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BOARD OF OPTICIANRY vs. DAVID SOMERVILLE, 86-000805 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000805 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1986

The Issue The issues in this case concern an administrative complaint brought by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Opticianry (Petitioner) against David Somerville (Respondent). It is alleged, among other claims, that the Respondent was licensed as an apprentice optician in the state of Florida and while in that capacity practiced opticianry without the benefit of supervision; entered a plea to dispensing optical devices without a license; and committed various forms of fraud related to the sponsorship of his apprentice training, all in violation of provisions of Chapters 455 and 484, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 21P, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Part A The following facts are found based upon the prehearing stipulation of the parties: a. Respondent is and has been, at all times material to the Administrative Complaint filed in the instant case and at all times relating to the hearings in the instant case, a licensed apprentice optician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number DA 0001541. Respondent's last known address is Brandywine Optical, 3112 N. Woodland Blvd., Brandywine Shopping Village, Deland, Florida. Respondent, David Somerville, is the owner of a business named Brandywine Optical located at 3112 North Woodland Blvd., Brandywine Shopping Village, Deland, Florida. Respondent is not now nor has he ever been licensed as an optician or optometrist in the State of Florida. On September 19, 1984, the Respondent filled out an application to be registered as an apprentice optician. On September 19, 1984, Madison Ziegler filled out an application to be Respondent's sponsor. The application signed by David Somerville stated that his supervising optician, Madison Ziegler, began supervising him on September 19, 1984. Ziegler was not present at the Respondent's optical shop on September 20, 1984, and in fact only worked one or two Saturday afternoons, in September. Madison Ziegler was employed full-time with Century 21 Optical, in Holly Hill, Florida. Part B Factual findings based upon the testimony adduced at hearing and in consideration of exhibits admitted at hearing: When Respondent made application to serve as an apprentice optician under the supervision of Madison Ziegler, on September 19, 1984, the arrangement called for forty-four hours of apprenticeship per week. This internship was to be performed at the business known as Brandywine Optical located at 3112 North Woodland Boulevard, Deland, Florida, respondent's business premises. On October 25, 1984, Geraldine B. Johnson, manager of the Office of Investigative Services for the Department of Professional Regulation, went to Brandywine Optical. She was accompanied by investigator Diane Radideau of the Department of Professional Regulation. While in the store, the only person in attendance was the Respondent. Johnson presented the Respondent with a prescription for eyeglasses, and the Respondent filled that prescription. In the course of this exchange, Respondent took the prescription from Ms. Johnson and assisted her in obtaining frames for the glasses. Respondent measured her eyes for trifocals and indicated that the glasses would be ready sometime within that week. On October 31, 1984, Ms. Johnson returned in the company of another employee of the Department of Professional Regulation, John E. Danson. At that time, no other persons were in the business premises of Brandywine Optical other than the Respondent and the two Department of Professional Regulation employees. Ms. Johnson obtained the glasses, Respondent fitted them on her face and provided her with a carrying case, the balance of the bill was paid and Ms. Johnson and Mr. Danson left the store. Before leaving, at the behest of Ms. Johnson, Respondent presented Ms. Johnson with a business card which identified the Respondent as dispensing optician and further indicated that Brandywine Optical was a store at which prescriptions involving eye glasses and contact glasses were filled. A photocopy of that card is found as part of the Petitioner's composite Exhibit 4 admitted into evidence. This also sets forth the prescription involved with Ms. Johnson's glasses, which Respondent placed on the back of the business card. On February 13, 1985, Respondent requested that the sponsorship of his apprentice training be transferred from Madison Ziegler to Leslie Virginia Darden. Within the Petitioner's composite Exhibit 6 is found a form, Apprentice Transfer of Sponsor, purportedly executed by Madison Ziegler indicating that he had supervised Respondent for a minimum of 40 hours per week between October 11, 1984, and January 18, 1985. This is an inaccurate portrayal. As stated before, Ziegler was involved in the supervision on only one or two Saturday afternoons in September 1984. Consequently, when Respondent transmitted with his Apprentice Transfer of Sponsor Request, the Apprentice Transfer of Sponsor form set out as an enclosure he was submitting information about his apprenticeship which was patently false related to the length of time over which Madison Ziegler had served as his sponsoring optician. On February 13, 1985, Leslie Virginia Darden executed the application for sponsorship of Respondent as apprentice optician. Leslie Virginia Darden was licensed by the state of Florida as an optician at that time. Her actual sponsorship of the Respondent took place over a period of approximately two days in February 1985. Upon the termination of the sponsorship, the Board of Opticianry was made aware of this change by telephone call from Ms. Darden. The effective date of termination of the sponsorship was February 19, 1985. A form executed by Ms. Darden further confirmed her choice to be removed as sponsor. This form, entitled Apprentice Optical Termination Form, is found as Petitioner's Exhibit 8 admitted into evidence. Ms. Darden also authorized Respondent to sign her name on a form known as Apprentice Transfer of Sponsor which is found as part of the Petitioner's composite Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence noting a change in sponsorship. As established in Petitioner's Exhibit 5 admitted into evidence, judgment and sentence in the case State of Florida vs. David Somerville, in the County Court in and for Volusia County, Florida - Div. "A," Case No. 84-15535-A, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to dispensing optical glasses without a license. He was placed on six months' probation and as a special term of probation was ordered not to dispense optical devices other than in accordance with a circumstance involving full-time supervision by a licensed optician. This judgment and sentence was placed against the Respondent on February 14, 1985. In February 1985, Samuel Rosenberg, who was licensed as an optician in the state of Florida, was contacted by the Respondent. An arrangement was made in which Rosenberg would work as an employee at Brandywine Optical for a period of twenty hours a week. This arrangement lasted for four or five weeks. It did not contemplate having Rosenberg sponsor the Respondent's apprenticeship. As reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, on March 14, 1985, Samuel Rosenberg made application as sponsor of an apprenticeship program for the benefit of David Somerville. In that application it was indicated that Rosenberg would supervise the apprenticeship of Somerville for a period of forty hours a week. Initially there was an arrangement in which twelve hours of supervision was to be provided Somerville by Rosenberg in supervising work as an optician at a stand in a flea market. In addition, four days a week, for a total of twenty-eight hours, were given to Somerville under Rosenberg's supervision at the Brandywine Optical address. This arrangement lasted for about nine months. From that point forward, the arrangement was to have Rosenberg supervise Somerville at the flea market on Saturdays for eight hours and to provide thirty-two hours of supervision at Brandywine Optical Monday through Thursday. Rosenberg was led to believe that on Friday an optometrist was in the Brandywine Optical offices, and according to Somerville's remarks to Rosenberg, the optometrist does all work related to eye glasses, etc., and Somerville was only involved with the selection of eye glasses and use of the telephone, unrelated to the practice of opticianry. On August 27, 1985, Douglas Vanderbilt, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation, went to the Brandywine Optical store. When he entered the store, Somerville and another customer were the only persons he saw. The customer was trying on frames and making a selection of frames, with the assistance of Somerville. Vanderbilt picked out some frames that he wanted to buy. Somerville took the glasses that Vanderbilt had and made measurements from those glasses. This was in furtherance of the preparation of a new pair of spectacles at a cost of $110. Sixty dollars was paid down. Some of the measurements Somerville made pertaining to Vanderbilt involved bifocals. No prescription had been presented by Vanderbilt and Somerville used the old glasses which Vanderbilt had as a basis for measurement. Vanderbilt was presented with a business card which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The business card reflects Brandywine Optical, prescriptions filled, eye glasses and contact lenses. It gives the business address and indicates that David Somerville is the dispensing optician. Somerville, upon the questioning of Vanderbilt, confirmed that the name Somerville reflected on the card and the Respondent Somerville were one and the same person. On September 9, 1985, Vanderbilt returned to the business premises at Brandywine Optical. At that time, only Somerville was present. Somerville broke the black stainless steel frame across the bridge of the new glasses. Consequently, Vanderbilt picked out a brown frame, and Somerville fitted the brown pair of glasses on Vanderbilt. AGGRAVATION Part C On February 28, 1986, Somerville entered a plea of nolo contendere to dispensing optical devices without a license in the action of State of Florida vs. David C. Somerville, in the County Court in and for Volusia County, Florida, Case No. 85-15487-A. He was given one year's probation to run consecutive to a previous probation and again cautioned not to conduct any business without the presence of supervisory personnel required in his apprenticeship status. In the course of the order of the court, reference was made to Section 484.007(e)(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 21P-16.01(4), Florida Administrative Code. A copy of the information and judgment and sentence related to this matter may be found as Petitioner's composite Exhibit 10 admitted into evidence. This offense pertained to the circumstance of the purchase of spectacles by Vanderbilt.

Florida Laws (7) 120.57455.227484.007484.013484.014775.082775.084
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SCAN-OPTICS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 91-006545BID (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 14, 1991 Number: 91-006545BID Latest Update: Mar. 26, 1992

The Issue Whether the Respondent, the Department of Revenue, acted in a fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest manner in deciding to award a contract to the Intervenor, Recognition Equipment Incorporated, based upon the Intervenor's response to Request for Proposal No. 90/91-261?

Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Respondent, the Department of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. On or about June 24, 1991, the Department issued Request for Proposal on No. 90/91-261 (hereinafter referred to as the "RFP"). The Petitioner, Scan-Optics, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Scan- Optics"), is an unsuccessful responder to the RFP. The Intervenor, Recognition Equipment Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "REI"), is the successful responder to the RFP. Scan-Optics and REI have standing to participate in this proceeding. Development of the RFP. For a number of years prior to the formal hearing of this case, the Department has been interested in purchasing optical scanning equipment for use in processing certain tax returns filed with the Department. The Department made inquiries and performed investigations concerning available optical scanning equipment as a result of its interest in the equipment. The Department contacted private producers of optical scanning equipment, including Scan-Optics and REI, and other state agencies that already had acquired optical scanning equipment. The Department observed Scan-Optics and REI optical scanning equipment in use by purchasers of the equipment in Florida and other States. During the Spring of 1991, the Department's budget was sufficient to allow the Department to purchase optical scanning equipment and the Department actually began to plan for such a purchase. The Department ultimately decided to acquire the equipment through a request for proposal instead of an invitation to bid because the Department knew what function the equipment was to serve but not how best to fulfill this function. James R. Evers, the Assistant Director of the Department's Division of Tax Processing, was assigned responsibility for drafting the specifications for the equipment to be acquired through the request for proposal. Mr. Evers travelled to several States with agencies that already had acquired optical scanning equipment, observed the equipment in use and discussed the equipment with personnel familiar with the equipment. Mr. Evers acquired and reviewed the specifications used in Florida and in other States in purchasing optical scanning equipment. Mr. Evers acquired requests for proposals and invitations to bid from other States and reviewed them. After preparing the specifications for the equipment to be included in the RFP, the Department submitted the specifications to the Information Technology Resource Procurement Advisory Council (hereinafter referred to as the "ITRPAC"). The ITRPAC was created pursuant to Section 287.073(5), Florida Statutes, and is composed of the Director of the Division of Purchasing of the Department of General Services, the executive administrator of the Information Resource Commission and the Director of the Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting. The ITRPAC, pursuant to the duty imposed on it by Section 287.073(5)(b), Florida Statutes, reviewed and approved the Department's specifications. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions in drafting the RFP were fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Issuance of the RFP. On June 24, 1991, the Department issued the RFP, No. 90/91-261, "Scanning Equipment Operation". Scan-Optics reviewed the RFP and concluded that several of the requirements of the RFP were product-specific; that only REI's equipment could meet some of the specifications. Based upon Scan-Optics' concerns, Scan-Optics sent a letter to the Department objecting to the RFP as "being a directed procurement to an individual company, namely Recognition Equipment Incorporated." In particular, Scan-Optics questioned why the features on pages 10 through 13 "which define a single vendor's product specifications . . . " were "mandatory" features. Scan- Optics requested that all REI-specific requirements be removed from the RFP. Pursuant to the RFP, a pre-proposal conference was held by the Department on July 16, 1991. This conference was attended by, among others, representatives of Scan-Optics and REI. The purpose of the pre-proposal conference was to provide written responses to written questions submitted by prospective vendors. Prospective vendors were informed through provisions of the RFP of the following concerning modifications to the RFP: Any question concerning the RFP was required to be submitted in writing. No interpretation of the RFP would be considered binding unless issued in writing by the Department. See paragraph 5 of the General Conditions of the RFP. Paragraph 5 of the General Conditions of the RFP also provided that protests to any part of the RFP were to be filed in writing as specified in Rule 13A-1.006, Florida Administrative Code. Section 1.4 of the RFP provided the following: No negotiations, decision, or action shall be initiated or executed by the offeror as a result of any discussions with any Department employee. Only those communications which are in writing from the purchasing office may be considered as a duly authorized expression on behalf of the Department. During the pre-proposal conference written questions that had previously been submitted by prospective vendors, including Scan-Optics' question concerning the "mandatory" features of section 3 of the RFP, and the Department's written responses thereto were distributed. Some discussion of the questions and responses also took place and some oral questions were answered. During the pre-proposal conference the Department's representative answered specific questions concerning the Department's desire to acquire "full multifont, set upper case, lower case alpha/numeric and hand print" capability. The questions to, and the comments of, the Department's representative during the pre-proposal conference were not reduced to writing or otherwise included in the RFP. Although the Department answered the oral questions asked during the pre-proposal conference, the Department's answers were not inconsistent with the intent of the Department evidenced in the RFP as discussed, infra. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions during the pre-proposal conference were fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest in light of the clear directions of the RFP concerning modifications thereto being in writing. In response to Scan-Optics' initial complaint about the RFP, the Department changed its "mandatory" features, beginning at Section 3.2 of the RFP, to "desired" features. This the Department did through the issuance of Addendum No. 1, which was issued by the Department after the pre-proposal conference on July 17, 1991, and included all written questions submitted prior to the conference and the Department's responses thereto. No other written modification to the RFP was made by the Department other than Addendum No. 1 and the attached written questions and responses. Other than the questions raised by Scan-Optics concerning the vendor- specific issue and the written questions attached to Addendum No. 1, no written clarification of the RFP was requested by Scan-Optics or any other prospective vendor. No written protest to the RFP was filed by Scan-Optics or any other prospective vendor. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions in issuing the RFP or it actions between the issuance of the RFP and the filing of proposals by vendors (i.e., the conduct of the pre-proposal conference) were fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Purpose of the RFP. The RFP included the following "overview" of why the Department issued the RFP: The Department of Revenue is planning the purchase of scanning equipment to enhance its data entry capabilities. The Department currently utilizes the Tartan Data Entry System to capture data from tax returns and related documents in a key to disk environment. . . . Scanning equipment would enable the Department to capture handwritten or typed data through optical character recognition. It is estimated that over 90% of typed data and 70% of handwritten data can be captured through optical character recognition. The initial application of Intangible Tax Returns represented over 68 million keystrokes during the last year. . . . . Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), section 1.2, page 1. The Department provided the following more specific indication with regard to what it was seeking through the RFP: It is the intent of the State to procure a total turn-key system comprised of all equipment, software, and services associated with optical scanning/optical character recognition of source data to provide output data for further processing at Florida Department of Revenue via magnetic tape or telecommunications. The system must be current state-of-the-art, allowing for future integration of imaging techniques into the scanner system as a field upgrade without replacing installed equipment. . . . A turn- key proposal is envisioned which will include installation, the design of the initial forms, scanner and edit and reject/re-entry system programming, operations and programmer training on-site, and any other support services essential to the successful operation of the system. It is requested that the successful vendor propose a minimum of 100 hours of software support for future applications to be allocated at the discretion of the Department. Reference Current System for details regarding the two Intangible Tax Form(s) and Documentary Tax Forms which we propose as initial scanning applications. We believe that the Section below appropriately sets forth the hardware and software sub-objectives including a scanner/imaging system, but we would like any potential Offerors to know that our overall objectives are a continuing improvement in all areas of operation at Florida Department of Revenue. In order of importance, the following are our goals: . . . . Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), section 3.1, page 9. The RFP went on to list a number of objectives (generally referred to as lower costs, enhance taxpayer service, improve quality, accelerate cycle time and decrease paper handling) and approximately 30 "desired" features the Department wanted vendors to address. Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), sections 3.2 through 3.31, pages 10-16. There were three forms attached to the RFP which the RFP indicated the Department intended to process with the system initially purchased pursuant to the RFP. Each form was identified and the potential data to be collected was identified by indicating the data elements currently captured, their size and their class. Although the data elements currently captured included only numeric data for two of the forms and numeric and some alpha data for the third form, the RFP did not specify that all data currently captured would necessarily be captured as a result of the RFP. The RFP also indicated that "[s]ubstantial changes to the layout will occur at design time" indicating that the forms were to be redesigned to accommodate a vendor's proposed method of collecting data from the forms. The RFP did not require that the Department acquire equipment which would read all Department forms which may ultimately be processed with optical scanning equipment or even that the exact three forms attached to the RFP for initial processing be processed as a result of any purchase under the RFP. The intent of the Department reflected in the RFP and as explained during the hearing of this matter was for vendors to provide the Department with details concerning their full capability (equipment and costs) to process Department materials with their optical scanning equipment and allow the Department to select a combination of equipment which would initially allow the processing of the three forms, in whatever format could best serve the Department's needs, and allow the Department to later upgrade and increase its use of optical scanning equipment. The RFP requested that vendors identify each component of their systems, including all recommended features for the initial task. Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), section 5.2, page 19. Vendors were also required to provide itemized prices for all components of their proposals: This tab must show the itemized prices for all components to include hardware, software, cables/connectors, shipping, installation, training, maintenance, start-up supplies/ equipment and any other goods/services. Pricing information must include all items that may be needed to provide a configuration of equipment and software to the Department. Any recurring charges must also be shown. Any quantity or price discounts offered in the proposal should be clearly stated. Pricing information must be submitted in the formats provided. It is imperative that adequate pricing information be included in the proposal. The Department cannot purchase any item against the proposal if adequate pricing information is not included in the proposal. Therefore, pricing information should be provided for optional features, equipment, software and services that are not a required part of any particular configuration herein, but may be desired if changes become necessary to any configurations purchased by the Department. . . . . . . . Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), section 5.2, page 20. Responses to the RFP. On or about August 6, 1991, Scan-Optics, REI and GTE Vantage Solutions submitted responses to the RFP. All responses to the RFP were determined to be responsive to the RFP and were evaluated and scored. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's determination that the responses to the RFP were responsive was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; General. Section 4.3 of the RFP established the criteria for evaluation of proposals to the RFP. A total of 35 points were available for "costs", 30 points for "functional requirements", 30 points for "future requirements" and 5 points for "tax related experienced". The Department established a four person committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee"), to review and evaluate proposals to the RFP. Those individuals were Mr. Evers, George Brown, Larry Neilson and Gerald Johnson. Pat Gonzalez, an employee of the Information Resources Commission, also served as a non-voting member of the Committee. Subsequent to the filing of the proposals to the RFP, the Committee met on several occasions to discuss scoring criteria and to review lists of equipment submitted by each vendor. The members of the Committee reviewed and scored each proposal individually. After individually scoring each proposal, the Committee met and reviewed the individual scores. The individual scores were averaged and tabulated by Ms. Gonzalez. REI received an average score of 30 points for the functional requirements of section 3 of the RFP, an average score of 23 points for section 5 of the RFP and 5 points for section 6 of the RFP. Scan-Optics received average scores of 24.19, 12.5 and 5, respectively, for these three categories. Adding the scores for cost, discussed infra, the final tabulation of scores was as follows: REI 85.16 Scan-Optics 76.69 GTE Vantage 54.72 Based upon the foregoing, the Department decided to award the contract under the RFP to REI. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; Costs. On August 6, 1991, when the proposals to the RFP were first opened, a preliminary bid tabulation sheet was completed. REI's proposed unit price was $1,389,025.00, and Scan-Optics' proposed unit price was $774,868.00. The Committee subsequently reduced the unit price of REI's proposal by $440,658.00, from $1,389,025.00 to $948,367.00. This reduction was made based upon a decision of the Committee, after a review of the REI proposal, to select a configuration of REI's equipment which the Committee believed comported with the Department's intent as evidenced by the RFP and would perform the tasks envisioned in the RFP. This decision was reasonable and consistent with the RFP in light of the following: The RFP informed vendors that the Department reserved the right to select any configuration of equipment submitted by vendors. Paragraph 7, General Conditions of the RFP, provided, in pertinent part: As the best interest of the State may require, the right is reserved to make award(s) by individual item, group of items, all or none, or a combination thereof; to reject any and all proposals or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in proposals received. . . . At Tab 11, Section 5 of the RFP, it was provided, in pertinent part: Offerors are required to include all equipment and software availability for their series or family of equipment proposed. The Department shall use these to determine the final ordered configuration from the selected proposal and from time to time, for additional equipment or software. This will also allow the Department the option of selecting equipment from State contract or under this RFP/Contract. This will also allow the Department to implement functions either undefined or unforeseen. The Department reserves the right to acquire any and all of the equipment, software and services necessary to meet the requirements of this proposal. Vendors were also required by Tab 11, Section 5 of the RFP to submit itemized prices for all components of a proposal: "Pricing information must include all items that may be needed to provide a configuration of equipment and software to the Department." REI's proposal included its entire array of equipment with itemized prices. This information allowed the Committee to equalize the vendors' proposals and, thus, allow a fair comparison of the two vendors. It also allowed the Committee to perform its task of deciding what configuration of equipment would best meet the Department's needs. Scan-Optics' proposal did not include separate itemized prices. Therefore, the Department was not able to decide the most advantageous configuration of Scan-Optics' equipment. Without the reduction in costs, REI's proposal was more extensive and more expensive than Scan-Optics' proposal. The Committee discussed the matter and questioned the Department's purchasing director as to whether REI's proposal could be reduced pursuant to the RFP to make it more compatible with the RFP. After being assured that such a reduction was permissible under the RFP, the Committee removed some of the REI proposed vocabulary kits and the costs of those kits. The Committee was unable to make a similar reduction to Scan- Optics' proposal because Scan-Optics had not itemized the cost of its equipment. With the reduction in REI's unit price made by the Committee, REI received a total of 27.16 points for the cost component during the evaluation process. The total score awarded to REI was 85.16. If the Committee had not given REI the reduction in unit price, REI would have only received 7.26 points for cost and its total score would have been 65.26. Scan-Optics received 76.69 total points (including 35 points for "cost"), which is higher than the points REI would have received but for the Committee's reduction of REI's unit price. REI was contacted by the Department to verify that the Department's understanding of the pricing information contained in REI's response to the RFP was correct. The evidence failed to prove that this contact allowed REI to provide any additional information to the Department or was otherwise improper. The Department did not contact Scan-Optics because Scan-Optics had not provided any information upon which the Department could have evaluated Scan-Optics' proposal in a similar manner as it had REI's. Therefore, there was no similar conclusion reached concerning Scan-Optics to be verified. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's evaluation of the costs of the vendors or the award of cost points to REI or Scan-Optics was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; An Oklahoma Tax Commission Evaluation Form. Prior to the evaluation of the proposals to the RFP Mr. Evers requested that an evaluation form used by the Oklahoma Tax Commission be provided to him. Mr. Evers made this request because he wanted to use the evaluation format he knew the Oklahoma Tax Commission had used. The evaluation form provided to Mr. Evers included the actual results of the Oklahoma Tax Commission's evaluation of proposals it had received. REI was awarded the Oklahoma Tax Commission contract. Mr. Evers provided a copy of the Oklahoma Tax Commission's evaluation to one of the members of the Committee and told him to give a copy to one other member. The evidence failed to prove if the fourth member and Ms. Gonzalez were provided a copy. The evaluation general point scale on the Oklahoma Tax Commission evaluation form was used by the Committee: Item not bid or does not meet specifications. Partially meets specifications. Meets specifications. Exceeds specifications. Substantially exceeds specifications. ? Need additional information from vendor. Although Mr. Evers could have avoided all appearance of impropriety by distributing a blank Oklahoma Tax Commission evaluation form, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Evers' actions in distributing the Oklahoma Tax Commission evaluation form was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. The evidence failed to prove that the Committee was in fact influenced by the Oklahoma Tax Commission evaluation form in any substantial way. I. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; REI's TARTAN XP80. REI's proposal included equipment named the TARTAN XP80. This equipment is the basic optical scanning system of REI. The XP80 system proposed by REI is capable of including from 40 to 720 templates. The Department, after evaluation of the proposals, decided that the XP80 with only 40 templates would be sufficient to meet the Department's initial goal as set out in the RFP. The Department concluded that it was not necessary to acquire the XP80 with its 720 template capacity. The 40 template system is the system which the Committee evaluated with regard to the cost of the REI proposal. Section 3.17 of the RFP included the following desired characteristic: Optical Character Recognition - The document scanning system must be capable of employing both feature matching and feature analysis recognition techniques. The system must be capable of processing all standard OCR fonts in single font, multiple font, or multi-font mode under program control. The Offeror must provide a list of all fonts recognized by their system and any restrictions that apply. Vendor to define number of fonts recognized by his system, i.e., single font, multiple font, omnifont, and multifont. The specifications of Section 3.17 of the RFP were not "mandatory" requirements of the system ultimately to be acquired by the Department. The Department requested information concerning these capabilities, but did not specify in the RFP that the system it would ultimately purchase for its initial project would contain the specifications of Section 3.17 of the RFP. In light of Scan-Optics own challenge to the provisions of section 3 of the RFP as "mandatory" and the Department's decision to eliminate the reference to the provisions of section 3 as "mandatory", it is clear that there was no requirement that the ultimate system acquired pursuant to the RFP had to be capable of processing all standard OCR fonts in single font, multiple font, or multifont mode under program control. The evidence failed to prove that REI did not provide information concerning its capabilities to meet the specifications set out in Section 3.17 of the RFP or that the information provided was inaccurate. Two of the forms to be initially processed (forms 601I and 601C) only required capability to read numeric characters. The third form (form 219) could, in a limited number of instances, contain numeric and alpha characters. In evaluating the proposals, the Department decided that, to the extent that alpha characters may be contained on form 219's, the alpha characters could be ignored without creating significant problems in processing. The Department's conclusion that the XP80 with only 40 templates can handle the initial task contemplated by the RFP was based upon the fact that the forms may be redesigned and the conclusion that the number of instances when alpha characters appear will be insignificant enough to ignore. There was evidence presented that the XP80 with only 40 templates cannot efficiently and successfully process the three forms to be initially processed. There was also evidence that the XP80 with only 40 templates will not be successful even if the forms are redesigned. The weight of the evidence failed, however, to substantiate this claim. Whether the XP80 with only 40 templates can successfully process the three forms depends upon the environment in which the forms are completed. It is possible that if the exact environment is known so that the number and type of fonts that may be used is known, only 40 templates can process the forms coming from that environment. The Department has not determined what exactly the environment in which the forms will be completed is. The Department did, however, consider the probable environment in reaching its decision. More importantly Scan-Optics did not prove what that environment is. Nor did Scan- Optics prove that the environment is, or will be, one which will prevent the XP80 with only 40 templates from being successfully used as contemplated by the RFP. The evidence proved that an XP80 with a minimum of 200 templates up to a maximum of 350 templates could be used to successfully carry out the task contemplated in the RFP even in a random environment (one in which any number of fonts might be used to complete a form). If up to at least 280 templates were purchased the XP80 could handle the processing of the forms and, adjusting the score of REI for the additional costs and additional performance characteristics of an XP80 with up to 280 templates, REI would still be the highest scorer. Exactly where the cut-off between the number of additional templates which it may be necessary to acquire according to evidence presented by Scan-Optics (between 200 and 350) and the resulting reduction in REI's score to below Scan- Optic's score would occur was not proved. The evidence failed to prove that the actions of the Department with regard to its decision to acquire an XP80 with as low as 40 templates was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; Table C. Table C of the RFP required that vendors list any optional features, which would enhance optical scanning operations: "LIST ANY OPTIONAL FEATURES WHICH ENHANCE PERFORMANCE OF THE SCANNING EQUIPMENT OPERATION". Joint Exhibit 1 (Tab D), page 30. REI did not provide a completed Table C with its proposal. REI's proposal included additional vocabulary kits containing from 40 to 720 templates and the cost of those kits in Table B of its proposal. Table B was to be used to provide the following: "LIST EACH AND EVERY COMPONENT AND FEATURES REQUIRED FOR INSTALLATION AND FULL OPERATIONAL STATUS." REI's proposal was consistent with these instructions. The fact that the vocabulary kits involved in the award of points for costs were included on Table B and were not included on Table C does not mean that the Department could not reject vocabulary kits as unnecessary for its initial purchase based upon other information contained in REI's proposal. The inclusion of the kits on Table B merely indicates that, to acquire REI's total capability with an XP80, up to 720 templates are required for "FULL OPERATIONAL STATUS." That does not mean that the Department intended or was required by the RFP to actually acquire "FULL OPERATIONAL STATUS." Section 3.9 of the RFP provided the following desired feature: Document Imaging - The proposed document scanning system must be capable of being field upgraded with image cameras for both front and back imaging of documents. Imaging must occur on both sides of the document in a single pass. The proposed system must be capable of taking partial images of the document within the confines of windows, zones, or strips. When and if imaging is added to the proposed system, it must not slow any other operations or functions of the system below that of normal throughput speed of the identical system without the added imaging capability. The following question, submitted in writing to the Department, and the following written answer from the Department, were included in Addendum No. 1: 48. Is the cost to retrofit to imaging included in evaluation criteria? Answer: Future costs will be considered. REI responded to section 3.9 as follows: Exceeds Requirement: The proposed TARTAN XP80 can be upgraded to imaging exactly as defined in Section 3.9. In addition, image output can be passed to an extremely wide range of image processing systems including those from IBM, NCR, Unisys, FileNet, Plexus and many others. Joint Exhibit 3 (Tab H), page 5. REI failed to list the equipment necessary to meet the desired feature of section 3.9, or the price of such equipment, on Table C of its proposal. This information, however, was included by REI on Table B according to the testimony of Mr. Evers. To the extent that Table C was not provided, REI's failure to provide the information to be contained thereon was a minor irregularity. The RFP did not require that the Department evaluate the proposals based upon the cost of future upgrades. The RFP only required that the Department determine the ability of vendors to upgrade and REI's proposal gave the Department sufficient information to accomplish this requirement. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's failure to reject REI's proposal because of its failure to provide Table C or that the Department's grading of REI's proposal in light of the failure to include a Table C with its proposal was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; The One- Year Warranty. The RFP required that a one-year warranty be included with each proposal. REI's proposal only included a 90-day warranty. REI's proposal, however, included the cost of one-year's maintenance costs of $61,587.00. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's acceptance of REI's warranty and maintenance costs was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Evaluation of the Proposals to the RFP; Grading of Sections 3.2 through 3.31. Addendum No. 1 to the RFP modified, among other things, three of the desired features of section 3 of the RFP. In particular, sections 3.5, 3.11 and 3.20 of the RFP were modified. The scores awarded to Scan-Optics by some of the members of the evaluation committee for its response to sections 3.5, 3.11 and 3.20 were lower than the scores awarded to REI. The evidence failed to prove the actual reason why the scores awarded to Scan-Optics pursuant to sections 3.5, 3.11 and 3.20 of the RFP were lower than the scores awarded to REI or that the lower scores were based upon the requirements of those sections without regard to the modifications of Addendum No. 1. The impact on the scores of Scan-Optics, even if attributable to error by the Department, would be minimal. The evidence failed to prove that even if the Department had graded Scan-Optics' proposal without taking into account the modifications of Addendum No. 1 to sections 3.5, 3.11 and 3.20, that the Department acted in a fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest manner. Conclusion. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions from the time that it developed the RFP to the announcement of its proposed award of the contract under the RFP to REI was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. Any unfairness to Scan-Optics was a result of the Department's broad discretion pursuant to the RFP to decide what to acquire as a result of the RFP and the apparent confusion of Scan Optics, and probably REI, caused by the RFP. The RFP was not, however, challenged.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order dismissing the Formal Written Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by Scan-Optics, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX Case Number 91-6545BID Scan-Optics and REI have submitted proposed findings of fact. The Department has indicated its intent to adopt the proposed findings of fact of REI. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Scan-Optics' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 3 and 5. 2 4-5. 3 See 31-37. See 32. See 33. 6-7 Hereby accepted and see 33 and 64-69. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 31-37 and 64-69. 11 and 13. The third, fourth and seventh sentences are not relevant. The fifth and sixth sentences are misleading and not totally accurate--there was only one RFP and one ITB and they were included in Mr. Evers' file on REI. See 19-20. The last sentence is not relevant. 11-12 20 and 26. 13 26. 14 22-23 and 26. 15 Hereby accepted. 16 See 20. But see 22, 25 and 27-30. 17-19 See 22, 25 and 27-30. 48, 58 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. But see 31-37. 58 and hereby accepted. 32, 70-71 and hereby accepted, except the fourth sentence, which is not supported by the weight of the evidence, and the last sentence, which is not relevant to this proceeding. 24-28 Hereby accepted. Not relevant. Hereby accepted. 31 32. 32 41. 33 44. 34 48 and 50-51. 35 See 47-48 and 51 and hereby accepted. 36 50-51. 48-49 and 51 and hereby accepted, except the fifth and last sentences, which are not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 54-57. The third sentence mischaracterizes Mr. Evers' testimony and is, therefore, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence or not relevant. 40 56. 41-42 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 43 See 60. 44 See 60-63. 45 Not relevant. 46-47 Not relevant. See 60-63 48 49-51 Not relevant. See 66-69. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 66-69. 52 See 45. But see 83-86. 53 Hereby accepted. 54 See 83 and hereby accepted. 55 Hereby accepted. 56 See 84-86. 57 Hereby accepted. 58 See 83 and hereby accepted. 59 See 84-86. 60-62 Hereby accepted. 63 See 84-86. 64 32. 65 74. 66 75. 67 76. 68 See 70-71 and hereby accepted. 69 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 77. 70 First sentence: hereby accepted. Second sentence: not supported by the weight of the evidence. Third sentence: hereby accepted as to the scores given REI; the rest of the third sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 71 Not relevant. 72 See 80-81. The computation of maintenance cost ignores the apparent discount which is given, depending on the length of the maintenance period purchased. For example, if a year's maintenance is purchased, the costs is less than the monthly rate times. 73 Not relevant. See 60-63. 74 58. 75 Not relevant. See 31-37 and 60-63. 76 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 77-79 and 81 Although these proposed findings of fact include correct quotations, other evidence was more persuasive. 80 Hereby accepted. 82 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 68. 83 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 65 and 68. 84 See 67. 85 67. 86 See 67. 87-88 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 68. Not relevant. See 68. 92 52. 93 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 31-37. REI's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 6. 2 7. 3 8. 4 9. 5 10. 6 11 and 13. 7 14. 8 15. 9 There was no proposed finding of fact 9. 10 18. 11 19-20. 12 20 and 26. 13 22 and hereby accepted. 14 22. 15 22 and hereby accepted. 16 29. 17 21. 18 26. 19-20 28. 21 24-25. 22 38. 23 41. 24 Hereby accepted. 25 42. 26-30 48. 31-32 48-49. 33 43. 34 40. 35 50-51. 36 44. 37 43. 38 45. 39 46. 40 39. 41 Hereby accepted. 42 59. 43 Hereby accepted. 44 See 61-63. 45 Hereby accepted. 46 See 37, 70 and 78. 47 77. Not relevant. Hereby accepted. 50-51 64. 52 59 and 65. 53 33 and 65. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence--there was some evidence presented. 54 67. 55-59 See 68. 60 See 83-86. 61 87. 62 Hereby accepted. 63 81. COPIES FURNISHED: James W. Linn, Esquire Rosa H. Carson, Esquire 1711-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William E. Williams, Esquire Rex D. Ware, Esquire Post Office Box 1794 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gene T. Sellers Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Vicki Weber, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (4) 120.5727.16287.0577.26
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BOARD OF OPTICIANRY vs. GILBERT ROSENBRIER, 82-000111 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000111 Latest Update: Oct. 02, 1990

The Issue Prior to hearing, Respondent moved to dismiss the administrative complaint. This motion was granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated in the order dated June 22, 1982. Those portions of the amended complaint asserting violation of Sections 484.03 and 484.09, Florida Statutes, were stricken by an order dated June 22, 1982, leaving only the allegation that the Respondent misrepresented material information on his application contrary to Section 484.014(1)(a), Florida Statutes. This was the only issue remaining for resolution at the hearing. Specifically, the factual dispute surrounded the representation by Respondent on his application that he had done his apprenticeship at House of Vision in South Hadley, Massachusetts, between 1973 and 1976. The Board of Opticianry asserted that the Respondent had not done his apprenticeship as he had represented. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact, memoranda of law and proposed recommended orders. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Gilbert Rosenbrier, is a licensed optician under the laws of the State of Florida, holding License #DO 0001378 issued by the Board of Opticianry. On or about December 2, 1977, Respondent filed an application for admission to the licensure examination in ophthalmic dispensing with the Florida State Board of Dispensing Opticians (now Board of Opticianry). A copy of said application was received as Petitioner's Exhibit #2. Respondent's application contains a form for reporting experience in ophthalmic dispensing under a licensed optician, optometrist or physician. The Respondent completed such a form as follows: Print full name: Gilbert Rosenbrier Street Address: 7825 Red Road Miami FL Title of position held: Optician Employed in position from: Nov 1973 to August 1976 Print full name of employer: House of Vision Full address of employer: Mountain Farms Mall, So Hadley Mass Print full name of supervisor: Harry Marsh Full address of supervisor (if different from employer): Presently: 7825 Red Road, Miami Fl. 33143 Check the type of establishment or office: (applicant indicated) Ophthalmic dispensers Check the specific duties of applicant and give approximate time (in hours) engaged in each during a normal work week of approximately 40 hours: (Applicant indicated) Fitting and adjusting spectacles to human faces 15 hours; Interpreting prescriptions and verifying optical calculations 10 hours; Optical laboratory work (Manufacturing) 15 hours House of Vision was owned by Harry Marsh. Marsh sold it to Kent Whalen. Whalen worked for Marsh and House of Vision of Mountain Farms Mall in South Hadley, Massachusetts, from May of 1974, until Whalen purchased the business in late 1976. Whalen knew the Respondent as a neighbor of Marsh's but only saw the Respondent in the store on two occasions, late in 1976. Whalen stated that to the best of his knowledge Respondent was never an employee of House of Vision. The Respondent testified in his own behalf. He had become interested in opticianry in 1973 by virtue of his association with his neighbor, Marsh. At that time, Respondent had started working at House of Vision with Marsh at a time when the Respondent was supervisor of an educational consulting firm and could set his own hours. Marsh's store had to be open during the hours the mall was open, and Marsh needed the Respondent's help. In the spring of 1974, Respondent needed to spend more time with his business but still wanted to learn about opticianry. Marsh agreed to provide Respondent with optical equipment of the type used at the store, which Respondent placed in his basement, in exchange for Respondent's promise that the would invest money in a venture with Marsh at a later date. This equipment was used by Respondent to perform the shaping of lenses, assembly of frames, tinting of lenses, etc., under Marsh's supervision in the afternoons, on weekends, and during Respondent's other free time. In addition, Respondent would go to the store on weekends and help Marsh when Whalen was off. Marsh sold the store in November of 1976, and he and Respondent came to Florida, where Respondent did invest money in a joint venture with Marsh in the opticianry business. Witnesses who had known Respondent and had visited his home between 1973 and 1976, corroborated the fact that the Respondent had optical laboratory equipment in his basement during that time, had spent his spare time working with this equipment, and had made one of the witnesses a pair of glasses using frames picked out at House of Vision. Respondent did not spend his time doing a specific task while he was learning opticianry, but started with simple procedures such as tinting and assembling frames and progressed to making patterns for grinding lenses, shaping, and grinding lenses in his basement lab. He obtained his experience in fitting glasses and selling at the store prior to the spring of 1974, and after that date when he worked with Marsh on weekends. Respondent did not mention drawing a salary from Marsh but gave the impression that this time was traded to Marsh for Marsh's expertise in teaching him. The Respondent has a doctorate degree in an academic area and was engaged in academic work and consultant work for years prior to 1973.

Recommendation Having found that the statute under which the Board of Opticianry seeks to discipline the Respondent, Gilbert Rosenbrier, was passed after the alleged acts occurred upon which the complaint is based, it is recommended that the Board dismiss the amended administrative complaint and take no action. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lionel Barnet, Esquire Miller Square 13842 Southwest 56 Street Miami, Florida 33183 H. Fred Varn, Executive Director Board of Opticianry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.57484.014
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs ESSAM ISMAIL, O.D., 00-001585 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Winter Haven, Florida Apr. 12, 2000 Number: 00-001585 Latest Update: Sep. 28, 2024
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BOARD OF COSMETOLOGY vs. TONI M. FARMER, 82-002931 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002931 Latest Update: Dec. 29, 1982

Findings Of Fact Toni M. Farmer, presently holds an active cosmetology license issued by Petitioner, License No. CL0062662, for the period July 19, 1982, through June 30, 1984. Between May 6, 1980, and July 6, 1981, Farmer worked as a cosmetologist in a salon operated by Shear Pleasure, Inc., in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. Shear Pleasure, Inc., is the holder of License No. CE0027634. Beginning July 13, 1981, to the present, Farmer has worked as a cosmetologist in the salon, Josef and Charles, Inc., d/b/a Josef and Charles Styling Salon, License No. CE0022674, located in Orange Park, Florida. When Farmer began her employment with Shear Pleasure she had a current and valid cosmetology license issued by Petitioner, which license expired June 30, 1980. Around August 18, 1980, Farmer forwarded a cashier's check made payable to the Board of Cosmetology for purposes of renewing her delinquent cosmetology license. Subsequent to the action on the part of Farmer and in the course of a routine inspection, Jewel Walker, an inspector for Petitioner, noted the fact of expiration of Farmer's license. This took place in 1980. When told that Petitioner had not responded to the renewal request, Walker instructed Farmer to post the indicia of payment of fees, i.e., a copy of the cashier's check of August, 1980, at Farmer's work station in the interim and to check the post office for any return of that cashier's check, due to the fact that Farmer had changed her mailing address following the transmittal of the cashier's check. Farmer made other contacts with the Tallahassee, Florida, office of Petitioner to determine the status of her renewal in 1980. In the beginning of 1981, Farmer spoke with Walker about the renewal, having failed to receive any notification confirming license renewal. (In the course of these matters, Walker had indicated certain logistical problems that were taking place, reference license renewal for cosmetologists.) The owner of Shear Pleasure, Inc., Fontaine LeMaistre, was aware of the efforts on the part of Farmer to obtain license renewal and allowed her to continue as an employee during her tenure. When Farmer took a position with Josef and Charles, her employer was made aware of the fact that she did not have the license document and the employer was made aware of the efforts which Farmer had made to obtain the license. On August 11, 1981, Farmer requested the Florida First National Bank of Jacksonville, which had issued the August 18, 1980, cashier's check to stop payment on that check, based upon the fact that the payee, Petitioner, had not cashed the check. This request was honored and on August 13, 1981, a cashier's check was issued to Toni M. Farmer in the like amount of thirty-five dollars ($35.00), which check was subsequently cashed by Farmer. On May 12, 1982, Charles Coats, an investigator with Petitioner, made an inspection of the Orange Park business of Josef and Charles and discovered that Farmer was without a license. At that time, a copy of the original thirty- five dollar ($35.00) check written to the Board of Cosmetology was shown to Coats. Farmer related the circumstances involving efforts which she had made to obtain the license. Following this conversation, and specifically in June, 1982, Farmer maid the necessary fees and offered required credentials which allowed her license to be renewed, effective July 19, 1982.

Recommendation Based upon a full consideration of the facts found, conclusions of law reached and being otherwise informed, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which suspends the license of Respondent for a period of fifteen (15) days based upon the violation found in Count I and dismisses Count II. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1982.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57477.028477.029
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BOARD OF OPTICIANRY vs. PATRICK GALLAGHER, 82-002060 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002060 Latest Update: Oct. 02, 1990

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent Patrick Gallagher was a licensed optician in Florida, having been issued license number D00001006. From approximately March of 1979 until December of 1981, except for the months of June and July, 1981, respondent was employed as a licensed optician for Union Optical in Tampa, Florida. Prior to May, 1981, respondent worked full time. When he returned to Union Optical in late July or August, 1981, he worked only three days a week. Another optician, Bobby Prohenza, was employed at Union Optical on a part-time basis in June and July of 1981. Rose Ochs, the manager and/or supervisor of Union Optical in Tampa is not now, and has never been, licensed as an optician in the State of Florida. Having received a complaint from Bobbie Prohenza against Union Optical and Rose Ochs, petitioner's investigator, Wayne Lopez, went to Union Optical on December 3, 1981, to investigate unlicensed opticianry activities. The only employee on the premises was Rose Ochs. While on the premises, Mr. Lopez observed Ms. Ochs handing a glasses case and glasses to a customer. Investigator Lopez, identifying himself to Ms. Ochs as a long , distance truck driver asked her if she could duplicate his existing prescription "glasses"" into "sunglasses." When Ms. Ochs refused to do so without a written prescription, Lopez told her he would obtain one. The investigator obtained a duplicate prescription from his personal physician and returned to Union Optical a few hours later. He handed the written prescription to Ms. Ochs and she took his eyeglasses and put them on a lensometer to see if the two prescriptions were the same. Mr. Lopez and Ms. Ochs then sat at a table across from one another and she began taking measurements with a small ruler across the bridge of his nose. She then wrote some numbers on a piece of paper and attached that paper to the prescription. Investigator Lopez, attempted to leave a deposit with Ms. Ochs, but was told he could pay for the glasses when he returned some weeks later. When Mr. Lopez departed from the Union Optical premises, he observed a Florida opticianry license hanging over the entrance door, which license was issued to respondent Patrick Gallagher. After learning of respondent's address, Mr. Lopez went to respondent's residence on December 3rd, identified himself as an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation and told respondent that he wanted to discuss with him the operation of Union Optical. Respondent worked at Union Optical 24 hours a week on Mondays, Tuesdays and Fridays. While he knew the store was open on his days off, respondent had been assured that opticianry work would not be performed on those days. It was the respondent's understanding that when he was not on the premises, the only business which would be transacted was the selling of non-prescription items, glass care items and cleaning solutions. Respondent was aware that Rose Ochs would receive written prescriptions in his absence and would, on occasion, transfer or copy the prescriptions onto an invoice which went to an independent laboratory. He was also aware that Ms. Ochs occasionally assisted customers in the selection of a frame for their lenses and quoted prices to customers in his absence. Respondent did not suspect that Ms. Ochs took pupillary distance measurements or used the lensometer when he was not on the premises. He does not believe that Ms. Ochs has sufficient knowledge or experience to properly operate the lensometer. Respondent was not present at Union Optical on December 3, 1981, when Investigator Lopez was on the premises. When Mr. Lopez described to him the events which had transpired at Union Optical on that date, some one-half hour after their occurrence, respondent was surprised to hear that Ms. Ochs had performed the functions of operating the lensometer and taking pupillary distances. Respondent had no managerial control over the premises of Union Optical or Rose Ochs.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint charging respondent with a violation of Section 484.014(1)(n), Florida Statutes, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 16th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Frances Carter, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul W. Lambert, Esquire Slepin, Slepin, Lambert & Waas 1115 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Varn Executive Director Board of Opticianry Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57484.002484.013484.014
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SAMUEL SCARDINO vs. BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, 84-002647 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002647 Latest Update: Mar. 15, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Samuel Scardino is an optometrist who is currently licensed as such in the states of California, Illinois, Kentucky, and Michigan. He graduated from the Illinois College of Optometry in 1978, and successfully passed all parts of the National Board of Optometry examination in the same year. He has been a practicing optometrist in Battle Creek, Michigan, since 1978. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 4) By application dated May 10, 1983, Petitioner applied to take the Florida optometry examination. His application was received by Respondent on May 13, 1983. Petitioner's application was approved pursuant to Respondent's Rule 21QER83-1 which amended Rule 21Q-4.01, Florida Administrative Code, on May 19, 1983, to provide that an applicant must have obtained a qualifying score on the national examination within five years prior or two years subsequent to the date of passage of the state examination. It also provided that a passing score of 75 must be obtained on the pharmacology section of the national examination in 1983, or subsequent thereto, within five years prior or two years subsequent to passage of the state examination. By letter of May 18, 1983, Respondent acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's application and $250.00 fee, but indicated that the application was incomplete in that a final transcript must be sent by his school, and also that the National Board report of passing grades within the past five years and the pharmacology section in 1983 with a score of 75 or above were required. Petitioner complied with these requirements and received an admission card for the optometry examination to be held in July of 1983. Petitioner took the examination at that time and received notice in September 1983 that he had failed the pharmacology/pathology portion of Part II of the examination with a grade of 61. A review of Petitioner's objections to the grade resulted in a further letter from Respondent, dazed December 23, 1983, which advised Petitioner that the Board of Optometry review committee had reviewed the matter and changed his final grade for the pharmacology/pathology portion of the examination from 61 to 65, but that a final grade of 70 percent or better was required to achieve a passing status. He was thereupon advised of his right to a hearing under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 5-8, Respondent's Exhibit 1) On March 19, 1984, Petitioner filed an application for optometry reexamination with the Respondent, together with the $250.00 reexamination fee. The state application form for reexamination did not ask for any information concerning the National Board of Optometry examination, as did the original application form. Respondent's Rule 21Q-4.02, Florida Administrative Code, pertaining to reexamination, provided pertinently as follows: 21A-4.02 Reexamination.-- An applicant who fails either Part I or Part II of the state examination for licensure shall be required to retake only that part of the examination on which he failed to achieve a passing grade, provided that the applicant shall be limited to two retakes within a two year period from the date of original failure. If the applicant fails to achieve a passing grade as provided above, he shall be required to take the complete state examination for licensure in order to be entitled to be licensed as an optometrist. Reexamination shall be conditioned on payment of the reexamination fee. Respondent advised Petitioner by an undated letter which he received on April 7, 1984, that his National Board scores were no longer valid to take the Florida examination since they had been obtained more than five years prior to his application to take the 1984 examination. The letter further stated that 1983 was his last year of eligibility for examination under his 1978 National Board scores and that he had not been successful in his 1983 Florida examination. The letter enclosed an application for refund of his $250.00 fee for the 1984 examination. Petitioner thereafter spoke with the Executive Director of the Board of Optometry who indicated that the Board would be evaluating his and other questions of candidates at their May 4, 1984 meeting. (Testimony of Petitioner, Gardner, Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 9, 11) The minutes of a meeting of the Board of Optometry on May 3, 1984, contains the following item: Examination 1984 - After discussion with Board Counsel, the Board reiterated that Examination candidates must have passed all parts of the National Board within 5 years prior to application to take the Florida examination in order that all candidates who pass the Florida examination are immediately eligible to apply for licensure. Any candidate who applies to retake the Florida examination must also meet the requirements of passing the National Board within 5 years of applying to retake the Florida examination. All requirements of 21Q-4.01 apply to all candidates and no waiver of requirements shall be granted. Motion by Dr. Walker, seconded by Mrs. Chambers. Passed unanimously. The Board's Executive Director advised Petitioner of the action taken by the Board in a letter of May 14, 1984. He was also informed by this letter that if he completed the National Board requirements prior to the 1985 examination and applied for such examination, he would be required only to take the practical portion of Part II of the Florida examination, but that if he were not licensed in 1985, he would be required to take the entire Florida examination. After receiving the letter, Petitioner submitted his application for refund of the $250.00 reexamination fee which was approved on April 4, 1984 and thereafter paid to Petitioner. By Petition dated June 19, 1984, Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to contest the Respondent's denial of his application to retake the Florida optometry examination which was scheduled for August 1984. The instant rule challenge was subsequently filed in September 1984. (Testimony of Petitioner, Gardner, Petitioner's Exhibit 10) The policy statement announced by the Board at its May 3, 1984, meeting that applicants for reexamination must have passed the National Board examination within a period of five years prior to such application was first applied in 1984 and was uniformly applied to all applicants for reexamination who had not taken the National Board examination within the requisite period prior to application. (Testimony of Gardner)

Florida Laws (3) 120.54120.56120.57
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PROFESSIONAL OPTICIANS OF FLORIDA AND WAYNE P. RIDDLEBAUGH vs BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, 93-006924RX (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 06, 1993 Number: 93-006924RX Latest Update: Dec. 27, 1995

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Rule 61F8- 3.015, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, and whether the Petitioners have standing to challenge that rule.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner POF is a non-profit Florida corporation organized under the laws of Florida for the purpose of representing its members who are licensed opticians. Petitioner Riddlebaugh is a board-certified, licensed optician pursuant to the laws of Florida and has been so licensed since 1987. After first becoming licensed in Florida, Petitioner Riddlebaugh worked in his family's optical business in Ormond Beach, Florida. He later worked for Burdine's Optical and Omni Optical. From April 1990 to February 1994, he owned and operated an independent opticianry business in Florida and was the sole employee of that business during the entire time of its operation. The Respondent is a state agency authorized to promulgate rules and regulations concerning the practice of optometry and licensure of optometrists, by authority of Chapter 463, Florida Statutes. The Intervenor is a non-profit Florida corporation whose membership is comprised of optometrists licensed under Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, and who are authorized to practice optometry in Florida. Petitioner POF's organizational purposes are to promote, protect, and improve the professional status of persons engaged in the practice of opticianry and to encourage, establish, and maintain standards of competence, knowledge, and performance through the provision of educational programs, training, and uniform licensing of optical dispensers. Petitioner POF has seven classes of membership entitled Professional Member Class I, Professional Member Class II, Professional Non-Licensed Member, Associate Member, Affiliate Member, Student Member, and Honorary Member. Only Professional Member Class I has Florida licensed opticians as members. Any member of Petitioner POF may terminate membership upon 60 days written notice to the executive director. Members of POF who fail to pay dues and other obligations within 60 days are removed from the membership rolls. It is impossible to determine the number of members of Petitioner POF, since the membership roster can change daily, based upon resignations and terminations. Petitioner POF did not introduce its most current or any membership roll designating the members by their appropriate membership class. The 1993-94 directory and desk guide of Petitioner POF lists the members of Petitioner POF followed by a number designation in parentheses. The number designation (1), which does not indicate only Professional Member Class I membership, as defined by the Bylaws of the association, represents members who are not licensed in Florida as opticians, as well as some members who are licensed in Florida as opticians. It is impossible to determine how many members besides Riddlebaugh and Richard W. Williams are licensed in Florida as opticians, although a substantial number of the total membership are Florida licensed opticians. No preponderant evidence was offered to show that the membership of Petitioner POF was substantially affected by the challenged rule. During the six years the rule has been in effect, Petitioner POF did not gather any information to show how or if the challenged rule affected its membership even though it had challenged the rule when first promulgated, later withdrawing the challenge. The number of licensed Florida opticians has increased during the entire six-year period the challenged rule has been in effect. Petitioner Riddlebaugh is a Florida licensed optician who was licensed in 1987. He closed his optical business "Spectacles" in February 1994. He closed that business because of generally declining economic conditions in Volusia County, Florida, where he practiced, due in large part to the competitive effects on his business in that vicinity posed by physicians (ophthalmologists), who, in addition to practicing as ophthalmologists, can also practice opticianry. Additional competition was posed by optometrists, other opticians, and large optical purveying firms, such as Opti-World, Pearle Vision Express, J.C. Penney Company, Inc., Lens Crafters, Inc., and Sears Optical. Petitioner Riddlebaugh was able to obtain employment at Omni Optical from February 1989 to February 1990 during the time the challenged rule was in effect, it having taken effect in 1988. He was able to open his business in April 1990 and operate it for four years during the time the rule was in effect. Ophthalmologists and optometrists are allowed under their practice acts to employ non-licensed personnel, who can perform optician-type functions and duties under appropriate supervision, delineated in those practice acts. This poses competition to opticians situated such as Petitioner Riddlebaugh, wholly apart from perceived and purported competitive effects posed by the subject rule under challenge. Petitioners POF and Riddlebaugh simply failed to demonstrate that any deleterious competitive effects imposed on Petitioner Riddlebaugh's business, or the business of any members of Petitioner POF, were occasioned by the operative effects of the rule under challenge. Although Petitioner Riddlebaugh testified that one of the primary factors for closing his business was the competition posed by the effect of the rule, that testimony is not deemed preponderant nor credible as evidence, since Petitioner Riddlebaugh had previously given testimony by deposition that another set of rules promulgated by the Board, unrelated to the challenged rule, was the only reason for closing his business. It appears, however, that the real reason for the closing of his business was due to the combined effects of competition from various optical establishments and other optometric and ophthalmologic professionals, as well as a general economic decline in Volusia County, Florida, in the early 1990's when he was attempting to operate his business and ultimately closed it. Unlicensed persons may work for opticians doing all functions within the definition of opticianry, under appropriate supervision, as delineated in the pertinent provisions of Chapter 484, Florida Statutes, and the opticianry practice rules promulgated thereunder. Unlicensed persons working for opticians can perform such functions as selection of frames and transfer of optical devices without the optician being on the premises. Unlicensed persons can also work for ophthalmologists, performing opticianry duties. In October 1986, the Respondent, with a view toward promulgating this rule, requested that the Board of Opticianry define "fitting, adjusting, and dispensing". This was an effort by the Respondent to avoid conflicting with the legally-defined practice requirements for opticianry. The Board of Opticianry was aware of the rule promulgation effort by the Respondent, however, it never responded to the request. Because it never obtained any definitional information from the Board of Opticianry, the Respondent elected to delete the terms "dispensing" and "measuring" from its proposed rule at that time. The words "delivery of eyeglasses" were inserted. Optician, Richard E. Williams, who testified at the hearing, defined "dispensing" as being the adjustments necessary to make certain that eyeglasses properly fit a patient. Mr. Williams defined "fitting" as determining whether the glasses were set properly on an individual's face. He also defined "fitting" as making certain that pupillary distance was accurate and defined "dispensing" as fitting and adjusting. Petitioner Riddlebaugh defined "fitting" as making certain that the frames of eyeglasses were properly adjusted to the patient. According to the preponderant evidence of record, the "adjustment of frames" is not the practice of opticianry. The purpose of adjusting frames is simply to get them to set comfortably and properly on a patient's face. Adjusting may also be used to align lenses properly within the frame. The "delivery of eyeglasses" is not the practice of opticianry either, nor is the "selection of frames". Unlicensed persons can also work for ophthalmologists, performing opticianry. Petitioner Riddlebaugh testified that the challenged rule affects the integrity of his opticianry license and the viability of his practice because it allows unlicensed persons to perform opticianry functions when working for an optometrist or an ophthalmologist. His testimony is not preponderant or credible, however, since there is no limit to the number of unlicensed persons that opticians themselves can employ to perform opticianry functions under appropriate supervision, just as optometrists and ophthalmologists may employ such unlicensed personnel to perform opticianry under the appropriate supervision, as delineated in their practice act and rules. There is no meaningful distinction between the competitive effects of unlicensed persons working for an optician and those working for ophthalmologists and optometrists. Richard E. Williams, a licensed optician, testified that he had to close his office in Panama City Beach, Florida, because a "group of doctors" opened an office in competition with him. On some days, their office was only staffed by unlicensed persons. He did not indicate in his testimony whether the "group of doctors" were ophthalmologists or optometrists. His testimony also described his practice on Panama City Beach dwindling because of the effects of ophthalmologists, regulated by Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder, who were in practice in the Panama City area. The Petitioners adduced evidence of preparation and dispensing of eyeglasses by unlicensed personnel in an optometry practice and establishment, done under general, rather than direct, supervision, which were more than merely ministerial in nature. Tasks which were performed under purported authority of the challenged rule, that were more than ministerial in nature, and constituted the practice of opticianry by an unlicensed person, were shown by the testimony of Deborah L. Metz-Andrews. Ms. Andrews is not licensed in either opticianry, optometry, or ophthalmology. She was employed by the Newberry Eye Clinic in Chipley, Florida, from January 1991 to August 1992. That establishment is an optometric practice owned and operated by an optometrist and which has an optical department. It has satellite offices in Chipley, Port St. Joe, Panama City Beach, and Panama City, Florida. While employed at Newberry, Ms. Andrews was referred to as "the optician" by the optometrist, but her job title was really "optical technician". During her employment with Newberry, she neutralized glasses with the use of a lensometer, to determine the prescription on the existing glasses worn by a patient. She took prescriptions and determined what the prescription was, what kind of frame would facilitate that prescription, and performed pupillary distance measurements. She determined if a patient needed trifocals or bifocals and did all of the required measurements. She also was responsible for ordering the eyeglasses from the laboratory in Panama City. Once the glasses were made and returned to Chipley, she would place them in the lensometer to check them, and the patient would be notified that the glasses were ready to be picked up. When the patient came in to pick up the glasses, she typically performed the following duties: She fit the glasses on the patient, double- checking the segment height, if they were bifocals; fit the eyeglasses to the nose; adjusted the frame; and made sure that the pantoscopic tilt was correct. She would inquire of the patient's ability to see and if satisfied, the patient would take the eyeglass case, go to a window, pay the bill, and leave. She performed these duties, some of which fall within the practice of opticianry, without the optometrist being on the premises in direct supervision. She stated that she did not feel confident doing some of the types of duties and tasks she was performing and received no guidance from the optometrist. Mr. Williams was accepted as an expert in the practice of opticianry (excluding the field of contact lenses). He opined that the duties being performed by Ms. Andrews, purportedly pursuant to the challenged rule, constitute the practice of opticianry. Dr. John McClane is a licensed Florida optometrist. Dr. McClane's Florida office employs 10 or 11 employees, only one of whom is a licensed optician. The unlicensed personnel in his office adjust frames and perform neutralization of lenses without the lenses having been checked by a licensed optometrist before final delivery to the patient. In operating a lensometer in the neutralization process, unlicensed personnel in Dr. McClane's office also read prisms and transpose prescriptions. The glasses are not always checked by either the licensed optician or the licensed optometrist prior to final delivery to the patient by the unlicensed personnel. According to Dr. McClane's understanding of the term "ministerial", as used in the rule, an unlicensed person can perform any tasks that an optometrist orders and determines, if it is appropriate for patient care. Any delegated task, by his understanding, may be performed under general, rather than direct, supervision. He believes that "direct supervision" is a situation where the optometrist is on the premises directly supervising the work of the unlicensed person. Even if the duties, or some of them, performed by unlicensed personnel at the Newberry and McClane establishments constitute the practice of opticianry by unlicensed personnel, under the general, rather than direct, supervision of optometrists, the testimony of Ms. Andrews and Dr. McClane does not definitively indicate which of the purported opticianry duties Ms. Andrews and other unlicensed personnel performed were actually done with the optometrist away from the premises and not in direct supervision. Further, even if such unlicensed personnel were doing some task which constituted the practice of opticianry, without the direct supervision of an optometrist, there was no competent, credible evidence to show that such practices, under the aegis of the challenged rule, are so widespread or common in practice as to indicate that the language and terminology embodied in the rule is fraught with vagueness so as to cause frequent, recurring misunderstandings by optometrists in conducting their practices with the use of unlicensed personnel. Rather, these two examples offered by the Petitioners may raise simply an issue of the application of the subject rule and a question as to uniformity of its enforcement. In 1986, the legislature enacted a substantial amendment to Section 463.009, Florida Statutes, regarding supportive personnel, by allowing such unlicensed personnel to perform functions for an optometrist under either general or direct supervision. The definition of direct supervision was changed and a definition of general supervision was added in Section 463.002(6)&(7), Florida Statutes. See Chapter 86-288, Laws of Florida. Pursuant to the 1986 amendments, the Respondent began rule-making at its August 21, 1986 annual meeting and rule workshop. The resulting Rule 21Q-3.015, Florida Administrative Code, at paragraph (3), listed the tasks which unlicensed personnel could perform under general supervision as dispensing, selection of frames, measuring and adjusting eyeglasses, and instruction in the insertion, removal and care of contact lenses. On October 3, 1986, Petitioner POF filed a rule challenge to the proposed rule alleging, inter alia, that the rule allowed unlicensed persons to practice opticianry under general supervision, thus, purportedly constituting a departure from the authorizing statute. After the filing of the rule challenge, at a public hearing on October 15, 1986, the Respondent withdrew the proposed rule. During that October public hearing, a member of the Respondent was requested by the Board Chairman to attend the Opticianry Board's rules committee meeting the following day, on October 16, 1986, and to request the opticianry rule committee to develop a rule to provide a definition of "fit, adapt, adjust, and dispense". During the October 16, 1986 meeting of the rules committee of the Board of Opticianry, a member of the Board, Ms. Card, reported that the Respondent was waiting for the Board of Opticianry to define "fitting and adjusting" before the Respondent continued with its rule-making regarding support personnel. She also stated that the Respondent had a meeting scheduled for December 19, 1986. The Board of Opticianry met on November 20, 1986 and approved the minutes of the rules committee meeting of October 16, 1986, but took no action regarding promulgating rules defining the terms which the Respondent requested it to define, even though the Board of Opticianry took extensive action on rule-making on other subjects. Thereafter, at the January 22, 1987 meeting of the Respondent, after receiving no information from the Board of Opticianry regarding the definitions requested, the Respondent approved an amended version of Rule 21Q-3.015, Florida Administrative Code, changing the list of tasks in paragraph (3) to "delivery of eyeglasses, selection of frames, adjustment of frames, and instruction in insertion and removal and care of contact lenses". The tasks of "dispensing and measuring and adjusting eyeglasses", contained in the prior version of the rule, were deleted. A meeting and public hearing was again held on April 10, 1987, during which the proposed rule was addressed; and it was reported that Petitioner POF had again filed a rule challenge to Rule 21Q-3.015, Florida Administrative Code. The proposed rule was then again withdrawn. Workshops by the Respondent were thereafter held in November 1987 and on February 12, 1988 concerning Rule 21Q-3.015, Florida Administrative Code, and the rule was noticed for promulgation on April 29, 1988. Rule challenges were thereafter filed by Petitioner POF and Jack Eckerd Corporation. The Respondent then met on August 5, 1988 and changed the word "employee" to "nonlicensed, supportive personnel" in paragraph (4) of the proposed rule. The two rule challenges were then voluntarily dismissed by those petitioners, and the rule was adopted and became effective on October 23, 1988 and has been in effect since. The Board of Opticianry was well aware of the Respondent's efforts to promulgate the rule on support personnel. The Board of Opticianry never promulgated rules defining "fitting, adjusting, and dispensing" of optical devices, despite the Respondent's request. During the time period that the Respondent was considering the rule in its present form, the members of the Board of Opticianry never agreed on a definition of "dispensing".

Florida Laws (8) 120.52120.57120.68463.002463.009484.002484.011484.018
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