Findings Of Fact The Respondent, T & L Management, Inc., was issued permits numbered AK081-12 and AK082-12 on or about August 30, 1983. These permits were for the erection of signs on the north side of I-10, approximately .4 mile west of SR 297, in Escambia County, Florida. They were issued because of the proximity of a welding business adjacent to the proposed sign location. The Respondent submitted the applications for these permits, and designated on the applications that the sign location would be in a commercial or industrial unzoned area within 800 feet of a business. On each of these applications the Respondent certified that the signs to be erected would meet all requirements of Chapter 479 of the Florida Statutes. Prior to the issuance of these permits, the subject site was inspected by the Department's outdoor advertising inspector, who approved the applications because of the existence of what she believed to be a welding shop nearby the proposed sign location. This inspector was looking for a welding shop because she had been informed that a welding shop was located there. What she saw was some welding being done on the property where the welding business was supposed to be. This could be seen from the interstate. Apparently because the inspector expected to find a welding business near the proposed sign site, she concluded that such a business existed there, and the applications were approved. However, the occupant of the subject property has lived there for 37 years, and he has never operated a welding business. He has only done welding on this site once since 1980, when he welded a bumper onto a truck in his barn. The photographs which were received in evidence show his property, and the general appearance of this area is residential or rural in nature, and not commercial. It is visible to traffic on I-10. The Department's inspector testified that she used a pair of binoculars to enable her to see a small sign reading "welding" on the property where she saw welding being done. However, the property owner denied that any such sign was on his property. Other witnesses presented by the Respondent also testified that they saw welding being done, but this issue has been resolved by accepting the testimony of the witness who lived on the property and who did the welding on the one occasion, as being the more credible and trustworthy evidence. The adjacent property is leased by Pensacola Outdoor Advertising. This property has a building on it which bears a small sign reading "Pensacola Outdoor Adv." and the telephone number. This building was leased by Pensacola Outdoor Advertising in 1984, and was not used for any business purpose when the permit applications were submitted. This property is also visible from I-10. When the Respondent applied for the subject permits there was no business activity being conducted within 800 feet of the proposed sign location. Therefore, the Department's inspector made a mistake in approving the Respondent's applications for this site. In October of 1984 the Department issued its violation notices advising the Respondent that the subject sign permits were being revoked.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, National Advertising Company, submitted applications for outdoor advertising sign permits to construct three (3) back-to-back outdoor advertising structures displaying six (6) outdoor advertising faces. One structure was to be located on the west side of 1-95, one mile south of State Road 76; the next structure was to be located on the west side of I- 95, 2300 feet south of State Road 76; and, the third structure was to be located on the west side of 1-95, 3800 feet south of State Road 76, all in Martin County, Florida. The applications submitted to the Department of Transportation by National Advertising Company had attached to them appropriate land leases and copies of appropriate Martin County Building Permits. The applications submitted to the Department by National Advertising Company were received by the Department on September 24, 1986. On October 27, 1986, the Department, acting by and through its District Administrator for Outdoor Advertising for District IV, Mr. Fred J. Harper, issued its Memorandum of Returned Application rejecting the applications submitted by National Advertising Company for the permits in question, based on Section 479.11(10), Florida Statutes. The first two sites in question are located on a segment of the Interstate Highway System in Martin County which was recently completed. The remaining site, one mile south, is slated to be open to the motoring public during December, 1987. Current urban area Boundaries are based on the 1980 U.S. Census designations, recommendations of the Metropolitan Planning Agency and approval by the Department and the Federal Highway Administration. Urban area boundaries can be inside or outside of the city limit, depending on population density. The current urban area designation for Martin County shows the area south of SR76, adjacent to the west side of 1-95, (the proposed site locations) to be outside the urban boundary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's permit applications. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire 200 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the subject signs of Respondent should be removed.
Findings Of Fact A notice of violation and a notice to show cause was sent to the Respondent, Harry Moody Signs and delivered on September 13, 1977 alleging violations of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes and violations of Rule 14-1O.4. The violation notice was marked Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 and entered into evidence. The notice cited six signs and for clarity the Hearing Officer numbered the signs from one through six on the violation notice. Testimony and evidence was taken on each sign as follows: Sign One: This sign was withdrawn from consideration by consent of both parties. Sign Two: The parties agreed that a permit would be issued for this sign within the city limits of Weeki-Wachee, Florida providing it was removed from the state's right-of-way and moved back some 51 feet. Sign Three: This double faced sign has no permit. The sign consists of a small sign stating "This is Beacon Country" which is attached to and on the top of a large sign that states "See ten different models, Beacon Woods, Beacon Homes by Hoeldtke"; on the poles at the bottom of the signs is a third sign reading "P G A Golf-Restaurant- Shopping Turn Right." Sign Four: This sign has an expired 1972 permit tag attached to it. Sign Five: This sign has no current permit tag attached thereto. Sign Six: This sign has no current permit or 1974 tag attached thereto. The Respondent admitted that this sign was in violation of the outdoor advertising law. The Respondent disclaimed any interest in Sign One and the Petitioner moved to withdraw the charges. Sign Two is located on the state's right-of-way and is within the city limits of Weeki-Wachee. It was stipulated that the sign would be removed or relocated within 20 days from date of the hearing but the Respondent has not so notified the Hearing Officer of removal. The double faced sign marked as Sign Three was the subject of argument by both attorneys who requested to submit & memorandum of law as to whether the sign was in violation of Section 479.16(3). No memorandum of law has been received from either attorney although the 30 days allotted to submit said memorandum has expired. Signs marked Four and Five have no current permit tag attached thereto. The Respondent admitted that there was no current permit for Sign number Six and the sign was in violation. The parties agreed that the sign may not be eligible for a permit.
Recommendation Remove each of the subject signs designated; Sign Two, Three, Four, Five and Six. Invoke the penalties provided for by Section 479.18 to wit: "479.18 Penalties. - Any person, violating any provision of this chapter whether as principal, agent or employee, for which violation no other penalty is prescribed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in Sec. 775.083; and such person shall be guilty of a separate offense for each month during any portion of which any violation of this chapter is committed, continued or permitted. The existence of any advertising copy on any outdoor advertising structure or outdoor advertising sign or advertisement outside incorporated towns and cities shall constitute prima facie evidence that the said outdoor advertising sign or advertisement was constructed, erected, operated, used, maintained or displayed with the consent and approval and under the authority of the person whose goods or services are advertised thereon." DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire 115 East Morse Blvd. Winter Park, Florida 32790
The Issue Whether respondent's initial proposal to deny petitioner's application for a permit to construct an outdoor advertising sign had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it occurred or was otherwise substantially justified; or, if not, whether special circumstances would make an award of costs and fees unjust?
Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1988, petitioner proposed to erect a sign facing east, within 15 feet of an existing outdoor advertising sign, on the north side of State Road 200, approximately .6 miles west of the intersection of State Road 200 and I-75. He planned to place a single face at such an angle to the existing, single-faced sign that a V configuration would result. Another outdoor advertising company held a permit for the existing sign, which faced west. It stood on property belonging to a land owner who did not own the property to the east on which Ray proposed to raise its sign. On November 10, 1988, the Department of Transportation issued a notice of intent to deny petitioner's application for a permit to construct the outdoor advertising sign. Petitioner reasonably incurred attorneys' fees of $787.50 and costs of $28.00 before Department of Transportation decided, well after the evidentiary hearing held April 5, 1989, to issue the permit, after all. As far as the record reveals, the Department has faced only one other situation in which an applicant for a permit to construct a sign, within 15 feet of an existing sign, proposed to build on property not owned by the land owner who had leased to the company which had built the existing sign, viz., Ad-Con Outdoor Advertising v. Department of Transportation, No. 89- 0087T. In that case, too, the Department issued a permit for the second sign. In an internal memorandum dated February 17, 1989, respondent's Rivers Buford wrote Dallas Gray, while the Ad-Con application was pending, the following: Inasmuch as the proposed sign would be within fifteen feet of another sign it would, by virtue of the provisions of Rule Chapter 14-10.1006(1)(b)3, be considered a part of a V-type sign and thus its two faces would be exempt from the minimum spacing requirements of Section 479.07, F.S. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. The memorandum antedated the final hearing in Case No. 88-6107 by more than six weeks. Presumably, the intended rule reference was to Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code. At the hearing in the present case, the Department of Transportation produced two witnesses to explain why the Department initially turned down petitioner's application. In their view, the Department of Transportation should never have granted petitioner's application, in order to protect rights vested in the other company, particularly a purported, preemptive right the other company had, by virtue of the location of its existing sign, to build another sign where Ray proposed to build, even though the other company did not own and had not leased the site Ray applied to build on. They asserted not only that the Department was substantially justified in turning down petitioner's application when it was originally considered, but also that any other similar application should be turned down. In their opinion, the Department erred in issuing permits in both cases in which the question has arisen. They attributed the eventual issuance of permits to petitioner and in the Ad-Con case to misinformed and misguided departmental employees. As authority for this view, Mr. Kissinger, respondent's Motorist Information Services Coordinator, cited Sections 479.07(9)(a) and 479.01(14), Florida Statutes (1989) and Rule 14-10.006(b)(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Jefferson County has established comprehensive zoning for the county pursuant to its Development Code which became effective on April 1, 1983. This code provides a system of land use regulation which includes comprehensive zoning of commercial uses by a category called "Site Particularly Suited for Economic Activity." The commercial zone allows for one of three types of employment centers, namely, Type 1-5, Type 6-20, and Type 21, which are commercial enterprises or firms distinguished by the number of employees in a building or group of buildings at a particular location. Type 6-20 and Type 21 employment centers are only allowed in a "Site Particularly Suited for Economic Activity." Section 1 of Article 25 of this code allows outdoor advertising visible from an arterial highway to be located in one of the "Sites Particularly Suited for Economic Activity" as defined in Article 26. Section 2 of Article 26 of the code states that Economic Activity refers to Type 6-20 and Type 21 employment centers. The Petitioner, by its application for outdoor advertising permits, seeks to erect signs on the south side of I-10, .6 mile west of State Road 59 in Jefferson County, facing east and west. This site is in a Type 1-5 employment center, not a Type 6-20 or a Type 21 employment center, as required by Article 26 of the code. This site is also within 660 feet of the right-of-way of Interstate 10. It is without commercial activity, and is vacant land at the present time. On May 7, 1984, the Petitioner made an application to the Jefferson County Planning Commission for a change of land use, or variance, and listed as its purpose "Outdoor Advertising." On July 12, 1984, the Jefferson County Planning Commission approved the variance as applied for on the property which is the subject of this proceeding. Thereafter, on September 11, 1984, the Petitioner applied with the Department of Transportation for outdoor advertising permits at the subject location. This application was denied by the Department on September 13, 1984.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Seminole Inns, Inc., for permits to erect outdoor advertising signs on the south side of Interstate 10, .6 mile west of State Road 59 in Jefferson County, Florida, facing east and west, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 22nd day of March, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrell C. Madigan, Esquire David D. Eastman, Esquire P. O. Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Hon. Paul A. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is which outdoor advertising signs should be permitted.
Findings Of Fact Escambia County, at all times material to these proceedings, had, in effect, a local ordinance that regulates the location and construction of outdoor advertising signs. The administrative agency of the county that handles enforcement of the ordinance is the county building inspection department. The policy adopted by that department is that an outdoor advertising company first submits to it a request for approval of a site location. The department inspects the location to see whether the location meets the spacing requirements of the ordinance. The building inspection department does not make an effort to determine at that time whether all other requirements for the issuance of a state permit are met. It issues a letter addressed to the Chipley office of the DOT stating whether it approves the proposed site and delivers that letter to the outdoor advertising company applying for the permit. Lamar submitted an application to the county for a site on the east side of Nine Mile Road (S.R. 297), 250 feet south of U.S. 90A, with a drawing showing the proposed sign location. (See, pg. 4; DOT Exhibit 4). The application was approved by the Escambia County building inspection department on January 6, 1989. On February 24, 1989, Outdoor submitted applications to the Escambia County building inspection department for sites on the east side of S.R. 297 (Nine Mile Road), south of U.S. 90A ("D" on DOT Exhibit 1), and on the south side of U.S. 90A east of S.R. 297 ("C" on DOT Exhibit 1). The locations were checked on February 27, 1989 by an employee of the Escambia County building inspections department, who found the sites to comply with spacing requirements and so indicated on the drawing submitted with the applications. However, that employee's supervisor, John Kimberl, found upon checking the records in the department's office that the application of Lamar for the site, 250 feet south of the intersection of S.R. 297 and U.S. 90A on the east side of S.R. 297, had been approved. This approval created a conflict with the site applied for by Outdoor on the east side of S.R. 297 ("D" on DOT Exhibit 1). Escambia County approved the application for the south side of U.S. 90A east of S.R. 297 ("C" on DOT Exhibit 1). Escambia County issued two letters, one of which stated that the application was approved and the other which stated that the application was denied because it would be in conflict with the spacing requirements because of a prior application. Both letters identified the sign in question using the same address. Outdoor applied for outdoor advertising permits for sites "C" and "D" to DOT by two separate applications on March 31, 1989. Outdoor attached sketches of both sites and a copy of the approval letter from Escambia County to its applications to the DOT representing to the DOT that the appropriate authorities of Escambia County had approved both sites. This may have been inadvertent and due to Outdoor's practice of proceeding only with letters of approval. The applications submitted by Outdoor were otherwise in order. A field inspection by Phillip Brown of the DOT showed that there would be a conflict between the two locations applied for by Outdoor because they were within 660 feet of each other and outdoor advertising signs would be visible to motorists on both highways. The DOT, therefore, offered Outdoor its choice of the two locations. Outdoor chose the location ("D") on the east side of S.R. 297. The DOT then issued Permit Nos. AY436-35 and AY437-35 and gave Outdoor notice that it had denied its other application ("C"). Lamar applied to DOT for an outdoor advertising permit for its location 250 feet south of the intersection on the east side of S.R. 297 initially on January 27, 1989 and again on February 23, 1989. On one occasion, it was rejected because it had the wrong lease attached and on another occasion because the 250-foot distance placed it on property not subject to a valid lease. (See DOT Exhibit 4). After February 23, 1989, this application was amended to 144 feet south of the intersection of S.R. 297 and U.S. 90A and resubmitted with a proper lease. This site was not resubmitted to Escambia County for evaluation, and the original approval letter for the site 250 feet from the intersection was used. (See DOT Exhibit 3). After Lamar's application for permits for the east side of S.R. 297, 144 feet south of U.S. 90A, were rejected as being in conflict with Permit Nos. AY436-35 and AY437-35 issued to Outdoor, Lamar requested an administrative hearing and alleged that Escambia County had not approved the application of Outdoor for the location on the east side of S.R. 297. It is the policy of both the Escambia County building inspection department and the DOT to approve applications for permits in the order in which they were received if the applications are in compliance with the requirements of the statutes, rules and ordinances. It is further the policy of Escambia County not to permit anyone to erect a sign unless they have state permits. In this case, neither Lamar nor Outdoor fully complied with the Escambia County requirements. Outdoor's application for site "D" was not approved by the county and Lamar changed the location of its sign from 250 feet to 144 feet south of the intersection. This new location was not resubmitted for site evaluation. The DOT should have been alerted to the problems of both applications because Outdoor's sketch said the approval was void and the date of the county's letter of approval to Lamar did not change when Lamar's site sketch was changed. Lamar received the approval of Escambia County; but by the time its otherwise valid application was submitted to the DOT, the DOT had issued the permits to Outdoor for the location on the east side of S.R. 297 and denied Lamar because of spacing problems. The DOT would have rejected the application of Outdoor for the location on the east side of S.R. 297 if Outdoor had submitted to it the proper letter from Escambia County.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the DOT revoke the issued Permit Nos. AY436-35 and AY437-35 because the site upon which the signs were to be erected was not properly approved by the county. The DOT properly rejected Lamar's application because its amended site was not approved by the county. DOT's denial of Outdoor's application for signs at site "C" is not at issue in this case and no recommendation is made regarding it. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Officer Hearings 1550 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399- (904) 488-9675 Hearings 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ben C. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Robert P. Gaines, Esq. Beggs and Lane P.O. Box 12950 Pensacola, FL 32576-2950 J. Arby Van Slyke, Esq. P.O. Box 13244 Pensacola, FL 32591 Charles G. Gardner, Esq. 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 31st day of January,
The Issue Whether the structure described in the Department of Transportation's Notice of Violation No. 10B DB 2000 007 (Notice) is in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and therefore subject to removal pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is an outdoor advertising company that was formerly known as AK Media. On December 10, 1998, Petitioner (while still known as AK Media) entered into an agreement with NWT Partners, Ltd., the owner of the New World Tower (Building), a "thirty story four (4) sided building" located at 100 North Biscayne Boulevard in Miami, Florida, to lease certain portions of the Building. The lease agreement contained the following provisions, among others: Effective Date. This Lease shall become effective on the later of (x) the date that Tenant provides written notice to Landlord that Tenant has obtained all permits, license and governmental approvals necessary or required to enable Tenant to construct, maintain and operate the Wall Faces and Wall Structures, as hereinafter defined or (y) January 1, 1999 (the "Effective Date"). Tenant shall have ninety (90) days from the date of this Lease to obtain all such permits, licenses and approvals or the Landlord may cancel this Lease. Purpose. The purpose of this lease is for Tenant to construct, maintain and operate painted, printed, illuminated and/or electrical signs on the north and south wall faces of the Building (the "Wall Faces"), and all other uses not inconsistent therewith, including all necessary supporting structures, devices, illumination facilities and connections, service ladders and equipment, and other appurtenances (the "Wall Fixtures"). All construction to the Building, and advertising thereon, including construction drawing and artwork to be furnished by the Tenant shall be subject to Landlord's written approval, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Tenant's Right to Enter and Use. For the duration of this Lease, Tenant shall have the non-exclusive right to enter onto the Property and into the Building and use the Wall Faces for the purposes described in this Lease and any other purposes allowed or required by this Lease and Tenant has the exclusive right to use the Wall Faces Property for advertising. In exercising Tenant's rights hereunder, Tenant may hang or attach the Wall Fixtures to the roof and exterior structure of the Building. Tenant shall maintain the Wall Fixtures at Tenant's cost and expense. Tenant shall pay all utility charges in connection with the operation and maintenance of the Wall Fixtures. Tenant shall be responsible for damage to the Building which is caused by Tenant's operation and maintenance and removal of the Wall Fixtures and shall repair any such damage and restore the Building to the condition it was in immediately prior to such damages at the expiration or termination of this Lease. Term. The term of this Lease is for five (5) years from the "Rent Commencement Date," as hereinafter defined, to the last day of the month during which the fifth anniversary of the Rent Commencement Date occurs (the "Term"). Rent. Tenant shall pay Landlord rent annually, in accordance with the schedule (the "Rent Schedule") set forth on Exhibit "B" hereto, inclusive of all taxes . . . . Contracts. Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, Tenant will use its best efforts to obtain contracts (the "Contracts") for advertising on the Building which exceed the amount of the Guaranteed Rent, as set forth on the Rent Schedule. . . . 9. Ownership/Removal. At all times, Tenant is and shall remain the owner of the Wall Fixtures and all signs and permits of any kind in relation thereto, and has the right to remove the Wall Fixtures at any time. . . . Exhibit "B" Rent Schedule Tenant shall pay annual rent to Landlord in an amount equal to the greater of (x) Fifty-five percent (55%) of the gross revenues attributable to advertisements displayed on the North Wall and the South Wall of the Building less any agency fee or commissions not greater than 16 2/3% to bona fide third parties (the "Net Revenues") associated with such advertisements (the "Percentage Rent") or (y) the minimum guaranteed annual rent (the "Guaranteed Rent") hereinafter set forth as follows: . . . The Landlord may terminate the Lease Agreement upon thirty (30) days prior written notice to Tenant if either Wall is vacant for more than one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days during the Term of the Lease and the Tenant has failed to obtain a contract, before the expiration of such notice period, for advertising on the North Wall or South Wall, as the case may be, pursuant to which the projected Percentage Rent under such contract would exceed the Guaranteed Rent. . . . Subsequently, Petitioner (while still operating under the name AK Media) entered into a "bulletin contract" with New York Outdoor, an advertising agency acting on behalf of Supreme International, in which Petitioner agreed, for a fee, to produce and maintain an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. Supreme International sells "Perry Ellis" and "Perry Ellis for Men" brand fashion apparel. In accordance with the "bulletin contract," Petitioner produced an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. The "outdoor advertising display" that Petitioner produced was a large mural more than 100 feet high and more than 60 feet wide. Such a product is referred to in the outdoor advertising industry as a "wallscape." The "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International consisted of artwork (a picture of a young woman) and print (the words "Perry Ellis for Men") on a "canvass-type" material that was mounted on a "picture frame" support structure attached to the north wall of the Building. It was located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of a roadway, US Highway 1 (also known, in that location, as North Biscayne Boulevard), which is a part of the federal-aid primary highway system. The artwork and print could be seen without visual aid by motorists of normal visual acuity travelling on US Highway 1 in the vicinity of the Building. At no time has Petitioner applied for, or obtained, a permit from the Department authorizing it to erect and maintain a "sign," as that term is used in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, on the north wall of the Building. Petitioner, however, did seek and obtain a Class II Special Permit from the City of Miami. The permit was granted by the Miami City Commission, through the passage of Miami City Commission Resolution 99- 828, at its October 26, 1999, meeting. The printed agenda distributed in advance of the meeting stated the following concerning the permit for which Petitioner had applied: Consideration of approving Class II Special Permit No. 99-0142 for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard for a sign of a graphic or artistic value. This will allow a mural containing a commercial message. The resolution passed by the Miami City Commission at the meeting read as follows: A RESOLUTION OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION APPROVING THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF CLASS II SPECIAL PERMIT APPLICATION NO. 99-0142, SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT THERE SHALL BE NO WRITING PERMITTED WITH THE MURAL AND OTHER CONDITIONS AS RECOMMENDED BY THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 100 NORTH BISCAYNE BOULEVARD, MIAMI, FLORIDA, PURSUANT TO SECTION 401 OF ORDINANCE NO. 11000, AS AMENDED, THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, AS AMENDED. WHEREAS, the Director for the Department of Planning is recommending approval of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida; and WHEREAS, Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Miami, Florida, requires City Commission approval of the Class II Special Permit as hereinafter set forth; and WHEREAS, the City Commission after careful consideration of this matter, finds the application for a Class II Special Permit does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, and deems it advisable and in the best interest of the general welfare of the City of Miami and its inhabitants to approve the recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to uphold the issuance of the Class II Special Permit, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Resolution are hereby adopted by reference thereto and incorporated herein as if fully set forth in this section. Section 2. The recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to issue Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, is hereby approved, and the City Commission finds that the issuance of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended. Section 3. The Resolution shall become effective immediately upon its adoption and signature of the Mayor. Inasmuch as the words "Perry Ellis for Men" were on the "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International, this "wallscape" was not in compliance with the condition imposed by the Miami City Commission, in issuing the Class II Special Permit to Petitioner, that there "be no writing permitted with the mural." On February 22, 2000, Bernard Davis, who, at the time, was the Department's District 6 Roadside Outdoor Advertising Administrator, issued a Notice of Violation (Notice No. 10B DB 2000 007) alleging that the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building (described above) was "in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, which requires a permit for all outdoor advertising signs not exempted by Section 479.16, Florida Statutes" and directing that the sign be removed within 30 days. Petitioner thereafter requested an administrative hearing on the matter. Prior to the hearing, the artwork and print on the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building were changed. As of the date of the final hearing in this case, the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building contained a picture of a man and part of a woman and the words "Perry Ellis," underneath which was written "www.perryellis.com," Supreme International's website address. The Monday and Tuesday before the final hearing (February 5 and 6, 2001), Mr. Davis' successor, C. Jean Cann, went inside the Building to determine whether Supreme International had an "on-premises presence." On Monday, February 5, 2001, Ms. Cann entered the Building at approximately 1:15 p.m. After obtaining information from the Building's Electronic Directory that "Perry Ellis" occupied room 2128, she took the elevator to the 21st floor. After getting off the elevator, she walked down a hallway, where she saw a paper sign on a door which read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128." When she knocked on the door, no one answered. She waited 10 to 15 seconds and then knocked again, with the same result. She then, unsuccessfully, attempted to open the door. At around 1:45 p.m., she left the Building. Ms. Cann returned to the Building the following day at approximately 11:40 a.m., at which time she spoke to a security guard, who informed her that "Perry Ellis" "was in 2126." She then again went up to the 21st floor, and, on the same door that she had seen the "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128" sign the day before, she saw a paper sign that read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2126." Her knocks on the door, like those of the previous day, went unanswered, and she was again unable to open the door. At around 12:00 noon, she exited the Building. At no time during either of her two visits was Ms. Cann able to ascertain what, if any, business activity Supreme International was engaging in inside the Building.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the "wallscape" on the north side of the Building is a "sign" that was erected and is being maintained without the Department-issued permit required by Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and that it therefore is a public and private nuisance that must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Empire Outdoor Advertising, Inc., is the owner of a sign located on the westbound or north side of Northwest 54th Street approximately 20 feet east of Northwest 12th Avenue, in Dade County, Florida. Northwest 54th Street is also designated as State Road 25A. The Respondent's sign is a structure or billboard designed to advertise or inform, and its copy is visible from the main traveled way of the adjacent roadway of State Road 25A or Northwest 54th Street. At the site where the Respondent's sign is located, State Road 25A or Northwest 54th Street is a part of the federal- aid primary highway system, and this roadway is open to the public for vehicular traffic. The Respondent's sign is located within 660 feet from the nearest edge of the pavement of State Road 25A. The Respondent's sign is situated within 500 feet from another outdoor advertising structure on the same side of the highway. These two signs face in the same direction and are both visible to westbound traffic on the north side of State Road 25A or Northwest 54th Street. The Respondent's sign has affixed to it copy which advertises Kraft Barbecue Sauce. This structure does not fall within any of the exceptions to the statutory licensing requirements set forth in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, and it must have a state sign permit. The Respondent has not applied for an outdoor advertising permit from the Department, and no such permit has been issued by the Department for the subject sign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter its Final Order finding the Respondent's sign which is the subject of this proceeding to be in violation of the applicable statutes and rules, and ordering its removal. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 25th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 L. Martin Reeder, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2637 Palm Beach, Florida 33480
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns the sign located on the west side of and adjacent to U.S. Highway 331, approximately 5.5 miles north of the intersection of U.S. Highway 331 and U.S. Highway 90 in Walton County, Florida. The sign advertises a motel owned by Petitioner. The sign is important to the motel's business. The sign is required to have an outdoor advertising sign permit. U.S. Highway 331 is a Federal Aid Primary Highway and was a Federal Aid Primary Highway prior to the sign's erection. Walton County is operating under a duly adopted comprehensive plan. However, the State of Florida has not fully approved such plan and Walton County has not yet entered into a compliance agreement with the State in regards to its comprehensive plan. Pursuant to its comprehensive plan, Walton County utilizes a method of zoning known as "performance zoning", as opposed to the traditional "euclidian zoning". Performance zoning has specific regulations and restrictions for each type of use, and each type of use has to meet certain criteria. In essence, performance zoning allows mixed uses of certain zones within the county. Different areas of the county have different requirements regarding the development of such use in order to safeguard the integrity of the zoning plan. The specific area where the sign is located allows for commercial, industrial and residential use and is permitted by the zoning scheme of Walton County. In a general sense, residential as well as commercial and industrial use is allowed in all of the areas of Walton County north of U.S. Highway 90. This area constitutes approximately one-half of the county. However, zones contained within the areas of Walton County north of U.S. Highway 90 may differ in the circumstances and criteria of the zoning plan under which such uses would be permitted. Even though Walton County was comprehensively zoned, Respondent's previous administration treated Walton County as if it did not have zoning. Therefore, Respondent would have previously permitted the sign in question. However Respondent changed its treatment of Walton County because it had been cited by the Federal Highway Administration for its lax interpretation of zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial areas within the counties. The Federal Highway Administration threatened to withdraw federal highway monies if the Department did not begin to follow the language in its statutes and rules defining zoned and unzoned areas. The clear language of the Respondent's statutes and rules governing the permitting of outdoor advertising signs, as well as the threatened action of the Federal Highway Administration demonstrate the reasonableness of and the factual basis for the Department's change in its interpretation of zoned and unzoned areas within a county. In this case, it is clear that the sign is located in a zoned area and not in an unzoned area. The area in which the sign is located is not zoned commercial or industrial. The area is zoned for mixed use according to the performance zoning utilized by Walton County. Since the sign is not in an area zoned commercial or industrial, the sign is not permittable under Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application for a permit to maintain a sign located on the west side of U.S. Highway 331, approximately 5.5 miles north of the intersection of U.S. Highway 331 and U.S. Highway 90 in Walton County, Florida, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraph 12 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order were not shown by the evidence. The fact contained in paragraph 11 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order are immaterial. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of Respondent's Proposed Recommended order are subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: William K. Jennings 119 E. Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether the outdoor advertising sign of Respondent should be removed for lack of an outdoor advertising permit and for being erected without a permit within the prohibited distance of an interstate highway.
Findings Of Fact A violation notice and Notice to Show Cause dated August 3, 1978, was served upon the Respondent charging him with violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, Sections 335.13 and 339.301, Florida Statutes, and Rules 14-10.04 and 14-10.05, Florida Administrative Code. The sign in question carries the copy "Arrowhead Campsites" and is located 0.5 mile west of U.S. Highway 231 on Interstate Highway 10. An administrative hearing was requested on the charges. A billboard advertising Arrowhead Campsites has been erected within the past three years in Jackson County, Florida, about one-half mile west of U.S. 231 on the south side of Interstate 10. The sign is approximately fifteen (15) feet south of a fence located within the right-of-way of Interstate 10. The outdoor advertising is approximately one hundred (100) feet from the edge of the interstate highway and is clearly visible to the public traveling on the interstate. It obviously was erected to advertise the campsites to those traveling on the federal highway. The sign is located on private property in a rural area along the interstate highway. No outdoor advertising permit is attached to the subject sign, and no application has been made to the Florida Department of Transportation for a permit for subject sign. It was stipulated that the Respondent, Bill Reddick, is the husband of the owner of Arrowhead Campsites, and that Mr. Reddick accepted service of the notice and the notice has not been questioned.
Recommendation Remove the subject sign without compensation therefor and assess penalties as provided in Section 479.18, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James P. Appleman, Esquire 206 Market Street Post Office Box 355 Marianna, Florida 32446 Richard C. Hurst, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Section Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
