Findings Of Fact Petitioner and Respondent agreed to the following facts: On November 23, 1975, Herschel and Audi Motes, a deputy sheriff with the Putnam County Sheriff's Department, died of a heart attack while arresting an individual who struggled with the arresting Louise Motes, Petitioner in this cause, was married to Herschel Audi Motes at the time of his death, thereby becoming his widow. Mrs. Motes remains unmarried to date and is qualified as to her status for all of the rights and benefits granted January 21, 1976, Sheriff E.W. Pellicer wrote a letter to the Department of Administration, Division of Personnel and Retirement, furnishing the Department with the record of Mr. Motes' salary, contributions to the retirement fund, together with the dates of his employment. The letter concluded by stating, "I would appreciate hearing from you at an early date and if anything further is needed, please advise." The letter was signed by E.W. Pellicer, Sheriff, Putnam County, Florida. On March 10, 1976, Mrs. Motes received a letter from Marjorie B. Smith, Retirement Benefits Specialist, with the letter showing a copy to Mr. E.W. Pellicer. The letter stated as follows: "As the designated beneficiary and surviving spouse of Herschel A. Motes, who died November 23, 1975, you are entitled to the refund of the accumulated retirement contributions which amount to $4,325.69 or the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. If you desire the refund of the contributions, you should execute a request for refund, form . . . which must be completed in the personnel office of the Putnam County Sheriff's Department If you prefer the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit, which has been computed to be $125.29 based on 18.30 years of service, you should execute the enclosed form FST-11b on which a single beneficiary must be designated and send your personal remittance in the amount of $1,089.23 made payable to the Florida Retirement System. This payment is necessary to allow credit for four years of military service, service rendered from April through August 1963, and complete payment of the necessary contributions for the 1963-64 and 1964-65 years. This monthly benefit, if elected instead of the refund, is a lifetime income which will continue even though you should remarry. In the event of your death prior to receiving in monthly benefits an amount equal to the total accumulated retirement contributions, any contribution on deposit in excess of the total monthly benefits paid will be refunded to your beneficiary. Please let us know if we may be of further assistance." (emphasis added). Enclosed with this letter was form FST-11b which is an "Application of Beneficiary for Monthly Benefits." The form. Joint Exhibit I, contained no reference whatsoever to any rights or benefits under Section 121.091(7)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (the death in the line of duty benefits). Either the Division of Retirement or a Mrs. Key, with the Sheriff's Office of Putnam County, had filled in the blank portions of the first sentence of the form by writing "121" and "3" in the blanks where the form states "Chapter 121, Option 3." The remainder of the form is typed in except for the signature of Louise A. Motes. After filing the "application" through the Putnam County Sheriff's Office, and receiving her first benefit check, Mrs. Motes had a conversation with a Mr. Ronald Clark of Palatka, Florida, about workmens' compensation comprehension benefits. As a result of that conversation, she went to an attorney, who filed a workmens' compensation claim for her. Sometime thereafter, Mrs. Motes was going through some of her husband's papers, which were contained in a filing cabinet at the Sheriff's Office, which her sons brought home. In those papers, she found a newspaper article that Mr. Motes had cut out and saved which told about the death in the line of duty benefits, a copy of the newspaper articles is attached to and made part of Joint Exhibit K. In response thereto, Mrs. Motes went back to the attorney who had filed her workmens' compensation claim and inquired about the "death in the line of duty retirement benefits" of Section 121.091(7)(c), Florida Statutes. At no time prior to or during her filing out the "application" from the State of Florida, Bureau of Retirement, was she informed by anyone that she might possibly entitled to higher benefits because of the manner in which her husband died. At no time prior to filling out the retirement "application" did she have any actual knowledge that the State paid benefits other than those benefits which had been presented to her which were listed on said application. At no time did the Sheriff's Office inform her that she had any possibility of benefits other than the benefits listed on the above stated State of Florida, Bureau of Retirement, application form. By letter of November 7, 1977, Steven S. Mathues, Assistant Division Attorney for the Division of Retirement, Department of Administration, informed Ms. Jill Brown (the attorney for Mrs. Motes who began the original inquiry as to obtaining the "death in the line of duty benefits"), that " . . . it is this Division's position that all retirement benefits and options become fixed when the first warrant is cashed. However, it would appear that under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, your client would have a right to challenge this position . . . . As I see it, the issue would be whether Mrs. Motes' notarized application . . . and continued acceptance of benefits would estop her from now attempting to change the benefit " Thereafter, Mrs. Motes' case was referred to Mr. Maynard, who after several conferences with Mr. Mathues, the attorney for the Division of Retirement, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on Mrs. Motes' behalf, alleging, among other things, that Herschel Audi Motes was killed in the line of duty within the meaning of Section 121.091(7)(c)(1), Florida Statutes. The petition also alleged that the Division's "policy" that as of the moment Mrs. Motes had cashed one of her benefit checks her retirement benefits had vested and could not be changed by her subsequent to that event was within the definition of a rule as defined by Section 120.54(14), Florida Statutes, and that the Division of Retirement had never promulgated such a rule in accord with the procedures required by Chapter 120. Depositions were taken in Daytona, Palatka, and Tallahassee on the issue of whether or not Mr. Motes had been "killed in the line of duty." Subsequent to those depositions, Mr. Mathues informed Petitioner that the Division of Retirement no longer wanted to contest the in line of duty issue. Thereafter, Mr. Mathues and Mr. Maynard, attorney for Petitioner, executed a "Joint Motion for Continuance" which states as follows: "1. The parties have settled all of the questions which relate to the issue of whether Herschel Audi Motes, his widow, to the in line of duty death benefits provided in Chapter121, Florida Statues. The only remaining issue in dispute is whether or not Louise Motes has waived her rights to the in line of duty death benefits provided in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, because she has been cashing her benefit checks since 1975. The remaining issue is solely a legal issue and does not require any testimony by witnesses, with the possible exception of testimony by Mrs. Motes and/or affidavits from Mrs. Motes and the Putnam County Sheriff's Office if the parties cannot agree to a stipulation of facts. Therefore, this issue can be argued by the undersigned attorneys for the parties in Tallahassee, Florida, at the time and place stated above." The Joint Motion was signed by both Mr. Maynard and Mr. Mathues. In response to that Motion, the hearing officer promulgated an Order entitled "Order of Continuance" which stated: "The parties in the above styled cause have filed a Joint Motion for Continuance of the hearing from February 15, 1979, at 1:00 p.m. in Palatka, Florida, to February 26, 1979, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 103, Collins Building, in Tallahassee, Florida. The Motion is granted. Done and Ordered this 12th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida." With the Division of Retirement, Department of Administration, no longer contesting the in line of duty issue, a final hearing was held on February 26, 1979, on the only remaining issue in dispute which is whether or not Louise Motes has waived her rights to the in line of duty death benefits provided by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, because she has been cashing retirement benefit checks since 1975. The issue as to whether Petitioner's husband died in such a manner as to entitle her to in-line-of-duty death benefits has been settled by agreement of the parties in Petitioner's favor. This Administrative Hearing was held to resolve the issue of whether Petitioner waived her right to the in-line-of-duty death benefits provided in Section 121.091(7)(c)(1), Florida Statutes, inasmuch as she has been cashing benefit checks awarded her pursuant to Section 121.091(6)(a)(3). Inquiry to the Respondent as to subject retirement claim was made by Petitioner, Louise Motes, when she became aware of the possibility of her entitlement to in-line-of-duty death benefits. No rules have been promulgated in relation to Section 121.091(7) Death benefits, although Rule 22B-4.10(5) was promulgated in 1972 (amended 1974) under authority of Section 212.091(6), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Deny the request of Petitioner to change the retirement benefits she now receives to in-line-of-duty death benefits provided in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Division of Retirement Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Zollie M. Maynard, Esquire 502 East Jefferson Street Post Office Box 1716 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT LOUISE MOTES, Petitioner, vs. DOAH Case NO. 78-2105 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (“Respondent”), is entitled to a deduction of the retirement benefits to be paid to Aubrie-Elle Perez, and if Respondent is entitled to a deduction, whether the deduction should be in the amount of the gross disbursements of $19,833.21 or the net payments to Edward Perez (“Lt. Perez”) in the amount of $17,017.80.
Findings Of Fact The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. There are approximately 400,000 active members within the FRS. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. In 1997, Lt. Perez began employment with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. For over 16 years, Lt. Perez served as a fire fighter with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department, his last position being a Lieutenant. Lt. Perez was a vested member of the FRS. Upon his initial employment and enrollment with the FRS in 1997, Lt. Perez entered the Investment Plan and made a retirement benefits election designating that if he died before his retirement and chose not to designate a beneficiary, retirement benefits would be paid in accordance with section 121.091(8), Florida Statutes. Lt. Perez chose not to designate a beneficiary. Thus, according to this statute, retirement benefits would first be paid to Lt. Perez’s spouse, and if no spouse, then to his only child, the Petitioner. Tragically, on April 7, 2013, Lt. Perez collapsed at the fire station. Subsequently, Lt. Perez was diagnosed with a grade-four malignant brain tumor known as a glioblastoma multi-forming--a very aggressive and generally terminal form of brain cancer. There is no cure and the median survival rate for adults with this form of brain cancer is 9 to 14 months. Due to his terminal brain cancer and the treatments he had undergone and was undergoing, Lt. Perez was unable to continue his duties with the Miami-Dade County Fire Department. On February 19, 2014, a two-page FRS Investment Plan Application for Disability Retirement Form PR-13 (“application for disability retirement”), and an FRS Investment Option Selection Form PR-11o (“option selection form”), were submitted to Respondent for Lt. Perez. They were sent to Respondent by mail by Lt. Perez’s sister, Alecs Perez-Crespo. The effect of the application for disability retirement and the selection of Option 1 on the option selection form would be to transfer the monies from the Investment Plan into the Pension Plan, and convert Lt. Perez’s accumulated Investment Plan retirement benefits to monthly disability retirement benefits during his lifetime. Then, upon his death, the monthly benefit payments would stop, and the beneficiary would receive only a relatively small amount, if any--a refund of contributions Lt. Perez had paid into the Investment Plan retirement account, which are in excess of the amount he received in benefits, not including the transferred Investment Plan account balance.2/ The two-page application for disability retirement was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. The option selection form was not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and was not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Affirmative medical and factual evidence establishes, and rebuts any legal presumption to the contrary, that Lt. Perez was not mentally, physically, cognitively, or legally competent to execute the option selection form or the application for disability retirement in February 2014, or to understand their legal nature and effect. Nevertheless, Respondent processed the application for disability retirement and option selection form. As a result, Lt. Perez was deemed to have retired effective April 1, 2014, and he forfeited approximately $238,000, which was transferred from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Subsequently, two disability retirement benefit warrants were issued by the State of Florida, Department of Financial Services, to Lt. Perez, via the Pension Plan, in care of Alecs Perez-Crespo, POA. The dates of these warrants are April 30, 2014, and May 30, 2014. Both warrants were endorsed by Ms. Perez-Crespo, “POA For Edward Perez.” Respondent made these disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: April 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less deducted taxes of $413.20, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,537.43; May 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43.3/ A direct deposit authorization for electronic transfer of future retirement benefit warrants into a checking account solely in the name of Lt. Perez was signed by Alecs Perez Crespo, “POA for Edward Perez,” on May 9, 2014. Two additional disability retirement gross benefit disbursements resulting in net payments to Lt. Perez were sent to the checking account of Lt. Perez on the following dates and in the following amounts: June 30, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,950.63, less taxes of $413.20 and less a medical deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,151.43; July 31, 2014: gross disbursement of $4,981.32, less taxes of $417.81 and less a medical insurance deduction of $386.00, for a net payment to Lt. Perez of $4,177.51, bringing the total sum of the gross disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $19,833.21, and the total sum of the net disbursements for the four payments made to Lt. Perez $17,017.80. The net sum of $17,017.80 issued by the Pension Plan as disability retirement benefits to Lt. Perez was deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. Accordingly, $19,833.21 (gross)/ $17,017.80 (net), was received by Lt. Perez. Lt. Perez died on July 16, 2014, from the cancer. At the time of Lt. Perez’s death, Petitioner was, and remains, his sole surviving child (natural or adopted). Lt. Perez was not married at the time of his death and, thus, left no surviving spouse. Because of the receipt of the four payments during his lifetime, which are applied first to the personal contributions made by Lt. Perez into the Investment Plan during his lifetime, the amount of Lt. Perez’s small contributions into the plan were exhausted by the time of his death. Therefore, if the option selection form is valid, Petitioner, as the sole beneficiary and child of Lt. Perez, would receive nothing. Respondent concedes that notwithstanding the facial appearance of the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the documents are void and invalid because they failed to comply with the statutory, rule, and manual requirements applicable to properly effectuate the Option 1 selection, in that they were not completed by the member, Lt. Perez, and not signed by Lt. Perez in the presence of a notary public. Respondent concedes that due to Lt. Perez lacking the mental, cognitive, physical, and legal capacity to understand the nature and legal effect of executing the option selection form and application for disability retirement, the purported execution by Lt. Perez of the option selection form and of the application for disability retirement are void and invalid. Respondent concedes that the option selection form is invalid and void ab initio, and Lt. Perez’s earlier selection in 1997, pursuant to section 121.091(8), should be reinstated under the FRS Investment Plan. Respondent concedes that with Lt. Perez having died in 2014 with no surviving spouse, and with Petitioner being his sole surviving child at the time of his death, that the full retirement benefits of $234,035.81, to which Lt. Perez was entitled under his Investment Plan designation of beneficiary should be paid directly to Petitioner. Respondent asserts, however, that the payment of the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled should be reduced by the amount of the four payments made by Respondent to Lt. Perez, which gross disbursements total $19,833.21, or net disbursements total $17,017.80, making the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled to be $214,202.60 or $217,018.01, not $234,035.81. Respondent’s position is correct because the gross benefits in the amount of $19,833.21 were received by Lt. Perez when the four payments, after applicable required deductions, were deposited into his personal checking account. At hearing, no persuasive and credible evidence was presented indicating whatever happened, if anything, to the net payments of $17,017.80 deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating whether any of the monies were withdrawn from the checking account before or after Lt. Perez’s death. No persuasive or credible evidence was presented indicating that Ms. Perez-Crespo used, diverted, or withdrew any of the funds from the checking account. No bank statements were offered into evidence. Petitioner, who is the personal representative of the estate, did not testify. No accounting of the assets of Lt. Perez’s estate was presented. Even if any of the $17,017.80 was used or diverted by Ms. Perez-Crespo after being deposited into Lt. Perez’s checking account, Petitioner, as personal representative of the estate of Lt. Perez, might have a remedy in another forum to recover such funds from Ms. Perez-Crespo. In any event, such a potential claim, not borne by the evidence presented in the instant proceeding, is beyond the scope of this administrative proceeding. Based on the evidence adduced at hearing and the stipulations of the parties, it is clear that $19,833.21 was received by Lt. Perez when $17,017.80 (after the required deductions) was deposited into his personal checking account. To require Respondent to pay the entire amount of $234,035.81 would result in overpayment of $19,833.21. Respondent is, therefore, entitled to a deduction in the amount of the gross disbursement of $19,833.21.4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order requiring that that the total sum of $214,202.60 be returned by Respondent to the FRS Investment Plan for the benefit of Lt. Perez, deceased, and that pursuant to section 121.091(8)(a), Florida Statutes, that Petitioner, Aubrie-Elle Perez, as the sole surviving child of and the sole beneficiary of Lt. Perez, immediately receive the amount of $214,202.60. The undersigned reserves jurisdiction to address issues regarding Petitioner’s entitlement to, and the amount of, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2017.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Fred E. Hild (Colonel Hild), a deceased member of the Florida Retirement System, was incapacitated at the time he selected his retirement option and through the time that his first benefits check was cashed and, if so, whether his retirement option should be amended retroactively to provide benefits for Petitioner, Lois Hild, his spouse.
Findings Of Fact Colonel Fred Hild, late husband of Lois Hild, served in the Air Force for 25 years before retiring from that service. After retirement from the Air Force and after Valencia Community College opened in Orlando, Florida, Colonel Hild joined the college staff, first as a teacher and then as an administrator. At the time of his retirement from the college, he was assistant to the provost. He worked at the college from 1978 until 1996. His employment at the college was covered by the Florida Retirement System (FRS). With the exception of a year's employment in her family's business, Mrs. Hild never worked outside of her home. She and Colonel Hild were married over 50 years and had a full, active life together. Colonel Hild provided the financial support for the family and, except for routine household expenses when he was away in the Air Force, he handled all of the family's financial affairs. Colonel Hild's family and co-workers acknowledge that he was a remarkable man in many ways, physically vigorous and mentally sharp. His work was always an important aspect of his life; he was well-respected and well-known on the college campus and, because of his long tenure, was very knowledgeable about the history and functioning of the college. As he aged, Colonel Hild slowed down a bit; he had days at work when he was sleepy or grumpy. Most days, though, he was quite normal and sharp. He knew all of the regulations for the college and always went by the rules. On October 12, 1995, at the age of 81 years, Colonel Hild suffered a major cerebrovascular accident (stroke) while at home. The stroke left lasting side effects. For a time after the stroke he lost all short-term memory and could neither read nor write. He became passive and frail. He underwent rehabilitation and improved quite a bit, according to Mrs. Hild, but he was never again the same man. Colonel Hild's son, David, who lived in California, sold his car and possessions and moved in with his parents to help Mrs. Hild provide the care Colonel Hild then required. This care included driving and assistance ambulating in the home neighborhood, where he would sometimes get lost. Colonel Hild was never again able to drive, as he lost part of his peripheral vision and would forget where he was going. He was unable at times to recognize friends or family members. He slept a lot and needed supervision in showering and dressing. He never again was able to assume responsibility for the financial affairs of the family. The Hild's son, Steve, an accountant in Miami, Florida, helped Mrs. Hild with financial planning and paperwork. Before his stroke Colonel Hild had made some plans for retirement. He spoke to co-workers of investments in stocks and bonds, and when the Air Force brought in a survivor's benefit program, he took advantage of that so that his wife would have some benefits when he died. He also spoke to Mrs. Hild of their having retirement benefits from Valencia for ten years. Still, before the stroke Colonel Hild worried about having enough for retirement and his worries increased after the stroke. He insisted on returning to work at the college after his rehabilitation and some recovery. Although they were worried about how he could function, Colonel Hild's wife and sons were reluctant to oppose him when he was so insistent. Dr. Collins, his personal physician for over 20 years, provided certificates authorizing Colonel Hild to return to the college part-time on April 8, 1996, and full time on June 1, 1996. Dr. Collins believed that the duties would be light and that the family and college staff would look out for Colonel Hild. Colonel Hild's son, David, drove him to and from work and made sure Colonel Hild got in the building. The first time they made the drive, Colonel Hild directed his son to the wrong campus of the college. Already thoroughly trained in the paperwork, the secretaries picked up much of the work that Colonel Hild had been doing. For example, they listened to students' problems and tried to work them out with the department chairpersons. For final decisions, the staff referred the problems to the provost, Dr. Kinzer. Colonel Hild's duties on his return to work were light. Because Colonel Hild was very organized and knew so much about the college, he was able to function with the help of his staff. He could review documents prepared for him and would initial or sign the documents, as appropriate, sometimes changing something if it had not been prepared correctly. Some days were better than others; he slept more than he did before his stroke and would sometimes get lost on campus. Because he was so well- known, someone would always help him back to his office. One of the annual responsibilities of Colonel Hild was organizing the graduation processions, making a list of the order of the march and placing posters or signs in the corridors for guidance. He performed this function without complaint in early May 1996. He refused assistance of his staff and, except for a couple of posters on the opposite wall, he managed to get everything done. At the actual graduation night, however, Colonel's Hild's, son, David, had to help him find his way at the end of the ceremony and recessional march. Colonel Hild retired from Valencia Community College on July 31, 1996. In preparation for that retirement he had several contacts with staff in the college's human resources office. Initially, Colonel Hild signed a form on May 30, 1996, applying for retirement and leaving blank the benefit option selection since he had not yet received an estimate of the amounts he would receive under each option. Vicki Nelson, a staff person in the human resources office, had approximately 4 or 5 contacts with Colonel Hild, face-to-face or over the telephone, while preparing paperwork for his retirement. At one point she was concerned that she was having to explain things over again and she suggested to Colonel Hild and to his secretary that maybe he should bring Mrs. Hild in with him. The issue she was trying to explain had something to do with the need to obtain Mrs. Hild's birth certificate if he selected either option 3 or 4. The suggestion was never followed up and ultimately Mrs. Hild's birth certificate was unnecessary. Michael Break is assistant vice-president of human resources at Valencia Community College. In his capacity as director of human resources Dr. Break was involved in preparing Colonel Hild's retirement documents. On June 19, 1996, Dr. Break, Vicki Nelson, and Colonel Hild met to discuss the benefit options and the monthly estimates of each amount. The FRS provides four benefit options to its retirees. Option 1 yields the maximum monthly benefit, but when the retiree dies there is no survivor benefit. Option 2 yields a reduced monthly benefit for 10 years. If the retiree dies before the end of 10 years, the benefit is paid to the survivor for the balance of the 10 years. Option 3 provides a reduced benefit for the joint lifetimes of the member and beneficiary; Option 4 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetimes of the retiree and beneficiary, which benefit is reduced by 33 1/3% upon the death of either. As explained to Colonel Hild, his monthly benefit under option 1 was $2,569.64; under option 2, his benefit was $1,692.72; under option 3 the benefit was $1,546.92; and under option 4, the benefit was $1,856.41, reduced to $1,237.61 upon the death of Colonel or Mrs. Hild. In his discussion with Colonel Hild, Dr. Break pointed out the implications of the various options, including the need to consider such factors as one's health and financial arrangements for a dependent spouse. In response, Colonel Hild mentioned that he had other financial means and this was not the only retirement that he depended on. Although Dr. Break was aware that some people were concerned about Colonel Hild's effectiveness after his return to work, nothing in Colonel Hild's responses to the discussion in the meeting raised red flags to alert Dr. Break that Colonel Hild did not understand. Colonel Hild expressed his opinion that the difference between benefits under option 1 and the remaining options was excessive. In Dr. Break's experience, and as he counsels pre- retirees, sometimes the selection of option 1, with the additional purchase of an annuity or life insurance policy, inures to the greater benefit of an individual's dependents than the other reduced-benefit options under the FRS. When a retiree selects option 1 or 2, there is a section on the option selection form for the spouse to sign in acknowledgment of the option. Colonel Hild brought the form home and gave it to Mrs. Hild to sign one morning before he left for work. When she signed it the form was blank. All she knew was what he told her, that the form was something she had to sign for his retirement. She did not question her husband or even read enough of the form to know that there were 4 options. Mary Ann Swenson has been employed at Valencia Community College for thirteen years, 8 of which have been in the human resources department. Ms. Swenson notarized Colonel Hild's signature on the benefits option form on June 24, 1996, and remembers the occasion. Colonel Hild came to the human resources office to meet with Vicki Nelson, who called Ms. Swenson. At the time that Colonel Hild signed the form, Mrs. Hild's signature was already on it, but her signature did not require a notary. Likewise, option 1 had been checked on the form and, in response to a question by Colonel Hild, Vicki Nelson showed him that he marked option 1 and said, "Yes, you have marked option 1." Colonel Hild signed the form and then Ms. Swenson notarized it. On June 24, 1996, during the approximately 10 minutes that Ms. Swenson spent with Colonel Hild and Vicki Nelson, she had no reason to believe that he was not in complete control of his mental facilities or that he failed to understand and recognize what he was signing. Colonel Hild retired, as planned, the end of July 1996, and his first retirement check arrived approximately August 30, 1996. Mrs. Hild saw the check and had her husband endorse it. She then cashed the check. She understood that by doing so, she was accepting the amount of the check. She saw no problem with this because she assumed that Colonel Hild had opted for what he and she had discussed as the "ten year" provision. Mrs. Hild assumed that the check reflected the number of years he was employed and the amount of money that he was making. The Hild's son, Steve, made the same assumption, as he and Colonel Hild had discussed retirement sometime in the early 1990's and Steve understood that his father would take the 10- year plan with Valencia. Neither Steve nor Mrs. Hild had requested any information from the college or Division of Retirement about the option selected by Colonel Hild or the amount of benefits he would receive once he retired. Colonel Hild died on September 28, 1997. He had received a total of approximately $37,000, or 14 months of benefits under FRS option 1 during his lifetime. Mrs. Hild and Colonel Hild's sons learned of the option 1 selection when the checks stopped coming after Colonel Hild's death and when Mrs. Hild called the college human resources office. It is necessary to glean Colonel Hild's mental capacity and state of mind from the circumstances described by the witnesses in this case, all of whom were candid and credible. From those circumstances it is impossible to find that Colonel Hild was incompetent to make the decision to chose option 1 for his FRS benefits. That decision was entirely consistent with his concern, described by his family and staff at the college, that there be enough money coming in when he retired. Although he plainly was concerned for making financial arrangements for his spouse, he had made some arrangements already with his Air Force retirement and with other assets or investments. Described as strong-willed, disciplined and well- organized, Colonel Hild, in spite of his diminished capacity after his stroke, convinced his family, the college and his long time physician that he should return to work. And he did function in that work prior to retirement, performing by habit those tasks that he had mastered in his long tenure. No one suggests that Colonel Hild was coerced, pressured or hurried into the decision he made. The various staff who met with him on several occasions regarding his retirement believed that he was capable of making his own decision and that he exercised the very option that he intended.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: THAT the Florida Division of Retirement issue its final order denying the relief sought by Petitioner, Lois Hild. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold Lewis, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Julia Smith, Esquire Amundsen and Moore 502 East Park Avenue Post Office Box 1759 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief Legal Counsel Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue Whether Petitioner's retirement benefits should be suspended pursuant to Section 121.091(9)(c) , Florida Statutes. Petitioner appeared at the hearing unaccompanied by counsel or other representative. His rights in administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to Chanter 120, F.S., were explained to him and he elected to represent himself in the matter.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Theron J. Owen was employed by the Department of Transportation, State of Florida, for a period of 13 years, and made contributions under the applicable retirement system during that period. On March 1, 1977, at the age of 56, he retired under the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with a monthly benefit of $88.79. (Testimony of Petitioner, Respondent's Exhibit 1) Petitioner was reemployed by the Department of General Services as a security guard at the State Office Building in Winter Park, Florida, on Nay 19, 1978. In December, 1978, Respondent received from Petitioner an executed Form FR23 "Application of Retiree for Suspension of Retirement Benefit and Return to Service" wherein he advised the Director of Retirement of his employment with the Department of General Services and that he had reached 500 hours of reemployment on August 15, 1978. Petitioner previously had provided verbal notice of his reemployment to Respondent in November, 1978. (Respondent's Exhibits 1-2) Petitioner's retirement benefits were suspended by Respondent in November, 1978, pursuant to Section 121.091(9) Statutes. However, December, benefit was inadvertently paid to Petitioner. During the period August- December, 1978, Respondent received $314.70 in retirement benefits. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Parties) Petitioner elected to take "early" retirement, but obtained reemployment with the state for financial reasons. He acknowledges his indebtedness to the state, but has been unable to obtain a loan to repay the overnayments. He has not received retirement benefits during 1979. He is of the opinion that the statutory provision which limits a retired state employee to state benefits only during the first 500 hours of reemployment with the state shows a punitive intent on the part of the legislature to prevent retired personnel from returning to gainful state employment. During his one-year tenure with the Department of General Services, he has been promoted and received an "above-satisfactory" performance rating. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That Respondent suspend payment of retirement benefits to Petitioner until restitution has been made of excess benefits paid in the amount of $314.70, plus accrued interest at 10 percent compounded annually from date of receipt of such excess benefits until date of repayment. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Theron J. Owen 818 San Juan Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32807 L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Petitioner receive a retirement benefit based upon the computations as outlined in the Conclusions of Law above. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of July, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Richard A. Sicking, Esquire 1951 NW 17th Avenue Post Office Drawer 520337 Miami, Florida 33152
The Issue Whether the Petitioners are entitled to benefits as joint annuitants of the deceased employee.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are the adult, nondependent children of the deceased, Leonora Chapin. Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of managing the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Leonora Chapin was a vested member of the FRS with over ten years of service as a teacher with the Miami Dade County School District. The exact number of years of her service was not established nor is it dispositive of the issues of this case. In February of 1991, Ms. Chapin became extremely ill. This illness prevented her from returning to work but she did not formally retire. Instead, Ms. Chapin continued as an active member of the FRS until her death, April 14, 1991. At the time of her death, Ms. Chapin had designated "according to will" as her beneficiary to receive benefits, if any, which would be payable at her death. This Personal History Record form is the only record of any designation by the deceased received by the FRS. Based upon the foregoing designation, the Respondent determined that the deceased's two sons would share the deceased's personal contributions to the FRS account. This amount totaled $4,305.17. The Petitioners have disputed this determination and claim they are entitled to benefits as joint annuitants.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying Petitioners' claim for benefits and returning the member's contributions in the amount of $4,305.17. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Robert Chapin 14014 Northwest Passage Unit 240 Marina Del Ray, California 90292 Stuart Chapin 10729 Westminster Avenue Los Angeles, California 90034 Barry M. Brant, C.P.A. Berkowitz, Dick, Pollack & Brant, LLP One Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 150 Fifteenth Floor Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue The issue is whether the retirement date for Petitioner's late husband should be back-dated from August 1, 2004, to September 6, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's late husband, Edward Imbertson, was employed as a HVAC technician by the School District. As such, he participated in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Respondent, the Division, is responsible for administering the FRS program for approximately 900 employers and 600,000 members. Mr. Imbertson suffered a heart attack on September 6, 1999. An order, entered by a judge of compensation claims on October 3, 2002, determined that he was entitled to workers' compensation because his condition was work-related, and that he had become totally and permanently disabled on the day of his heart attack. Mr. Imbertson's medical condition continued to deteriorate. He had a heart transplant in 2002, suffered renal failure, and became diabetic and legally blind. Mrs. Imbertson stopped working to care for her husband full time. They spent substantial time away from their home in Jupiter seeking medical care for her husband that included over 75 invasive procedures, many at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami. At the same time, Mrs. Imbertson was trying to get benefits for her husband, but primarily she focused on his deteriorating health. Following numerous requests for information and forms from multiple sources, Mrs. Imbertson filed an application dated July 1, 2004, for her husband to receive in-the-line-of-duty disability benefits. On the application form, she reported that the last day he actually worked was 9/3/99, his last day in pay status was 3/21/00, but she left his termination date blank. When she listed the last pay status date as March 21, 2000, Mrs. Imbertson was using the date that her husband received a check for unused leave. She believed, apparently correctly based on subsequent notice from the District, that he was still employed and that his pay status changed because he began receiving workers' compensation benefits. In a letter dated July 14, 2004, the Division requested additional information in support of the application. The information requested included an explanation of the delay in applying for disability retirement, physicians' reports attesting to total and permanent disability, proof of total and permanent disability when employment terminated or of a Social Security Disability Award notice, and workers' compensation documentation that the injury is compensable and benefits have been approved. Mrs. Imbertson provided some of the additional information. On August 6, 2004, the Division again sent a letter asking for more information, noting that it needed reports from two physicians, and proof of total and permanent disability on the termination date. Mrs. Imbertson sent the second doctor's report on August 7, 2004. Both the July 14, 2004, and August 6, 2004, letters included the following language: If you are no longer employed and your disability application was not received within thirty days of your termination date, provided you are not due to receive any salary payments or credible service after your application has been received, your effective retirement date will be the first day of the month following the date we received your application. When Mrs. Imbertson responded to those letters, she was focused on providing the additional personal and medical information for her husband, not on challenging the effective retirement date. By certified mail from the Division dated September 17, 2004, Mr. Imbertson was notified that he was approved to receive regular disability retirement benefits, but that his application for in-line-of-duty disability benefits was denied. Mr. Imbertson died on January 10, 2006. After an appeal to the State Retirement Commission, on June 6, 2006, Mr. Imbertson was found eligible for in-line-of-duty-retirement benefits from the retroactive effective retirement date of August 1, 2004. Mrs. Imbertson requested that the Division determine that her late husband's effective retirement date was September 6, 1999. On January 6, 2009, the Division denied the request, relying on Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-4.0035, that sets the date as the first day of the month following the month in which the application was received. At the hearing, the Division also relied on essentially the same language that was included in the July 14, 2004, and August 6, 2004, letters sent to Mr. Imbertson. It also relied on a letter dated November 10, 2004, in which the District notified the Division that Mr. Imbertson's employment was terminated on September 7, 2000. Mr. Imbertson was not copied on the letter and Mrs. Imbertson did not know the official date of termination, as indicated by her having left the date blank on the application for disability retirement. Based on the lack of notice from the District of her husband's termination date, his inability to handle his personal matters, and her difficulty in getting benefits while taking care of him, Mrs. Imbertson believes she is entitled to have her husband's effective retirement date back-dated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services enter a final order affirming the establishment of August 1, 2004, as the effective retirement date for Edward Imbertson. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan M. Aronson, Esquire Rosenthal & Levy, P.A. 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard, Suite 350 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The primary issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Sections 121.091(3)(b) and 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on an effective retirement date of February 1, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Historical Facts When he passed away on January 26, 1996, at the age of 56, Roy Hoffman, Jr., was a fully vested participant in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), having worked as a professor at Florida Atlantic University for nearly 27 years. Professor Hoffman's named beneficiary and joint annuitant was his wife, Petitioner Jeanne Hoffman ("Hoffman"). As such, Hoffman became entitled, upon her husband's death, to receive a lifetime retirement benefit from the FRS. By letter dated March 8, 1996, Respondent Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement ("Division"), which administers the FRS, first notified Hoffman of her eligibility to receive a benefit. The letter provided in pertinent part as follows: As the designated beneficiary and joint annuitant, you are entitled to the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. The Option 3 monthly benefit is payable for your lifetime and is estimated to be $1,812.58 effective February 1, 1996. To receive this benefit, you need to [submit an application and provide certain information.] If we may be of further assistance, please call us at (904)488-5207. After receiving this letter, Hoffman was uncertain about whether she should accept the benefit immediately or, alternatively, postpone the benefit commencement date until nearer her own retirement, so she called the Division for assistance. Following a telephone conversation with an FRS counselor, Hoffman was left with the impression that she would be better off waiting until she reached the age of 59.5 years to begin receiving the monthly benefit, for the benefit, she believed, would then be higher.1 The Division sent a second letter to Hoffman, which was dated April 26, 1996, and provided: Please refer to our letter dated March 8, 1996. Before we can finalize [your] account, we need [to receive] the following [items and information from you.] Hoffman did not respond to this letter. Four months later, the Division sent a third letter to Hoffman regarding her benefit eligibility. Dated August 28, 1996, this letter provided in relevant part as follows: We have not received a response from our letters dated March 8, 1996 and April 26, 1996. If we have not heard from you within thirty days of the date of this letter, the file will be placed on inactive status. It will then be your responsibility to contact us to apply for a monthly benefit. The benefit will be effective the first of the month following contact from you. By this "warning letter," the Division intended to communicate its decision that, unless Hoffman submitted an application for benefits on or before September 27, 1996, she would forfeit the right to receive an "early retirement-death benefit"2 based on an effective date of retirement ("EDR") closely tied to her husband's date of death and be deemed to have elected a "deferred monthly benefit"3 based on a post-mortem EDR tied to the Division's receipt of her application for benefits. (EDR is a critical date because that is when the benefit accrues. See § 121.021(41), Fla. Stat.4) The parties dispute whether, in fact, the warning letter reasonably notified Hoffman of the Division's decision; the issue will be taken up below. Hoffman did not take the warning letter to mean what the Division had intended to convey. Thus she had no idea that she was in jeopardy of forfeiting the right to an early retirement-death benefit. Further, she did not deliberately elect to forego receipt of an early retirement-death benefit in favor of a deferred monthly benefit. Rather, being unfamiliar with the details regarding benefits payable under the FRS, Hoffman believed that, without any present action on her part, the benefit to which she was entitled had begun upon her husband's death to accrue for her use and benefit and would continue to accumulate until she was ready to begin receiving the benefit in monthly installments. Consequently, Hoffman made no reply to the warning letter, and at some point after September 27, 1996, the Division placed her file on inactive status. For the next eight-and-a-half years, nothing relevant to this case occurred. Then, in January 2005, Hoffman met with a financial planner for advice concerning her retirement. She was 57 at the time and told the planner about the benefit she expected to receive in a couple of years as her late husband's joint annuitant. The financial planner recommended that she contact the Division straightaway. On January 31, 2005, Hoffman called the Division and was informed that, having failed to apply for an early retirement-death benefit by September 27, 1996, in accordance with the warning letter dated August 28, 1996, she had forfeited nine years' worth of retirement income, and that her only remaining option was to request a deferred monthly benefit based on an EDR of February 1, 2005, at the earliest. The Division followed this telephone conversation with a letter dated February 16, 2005, which made clear that the only benefit for which Hoffman could apply would commence no earlier than February 1, 2005. Being given no choice, Hoffman applied as instructed, with the result that the FRS began paying Hoffman approximately $2,011 per month, which it was continuing to do as of the final hearing. Thereafter, by letter dated March 1, 2005, Hoffman petitioned the Division to pay her a retirement benefit "retroactive" to February 1, 1996, the date which, had she applied for an early retirement-death benefit on or before September 27, 1996, would have been her husband's EDR, without controversy.5 The Division denied Hoffman's request, by letter dated March 15, 2005. Relying on Section 121.091, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-4.0035, which will be examined below, the Division determined that it could not "pay benefits retroactive to 1996 because [Hoffman had] not compl[ied] with the Rule requiring that the application be filed timely." Hoffman requested a hearing on this determination, giving rise to DOAH Case No. 05-3200. Hoffman also petitioned the Division, pursuant to Section 120.542, Florida Statutes, to waive——or grant her a variance from——the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(c) upon which the Division intended to rely in rejecting her claim for an early retirement-death benefit. The Division denied Hoffman's petition for waiver or variance in an order dated August 15, 2005. Thereafter, Hoffman timely requested a hearing on the matter, which led to the commencement of DOAH Case No. 05-3679. Factual Analysis The parties sharply disagree about whether the Division reasonably notified Hoffman of the important decision (see paragraph 6, supra) that it made in late August 1996 respecting her eligibility to receive a benefit, which decision the Division intended to communicate to Hoffman via the warning letter. To recapitulate, the warning letter told Hoffman that if she failed to contact the Division by September 27, 1996, then (1) her file would become "inactive"; (2) it would be her responsibility to initiate further contact with the Division; and (3) her "benefit" would be "effective" starting the month after she contacted the Division. Yet, in fact, the Division had decided that if Hoffman did not contact the Division by September 27, 1996, then (1) she would forfeit the right to receive an early retirement-death benefit based on an EDR closely proximate to her husband's date of death; (2) the Division would treat her inaction as an affirmative election to receive a deferred monthly benefit; and (3) her benefit would be based on an EDR related to the Division's receipt of her application for benefits. It is striking, in reading the warning letter from the standpoint of a reasonable recipient, that no mention was made therein of the different types of benefits available to a surviving spouse, no explanation regarding the distinction between an early retirement-death benefit and a deferred monthly benefit was given, and no information concerning a beneficiary's right to elect the latter as an alternative to the former——much less why one might do so——was imparted. (The same can also be said of the two letters that preceded the warning letter.) It is striking, too, that neither the warning letter nor the two earlier ones mentioned EDR or its significance. Instead, the warning letter spoke of an effective date of "benefit," which, at least without more information than was contained in the letter, could be understood to refer to the date on which the benefit payments would commence as opposed to when benefits would start to accrue. The undersigned finds, therefore, that, as a matter of fact, the warning letter itself did not reasonably communicate that Hoffman was at risk of forfeiting the early retirement- death benefit and being deemed to have elected a deferred monthly benefit based on a future EDR to be determined. Put another way, although the warning letter clearly established a deadline (September 27, 1996) for making contact with the Division, its description of the consequences of letting the deadline pass without contacting the Division did not fairly match the consequences the Division actually had decided would follow such inaction. Of course, as the Division points out, the warning letter was not the only source of information about retirement benefits available to Hoffman. There were, in addition, the governing statutes and rules. Hoffman did not actually avail herself of these references, but, as the Division argues, she is presumed to know the contents of the applicable laws.6 Perhaps, armed with such knowledge, she would have——and hence should have——understood what the Division was trying to tell her in the warning letter. If Hoffman had consulted the relevant statutes, she would have learned that she was entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Section 121.091(3), Florida Statutes, which provides as follows: EARLY RETIREMENT BENEFIT.--Upon retirement on his or her early retirement date, the member shall receive an immediate monthly benefit that shall begin to accrue on the first day of the month of the retirement date and be payable on the last day of that month and each month thereafter during his or her lifetime. Such benefit shall be calculated as follows: * * * (b) If the employment of a member is terminated by reason of death subsequent to the completion of 20 years of creditable service, the monthly benefit payable to the member's beneficiary shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (1), but shall be based on average monthly compensation and creditable service as of the date of death. The benefit so computed shall be reduced by five-twelfths of 1 percent for each complete month by which death precedes the normal retirement date specified above or the date on which the member would have attained 30 years of creditable service had he or she survived and continued his or her employment, whichever provides a higher benefit. There is no dispute that Hoffman was entitled to an early retirement benefit under Section 121.091(3)(b) when her husband's employment was terminated by reason of death after completing nearly 27 years of creditable service. The parties agree as well that, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the statute, the benefit would have been reduced by five percent per year for each of the approximately three years by which Professor Hoffman's death preceded the date on which he would have attained 30 years of creditable service. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 60S-4.005(2)(c)(describing benefits payable upon early retirement brought about by death). If Hoffman had read Section 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, she would have learned the following: If the employment of an active member who may or may not have applied for retirement is terminated by reason of his or her death subsequent to becoming vested and prior to his or her effective date of retirement, if established, it shall be assumed that the member retired as of the date of death in accordance with subsection (1) if eligible for normal retirement benefits, subsection (2) if eligible for benefits payable for dual normal retirement, or subsection (3) if eligible for early retirement benefits. Benefits payable to the designated beneficiary shall be as follows: 1. For a beneficiary who qualifies as a joint annuitant, the optional form of payment provided in accordance with [option 3] shall be paid for the joint annuitant's lifetime. Clearly, under the plain language of Section 121.091(7)(b), Hoffman was entitled to receive death benefits in the form of an early retirement benefit, for which latter her husband was eligible at the time of his death. As just mentioned, however, Professor Hoffman satisfied the conditions set forth in Section 121.091(3)(b) for an early retirement benefit, payable to his beneficiary, without reference to Section 121.091(7)(b). Moreover, because Professor Hoffman was, at the time of his death, closer to attaining 30 years' service than reaching age 62, Hoffman's early retirement benefit would be highest if calculated under Section 121.091(3)(b). Nevertheless, as Section 121.091(7)(b) is not inconsistent with Section 121.091(3)(b), there is no reason to treat them as mutually exclusive. Thus, bowing to the interrelatedness of these statutes——Section 121.091(3)(b)(early retirement benefits upon termination of employment by death) and Section 121.091(7)(b)(death benefits)——the undersigned has chosen to use the term "early retirement-death benefit" to refer to that benefit, available thereunder, which is based on an EDR in close proximity to the member's death. As an alternative to the early retirement-death benefit, Section 121.091(7) makes available to beneficiaries such as Hoffman another option, namely the "deferred monthly benefit." Had Hoffman studied the statute, she would have discovered that [t]he designated beneficiary who is the surviving spouse or other dependent of a member whose employment is terminated by death subsequent to becoming vested, but prior to actual retirement, may elect to receive a deferred monthly benefit as if the member had lived and had elected a deferred monthly benefit, as provided in paragraph (5)(b), calculated on the basis of the average final compensation and creditable service of the member at his or her death and the age the member would have attained on the commencement date of the deferred benefit elected by the beneficiary, paid in accordance with option 3 of paragraph (6)(a). § 121.091(7)(h); see also Fla. Admin. Code. R. 60S-4.008(2)(b). The deferred monthly benefit allows a surviving spouse to postpone the deceased member's EDR, thereby reducing or eliminating the early retirement penalty of five percent per annum for each year the EDR precedes the member's normal retirement date.7 Postponing the EDR would make sense, most obviously, when, because of the number of years between the member's date of death and his or her normal retirement date, the survivor's early retirement-death benefit would be substantially consumed by the penalty. Because Professor Hoffman met the criteria for an early retirement benefit under Section 121.091(3)(b), however, his wife's benefit was subject to a relatively light penalty. Thus, it is unlikely that Hoffman intentionally would have made an election under Section 121.091(7)(h) for a deferred monthly benefit, had she been aware of the statute. The Division has promulgated a rule that specifies how the EDR will be determined in certain circumstances. Rule 60S- 4.0035(3)(c) was available to inform Hoffman as follows: For a member who dies prior to an effective retirement date established pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b), the effective retirement date shall be the first day of the month following the month in which the member died, provided the joint annuitant makes timely application for benefits; or, for a deferred monthly benefit, the first day of the month following the month in which the Division receives the joint annuitant's application for benefits, or the first day of a later month specified by the joint annuitant. Significantly, the Division has not established by rule a method of determining whether an application is "timely" for purposes of Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(c). Rather, it determines timeliness on a case-by-case basis. Had Hoffman been aware of Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(c), she might have surmised, upon reading the warning letter, that the Division had decided that her application for benefits would be "timely," for purposes of the Rule, only if received on or before September 27, 1996. She might also have reasoned that if her application were untimely, then the applicable EDR might not be February 1, 1996 (i.e. the first day of the month following the month in which her husband had died). At that point, she might have concluded that unless her application were received by September 27, 1996, she would forfeit the early retirement- death benefit, as the Division would deem her delay an election to receive a deferred monthly benefit. Maybe Hoffman would have connected all these dots. The undersigned finds, however, as a matter of fact, that a reasonable person could not have figured out what the Division had decided and what it intended to do, even if armed with the statutes and rules, because ascertaining the true nature of the Division's determination entails more analytical, indeed legal, reasoning than an ordinary layperson should be expected to employ. In fact, it is determined, the warning letter was inadequate to put even a well-informed person, cognizant of the applicable laws, on notice of the Division's decision regarding Hoffman's potential forfeiture of the early-retirement death benefit and "deemed election" of the deferred monthly benefit. While the warning letter was deficient in that it failed reasonably to tell Hoffman what the Division actually had determined with regard to her substantial interests, it was defective in yet another consequential way: the warning letter failed to notify Hoffman of her right to request a hearing to determine the substantial interests affected by the Division's establishment of an application deadline and the consequences of noncompliance therewith. The warning letter, in other words, did not afford Hoffman a clear point of entry into an adversarial proceeding, where the Division would be required to substantiate its determination with competent substantial evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order determining that Hoffman shall receive an early retirement-death benefit based on an EDR of February 1, 1996, and establishing the form in which Hoffman shall be paid the benefits that have accrued, but not been paid, from the EDR to the present, as well as the benefit going forward.10 In the event that one or more factual disputes arise over the amount of the unpaid accrued benefits or the method of paying them, the amount or form of the benefit going forward, or some combination of these, then Hoffman should be afforded the right to request a hearing to determine the disputed issue(s).11 DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 2006.
The Issue The general issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is entitled to modify her deceased husband's retirement benefit option by changing from "Option 1" to "Option 3". Embodied within that issue is the question of whether the Petitioner's deceased husband was competent to effect a change in his retirement option from service retirement "Option 3" to disability retirement "Option 1."
Findings Of Fact The decedent, Elijah B. Hutchinson, was a teacher of math and science for the Calhoun County school district for some 31 years. In the early 1980's, his health had deteriorated significantly due primarily to diabetes mellitus, which caused a number of associated complications necessitating several hospitalizations during the early 1980's. In consideration of his deteriorating health, the decedent elected to retire in the spring of 1983. He filed an application dated May 27, 1983, seeking regular retirement benefits from the Florida Retirement System. See Exhibit 1 in evidence. In response to his application, the decedent received information from the Division advising him of his retirement benefits under the different retirement options he was entitled to select. On or about June 24, 1983, the decedent elected retirement Option 3. Option 3 retirement benefits include the retiree's entitlement to a reduced monthly retirement benefit during his lifetime with the same monthly retirement benefit being paid, after his death, to his "joint annuitant", in this case, his surviving spouse, the Petitioner. Thereafter, and before he received any benefit check from his initially-selected Option 3 retirement, the decedent appeared at the Division's offices and requested to change his type of retirement or option. On August 12, 1983, therefore, the decedent requested to change his type of retirement benefit from regular retirement to disability retirement. On that date, he requested to change his option selection from Option 3 to Option 1. See Exhibit 4 in evidence. An explanation of the benefits to be provided and the differences in the two options as to his benefits was given to the decedent by an employee of the Division. See Exhibit 4 in evidence. The decedent thereupon changed his option selection from Option 3 to Option 1. In 1983, a retirement system member receiving retirement benefits as the result of a disability could only receive benefits in accordance with either Option 1 or Option 2, if he chose to elect disability retirement. On September 16, 1983, the decedent was mailed a letter from the Division advising him that his application for disability retirement benefits had been approved by the State Retirement Director and acknowledging that he had elected Option 1 for disability retirement. Thereafter, the decedent received and cashed a number of State warrants representing payment of those retirement benefits under Option 1. See Exhibit 10 in evidence. The decedent died on March 8, 1991. The Petitioner had been unaware that he had changed from Option 3 benefits to Option 1 benefits, as delineated above. Upon learning of this, after the decedent's death, the Petitioner, on April 30, 1991, requested the Division to modify the benefits option selected by the decedent to Option 3 benefits. Her basis for requesting this change was that the decedent had not been mentally or physically competent to make an informed selection at the time he changed his Option 3 retirement benefits election to Option 1 and that, therefore, she should be allowed to modify and reinstitute his retirement election to Option 3 benefits, which would provide her the death benefits permitted under the Option 3 election. This request was denied by the Division by its "final agency action letter" dated May 21, 1991, by which the Division advised the Petitioner that based upon its records, the decedent, who had requested Option 1 retirement benefits, was added to the retirement payroll in that category for September, 1983 and that he had received benefit payments and negotiated the checks, so that, under the provisions of Rule 22B-4.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, the selection of the option could no longer be altered. The Petitioner's testimony and that of Phillip H. Hutchinson indicates that sometime in 1983, the decedent suffered a cerebral-vascular incident or "stroke". This testimony is borne out by the medical records in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, which, however, does not indicate when the stroke occurred. The Petitioner and her son maintain in their testimony that the stroke resulted in a deterioration in the decedent's mental faculties such that he could no longer manage his business affairs, pay bills, and handle financial matters in general. They maintain that this was evidenced also by a marked personality change whereby the decedent became extravagant with money, as evidenced by impulsively ordering and purchasing items which he observed advertised on television, sending money to television evangelists, and otherwise being free with donations. This was entirely different from his character and personality before he suffered the stroke, whereby he was known to be miserly with the family funds and very careful about not spending money unnecessarily. As a result of his stroke, he was no longer able to handle his business affairs; and his spouse, the Petitioner, had to assume the duties of paying family bills and otherwise handling financial and business matters for the family. When the decedent first decided to retire, he had explained to the Petitioner that he would select a retirement option which would give her something after he "passed"; and he showed her the retirement system booklet of allowable retirement options in discussing the matter with her. He never mentioned to her that he decided to or did change his option to Option 1 disability retirement. Although the Petitioner may have established that due to the stroke he suffered, the decedent may have, indeed, had difficulty attending to financial matters and overseeing and managing the family finances, the Petitioner failed to establish that at the time he made the election to select Option 1 retirement benefit, he did not possess the mental capacity to make a knowing and intelligent selection of that option and to waive his previously-selected Option 3 benefits. The evidence shows that he appeared at the Division's offices and, after an explanation of the option he chose to select, he freely and voluntarily selected that option and signed the pertinent documents attesting to it. It has simply not been demonstrated by substantial evidence that at the time the decedent made the second retirement option election, he did not understand the nature and consequences of that election, especially since it was not established by the Petitioner when he actually suffered the stroke, other than that it occurred sometime in 1983. As found above, the decedent made the election to chose Option 1 retirement benefits in August, 1983. Consequently, due to insufficient evidence, it cannot be found that the Petitioner's decedent was incompetent to knowingly and intelligently elect to receive Option 1 retirement benefits at the time he made the election.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Division denying the request of the Petitioner to modify the retirement benefits elected by the decedent from Option 1 retirement benefits entitlement to Option 3 retirement benefits entitlement. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrativ Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24 day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-3870 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted, except that the evidence does not support that the stroke actually occurred in mid 1983. 3-4. Accepted. Rejected, as not being demonstrated by the preponderant evidence of record. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-14. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Phillip H. Hutchinson 4115 Tanglewood S., Apt. 570 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 Larry D. Scott, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the exhibits presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Since 1964, Petitioner has been employed by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation. His duties consist of operating a tractor pulling a rotary mower which cuts grass on the rights of way of primary and interstate highways. Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. Prior to 1970, Petitioner was a member of the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System, under which he was not covered for in line of duty disability retirement benefits. In 1967, while employed by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation, Petitioner injured his lower back and left leg when a tractor fell off the back of a lowboy trailer. Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 11. In 1970, Petitioner transferred from the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Exhibit 17. During his regular working hours in March of 1974, Petitioner again injured his back while moving road material. Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 8 and 13. On October 31, 1974, Petitioner applied for disability retirement on the basis of the March of 1974 injury. Exhibit 1. Mr. W. W. Ray, Engineer II with the Department of Transportation, completed a "Statement of Disability by Employer" form on October 21, 1974, answering affirmatively the question of whether petitioner was, prior to his alleged disability, able to perform all of the duties of his position fully and completely. It was further stated by Mr. Ray that petitioner "has been very good employee during his employment. Had worked up to lead worker in his mowing crew." Mr. Ray concluded that "most any job which we have would require a certain amount of working with hand tools and stooping over or standing for long periods of time which could be painful for persons with back problems." Exhibit 2. Two Florida licensed physicians submitted Florida Retirement System Physician's Reports. Form FR-13b. Dr. W. J. Newcomb stated that Petitioner "had strained his back and aggravated the degenerative arthritic condition that existed in his back." He had no "definite indication of proof that the original injury of 1966 [sic] or the subsequent injury of 1974 caused his degenerated condition." Dr. Newcomb felt "it was just probably aggravated by the related accidents." It was opined that Petitioner could do the duties of his occupation in a protected manner, but he would have chronic difficulty with his back. The performance of Petitioner's duties would produce pain because of his current illness or injury. Exhibit 3. Dr. Howard T. Currie opined that Petitioner was unable to, perform any of the duties of his occupation because of his current illness or injury. Exhibit 4. On June 5, 1975, a letter was sent to Petitioner by Administrator, Robert L. Kennedy, Jr., under the signature of David W. Ragsdale, Supervisor, Disability Determination Unit. This letter notified Petitioner that the State Retirement Director was unable to approve his application for in line of duty disability retirement benefits "[s]ince your injury is an aggravation of a preexisting condition and since your initial injury occurred prior to the Florida Retirement System..." However, it was determined that Petitioner did meet the requirements for regular disability retirement as described in F.S. 121.091(4)(b) Exhibit A. In accordance with F.S. Chapter 120, the Petitioner filed a petition requesting a hearing and the Respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that Petitioner be awarded the greater benefits allowable for a member totally and permanently disabled in line of duty. Respectfully submitted and entered this 9th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: George Ralph Miller, Esquire P.0. Box 112 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433 L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
