Findings Of Fact prior to the regulation of hearing aid dispensers in Florida in 1967, the National Hearing Aid Society and its Florida chapter, the Florida Hearing Aid Society, were voluntary nonprofit organizations established to provide information to, and establish certain standards for, its members. In 1951 the National Hearing Aid Society inaugurated the title Certified Hearing Aid Audiologist and established certain criteria for certification. These included two years experience dispensing hearing aids, a letter from a doctor of medicine that he had observed a fitting that had been done by the ,applicant, credit reference, complete the National Hearing Aid Society's certified exam or its equivalent, and submit a fee to the National Hearing Aid Society. Subsequent to 1967, passing of the Florida exam for licensure as a hearing aid specialist was deemed equivalent to the National Hearing Aid Society's exam. The term Certified Hearing Aid Audiologist was patented by the National Bearing Aid Society in 1970. Those hearing aid dispensers certified by the National Hearing Aid Society (NHAS) were authorized by NHAS to advertise and hold themselves out at CHAA's. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977) defines audiology as: A branch of science dealing with hearing; specif. therapy of individuals having impaired hearing. Audiologists are licensed in Florida pursuant to Section 468.139 et seq. Florida Statutes (1979) which requires formal education and training before the applicant for licensure becomes qualified to take the examination which must be passed before certification is granted. Most audiologists are designated as clinical audiologists apparently because their testing and diagnosing of clients occurs in a clinic equipped with machines designed to test and diagnose hearing difficulties. Many audiologists dispense and fit hearing aids as do some otologists. The latter are exempted from hearing aid regulation by Section 468.137(2) , Florida Statutes. The average person is unaware that a CHAA does not have equal (and some people believe greater) qualifications respecting hearing disorders than does an audiologist. Few people know there is any difference between the two. Even one of Petitioner's witnesses acknowledged that a lot of physicians are confused about the term certified hearing aid audiologist. Accordingly, holding oneself out as a CHAA tends to mislead the general public when one so holding himself out is not, in fact, a qualified audiologist.
The Issue Whether Rules 21JJ-7.007(2), (3) and (3)(a), Florida Administrative Code, are invalid pursuant to Sections 120.54(2) and 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987)?
Findings Of Fact Section 484.0401, Florida Statutes (1987), provides the following: The Legislature recognizes that the dispensing of hearing aids requires particularized knowledge and skill to ensure that the interests of the hearing-impaired public will be adequately served and safely protected. It recognizes that a poorly selected or fitted hearing aid not only will give little satisfaction but may interfere with hearing ability and, therefore, deems it necessary in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare to regulate the dispensing of hearing aids in this state. Restrictions on the fitting and selling of hearing aids shall be imposed only to the extent necessary to *protect the public from physical and economic harm*, and restrictions shall not be imposed in a manner which will unreasonably affect the competitive market. [Emphasis added]. The Legislature amended Section 484.0401, Florida Statutes (1987), during the 1986 Session to provide for the protection of the public against economic harm and to include the public welfare within the scope of the protection of Chapter 484, Florida Statutes. Section 484.044, Florida Statutes (1987), authorizes the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), to adopt rules it deems necessary to carry out the provisions of Chapter 484, Florida Statutes. On April 24, 1987, the Board caused to be published Rule 21JJ-7.007, Florida Administrative Code, in Volume 13, Number 17, Florida Administrative Weekly. On May 20, 1987, a public hearing was held to allow comments concerning the challenged rule. Following this meeting and a meeting before the Board on July 10 and 11, 1987, a Notice of Change, changing the challenged rules was published in the July 24, 1987, edition of the Volume 13, Number 30, Florida Administrative Weekly. Rule 21JJ-7.007, Florida Administrative Code, was filed with the Department of State on July 23, 1987. Volume 13, Number 31, Florida Administrative Weekly. It was effective August 12, 1987. Rule 21JJ-7.007(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Fraudulent, False, Deceptive or Misleading Advertising. An advertisement or advertising is fraudulent, false, deceptive or misleading, if it: (2) Conveys the impression that the licensee or trainee possesses qualifications, skills, or other attributes which are false, other than a simple listing of earned professional achievements and degrees. Rule 21JJ-7.007(3) and (3)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provide the following: Fraudulent, False, Deceptive or Misleading Advertising. An advertisement or advertising is fraudulent, false, deceptive or misleading, if it: Is misleading or deceptive because its content or the context in which it is presented makes only a partial disclosure of relevant facts. Specifically, it is misleading and deceptive to advertise a discounted price, without identifying the specific product or service against which the discounted price applies, and without specifying the usual price for the product or service identified. Advertising is an extremely important part of the hearing aid business. It is the principal manner in which hearing aid licensees attract clients. Advertising may assist consumers in making an educated decision about hearing aid products and services. It is common for licensed hearing aid specialists and businesses employing licensed hearing aid specialists to include information such as the following in advertisements: The length of service in a particular community or in the hearing aid profession. Such advertisements can be an indication of the stability of a hearing aid business; Statements such as the following: "trust your hearing to the professionals", "ethical professional practice", "ask the expert" and "factory- trained"; Other types of training, such as factory training; and Educational experiences, including research and teaching experiences. The type of information listed in finding of fact 10 may be beneficial to the public and is not necessarily false, deceptive or misleading. Advertisements used by licensed hearing aid specialists do not include every bit of information about a product. For example, the following type of information may be included in an advertisement: One of the smallest hearing aids, designed for nerve deafness to 40 db. Model E-50 complete with one year warranty. This type of advertisement is not false, deceptive or misleading. It does not, however, contain all the relevant facts concerning the product advertised. Additional relevant information concerning the product may be voluminous, technical and of no use to a consumer. To include all information which may be relevant could require a very large advertisement which would be expensive. Advertisements used by licensed hearing aid specialists commonly indicate a reduction of a certain dollar amount or a percentage reduction for individual hearing aids, lines of hearing aids or all products carried by a specialist. Such advertisements do not necessarily list the specific product or service to which a discount applies or the price for each product or service before the discount. Where discounts apply to several products or services, to list each product and the price before discount would require a large advertisement which would be expensive. As of May 15, 1987, there were 1,016 licensed hearing aid specialists in the State of Florida. Two hundred and forty-four of the total number of licensed hearing aid specialists were on inactive status. Of the 772 active licensed specialists, 670 were members of the Petitioner as of December 4, 1987, or approximately 88 percent of all active licensed practitioners. The Petitioner has an ethics committee and a grievance committee which are active in reviewing advertising used by hearing aid specialists. Members of the Petitioner are subject to discipline, including expulsion from the Petitioner, for improper advertising. The following Summary of Estimate of Economic Impact of the Rule was published by the Department: The implementation of this proposal will have minimal impact upon the Board or the Department other than the costs involved in promulgation. There should be no adverse economic impact or benefit to current licensees or potential applicants as a direct result of the proposed rules. The Board feels the rule is imperative to clarify statutory provisions within Section 484.056(1)(f), F.S., by delineating for the activities which constitute fraudulent, false, deceptive or misleading advertising. It is therefore impossible to determine exactly what impact the proposed rule will have upon current or potential licensees. It is not foreseeable that the proposal will place an economic impact upon competition among current licensees, the open market for employment, or upon entities falling within the definition of "small entities" as defined in Section 288.703(1), F.S.
The Issue Whether petitioner should be removed from the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979, on grounds of ineligibility.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a licensed attorney, practices law in Clewiston, Hendry County, Florida. Since at least September 1, 1970, he has continuously engaged in the private practice of law in Clewiston. On September 1, 1970, the Glades County School Board ("School Board" or "Board") hired him as the School Board attorney, a position which he continues to hold. This is a part-time position, since the Board has no need for a full-time attorney. The School Board is headquartered at Moore Haven, 16 miles northwest of Clewiston, in neighboring Glades County. The terms and conditions of petitioner's employment with the School Board have remained virtually unchanged since he was originally hired. Each year, the School Board sets his salary consisting of a monthly retainer or salary, plus a fixed amount per hour for any additional professional services or litigation required by the School Board. For the 1979-80 school year, the Board set his salary or retainer--terms which the School Board used interchangeably-- as shown by the Minutes of the July 11, 1979, meeting: 3. SALARY/SCHOOL BOARD ATTORNEY - 1979-80 Chairman Hilliard opened the floor for discussion on the salary for the school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. After some discussion between the board and Mr. Potter, the board proposed a retainer of $750.00 per month. (annual salary of $9,000.00) plus $50.00 per hour for additional pro fessional services or litigation required by the board. ON MOTION by Sapp, seconded by Johnson, the board approved this pro- posal for school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. (Vote: Arnold, yes; Johnson, yes; Taylor, yes; Sapp, yes; Hilliard, yes.) His salary is paid from the School Board's regular employee salary account. But as the School Board's attorney, unlike other School Board employees, he does not accrue annual leave, sick leave, or pay during vacations, holidays or illness, though when he is sick or on vacation, there is no adjustment to his salary. He is reimbursed for work-related travel and meals at the rates provided by Section 112.061, Florida Statutes (1983), and is covered by the School Board's group health and life insurance, and Workers' Compensation. Since 1970, the Board has withheld his Social Security contributions from his fixed monthly salary payments; has paid the employer's Social Security contributions on his salary payments; and has annually reported his monthly salary payments on Internal Revenue Service Form W-2. To this extent, the School Board considered him an employee and treated him the same as it treated its other employees. The legal services which he furnished the School Board are described in his employment agreement and the School Board's job description for the position: TYPICAL DUTIES: Attend all regular Board meetings and such special meetings as deemed advisable by Board Chairman or Superintendent. Be available for routine telephone or personal consultations with Board Chairman, Superintendent and Staff members. Perform legal research. Prepare or approve leases or agreements prior to execution by Board. Prepare and prosecute law suits in behalf of Board and defend law suits against Board, including any actions against Superintendent, Staff or other school district employees allegedly arising etc., unless special counsel is deemed necessary by Board Attorney with Board's concurrence. Attend the quarterly seminars/meetings of Florida School Board Attorneys Association; and any other approved by Board. Represent Board and/or Superintendent in personnel matters where appropriate, as well as student discipline matters. School Board meetings, held monthly, last approximately one and one-half hours. Litigation, although described as a typical duty, is considered extra work, and an hourly rate is charged over and above the monthly salary. Petitioner agrees that he would not knowingly accept any new clients which would cause a conflict of interest with his School Board employment. Although he has been free to turn down work assigned by the School Board, he never has--at least through 1976. As explained by Mr. Strope, Superintendent of Schools from 1968 to 1976, although petitioner was free to turn down work, he "shouldn't have." Petitioner is not required to maintain any set office hours, and his monthly salary does not vary with the number of hours' work. He is not furnished office space by the School Board. The majority of his legal work for the Board is performed at his private law office, in Clewiston. The cost of operating his law office is not a budget item in the School Board's budget. Under his employment arrangement with the School Board, he furnishes all personnel, equipment, and facilities needed to perform his services. He is responsible for supervising the secretaries who work in his private office. Occasionally, when he is at School Board headquarters in Moore Haven he will ask a School Board employee to type a document. At his request, however, the School Board will furnish him pencils, legal pads, legal periodicals and stationery. It also pays for his travel; for per diem expenses incurred while attending legal seminars or meetings; and for long distance telephone calls made in connection with his School Board employment. He is neither responsible for, nor supervises, any employee of the School Board. The School Board does not furnish him any legal secretaries or part-time attorney assistants. He has not shown what percentage, or amount, of his working hours are devoted to performing legal services for the School Board, as opposed to legal services which he performs for his other clients. Other than assigning specific legal tasks, the School Board exercises no more control over the means, methods, and manner by which petitioner performs the legal work given him than is ordinarily exercised by any client over an attorney. Because of ethical constraints and the nature of legal work, petitioner must exercise independent professional judgment. Since September 1, 1970 2/, petitioner has been enrolled in the FRS. This was accomplished by his filling out a prescribed form which the School Board then filed with the Division. The Board then began reporting him on its employee rolls. There is no evidence that the initial FRS entry form, filed with the Division, described petitioner's work duties or the nature of his employment with the School Board. Both the Board and the Division enrolled him in the FRS, believing that he was eligible for membership. The Division did not question or investigate the nature of his employment relationship with the Board until 1983. From his initial enrollment until January 1, 1975, when FRS became a non-contributory system, petitioner contributed one-half of the the required FRS contribution, while the School Board contributed the other half. Since January 1, 1975, the School Board has contributed 100 percent of his contributions to FRS. During the 1970s petitioner's membership in the FRS prevented him from participating in any other tax sheltered retirement plan. 3/ Since July 1, 1979, the Division has, by rule, given notice that consultants and other professional persons contracting with public employers are, ordinarily, ineligible for membership in the FRS. All public employers, including the School Board, have been asked to remove such persons from their retirement payrolls. Since at least July 8, 1981, petitioner was on notice that his status as an employee, and his eligibility for continued membership in the FRS, were in question. Both the parties stipulate that part-time electricians, plumbers, painters, combustion engine mechanics, air conditioning mechanics, janitors or sewage plant operators (and even other occupations) employed in 1983 by the Glades County School Board on a year-round salary basis (i.e., at least 10 consecutive months), and paid out of the School Board's regular salary and wage account, would be mandatory members of FRS by statute. (Prehearing Stip., para. E. 6)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter an order removing petitioner from membership in the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979; and That the Division return to petitioner and the School Board their respective FRS contributions, mistakenly made to his account. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1984.
The Issue Does correspondence dated August 18, 1997, from John M. Awad, Ph.D., District Administrator for District II, State of Florida, Department of Children and Family Services, directed to Theodore R. Buri, Jr., Regional Director, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal employees, AFL-CIO, identify Respondent’s agency policy? If yes, is that policy a “Rule” as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996)? If a “Rule," has Respondent promulgated the policy in accordance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996)? If the policy is a “Rule” that has not been promulgated, does a statutory basis exist for its promulgation?
Findings Of Fact The individual Petitioners are employed at the Florida State Hospital. This is a mental health facility operated by the Respondent. The individual Petitioners have contact with the clients who reside in the hospital. Because those individual Petitioners have client contact in performing their employment at the hospital, Respondent, as their employer, is responsible for screening the employees to ascertain whether those individual Petitioners have been convicted of or pled guilty or nolo contendere to certain offenses set forth in Sections 435.03 and 435.04, Florida Statutes (1995). Such a finding would disqualify the employees from working directly with the clients. The requirement for screening is in accordance with Section 110.1127(3), and Section 394.4572, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Florida Public Employees Council 79, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), represents the individual Petitioners in collective bargaining between those Petitioners and the State of Florida. Each of the individual Petitioners received notification from Robert B. Williams, Hospital Administrator, Florida State Hospital, that each person had been declared ineligible to hold a position of “special trust” based upon certain offenses attributable to the Petitioners. The basis for the disqualifications was Chapter 435, Florida Statutes (1995). This meant that the individuals could not have client contact. As a consequence, Petitioners were told, through the correspondence notifying them of their disqualifications, that they could seek exemption from disqualification and/or contest the accuracy of the records declaring their disqualifications. All Petitioners sought relief from Respondent in accordance with Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes (1995), by requesting exemption from disqualification before the Respondent. Bobby Jones, Clarence Cornell Simmons, Freddie Lee, and Frank Lawrence Dickens were denied exemption. Whether those Petitioners have contested the preliminary decision by Respondent denying their exemption through hearing procedures set forth in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes is not known. The other Petitioners were granted exemption from disqualification by action of the Respondent. Before Respondent made its preliminary determination on eligibility, on August 13, 1997, Theodore R. Buri, Jr., Regional Director of AFSCME Florida Council 79, wrote to Dr. John Awad, District Administrator, District II, Department of Children and Family Services. The purpose of the letter concerned the disqualification of the individual Petitioners to continue work in positions of “special trust” by having contact with clients at Florida State Hospital. That correspondence stated: The above referenced employees have been previously notified of disqualification, allegedly under the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. These employees have notified Council 79, through their local union, that they are scheduled for a hearing on a possible exemption from the provisions of Chapter 435 on August 27, 1997. I have reviewed the documents of these individuals and I have found, without exception, that the charges which served as the basis of potential disqualification all occurred prior to October 1, 1995. As I am sure you are aware the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, did not become effective until October 1, 1995. Further, the notations are consistent throughout Chapter 435, indicating that the provisions of Chapter 435 shall apply only to offenses committed subsequent to October 1, 1995. It appears that these, and other, employees are being improperly required by the Department to defend themselves against provisions of Florida Statutes which do not apply to them. I wish you would immediately review this concern with your legal department and direct Florida State Hospital to immediately make the affected employees whole and to terminate the pending actions against these employees. Your prompt attention in this matter is very much appreciated. On August 18, 1997, Dr. Awad responded to Mr. Buri’s inquiry through correspondence, in which Dr. Awad stated: The concerns expressed in your letter dated August 13, 1997, concerning background screenings were reviewed approximately a year and a half ago by an agency statewide workgroup, which included several background screening coordinators, District Legal Counsels, and attorneys from the General Counsel’s office. The legal research from that group resulted in the issuance of Agency policy addressing this and other statewide issues. In response to a question similar to that raised in your letter, Agency policy is that although Section 64 of Chapter 95-228, Laws of Florida, states that “this act shall take effect October 1, 1995, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after that date,” it applies only to the new criminal offense of “Luring or enticing a child” created by Section 1 of the law and does not apply to screening provisions. Therefore, in accordance with established principals [sic] of statutory construction, a person being rescreened after 10-1-95, must meet the requirements of the law in effect as of the date of the rescreening, which includes the broadened offenses, just as a new job applicant must meet such requirements. If you have any further questions concerning this matter, you may wish to have your attorney discuss this with the Agency’s General Counsel. The exemption hearings before Respondent were held on August 27, 1997, leading to the grant of exemptions for some Petitioners, and denial for others. Through their Petition to determine the invalidity of a “Rule," Petitioners allege and request the following relief: Although Chapter 435 of the Laws of Florida concerning employment screening specifically states that it applies to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1995, the Respondent applies employment screening to all employees and to all offenses regardless of the date of the offense. The Respondent articulated this policy of application in correspondence addressed to Theodore R. Buri from John Awad dated August 18, 1997,. . . The Respondent’s policy, as more fully described above, is a 'Rule' within the meaning of Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, because it is an 'agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of the agency.' Id. This rule should be declared an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority for the following reasons: The above described rule has not been adopted in substantial compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes; The Respondent has no statutory or rule authority to adopt the above described rule as applied to offenses predating October 1, 1995, thus the rule violates Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The rule imposes a civil penalty against the individually named Petitioners for which there is no specific statutory authority. The rule is arbitrary and capricious as applied to offenses predating October 1, 1995, and thus violates Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The rule adversely affects the Petitioners' substantial interest in continued employment in a position of 'special trust.' The rule is an unconstitutional impairment of the contract of employment. It unfairly burdens the Petitioners and others similarly situated with the duty to timely request and prove by clear and convincing evidence that [sic] either an entitlement to an exemption from disqualification or that the records are inaccurate. It is an oppressive and unreasonable condition of employment. As a penalty attached to an offense committed prior to October 1, 1995, the Rule is unlawful as an ex post facto law. The immediate removal from a position of trust before an employee may be heard denies the employee due process. The rule attacks a protected property and liberty interest of the individually named Petitioners and those similarly situated. The Agency’s actions against the Petitioners based on the Rule stigmatizes the employee. Petitioners also request that they be granted costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Section 120.595(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Chapter 95-228, Laws of Florida, referred to by Dr. Awad in his August 18, 1997, correspondence to Mr. Buri, created Chapter 435, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issues posed for decision herein are whether the license to dispense hearing aids issued to the Respondent should be suspended or revoked, or whether the Respondent should be otherwise disciplined for reasons which will be set forth hereinafter in detail as contained in the Administrative Complaint issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on or about May 7, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. By its Administrative Complaint filed on or about May 7, 1979, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department), Petitioner, alleged that Ralph F. Heller, Respondent, violated certain provisions of the Florida Hearing Aid Law, Chapter 468, Florida Statutes, and regulations promulgated thereto, and that he violated the terms and conditions of a Stipulation and Final Order entered in a previous administrative proceeding before this Division, Case No. 78-1222, involving the same parties. During the final hearing herein, Respondent admitted that he was the Respondent in Case No. 78-1222 and that copies of that Final Order and Stipulation were properly received and admitted without objection (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1). The Stipulation incorporated into the Final Order in Case No. 78-1222 provided in pertinent part that Respondent admitted that he had been or is currently in violation of Chapter 468, Part III, Florida Statutes, and that he (Respondent) would be suspended from the fitting and selling of hearing aids in the State of Florida for a period of forty-five (45) days commencing twenty (20) days after the entry of the Final Order by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and that Respondent would be on a period of supervision and/or probation by the Department for a period of two (2) years beginning at the end of the forty-five (45) day suspension period during which time Respondent was to furnish to the Department copies of all contracts for hearing aids sold by him in the State and audiograms performed on any person, whether a hearing aid is sold or not, and that contracts were to comply with the provisions of Chapter 468, Part III, Florida Statutes. Such reports were to be submitted monthly commencing on the tenth day of the month succeeding the commencement of the probation and supervision period. That Stipulation provided further that Respondent's failure to comply with the requirements imposed during the period of supervision and probation would be grounds for cancellation of his license to sell and fit hearing aids in the State. The Final Order was adopted by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on November 27, 1978. Respondent's testimony reflects that he performed an audiogram and sold a hearing aid on January 17, 1979, to a Beatrice K. Patterson of Dunnellon, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2.) Respondent also performed a hearing test on Mrs. Alfred E. Hull, Sr., on or about February 18, 1979, in his office. Respondent did not report the results of these audiograms and/or hearing tests to the Department, nor did he report the sale of the hearing aid to Mrs. Patterson to the Department. In this regard, Respondent attempted to defend his actions on the basis that the Hull test was not reported because it was not a complete hearing test and that the Patterson test and sale were not reported because prior to the reporting time the Department had independently learned of the Patterson transaction and that the sale to Mrs. Patterson had been rescinded. During the month of August, 1979, Respondent performed an audiogram and sold a hearing aid to a Mr. A. J. Bullinger, of Dunnellon, Florida, and rescinded the sale after Mr. Bullinger developed an ear infection from certain foreign material left in his ear during the fitting. Respondent voluntarily paid Mr. Bullinger's medical expenses incidental to the ear infection and although he (Respondent) claimed that the test and sale were reported to the Department, an examination of the reports submitted to the Department and Mr. Gray's testimony show that this was untrue. Mr. Ralph Gray, Director of the Hearing Aid Licensure Program, testified during the hearing and indicated that he received some of the required monthly reports from Respondent on audiograms and sales of hearing aids. Pursuant to the parties' agreement during the hearing, these reports were not introduced into evidence en masse although the evidence reveals that the Respondent failed to file reports for the months of November and December, 1979. Additionally, an examination of the report submitted by the Respondent for the month of August, 1979, reveals that Respondent failed to report the hearing examination and sale to Mr. A. J. Bullinger. As to these events, Respondent's defense is that he instructed his secretary to file such reports with the Department although when questioned by the undersigned, Respondent was evasive and was unable to recall the secretary to whom he gave such instruction. During the hearing, Respondent also evidenced a policy of not reporting to the Department those hearing tests and audiograms conducted by himself which did not result in a sale. The Department's Administrative Complaint also alleged that the Respondent violated specified sections of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes, in connection with the sale of a hearing aid to Mr. Alfred E. Hull, Sr., on or about June 24, 1977. Mr. Hull has died since the inception of these proceedings; however, the transaction was testified to by the Respondent and by Mrs. Alfred E. Hull, Sr. An examination of the contract of sale introduced into evidence fails to indicate whether the hearing aids were new, used or reconditioned although the Respendent represented that the hearing aids were new when sold to Mr. Hull. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3 and the testimony of Respondent and Mrs. Hull.) The deposition of Ellery L. Childers, taken pursuant to notice at a distance of more than one hundred (100) miles from the place of hearing, was introduced into evidence by the Department. Mr. Childers has a background in the manufacturer's history of sale and warranty of the Hull hearing aids. Some of this information is also recited in a letter-affidavit of Mr. George A. Shymanik, Sales Manager of Beltone Electronics Corporation, which letter was introduced into evidence without objection. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5.) The evidence reveals that a certain Beltone Rondo hearing aid, Serial No. 95898, was sold in April, 1975, to one Lloyd Jennings, a Beltone dealer in Meridian, Mississippi, and was subsequently registered for warranty to a Lucille Wortham of Louisville, Mississippi. The contract of sale between Respondent and Mr. Hull, dated June 24, 1977, recites the sale of the same Beltone hearing aid to Mr. Hull. Evidence also reveals that the Beltone company did not use the same serial number on more than one instrument. (Deposition of Ellery L. Childers.) 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, forwith REVOKE the license of Respondent, Ralph F. Heller, to fit and sell hearing aids within the State of Florida. ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. James E. Bradwell, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
