Findings Of Fact Respondent, Camino Real Village, is the joint venture and developer of a sixty-four unit condominium project known as Camino Real Village V (project) in Boca Raton, Florida. The project consists of two buildings (5751 and 5801) with thirty-two units each. Respondent, B&S Ventures, Inc. (B&S), a Florida corporation, is a partner in the joint venture. The other partner, Middlesex Development Corporation, a California corporation, was not named a respondent in this cause. Although the development consists of at least four separate condominium projects known as Camino Real Villages II, III, IV and V, only Camino Real Village V is in issue in this proceeding. Respondents, as the developer and partner of the joint venture, are subject to the regulatory requirements of petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Division). They are charged with violating various provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes (1985), as set forth in greater detail in the Division's notice to show cause issued on July 17, 1986. The Camino Real project is considered to be a multi-condominium project. This means the development includes more than one condominium project but that all are operated by a common association. The parties agree that the project is not a phase condominium project. Under Division rules and applicable statutes, the developer of a multi-condominium project is required to file with the Division a set of "creating" documents at the inception of the project. The creating documents include, among other things, a prospectus, declaration of condominium, plans and survey, legal description, percentages of common ownership, surplus and expenses, articles of incorporation, by- laws, site plan, restrictions (if any), and the estimated operating budget for the first year. Such documents must be submitted for each condominium within the project. However, where the documents are identical to those submitted for another condominium, the developer may file a "certificate of identical documents" wherein the developer certifies that all disclosure items are identical with items for another condominium within the project which has been previously filed with the Division. After the creating documents are filed, the developer must thereafter file additional documents as new condominiums are constructed and completed. This is generally accomplished by filing an amendment to the original declaration for condominium. The amendment includes a surveyor's certificate attesting that the construction on the project has been completed. The purpose of the later filing is to inform the Division that construction on the new condominium has been substantially completed. On an undisclosed date in 1979, respondents filed their creating documents for certain condominiums in Camino Real Village. On November 19, 1980, they submitted their filing for the creation of Camino Real Village V. These documents were accepted as to "form" on December 11, 1980. They included a certificate of identical document signed by B&S' president which certified certain documents were identical to those previously submitted for Camino Real Village IV, a legal description of the property on which the condominium sits, sketches of the types of units to be built, a typical floor plan for Buildings 5751 and 5801, an estimated operating budget based on sixty-four units and common ownership percentages for each unit in the two buildings. Under Division requirements and state law, the documents should have contained a statement reflecting that the condominium was not substantially completed. 3/ However, they did not, and this omission was not detected by the Division when it reviewed and approved the initial filing. On October 23, 1984 respondents filed the declaration of condominium for Camino Real Village V in the local public records. The documents have been received in evidence as petitioner's composite exhibit 1. They reflected that the percentage of ownership in the common elements for both buildings equaled one hundred percent. Section 3(b) of the declaration provided for the creation of a condominium consisting of two buildings (5751 and 5801) containing thirty- two units each. The documents included a surveyor's certification that Building 5751 was substantially completed. However, as to Building 5801, which was not completed at that time, no statement reflecting its state of completion was filed. It is also noted that the declaration was not filed with the Division as required by law, and the Division did not learn of its existence until sometime later. Since the filing of the declaration, respondents have operated Camino Real Village V as a condominium. On October 23, 1984, respondents executed the closing documents on the sale of the first unit (Unit No. 106 in Building 5751) in Camino Real Village V. The warranty deed was later recorded in the local public records on November 1, 1984, and it is found this is the appropriate date on which the sale of the first unit occurred. This is consistent with the standard practice of parties executing documents prior to closing but not considering a unit sold until the money is actually transferred from the buyer to the seller. This date is significant since it may bear directly upon the date when the developer must begin paying common expenses on developer-owned units. On or about October 24, 1985 a "First Amendment to the Declaration of Camino Real Village V" was recorded by respondents in the local public records. It amended the declaration previously executed on October 23, 1984 and included, among other things, a surveyor's certificate reflecting that Building 5801 had been substantially completed. It also attempted to submit Building 5801 to condominium ownership. Although the amendment and attached documents should have been filed with the Division, respondents neglected to do so. The Division first learned that the documents existed during the course of this proceeding. According to paragraph 15 of the declaration, common expenses can only be assessed by the Association against "each condominium parcel." A condominium parcel is defined in paragraph 4(c) as "the condominium unit, together with an undivided share in the common elements appurtenant thereto." A condominium unit in turn is defined in paragraph 4(a) as "the unit being a unit of space, designated 'condominium unit' on the sketch of survey and plans attached hereto and marked as Exhibit B." The latter exhibit, which is attached to the declaration, contains the plans and survey of the project, the surveyor's certification of substantial completion, and a graphic description of each finished unit within the project. Therefore, the above definitions evidenced an intent that common expenses could be assessed only against completed units. Pursuant to Subsections 718.116(1) and (8), Florida Statutes (1985), a developer is responsible for paying his pro- rata share of common expenses on all developer-owned units. The same law permits the declaration to provide that the developer is relieved of this per-unit obligation until the expiration of a ninety-day period after the first unit is sold. In this case, the declaration had such a provision in paragraph 14. It provided in part as follows: . . . for such time as the Developer continues to be a Unit Owner, but not exceeding ninety (90) days subsequent to the closing of the first condominium unit, the Developer shall only be required to contribute such sums to the common expenses of the Condominium, in addition to the total monthly common expense assessments paid by all other Unit Owners, as may be required for the Condominium Association to maintain the condominium as provided in said Declaration of Exhibits . . . Developer hereby reserves the option to guarantee the level of assessments to unit owners for a specified time interval and thereby limit its obligations to contribute to condominium maintenance in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. The parties agree that the monthly assessments for common expenses during the period relevant to this proceeding were as follows: Type A Units $135.20 Type B Units 138.64 Type C Units 163.96 The declaration also provides that ten percent interest must be added to any liability owed. The record reflects, and respondents concede, that such assessments were not paid on any units in Building 5801 until the following dates: Units 100-107 ----------- August 28, 1985 Units 200-207 ----------- September 5, 1985 Units 300-307 ----------- September 10, 1985 Units 400-407 ----------- September 18, 1985 The above dates are exactly ninety days after certificates of occupancy were issued for each of the four floors of Building 5801. Even though assessments were not paid by respondents until those dates, beginning on January 31, 1985 and continuing until such assessments were paid, other unit owners were charged and paid assessments based upon a budget for sixty-four units. As it turned out, the difference between the budget and annual common expenses actually incurred by the project was approximately $32,100, or the amount the Division contends respondents owe. In 1982-84, petitioner conducted an investigation of Camino Real Villages II, III and IV based upon complaints received from a certain unit owner. The complaint concerned allegations that access to association books was denied, that the declaration contained a developer guarantee, that maintenance expenses were not properly paid, and that improper assessments were levied on unit owners. The file was closed in November, 1984 after the Division's enforcement supervisor concluded that the allegations were either "unfounded" or could be resolved through voluntary compliance by the Association. As to the fourth issue, which was an allegation that the developer- controlled Association had improperly assessed unit owners from November, 1980 to January, 1982, the investigative report noted that the developer was "allocating them based on the completed units versus the total units filed for the entire community." The enforcement supervisor concluded that this was "the method chosen by the Association," and "absent specifics in the documents, we lack jurisdiction . . . to question this practice." There is no mention of the term "certificate of occupancy" in the report. However, uncontradicted testimony by respondents reflects that its use of the date of issuance of the certificate of occupancy to determine when assessments became due was the focus of the investigation, and that respondents relied upon those statements in continuing their practice of not paying assessments until ninety days after a certificate of occupancy was issued on a unit. They did so, at least in part, on the theory that the Association did not assume responsibility for expenses until that time. Respondents point out that the filing documents submitted to the Division in November, 1980 were defective in that the surveyor's certificate was incorrect. They go on to suggest that, because of this deficiency, the filing might be invalidated by a court and therefore the statutory assessment provision would not apply. However, no person has ever challenged the validity of the filing, and the general law contains a curative provision for any initial filing errors. They also assert that, if any liability is in fact owed, they are entitled to set-offs for expenses incurred by the developer while the project was being constructed. These include payments for real estate taxes, utility bills, Boca Del Mar Improvement Association, Inc. fees, trash removal, insurance, security service, assessments and maintenance and are itemized in attachments to respondents' exhibit 1. However, there is no rule or statutory provision which authorizes this type of set-off to be applied against common expenses. Therefore, the expenses itemized in respondents' exhibit 1 are deemed to be irrelevant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the respondents be found guilty of violating Section 718.116, Florida Statutes (1985), as charged in the notice to show cause, and that they be required to pay the Association for past due common expenses on developer-owned units in Building 5801 as set forth in paragraph 8 of the conclusions of law plus ten percent interest to and including the date of payment. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1988.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a corporate condominium association operating Vantage View Condominium, a 175-unit condominium subject to the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations at issue, the Respondent maintained “building block diagrams” which identified unit owners, their unit number, their telephone number, and their assigned parking space. The block diagrams were utilized by condominium personnel in order to contact unit owners as need dictated. Such diagrams were kept in the regular course of the condominium business but were not always given to unit owners. If distributed, the block diagram might be abridged to delete information unrelated to an inquiry or information which the association did not release such as the telephone numbers of residents. Written requests for information were processed through the condominium office located within the condominium complex. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Mr. Salkin was a unit owner at Vantage View Condominium who resided at the property. On more than one occasion, Mr. Salkin made written requests for the block diagrams described above. On no occasion did the Respondent release the complete and unabridged document to Mr. Salkin. Upon notice of the dispute, the Petitioner’s agent investigated the matter and directed the Respondent to release the complete block diagram to Mr. Salkin. Despite the directive, the Respondent again refused to release the document to the unit owner. Thereafter, the Petitioner and Mr. Salkin discovered another document, known by Respondent as its “unit owner roster” which also contained the unit owner names, addresses, and telephone numbers. On or about June 30, 1997, Mr. Salkin made a written request for the unit owner roster maintained by Respondent. Again, the Respondent refused to make an unedited version of the unit owner roster available to Mr. Salkin. The Petitioner directed Respondent to make the roster available to Mr. Salkin but it has failed to do so. While some of the information on the roster and block diagrams might be available through other sources, unit owners are not required by law to research public records for information routinely kept by a condominium association. Although the Respondent cooperated fully with the investigation in this case and was cordial and open with regard to its unwillingness to produce the documents requested by Mr. Salkin, it presented no legal basis for its refusal to make complete copies of the documents available to the unit owner. The Petitioner is in the process of promulgating enforcement guidelines to set the ranges for penalties in cases of this nature. It has determined that failure to provide access to official records warrants an administrative fine from one dollar to five dollars per unit. Accordingly, it seeks a fine in the amount of $875.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, enter a Final Order sustaining the Amended Notice to Show Cause, determining the Respondent has willfully and intentionally failed to make its official records available to a unit owner after written request for same, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $875. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850)488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert H. Ellzey, Jr., Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1030 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1030 Robin L. Suarez, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1030 Irv Goldfarb, President Vantage View, Inc. 2842 North Ocean Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents, The Fourth Bayshore Condominium Association, Inc. (“Bayshore”), Karl Stemmler (“Stemmler”), and/or Richard Grove (“Grove”), discriminated against Petitioner, Robert Pagano (“Pagano"), on the basis of his physical handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Pagano is a Caucasian male who is handicapped by virtue of medical complications which resulted in the amputation of his left leg in March 2008. He has been confined to a wheelchair since that time. At all times relevant hereto, Pagano was renting a condominium unit at Bayshore. In January 2012, Pagano saw another unit at Bayshore advertised for rent. He called Grove, listed as the owner of the unit, and inquired about renting the property. Grove told Pagano that a key to the unit would be left under a mat between the screen door and front door on January 19, 2012. On that day, Pagano went to inspect the unit, accompanied by a friend, Philip Saglimebene. Upon arrival at the unit, Pagano and his friend began looking for the hidden key, but could not find it. They apparently made some noise while searching for the key, because they were confronted by Stemmler. According to Pagano, Stemmler began asking them in unfriendly terms who they were and what they were doing at the unit. The friend then told Stemmler they were looking for a key so they could go in and inspect the unit as Pagano was interested in renting it from Grove. Stemmler, supposedly identifying himself as a “building representative,” said there was no key to be found. He also reputedly told Pagano and his friend that they would not need a key anyway, “because you are not moving in.” When the friend explained that the unit was for Pagano, not him, Stemmler allegedly said that Pagano was not moving in either because he was an “undesirable.” When asked to explain that comment, Stemmler purportedly said, “He just is; that’s all you need to know.” (None of Stemmler’s comments were verified by competent evidence and, without verification or support, cannot be relied upon to make a finding of fact in this case.) Pagano believes Stemmler’s purported comments were based on the fact that he (Pagano) has long hair and a beard and does not fit into the conventional norm at Bayshore. He also believes that his handicap served as a basis for Stemmler’s alleged comments. There was no credible evidence presented at final hearing to substantiate Pagano’s suppositions. Grove had put his condominium unit up for rent at the beginning of the year. When Pagano called to inquire about it, Grove – who lives out-of-state – notified a friend to leave a key under the mat, as described above. That friend simply forgot to leave a key at the unit on the designated date. Grove knew nothing about Pagano’s interaction with Stemmler. Grove had not spoken to Stemmler prior to the day he and Pagano had their interaction. Stemmler had no authority to speak for Grove or to make a decision concerning to whom Grove would rent his condominium unit. Subsequent to the day Pagano visited the unit, Grove took the unit off the rental market because his wife decided to use the unit to house family and friends rather than renting it out to someone else. It took several weeks for the rental advertisement for the unit to be removed from a locked bulletin board at Bayshore. Grove said that if the unit ever went back on the market, he would call Pagano first about renting it, i.e., Grove had no opposition whatsoever to Pagano’s being a tenant. Van Buren, president of Bayshore, explained that the condominium association utilizes the support of voluntary building representatives to assist with security and minor maintenance at Bayshore. The volunteers, who are generally seasonal residents at Bayshore, do not hold keys to individual units and have no authority to grant or deny an applicant’s request to rent a unit. Stemmler is one of many building representatives who resides part-time at Bayshore. Pagano does not know of any non-handicapped individual who was allowed to rent a unit at Bayshore to the exclusion of himself or any other handicapped person. In fact, Pagano currently resides in another unit at Bayshore; he is already a resident there.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Robert Pagano in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2012.
The Issue This case concerns the issue of whether the Respondent offered condominium units for sale to the public and offered contracts for sale of those units in violation of Section 718.502(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is charged with having offered units for sale and offered contracts prior to the time of filing the required condominium documents with the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums as required by Section 718.502 and the rules promulgated thereunder. At the formal hearing, Petitioner called as its witness Luis Stabinski, an officer and 50 percent owner of the Respondent corporation. The Petitioner also presented testimony by the deposition of Luis Stabinski, which was entered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, and the deposition of Paul Scherman, which was admitted into evidence as petitioner's Exhibit 2. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 was a deposition of William Hirsch, an investigator for the Department of Business Regulation. There was an objection made to the admissibility of the deposition of Mr. Hirsch by the Respondent on the grounds that Mr. Hirsch had previously investigated a prior development in which the owners and officers of Finst Development, Inc. were involved. The undersigned Hearing Officer took that objection under advisement and after having reviewed the deposition, overrules the objection and admits Petitioner's Exhibit 3, the deposition of William Hirsch. Petitioner also offered and had admitted Petitioner's Exhibits 4 - 9. Mr. Luis Stabinski was also called as a witness by the Respondent in the Respondent's case-in-chief. Respondent did not offer any exhibits into evidence. Counsel for the Petitioner and for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law are not adopted herein, they were considered by the undersigned Hearing Officer and determined to be irrelevant to the issues in this cause or not supported by the evidence.
Findings Of Fact Based upon a stipulation between Petitioner and Respondent, the following facts (a) through (b) are found: The condominium development which is the subject of this action is named Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North. Twenty-eight (28) contracts, other than Petitioner's Exhibit 8, for the purchase of units in the Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North bear dates or are dated by their terms prior to September 25, 1981. The Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North contains 52 units and was developed by the Respondent, Finst Development, Inc. Finst Development, Inc., is a Florida corporation for profit and is owned in equal shares by Mr. Luis Stabinski and Mr. Richard Finvarb. Mr. Finvarb was president of the corporation and Mr. Stabinski served as vice- president and secretary. On September 25, 1981, the Respondent, Finst Development, Inc., filed the following items with the Department of Business Regulation, the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums: Condominium documents for Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North. Condominium filing statement. Condominium filing checklist. Check in the sum of $520.00, representing filing fee for the above-referenced condominium project. The Declaration of Condominium was executed by Richard Finvarb and Luis Stabinski on September 30, 1980. The Articles of Incorporation of Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium Association North, Inc., were executed by Richard Finvarb, Bell Stabinski, and Luis Stabinski on August 12, 1981. The bylaws for Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North were executed on August 12, 1981. Each of these three documents is part of the required filing which was filed on September 25, 1981. On December 9, 1981, the Respondent was notified by Petitioner that the review of the documents filed by the Respondent in connection with Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North was complete. That notice also informed Respondent that the documents were considered proper for filing purposes and the developer "may close on contracts for sale or lease for a lease period of more than five years." (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 6.) Upon the insistence of Mr. Stabinski, his law firm, Stabinski, Funt, Levine, and Vega, P.A., did all the legal work in connection with the condominium. Specifically, Mr. Paul Scherman, an associate and employee of the firm, did the legal work for the condominium. Mr. Scherman worked under the direct supervision of Mr. Stabinski. Prior to the filing of the condominium documents on September 25, 1981, the fifty-two (52) units of the condominium were offered for ale to the public. Contracts for the purchase and sale of units in the condominium were also offered to the public. Prior to filing the condominium documents on September 25, 1981, the Respondent entered into 29 contracts for the purchase and sale of units in Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North. There were no closings held on any units prior to approval of the condominium documents by the Department. During the construction and sale of units in Indian Creek Club and Marina Condominium North, Richard Finvarb was in charge of construction, sales, and supervision of the Finst Development, Inc. office and personnel. Luis Stabinski's involvement was as an investor. The documents filed by Respondent with the Department were prepared by Paul Scherman, an associate in Mr. Stabinski's law firm. Mr. Scherman also attended all closings on units and received copies of contracts entered into by Respondent for the sale of units in the condominium. Mr. Scherman was aware that contracts were being entered into prior to the filing of the condominium documents described in Paragraph 2 above. Luis Stabinski has been a practicing attorney for 13 years. He represents individual condominium purchasers and has been involved as an investor in three other condominium projects prior to the Indian Creek Club and Marina North Condominium. Following the initial filing of the condominium documents, the Respondent promptly responded to and made the changes and corrections required by the Department in two Notices of Deficiencies. After being provided with the required documents, all but five or six of the purchasers who had entered into contracts prior to the filing of the documents closed on their units. The five or six that did not close are presently in litigation with the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order imposing a civil penalty of $7,500 and ordering the Respondent to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 718 or the rules promulgated thereunder. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Norman Funt, Esquire Stabinski & Funt, P.A. 757 N.W. 27th Avenue Third Floor Miami, Florida 33125 Mr. Gary Rutledge Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact For purposes of the Motions to Dismiss filed by Agrico and the Department, the following findings of fact are based upon the pleadings in this case, matters to which the parties have stipulated, and DOAH Case Number 86-3618, as well as final agency action resulting therefrom: On or about August 26, 1986, Petitioners filed with the Department a petition for formal administrative proceeding which challenged the dredge and fill permit that the Department intended to issue to Agrico. The Department transmitted this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing, and it was assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer as DOAH Case Number 86- 3618. Petitioners relied upon Sections 120.57(1) and 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, to "initiate" DOAH Case Number 86-3618 as is clearly set forth in paragraph 20 of their Petition filed in that case. In their Motion for Fees and Costs at paragraph 3, Petitioners further allege, and thereby concede, that they "initiated the above styled proceeding (DOAH Case Number 86-3618)." A final hearing was scheduled to begin on April 28, 1987 in DOAH Case Number 86-3618. However by letter to the Department dated March 2, 1987, Agrico voluntarily withdrew its application for a dredge and fill permit which was the subject of that case. Thereafter, a telephone conference call was held on March 17, 1987, following which an Order Closing File was filed in DOAH Case Number 86-3618 on that same date, and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Department. The Final Order in Case Number 86-3618 was entered by the Department on May 18, 1987 which states: Upon consideration, it is ORDERED that the withdrawal of permit application number 53-1093999 is GRANTED with prejudice to further Department consideration of the application, but without prejudice to the future submission of another dredge and fill application covering the same tract of land covered by application number 53-1093999. The withdrawal of permit application number 53-1093999 divests the Department of jurisdiction to proceed with consideration of (Booker Creek and Manasota's) petition. Humana of Florida, Inc., v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 500 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Accordingly, the above-captioned case (DOAH Case Number 86-3618) is DISMISSED as moot. On July 16, 1987, Petitioners timely filed their Motion for Fees and Costs which was assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer and given DOAH Case Number 87-3007F. Petitioners are each incorporated as not-for-profit corporations within the State of Florida, with principal off ices in Florida, and each having less than twenty-five full time employees, as well as a net worth of not more than two million dollars.
The Issue The issue for resolution in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Notice to Show Cause: Failure to deliver to the association a review of financial records for the required period. Section 718.301(4)(c) F.S. (1981). Failure to fund reserves. Section 718.112(2)(k) F.S. (1981). Failure to turn over converter reserves. Section 718.301(4)(d) F.S. (1981). Charging the association $10,000 for management services without documentation of the contract for the services. Section 718.115(1) F.5. (1981). If it is determined that violations occurred, the remaining issue is what corrective action and civil penalties are appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated to the following facts: Batura Enterprises, Inc. (Batura) is the developer, as defined in Section 718.103(13) F.S., of a residential conversion condominium known as English Park, in Melbourne, Florida. The condominium association for English Park was incorporated on December 2, 1980. The declaration of condominium for English Park was recorded in the public records on January 22, 1981. Turnover of control of the condominium association from control by the developer to control by unit owners other than the developer pursuant to Section 718.301 F.S., occurred on May 31, 1982. (Joint exhibit #1.) A review of financial statements dated January 19, 1983, was delivered to the condominium association. The review covers a ten-month period commencing August 1, 1981, and ending May 31, 1982. (Joint Exhibit #4.) A supplemental turnover review, performed during the course of this litigation and signed on February 7, 1987, covers the period from incorporation of the condominium association on December 2, 1980, through July 31, 1981. (Joint exhibit #6.) The function of the review is to provide an accounting during the time that the developer is responsible for the association, and to insure that assessments are charged and collected. (Testimony of Eric Larsen, C.P.A., qualified without objection as an expert in condominium accounting.) The proposed operating budget included $15,248.00 for an annual reserve account ($1,270 per month). (Joint exhibit *5, p. 83.) Based on this, the reserve account from the creation of the condominium, January 22, 1981, until the date of turnover, May 31, 1982 should have been $20,688.71 (sixteen months and nine days). The "election period" provided in Section 718.116(8)(a) F.S. (1979) is addressed in the Condominium documents, p. 31: F. Common Expenses payable by the Developer. Until the sale of the first Unit in the Condominium, Developer shall be solely responsible for all expenses of the Condominium. Following the first closing, the Unit Owner in whom title shall have been vested shall be responsible for his proportionate share of Common Expenses, based upon his percentage interest in the Common Elements. The Developer shall be excused from payment of the share of the Common Expenses and Assessments relating to the unsold units after the recording of this Declaration for a period of time which shall terminate on the first day of the fourth calendar month following the month in which the closing of the sale of the first unit occurs. The Developer shall pay the portion of expenses incurred during that period which exceeds the amount assessed against other Unit Owners. (Joint Exhibit #5.) The first units were sold in April 1981. (Joint Exhibit #2, p. 2). Therefore, the "election period" ended on August 1, 1981. The turnover review does not reflect the existence of the $20,688.71 reserve fund at the time of turnover on May 31, 1982. Instead, it reflects a certificate of deposit in the amount of $18,795.00 that was created as a "reserve for transition operations". This was derived from initial payments made by the owners to the association to provide working capital for the start- up phase. (Joint Exhibit #4., testimony of Philip Batura.) These "initial assessments" are addressed in the condominium documents: G. Initial Assessments. When the initial Board, elected or designated pursuant to these By-laws, takes office, it shall determine the budget as defined in this Section for the period cornencing 30 days after their election or designation and ending on the last day of the fiscal year in which their election or designation occurs. Assessment shall be levied against the Unit Owners during said period as provided in this Article. The Board will levy an "initial assessment" against the initial purchaser at the time he settles on his purchase contract. Such initial assessment shall be in an amount equal to two months regular assessments, and shall be utilized for commencing the business of the Association and providing the necessary working fund for it. In addition, the initial purchaser shall pay the pro-rated portions of the monthly assessments for the remaining balance of the month in which closing takes place. The initial assessment and other assessments herein provided shall be paid by each subsequent purchaser of a Unit; no Unit Owner shall be entitled to reimbursement from the Association for payment of the initial assessment. Developer shall not be liable to pay any initial assessment. (Emphasis added) (Joint Exhibit #5, p. 31.) Based on the above, it is apparent that none of the $18,975.00 was contributed by the developer. Between April 1, 1981, and August 1, 1981, 60 percent of the units were sold. (Testimony of Philip Batura. Joint exhibit #4, attachment C.) Therefore at any given point in time between those dates, at least 40 percent of the units were in the hands of the developer. Between August 1, 1981 and turnover at the end of May 1982, an additional 30 percent of the units were sold, for a total of 90 percent. (Testimony of Philip Batura.) This means a minimum of 10 percent of the units were in the hands of the developer at any point between those dates. While Philip Batura claims that reserves were waived by a majority of members pursuant to Section 718.1l2(2)(k), F.S. (1981), he produced no evidence of that. He admitted that the action is not reflected in association minutes. (Joint Exhibit #1.) Reserves are included in the proposed budget filed with the condominium documents. (Joint Exhibit #5.) Reserves are noted in the supplemental financial review provided by the developer: ENGLISH PARK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (UNAUDITED) (SEE ACCOUNTANT'S REVIEW REPORT) JULY 31, 1981. NOTE 1 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES RESERVES - The Association's policy is to currently fund all expected replacements and major repairs of commonly owned assets. Should restricted funds available to meet future replacements and major repairs prove to be insufficient, the Association's Declaration provides that special assessments may be made against the unit owners. * * * (Joint Exhibit #6.) The purpose for a reserve account is to insure that funds are available in the future for replacements and deferred maintenance on the common elements. (Testimony of Eric Larsen) In addition to the statutorily-required reserves for exterior painting, roof replacement and repaving, the English Park proposed budget includes reserves for the swimming pool and "townhome hot water tanks". According to Philip Batura the budget was not amended prior to turnover. A separate reserve was required at the time of turnover because this was a condominium converted from apartments. (Testimony of Philip Batura) The only converter reserve applicable was a reserve for roofing in the amount of $6,114.00. (Joint exhibit #2, p. 2 of 11.) The Respondent has admitted its failure to turn over this reserve, but claims the obligation is offset by $10,000 in management fees which it asserts the association owes. (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 2 of 6.) Philip Batura is President of Batura Enterprises, Inc. He was elected or designated to the association board of directors at some point prior to turnover and remained on the board at turnover as he still owned some units. He mostly ran the association until the turnover in May 1982. (Testimony of Philip Batura.) Batura claims that there was an oral agreement for management services for $1,000.00 per month, commencing on August 1, 1981, between the association and Batura Enterprises, Inc. He said this was never paid by the association as there was not enough income to cover the costs of operation. The financial review covering the period August 1, 1981 to May 30, 1982, addresses the accrual of a management fee of $10,000, "...per the proposed operating budget which was recorded in the original declaration." (Joint Exhibit #4.) It is unclear where this figure was derived, as the budget does not reflect a $1,000.00 per month expense line item for management services. Included in the condominium documents is a proposed contract between the association and Eussel G. Hurren for management services. Both the fee and the term of the contract are left blank. The contract form that was filed is not signed, nor was a contract with this individual ever signed. (Testimony of Philip Batura.) The Declaration of Condominium permits a contract with a professional managing agent, including the developer. (Joint - Exhibit #5, p. 25.) No competent evidence was adduced by either party that this provision was ever fulfilled.
Recommendation Final hearing in the above-styled action was held on February 10, 1987, in Cocoa, Florida, before Mary Clark, Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties were represented as follows: For Petitioner: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 For Respondent: James S. Cheney, Esquire Post Office Drawer 10959 Melbourne, Florida 32902-1959
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2008),1 by revoking an accommodation which allowed Petitioner to have a support dog in his condominium on the alleged ground that the support dog presents a health hazard for Petitioner’s neighboring condominium resident.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a resident owner of a condominium in Embassy House Condominiums (Embassy House). Embassy House is a covered, multifamily dwelling unit within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2). Petitioner’s condominium is a dwelling defined in Subsection 760.22(4). Respondent is the entity responsible for implementing the rules and regulations of the condominium association. Relevant rules and regulations prohibit residents from keeping dogs in their condominiums. Sometime after July 17, 2008, Respondent granted Petitioner’s written request to keep a support dog in his condominium as an accommodation based on Petitioner’s handicap. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner is a handicapped person within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(7). Petitioner’s handicap includes cancer and depression. After Respondent granted permission for Petitioner to keep a support dog in his condominium, Petitioner purchased a small dog that weighs less than 15 pounds. Respondent now proposes to revoke permission for Petitioner to keep the support dog. The sole grounds for the proposed revocation is that the female resident of the condominium adjacent to Petitioner’s, identified in the record as Ms. Madeline O’Connell, allegedly is allergic to pet dander. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the support dog presents a health hazard to Ms. O’Connell. Neither Ms. O’Connell nor her physician, who is not identified in the record, testified. The admitted “sole basis” of Respondent’s position is a note from an unidentified, alleged physician that Respondent did not submit for admission into evidence. Respondent identified the note through the testimony of a lay witness, but never submitted the note for admission into evidence. The lay witness for Respondent identified the note as the note provided to him by Ms. O’Connell. The remainder of the testimony of the lay witness consists of statements by Ms. O’Connell to the lay witness concerning the alleged allergy of Ms. O’Connell. If the evidence were to show that Ms. O’Connell is allergic to pet dander, the support dog is a breed that does not have dander. The support dog is hypoallergenic. If the evidence were to show that the support dog were not hypoallergenic, adequate measures have been implemented to protect Ms. O’Connell from any threat to her health. The air conditioning vents that feed cool air from Petitioner’s condominium into the common lobby for the two condominium units have been sealed. The interior of the condominium units are cooled by separate air conditioning units. The trier of fact finds the paucity of testimony concerning the alleged health hazard to Ms. O’Connell to be less than credible and persuasive. Ms. O’Connell makes no effort to protect herself from exposure to the support dog. On at least three occasions, Ms. O’Connell voluntarily exposed herself to the support dog to make confrontational comments to Petitioner about the support dog.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order upholding the Petition for Relief and dismissing the proposed revocation of the accommodation for Petitioner to keep a support dog in his condominium. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2009.
The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent has committed violations of the Florida Condominium Act (Chapter 718, Florida Statutes) and, if so, whether a cease and desist order and/or civil fine should be imposed. Petitioner contends that the allegations of the Notice to Show Cause have been established and that a cease and desist order and civil fine are appropriate. The Respondent contends that to the extent any violations of the Act have been established, they are only of a technical sort, and do not justify the imposition of any sanction.
Findings Of Fact Nautico Bay Club, Inc., is the developer of the Nautico Bay Condominium, located at 6937 Bay Drive, Miami Beach, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Samuel Weintraub was the president of Nautico Bay Club, Inc., and was primarily responsible for conducting its day-to-day business activities. The Nautico Bay Club Condominium includes 48 residential units. The first units were sold on December 1, 1980. The final closing on the 48 units occurred on December 31, 1980. The Respondent failed to call an annual meeting of the unit owners at Nautico Bay Condominium during 1981. The Respondent was having some difficulty communicating with some of the unit owners because they lived outside of the country. Nonetheless, the Respondent did not give written notice to unit owners of an annual meeting during 1981, did not post notice of an annual meeting during 1981 on the condominium property, did not send a notice of an annual meeting during 1981 by mail to each unit owner, and did not retain a post office certificate of mailing as proof of mailing of notice to unit owners. No annual meeting of unit owners was conducted during 1981. As the developer who maintained control over condominium activities during 1981, the Respondent was obliged to call and conduct an annual meeting of unit owners. The Respondent retained a private public accounting firm to prepare a financial statement for the Nautico Bay Club Condominium for the year ending December 31, 1981. The statement was completed on February 10, 1982. The Respondent remained in charge of the administration of the condominium association at that time. The Respondent made no effort to provide copies of the financial statement by mail or personal delivery to each unit owner. While some unit owners may have obtained copies of the financial statement within 60 days of December 31, 1981, most did not. At least one unit owner did not receive a copy of the financial statement until sometime in November, 1982. On or about September 17, 1982, the Respondent turned over operation of the condominium association to the Nautico Bay Club Condominium Association. The Respondent's president, Mr. Weintraub, offered to have the financial records reviewed by the independent certified public accounting firm that he had utilized in the past. The unit owners protested and asked instead that he pay to have the documents reviewed by a firm of their choosing. The Respondent did not have the financial records and statements reviewed by an independent accounting firm. He offered to have them reviewed by the firm he had utilized in the past, but the unit owners declined that offer. In the prospectus that the Respondent offered to potential unit purchasers, an estimated monthly operating budget and an estimated annual operating budget for the condominium, and an estimated monthly operating budget and an estimated annual operating budget per unit were set out. No other proposed budget was issued for 1981, nor does it appear that one was required, since the first persons who purchased units did not do so until December, 1980. No proposed annual budget of common expenses was prepared for the 1982 calendar year. Instead, the Respondent merely utilized the estimated budgets that had been set out in the prospectus. These were never, however, presented as a proposed annual budget for 1982. The Respondent did not provide as a part of its budgets for 1981 or 1982 for reserve accounts for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance. Accounts were not established to reserve funds for roof replacement, building painting, pavement resurfacing, and the like. The estimated replacement costs of such items were not a part of any budget prepared by Respondent. The funds were neither established nor funded by the Respondent. Mr. Weintraub testified that the reason the accounts were not established is that he had difficulty collecting assessments from unit owners. It does not appear, however, that the Respondent made any effort to collect assessments from unit owners, nor that the accounts were established with such funds as could have been collected.
Findings Of Fact The first issue delineated above has in effect been resolved by the First District Court of Appeal. The Declaratory Statement was issued on June 25, 1980, by the Division, declaring that the Master Association was an "association" as defined in Chapter 718(1), Florida Statutes. The Master Association appealed this Declaratory Statement to the first District Court of Appeal (Exhibit 2). Palm Greens Limited vs. Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums, Case No. WW-363. The Respondents filed a petition to stay the Division's proceedings to enforce the rules and the Division denied that petition. The Respondent then filed a petition for review of the denial of the stay in the First District Court of Appeal (Exhibit 5). This petition was denied by the Court. The appellate case was argued in the District Court of on June 2, 1981, and a per curiam affirmance of the declaratory statement was issued on June 4, 1981. That decision has since become final. With regard to the second issue referred to above, there is no question that the Master Association failed to allow the members to view the Master Association's books and records, although the Master Association did offer to allow them to view the books and records upon their agreeing to certain conditions. The agreement could not be reached and therefore the Unit One Association members were never allowed to view the books and records. The President of the Master Association, Mr. Lawrence Sadick, admitted in his testimony that the Master Association had not allowed its members to see the books and records. Similarly, in the Respondent's Amended Formal Response to Notice to Show Cause, the Master Association stated that it "admits that it has denied Number One's request for access to its books and records." The primary dispute to be resolved here is whether the Master Condominium Association, Respondent, increased its 1980 budget assessment over the statutorily prescribed limit of 115 percent of the 1979 assessment. The Respondent, the Master Association, is composed of two members, the Number One Condominium Association and the Number Two Condominium Association. The Number One Association includes those unit owners who purchased units which were constructed in the initial phase of the Palm Greens Condominium development. In 1977, the developer, named above, controlled both the Number One and the Number Two Associations. In 1978, the 678 unit owners in the Number One Association took over control of that sub-association from the developer. The Number Two Association continues to be controlled by the developer. Similarly, the developer controls the Master Association (by control of its Board of Directors) until such time as all the units in the Number Two Association are sold out. In 1977, Palm Greens Limited and Yusem Properties of Del Ray Limited (Developer) maintained a single set of books, records and accounting procedures for all three of these Associations. The Developer did not prepare a separate 1978 budget for the Master Association. When the unit owners of Number One Association assumed control of Number One from the Developer in 1978, the Developer and the Board of Number One entered into an agreement that Number One would continue the budgeting for the recreation area and allocate its cost to Number One and to the Number Two Associations (although statutory responsibility for the budgeting remained with the Master Association). Thus, at that time, the Master Association's primary responsibility was managing the recreation areas which it owned. Although the Developer delegated the budget preparation responsibility for the recreation areas to Number One, it never terminated its ultimate control and authority over the recreation areas and the Master Association. With regard to the authority granted by the Master to Number One to operate the recreation area and to set and collect assessments for the two sub- associations, the Respondent maintains that Number One was required as a condition to the delegation of that authority to keep records of the actual receipts and expenditures during that 1979 budget year and that Number One failed to keep those records. There was no showing, however, that the Master Association, although it delegated the budget preparation responsibility for the recreation areas to Number One, ever informed Number One that it would be required to keep the sole set of books and records of receipts and expenditures for 1979 on behalf of the Master Association. The percentage allocation of the budgetary assessments between Number One and Number Two Associations, of the total Master Association assessment, was based upon the total number of units sold in both associations. As a result, the percentage that each association paid toward the total Master Association assessment changed each year. For example, the total 1979, Master Association assessment was $153,212, of which 73 percent was the percentage contribution of Number One and 27 percent was the percentage contribution of Number Two Association, according to the stipulation entered into between the parties as a result of the pre-hearing conference. The Number One Association Condominium units were essentially sold out at the times pertinent hereto and new sales were continuing in the Number Two Association, such that the percentage contribution between the two associations changed considerably between 1979 and 1980. In effect, Number One Association was paying a smaller portion of the total Master Association assessment and, at the same time, in return for its payment it was sharing a recreation area with many more condominium owners in 1980 than in 1979. Thus, it is not accurate, in determining the percentage amount of change in the total assessment, to compare the amounts each individual unit owner contributed in each year toward the total Master Association assessment. This would in effect, be comparing "apples and oranges" since the total base number of persons paying the Master Association assessment changed considerably from 1979 to 1980 with corresponding changes in the per capita shares of the total assessment paid by each unit owner. The only "similar" assessment which can accurately be used for comparison purposes is the total Master Association assessment for one year against the total Master Association assessment for the succeeding year. Since the Master Association did not prepare a separate budget or assessment for 1979, the $153,212 figures stipulated to by the parties was the figure that the Number One Association extrapolated from its overall budget which included most of the Master Association's recreational facility expenses. At the close of 1979, the Developer which controlled the Master Association asserted and actively assumed its responsibility for the recreation area services and for the first time prepared a Master Association budget and coextensive assessment. The Master Association and the Developer admitted on page 1 of the Amended Formal Response to the Notice to Show Cause that on its face, the 1980 Master Association Recreation budget reflects an increase of more than 115 percent over the 1979 recreation budget prepared by Number One Condominium Association [at the behest of the Master Association." The Master Association also admitted at the hearing that it did not obtain approval for the increase from a majority of the unit owners. The Respondent maintains that the total 1980 Master assessment did not exceed 115 percent of the total 1979 Master assessment if deductions are made for reserves for repairs and replacements (which it maintains were authorized by Section 718.112(2)(f)(k) Florida Statutes [1979]). Thus, the Respondent admitted that on its face the 1900 Master Association budget reflects an increase of more than 115 percent over the 1979 Master Association budget with the qualification that if these reserves for repairs and replacements in the amount of $45,050 are deducted, then the total 1980 Master Association assessment would be within 115 percent of the total Master assessment. The Number One Association is not claiming any excessive payments which the Number Two Association members may have made toward the total Master Association assessment. The Number One Association established that the amount of the increased budgetary assessment over 115 percent for 1980 is $40,784. (See Exhibit 8.) Accordingly, inasmuch as the Number One Association's 1980 share of the 1980 Master Association budget assessment was 59 percent (by agreement of the parties) Number One Association is therefore Paying the pro- rata excessive amount of $24,062.
