were unchanged in the 2011 ordinance. References to the "Plan" are to the 2011 ordinance due to its superior formatting and ease of use. All references to "section" or "§," such as "section 8.08," are to the Plan, as codified by the ordinance, unless the reference is to Florida Statutes. 5 Presumably, Respondent negotiated identical language in the collective bargaining agreement with the police union, but this contract is not part of the record. 6 § 2.01. 7 "Making" probably means "implementing," because Respondent, not the Board, "makes" or enacts ordinances. 8 § 3.01. Board consists of one trustee elected by the police, one trustee elected by the firefighters, two trustees appointed by Respondent, and a fifth trustee, who is selected by the other four trustees and appointed by Respondent.9 The Plan authorizes the Board "to take such action as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Plan and all decisions of the Board … , made in good faith, … shall be final, binding and conclusive on all parties."10 The Board may "establish and maintain communication with [Respondent's] departments and other agencies of government as is necessary for the management of the … Plan," but the Board must "determine all questions relating to and process all applications for … benefits."11 However, "[i]f an action of the Board has an impact on [Respondent's] contribution the action must be approved by the City Commission. [Respondent] retains the right to obtain independent actuarial services to determine financial impact." Despite this exception to the Board's administrative authority, only the Board, not Respondent, is a fiduciary of the Plan, so as to be subject to the obligation "to discharge its responsibilities solely in the interest of the members and beneficiaries of the Plan for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to the members and their beneficiaries and to defray the reasonable expenses of the Plan."12 As authorized by the Plan,13 the Board retained, at all material times, the services of independent counsel, actuarial firms, and pension services 9 § 3.02. See also §§ 175.061(1)(b)2.; 185.05(1)(b)2., Fla. Stat. Chapter 175 applies to a city pension plan for firefighters, and chapter 185 applies to a city pension plan for police officers. 10 § 3.09. 11 § 3.11(f) and (g). 12 § 3.10. This section continues: "The [Board] shall exercise those fiduciary responsibilities with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a similar character and with similar aims." 13 § 3.12. companies to assist in the administration of the Plan. Board counsel and a representative of the pension services company routinely attended Board meetings. The Plan's primary retirement benefit, which is payable for the remaining life of the member, but not less than ten years,14 is based on a formula that, for a vested member,15 multiplies the member's final average compensation by the member's credited years of service by the applicable annual accrual rate, which is typically 3.2%.16 For instance, the lifetime benefit payable to a member earning annual compensation of $50,000 with 20 years of service at an accrual rate of 3.2% would be $32,000 annually or $2667 monthly.17 The Plan's funding is more complicated and requires the services of an actuary to calculate the assets and liabilities of the Plan, which are held by a trust.18 For a fully funded plan providing a defined benefit, the assets--the 14 § 6.04. 15 The vesting period for the Plan is generally ten years. §§ 1.31, 1.32, and 8.01. 16 § 6.02. 17 The annual benefit is the product of $50,000 x 20 x .032. 18 For an excellent discussion of the responsibilities of an actuary in determining the proper funding of a pension plan, see Vinson & Elkins v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 99 T.C. 9, 15-16 (1992), which cites the following legislative history concerning the treatment of actuaries in The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: In estimating pension costs, actuaries must make assumptions (“actuarial assumptions”) about a number of future events, such as the rate of return on investments (“interest”), employees' future earnings, and employee mortality and turnover. Actuaries also must choose from a number of methods to calculate future plan liabilities. The amounts required to fund any given pension plan can vary significantly according to the mix of these actuarial assumptions and methods. As a result, the assumptions and methods used by actuaries are basic to the application of minimum funding standards for defined benefit pension plans. [citations omitted] contributions of the plan sponsor; the contributions of members; for a local pension plan for police officers and firefighters, the plan's share of state excise taxes that are imposed on insurers19 or local excise taxes that may be imposed on local insurance premiums;20 forfeitures, usually of the sponsor's contributions on behalf of members whose service terminated prior to vesting;21 and the expected investment returns on these contributions and forfeitures, from receipt until payout--will provide adequate funds for the plan's trust to pay all liabilities, or benefits, when due. The benefits include projections and estimates of how many members will become vested; the retirement benefits due based on the members' final compensation levels, years of service, and form of benefit--disability, early retirement, normal retirement, and enhanced retirement benefits, such as from additional accrual rate or additional years of service; and the remaining life expectancies of members when they start receiving retirement benefits.22 19 §§ 175.1215 and 185.105, Fla. Stat. 20 §§ 175.101 and 185.08, Fla. Stat. 21 The Plan seems to preclude a forfeiture of the sponsor's contributions on behalf of even an unvested member. Section 8.03 provides that "[e]very member shall have the right to receive, in lieu of all benefits under the plan, a return of the member's accumulated contributions." If the member terminates with less than five years' service, the member is entitled "to a return of the contributions" without interest. If the member terminates with more than five years' service and elects a lump-sum "return of contributions," the member receives interest. Section 1.01 defines "accumulated contributions" as "the sum of all amounts deducted from a member's compensation or picked up on behalf of a member." Section 4.01 states that Respondent "shall pick-up, rather than deduct from each member's pay," specified percentages of pensionable earnings, so the pick-up amount appears to be Respondent's contribution on behalf of a member. As discussed below, this case presents another category of forfeitures--members' payments for additional accrual rate that cannot be applied due to insufficient years of service at the time of retirement. 22 See, e.g., Vinson & Elkins, 99 T.C. at 13 ("The amount estimated to fund a defined benefit plan is calculated by the plan's actuary and is determined based upon actuarial assumptions about a number of future events, such as rates of return on investments, the benefit commencement date, future earnings, and member mortality, among other things."). This case involves an optional enhanced retirement benefit in the form of additional accrual rate. As noted below, eligible members have previously been able to purchase additional accrual rate, but this case concerns a pricing change that went into effect for police officers hired after January 1, 2006, and firefighters hired after January 1, 2007.23 Section 8.08 authorizes such persons to purchase up to five years' additional accrual rate--so as to add 3.2% accrual rate to the Plan's 3.2% accrual rate, for a total 6.4% accrual rate--for each year of service that the member completes from his or her 16th through 20th years of service or, if fewer than five years' accrual rate is purchased, for the purchased number of years constituting the final years of service within the 16th through 20th years of service.24 Taking the example in paragraph 6, if a member purchased five years' additional accrual rate and retired with 20 years of service, the benefit would be $40,000 annually or $3333 monthly.25 In this illustration, the enhanced retirement benefit would increase the member's monthly benefit by $666 and would produce a retirement benefit, at 20 years' service, that would be the equivalent of the retirement benefit, at 25 years' service, without the additional accrual rate purchase.26 23 The difference of one year reflects the one-year difference in the commencement date of each union's collective bargaining agreement. 24 Section 8.08 does not so clearly limit the member purchasing fewer than five years' additional accrual rate to the corresponding number of years in the member's 16th through 20th years of service, but the parties seem to share this interpretation. Thus, it appears that a member purchasing three years' additional accrual rate would be required to apply the additional rate to the member's 18th through 20th years of service. 25 The 3.2% accrual rate for the first 15 years at $50,000 would produce an annual benefit of $24,000, and the 6.4% accrual rate for the final five years at $50,000 would produce an annual benefit of $16,000. 26 The total annual benefit of $40,000, as calculated in the preceding footnote illustrating the effect of five years' additional accrual rate, is identical to the total annual benefit of a 3.2% accrual rate for 25 years at $50,000. Section 8.08 imposes three conditions on the purchase of additional accrual rate. The member must have been employed as a police officer or firefighter with Respondent for at least one year, the member "must exercise this option within [90] days after completion of probation," and the member "shall contribute the full actuarial cost of the benefit for each of year enhanced multiplier purchased," which the member may pay over ten years or prior to entry into DROP,27 whichever occurs first. During the time in question, it appears that probation ran one year from the date of hire. Section 8.07 authorizes an eligible member to purchase additional years of service based on prior years of service with certain employers, such as the military or other law enforcement agencies. Section 8.07 limits this "buyback" of prior service to four years' qualifying service and requires a member to pay 8.4% of the member's current annual compensation for each year of prior service purchased. Section 8.07 allows a member five years to pay the purchase price and limits a member to the purchase of no more than a total of five years' additional accrual rate and additional years of service. Nomenclature problems render some of the minutes of Board meetings discussed below difficult to understand. The problem starts with "AAS," which misleadingly refers to "service," not rate, so as to encourage the reference to the purchase of additional accrual "rate" as the purchase of "service," which properly applies only to the purchase of additional years of service. The confusion is compounded by the use of the term, "buyback" to apply to the purchase of additional accrual rate, as well as to the purchase of additional years of service. The sense of reacquisition in the term, "buyback" limits its use to the purchase of additional years of service, because a member is not reacquiring anything when she purchases additional accrual rate. The Plan appropriately describes the purchase of additional years of service as a "buyback," but does not use this term to describe the purchase of 27 DROP is the Deferred Retirement Option Program. additional accrual rate, although the Plan elsewhere uses "buyback" to refer to the purchase of both additional years of service and additional accrual rate.28 Distinguishing between these two enhanced benefits was less important for police officers hired on or before January 1, 2006, and firefighters hired on or before January 1, 2007. For them, each year of additional accrual rate cost 8.4% of compensation and payment of the purchase price was limited to five years--the same terms that applied and apply to the purchase of each year of additional service. Another common feature between the two optional benefits is their monetary value to the member. At all material times, for identically situated members, the purchase of an additional year of accrual rate has resulted in the same increased benefit as the purchase of an additional year of service.29 Respondent introduced the 2005 and 2006 changes to end its subsidy of members' purchases of additional accrual rate,30 but obviously chose not to end its subsidy of members' purchases of additional years of service--an option that is obviously available only to new hires with qualifying past employment. Calculating the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate should not have been inordinately difficult. Compensation levels for the members would have been relatively easy to project due to the nature of their 28 § 1.01 ("Accumulated contributions shall … include buy-back amounts paid under sections 8.07 and 8.08."). 29 Assume that the members are the same age, retire on the same date with 20 years of service, commence benefits at retirement, and earned $50,000 at all times during employment with Respondent. As noted above, the annual retirement benefit for such a member who did not purchase additional accrual rate or additional years of service would be $32,000. The purchase of one year of additional accrual rate would raise the member's annual retirement benefit to $33,600: ($50,000 x 19 years x .032) + ($50,000 x 1 year x .064). The purchase of one year of additional year of service also would raise the member's annual retirement benefit to $33,600: ($50,000 x 21 x .032). 30 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 27, 2007. employment with expected raises based mostly on years of service. Normal retirement under the Plan is the earlier of 25 years of service or 52 years of age with at least ten years of service, and there is no mandatory retirement age.31 A member's age at retirement would not have been difficult to project due to the necessity that, for additional accrual rate, a member must work at least through her 16th through 20th years of service and the knowledge of the age of a member at the time of her employment. A member's age at retirement is especially important because a lifetime enhanced monthly benefit of, say, $666 is far more costly to the Plan, for a member who is 52 years old at retirement than for a member who is 70 years old at retirement, given the large difference in remaining life expectancies between these two retirees. With this information, coupled with standard mortality tables and an assumed investment return, an actuary could readily determine the sum required to support the enhanced monthly benefit payment. Estimating the contribution required to generate the sum determined in the preceding paragraph also should have been straightforward. If a member paid the contribution in a lump sum, the main task would be settling upon a reasonable investment return from the contribution until payout, more than 19 years later. If a member paid the contribution by installments over ten years, the investment return would apply to each payment, upon receipt, as payments made in the first year would produce more total investment return than payments made in the tenth year. As detailed below, two issues emerged that interfered with the rollout of the revisions to the purchase of additional accrual rate. The first issue, which was first seen in April 2007, was whether a vested member forfeited her payment or payments if she retired prior to the 16th through 20th years of service. If a member forfeits her payment or payments, an actuary could 31 § 6.01. consider projected forfeitures in calculating the full actuarial cost of the additional accrual rate purchase; this would lower the cost to a member, whose enhanced benefit would be partly paid by such forfeitures. This issue may have been more theoretical, unless the Plan had had sufficient experience with such forfeitures to allow an actuarial assumption as to the amount that would be forfeited over a specific interval. In any event, Plan provisions clearly would have supported the Board's determination that such forfeitures were not permitted by the Plan.32 The second issue, with which the Board wrestled from at least September 200833 through February 2009,34 is whether a member who pays the full actuarial cost by installments must pay interest on the installments. This issue raises questions about the communications between the Board and its actuaries,35 who, if asked, should have promptly advised the Board that their actuarial calculations already captured the time value of money, so as to dispense with the necessity of charging interest.36 32 See footnote 21. 33 Minutes of Board meeting on Sept. 8, 2008. 34 Minutes of Board meeting on Feb. 23, 2009. 35 A couple of years later, relations between the Board and its actuaries were decidedly suboptimal when the actuary informed the Board that his firm would require an additional $100 per calculation of the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate, the Board told the actuary that his firm needed to live up to its contract, a motion to approve the fee increase died for lack of a second, and the actuary told the Board that the firm would resign, if the Board failed to approve the fee increase. Minutes of Board meeting on Oct. 10, 2011. 36 This assumes that Respondent or the trust did not effectively lend the purchase price to the member--perhaps, to simplify the actuarial calculations--and, if not, that the actuaries made some attempt at pricing the full actuarial cost based on how long the trust held each installment payment. Because the full actuarial costs reflects the amount necessary to produce the defined benefit, the member who pays over ten years already will pay more than the member who pays in a lump sum at the time of purchase; the former's final year's installment payments will support investment return for nine fewer years than any payments in the year of purchase. Charging interest on deferred payments would have imposed duplicative exactions upon the member. Nevertheless, the available minutes do not document how the Board resolved this issue. Given one year's probation for new hires, the above-described changes to Section 8.08 would have applied to police officers starting in 2007 and firefighters starting in 2008. Although Respondent did not enact the first ordinance with these changes until 2008, the operative language had been incorporated into the CBA, which adequately captures the new provisions governing additional accrual rate purchases, so as to permit immediate implementation. The CBA provides: For employees hired after 01/01/2007, modify the Additional Accrual Service (AAS) Buyback percent the employee pays from 8.4% to the actual actuarial cost of the benefit and allow the member to pay for this in 10 years instead of 5 years. Effective 11/01/2006, continue the current prior service credit buyback provision … .[37] The record contains no minutes for Board meetings prior to 2007, but, in minutes of a meeting in early January 2007, the Board recognized that it could not provide a member with the purchase price of additional accrual rate until an actuary calculated the full actuarial cost.38 This was a good start. The next month's Board meeting, though, provided evidence of poor communications with the actuaries on the crucial issue of Plan provisions. In February 2007, an actuary performing an audit of the trust fund complained that the Plan was unclear in its treatment of the "buyback [of] service," and he could not reconcile his determination of the present value of benefits with the same determination by another actuary, who had a different interpretation of this buyback provision. Due to confused use of nomenclature, as described above, it is unclear whether this complaint pertained to additional accrual rate, additional years of service, or both 37 Coyle Ex. 11, Bates Stamp, p. 296. 38 Minutes of Board meeting on Jan. 8, 2007. optional benefits, but, given the recent change as to the accrual rate, it likely pertained to the optional benefit at issue in this case. The response of the Board's counsel was not to refer the actuary to language in the ordinance or a collective bargaining agreement, but to a recommended clarification of the "service buyback" within the Summary Plan Description,39 which, as the name implies, is intended to be merely a synopsis of provisions in the operative Plan, not a source of Plan provisions.40 In a Board meeting in April 2007, a Board trustee asked whether a vested member who terminated service was entitled to a refund of the member's contributions as part of a "five year buyback," which likely referred to the additional accrual rate purchase, as a member may purchase five years of that optional benefit, but only four years of additional years of service. Construing the question to pertain to the purchase of additional accrual rate, Board counsel referred to a Draft Summary Plan Description from October 2006 that provided clearly that such contributions were forfeited if a member elected to receive a retirement benefit prior to the completion of the 16th through 20th years of service, but member contributions were not forfeited if the member elected to receive a refund of all contributions instead of a pension benefit.41 Rather than accept this substantive guidance or argue for a different policy, another Board trustee 39 Minutes of Board meeting on Feb. 26, 2007. 40 Nor may a collective bargaining agreement have been the sole alternative source of important Plan provisions. On one occasion, the minutes state that an important provision regarding DROP was addressed only in "a contract"--presumably, a collective bargaining agreement--not in any "ordinance," and Mr. Antonio suggested that Respondent and the union enter into a "letter of understanding" on the matter. Minutes of Board meeting of Oct. 15, 2007. 41 Neither the Draft Summary Plan Description nor any written opinion of Board counsel is part of the record. It seems odd that a vested member would not receive a refund of her payments, but an unvested member would. See footnote 22. The last sentence of section 1.01, which defines the "accumulated contributions" that are to be returned to a member, states: "Accumulated contributions shall also include buy-back amounts paid under sections 8.07 and 8.08." responded that Respondent had never adopted this Draft Summary Plan Description. The discussion ended, and the forfeiture issue remained unresolved for an extended period of time, even though Board counsel had provided the Board with an unequivocal opinion that a vested member forfeited her payments, and the implementation of this opinion would not have impacted--i.e., increased--Respondent's contribution, as addressed in Section 3.16. The Board's nondecision on forfeitures deprived the actuaries of important information needed to price the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchased. Poor communications with the actuaries may have resulted from direct communications that they received, not from Board representatives, but from representatives of Respondent. At times during the hearing, Petitioners' witnesses described how well the Plan was administered when Respondent's employee, Marc Antonio, was available to prepare cost worksheets for the optional benefits and help new hires complete their applications. In 2007, Mr. Antonio was an assistant City manager; by August 24, 2009, he was in the Finance Department. But Mr. Antonio was still regularly attending Board meetings during the period that the full actuarial cost was in effect, and neither he nor the Board was able to provide this information to interested members. The record does not reveal whether Mr. Antonio contributed to confusion among the actuaries. However, another employee of Respondent did. According to Board minutes in 2018, Mr. Cowley recalled speaking ten years earlier to a former human resources director who had become active in Plan business. Mr. Cowley mentioned to the director the need of the Board to be able to present full actuarial costs to members seeking to purchase additional accrual rate, but any deadlines for producing this information "kept getting pushed back." A Board trustee familiar with the director added that he had "always deferred sharing the specifics of the buyback procedures and had trouble conveying the information to the actuary."42 Nevertheless, in early 2007, the actuaries began to develop a method to calculate the full actuarial cost of the purchase of additional accrual rate. Minutes of a Board meeting on August 27, 2007, reveal that, at the previous month's meeting, the Board had been presented with a draft ordinance, perhaps of the Plan or at least Section 8.08, as well as "buy-back tables" that appear to pertain to the purchase of additional accrual rate for a member who retired at age 52. An actuary referred to these tables as applicable to members purchasing "additional service," but these comments pertain to the purchase of additional accrual rate. Mr. Antonio replied that the "dynamic created by eligibility makes the cost very difficult to … estimate,"43 perhaps accurately commenting on the impact of the member's age at retirement on the full actuarial cost of the optional benefit. The actuary asked that each member seeking to purchase additional accrual rate be required to submit an application. At the time a Board trustee, Mr. Cowley asked for the chart as a guide for all members, even though the chart would overstate the cost for older members at retirement. Mr. Antonio seemed to discourage the broader use of a chart designed for a 52-year-old retiree, but incorrectly explained that, while he thought the chart would be accurate, the benefit and cost could be difficult to explain to members--obviously true if someone tried to explain the cost to a 65-year-old retiree based on a chart prepared for a 52-year-old retiree. The actuary said that she would expand the chart to include older members at retirement, and the Board agreed that members older than the oldest age used in the revised chart would apply for an individual calculation of the full actuarial cost. Mr. Antonio concluded the discussion by saying that he 42 Minutes of Board meeting on Nov. 26, 2018. 43 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 27, 2007. wanted "the chart" to be a fixed cost to members with Respondent bearing the financial burden of what he termed, "minor variations in experience." It seems as though Mr. Antonio was referring to the relatively minor cost of preparing a chart, rather than to a directive that the full actuarial cost disregard the age of the retiree--as before, at the expense of Respondent. The actuaries expended considerable time preparing the age-based "Buy Back Tables,"44 and the work proved to be much more difficult than they had initially expected. During a Board meeting in October 2007, the actuary, by letter, asked the Board to approve an increase in actuarial fees for this service from the quoted $2500 to $3000 to $19,424 for 89 hours of work already completed. The letter explained that "the unusual nature of the Plan's buyback provision" had necessitated "much more extensive testing than is required for other plans." Even though this optional benefit should have been rolled out for police officers months earlier, the Board deferred action on the request.45 These are all of the minutes of Board meetings in 2007 that are in the record. For all of 2007, the development of the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchase indisputably remained a work in progress. Regardless, Respondent contends, in derogation of the Board's minutes, that an interested member could, in late 2007, obtain the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate. In support of this fanciful contention, Respondent produced four exhibits. Respondent Exhibits 1 through 3 purport to be worksheets showing the calculation of the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchased 44 If Mr. Antonio's "fixed cost" reply ended the investigation into charging the full actuarial cost for the purchase of additional service years, this reference to "Buy Back Tables" is to the purchase of additional accrual rate. Otherwise, the tables might pertain to the purchase of additional accrual rate and additional years of service. 45 Minutes of Board meeting on Oct. 15, 2007. by three police officers: John Cameron,46 Marco McAdam,47 and Victor Lynch,48 respectively. In each case, the worksheet indicates that the member had completed probation less than 90 days earlier. The Cameron and McAdam worksheets depict four years' additional service and one year's additional accrual rate, and the Lynch worksheet depicts five years' additional accrual rate. There is no evidence about the authorship of these worksheets or, for the Cameron and McAdam worksheets, that the members were able to purchase the service and rate credit at the prices quoted. Respondent Exhibits 1 and 2 are thus entitled to no weight. By contrast, the Lynch worksheet is supported by Respondent Exhibit 4, which is documentation of actual payroll deductions. Both documents are consistent, showing a total cost of $55,840.50, 260 payroll deductions of $214.77 each, and a start date of October 15, 2007. However, Respondent Exhibits 3 and 4 do not support Respondent's claim that, in the fall of 2007, members were able to obtain the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchases, and, if they failed to do so, it was due to a lack of interest in this optional benefit. Given the timing of the Lynch worksheet and the request of the actuary for Board approval of fees over six times higher than the actuary had quoted for working up the full actuarial cost, the Lynch worksheet likely was a prototype that the actuary prepared in trying to develop a method for calculating full actuarial costs. Noticeably missing from the record is any indication that the calculations for the prototype Lynch worksheet proved reliable or the workup could be used for other members. Judging from the absence of Board-approved purchases the 46 Resp. Ex. 1. 47 Resp. Ex. 2. 48 Resp. Ex. 3. following year, either the Lynch calculations were unreliable or at least premature. Minutes of a Board meeting years later, in November 2018, address the Lynch worksheet. In this meeting, Mr. Dodea told Petitioner Roccisano that Mr. Dodea had found one early calculation of full actuarial cost--a calculation done by actuary, Chad Little, in 2008 for Victor Lynch, which the Board had approved. It seems that Mr. Dodea was off by one year in his description of Respondent Exhibit 3. Aptly, Petitioner Roccisano replied that all that this proved is that Mr. Lynch had found a "different channel" by which to obtain a calculation of the full actuarial cost of his purchase of additional accrual rate.49 The minutes of the Board meeting in January 2008 revealed progress in the preparation of an age chart for determining the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate for a span of ages at retirement. The Board agreed that any member over the ages shown on the chart should receive an individual calculation.50 The next Board meeting for which minutes are available took place in August 2008, and they confirm that, besides Mr. Lynch, no one had obtained the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate, so as to be able to make an informed purchase decision. An actuary stated that he would charge $600 for each such "buyback" calculation. Told that members had been waiting "for over a year" for an estimate of the full actuarial cost of a purchase of additional accrual rate, the Board agreed to send the information for these members to the actuary for calculations of their purchase prices. The motion 49 These minutes suggest that, contrary to Mr. Dodea's testimony (Tr., pp. 598, 601), he did not discover the Lynch worksheet on the day prior to the last day of the hearing, but, at best, he "rediscovered" it at that time. Given the treatment of the Lynch worksheet, Respondent's failure to disclose the existence of this exhibit in a more timely fashion is immaterial. 50 Minutes of Board meeting on Jan. 14, 2008. that passed specifically approved sending the information for members who "are past their one year anniversary since 9/30/06 through 9/30/08."51 In September 2008, a Board trustee raised the issue of interest on installment payments for "buyback purchases" and stated that the installment payments must not impact the trust assets. "Buyback purchases" may refer to the purchase of additional accrual rate, additional years of service, or both. Interest on the purchase of additional years of service makes sense, because 8.4% per year purchased does not seem to reflect the time value of money. Again, the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchased should reflect the time value of money, although nothing in the record clearly confirms that actuaries calculated a considerably higher full actuarial cost for installment payments than for a lump sum.52 This issue should have been resolved at this time--ideally based on the approach of the actuary calculating the full actuarial cost, but practically with a decision either to charge interest or not to charge interest. Instead, as detailed below, this issue lingered, unresolved, until February 2009. The same Board trustee raised the forfeiture issue by suggesting that members be allowed to obtain a refund of their payments toward additional accrual rate, presumably if they were unable to qualify for the rate due to insufficient years of service. The minutes state: "The City does not agree, 51 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 11, 2008. 52 Nine years later, in 2017, an actuarial letter prepared for Petitioner Manny Gonzalez alludes to this issue. Coyle Ex. 1, Bates Stamp, p. 5. The letter quotes nearly $80,000 as the cost of five years' additional accrual rate for retirement benefits commencing 11 years later. Given that the full actuarial cost likely approximated Mr. Gonzalez's annual salary, the letter unrealistically "recommend[s] … payment … be made as a lump sum within six months of the request." This seems like wishful thinking by the actuary, but was it to spare the actuary the task of recalculating the full actuarial cost if paid over ten years, running a simple installment payment plan with interest, running a simple installment payment plan without interest (and ignoring the time value of money), or avoiding the interest issue with Respondent? until they can resolve a separate issue related to interest on buyback payments over time." This quote marks the end of a documented, evidently brief discussion about interest and forfeitures--over one-and-one-half years after the Board initially referred the matter to its actuaries. The Board does not explicitly defer to Respondent's objection to refunds and claim that it must resolve the interest issue, but, characteristically, the Board took no action. At this point, both of these issues were overripe for resolution,53 and the Board's failure to proceed appears at least partly attributable to Respondent's refusal to agree--even though, two years earlier, Respondent had completed its relevant work when it incorporated the change, in implementable form, in the CBA. The next Board meeting for which minutes are available took place in January 2009. The actuary discussed the calculations of the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchases--work that was still "in the process." Someone asked whether a vested member would receive a refund of the purchase price if the member's services terminated, presumably prior to the 16th year of service. The Board attorney said that the member would receive a refund, but Mr. Antonio disagreed, adding that Respondent was negotiating this issue with the unions. A Board trustee raised the issue of interest, and Mr. Antonio replied that Respondent was negotiating this with the union. No one on the Board displayed the initiative to resolve the issues at this time. A Board trustee mentioned that two persons were "currently buying back time" and were not paying interest. Once again, a lack of clarity with nomenclature precludes a finding that Mr. Lynch had been joined by 53 It seems that these issues should have arisen and been resolved under the prior Plan provisions authorizing the purchase of either optional benefit at 8.4% of compensation per year purchased, even though the maximum repayment period for both options was only five years. It is unclear if the provision as to the 16th through 20th years of service previously applied to the purchase of additional accrual rate, but, if not, the forfeiture issue would have arisen at least when an unvested member terminated service. another lucky member; again, a member "buys back time" when purchasing additional years of service and buys rate when purchasing additional accrual rate. Rather than resolve the issue, the Board agreed on an impractical temporary fix: to provide members with two purchase prices--one with interest and one without interest. At the end of the minutes, a Board trustee noted that new employees did not know the cost of additional accrual rate, and the "Board must first retain an actuary"54--precisely what the Board had done two years earlier. At the Board meeting on the following month, the same Board trustee complained about the "buyback" calculations that had recently been completed for 14 members. Because Respondent had failed to indicate whether these installment payments would be charged interest, the calculations were done in the alternative, and the difference between each pair of calculations was "huge," thus demonstrating the impracticality of this "solution." However, this discussion concluded with an observation that "[s]ome members have already started buying back time."55 At a meeting in August 2009, the Board deferred the approval of "buyback statements" that had been prepared by an actuary.56 At the Board meeting the following month, the Board discussed a request of a member currently "buying back time." Without terminating employment, the member wanted to stop the purchase and obtain a refund of all payments previously made. The member added that he was under the old purchase price of 8.4%, suggesting that he was purchasing additional accrual rate, not years of service. The Board deferred action, but relieved the member from the responsibility of making further payments.57 54 Minutes of Board meeting on Jan. 5, 2008. 55 Minutes of Board meeting on Feb. 23, 2009. 56 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 24, 2009. 57 Minutes of Board meeting on Sept. 29, 2009. The next Board meeting for which minutes are available took place in January 2010. Board counsel informed the Board that the actuary had increased the cost of a calculation of additional accrual rate purchase to $350, but all other calculations would remain $100 per calculation.58 It seems, finally, that the Board had sorted out the remaining problems that had prevented the presentation of the full actuarial cost to a member purchasing additional accrual rate. By mid 2010, another issue had arisen, though. In July 2010, the Board considered the timeliness of a request to purchase an optional benefit relative to the expiration of probation. As noted above, a request for either optional benefit must be filed within 90 days of the completion of probation. An employee of the Board or Respondent advised the Board that members had been told to wait to purchase additional years of service until Respondent entered into a new collective bargaining agreement with the unions and, now that the parties had concluded a new agreement,59 the members wanted to proceed with their purchases of additional years of service. The Board agreed that it would allow these purchases to take place, but would need a list of these members.60 In August 2010, the Board was informed that a vested member had complained to the Florida Division of Retirement that, upon termination of employment, he had not received a refund of his payments for additional accrual rate. The Board declined to change its earlier decision, which evidently was not to refund the payments. In response to the business taken up at the July 2010 meeting, Mr. Dodea distributed a list of members who 58 Minutes of Board meeting on Jan. 11, 2010. 59 It is possible that a new collective bargaining agreement had resolved the issues of forfeitability of payments for additional accrual rate by a vested member and whether the installment payments bore interest. But the record contains no collective bargaining agreements subsequent to the CBA. 60 Minutes of Board meeting on July 12, 2010. wanted to purchase additional years of service, even though they were past 90 days from the end of their probation. Board counsel advised the Board that this process was being undertaken because, when the probation had ended for these members, a "final contract" was not in place.61 In any event, in October 2010, Board counsel presented lists of members who wanted to purchase additional accrual rate or additional years of service, but who were past 90 days from the end of their probation. The minutes reflect that Respondent had questioned by what authority the Board could "impasse [bypass?] the Ordinance," which probably means disregard the 90-day limitation periods, and Board counsel replied that Respondent would not have to amend the ordinance to authorize this extension of these two 90-day deadlines. Apparently mollified, Respondent insisted that the Board communicate a firm deadline to members by which they would have to elect one or both options. In other related business, the actuarial firm reported that it had completed its "first buyback calculation." But the actuary asked if the calculation was based on the member's base pay or pay with benefits. Suggestive of a program that was rolling out, finally, the Board told the actuary to use base pay--and not to charge interest on the installment payments.62 In April 2015, Board counsel stated that letters that the Board had sent to eligible members "a couple of years ago," advising them of the 61 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 23, 2010. Regardless of the status of any effort to document a collective bargaining agreement, the law unsurprisingly requires that, at all times, the provisions of a pension plan of the type at issue be documented, not open-ended. Section 175.261(2)(a)1. requires an annual filing with the Division of Retirement of "each and every instrument constituting or evidencing the plan." Chapter 175 applies to firefighters, and this requirement applies to "local law" plans, not "chapter" plans, which merely incorporate the relevant provisions of chapter 175. See § 175.032(4), (14) (definitions of "chapter plan" and "local law plan"). Similar provisions govern police pensions. See § 185.221(2)(a)1. 62 Minutes of Board meeting on Oct. 11, 2010. reopening of the window to purchase optional credit, had limited the reopening to the purchase of additional years of service. As noted above, four and one-half years earlier, the Board had approved such letters to members interested in purchasing either option. It seems that Board staff or the pension services representative had taken two years to mail or email these letters and had mistakenly dropped the option for the purchase of additional accrual rate. Board counsel asked if the Board wished to reopen the window for members interested in purchasing either option, and the Board agreed to do so.63 In May 2015, the Board clarified that, when the purchase window was reopened, the purchase price for additional years of service would be based on the member's current income, not the member's income in 2010.64 In its August 2015 meeting, Board staff informed the Board that buyback applications for the purchase of additional accrual rate and additional years of service had been emailed to all members with a deadline of September 18, 2015. Board staff advised that it would forward timely filed applications to the actuary for the calculation of the purchase price and then forward the price to the member, who would decide whether to complete the purchase.65 Minutes of the next month's Board meeting indicate that this process was continuing.66 In its August 2018 meeting, the Board was addressed by Petitioner Roccisano, who complained that the purchase price that he had been given for additional accrual time was based on current conditions, not the conditions when he first had the right to purchase additional accrual rate. By now a former Board trustee, Mr. Cowley confirmed that "the City" never 63 Minutes of Board meeting on Apr. 6, 2015. 64 Minutes of Board meeting on May 18, 2015. 65 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 24, 2015. 66 Minutes of Board meeting on Sept. 30, 2015. decided on the cost method, which "prohibited" a member from completing a timely purchase of additional accrual rate.67 Its own minutes reveal a Board that, sluggish, reactive, and aimless, failed to discharge its responsibility to implement the revision in the Plan requiring that members pay the full actuarial cost of additional accrual rate purchased. There were suggestions during the hearing that perhaps problems with certain actuaries or certain plan services representatives impeded this effort, but these advisors, like Board counsel, served the Board, and, if they failed to discharge their duties, it was the Board's job to replace them promptly with professionals who would timely do their jobs. From the minutes, the more prominent problem involving a third party was Respondent--specifically, the Board's reliance on Respondent's approval for administrative decisions that are assigned to the Board, not the Plan's sponsor. Respondent discharged its responsibilities with the documentation in the CBA of the changes to the purchase of additional accrual rate, as later enacted in Section 8.08, but the Board failed to discharge its responsibilities in the timely implementation of these changes--for years, not weeks or months. For these reasons, the Board prohibited members from purchasing additional accrual rate at all material times. On the other hand, no Petitioner ever submitted to the Board a request to purchase additional accrual rate in writing or at a Board meeting. 67 Minutes of Board meeting on Aug. 13, 2018. These comments get to the crux of the dispute from the perspective of Petitioners. They do not merely seek another reopening of the window to purchase additional accrual rate; now that this purchase is priced at full actuarial cost, Respondent may not even oppose such a remedy. Petitioners want to purchase additional accrual rate at the full actuarial cost, but as it would have been calculated when each petitioner first became eligible to purchase additional accrual rate--say, 12 or 13 years ago, not now. This administrative proceeding cannot reach such an issue. The Board did not contract with DOAH to address this issue and such a remedy likely represents damages, which are reserved for the judicial branch, not the mere application of basic principles of actuarial science, where investment returns, like time, wait for none of us, even the ever-youthful Petitioner Roccisano. The facts pertaining to each Petitioner are very similar. While still on probation, each Petitioner learned from more senior police officers or firefighters about the optional benefit for the purchase of additional accrual rate. If a police officer, the Petitioner contacted Mr. Cowley; if a firefighter, the Petitioner contacted Jim Bunce. Mr. Cowley was a Board trustee at all material times until at least early 2010. Mr. Bunce became a Board trustee by September 29, 2009, and remains on the Board; from 2007 until 2020, Mr. Bunce was the district president of the firefighters' union. Prior to the expiration of 90 days following the end of probation, each Petitioner contacted Mr. Cowley or Mr. Bunce, depending on whether Petitioner was a police officer or firefighter, and asked about purchasing additional accrual rate. In each case, Mr. Cowley or Mr. Bunce told the Petitioner that the optional benefit was not available due to problems in calculating the cost of the benefit and the absence of a procedure for applying for the benefit; each Petitioner was advised--or directed--to be patient. Sometimes, a Petitioner contacted an employee of Respondent, but was told the same thing. Petitioners completed their probations from March 12, 2008, in the case of Petitioner Pan, through June 8, 2010, in the case of Petitioner Bruce. At least 12 other members, who completed their probations from 2008 to 2012, are identically situated to Petitioners.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order determining that Petitioners have failed to prove that they timely submitted a request to 68 See footnote 2. purchase additional accrual rate in writing to the Board or orally at a Board meeting. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 2021. Michael Allen Braverman, Esquire Michael Braverman, P.A. 2650 West State Road 84, Suite 104 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Brendan Michael Coyle, Esquire Law Office of Brendan M. Coyle, P.A. 407 Lincoln Road, Suite 8-E Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Teri Guttman Valdes, Esquire Teri Guttman Valdes LLC 1501 Venera Avenue, Suite 300 Miami, Florida 33146 Brett J. Schneider, Esquire Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L. 1200 North Federal Highway, Suite 312 Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Garth Bonner (Address of Record) Luis Acosta (Address of Record) Janira Camero (Address of Record) Miguel Cordova (Address of Record) John Faul (Address of Record) Philip Rothman (Address of Record) Yvette de la Torre (Address of Record) Wissem Mejdoub (Address of Record) Gabriel Castillo (Address of Record) Gary di Lella (Address of Record) Robert David Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 7080 Northwest 4th Street Plantation, Florida 33317 Michelle Rodriguez, Plan Administrator City of Hallandale Beach Police Officers’ and Firefighters’ Pension Plan Foster and Foster Plan Administration Division 2503 Del Prado Boulevard South, Suite 502 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Pietro G. Roccisano (Address of Record) Anthony Gonzalez (Address of Record) Stephen Sanfilippo (Address of Record) Eric Bruce (Address of Record) David DeCosta (Address of Record)
The Issue Whether accounting fees charged in connection with petitioner's rate increase application should be included as rate case expense; and Whether anticipated accounting fees for "pass-through" rate increase requests should be included in annual operating expenses.
Findings Of Fact Accounting Fees as Part of Rate Case Expense At issue was whether Atlantis had substantiated the accounting fees it sought to include as rate case expense. Without objection, Atlantis agreed to submit a late-filed exhibit (P-2) itemizing the accounting tasks performed, the time required, and the fees charged. After reviewing that exhibit, the Commission agreed that the accounting fees were justified and should be included in rate case expenses. Consequently, operating expenses included in the Commission's proposed agency decision 2/ should be increased $2,659 for both water and sewer systems; this represents actual rate case expenses of $15,954 amortized over three years, allocated equally to each system. ($15,954/3 = $5,318/2 = $2,659.) (Testimony of Mitchell, Deterding; Commission's Recommended Order; P-2, R-1.) II. Accounting Fees for Projected "Pass-Through" Rate Increase Requests Atlantis is a small private utility providing water and sewer service to customers located in the City of Atlantis, Palm Beach County, Florida. On December 31, 1980, it had 893 residential- and 65 general-service water customers; 877 residential- and 28 general-service sewer customers. (Commission Order No. 10445.) The City of Lake Worth pumps Atlantis sewage effluent to the West Palm Beach regional sewer plant for treatment and disposal. The regional plant imposes a treatment charge which Lake Worth passes on to Atlantis. Twice a year the regional plant has increased its treatment charge to Lake Worth which, in turn, has passed on the increased costs to Atlantis. Such increases may be recovered by filing a "pass-through" rate increase request with the Commission. (Testimony of Mitchell, Deterding.) In the past, Atlantis employed a certified public accountant to assist in preparing "pass-through" rate increase requests. The accountant charged approximately $900 per "pass-through" request. He worked 25-30 hours per request at $36 per hour. Much of his time was spent preparing a billing analysis-- showing the number of bills rendered, cumulative gallons consumed, cumulative bills, and a consolidated factor. (Testimony of Mitchell, Neville.) Atlantis wishes to continue retaining the accountant for this purpose in the future by including $1,800 in operating expenses in anticipation of biannual "pass-through" rate increase requests. It contends that such an accounting expense is reasonable and necessary because of its limited staff: one full-time bookkeeper who handles billing and one part-time accountant who supervises daily office procedures and bookkeeping routines. The Commission contends that this anticipated accounting expense is unnecessary--that a "pass- through" rate increase request and the necessary documentation could easily be prepared by the staff bookkeeper. (Testimony of Mitchell, Neville, Deterding.) There is conflicting expert testimony on whether the preparation of such "pass-through" rate increase requests require the supervision and assistance of a certified public accountant. Phillip Mitchell, the accountant who performed this service for Atlantis in the past, testified that it is necessary; Floyd Deterding, the Commission's accountant, testified that it was not. Mr. Deterding's opinion is accepted as persuasive. Don Neville, the accountant who manages the daily affairs of Atlantis, testified that it would be much "easier" having Mr. Mitchell assist in preparing the "pass-through" requests; but he admitted that he thought the bookkeeper was competent enough to perform the work if Mr. Mitchell was unavailable. (Tr. 30.) Furthermore, a billing analysis (containing a consolidated factor and consumption by customer groups) is not a requirement for filing a "pass-through" request. The only items required are: A schedule of monthly charges for sewage treatment from governmental authority. A schedule of monthly gallons of purchased sewage treatment. A schedule of sewage treatment sold (billings to customers in gallons) by month. A schedule of the proposed rates which will pass the increased costs through, showing calculations thereof. A[n] affirmation from an officer that the increase will not cause the util- ity to overearn. A copy of the notice of the increase to customers. A certified copy of the letter, Order or Ordinance setting out the increased charges from the governmental authority. Finally, Mr. Mitchell was not a disinterested witness since--as the outside accountant--he stood to gain from including the $1,800 accounting fee in annual operating expenses. (Testimony of Neville, Deterding, Mitchell.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Atlantis to increase its water and sewer rates be granted, consistent with the Commission's proposed agency action dated December 9, 1981, and this recommended order. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times material to these proceedings, Petitioner Rodriguez has been employed by the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners as the Director of the Department of Emergency Support Services. This position is exempt from the Hillsborough County Civil Service Act because it is a managerial/executive position under the jurisdiction of the County Administrator. Petitioner's employment with the County allows him to participate in the Florida Retirement System administered by the Division. On January 1, 1988, the County implemented a classification and compensation system for all positions under the jurisdiction of the County Administrator that are exempt from the Civil Service Act. This system is known as the Hillsborough County Exempt Service Classification and Compensation Plan (the Plan). As an incumbent employee, Petitioner's salary was not reviewed or subjected to the compensation structure set forth in the Plan until October 1, 1988. Effective October 1, 1988, Petitioner's compensation with the County was structured according to the Plan, as revised May 1988. During his performance rating prepared December 12, 1988, Petitioner's job performance from October 1, 1987 through September 30, 1988 was found to exceed standards. Under the Plan, this meant that his current annual salary could be increased. The salary action permitted by the Plan was a combination of salary adjustment "merit increase" and a one-year "performance pay" increase. The salary adjustment under the "merit increase" category became part of Petitioner's adjusted base salary. The "performance pay" was an increase created for a one- year term. It was not part of Petitioner's base salary. This method of creating a pay increase applied to Petitioner because his pay was already above the midpoint of the pay grade the Plan dictated the County was willing to pay for the performance of his particular job when completed to the required standard. The division of salary increases above the midpoint into two separate categories was placed into the Plan in order to balance two distinct County interests. The first was to keep the maximum salary range in a pay grade aligned with the competitive salary indicators in the geographical area for the same type of work. The second was to annually reward each employee whose performance exceeded standards over the past year and to motivate continued high performance on a personalized basis. The compensation approved for Petitioner for October 1, 1988 through September 30, 1989, was a "merit increase" of three percent of his current annual salary along with a one-year "performance payment" of eight percent of his current annual salary. This created an annual salary of $58,177,00 base pay with a one-year performance increase of $4,514.00. Petitioner's total compensation for the time period was $62,691.00. The pay increase approved for Petitioner for October 1, 1989 through September 30, 1990, was a five percent "merit increase" and a four percent "performance payment" of his current salary. This gave Petitioner a new base pay of $61,090.00 with a one-year performance increase of $2,330.00. Petitioner's total compensation for the time period was $63,419.00. From October 1, 1990 through September 30, 1991, Petitioner had the same base pay and one year performance increase as the year before. So did every other employee subject to the Plan. This salary designation violated the Plan because a "merit increase" was required before a one year "performance pay" increase could occur. However, "performance pay" was still classified in the usual manner and was not pledged by the County as a payment that would be reoccurring. From October 1, 1991 to September 30, 1992, Petitioner's base salary is $66,020.42. The County no longer pays the "performance pay" previously in effect under the Plan. Instead, the part of Petitioner's salary designated as "performance pay" the year before was added into his base salary. As a result, retirement benefits are earned on Petitioner's entire salary in this pay period.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: Petitioner's "performance pay" received from October 1, 1988 through September 30, 1991, should be excluded from the calculation of his "average final compensation" by the Division. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1 and #2. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #5. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Reestablished each year. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #5, #6 and #10. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. Evidence is rejected because calculations are incorrect. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: GILBERT M RODRIGUEZ 18506 TURTLE DR LUTZ FL 33549 STANLEY M DANEK ESQ DIVISION OF RETIREMENT CEDARS EXECUTIVE CENTER/BLDG C 2639 N MONROE ST TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 1560 A J McMULLIAN III DIRECTOR DIVISION OF RETIREMENT CEDARS EXECUTIVE CENTER/BLDG C 2639 N MONROE ST TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 1560 AUGUSTUS AIKENS ESQ JOHN PIENO GENERAL COUNSEL SECRETARY OF ADMINISTRATION DEPT OF ADMINISTRATION 435 CARLTON BLDG 435 CARLTON BLDG TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 1560 TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 1560
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, St. Joe Paper Company, is a taxpayer subject to the requirements of the Florida Corporate Income Tax. Its principal offices are located at 803 Florida National Bank Building, Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner filed its 1976 calendar year tax return with respondent, Department of Revenue (Department), on September 23, 1977. Although filings are normally due on April 1, the filing was made pursuant to an extension of time to and including October 1, 1977 which was granted by the Department. Petitioner was subsequently audited by the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) for calendar years 1972 through 1977. Thereafter, petitioner and IRS entered into a settlement in 1982 wherein they agreed that certain adjustments were required for each of the audited tax years. The adjustments resulted in an overpayment of the Florida Income Tax for 1976. Subsection 220.23(2) , Florida Statutes, requires that a taxpayer notify the Department whenever an IRS audit results in adjustments to the taxpayer's net income subject to the Florida corporate income tax for any taxable year. Because the IRS sett1enent affected the years 1972 through 1977, petitioner filed amended returns for those years with the Department on October 8, 1982. According to the amended returns, petitioner owed additional taxes for all years except 1976, when it had made an overpayment. It added these deficiencies, totaling $82,003.03, and subtracted the overpayment for 1976 ($18,174.10), resulting in a net tax owed the Department of $63,828.94. Petitioner also computed interest owed on its deficiencies for the years 1972-1975 and 1977 to be $39,956.58 and offset this amount with a $12,067.40 credit which it claimed was interest owed it by the Department for its overpayment of taxes for calendar year 1976. When the interest was added to the $63,828.94, the total liability was $91,718.42. The record is unclear whether petitioner calculated its 1976 interest using a 12 percent or 6 percent rate. The proper rate to be used is 6 percent. On August 5, 1983 the Department directed petitioner to appear at its Jacksonville office on August 11 to pay $12,067.40 and if it failed to do so, a tax warrant would be issued. Thereafter, on August 9 petitioner paid the deficiency. On August 15, 1983 petitioner filed an Application for Refund Form DR- 26 requesting a refund of its August 9 payment. In its application, it stated chat "(i)nterest computed on the tax refund for 1976 was offset against interest due for other years", and that the Department's refusal to allow this offset was error. On August 19, 1983 the Department's classification officer, audit classification, issued a letter denying the application on the following grounds: Florida Statutes 214.14 requires that interest be paid should the Department take longer than nine (9) months to refund an overpayment of tax. When computing interest, the Department does so under the theory that each year stands alone. Consequently, offsetting of deficiencies and overpayments is not recognized when computing interest. Your letter of October 8, 1982, shows that check number 2400 was sent, with the Amended Florida returns, to pay the net additional tax and interest. Consequently, the 1976 refund would be deemed to have been made within the nine-month period required under Florida Statute 214.14. This letter prompted the instant proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: that petitioner's application for a refund be GRANTED and that it be computed at a 6 percent rate to run from October 1, 1977. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. W. W. Carlson Assistant Vice-President St. Joe Paper Co. 803 Florida National Bank Building Jacksonville, Florida 3220 Barbara Staros Harmon, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue Carlton Building, Room 102 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioner received more than one increase in pay in any twelve-month period for the category of added duties and responsibilities, Rule 60K-2.006, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Stephen C. Metzler is an Environmental Specialist II in a leadworker position with the Department. Stephen C. Metzler received an Increase to Base Rate of Pay for added duties in the amount of $69.39, on April 7, 1998. Thereafter, Robert Merritt was promoted and there was no one to supervise the employees that he had previously supervised. He asked Petitioner to continue to perform the duties he had been performing, and assume the supervisory duties that Merritt had previously performed. Merritt advised Petitioner that he would be given additional compensation for performing these duties. Petitioner assumed and performed these added supervisory duties, and Merritt administratively initiated the pay increase. Subsequently, the paperwork was prepared by one of Respondent's clerical personnel, reviewed by the personnel officer, and signed by Petitioner's superiors. Petitioner did not see this paperwork at any time prior to its submission and had no part in its preparation. Both of Petitioner's supervisors who had signed and approved the pay-raise testified. They were aware that Petitioner was performing supervisory, leadworker duties and it was their intent to increase his compensation for performing those duties. Metzler received an increase to his base rate of pay for added duties in the amount of $75.86, on October 2, 1998. The Escambia County Health Department was not aware of the rule of prohibiting more than one pay increase in twelve consecutive months for the same category. The Department of Management Services audited the payroll of the Department of Health and found several deficiencies including overpayment to Metzler. The Personnel Action Request Form dated April 7, 1999, indicated that the pay increase being approved was to Petitioner's base rate of pay for the performance of added duties. Under the section of the form relating to "Salary," there is no selection under "Salary Additive." The Personnel Action Request Form dated October 2, 1999, indicated that the pay increase being approved was to Petitioner's base rate of pay for the performance of added duties. However, under the section of the form relating to "Salary," salary additive, the block "leadworker" was checked. It was testimony of the personnel officer that, had they known of the Rule restricting two pay increases within twelve consecutive months, they would have checked the block under increase in base rate of pay, Internal Pay Relationships. That, together with the selection of "Leadworker" under "Salary Additive," would have been administratively correct. Both payroll request forms authorize the increase of pay by placing an "X" in the box "added duties." Personnel Action Request one authorized a raise on April 7, 1999, and Personnel Action Request two authorized a raise on October 2, 1999, which is within twelve months of the first raise. McCulough calculated the $1,010.80 overpayment by determining the increases paid prior to the expiration of the twelve-month period of the preceding raise for the same category, added duties and responsibilities. McCullough calculated the amount of overpayment and drafted a letter for the Director of the Health Department's signature. McCullough drafted the letter seeking reimbursement of the $1,010.80, because of the audit exception and the demand of the Department of Management Services to correct the administrative error that had been made.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent correct its paperwork and not attempt to collect the monies involved. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen C. Metzler 4048 Charles Circle Pace, Florida 32571 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Department of Health 1295 West Fairfield Drive Pensacola, Florida 32501 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Robert G. Brooks, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's 1987 budget for its fiscal year beginning July 1, 1986 and ending June 30, 1987 should be approved pursuant to Sections 395.509(2), (5), and (7), Florida Statutes (1985)?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The following findings of fact were contained in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation: The Petitioner's name and address are Doctors Memorial Hospital, 401 E. Byrd Avenue, Bonifay, Florida 32425. Doctors Memorial is located and operating in Holmes County. Doctors Memorial is owned by National Healthcare of Holmes County, Inc. The name and address of the agency affected are the Hospital Cost Containment Board, Executive Office of the Governor, State of Florida, Woodcrest Office Park, Building L, Suite 101, 325 John Knox Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32303. The HCCB I.D. number of Doctors Memorial is 10-0078. Doctors Memorial has standing in these matters based on the facts alleged in its petitions. The Petitioner is the only hospital located in Holmes County, Florida. The Petitioner was previously owned by the Holmes County Hospital Authority. The Petitioner was acquired by its present owner in November of 1984. The Petitioner is an investor-owned hospital. The Petitioner's fiscal year begins on July 1 of each year and ends on June 30 of the following year. Hospital Groupings. There are approximately 217 general acute care hospitals in Florida. Those hospitals are grouped into 10 general hospital groups, including one for teaching hospitals, for purposes of determining whether a hospital's budget is subject to further review. The Petitioner has been placed in the Respondent's Group 1, which consists of 17 hospitals, most of which are located in North Florida and the Panhandle. The average gross revenue per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as the "GRAA") of the hospitals in Group 1 has been considerably lower than the average GRAA of all other Florida hospitals. All of the hospitals in Group 1 have a fiscal year beginning October 1 of each year except the Petitioner. Therefore, except for the Petitioner, the 1987 fiscal year of all of the hospitals in Group 1 begins October 1, 1986. The "150-day letter". The Petitioner received a "150-day letter" prior to the preparation of its 1987 budget. The information contained in the 150-day letter was based upon data as of January 31, 1986. The 150-day letter indicated that the 50th percentile GRAA of the most recently approved budgets of Group 1 hospitals was $2,518.00. It was indicated in the 150-day letter that the upper 20th percentile GRAA of the most recently approved budgets of Group 1 hospitals was $3,390.00. It was indicated in the 150-day letter that the maximum allowable rate of increase (hereinafter referred to as the "MARI") for 1987 was 7.2 percent. The MARI consists of the National Hospital Input Price Index (hereinafter referred to as the "NHIPI") of 3.7 percent and "plus points" of 3.5 percent. The Petitioner's 1987 Budget. The following finding of fact was contained in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation: On or about March 27, 1986, Doctors Memorial submitted to the HCCB its projected 1987 fiscal year budget. Doctors Memorial's 1987 fiscal year begins on July 1, 1986, and runs through June 30, 1987. The Petitioner budgeted GRAA for 1987 of $3,009.00. This amount is 39.8 percent greater than its approved 1986 budgeted GRAA of $2,151.44. The Petitioner's 1987 budget also included the following pertinent amounts: net revenue per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "NRAA") of $2,025.00, total gross revenue of $4,397,436.00, total net revenue of $2,959,958.00 and operating revenue of $149,188.00. Gross revenue represents the amount patients are charged. Net revenue represents the amount of patient charges actually collected less certain write- offs or deductions. Determination of Whether the Petitioner's Budget was Subject to Review. The Petitioner's 1987 budgeted GRAA ranks between the 50th and the upper 20th percentile GRAA for Group 1 hospitals. The Petitioner's rate of increase in its 1987 budgeted GRAA over its approved 1986 budgeted GRAA of 39.8 percent is in excess of the MARI of 7.2 percent for 1987. Based upon these facts, the Petitioner's 1987 budget was not subject to automatic approval by the Respondent. The Respondent's Preliminary Findings and Recommendations. The following finding of fact was contained in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation: On May 16, 1986, Doctors Memorial received the Staff analysis and preliminary findings and recommendations relative to its 1987 fiscal year budget. Doctors Memorial was advised that the Staff would recommend to the HCCB that Doctors Memorial's budgeted gross revenue per adjusted admission and net operating revenue per adjusted admission for fiscal 1987 be adjusted downward for reasons set forth in the Staff analysis. Doctors Memorial timely filed its petition challenging Staff's recommendations on May 30, 1986. The Respondent preliminarily recommended that the Petitioner's GRAA be reduced by $599.00 from $3,009.00 to $2,410.00 and that the Petitioner's NRAA be reduced by $406.00 from $2,025.00 to $1,619.00. The amount of GRAA approved by the Respondent included the Petitioner's 1986 approved GRAA of $2,151.00, $80.00 attributable to inflation and $179.00 attributable to an increase in the average length of stay (hereinafter referred to as the "ALOS") at the Petitioner. The recommendation of the Respondent with regard to the reduction in GRAA would allow the Petitioner an increase of 12.04 percent in GRAA for 1987 over the Petitioner's 1986 budgeted GRAA. If no other adjustments are made in the Petitioner's 1987 budget, the proposed reduction in GRAA and NRAA will result in a total reduction of $875,139.00 of total gross revenue from $4,397,436.00 to $3,522,297.00 and a total reduction of $593,166.00 of total net revenue from $2,959,958.00 to $2,366,792.00. This would result in an operating loss of $443,978.00. In its preliminary findings and recommendations the Respondent indicated that it was concerned by the fact that the Petitioner's 1987 budgeted increase in GRAA exceeded the MARI and that most of the projected 38 percent increase in operating expenses per adjusted admissions over 1986 budget was attributable to increases in salaries and benefits. The Respondent also indicated the following policy applied in its preliminary findings and recommendations: Current agency policy states that hospital's [sic] exceeding the MARI can only increase gross revenue per adjusted admission to the National Hospital Input Price Index (NHIP) of 3.7 percent without further justification. Any increase in excess of the NHIPI must be sufficiently justified and quantified to staff. This policy was set out in memoranda to all financial analysis personnel of the Respondent from Mr. John Pattillo Chief Financial Analyst of the Respondent, dated May 16, 1986 and June 19, 1986. Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1985)-- Is the Petitioner's Rate of Increase in its GRAA Just, Reasonable and Not Excessive? On May 30, 1986, the Petitioner submitted Objections to the Respondent's preliminary findings and recommendations in an effort to support its increase in its GRAA. The increase in the Petitioner's 1987 budgeted GRAA includes an across-the-board patient rate increase of 6.8 percent. The Petitioner has not increased its patient rate since October of 1984. The balance of the increase in the Petitioner's 1987 GRAA is attributable to the following facts. The NHIPI is a average rate of inflation for hospitals in the United States. It represents the additional costs of providing services by hospitals in the Country caused by inflation. The NHIPI of 3.7 percent should be allowed in determining the Petitioner's GRAA rate of increase for 1987. This would result in an increase in the Petitioner's GRAA for 1987 over its approved 1986 budgeted GRAA of $80.00 ($2,151.00 1986 GRAA x 3.7 percent NHIPI = $80.00). In determining what GRAA rate of increase should be approved it is reasonable to also take into account an inflation rate which takes into account Florida's unique characteristics compared to the rest of the country. In Florida, there are more elderly, Medicare patients are much older on average, there is an impact on health care costs from seasonality, there is a migrant labor force, Medicaid coverage is poor, the cost of living is higher than in most southern states and there are a large number of standard metropolitan statistical areas (areas with a city with a population or a county with a central city, with a population greater than 50,000 people). The rate of inflation unique to Florida is not capable of quantification absent evidence on a case by case basis. Other than the fact that the Petitioner's Medicare and Medicaid coverage is higher than most other areas of the State of Florida, the characteristics unique to Florida which affect inflation do not apply in this case. The Petitioner has budgeted Medicaid utilization of 10.7 percent (in the upper 20th percentile of the State where the average is only 3.9 percent), Medicare utilization of 65 percent (in the upper 20th percentile of Group 1 hospitals) and uncompensated indigent care of 11.1 percent (above the 50th percentile of the State 50th percentile of 6.2 percent). These figures represent an extremely high percentage of patients who do not pay full charges (almost 87 percent). The Respondent recognizes that hospitals with Medicaid utilization in the upper 20th percentile statewide may tend to have a higher GRAA than similar hospitals. The Respondent did not, however, take this consideration into account in reviewing the Petitioner's budget for 1987. Using an appropriate method of quantifying the effect of Medicaid on the Petitioner's GRAA, the Petitioner proved that its high Medicaid utilization would justify an additional 198.64 of GRAA for 1987. Using appropriate methods of quantifying the effect of Medicare and indigent care on the Petitioner's GRAA, the Petitioner proved that it was justified in including an additional $32.39 of GRAA attributable to Medicare and an additional $96.77 of GRAA attributable to indigent care. In 1986 the Petitioner budgeted $29,421.00 for insurance expense. In 1987 the Petitioner budgeted $77,000.00 for insurance. The Petitioner cannot control the amount of its insurance expense. In Order for the Petitioner to recoup the additional cost of insurance the Petitioner must increase its net revenue in an amount equal to the increase in its insurance costs and its gross revenue in an even greater amount. Based upon the Respondent's own method of increasing GRAA on account of the increase in insurance costs, the additional GRAA attributable to the increase would be $48.38. Taking into account the effect of Medicare and Medicaid on the difference in gross revenues and net revenues, the Petitioner would be justified in increasing its GRAA from 1986 to 1987 by $162.83 on account of the increase in insurance costs. Beginning in the second calendar quarter of 1986, the Petitioner added physician specialists from its courtesy staff to active staff. Physicians added include a cardiologist in January of 1986, an orthopedic surgeon, a urologist, a general surgeon, a thoracic and vascular surgeon and a specialist in internal medicine. Several of these physicians moved their practices from Washington County Hospital, which has been experiencing financial difficulties. The addition of physician specialists can have a significant impact on the intensity of services offered at a hospital and its GRAA. This is especially true at a hospital as small as the Petitioner. For example, the addition of the cardiologist at the Petitioner in January of 1986, resulted in six to seven patients a day on average at the Petitioner. The addition of the thoracic surgeon, the cardiovascular surgeon, the orthopedic surgeon and the cardiologist could have the effect of increasing GRAA by $121.31 due to the increase in intensity of services caused by their addition. The Respondent did not allow any increase in the Petitioner's GRAA on account of the addition of physicians to the Petitioner's staff or the impact of their addition on the intensity of services at the Petitioner. The only rationale offered by the Respondent for not taking these facts into account was based upon speculation by Mr. Pierce that the added physicians might resolve their reasons for leaving Washington County Hospital and leave the Petitioner's staff. The fact that the Petitioner added a family practitioner and a GYN and general surgeon since April of 1986 and an internist in July of 1986 supports a conclusion that it does not appear that the added physicians will be leaving the Petitioner any time in the near future. In its 1987 budget the Petitioner projected an increase in its ALOS of 5.5 days. This amounts to an increase of 0.7 days over the 1986 budgeted ALOS of the Petitioner of 4.8 days. The Petitioner's budgeted ALOS for 1987 was based upon the actual ALOS of the Petitioner from July of 1985 to February of 1986 of 5.57 days. More recent data through May of 1986 proves that the actual ALOS for 1986 is 5.57 days. It is doubtful that this ALOS for the first 11 months of 1986 will change substantially during the last month of the Petitioner's 1986 fiscal year. The Respondent allowed an increase in the Petitioner's GRAA based upon the impact of an increase in its ALOS of 0.35 days. Initially, however, the Respondent's analyst who reviewed the Petitioner's budget had recommended approval of the 0.7 day increase contained in the Petitioner's budget. This recommendation was not accepted because of the Respondent's policy of limiting the rate of increase in a hospital's GRAA to the NHIPI. The Respondent ultimately allowed an increase in the Petitioner's GRAA based upon the impact of an increase in its ALOS of 0.35 days. This increase amounted to an additional $179.00 of GRAA. The increase in GRAA approved by the Respondent attributable to an increase of 0.35 days ALOS was based upon the actual ALOS of the Petitioner for the first 6 months of the 1986 fiscal year. No greater increase was allowed because the Respondent was concerned that the ALOS for the entire 1986 fiscal year might fluctuate because of seasonality. Based upon the actual ALOS of the Petitioner through May of 1986, the budgeted ALOS increase of 0.7 days and a total budgeted ALOS of 5.5 days for 1987 is reliable and should be accepted. An ALOS of 5.5 days justifies an increase in the Petitioner's 1986 GRAA of $36O.00. The methodology utilized by the Petitioner in arriving at this amount is reasonable. The Petitioner budgeted a 6 percent increase in salaries per manhour over that level of salaries existing at the time the 1987 budget was prepared (March of 1986). This increase includes a 5 percent merit salary raise which the Petitioner normally gives to its employees on their anniversary dates and a 1 percent increase attributable to merit raises between March of 1986 and the end of the 1986 fiscal year. The additional increase in salary and benefit costs budgeted for 1987 over 1986 is attributable to the fact that the current owner of the Petitioner has replaced non-technical employees such as aides and orderlies with more skilled personnel such as registered nurses. Also, the Petitioner's increase in census and budgeted admissions and the fact that those increases have resulted in the need for more skilled personnel has caused the increase in salary and benefits costs. The Petitioner's total average salaries, benefits and manhours are very reasonable when compared with hospitals located in surrounding counties. The Petitioner's total salaries per FTE and the total benefits per FTE are below the 50th percentile of hospitals in surrounding counties. The Petitioner's total manhours also are below the 50th percentile for hospitals in Group 1. It is unreasonable for the Respondent to expect the Petitioner to reduce its salary and benefit costs in the amount recommended by the Respondent. The Petitioner would very likely lose employees which would affect the Petitioner's ability to provide quality services. The salary and benefits budgeted by the Petitioner for 1987 are reasonable. The Petitioner has projected a 5 percent operating margin in its 1987 budget. This operating margin is reasonable. This would result in total operating revenue over expenses of $149,188.00 and an after-tax profit of $81,561.00. If the Respondent's recommended GRAA and NRAA were proper and no other changes were made to the Petitioner's budget, the Petitioner's operating margin would be a minus 18.8 percent. The Respondent recommended that the Petitioner reduce salary and benefits expenses in the 1987 budget by $432,544.00 to the Petitioner's 1986 level of salary and benefits. This reduction, which is unreasonable, would result in an operating margin of 0.3 percent and an operating profit of $7,850.00 before taxes. The evidence does not support a finding of fact that the Respondent's recommendation is reasonable. An operating margin of 5 percent is substantially less than the average operating margin for other investor-owned hospitals in the State of 13.3 percent. In reviewing hospital budgets, the Respondent generally compares the operating margin of the hospital subject to review with similar hospitals in Florida. The Respondent did not do so in this case. The recommendations of the Respondent would adversely affect the Petitioner's ability to earn a reasonable rate of return. The recommendations of the Respondent could drastically hinder the Petitioner's ability to efficiently operate. The Petitioner's budgeted 1987 expenses are reasonable. In 1985 the Petitioner reported a budgeted GRAA of $2,234.66. The Petitioner's audited actual 1985 GRAA was $2,467.69. The Petitioner's actual experience with regard to GRAA in 1985 was 10.4 percent greater than its budgeted GRAA. In 1985 the Petitioner reported a budgeted NRAA of $1,392.39. The Petitioner's audited actual 1985 NRAA was $1,899.48. The Petitioner's actual experience with regard to NRAA in 1985 was 36.4 percent greater than its budgeted NRAA. In 1986 the Petitioner reported a budgeted GRAA of $2,151.44. The Petitioner's audited actual 1986 GRAA was $2,865.92. The Petitioner's actual experience with regard to GRAA in 1986 was 33.2 percent greater than its budgeted GRAA. In 1986 the Petitioner reported a budgeted NRAA of $1,454.70. The Petitioner's actual experience with regard to NRAA in 1986 was 36.4 percent greater than its budgeted NRAA. The Petitioner's 1987 budgeted GRAA ranks 8th out of the 17 hospitals in Group 1, only 1 ranking higher than the 50th percentile hospital. This comparison is based upon the 1986 budgeted GRAA of the hospitals in Group 1 as of January 31, 1986, fiscal year adjusted. The Petitioner's 1986 budget was low when compared with other Group 1 hospitals. Its GRAA ranked 12th and its NRAA ranked 14th out of 17 hospitals. These rankings were below the 50th percentile. The Petitioner's budgeted GRAA and GRAA for 1986 were, however, considerably lower than its actual 1986 GRAA and NRAA as discussed supra. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner's rate of increase in its 1987 budgeted GRAA over its approved 1986 budgeted GRAA is just, reasonable and not excessive. The Petitioner has proved that in addition to its 1986 budgeted GRAA of $2,151.00, it is entitled to GRAA in 1987 for additional physicians it has added to its staff ($121.00), inflation ($80.00), its increased ALOS ($360.00), its high rate of Medicare use ($32.00), its high rate of Medicaid use ($199.00), its high rate of indigent care use ($97.00), and to cover the increase in its insurance costs ($163.00). The Petitioner has also proved that it is entitled to a reasonable rate of return. The Petitioner has justified an amount of 1987 budgeted GRAA in excess of the $3,009.00 of GRAA included in its 1987 budget.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's 1987 fiscal year budget filed with the Respondent be approved as submitted. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of July, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2111H The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they were accepted. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reasons for their rejection have also been noted. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph Number: Accepted in RO 1 and 2. Accepted in RO 1, 3 and 4. Accepted in RO 13-15. Accepted in RO 6-8. The first sentence of this proposed finding of fact is accepted in RO 9 and 10. The remainder of this proposed finding of fact is rejected as not relevant. The percentiles of Group 1 hospitals for GRAA relevant to this proceeding are those as of 150 days prior to the beginning of the Petitioner's fiscal year. The first sentence of this proposed finding of fact is accepted in RO The second sentence is rejected because only the percentiles of Group 1 hospitals for GRAA 150 days prior to the beginning of the Petitioner's fiscal year are relevant. The last sentence is accepted in RO 17. The first three sentences of this proposed finding of fact are accepted in RO 12 and 14 except that the portion of the second sentence to the effect that hospitals between the 50th and 80th percentile GRAA are automatically entitled to an increase in their GRAA equal to the MARI is rejected as contrary to the law. The next to the last sentence of this proposed finding of fact is rejected as irrelevant. The last sentence is accepted in RO 65 and 66. Accepted in RO 28 and 29. Except for the amount of total gross revenue, this proposed finding of fact is accepted in RO 15, 16, 20, 21 and 24. The correct amount of total gross revenue is $4,397,436.00, not $4,907,436.00 as suggested by this proposed finding of fact. The first sentence of this proposed finding of fact is accepted in RO The second sentence is accepted in RO 59. The remainder of the proposed finding of fact is rejected as irrelevant. There is no requirement in the law that the Respondent suggest how the Petitioner should adjust its budget to reflect a recommendation from the Respondent as to what its budgeted GRAA should be. Accepted in RO 27. This proposed finding of fact is rejected as not relevant. Section 395.509(4), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that hospitals are to be grouped to "assist" in making determinations under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1985). This does not preclude a hospital subject to review under Section 395.509(5), from making comparisons with other groups of hospitals such as those throughout the State or in neighboring counties. The Petitioner, however, failed to prove that such comparisons are relevant in this proceeding. The first two sentences of this proposed finding of fact are accepted in RO 67. The last sentence is rejected for the same reasons paragraph 12 was rejected. Accepted in RO 68. 15-18. These proposed findings of fact are rejected for the same reasons paragraph 12 was rejected. Accepted in RO 52 and 53. Accepted in RO 54. Accepted in RO 55, 56 and 59. Accepted in RO 41-44. The first sentence of this proposed finding of fact is rejected as not relevant. The rest of the proposed finding of fact is accepted in RO 41 and 42. Accepted in RO 43. Accepted in RO 44. Accepted in RO 45 and 46. Accepted in RO 47 and 48. Accepted in RO 49 and 50. This proposed finding of fact is rejected. This proposed finding of fact is essentially argument as to what constitutes competent substantial evidence in this proceeding. Accepted in RO 50 and 51. This proposed finding of fact is rejected. This proposed finding of fact is essentially argument as to whether certain testimony should be accepted in support of a finding of fact. (page 13): Accepted in RO 57. Except for the last sentence, this proposed finding of fact is accepted in RO 57 and 60. The last sentence is rejected. The Petitioner's 1986 GRAA already includes a reasonable rate of return which is in turn included in its 1987 budgeted GRAA. It would not be proper to include an additional amount of profit in determining whether its projected rate of increase in its GRAA for 1987 is just, reasonable and not excessive. Accepted in RO 60. Accepted in RO 61. Accepted in RO 61. This proposed finding of fact is rejected. It is not relevant to this proceeding because each case must be judged on its own merits. Accepted in RO 34. Accepted in RO 35 and 36. Accepted in RO 37. 40-42. These proposed findings of fact are rejected as essentially argument concerning the weight to be given to certain evidence. Accepted in RO 38. Accepted in RO 39. Accepted in RO 40. Accepted in RO 40. 47 and 49. The proposed findings of fact contained in these paragraphs deal primarily with the rule challenge brought by the Petitioner in D0AH Case No. 86-2014R. Therefore, most of these proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this proceeding. The first sentence in paragraph 49 has been accepted in RO 22 and 30. See also RO 26 and 31-33. 48. This proposed finding of fact is rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. See RO 31-33. 50. Most of these proposed findings of fact are accepted in RO 30, 36, 37, 40, 43, 51, 69 and 70. The proposed findings of fact contained in this paragraph which are inconsistent with those RO paragraphs are rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 51 and 52. This proposed finding of fact is rejected as not relevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. The evidence does not prove that what the Respondent has done in budget amendment cases is applicable to a budget review case or that what the Respondent has done in other cases is equally applicable in this case. This proposed finding of fact is rejected as not relevant. This proposed finding of fact is rejected as not relevant. Accepted in RO 1. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph Number: The first sentence of this proposed finding of fact is accepted in RO 3 and 13. The last sentence is rejected as a statement of law. Accepted in RO 12, 14, 23, 28 and 29. The first sentence of this proposed finding of fact is rejected as a statement of law. Except for the last sentence, the remainder of this proposed finding of fact is accepted in RO 63-66. The last sentence is rejected as argument. The first two sentences of this proposed finding of fact are accepted in RO 45 and 46. The remainder of this proposed finding of fact is rejected as not relevant. The first two sentences of this proposed finding of fact are rejected as statements of law. The remainder of the proposed finding of fact are accepted in RO 26, 31 and 33. Except for the last sentence this proposed finding of fact is accepted in RO 41 and 44. The last sentence is rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. The first two sentences of this proposed finding of fact are rejected as not relevant and contrary to the law. The third sentence is hereby accepted. The fourth through sixth sentences are rejected as statements of the law and argument. The rest of the proposed finding of fact is hereby accepted. This proposed finding of fact is rejected as argument. There is absolutely no requirement that a witness who otherwise has knowledge of the finances of a hospital must present documentary evidence to support and substantiate his or her testimony. If the Respondent has any doubts as to the truth of the Petitioner's witnesses, it had ample opportunity prior to the final hearing to discover evidence which would disapprove the evidence presented by the Petitioner's witnesses or to present other testimony to refute the testimony of the Petitioner's witnesses. The testimony of the Petitioner's witnesses constitutes competent substantial evidence of a kind which is always presented and acceptable in administrative proceedings. This proposed finding of fact is rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. Although there was some evidence to support this proposed finding of fact, that evidence was to sketchy and unpersuasive to overcome the evidence concerning the Petitioner's methods of computing a just, reasonable and not excessive 1987 GRAA. COPIES FURNISHED: John H. Parker, Jr., Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs 1200 Carnegie Building 133 Carnegie Way Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs The Perkins House, Suite 101 118 North Gadsden Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Curtis A. Billingsley, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Hospital Cost Containment Board Woodcrest Office Park Building L, Suite 101 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 James J. Bracher Executive Director Hospital Cost Containment Board Woodcrest Office Park Building L, Suite 101 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 =================================================================
The Issue The issues in this case are the amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to Petitioners pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2007);1 whether Petitioners are entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Subsections 57.105(5), 120.569(2)(e), and 120.595(4), Florida Statutes; and, if so, what amount should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact Each of the 14 Petitioners filed separate rule challenges, challenging the validity of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-26.2031 and challenging eight statements of policy of the Board of Pharmacy, which statements had not been adopted as rules. Prior to the filing of his or her rule challenge, each Petitioner had graduated from a pharmacy school located outside the United States and had taken and passed the Foreign Pharmacy Graduate Equivalency Examination, the Test of Spoken English, and the Test of English as a Foreign Language. Petitioners had been issued Intern Registrations by the Board of Pharmacy. All but two of the Petitioners had submitted an application to be admitted to the professional licensure examination. Those applications had been denied. All Petitioners, including the two Petitioners who had not submitted an application, had applied to the Board of Pharmacy for a variance or waiver to allow them to sit for the professional licensure examination. The Board of Pharmacy denied each Petitioner’s application for a variance or waiver. Each Petitioner had been represented by The Health Law Firm in their applications for a variance or waiver and wanted The Health Law Firm to continue to represent them in the rule challenge. When asked why the Petitioners had contacted The Health Law Firm to represent them, an attorney for The Health Law Firm stated: I think they have a network where word just gets around. And they-–I believe they even had some sort of list serve or Web site where they had all noted that they were being treated unfairly, and so they knew each other. And maybe our name got out on that or something. But they-–they all seemed to know each other-–seemed to know each other. Additionally, The Health Law Firm had sent out letters soliciting the foreign pharmacy graduates to join the rule challenge. An attorney for The Health Law Firm was not sure whether the letter had been posted on the web site for the foreign pharmacy graduates. In several of the invoices submitted by The Health Law Firm, there was a charge of $20.00 for a “[t]elephone conference with client’s colleagues who are in the same situation and interested in filing petitions for waivers and joining the rule challenge.”2 Thus, the circumstances surrounding the representation of Petitioners by The Health Law Firm do not demonstrate that it was a coincidence that Petitioners just happened to pick The Health Law Firm to represent them in the rule challenges. The Health Law Firm decided to file 14 separate petitions instead of one petition with 14 petitioners. The reason for the filing of the separate petitions was to increase the amount of attorney’s fees which could be awarded. Given the inexperience of attorneys at The Health Law Firm with rule challenges and the difficulty in understanding the speech of Petitioners, who received their pharmacy training in countries other than the United States, The Health Law Firm felt that it was not economically feasible to pursue the rule challenge for $15,000.00. Petitioners had a common goal, i.e. to be allowed to sit for the professional licensure examination. The wording of each of the petitions was essentially the same except for the names of the individual Petitioners. Because the issues were the same for all the rule challenges, the rule challenges were consolidated for final hearing. No final hearing was held in the consolidated cases. The parties agreed that, based on the parties’ Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, there were no disputed issues of material fact and agreed to file proposed final orders addressing each party’s position regarding the application of the law to the stipulated facts. The Board of Pharmacy conceded that Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-26.2031 was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and Petitioners were determined to prevail on the issue of the invalidity of the existing rule. On the challenge to the Board of Pharmacy’s policy statements, four statements were determined to meet the definition of a rule. The Board of Pharmacy conceded in the parties’ pre-hearing stipulation that the instructions in the Foreign Pharmacy Graduate Application for Licensure by Examination, directing applicants not to apply prior to obtaining all the required internship hours, constituted a non-rule policy. On August 1, 2008, in response to its concession that some of the statements or policies at issue were invalid non-rule policies, the Board of Pharmacy had published, in the Florida Administrative Law Weekly, a Notice of Rule Development for Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-26.2031. On August 21, 2008, the Board of Pharmacy approved changes to Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16- 26.2031, eliminating the Foreign Pharmacy Graduate Examination Committee (FPGEC) requirement, incorporating by reference the Foreign Graduate Examination Application, and stating the time frames for the application of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-26.2031. Pursuant to Subsection 120.56(4)(e), Florida Statutes, the portion of the petitions dealing with the statements on which the Board of Pharmacy did not prevail was abated pending the rulemaking process. Petitioners did not prevail on four of the policy statements they challenged. These were the policy statements which the Board of Pharmacy contested. Based on the invoices submitted, the parties attempted to settle the case. Essentially, the Board of Pharmacy had started rule development which eliminated the requirement in the existing rule which caused it to be invalid and which dealt with the unpromulgated rule issues that the Board of Pharmacy had conceded in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation. Petitioners wanted to be able to sit for the National Association of Pharmacy Licensure Examination (NAPLEX) and the Multistate Pharmacy Jurisprudence Examination (MPJE). All Petitioners who had a Foreign Pharmacy Graduate Application for Licensure by Examination pending on August 21, 2008, were approved by the Board of Pharmacy to sit for the NAPLEX and the Florida version of the MPJE. Thus, by August 21, 2008, those Petitioners had reached their goal. The impediment to settling the cases was the amount of attorney’s fees that should be awarded to Petitioners. There was no undue delay by the Board of Pharmacy or anything which could be attributed to the Board of Pharmacy as needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. The Board of Pharmacy correctly contended that the amount of fees requested by Petitioners was unreasonable. The Partial Final Order entered in the underlying rule challenges held that Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. The Board of Pharmacy was not substantially justified in promulgating the challenged rule in the underlying case and did not demonstrate that special circumstances existed to warrant the promulgation of the challenged rule. The Board of Pharmacy did not demonstrate that the statements which constituted unpromulgated rules are required by the Federal Government to implement or retain a delegated or approved program or to meet a condition to receipt of federal funds. Each Petitioner entered into a contingency fee contract3 with The Health Law Firm to represent him or her in a rule challenge. The parties have agreed that the hourly rate of $350.00 per hour for the services of George F. Indest, III, Esquire, is reasonable and fair under the circumstances. The parties have agreed that some of the hourly rates being claimed for the other attorneys and employees of The Health Law Firm are reasonable and fair under the circumstances. Those fees are $200.00 and $150.00 per hour for the associate attorneys, $80.00 per hour for the paralegals, and $70.00 per hour for the legal assistants. There were a few entries in the invoices made by senior attorneys for whom the rate charged is $300.00 per hour. Based on the rates charged for the senior partner and the associate attorneys, an hourly rate of $300.00 for a senior attorney is reasonable. The names of the attorneys and staff and the respective hourly rate amount for each are listed below. In discussing the reasonableness of the fees claimed in the various invoices, the attorneys and staff will be referred to by their initials as listed in the invoices. Initials Name Hourly Rate GFI George F. Indest, III, Senior Partner $350.00 MLS Michael L. Smith, Senior Attorney $300.00 JK Joanne Kenna, Senior Attorney $300.00 TJJ Teresa J. James, Attorney $200.00 MRG Matthew R. Gross, Attorney $150.00 JP Justin Patrou, Law Clerk $100.00 GJ Gail Joshua, Senior Paralegal $80.00 PD Pamela Dumas, Litigation Clerk $80.00 SF Sandra Faiella, Paralegal $80.00 RS Rebecca Simmons, Paralegal $80.00 AE Alexa Eastwood, Legal Assistant $70.00 SE Shelly Estes, Legal Assistant $70.00 The amount of fees claimed by each Petitioner for representation by The Health Law Firm for the rule challenge is listed below. These amounts are based on the individual invoices and the first consolidated invoice:4 Name Amount Vipul Patel $15,212.36 Miriam Hernandez $15,683.36 Mirley Aleman-Alejo $11,469.36 Valliammai Natarajan $5,074.36 John H. Neamatalla $11,215.36 Samad Mridha $13,650.36 Se Young Yoon $12,292.36 Saurin Modi $10,093.36 Deepakkumar Shah, M.Ph. $11,764.36 Mijeong Chang $12,528.36 Nabil Khalil $10,272.36 Hadya Alameddine $5,313.36 Balaji Lakshminarayanan $4,585.36 Anand Narayanan $4,218.36 Total $143,372.04 Sandra Ambrose testified as an expert witness on behalf of Petitioners. Her opinion is that the amounts claimed are based on a reasonable number of hours expended in the litigation of the rule challenge. However, Ms. Ambrose has never represented a client in a rule challenge. It was Ms. Ambrose’s opinion that the difficulty in the cases was a result of the number of Petitioners not the issues to be litigated. Having reviewed all the invoices submitted in these cases, the undersigned cannot credit Ms. Ambrose’s testimony that the fees are reasonable. The Board of Pharmacy argues that the amount of fees and costs should be limited to the amount expended in the petition brought by the first Petitioner, Vipul Patel. The expert who testified for the Board of Pharmacy did not give a definite amount that he considered to be a reasonable fee in these cases. Prior to the final consolidation of all 14 rule challenges, The Health Law Firm invoiced for its services and costs by individual Petitioner. After all 14 rule challenges were consolidated, The Health Law Firm invoiced for its time and costs via a consolidated invoice. The undersigned has painstakingly reviewed all the invoices that were submitted to support Petitioners’ claims for fees and costs in the rule challenges and finds the fees requested are not reasonable. On May 15, 2008, the invoices for Case Nos. 08-2733RX contained the following entry for MRG. “Review/analyze final order. Strategize regarding final order.” The final order appears to be related to a petition5 for a waiver or variance before the Board of Pharmacy, and the entry is deleted. This conclusion is supported by the entry in the invoice dated May 29, 2008, relating to a telephone conference with the client relating to a re-petition for waiver. In Case No. 08-2730RX, there is an entry on May 27, 2008, for .10 hours for MRG, but no service is listed. That entry is deleted. On June 6, 2008, MRG entered .50 hours each in Case Nos. 08-2728RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2733RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, 08-2824RX, and 08-3298RX. The entry stated: “Continue preparing rule challenge and waiver.” The Health Law Firm represented the Petitioners in four of these cases before the Board of Pharmacy on June 10, 2008, on their petitions for a wavier or variance. The invoice does not delineate the amount of time that was spent on the rule challenge and the amount of time that was spent on the waiver cases. Therefore, the time is divided equally and .25 hours in each case is charged toward the rule challenge. 23. On June 9, 2008, in Case Nos. 08-2733RX, 08-2730RX, 08-2731RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2729RX, and 08-2732RX, the senior partner of The Health Law Firm entered .30 hours for each case, which stated: “Prepare letter to Division of Administrative Hearings forwarding Petition for Rule Challenge to be filed.” The letter which accompanied the petitions in these cases stated: Dear Clerk: Attached for filing, please find a separate Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Agency Rule and the Invalidity of Agency Policy and Statements defined as Rules, for each of the individuals listed below: Miriam L. Hernandez Mirley Aleman-Alejo Se Young Yoon John H. Neamatalla Valliammai Natarajan Md. A. Samad Mridha Thank you for your assistance in this matter. For this letter, Petitioners are claiming 1.8 hours or $630.00. This is not reasonable. On the same date, GFI prepared a similar transmittal letter in Case No. 08-2728RX and listed .3 hours, which is a reasonable amount for the preparation of such a letter. Thus, the preparation of the transmittal letter on June 9th for Case Nos. 08-2733RX, 08-2730RX, 08-2731RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2729RX, and 08-2732RX is reduced to .3 hours, which is prorated to .05 hours for those cases. The senior partner in The Health Law Firm claims 23.6 hours during June 3 through 5, 2008, for the following service which was entered on the invoices for Case Nos. 08-2730RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2731RX, 08-2823RX, 08-3298RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2728RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2733RX, and 08-2824RX. Conduct legal research, review statutes, cases (approximately 28 cases reviewed and analyzed) and two (2) different Florida Administrative Law legal treatises regarding rule challenges and challenging agency statements not adopted as rules, in order to properly prepare Petition for Formal Rule Challenge in case. Research legal issues including administrative agency rules exceeding authority granted in statutes, retroactive applications of agency rules, adding requirements to licensure requirements through administrative rules when those requirements are not contained in the statute. Review Rules of Procedure and Chapter 120 to determine contents of Rule Challenge Petition. Begin reviewing and revising draft for Rule Challenge in case. (Note: Only pro-rata portion of this time charged to each case.) The total amount of fees claimed for this research is $8,260.00. GFI testified that he had never done a rule challenge prior to filing the petitions in the instant cases. His fees for research due to his lack of knowledge of the basics of a rule challenge should not be assessed against the Board of Pharmacy. A reasonable amount of time for his research is four hours. Thus, the amount for this legal research prorated among the ten cases for which it was listed is .4 hours. On July 19, 2008, the senior partner of The Health Law Firm entered .60 hours in ten of the rule challenges for reviewing the Transcripts of the Board of Pharmacy meetings for February 8 and April 5, 2008, and preparing a notice of filing the Transcripts with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Six hours to review the Transcripts and prepare a notice of filing is not reasonable. Three hours is determined to be a reasonable amount of time for this task, and that amount is prorated among the ten cases in which the charge was made. On June 10, 2008, members of The Health Law Firm attended a Board of Pharmacy meeting at which they represented foreign pharmacy graduates who had petitioned the Board of Pharmacy for a waiver or variance. In Case Nos. 08-2821RX, 08-3298RX, and 08-2733RX, the senior partner listed .90 hours for each case for preparation for the June 10th Board of Pharmacy meeting. The preparation related to the petitions for variances or waivers and should not be assessed for the instant cases. For June 10, 2008, JP listed .70 hours each in Case Nos. 08-2823RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2821RX, and 08-2733RX for attendance at the Board of Pharmacy meeting. For June 10, 2008, GFI entered 1.4 hours for attendance at the Board of Pharmacy meeting. The entries for attending the Board of Pharmacy meeting related to the petitions for waivers and should not be assessed in the instant cases. For June 19, 2008, the senior partner made the following entry in the invoices for Case Nos. 08-2728RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2733RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, and 08-2824RX: Travel to Boca Raton to meet with other health care lawyers and discuss issues in common on these cases and others. Discuss legal strategies that worked in the past and legal strategies to be avoided. Return from Boca Raton. Each entry was for one hour, for a total of eight hours claimed for a trip to Boca Raton, which equates to $2,880.00. Based on the entry, it seems that the trip included discussions of other cases that The Health Law Firm was handling or that other attorneys were handling. Additionally, there was no rationale for having to travel to Boca Raton to discuss the issues, and fees for such travel should not be awarded. A reasonable amount of time for discussion of the case with other attorneys by telephone would be .80 hours. The prorated amount of time for each case listed is .10 hours. On May 27, 2008, SF made a .30-hour entry in Case No. 08-2824RX for reviewing the agenda of the June 10th Board of Pharmacy meeting as it related to the client in Case No. 08-2824RX. The entry related to the client’s petition for a waiver, which was heard at the June 10th meeting and should be deleted. On May 30, 2008, in Case No. 08-2824RX, SF made a .40-hour entry for drafting a letter to client with retainer agreement. The entry is clerical and should be deleted. On June 18, 2008, an entry was made in the invoice in Case No. 08-2731RX, which stated: “Telephone call from husband of our client indicating that they want us to close this matter and that they do not wish to pursue it any further; follow-up memorandum to Mr. Indest regarding this.” Charges continued to be made to the client through July 16, 2008. Based on the entry to the invoice on June 18, 2008, no further charges should have been made to the client except for the filing of a voluntary dismissal of the rule challenge for the client. However, no voluntary dismissal was filed. Based on the absence of any further charges to the client after July 18, 2008, it is concluded that the client did wish not to proceed with her rule challenge. Any charges by The Health Law Firm after June 18, 2008, in Case No. 08-2731RX will not be assessed against the Board of Pharmacy as it relates to the rule challenge. On June 19, 2008, TJJ made the following .10-hour entry in ten of the cases: “Review June 10, 2008, Board of Pharmacy Agenda. Telephone conference with Court Reporter, Ms. Green, ordering transcript of the June 10, 2008, meeting.” An hour for reviewing an agenda and ordering a transcript is not reasonable. A reasonable amount of time is .40 hours, and such time is prorated to the ten cases in which it is charged. 33. On June 20, 2008, in Case Nos. 08-2823RX and 08-2824RX, TJJ made a .80-hour entry which stated: “Prepare draft motion for consolidation.” No motion was ever filed and would not have been necessary since the parties had agreed at the pre-hearing conference that the rule challenges would be consolidated. The time for this service should be deleted. 34. On July 10, 2008, TJJ made the following .10-hour entry in several of the cases: “Review prehearing instruction orders and amended orders to determine respondent’s deadline to serve discovery responses.” The entry is duplicative of services provided by MRG on July 8, 2008, and should be deleted. 35. On July 15, 2008, in Case Nos. 08-2729RX, 08-2728RX, 08-2730RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2733RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, 08-2824RX, and 08-3298RX, TJJ had .40 hours for a total of 4.00 hours for the following entry: Prepare Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Discovery and assemble and copy documents to be attached to Motion. Prepare facsimile coversheets and transmit the Motion to the attorney for the Board of Pharmacy, Ms. Loucks, and to the clerk for the Division of Administrative Hearings. The copying, preparing facsimile coversheets, and transmitting the motion are clerical tasks. The entries are reduced to .20 hours due to the clerical nature of the tasks, which leaves a total of two hours for preparing a simple motion to compel. The time for the preparation of the motion to compel is not reasonable and is reduced to .10-hour for each entry. On July 22, 2008, the last Order consolidating all the cases was filed. The Order consisted of four paragraphs. On July 29, 2008, TJJ entered .10 hours in Case Nos. 08-2733RX, 08- 2730RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2728RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2824RX, 08-3510RX, 08-3488RX, 08-3347RX, 08-2823RX, 08-3298RX, and 08- 2821RX, and each entry stated: “Review order of consolidation filed on July 22, 2008, for common information needed for all cases.” Thus, Petitioners are claiming a total of 1.3 hours or $260.00 to review a four-paragraph Order of Consolidation. This claim is not reasonable. A reasonable amount of time to review the Order was .10 hours, and the time shall be prorated among the cases for which it was claimed at .08 hours each. On July 24, 2008, TJJ made an entry of .10 hours in ten of the cases which stated: Telephone conference with the clerk of the District Court of Appeal, First District to find out the start time of oral arguments on Custom Mobility (rule challenge case). Request information from clerk regarding how to listen to oral arguments online. Observing this oral argument will allow us to better prepare our case for possible appeal. First, a one-hour telephone conversation with the Clerk of District Court of Appeal to ascertain the time for an oral argument and to learn how to listen to oral arguments online is not reasonable. Second, it is not reasonable to charge the Board of Pharmacy with a call to the District Court of Appeal in the instant cases, even if the amount of time for the call had been reasonable. The one-hour charge for $200.00 for a telephone call is deleted. On July 30, 2008, TJJ made an entry of .10 hours in 13 of the rule challenges. The entry stated: “Listen to oral arguments presented before District Court of Appeals, First District, in Custom Mobility case (rule challenge case).” The oral argument was not related to the instant rule challenges and should not be charged to the Board of Pharmacy. The 1.3 hours or $260.00 claim for listening to an oral argument is deleted. On August 4, 2008, TJJ made the following .10-hour entry in 13 of the cases: “Review Joint Motion for Abeyance and Order Canceling Hearing and Placing Cases in Abeyance. Calendar deadlines regarding same.” The time of 1.3 hours for reviewing the simple motion and Order is not reasonable. Calendaring is a clerical task. The time for this service is reduced to .01 hours for each entry. On August 5, 2008, TJJ made the following .10-hour entry in 13 of the cases: “Review Respondent’s Objections and Responses to Petitioners’ Second Set of Interrogatories and Respondent’s Objections to Petitioners’ Second Set of Requests for Admissions.” The objections were that the interrogatories and requests for admissions exceeded 30. The time of 1.3 hours for reviewing the pleadings is not reasonable. The time for this service is reduced to .04 for each entry. Petitioners had scheduled the depositions of Rebecca Poston and Daisy King for July 18, 2008. On July 17, 2008, Petitioners filed notices canceling the depositions. On July 17, 2008, PD entered .10 hours in ten of the rule challenges for the following entry: Telephone conference with Accurate Stenotype Reporters regarding cancellation of depositions of Daisy King and Rebecca Poston on July 18, 2008 and delay transcription of depositions of Erika Lilja and Elizabeth Ranne due to potential settlement. It is not reasonable to charge an hour to cancel depositions with the court reporter. A reasonable amount of time would be .10 hours, which is prorated to the ten cases to which it is charged. PD prepared the notice of the canceling of the deposition of Ms. Poston and the notice of the canceling of the deposition of Ms. King. Entries were made in ten of the cases for time for preparing the notices. The total time for preparing the two notices by PD was 1.45 hours. The time is not reasonable. A reasonable time to prepare two notices of canceling depositions would be .40 hours, which is prorated among the ten cases in which it was charged. One of the issues on which Petitioners did not prevail in the rule challenges was the issue of retroactive application of the rule. There are entries totaling 3.4 hours for JP for preparation of a memorandum dealing with the retroactive application of a rule issue. GFI entered .30 hours for the same issue. The time relating to the retroactive application issue is deleted. On April 19, 2008, MRG entered .20 hours each in several cases, which related to the rule challenge and retroactive application issue. That time is reduced by half. On May 6, 2008, MRG made .60-hour entries in Case Nos. 08-2728RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2730RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2733RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, 08-2824RX, and 08-3298RX, which showed the preparation of three sections of the petition. One of the sections dealt with the retroactive application issue, and the entries are reduced by .20 hours for that issue. The invoices demonstrated that a considerable amount of time was charged for legal assistants and paralegals. Much of this time was for clerical tasks. SE is identified in Petitioners’ exhibits as a legal assistant. The majority of the entries by SE dealt with the photocopying, labeling, organizing, indexing, and filing documents. These services performed by SE are clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. RS is identified in Petitioners’ exhibits as a paralegal/legal assistant. The majority of the entries in the invoices for RS deal with receiving, reviewing, labeling, indexing, scanning, summarizing, and calendaring pleadings and orders that were received in the cases. These services are clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. Petitioners in Case Nos. 08-2728RX, 08-2732RX, and 08-2733RX each claimed .30 hours for RS for the following service on April 30, 2008: Received and reviewed letter from Department of Health regarding our Public Records Request dated April 28, 2008 relating to client’s case. Index document for filing and scanning for use of attorneys at hearing. However, .90 hours for reviewing and indexing a letter is not reasonable and is clerical in nature. On June 17, 2008, in Case No. 08-2730RX, RS entered .60 hours for preparing, copying, and sending a letter to the client forwarding a copy of the Order of Assignment. That entry is reduced to .30 hours, since at least half of the time appeared to be for clerical tasks. AE, who is identified as a legal assistant in Petitioners’ exhibits, has numerous entries in the invoices for receiving, indexing, filing, calendaring, and providing pleadings and orders to clients. Those services are clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. In Case No. 08-2728RX, PD, identified in Petitioners’ exhibits as a paralegal, made entries on June 16 and June 25, 2008, for .30 hours each. These entries were to update the litigation schedule with the hearing date. The entry is clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. SF, who is identified in Petitioners’ exhibits as a paralegal/legal assistant, made an entry for .30 hours in Case No. 08-2728RX on June 26, 2008, and in Case No. 08-2732RX on June 11, 2008, for forwarding orders to the client. An entry was made on July 10, 2008, in Case No. 08-2728RX and on June 18, 2008, in Case No. 08-2730RX for .30 hours for processing the retainer package. Additionally, SF had entries for organizing and filing transcripts and orders. Such services are clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. In Case No. 08-3488RX, SF made a .30-hour entry on June 30, 2008, for updating the parties list and document file and a .50-hour entry on June 26, 2008, for completing opening procedures. In the same case, SF made two entries on July 7, 2008, for a total of 1.5 hours for preparing a retainer package and sending it to the client. These tasks are clerical. On June 24, 2008, SF made the following .30-hour entry in 11 of the cases: “Finalize and forward Joint Motion for Continuance of Final Hearing to client in this matter.” These entries are deleted; as they represent clerical tasks and an unreasonable amount of time to finalize a motion for continuance for which GFI had charged 1.1 hours for preparing the motion. In several cases JP, identified as a law clerk, made entries on July 15, 2008, for .30-hour for creating, numbering, and copying exhibits. Such service is clerical. On July 30, 2008, PD made the following .20-hour entry in 13 of the cases: Prepare Petitioners’ Notice of Service of Second Set of Interrogatories and Certificate of Filing and Service. Prepare correspondence to Debra Loucks, attorney for Board of Pharmacy regarding filing and Service of Petitioners’ Fourth Set of Request to Produce and Second Set of Interrogatories. However, 2.6 hours is not a reasonable amount of time to prepare a notice of service of discovery and a transmittal letter to opposing counsel. A reasonable amount of time to prepare such documents is .50 hours, and the time is prorated among the 13 cases. On July 28, 2008, PD made the following .10-hour entry in 13 of the cases: Prepare Notice of Filing Videotaped Depositions of Elizabeth Ranne and Erika Lilja. Prepare draft of Notice of Filing Deposition Transcript of Elizabeth Ranne. However, 1.3 hours is an unreasonable amount of time to prepare two notices of filing depositions. A reasonable amount of time is .40 hours, and that amount is prorated among the 13 cases. On June 17, 2008, PD made the following .20-hour entry in each of the 11 cases: Prepare Petitioners’ Notice of Service of First Set of Interrogatories to Respondent and Certificate of Filing and Service. Prepare correspondence to Debra Loucks, attorney for Board of Pharmacy, regarding filing and service of Petitioners’ First Set of Request to Produce, Petitioners’ First Set of Request for Admissions and Petitioners’ First Set of Interrogatories. However, 2.2 hours is an unreasonable amount of time to prepare a notice of service of discovery and a transmittal letter to opposing counsel. A reasonable amount of time is .50, which is prorated among the 11 cases. 58. On June 21, 2008, in Case Nos. 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, and 08-2824RX, there is a .30-hour entry for SF for finalizing and forwarding a petition for formal hearing to the Department of Health for filing. This entry does not appear to be related to the rule challenges and is deleted. In Case No. 08-3298RX, MRG made an entry of .50 hours for a telephone conference regarding the date of rule challenge and petition for rehearing. The petition for rehearing dealt with the client’s petition for waiver and should not be included. Thus, the entry is reduced to .25 hours. After all the cases were consolidated The Health Law Firm began to make entries for all cases in the first consolidated invoice. On July 28, 2008, GFI made an entry of 2.8 hours, which related exclusively to the issue of retroactive application of the rule. This entry is deleted. RS made entries in the first consolidated invoice for August 12, 14, 28, and 29, 2008, and September 2, 5, 10, and 18, 2008, relating to filing, indexing, copying, and forwarding documents. There are similar entries for SF on August 26, 2008, and September 4 and 9, 2008, and for AE on September 8, 2008. Those entries are for clerical tasks. PD had entries for reviewing, organizing, and indexing documents on September 4, 8, 11, and 17, 2008, and October 8, 2008. Those entries are for clerical tasks. There were numerous entries in August 2008 relating to a Board of Pharmacy meeting on August 21, 2008, in which the Board of Pharmacy heard motions for reconsideration of orders denying Petitioners’ petitions for waivers. Those entries are related to the petitions for waiver and not to the rule challenges. Although, The Health Law Firm makes reference to a settlement agreement in which the Board of Pharmacy agreed to grant the waivers, there was no settlement agreement of the rule challenges because the parties proceeded to litigate the issues by summary disposition. Thus, the references to attending and preparing for the August 21, 2008, Board of Pharmacy meeting as well as advising the clients of the outcome of the meeting on August 20 and 21, 2008, are deleted. Additionally, an entry by MRG on August 20, 2008, which included reviewing the August 21st agenda is reduced to .75 hours. On August 25, 2008, MRG made an entry which included a telephone conference with Mr. Bui and a telephone conference with Ms. Ranne regarding Mr. Bui. Mr. Bui is not a Petitioner, and the entry is reduced to .55 hours. Based on the invoices, it appears that Mr. Bui and Ms. Ranne were also foreign pharmacy graduates seeking waivers from the Board of Pharmacy. On August 29, 2008, MRG made another entry which included the preparation of an e-mail to Mr. Bui. The entry is reduced to two hours. On August 6, 2008, MRG made a 1.80-hour entry which included preparing e-mail to Mr. Bui and a telephone conference with Mr. Sokkan regarding the rule challenge and settlement negotiations. Neither of these persons is a Petitioner; thus, the entry is reduced to .60 hours. On August 28, 2008, TJJ made a 3.60-hour entry for researching and preparing Petitioners’ second motion to compel discovery. No such motion was filed. Thus, the entry is deleted. Another entry was made on September 2, 2008, which included, among other things, the revision of the motion to compel. That entry is reduced to .80 hours. On August 8, 2008, MRG made a 1.00-hour entry which included a telephone conference with Ms. Alameddine regarding her passing the MPJE and being licensed in Michigan. Those issues relate to the petition for reconsideration of the waiver. The entry is reduced to .50 hours. On September 4, 2008, TJJ made a .80-hour entry for preparing a letter to Mr. Modi regarding his approval to take the examination, a 1.00-hour entry dealing with Mr. Lakshminarary’s application, a .90-hour entry dealing with Petitioner Narayanan’s application, a .70-hour entry dealing with Mr. Shah’s application, and a .60-hour entry dealing with Ms. Hernandez’s application. The entries deal with the petitions for a waiver and are deleted. On September 4, 2008, MRG made an entry which included, among other tasks, time for determining if the Board of Pharmacy had sufficient funds to pay Petitioners’ attorney’s fees. This entry is reduced to two hours. On October 10, 2008, MRG made a 1.20-hour entry which included, among other things, analyzing pleadings to determine if persons who were not Petitioners should file petitions for attorney’s fees. The entry is reduced to .60 hours. On July 16, 2008, MRG and JP made entries in ten of the cases for traveling to Tallahassee and attending the depositions of Elizabeth Ranne and Erika Lilja. The total hours for MRG was 16.9 hours and for JP the total was 17 hours. These total hours are reduced by ten hours each for travel time. On August 12 and 13, 2008, MRG made entries which included travel time to attend Board of Pharmacy meetings.6 Those entries are reduced each by one hour to account for travel time. The following is a listing of the amount of hours and dollar amount for fees, which are considered to be reasonable for the rule challenges. Individual and First Consolidated Invoice Hours Rate Amount GFI 146.10 $350.00 $51,135.00 MLS 3.70 $300.00 $1,110.00 JK 1.40 $300.00 $420.00 TJJ 80.13 $200.00 $16,026.00 MRG 210.16 $150.00 $31,824.00 JP 37.80 $100.00 $3,780.00 PD 39.053 $80.00 $3,124.24 SF 16.80 $80.00 $1,344.00 GJ .40 $80.00 $32.00 RS 1.3 $80.00 $104.00 $108,899.24 The Partial Final Order found that Petitioners were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. Thus, the issue of entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes, was not an issue that was litigated in the instant fee cases. The issue of whether Petitioners were entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Subsections 57.105(5), 120.569(2)(e), and 120.595(4), Florida Statutes, were entitlement issues which were litigated in the instant fee cases.7 Most of the charges dealing with the petitions for fees and costs are related to the amount of fees that are to be awarded and not to the entitlement to fees. In Petitioners’ second consolidated invoice (Petitioners’ Exhibit 4), there is a two-hour entry by MLS on November 3, 2008, for research of entitlement to fees pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. This entry is deleted since the issue of entitlement to fees pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes, had already been determined. The following entries in the second consolidated invoice relate to the litigation of the amount of fees to be awarded and are deleted: 11-5-08 GFI 6.90 hours 11-6-08 SF 7.00 hours 11-6-08 GFI 7.40 hours 11-7-08 SF 7.00 hours 11-7-08 MLS 1.00 hour 11-7-08 JCP 7.00 hours 11-8-08 JCP 1.00 hours 11-8-08 GFI 7.10 hours 1-26-09 GFI 1.00 hour 2-9-09 GFI .60 hours 2-10-09 GFI .30 hours 2-12-09 GFI .60 hours 2-17-09 GFI .30 hours 2-17-09 GFI .60 hours 2-19-09 GFI .60 hours The following entries were made in the second consolidated invoice for clerical tasks performed by paralegals and legal assistants: 11-3-08 RAS .30 hours 2-9-09 RAS .30 hours 2-10-09 RAS .30 hours 2-12-09 ACE .40 hours The issue of entitlement to fees pursuant to statutes other than Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes, was a small portion of the litigation relating to attorney’s fees and costs. The major areas of litigation dealt with the amount of fees and costs that should be awarded. The invoices do not specifically set forth the amount of time that was spent on the issue of entitlement to fees on statutes other than Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. Based on a review of the pleadings in these fee cases and a review of the invoices submitted for litigation of attorney’s fees and costs, it is concluded that ten percent of the time should be allocated to the issue of entitlement to fees. The percentage is applied to the fees after the fees listed in paragraphs 76, 77, and 78, above, have been deleted. Thus, the following entries in the second consolidated invoice are reduced to the following amount of hours: 11-1-08 JCP .26 hours 11-3-08 MLS .10 hours 11-4-08 MLS .40 hours 11-8-08 JCP .32 hours 12-22-08 GFI .04 hours 12-30-08 MLS .03 hours 1-7-09 GFI .02 hours 1-14-09 GFI .04 hours 1-15-09 GFI .07 hours In the third consolidated invoice (Petitioners’ Exhibit 5), the following entries relate to the amount of fees to be awarded and are deleted: 3-4-09 SME 4.80 hours 3-4-09 GFI 1.20 hours 4-3-09 GFI 3.20 hours 4-7-09 GFI .50 hours 4-7-09 GFI .60 hours 4-7-09 GFI .30 hours 4-8-09 GFI 4.20 hours 4-8-09 GFI 1.00 hour 4-9-09 MRG 1.50 hours 4-9-09 GFI 3.20 hours 4-11-09 GFI .60 hours 4-15-09 GFI 4.40 hours On April 14, 2009, GFI made an entry which included time for travel to the expert witness’ office. The entry is reduced by .75 hours for travel time. Ten percent of the time not excluded or reduced above related to the issue of entitlement of fees pursuant to statutes other than Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. The following entries are reduced to that percentage: 3-31-09 GFI .05 hours 4-1-09 GFI .20 hours 4-6-09 GFI .19 hours 4-6-09 GFI .03 hours 4-7-09 MRG .05 hours 4-7-09 GFI .07 hours 4-7-09 GFI .19 hours 4-7-09 GFI .27 hours 4-9-09 GFI .10 hours 4-13-09 GFI .50 hours 4-14-09 GFI .48 hours 4-14-09 GFI .275 hours The following is a list of the fees in the second and third consolidated invoices which are related to entitlement of fees pursuant to Florida Statutes other than Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. Second and Third Consolidated Invoice Hours Rate Amount GFI 2.525 $350.00 $883.75 MLS .43 $300.00 $129.00 MRG .05 $150.00 $7.50 JCP .32 $100.00 $32.00 $1,052.25 With the exception of the costs related to the Transcripts of the Board of Pharmacy meetings of April 8 and 9, 2008, and June 10, 2008, Respondent, as stipulated in the parties’ Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, does not dispute that the amounts of costs set forth in the invoices submitted by Petitioners are fair and reasonable.8 The cost of the Transcripts of the Board of Pharmacy meetings on April 8 and 9, 2008, was $1,476.00. The cost of the Transcript of the Board of Pharmacy meeting on June 10, 2008, was $524.00. At the final hearing, the Board of Pharmacy’s objection appeared to be based on the timing of the payment of the court reporter’s fees related to the transcribing of those meetings. The Transcripts were filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings prior to the issuance of the Partial Final Order. Thus, the costs of the transcribing of the Board of Pharmacy meetings are properly included in the amount of costs to be awarded to Petitioners. The amounts of the costs claimed for the rule challenges in the individual and first consolidated invoice are reasonable. The costs incurred by Petitioners for the rule challenges as set forth in the individual and first consolidated invoices are listed below: Name Amount Vipul Patel $1,773.62 Miriam Hernandez $1,801.41 Mirley Aleman-Alejo $1,213.80 Valliammai Natarajan $321.17[9] John H. Neamatalla $1,118.72 Samad Mridha $975.12 Se Young Yoon $1,097.07 Saurin Modi $1,168.75 Deepakkumar Shah, M.Ph. $1,119.24 Mijeong Chang $1,213.16 Nabil Khalil $961.32 Hadya Alameddine $464.60 Balaji Lakshminarayanan $509.71 Anand Narayanan $461.87 The total amount of costs to be awarded for the challenge to the existing rule and to the policy statements is $14,199.56. The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of the costs contained in the second consolidated invoice. The second consolidated invoice lists the total costs as $2,096.12. Therefore, the costs for the second consolidated invoice are reduced to $209.61,10 which represents the amount attributable to litigation of entitlement of fees, ten percent of the total costs. The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of the costs contained in the third consolidated invoice. The third consolidated invoice lists the total costs as $580.62. Therefore, the costs for the third consolidated invoice are reduced to $58.06,11 which represents the amount attributable to litigating the entitlement of fees, ten percent of the total costs. Petitioners incurred costs in the litigation of the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded. Petitioners retained an expert witness, Sandra Ambrose, Esquire. Ms. Ambrose’s fee relating to the issue of attorney’s fees is $5,200.00. Her fee is reasonable; however, Ms. Ambrose’s testimony was related to the amount of the fees not to the entitlement to fees and are, therefore, not awarded as part of the costs. The total costs to be awarded for the litigation of the fees is $267.67.
