Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to the matters considered here, the Respondent was a medical doctor licensed by the State of Florida under license number ME1472. He has been engaged in the practice of medicine for 50 years. While in practice in Orlando, Florida, during the period March 14, 1980, through August 8, 1980, Respondent had as a patient, and acted as treating physician for, Mary Walsh, who was at the time suffering from cancer of the lung. Respondent's treatment of Mary Walsh during the entire period she was his patient included the administering to her of laetrile, dimethylsulfoxide (DMSO) intravenously, enzymes, and megavitamins. Dr. James M. Johnstone (D.O.) had been a physician to Mrs. Walsh over a period of several years for a variety of complaints. (Her lung cancer was detected in December, 1979, however, when she went into his office on a routine visit.) Over the period of time he had treated her, she had suffered from such things as seizures, thyroid problems, and the like, but on this particular December 1979 visit, she complained of a sore throat. Dr. Johnstone referred her for consultation with a Dr. Porth, who ultimately opined she might have cancer of the epiglottis. As a result, in January, 1980, she was admitted to the hospital, where she was diagnosed as having cancer of the left lung. Exploratory surgery conducted during a second period of hospitalization in February, 1980, revealed that the cancer was inoperable and terminal, and the procedure was terminated without any surgical excision. Dr. Johnstone and several other physicians advised Mrs. Walsh and her daughter, Vicki L. Chapman, that conventional-treatments such as radiation therapy were available for, if not a cure, at least palliative treatment to reduce pain and perhaps extend life somewhat, but Mrs. Walsh was afraid of radiation therapy and refused it repeatedly. During this period of diagnoses and tests, Mrs. Walsh and her daughter, Vicki, were told by an acquaintance named Elmer Boener, of the Fairfield Medical Center in Jamaica, which offered the organic approach to cancer control, including the use of diet and vitamins. While Mrs. Walsh and her daughter were deciding whether to go to Jamaica, Mr. Boener informed them that a Dr. Wedel would be working at Respondent's clinic offering the same treatment as available in Jamaica, and they would not have to have the stress of going out of the country. They decided to go to Jamaica, however, because of the stress in this course of treatment on diet and, in March, 1980, went to the Fairfield Clinic for ten days, returning during the first week in April, 1980, at which time Mrs. Walsh took up treatment of her condition with Dr. Wedel and Respondent at the latter's clinic in Orlando. Mrs. Chapman went with her mother on almost every visit to Respondent's office and was present when Mrs. Walsh talked with either doctor or got her treatment. On one occasion, after looking at some X rays taken of Mrs. Walsh's lungs, in the presence of Mrs. Chapman, Dr. Lynn allegedly told Mrs. Walsh that her cancer was shrinking and getting better. This was not true. Dr. Lynn denies telling her this, saying he told her the amount of fluid in the lungs had reduced, but not the size of the cancer. Considering all the evidence and weighing all the factors, I find that Dr. Lynn did make the statement alleged. However, Mrs. Walsh still had pain, and Respondent would not prescribe medication for her. Because of that, she had to go to another doctor for a prescription for whatever she needed to relieve pain. During the time that Respondent treated Mrs. Walsh, he was assisted by a "Dr." Wedel, who held himself out to be a nutritionist. However, search of the records of the various licensing agencies for the medical disciplines within this state reveals that he is not licensed as a medical doctor, osteopath, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, chiropractor, pharmacist, registered nurse, or licensed practical nurse. His service to Mrs. Walsh consisted of nutritional counselling as to diet, vitamins, etc., and writing prescriptions for vitamins that were subsequently signed by Respondent. Respondent's supervision of Wedel was not regular, but periodic. Wedel was recommended to Respondent by a friend in Oregon and intended to apply for a Florida license as a medical doctor. Dr. Lynn states that before offering Wedel employment, he cleared taking him on with the Orange County Medical Association, which agency interposed no objection. When Mrs. Walsh returned to Respondent's care from Jamaica, she requested that he continue the course of treatment she had been undergoing there, which included diet control and the use of vitamins, enzymes, laetrile, and DMSO. Though Dr. Lynn's medical notes were not introduced at the hearing, he indicated that they fail to reveal he counseled Mrs. Walsh on other, conventional forms of treatment for her condition, such as X-ray therapy or chemotherapy. He is satisfied, however, that she was aware of them. Respondent, due to Mrs. Walsh's request to him that he continue the use of laetrile and DMSO, had her oral consent to do so. However, he did not have, nor did he insure that, his staff secure for him her informed, written consent to treat her with either drug. Further, he did not, prior to utilizing either drug, inform her in writing that neither was approved for use in the treatment of cancer by the Federal Food and Drug Administration of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (FDA). Laetrile, DMSO, enzymes, and megavitamins, either singly or taken together, are unconventional treatments for cancer, as accepted by the medical community, and are generally recognized by that community as being experimental.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida be suspended for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 10983. COPIES FURNISHED: Charlie L. Adams, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Trickel, Jr., Esquire 35 West Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Dr. Gans is a chiropractor licensed in Florida on the basis of examination. Dr. Gans prepared and filed an application for examination and licensure with the Florida State Board of Chiropractic Examiners. Dr. Gans answered the question on the application, "Do you have a chiropractic license in any state?" by stating: "Ohio - Mechanotherapy." The Ohio authorities recognized several professions whose functions would be included under the practice of chiropractic in Florida. Mechanotherapy generally would be limited to the practice of manipulation only. Dr. Gans was licensed in Ohio as a mechanotherapist. Dr. Gans answered the question on the application, "Have you ever been refused licensure in any state?" by stating, "No." Dr. Gans had applied for, taken, and failed the Ohio chiropractic examination whereupon he was not issued a license as a chiropractor by the State of Ohio. Dr. Gans was eligible to reapply to take the Ohio examination. At the time of his application to Florida, Dr. Gans had appealed the determination by the Ohio authorities that he had failed the Ohio examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida State Board of Chiropractic Examiners revoke the license of Ray E. Gans. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of October, 1978 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Sutton, Esquire 250 Bird Road, Suite 310 Coral Gables, Florida 33146 Paul Lambert, Esquire 1311 Executive Center Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C. A. Hartley, Director Florida State Board of Chiropractic Examiners Suite 202, Building B 6501 Arlington Expressway Jacksonville, Florida 32211
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the administrative complaints; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Florida law. The Respondent is a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME 0043628. In September, 1987, J.B., a patient at Hialeah Hospital, underwent exploratory surgery and was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer. At the time of the surgery, it was estimated that J.B. had six months to live. Dr. Roberto Cruz, J.B.'s doctor at Hialeah Hospital, recommended that the patient undergo chemotherapy; however, J.B.'s wife rejected that proposal. She did not want J.B. to know of the diagnosis. J.B. had told his family that if he had cancer, he would commit suicide. J.B.'s father and brother had had cancer, and the latter had committed suicide. J.B.'s wife and sister believed his threat to be sincere. Based upon the foregoing, J.B.'s wife implored J.B.'s doctors not to disclose his true condition. The families of J.B. and Respondent had been friends for many years going back to their common home in Central America. Respondent knew of J.B.'s diagnosis, and agreed to become his treating physician in November, 1987. Respondent did not tell J.B. of his true medical condition. Instead, Respondent let J.B. presume discomfort and other symptoms were the result of years of heavy drinking. In November, 1987, Respondent had been in private practice only a short time and was unfamiliar with office practices and billing procedures. Respondent did nothing to become familiar with billing practices, and relied on an employee who he mistakenly believed was competent to complete billing from the patient charts. When J.B. first presented at Respondent's office, he complained of abdominal pain. Further J.B. had discovered lumps which concerned him. To pacify J.B., Respondent suggested that a lymph node be removed and biopsied. J.B. and his wife discussed the removal of the lump and agreed that such removal would be appropriate. J.B. wanted to know that the lump was not cancer, and his wife wanted to know that the cancer had not spread or metastasized beyond the original sites. Respondent performed the lump removal in November, 1987, and billed J.B.'s medical insurance for same. At the time of this surgery Respondent was fully aware of J.B.'s medical condition, and knew that the procedure would not affect the medical condition, treatment, or life expectancy of the patient. The only medical result of the procedure was the uplifting of J.B.'s mental attitude since the lump was not cancer. In March, 1988, Respondent performed a colonoscopy with biopsy on J.B. This procedure was suggested as Respondent had presented with rectal bleeding, a symptom common in terminal cancer patients, and was desirous of some diagnosis as to the medical origin of the bleeding. Instead of advising J.B. that the bleeding could be consistent with the known medical condition, Respondent went ahead with the colonoscopy after less intrusive examinations did not establish the origin of the blood. At the time of the colonoscopy, Respondent knew that the procedure would not affect the medical condition, treatment, or life expectancy of the patient. Again, the only beneficial effect from the colonoscopy was an uplifting of J.B.'s mental attitude since the colonoscopy results, which were medically inconclusive, did not disclose cancer to J.B. Even if the colonoscopy had revealed some medical condition which could be treated, it would not have been medically necessary given J.B.'s other, overriding, condition. Anemia, a condition resulting from the loss of blood which is common in terminal cancer patients, could be treated without the colonoscopy procedure. Respondent did not refer J.B. to a psychiatrist for mental evaluation or confirmation as to the suicidal ideation but accepted J.B.'s wife's representations regarding his mental state. Respondent did not allege J.B. had expressed suicidal thoughts to him and did not report same in his medical notes. At all times material to the treatment of J.B., Respondent performed medical services through a company owned by his wife. This company, Sigma Medical Center, submitted bills for the services afforded J.B. on the standard billing forms known as "HCFA 1500." Respondent, as the treating physician, was required to sign all HCFA 1500 forms submitted regarding services for J.B. By executing the HCFA 1500 form Respondent certified that the information was correct and the procedures billed for were medically necessary and appropriate. In this case, Respondent has admitted that numerous billing errors occurred, that the HCFA 1500 forms were incorrect, and that an over-billing regarding services provided to J.B. resulted. For example, consultation visits are billed at a higher rate than regular office visits. Respondent routinely billed J.B.'s visits at the consultation rate even though there was no consultation to be given. Second, Respondent billed post-operative visits which should have been included in the surgical charges separately. Third, J.B. returned for office visits more frequently than would be expected because of the pain management Respondent employed. Because J.B.'s wife would not allow Respondent to prescribe any pain medications which J.B. might associate with cancer, he ended up taking quantities of other prescriptions to manage the pain and to return to Respondent frequently due to the unexplained (to him) reoccurrence of pain. Despite an admission that he reviewed the HCFA 1500 forms before signing them, Respondent maintains he did not, at the time, know that the billing was inaccurate. This assertion has not been deemed credible As to various tests ordered by Respondent for J.B., it is concluded that the following tests were medically unnecessary: the RPR test designed to detect syphilis infection (a STD was the least of this patient's worries), the FTA (a follow-up test to the RPR), and thyroid studies. Given the totality of the circumstances, Respondent's care and treatment of the patient, J.B., fell below the standard of care and skill which a reasonably prudent physician under similar circumstances and conditions would recognize as acceptable. As to DOAH case no. 94-0778 L.G. was an employee in Respondent's office. Unbeknown to Respondent, L.G. took samples of aerobid and proventil without a prescription for the drugs. An aerobid inhaler is used to control the symptoms of bronchial asthma. Proventil is also used to control bronchospasm which may be associated with asthma. L.G. took the samples with the intent that she would forward them to a relative in Cuba who suffers from asthma. L.G. had access to the samples. Respondent had never treated L.G. and there would have been no medical justification to dispense the samples to her. Although somewhat incredulous, Respondent's admission that he had dispensed the samples to L.G. was given, to his understanding, to end the investigation of the matter. He mistakenly believed that if he made the admission the matter would be closed. L.G.'s account as to the events of her removing the samples without Respondent's knowledge has been accepted. Nevertheless, the statement Respondent gave to the Department in connection with this incident was false.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration, Board of Medicine, enter a final order determining the Respondent violated Sections 458.331(1), (n) and (t), Florida Statutes, in the care provided to patient, J.B., suspending his license for a period of one year, placing him on probation for a period of two years thereafter, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount $10,000. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of December, 1996. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 1996. APPENDIX Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 17, 19 through 39, 42 through 46, 48 through 52, 54 through 65, 69, 70, and 74 are accepted. Paragraph 18 would be rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence IF J.B. had been sincerely suicidal; however, in this case Respondent did not refer J.B. to a psychiatrist, did not make an independent confirmation of J.B.'s mental state, and did nothing to which J.B.'s wife did not agree--therefore, it is impossible under the facts of this case to know whether or not J.B. should have been told. Under most circumstances, J.B. should have been told, and it is accepted that the care afforded to J.B. fell below the standard of care a reasonably prudent similar physician would have provided. Respondent's whole theory of this matter fails because Respondent never independently confirmed and had J.B. properly assessed, by a physician competent to make such assessment, as to whether this major hoax was appropriate. With all due respect to Dr. Blaustein, he merely relied on factual conclusions which are unsupported by medical records in this case. Paragraphs 40 and 41 are rejected as irrelevant because the examination was medically unnecessary regardless of how performed. Paragraph 47 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence; this procedure, like others, was medically unnecessary and below the standard of care but its primary purpose was to pacify the patient and his wife regarding the rectal bleeding. Had Respondent been forthright this procedure would not have been performed. The overbilling for the procedure was for financial exploitation of the patient's insurance. Paragraph 53 is rejected as irrelevant because the studies were medically unnecessary anyway. Paragraphs 66 through 68 are rejected as irrelevant since the diagnosis would have always been subservient to the primary diagnosis and Respondent's services in this regard were medically unnecessary. Paragraph 71 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. L.G. was not Respondent's patient. L.G. stole the drugs and Respondent covered for her with the misguided idea that it would solve the problem and the investigation would be over. Paragraphs 72, 73, 75, 77, and 78 are all rejected since L.G. was not a patient they are irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 31, 32, 38 through 48, 51, 55 through 64, 68 through 74, 77, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 89 through 92, 100, 107 through 120, 122, and 123 are accepted. Paragraph 7 is rejected as speculation or irrelevant given the overriding issues of this case; further rejected as not credible. Paragraph 9 is rejected in part as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence as to the issue of money; otherwise, as to the families' long- standing friendship accepted. The credible evidence in this case supports the conclusion that Respondent was overpaid for unnecessary services until J.B.'s insurance ran out; that he did not require payment thereafter is irrelevant. It may also have been Respondent's motive for overcharging the insurance before it ran out. Paragraphs 13 through 17 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Respondent was not authorized to delegate the medical decisions regarding J.B.'s care to his wife or family. As the physician he was responsible, regardless of how difficult the situation, to either practice within the standard the care or refer the patient to a physician able to do so. Obviously, any physician would want to keep J.B. comfortable, that is why unpleasant procedures such as the colonoscopic examination were, in part, medically unnecessary. Respondent's highest obligation was to the patient not that person's family or their perceived (and uncorroborated by Respondent) notions as to the patient's mental state. Paragraph 20 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 21 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraphs 25 through 30 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 33 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraphs 34 through 37 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraphs 49, 50, 52, 53, and 54 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The fact that J.B. was encouraged by the false or meaningless services performed by Respondent does not justify the performance or billing for same. Respondent could have listed a textbook full of conditions which J.B. did not have to encourage him but it would not have been based on medical reality any more than the colonoscopy was. Lying to a patient to make him fell better and for financial gain is not acceptable practice. Paragraphs 65, 66, and 67 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraphs 75, 76, 78, 79, and 80 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. 13. Paragraphs 83, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 105 are rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Respondent was responsible for all insurance billing for Sigma Medical Center. Paragraph 106 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence as to whether or not L.G. was a patient at the time of the incident complained of, or irrelevant if stating such relationship was at a prior time. Paragraph 121 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 124 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the General Counsel Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Harold M. Braxton, Esquire Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to practice medicine at the level of care, skill, and treatment that is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances and, if not, the penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed physician, holding license number ME 0026784. He is Board-certified in radiology. On January 30, 1997, T. D., a 30-year-old female who was eight months pregnant, presented to the emergency room of the Columbia Largo Medical Center complaining of pain in the left flank radiating to the left groin, together with nausea and vomiting. She also reported a prior history of kidney stones. A urologist diagnosed T. D. as suffering from kidney stones and severe hydronephrosis, which is the dilation of the kidney due to an obstruction in the flow of urine. The urologist was unable to pass a stent and catheter by the stones to drain the urine and relieve the pressure on the kidney, so he asked Respondent to perform a left percutaneous nephrostomy. A percutaneous nephrostomy is a procedure in which a physician places a tube through the skin and into the collecting system of the kidney to drain the kidney. The tube remains in place until the obstruction is removed. On February 1, Respondent performed a left percutaneous nephrostomy under local anaesthesia. For guidance in placing the tube, Respondent used ultrasound, rather than ultrasound and a flouroscopy. Respondent has performed 100-150 nephrostomies. As is the common practice, he normally does not rely exclusively ultrasound in guiding the placement of the tube in the kidney. In this case, the urologist asked that he not use a flouroscopy, in deference to the patient's pregnancy and the duration of x-ray exposure in a flouroscopy. Respondent was comfortable doing the procedure in this manner, although he decided that, if he encountered any problems in placement, he would resort to flouroscopy. Respondent proceeded to perform the percutaneous nephrostomy in the morning. As is typical, the radiology technician helped position T. D. on the table for the procedure. T. D.'s advanced pregnancy necessitated a slight adjustment to the normal posture of patients being prepared for this procedure, so T. D. lay slightly more up on her side than is usual. However, this did not change the point of entry chosen by Respondent. And, regardless of her precise position, the location of the spinal canal relative to the kidney relative to the point of entry into the skin remains constant: an imaginary line from the kidney to the spinal canal is perpendicular to an imaginary line from the point of entry to the kidney. The point of entry is on the lower back of the patient. T. D. is thin and her pregnancy did not manifest itself on her back, so the length of tube used by Respondent was relatively short. T. D.'s thin build makes it less likely that Respondent would have placed sufficient excess tube into the patient so as to permit the tube to run from the kidney to the spinal cord. Upon placement of the tube, at least 100 cc of fluid drained through the tube. This is well within the range of urine that would be expected under the circumstances. The color was well within the range of color for urine. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that the fluid was urine and that Respondent had placed the tube correctly in the kidney. At the end of the procedure, T. D. appeared a lot more comfortable. Late in the afternoon, someone called Respondent and told him that the drainage had slowed to a very small amount or nothing at all. This is not uncommon, as moving the patient or over-energetic nurses may accidentally dislodge the stent in the kidney. It is also possible that the tube has rested in a part of the kidney that does not facilitate maximum drainage. Using ultrasound, Respondent confirmed that the tube remained in place in the kidney, although he could not tell whether the stent had come to rest in a narrow place in the kidney or possibly even against a stone. Even with this uncertainty, Respondent still was able to determine that the stent was predominantly in the collecting system. Because T. D. was resting comfortably, she said that she felt fine, her fever was going down, and the hydronephrosis had decreased, Respondent decided to do nothing until after re-examining T. D. the next morning. However, at about 11:00 p.m. or midnight, Respondent, who was visiting a nearby patient, dropped in on T. D. The nurse said that she was fine and her kidney was draining a little better. T. D. also said that she was feeling fine. About three or four hours later, T. D. reported a feeling of some paralysis. Petitioner's expert testified that this was linked to the misplacement of the stent in the spinal canal, but he was unaware that T. D. had undergone a spinal block for the percutaneous nephrostomy and that a problem with the first anaesthetic procedure had necessitated a second. It is more likely that T. D.'s paralysis was in response to the two spinal blocks. At 9:00 a.m. the next day, Respondent returned and examined T. D. He found that she was still doing better, and her urologist was preparing to discharge her from the hospital. She looked better, and her urine flow had improved. He told her to call him if she had any problems, but he never heard from her again or even about her until he learned from the urologist that T. D. had been admitted to another hospital where a radiologist had inserted contrast material into the tube to locate the stent and found it in the spinal canal. The father of the baby picked up T. D. at the Columbia Largo Medical Center. He picked her up out of the wheelchair and placed her in the car. Her condition deteriorated once she got home. A hospital nurse directed the father to change the collection bag, if it filled prior to the visit of the home health care nurse. In the three or four days that T. D. remained at home, he changed the bag several times. He daily checked the site at which the tube entered T. D.'s skin and noticed that it had pulled out a little bit. However, he testified that he did not try to adjust the length of tube inside T. D., nor did he change the setting on the tube, which had "open" and "closed" settings for the pigtail at the end of the tube. The proper setting was closed, as the pigtail is not to be open once the stent has reached its destination in the kidney. On February 5, the father took T. D. to the emergency room of the Columbia St. Petersburg Medical Center, where she presented with complaints of severe back pain. An ultrasound confirmed the presence of kidney stones, whose removal had been deferred until the delivery of the baby. In an effort to locate the end of the tube, a radiologist inserted radiographic contrast dye, which showed that the end of the tube was in the intrathecal space of the spine. A urologist removed the tube. However, T. D. suffered a seizure. Another physician attempted an emergency C-section, but the baby did not live. There are two alternatives to explain how the stent at the end of the tube found its way into the spinal canal. First, Respondent placed it there during the procedure. Second, it migrated from the kidney, where Respondent placed it, to the spinal canal. If not unprecedented, both alternatives are extremely rare. The drainage during the procedure and initial improvement of the distended kidney are consistent with the proper initial placement of the stent. The difficulty of inadvertently turning a relatively short length of tube 90 degrees from the kidney to the spinal canal also militates against a finding that Respondent misinserted the tube. Problems with the first spinal tap may have contributed to some of the complaints, such as paralysis, that T. D. experienced after the procedure. Although unlikely, the migration alternative would be consistent with well-intended, but incorrect, attempts by the baby's father or a home health care nurse to ensure that the tube did not travel too far in or our of the point of entry. Migration would be facilitated if either the father or nurse misread the "open" and "closed" settings and turned to "open," in the hope of improving drainage, when such a setting opens the pigtail, which would increase the possibility that the stent could migrate into the spinal canal. In a case requiring proof that is clear and convincing, it is impossible to find that Petitioner has adequately proved that Respondent misinserted the tube during the procedure. Likewise, the evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent should have recognized at anytime prior to T. D.'s discharge from the Columbia Largo Medical Center that something was wrong with the procedure that he had performed or that he needed to confirm by x-ray the location of the stent at the end of the tube.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Britt Thomas, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William B. Taylor, IV Macfarlane, Ferguson & McMullen Post Office Box 1531 Tampa, Florida 33601-1531 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a state agency which initiated a proceeding with the filing of an Administrative Complaint against Marc Richman, D.O. The said complaint was assigned to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to a request for Administrative Hearing pursuant to Chapter 120 and was assigned Division of Administrative Hearing Case Number 88-5258. On June 24, 1989, the Department of Professional Regulations issued a notice of voluntary dismissal in the above captioned proceeding and dismissed all charges against Marc Richman, D.O., in that case. Marc Richman, D.O. is a prevailing small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111(3)(c) and (d). The amount of attorney's fees and cost sought by the Petitioner in the Petition for Attorney's Fees is reasonable for the Representation of Marc Richman, D.O., in the defense of the Administrative Complaint through the date of issuance of the Notice of Dismissal. The Department of Professional Regulation maintains that the proceeds (sic) above-captioned were substantially justified at the time the Administrative Complaint was initiated by the state agency in that it maintains that there existed a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint. This position is disputed by the Petitioner, Marc Richman, D.O. The request for attorney's fees in the amount of $8,572.00 and costs of $563.96 for a total of $9,225.96 is reasonable for the representation of Petitioner throughout the instant proceeding. These proceedings were initiated by the filing of a complaint on September 16, 1986 with the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), Petitioner in Case 88-5258, by the parents of G.H. who died October 18, 1984. G.H. was a long time patient of Dr. Jaffee, D.O. who called in Dr. Richman, an orthopedic surgeon to consult and perform an arthodesis on the left ankle of G.H. to relieve constant pain. G.H. was a 34 year old male accountant who had suffered from juvenile rheumatoid arthritis since the age of 4. Although badly crippled he was able to lead a relatively independent life. As a result of his malady G.H. had for years taken steroid and corticosteroid medications. These medications depress the body's immune system and the ability to fight off infections. Accordingly, G.H. was at more than normal risk anytime he was exposed to infectious diseases. After Petitioner explained the procedure and the risks to G.H., the latter elected to have Petitioner perform the arthodesis. This operation consists of grafting bone into the ankle to stabilize that joint. The donor site chosen for the bone to graft to the ankle was the crest of the left ilium of the patient. This operation was successfully performed on August 2, 1984 at Metropolitan General Hospital, Pinellas Park, Florida. In the hospital on August 9, 1984, while G.H. was being adjusted in his bed, he felt a pop in his left hip and a large hematoma developed over the wound at the donor site. It is not unusual for hematomas to develop over surgical wounds but it is important that such conditions be closely watched because hematomas are a fertile field for an infection. The hematoma on G.H.'s hip showed no evidence of infection and G.H. was discharged from the hospital August 12, 1984 and sent home. Arrangements were made by Petitioner for Robert's Home Health Services, Inc. of Pinellas Park to send a nurse 3 times per week to check on G.H., take his vital signs, dress his wounds and attend to any other medical needs he may have. Verbal reports were made by the nurse to Richman reporting the condition of G.H. While being helped from his wheel chair into bed by his parents on or about August 15, 1984, G.H. apparently fell and caused additional bleeding of the wound on the left hip. On August 16, 1984 the nurse reported to Richman the additional bleeding and she was directed to have G.H. taken to the hospital to be seen by Richman. On August 16, 1984, Petitioner examined the wound, noted the reports that the hematoma was neither inflamed nor more tender, and that G.H.'s temperature had remained normal since the hematoma developed. He sent G.H. back home without further tests. The classic signs and symptoms of infection are redness, swelling, heat and pain. Redness of the skin due to intense hyperemia, is seen only in infections of the skin itself. Swelling accompanies infection unless the infection is confined to the bone which cannot swell. Heat results from hyperemia and may be detected even in the absence of redness. Pain is the most universal sign of infection. Along with pain goes tenderness, or pain to the touch, which is greatest over the area of maximal involvement. (Exhibit 12, Principals of Surgery, Fourth Edition). The hematoma on G.H.'s left hip between its inception and September 13, 1984 never exhibited any sign of infection. On September 6, 1984, G.H. reported to the visiting nurse that he had a pain in his stomach and didn't feel well. The nurse described this as having flu-like symptoms. This was reported to Petitioner and the nurse received no additional orders. On the nurse's next visit on September 10, 1984, G.H. reported his abdomen was still hurting and he didn't feel good. At this time his temperature was elevated at 101. The nurse called Dr. Jaffee's office and was told to have the patient admitted to Metropolitan Hospital. Upon admission to the hospital on September 10, 1984, G.H. was nauseous, vomiting, and had a high fever (103). He had no complaints regarding his ankle or iliac crest and the hematoma had decreased greatly. On September 13, 1984, while G.H. continued showing signs of infection (high fever) Petitioner operated on G.H. to remove the hematoma. At this time aerobic and anaerobic cultures were obtained. Forty-eight and seventy-two hours later these cultures had grown no infectious substance. Further studies and tests revealed that G.H. had bleeding ulcers and surgery was required to patch the ulcers. At this time the spleen was also removed. Following this surgery G.H. was more debilitated and with the precarious condition of his immune system he continued to go down hill until he expired on September 18, 1984. Cause of death was cardiac pulmonary arrest caused by candida septicemia. During the initial stage of the investigation, which was initiated some two years after the death of G.H., the investigator interviewed the parents of G.H., who had filed the complaint, and assembled the medical records including those kept by the home health agency. The parents contended that when the hematoma was removed by Dr. Richman he told the parents that he had found infection at that site. Dr. Richman denies making any such statement to the parents of G.H. and the medical records support the conclusion that there was no infection in the hematoma on September 13, when the hematoma was excised. The parents complained of the treatment that G.H. received from Drs. Jaffee and Richman as well as Roberts Home Health Services. Accordingly the investigation started with both Jaffee and Richman charged with malpractice by the parents of G.H. The investigator selected an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Richard M. Couch, D.O., from DPR's consulting list and forwarded to him on January 7, 1987, the patient records of G.H. and requested he review those records and give his opinion on whether Drs. Jaffee and Richman diagnoses and treatment of G.H. was appropriate. In this letter (Exhibit 1) the investigator advised Dr. Couch that following surgery a hematoma developed, that after G.H.'s discharge from the hospital the hematoma ruptured and that G.H. was taken back to the emergency room where Dr. Richman saw the patient but found nothing significant about the hematoma. He also told Dr. Couch that when Richman cleaned out the hematoma he advised the family (of G.H.) that infection was found, and that, after this G.H. started internal bleeding which ultimately resulted in the patient's death. Dr. Couch responded to this request with two letters, the first of February 16, 1987 and a second on March 6, 1987. In his first letter Dr. Couch concluded that the iliac wound began draining on or about August 14, 1984 and cultures of this wound were not secured until after G.H.'s hospitalization on September 10, 1984. Since the hematoma was a post-operative complication he opined that Richman failed to adhere to certain tenets regarding wound care in this situation. However, Dr. Couch suggested the records be referred to an internist who reviewed the treatment provided by Dr. Jaffee. In his second letter Dr. Couch opined that Richman was at fault for not incising, debriding and draining the hematoma when it developed and for not taking cultures when Richman saw G.H. in the emergency room on later dates. He also found Richman at fault for not referring G.H. to a consultant in infectious diseases. A letter similar to the letter sent to Dr. Couch was sent by the investigator to Neal B. Tytler, Jr., D.O., an internist. Although the investigator contends he submitted the records maintained by Roberts Home Health Services in this case to Dr. Tytler it is obvious that before he submitted his report on June 5, 1987, Dr. Tytler had not read those records and was concerned regarding the absence of medical records during the period between G.H.'s discharge from the hospital on August 12, 1984, and his readmission on September 10, 1984. In his report Dr. Tytler carefully noted G.H.'s long term medication for juvenile rheumatoid arthritis and the serious side effects, viz depression of the immune system, which results from long-term steroid therapy. Recognizing the risk to G.H. from any surgery Dr. Tytler questioned the wisdom of the arthodesis but recognized that this was more of an orthopedic problem than an internal medicine problem. From the records received, Dr. Tytler concluded that G.H. developed a hematoma after his departure from the hospital and before September 6, 1984. Significantly, Dr. Tytler reported "Of concern to me is the apparent lack of records to document the events which transpired between August 12, 1984 and September 10, 1984. In this one month period an abscess formed at the surgical site and led to disastrous consequences. Unfortunately it can only be inferred that the first recognition of any problem occurred on September 6, 1984, when the patient developed `flu-like symptoms'. He was not examined and no one perceived that his problems were serious." When the probable cause panel met on June 25, 1988 to consider the charges against Drs. Jaffee and Richman, no probable cause was found as to Jaffee. One of the two members of the probable cause panel disclosed at the opening of the panel meeting that he knew Dr. Richman socially and that Richman had been his treating physician for a finger injury. He was excused from further participation and the hearing was tabled regarding Dr. Richman. At a subsequent panel meeting by telephone conference call, after a substitute lay panel member was selected and had been furnished the medical records, a vote was taken to find probable cause. The excerpt from those proceedings (Exhibit 8) shows that the DPR attorney opened the conference call by stating that Richman was charged with medical conduct falling below acceptable minimal standards and "at the last probable cause panel meeting you voted to find probable cause, and asked that administrative complaint be issued. At this time the Department recommends that you do find probable cause to believe that this violation exists." Following receipt of this erroneous information regarding the previous probable cause panel meeting, the Chairman, Mr. Wheeler, stated that after reviewing the entire file he believes probable cause exists to file an Administrative Complaint. Dr. Barker concurred. The case against Dr. Richman began to unravel when the deposition of Dr. Tytler was taken on February 24, 1989. Prior to taking this deposition Dr. Tytler had been provided records from Metropolitan General Hospital, records from Roberts Home Health Services and a copy of the Administrative Complaint. In response to questions regarding the treatment of G.H. as afforded by Dr. Richman, Dr. Tytler stated that a review of all medical records clearly demonstrated that after the hematoma developed at the donor site for the transplant no indication of infection ever appeared; that considering the medical history of G.H. and his high susceptibility to infection it would be more dangerous to the patient to evacuate the hematoma and risk additional infection than it would to continue to observe the hematoma and let it cure itself; that the cultures taken on September 13, 1984, when the hematoma was evacuated clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that the hip wound was not the source of the infection that ultimately led to the demise of G.H.; and that the treatment rendered by Petitioner was in all respects in conformance with required medical standards and procedures. Dr. Tytler further opined that treating an immune compromised patient with antibiotics without a specific infection in mind "could lead to the very scenario that caused his (G.H.) death", namely secondary infection. Further, with respect to the contention of Dr. Couch regarding the failure of Petitioner to take cultures at the hematoma site before September 10, 1984, Dr. Tytler opined that indiscriminate taking of cultures when no evidence of infection is present could result in a positive culture unrelated to the wound but which the doctor would be called upon to treat. This could invite a major change in therapy and an inappropriate prescribing of an antibiotic. Following the deposition of Dr. Tytler, DPR referred the medical records to another orthopedic physician and this doctor concurred with the opinion of Dr. Tytler that Dr. Richman's treatment of G.H. was not below minimally acceptable standards, that no malpractice was involved and that the treatment was in accordance with acceptable medical standards. The Department then dismissed the Administrative Complaint. In his deposition the physician member of the probable cause panel, James H. Barker, D.O., emphasized that his conclusion that probable cause existed to go forward with the Administrative Complaint was significantly influenced by the fact that no culture was done at the hematoma site. From his subsequent testimony it is clear that Dr. Barker was unaware, when he voted to find probable cause, that the culture taken from the hematoma site on September 13, 1984 was negative. The record clearly shows this to be a fact. As stated by Dr. Tytler in his testimony "hematoma yes; infection no." Dr. Barker was also concerned, and perhaps rightly so, that any time that someone goes in for an elective procedure and he dies "that alone makes you think there may be probable cause here." However, there must be factual evidence to support a finding of probable cause and here there was no such evidence.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q-2.035, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner, Jules G. Minkes, was licensed as an osteopathic physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0S001516. For purposes of this proceeding, there is no dispute that Dr. Minkes qualifies as a small business party as defined in the FEAJA. In approximately May of 1988, the Department of Insurance notified the Department of Professional Regulation of a closed claim regarding Dr. Minkes. 2/ Specifically, the notice advised that an indemnity had been paid on behalf of Dr. Minkes to a patient T. G. (the "Patient") in the amount of $150,000 in settlement of a claim that Dr. Minkes had allegedly failed to diagnose and treat the Patient's basal cell carcinoma. The Department assigned an investigator to the case who notified Dr. Minkes of the investigation by letter dated June 26, 1988. The investigator interviewed Dr. Minkes and Dr. Munzer, a dermatologist who treated the Patient upon Dr. Minkes' referral. The Investigator also obtained the Patient's medical records from Dr. Minkes and several other physicians who treated her. From the outset of the Investigation, Dr. Minkes' maintained that the Patient had lied in connection with her claim. The investigator did not interview the Patient nor her husband, nor did the Investigator contact any of the individuals identified by Dr. Minkes as having knowledge of the case. The notes of the Investigator's interview with Dr. Minkes and the Patient's medical records were sent to an osteopathic physician with similar credentials to Dr. Minkes, a specialist in internal medicine. Joseph H. Rosin, D. O., was the expert retained by the Department to review Dr. Minkes' treatment of the Patient. In a report dated January 18, 1989, Dr. Rosin opined that Dr. Minkes' care of the Patient did not meet community standards. In particular, the Report noted that the Patient had a clear history of invasive basal cell carcinoma and Dr. Minkes failed to provide adequate treatment when it was known to have reoccurred. Dr. Rosin stated that it was not the standard of care in the community for an internist such as Dr. Minkes to treat extensive basal cell carcinoma, that surgical intervention and proper follow-up care by a dermatologist was necessary and the Patient's locally invasive carcinoma, which had been confirmed by a biopsy performed by Petitioner, should have been treated in a more timely and appropriate manner. After the consultant's report was obtained, the investigative file was completed and sent to Tallahassee for review by the investigator's supervisors in Tallahassee. The complete investigative report was reviewed and approved by the investigator's supervisor on January 31, 1989. On June 7, 1989, the Department's investigative file was forwarded to members of the Probable Cause Panel (the "Panel") of the Board along with a copy of the Department's recommendation to find probable cause and a copy of a proposed Administrative Complaint. The Panel, consisting of one lay member from the Board who was serving as chairman of the Panel and a licensed osteopathic physician, met on June 16, 1989. Both members acknowledged that they had received the materials sent to them and had reviewed the materials prior to the meeting. An assistant attorney general was present to answer any questions concerning the Panel's duties and/or the proper interpretation of the applicable laws or rules. A prosecuting attorney for the Board was also present to discuss the Department's recommendation to file an Administrative Complaint. The transcript of the June 16, 1989 Panel meeting reflects little discussion of the case. The Panel members concurred with the Department's recommendation and authorized the filing of the Administrative Complaint against Dr. Minkes. The Department filed the Administrative Complaint against Dr. Minkes' license to practice osteopathic medicine on or about June 20, 1989. That Administrative Complaint included three charges. Count I charged Dr. Minkes with violating Section 459.015(1)(r), Florida Statutes, as a result of his alleged failure to refer the Patient to a specialist for adequate treatment of her basal cell carcinoma, thus exploiting her for his own financial gain. Count II charged Dr. Minkes with violating Section 459.015(1)(p), Florida Statutes, by failing to keep medical records justifying his course of treatment of the Patient. Count III charged Dr. Minkes with violating Section 459.015(1)(y), Florida Statutes, by failing to practice osteopathic medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar osteopathic physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Although the allegations in the Administrative Complaint are somewhat vague and ambiguous, it arguably charges Dr. Minkes with malpractice because he failed to refer the Patient for proper treatment of her basal cell carcinoma, he attempted to treat the Patient's growing recurring basal cell carcinoma himself even though it was a condition which the Administrative Complaint alleges should have been treated by a specialist in that area of medicine, and he ignored the Patient's basal cell carcinoma. Most of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint were consistent with and apparently based upon the allegations made in the civil complaint filed by the Patient and her husband against Dr. Minkes. A copy of the civil complaint was contained in the Department's Investigative File. (It was the settlement of that civil law suit which prompted the investigation by the Department.) The charge that Dr. Minkes had not referred the Patient to a specialist for treatment was also supported by the Department investigator's conversation with Dr. Munzer, whom Dr. Minkes had identified as the specialist to whom he had referred the Patient. A formal administrative hearing was held before the undersigned Hearing Officer pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Following the conclusion of that hearing, a Recommended Order was issued on December 13, 1990, recommending the dismissal of Count I, but recommending that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner guilty of Counts II and III. As noted above, the Department's investigative file does not include any interviews with the Patient or her husband to confirm the allegations that were made in the civil law suit. However, the Department presented the testimony of the Patient's husband during the hearing in the Underlying Proceeding and, in addition, the previously transcribed testimony of the Patient was also accepted into evidence. (The Patient had died of unrelated causes prior to the hearing in the Underlying Proceeding.) As noted in Finding of Fact 35 of the Recommended Order, both the Patient and her husband testified that Dr. Minkes advised them that he could treat the Patient's basal cell carcinoma and that he in fact attempted to do so. If this testimony had been accepted as credible, it would have been sufficient when considered with the other evidence presented, to establish that Dr. Minkes was guilty of all of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint. However, after considering all of the evidence, that testimony was specifically rejected. Notwithstanding the conclusion that Dr. Minkes did not attempt to treat the Patient's basal cell carcinoma himself as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, the Recommended Order concluded that certain violations had been established. As set forth in paragraphs 8 through 13 of the Conclusions of Law, the undersigned Hearing Officer concluded that Dr. Minkes' records regarding the Patient were deficient and that his treatment fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent physician under similar conditions and circumstances. Dr. Minkes filed exceptions to the Recommended Order arguing that the factual grounds for the violations found in the Recommended Order were not specifically alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The Board apparently agreed with this contention since, in its Final Order, the Board adopted all of the Findings of Fact in the Recommended Order, but dismissed the charges in the Administrative Complaint. Some of the charges in the Administrative Complaint presume that Dr. Minkes attempted to treat the Patient's basal cell carcinoma. In particular, the Administrative Complaint refers to several instances when Dr. Minkes hyfercated lesions on the Patient's forehead. The Administrative Complaint suggests that these instances were improper attempts to treat the Patient's basal cell carcinoma. The evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to overcome Dr. Minkes contention that his clinical observations justified his conclusions that these lesions were keratotic and not related to the Patient's basal cell carcinoma. This testimony by Dr. Minkes and the rejection of the testimony of the Patient and her husband on this matter undermined some of the fundamental presumptions in the Administrative Complaint. Nonetheless, the undersigned Hearing Officer concluded that the evidence was still sufficient to establish violations of the statutory provisions cited in Counts II and III of the Administrative Complaint. The Board's apparent determination that the violations found in the Recommended Order were not adequately alleged in the Administrative Complaint does not obviate the conclusion that violations of the charged statutes were found to have in fact occurred. Dr. Minkes complains that the consultant's opinion which led to the Panel's finding of probable cause indicates that Dr. Minkes did not refer the Patient to a specialist for treatment when, in fact, such a referral was made to Dr. Munzer. This matter was recognized in Findings of Fact 67 of the Recommended Order. As noted in that Finding, the consultant subsequently acknowledged the referral to Dr. Munzer and amended his opinion. The consultant still felt that Dr. Minkes failed to meet the applicable standard of care because he failed to take adequate steps to insure that the Patient's basal cell carcinoma was treated. It should be noted that there are many unresolved questions regarding the scope of Dr. Minkes' referral to Dr. Munzer. Dr. Munzer's statement to the Department's investigator and his deposition testimony offered into evidence during the Underlying Proceeding regarding his treatment of the Patient differed greatly from Dr. Minkes' version of the referral. Dr. Munzer claimed that he did nothing more than evaluate the Patient's biopsy. He claimed that he told Dr. Minkes that the Patient needed chemosurgery, but Dr. Minkes continued to treat her. Dr. Munzer disclaimed any responsibility for treating the Patient's basal cell carcinoma and states that he would not have agreed to treat her condition because he was not qualified to do so. In determining whether probable cause existed to file the Administrative Complaint, the Panel was not required to, and did not attempt to, reconcile this discrepancy between Dr. Minkes and Dr. Munzer. Dr. Minkes also points out that Dr. Tytler, whose opinion was not available at the time the Administrative Complaint was filed but whose subsequent deposition was accepted into evidence at the final hearing, testified that there was no indication in the Patient's medical records that Dr. Minkes ever treated or attempted to treat the Patient's basal cell carcinoma as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. However, Dr. Tytler did testify that Dr. Minkes' treatment of the Patient did not meet community standards in certain respects. Without question, there were some gaps and/or oversights in the Department's investigation. In retrospect, the Department perhaps should have recognized the possibility that the Patient's version of events might not be accepted in its entirety in which case the Administrative Complaint could have been drafted in a manner that would have minimized the impact of such a conclusion. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, there was sufficient evidence for the Panel to conclude that the Patient had received substandard care. Even if the Patient's own decisions contributed to the delay in treating her basal cell carcinoma, there was clearly a lack of understanding and/or miscommunication between Dr. Minkes and Dr. Munzer as to how the Patient was to be treated. While there were conflicting versions as to who was responsible for this breakdown in communication, there was some evidence considered by the Panel which would reasonably indicate that the violations alleged had indeed occurred. After considering all of the circumstances, it is concluded that the Department was substantially justified in filing the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that Dr. Minkes' Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs is DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February 1995.
