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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ERNEST PAGE AND PAGE REALTY, INC, 84-001202 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-001202 Latest Update: May 31, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Respondents, Ernest Page and Page Realty, Inc. are licensed as real estate brokers in the State of Florida, having been issued license numbers 0187380 and 0223391, respectively. From approximately July 28, 1983, to approximately August 11, 1983, the Respondent, Ernest Page, knowingly obtained or used, or endeavored to obtain or use, certain personal property, including typewriters, copy machines, a television receiver, and a stereo receiver, each of which was valued at $100.00 or more, which was the property of Stewart Hudson or Michael Bethea, with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owners thereof, and to appropriate this property to their own use. The Respondent, Ernest Page, had received and was in possession of property that he knew or had reason to know was stolen. The Administrative Complaint tracked the charging language of the information filed against the Respondent, Ernest Page, in the Circuit Court of the 9th Judicial Circuit of Florida. The Respondent, Ernest Page, was found guilty of six counts of grand theft second degree by a jury on January 31, 1984. He was adjudicated guilty by judgment dated March 28, 1984, of six counts of grand theft second degree, which crimes are punishable as third degree felonies. The Respondent, Ernest Page, was sentenced on March 28, 1985.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that real estate broker's license numbered 0187380 and 0223391, held by the Respondents, Ernest Page and Page Realty, Inc., respectively, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 31st day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Edward R. Kirkland, Esquire 126 E. Jefferson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERT C. AKERS, 81-000175 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000175 Latest Update: Aug. 27, 1981

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Robert C. Akers, at all times relevant hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in Brooksville, Florida, having been issued license number 0000587 by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation. Victoria Weeks was employed by Respondent as a real estate salesperson. In May, 1978, Weeks negotiated the sale of a residence to be built on Lot 19, Block 7, Unit 2 of Hill 'N' Dale Subdivision in Hernando County, Florida, to Roseann Iannaccone. The sale was conditioned upon the buyer being approved by the Farmers Home Administration (FHA) for a mortgage loan of approximately $25,500. A part of the mortgage loan application was personally prepared by Iannaccone. Another part was prepared with the assistance of Akers' secretary. Respondent himself prepared or assisted in the preparation of two requests for verification of employment dated June 18, 1978, and April 3, 1979, respectively, which were a part of the application (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Both verification sheets stated that Iannaccone was employed by Respondent in the position of secretary, that she earned approximately $30 to $40 per week, and that employment was considered to be "permanent". During the period of March, 1977, through August, 1980, Iannaccone was employed by Sam Sack, the developer of Ridge Manor, a subdivision in Hernando County. Sack shared office space with Akers' real estate firm, which handled sales within the subdivision. Although she worked for Sacks, Iannaccone also devoted a portion of her time to assist Akers and Weeks, who occupied the same office. She performed such jobs as typing, answering the telephone, sending out promotional letters, and cleaning the office. For this she was paid by Akers on a periodic basis, depending on the amount of work performed. Akers also advanced her money periodically which she "worked out" by performing various jobs in the office or at his home. The compensation averaged out to approximately $30 to $40 per week. This relationship continued until August, 1980, when Sam Sack left Brooksville; Iannaccone then moved from Brooksville to Seffner, Florida, where she now resides. During the time period in question, no payroll records were kept by Respondent, nor did he deduct her compensation for tax purposes. Similarly, Iannaccone did not report the money as income on her income tax return. When Iannaccone filed her application with the FHA, she was advised by the FHA to report all income on her application, regardless of whether it was for part-time employment, or whether it had been reported for income tax purposes (Respondent's Exhibit 2). For this reason, Akers filled out the verification of employment forms and reported that Iannaccone earned around $30 to $40 per week as his employee. Because her primary employer, Sam Sack, was expected to remain in the Brooksville area indefinitely, Akers also indicated that her employment with him would be permanent. Respondent has been a real estate broker-salesman in Brooksville for over 20 years. He has been president of the Hernando County Board of Realtors and is active in many civic and community affairs. He enjoys a reputation of honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and has never been the subject of any prior disciplinary proceedings. (Respondent's Exhibit 1).

Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint against Robert C. Akers be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1981.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57475.24475.258.02
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. RICHARD ELMER BACKUS, 81-002558 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002558 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 1982

Findings Of Fact Respondent is licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate brokers and holds license No. 0002997. On May 7, 1979, Respondent acted in the capacity of a real estate broker in the transaction of the sale of a parcel of real property located in Polk County, Florida. The purchaser in that transaction was Margaret Rhoden, and the seller was June Davis, who was represented in the transaction by a relative, Henry Goodwin. On May 7, 1979, Margaret Rhoden entered into a Contract for Sale of Rea1 Estate for the purchase of a piece of property Frostproof, Florida, from June Davis. The full purchase price of the property was $3,500, which Ms. Rhoden paid to Respondent in cash on May 7, 1979, and obtained a receipt from Respondent for that amount. At the time the contract was entered into, Ms. Rhoden was advised that a deed should be forthcoming from the seller within two to four weeks. A date of June 20, 1979, was established to close the transaction, subject to a 120-day curative period should any cloud on the title be discovered. The contract between the parties provided that should any such cloud appear of record, the seller would have a period of 120 days after receipt of written notice prior to the date set for closing in which to attempt to cure the defect. The contract further provided that if title defects were not cleared within the l20-day period, the deposit would be returned to the buyer, or, at the buyer's option, the transaction should be closed in the same manner as if no defect had been found. A warranty deed purporting to transfer the property from the seller to the buyer was executed on June 7, 1979, and a title binder was issued on that same date. The title binder indicated an outstanding mortgage on a larger piece of property of which the parcel purchased by Ms. Rhoden was only a part. When efforts to clear this cloud on the title took longer than expected, Ms. Rhoden asked, and was granted, permission by the seller's agent to commence construction on the improvements on the property notwithstanding the fact that she knew that a cloud remained on the title to the lot, and the transaction had not been closed. Construction was not completed on the improvements because Ms. Rhoden ran out of cash during the course of construction. She moved into the dwelling while it was still in a partially completed condition and, on September 8, 1979, with the permission of the seller's agent, received a loan of $3,000 from the $3,500 deposit she had placed with Respondent, Ms. Rhoden executed a promissory note dated September 8, 1979, in which she agreed to repay the $3,000 loan when clear title to the property was issued. Ms. Rhoden used the proceeds of this loan to make additional improvements on the property. On October 26, 1979, Respondent received both the warranty deed dated June 7, 1979, and the title binder issued on that date from the attorney for the seller. When approached by Ms. Rhoden, Respondent agreed to lend her the deed and title binder to attempt to obtain additional financing to complete construction on her home. The clear inference from the record in this proceeding is that there was never any understanding between Respondent and Ms. Rhoden that this deed could be recorded at this or any other juncture in this transaction. In fact, the contract entered into between the buyer and seller clearly called for the payment of the full purchase price of the property at closing, and the note subsequently executed by Ms. Rhoden conditioned the issuance of a warranty deed to her on the payment of the $3,000 face value of the note. Ms. Rhoden was unsuccessful in obtaining additional financing to complete construction on her home, probably due to the fact that when she sought that financing the outstanding mortgage on the property had still not been satisfied. When Respondent advised the seller's attorney that he had loaned the warranty deed to Ms. Rhoden for the purposes outlined above, he was advised that there was nothing to keep Ms. Rhoden from recording the deed, at which point Respondent apparently determined that it would be prudent for him to retrieve the deed from Ms. Rhoden's possession. Ms. Rhoden had her mother return the deed to Respondent in February of 1980. According to the testimony of both Ms. Rhoden and her mother, they felt the purpose for the returning of the deed was to have it recorded. Respondent denies any such understanding. In resolving this conflict in testimony, the clear inference from the circumstances involved in this transaction, including the wording of the contract of sale and the note executed by Ms. Rhoden, supports a finding that all of the parties to this transaction either knew, or should have known, that the recording of the deed at this juncture in the transaction would have been improper. Although the outstanding mortgage had been satisfied in January of 1980, Ms. Rhoden had not Performed her obligation under the contract of sale by paying the full purchase price. When Respondent had recovered the deed from Ms. Rhoden, he was advised by the attorney for the seller not to record the deed until he had received payment from Ms. Rhoden in accordance with the contract and the promissory note. As indicated above, the outstanding mortgage on the property was satisfied in January of 1980. On February 6, 1980, Respondent Prepared a closing statement reflecting the purchase price of the property as $3,500. From this amount he deducted a total of $478 for state documentary stamps, title insurance, Preparing the deed, and amount of real estate commission leaving a the apparently forwarded the note from Ms. Rhoden for $3,000, together with the $22.00 cash balance remaining from her initial $3,500 deposit to the seller along with the deed which the seller had earlier executed. Ms. Rhoden apparently never made or tendered payment of the $3,000 note, the transaction never closed, and at the time of final hearing in this cause an eviction action was apparently pending between the seller and Ms. Rhoden. Paragraph seven of the contract of sale executed between the seller and Ms. Rhoden Provides as follows: If Buyer fails to perform this contract, the deposit this day paid by Buyer as aforesaid shall be retained by or for the account of Seller as consideration for the execution of this agreement and in full settlement of any claims for damages.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. STEPHEN HAUTALA, ARLENE GUENNEL, AND ALMAR REALTY, INC., 87-002144 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002144 Latest Update: Feb. 12, 1988

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondent Stephen S. Hautala was licensed as a registered real estate broker in Florida; Almar Realty, Inc., was licensed as a real estate brokerage corporation in Florida; and Arlene J. Guennel was licensed as a real estate salesman in Florida. At the time of the alleged misconduct, Robert J. Tracey owned and occupied a home located at 1123 SE 36th Terrace in Cape Coral, Florida, which he occupied as his private residence. He met Respondent, Arlene Guennel, at a construction site at which he was working and agreed to let her attempt to sell the house. He gave her a key so she could preview it and never received the key back. After this meeting, Mr. Tracey did not contact Ms. Guennel, nor did he hear from her for quite a while. From time to time he would come home and find his bed had been made and he assumed that Ms. Guennel had done it. She had on several occasions straightened up the house so that it would be presentable to show. Mr. Tracey did not execute a formal listing agreement with Ms. Guennel. One evening in early April, 1986, she came to the Tracey home with a sales contract bearing an offer of $115,000.00. Mr. Tracey did not accept that offer by signing his name to the contract which now bears his purported signature, "Bob" Tracey. The listing agreement purportedly entered into by Mr. Tracey with Ms. Guennel, who was representing Almar Realty, also bears the signature of the lister as "Bob" Tracey. Mr. Tracey strongly contends that he never signs his name that way and it is found that Mr. Tracey did not sign either document. Respondent, Guennel, admits to having signed Mr. Tracey's name to the sales contract and though she denies having signed the listing contract, it is found that she signed it, or procured someone else to sign it. Mr. Tracey contends that he did not agree to the terms of the contract presented to him by Ms. Guennel. He did, however, initial certain counterproposals which are contained on the document and admits to having initialed it in the lower right hand corner. Mr. Tracey denies having given Ms. Guennel any permission to sign documents or initial corrections to documents in his name, utilizing his signature or initials. However, it is found that on the evening that Respondent Guennel came to Tracey's house with the contract containing the offer to purchase the property, he did propose a counter offer. He also indicated that in the event that Ms. Guennel could not get to him in person with a proposal, it would be all right for her to secure verbal approval by phone and thereafter make the appropriate changes in the contract. At no time, however, was Mr. Guennel or Mr. Hautala authorized to commit Mr. Tracey to any change without at least his verbal approval and neither was authorized to affix his signature to any document. William C. Rhoad was referred by his former broker to the local Merrill, Lynch office and Ms. Ciavarella, the local representative, showed him the Tracey home which was listed in the multiple listing book. Mr. Rhoad had indicated his need for a large home in excess of 2200 square feet and chose the Tracey home after seeing several others on the basis of the square footage represented in the multiple listing book. Neither Mr. Rhoad nor his agent measured the property. He made an offer which was presented by his agent to Respondent Guennel at Ms. Guennel's home on or about April 7, 1986. Ms. Guennel called her back on or about April 9, 1986, to advise that the contract had been signed by the seller. The seller's signature, however, was in conjunction with a counter offer of $119,500.00 as opposed to the $115,000.00 offered plus a split of 50/50 on the cost of the title insurance. Mr. Rhoad countered that counteroffer with another offer of $119,000.00 and Ms. Guennel, after talking with Mr. Tracey about it, advised that Tracey had accepted the contract at $119,000.00 without the need to pay 50 percent of the title insurance costs. When the closing was held, Respondent Guennel was not present. As the parties were going over the closing statement, Mr. Tracey said he would not pay $363.00 for title insurance. When he asked why he should pay, Ms. Ciavarella, who was also present, advised him that it had been provided for in handwriting on the contract which he had allegedly initialed. Mr. Tracey, immediately denied having initialed that change and denied signing the contract. It became apparent then that Respondent, Guennel had signed the contract and at that point, Mr. Tracey's broker, the Almar representative, agreed to pay the title insurance cost and have it come out of their portion of the commission. Mr. Tracey had, however, initialed the title insurance change and was subsequently held responsible for it in court. It also appeared that the room size, as described on the multiple listing placed by Ms. Guennel, as well as the lot size, the year the house was built, it's elevation above sea level, and several other particulars were incorrect. Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Rhoad looked at the house four or five time prior to deciding to buy it and had some doubt as to the size, he said nothing about this until shortly before closing. Because of the various discrepancies described above and Mr. Rhoad's feeling he was being cheated, Mr. Rhoad attempted to back out of the deal. He was contacted, however, by his own agent and asked if he would reconsider going through with the purchase if concessions were made. He agreed and the listing agent, Mr. Tracey, and his agent reduced their commissions by a total of $3,500.00, all of which was passed on to Mr. Rhoad. This reduction in price was prorated $2,500 to Almar Realty, $500.00 to Mr. Tracey, and $500.00 to Merrill, Lynch Realty. The errors which appeared in the multiple listing book were the result of the input accomplished by Ms. Guennel.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent Arlene J. Guennel's license be suspended for one year and that she pay a fine of $500.00; that the license of Almar Realty, Inc. be suspended for one year; and that the charges against Respondent Stephen S. Hautala be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of February, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire DPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Neale Montgomery, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1507 Ft. Myers, Florida 33902 Darlene F. Keller Acting Executive Director DPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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PAULINE SEELY COSYNS vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 88-000241F (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000241F Latest Update: Jul. 03, 1989

The Issue The issue to be resolved herein concerns whether the Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this proceeding. Embodied in that general issue are questions concerning whether the Petitioners are the prevailing parties; whether they meet the definition of "small business" parties, including the net worth amounts, enumerated in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as well as whether the disciplinary proceeding against both Petitioners was "substantially justified". See Section 57.111(3)(e) , Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practices of real estate salesmen and brokers by the various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Included within those duties is the duty to investigate conduct by realtors allegedly in violation of Chapter 475 and related rules and to prosecute administrative penal proceedings for which probable cause is found as a result of such investigations. At times pertinent hereto, both Ms. Maxwell and Ms. Cosyns, (then Pauline Sealey) were licensed realtors working as independent contractors for Mariner Properties, Inc. and V.I.P. Realty Inc. The complete file of the underlying proceeding DOAH Case No. 86-0140, was stipulated into evidence. That file included the Administrative Complaint filed against these Respondents and the Recommended and Final Order, which Final Order adopted the Recommended Order. The findings of fact in that Recommended Order are incorporated by reference and adopted herein. During the Petitioner's case, counsel for Petitioner voluntarily reduced the attorney's fees bills for both Petitioners such that Ms. Maxwell's bill is the total amount of $2,695.50 and Ms. Cosyns' bill is $17,200, rather than the original amounts submitted in the affidavit. Respondent acknowledged in its proposed Final Order that the fees and costs submitted by the Respondent were thus reasonable. The testimony the Petitioners presented through depositions, transcripts of which were admitted into evidence into this proceeding, was unrefuted. That testimony demonstrates that both Ms. Cosyns and Ms. Maxwell were prevailing parties in the administrative proceeding referenced herein brought by the Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation. They were individually named as Respondents in the Administrative Complaint whereby their professional licenses were subjected to possible suspension or revocation for alleged wrong doing on their part. There is no dispute that they were exonerated in that proceeding and are thus prevailing parties within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Petitioners are also "small business parties". In that connection, they both were independently licensed Real Estate professionals during times pertinent to the underlying proceeding and were acting in the capacity of independent contractors for all the activities with which the administrative complaint was concerned. Each established that her net worth is below the limit provided by Section 57.111 as an element of the definition of "small business party". The reasonableness of the fees having been established in the manner found-above and the Petitioners having established that they meet the definitional requirements of prevailing small business parties, there remains to be determined the issue of whether the proceedings against the two Petitioners were "substantially justified", that is, whether the proceeding had a "reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a State agency." See Section 57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes. The facts concerning each Petitioner's case regarding the three counts of the Administrative Complaint relating to them are as found in the Recommended Order incorporated by reference herein. Respondent Maxwell was charged in the complaint with having worked in conjunction with an office manager, Mr. Hurbanis of V.I.P. Realty, in conspiring with him to submit a fraudulent real estate sales contract to a lending institution for purposes of financing. This allegedly involved submitting a contract to the lending institution with an inflated purchase price in order to secure one hundred percent financing, the scheme being more particularly described in that portion of the findings of fact in the Recommended Order related to Jean Maxwell. In fact, Ms. Maxwell did not work in the realty office as charged in the Administrative Complaint, but rather was employed by Mariner Properties, which may have been a related company. The contract in question, although alleged to be fraudulent was, in fact, a bona fide contract which was a legitimate part of the Real Estate transaction submitted to the bank for financing purposes, about which the bank was kept fully advised. All details of the transaction were disclosed to the lender. Maxwell was specifically charged with concealing the true contract from the lender in order to enhance the percentage of the purchase price that the bank would finance, done by allegedly inflating the purchase price in a second contract submitted to the bank. It was established in the disciplinary proceeding that no such concealment ever took place. In fact, Ms. Maxwell was purchasing a lot from her own employer, Mariner Properties. Two contracts were indeed prepared for the purchase of Lot 69, a single family lot on Sanibel Island. In fact, however, the difference of $42,875 and $49,500 in the stated purchase price, as depicted on the two contracts, was the result of continuing negotiations between Ms. Maxwell and the seller, who was also her employer. The difference in the two prices depicted on the contracts was the result of, in effect, a set-off to the benefit of Ms. Maxwell, representing certain employee discounts and real estate commission due from the employer and seller to Ms. Maxwell, the purchaser. As Petitioners' composite Exhibit 5 reflects, the lender involved, North First Bank of Ft. Myers, Florida, was fully apprised of all the details concerning this transaction at the time it was entered into and the loan commitment extended and closed. Mr. Allan Barnes, the Assistant Vice President of North First Bank revealed, in the letter contained in this exhibit in evidence, that there was no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts to his institution by Ms. Maxwell. This letter is dated April 18, 1984. The other related letter in that exhibit, of May 2, 1984 from attorney Oertel to attorney Frederick H. Wilson of the Respondent agency, thus constitutes notice to the agency well before the complaint was filed, that no concealment or misrepresentation to the lender involved had occurred and the charges were requested to be dismissed. In spite of the fact that the agency was on notice of this turn of events well before the filing of the Administrative Complaint, it proceeded to file the complaint and to prosecute it all the way up to the date of hearing, requiring Ms. Maxwell's attorney to attend the hearing to defend her interests. At the hearing, counsel for the Department acknowledged that there was no basis for prosecuting Ms. Maxwell and voluntarily dismissed the complaint as to her. The Respondent's witness, Investigator Harris, in his deposition taken September 11, 1984, acknowledged that he did not discuss any details concerning the investigation, with attorney Frederick Wilson, who prepared the complaint, nor did he confer with him by telephone or correspondence before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the complaint was prepared solely on the basis of the investigative report. The investigative report came into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. It reveals that Mr. A. J. Davis the president of Mariner Group and Mariner Properties, who was Jean Maxwell's employer and the owner of the lot in question, signed one contract and his Executive Vice President signed the other. In spite of this, the investigative report does not reveal that the investigator conferred with either Ms. Maxwell, or the sellers concerning this transaction. He conducted a general interview of A.J. Davis concerning the alleged "problem" in his office of "double contracting," but asked him no questions and received no comment about the Jean Maxwell transaction whatever. Nor did the investigator confer with Mr. Allen Barnes or any other representative of North First Bank. If the investigation had been more complete and thorough, he would have learned from Mr. Barnes, if from no one else, that the bank had knowledge of both contracts and all details of the transaction underlying them and there had been no concealment or misrepresentation of the facts regarding the transaction by Ms. Maxwell. This information was learned by attorney Oertel as early as April 18, 1984 by Mr. Barnes' letter, referenced above, and it was communicated to the agency by Mr. Oertel on May 2, 1984. Nevertheless, the complaint was filed and prosecuted through to hearing. Therefore, the prosecution and filing of the Administrative Complaint were clearly not substantially justified. If the Department had properly investigated the matter it would have discovered the true nature of the transaction as being a completely bona fide real estate arrangement. Former Respondent, Pauline Sealy Cosyns was charged with two counts, III and V, in the Administrative Complaint at issue. One count alleged, in essence, that Ms. Sealey had engaged in a similar fraudulent contract situation regarding the sale of her residence to a Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Floyd. The evidence in that proceedings revealed no concealment of any sales contract occurred whatever with regard to the lending institution or anyone else. The facts as revealed at hearing showed Ms. Cosyns and the Floyds, through continuing negotiations after the original sales contract was entered into, amended that contract and executed a second one, in order to allow Ms. Cosyns to take back a second mortgage from the Floyds. This was necessary because Mr. Floyd, an author, was short of the necessary down payment pursuant to the terms of the original contract, because his annual royalty payment from his publishers had not been received as the time approached for closing. The second contract was executed to allow for a second mortgage in favor of the seller, Ms. Cosyns, in order to make up the amount owed by the Floyds on the purchase price agreed upon, above the first mortgage amount. The testimony and evidence in the disciplinary proceeding revealed unequivocally that the lending institution, Amerifirst Mortgage Company, was fully apprised of the situation and of the reason for the two contractual agreements. The $24,000 second mortgage in question is even depicted on the closing statement issued by that bank. There was simply no concealment and no effort to conceal any facts concerning this transaction from the lender or from anyone else. The investigation conducted was deficient because the investigator failed to discuss this transaction with the lender or with the purchasers. He discussed the matter with Ms. Sealy-Cosyns and his own deposition testimony reveals, as does his investigative report, that he did not feel that he got a complete account of the transaction from her. She testified in her deposition, taken prior to the instant proceeding, that she indeed did not disclose all facts of the transaction to him because she was concerned that he was attempting to apprehend her in some "legal impropriety". Therefore, she was reluctant to be entirely candid. The fact remains, however, that had he conducted a complete investigation by conferring with the lender and the purchasers, he would have known immediately, long before the Administrative Complaint was filed and the matter prosecuted, that there was absolutely no basis for any probable cause finding that wrong-doing had occurred in terms of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Thus, the facts concerning the prosecution as to Count III against Pauline Sealy-Cosyns, as more particularly delineated in the findings of fact in the previous Recommended Order, reveal not only that Ms. Cosyns was totally exonerated in the referenced proceeding, but that there was no substantial basis for prosecuting her as to this count at all. Concerning Count V against Ms. Cosyns, it was established through the evidence at the hearing in the disciplinary case that she was merely the listing agent and did not have any part to play in the drafting of the contract nor the presenting of it to the lender. Because there was no evidence adduced to show that she had any complicity or direct involvement in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction involved in Count V of the Administrative Complaint at issue she was exonerated as to that count as well. It is noteworthy here that a statement was made by counsel for the agency, appearing at pages 20 and 21 of the transcript of the proceeding involving the Administrative Complaint, which indicates that the agency, based upon its review of certain documents regarding Counts III and V, before hearing, felt that indeed there might not be a disputed issue of material fact as to Mrs. Cosyns. The agency, although acknowledging that a review of the documents caused it to have reason to believe that it was unnecessary to proceed further against Ms. Cosyns nevertheless did not voluntarily dismiss those counts and proceeded through hearing. Be that as it may, the investigation revealed that Ms. Cosyns acknowledged that she knew that there were two contractual documents involved, but the investigation also revealed that Ms. Cosyns was only the listing agent. The selling agent was Mr. Parks. The investigation revealed through interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Parks and Mr. Hurbanis, the office Manager of V.I.P. Realty, that Ms. Cosyns, as listing agent, was merely present when the offer from the buyers was communicated to the office manager, Mr. Hurbanis, and ultimately to the sellers, the Cottrells. There was no reason for the investigator to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the drafting of the contracts nor with the communication of them to the lending institution involved. That was done by either Mr. Parks or Mr. Hurbanis or by the buyers. The investigation (as revealed in the investigative report) does not show who communicated the contract in question to the lender. The investigation was simply incomplete. If the investigator had conferred with the buyers, the sellers and especially the lender, he could have ascertained-whether the lender was aware of all the facts concerning this transaction and whether there was any reason to believe that Ms. Cosyns had anything to do with the arrangement and the details of the transaction. It was ultimately established, by unrefuted evidence at hearing, that indeed Ms. Cosyns did not have anything to do with the transaction, nor the manner in which it was disclosed to the lender. The fact that she was aware that two contracts had been prepared did not give a reasonable basis for the investigator to conclude that she had engaged in any wrong-doing. The report of his interviews with Ms. Cosyns, Mr. Hurbanis and Mr. Parks, as well as Donna Ross, does not indicate that he had a reasonable basis to conclude that Ms. Cosyns had engaged in any fraudulent conduct with regard to the transaction, including the conveyance of a bogus contract to the lending institution involved, nor for that matter, that Mr. Hurbanis or Mr. Parks engaged in such conduct. In order to ascertain a reasonable basis for concluding whether Ms. Cosyns was involved in any wrongful conduct, he would have had to obtain more information than he did from these people or confer with the lender, the buyer or the seller, or all of these approaches, before he could have a reasonable basis to recommend to the prosecuting agency that an Administrative Complaint be filed against her concerning this transaction. In fact, he did not do so, but the Administrative Complaint was filed and prosecuted through hearing anyway, causing her to incur the above-referenced attorney's fees. It thus has not been demonstrated that there was any substantial basis for the filing and prosecution of Count V of the Administrative Complaint against Ms. Cosyn. Thus she is entitled to the attorneys fees referenced above with regard to the prosecution of the Administrative Complaint in question.

Florida Laws (3) 120.68475.2557.111
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. MAUREEN ANN O`MALLEY AND FREDERICK E. LEWIS, 80-002051 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-002051 Latest Update: Aug. 27, 1981

The Issue At issue herein is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be revoked or suspended or whether they should be otherwise disciplined for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(a) Florida Statutes (1977) by failing to disclose a fire-damaged attic to the purchasers of a house.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, Respondents Maureen Ann O'Malley and Frederick E. Lewis held real estate license numbers 0065689 and 0052102 respectively. Respondent O'Malley was employed as a broker-salesman by Respondent Lewis, who operated under the trade name of Lewis Realty with offices in Atlantic Beach, Florida. On or about May 17, 1979, Respondent O'Malley negotiated a contract for the sale of a house owned by Respondents to James E. and Gloria Gipson, husband and wife (Respondents' Exhibit No. 1). The house was located at 825 Plaza Drive, Atlantic Beach, Florida, and the total purchase price was $28,500. In November, 1965, a fire had occurred in the attic of the Gipson's house causing damage to the electrical wiring, and leaving portions of the rafters and attic floor in a charred and blackened condition. However, no structural damage occurred. Shortly after the fire, some of the trusses in the roof were reinforced with two by fours in order to insure the structural integrity of the premises. The house has been sold on a number of occasions since the fire occurred, and before the Respondents purchased the house in early 1979, the most recent sale was 4 or 5 years earlier. The attic is a small space between the roof and the ceiling, and is reached by climbing a ladder and crawling through an opening in the ceiling. It is too small to stand in, cannot be used for living purposes, and its value is limited to storing boxes, suitcases and the like. Prior to the closing, the Gipsons were advised by O'Malley to inspect the property, and if any problems existed, they would he corrected at Respondents' expense. The Gipsons visited the house on at least one occasion before the closing, and were given the keys for the purpose of measuring curtains and installing a television antenna. However, at no time did they inspect the attic, or were they apprised by the realtor of the fact that a fire had occurred. The attic was finally inspected by Mr. Gipson several days after the house was purchased. He found portions of the attic charred, and covered with ashes and soot. Upon being advised by the Gipsons of the attic condition, O'Malley had a contractor check the attic for structural damage. There being none, she then offered to provide cosmetic repairs by spraying it with silver paint, and laying plywood strips on the floor. However, this was unsatisfactory to the Gipsons. Respondent O'Malley did not disclose the attic condition to the Gipsons because (a) she considered the matter to be "immaterial", particularly since there was no structural damage to the attic, (b) the house had been sold on several occasions since the fire, and (c) she was not aware of any prior complaints. Respondent Lewis had only limited contact with the Gipsons, and was not involved in the negotiation of the sale of the house.

Recommendation From the foregoing findings; fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Maureen Ann O'Malley be found guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(a) Flrida Statutes (1977), by reason of failure to disclose to or buyers a fire-damaged attic in a residence located at 825 Plaza Drive, Atlantic Beach, Florida. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent O'Malley be given a private reprimand. It is further RECOMMENDED that the charges against Respondent Frederick E. Lewis be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of February, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Ralph Fetner, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Myron S. Dunay, Esquire 912 American Heritage Life Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Ms. Maureen Ann O'Malley 1195 Mayport Road Atlantic Beach, Florida 32233 Mr. Frederick E. Lewis c/o O'Malley Real R:tote 1195 Mayport Road Atlantic Beach, Florida 32233

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.24475.25
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs JUAN C.CHAVARRIAGA, 08-002165PL (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida May 02, 2008 Number: 08-002165PL Latest Update: Dec. 10, 2008

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Juan C. Chavarriaga, committed the violations alleged in a four-count Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, on January 17, 2008, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his Florida real estate broker associate license.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (hereinafter referred to as the “Division”), is an agency of the State of Florida created by Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, and charged with the responsibility for the regulation of the real estate industry in Florida pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Juan C. Chavarriaga, is, and was at the times material to this matter, the holder of a Florida real estate broker associate license, license number 3130017, issued by the Division. At all times relevant, Mr. Chavarriaga was employed as a real estate associate with Ocampo & Alvarez Realty LLC. On or about March 30, 2006, Mr. Chavarriaga rented real property (hereinafter referred to as the “Subject Property”) to Carlos Alvarez for an annual lease amount of $18,000.00 or $1,500.00 per month (Pre-hearing Stipulation). The Subject Property was rented pursuant to a Residential Lease for Single Family Home and Duplex agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Lease”) which was entered into on or about March 30, 2006 (Petitioner’s Exhibit 5). Mr. Chavarriaga, according to an admission he made to Veronica Hardy, a Division investigator, received rent paid for the rental of the Subject Property pursuant to the Lease. According to an admission of Mr. Chavarriaga, the Subject Property was owned by Claudia Mejia. Mr. Chavarriaga’s real estate broker employer was unaware of the Lease or Mr. Chavarriaga’s involvement therein. The Lease was entered into without written permission from Ms. Mejia, according to another admission of Mr. Chavarriaga. The evidence failed to prove, however, that Ms. Mejia was unaware of the Lease or that she had not verbally authorized Mr. Chavarriaga to rent the Subject Property on her behalf. Mr. Chavarriaga also admitted to Ms. Hardy that he received rents pursuant to the Lease which were deposited with a company named Maux Management. What Maux Management is was not proved. Nor was it proved that Mr. Chavarriagag owned Maux Management. As to what was done with moneys received pursuant to the Lease, the only competent substantial evidence again consists of an admission by Mr. Chavarriaga: he told Ms. Hardy that the rents were deposited with Maux Management, which then paid part of the proceeds for reasonable expenses related to the Lease and deposited the remainder in the account of Ms. Mejia.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate: Dismissing Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint; Finding that Mr. Chavarriaga is guilty of the violation alleged in Counts III and IV of the Administrative Complaint; and Suspending Mr. Chavarriaga’s real estate associate license for a period of one year and requiring that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this day of 8th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Alan A. Glenn, Esquire 14629 Southwest 104 Street, No. 432 Miami, Florida 33186 Thomas W. O’Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N802 Orlando, Florida 32801 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.5720.165455.2273475.25475.4290.80190.804 Florida Administrative Code (3) 61J2-14.00861J2-14.00961J2-24.001
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. SHIRLEY JANE JOHNSON, 85-003863 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-003863 Latest Update: May 23, 1986

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters involved herein; Petitioner held Florida real estate salesman's license number 0403224. Her license was listed with Century 21 ACR Equities; Inc., 4222 W. Fairfield Drive, Pensacola; on May 25; 1983. On March 4, 1985, Respondent listed her license with Century 21; Five Flags Properties; Inc., in Pensacola, without terminating her listing with ACR Equities. On March 22, 1985, Five Flags terminated her listing with that firm and on April 30; 1985, ACR Equities terminated her listing with that firm. On May 14; 1985; Respondent applied for a change of status to list her license with Old South Properties; Inc., in Pensacola. That firm terminated the association on July 9, 1985. On March 19; 1985; Emmison Lewis and his wife; Lillie Mae signed a handwritten sales agreement prepared by Respondent for the purchase of a piece of property located in Escambia County; for $33,000.00. The Lewises gave her a deposit of $500.00 by check made payable to Respondent and which bears her endorsement on the back. This check was made payable to Respondent because she asked that it be made that way. Several days later; Respondent came back to the Lewises and asked for an additional $1,500.00 deposit. This was given her, along with a rental payment of $310.00; in a $2,000.00 check on March 29, 1985. Respondent gave the Lewises the balance back in cash along with a receipt reflecting the payment of the $1,500.00. On that same date; Respondent had the Lewises sign a typed copy of the sales agreement which reflected that both the $500.00 deposit and the additional $1,500.00 were due on closing. This typed copy was backdated to March 19; 1985. Both the handwritten and typed copies of the sales agreement bear the signature of the Respondent as a witness. The sale was never closed and the Lewises have never received any of the $2;000.00 deposit back. On about four different occasions, Mr. Lewis contacted Respondent requesting that she refund their money and she promised to do so, but never did. They did, however, receive the $310.00 rent payment back in cash approximately two weeks later. On April 26, 1985, James E. Webster and his wife Pearlie signed a sales agreement as the purchasers of real estate with Respondent. This property had a purchase price of $31,900.00. At the time of signing, Mr. Webster gave Respondent $150.00 in cash and a check drawn by his wife on their joint account for $400.00. Due to Mrs. Webster's change of mind, the Websters did not close on the property. They requested a refund of their deposit and Respondent gave the Websters a check for $400.00 which was subsequently dishonored by the bank because of insufficient funds. The Websters called Respondent at home several times, but she was always out. Calls to the broker with whom her license was placed were unsuccessful. Finally, however, Respondent refunded the $400.00 to the Websters in cash. Respondent had listed her license with ACR Equities in May, 1983. At no time while Respondent had her license with Mr. Bickel's firm did she ever turn over to him as broker either the $2.000.00 she received from the Lewises or the $550.00 she received from the Websters. Mr. Bickel, the broker, was not aware of these contracts and did not question her about them. He terminated the placement of her license with his firm because he found out that in early March 1985, she had placed her license with another firm., Both sales agreements for the Lewises and that for the Websters had the firm name of ACR Equities printed on them as broker.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law; it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee; Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Esquire p. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ralph Armstead; Esquire P. O. Box 2629 Orlando; Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 475.25475.42
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DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE vs. MICHAEL J. JAMES, 88-004380 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004380 Latest Update: Jun. 26, 1989

The Issue The issues in the case are whether Respondent's real estate broker's license had been revoked when he applied for a mortgage broker's license and whether Respondent falsely answered certain questions on his application for a mortgage broker's license.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the State of Florida. He holds license number HA 056265422-5P. He had been licensed continuously since August 5, 1986. Respondent previously has been licensed as a real estate salesman in the State of Florida. By Administrative Complaint filed March 1, 1985, the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, alleged, among other things, that Respondent was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and breach of trust, among other things, in connection with an improper disbursement from an escrow account. Following a hearing on January 17, 1986, a Recommended Order entered April 18, 1986, found that Respondent was, as to the above-described allegations, guilty "at least of culpable negligence and breach of trust" and recommended that Respondent's license be suspended for one year. After a hearing on June 17, 1986, the Division of Real Estate entered a Final Order June 30, 1986, effective 30 days thereafter, adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Recommended Order, but revoking rather than suspending Respondent's license. By Application for Registration as a Mortgage Broker signed by Respondent on March 22, 1986, Respondent applied for a mortgage broker's license (March Application). The application was filed on March 25, 1986. Question 19 of the March Application asks: Has any judgement or decree of a court or other judicial, administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal been entered against you, or is any such case pending in this or any other state, province, district, territory, possession or nation, in which you were charged in the petition, complaint, declaration, answer, counterclaim or other pleading with any fraudulent or dishonest dealing? (If your answer is in the affirmative, attach complete signed notarized statement of the charges and facts, together with the name and location of the court in which the proceedings were had or are pending.) Respondent answered this question, "no." By Application for Registration as a Mortgage Broker signed by Respondent on July 1, 1986, Respondent applied for a mortgage solicitor's license (July Application). The application was filed on July 9, 1986, and approved by Petitioner on July 31, 1986. Question 16 on the July Application asks whether the applicant is currently licensed in any state as a real estate broker or salesman. Respondent answered this question, "no." Question 17 on the July Application asks: "Has your license of any kind ever been denied, suspended or revoked?" The question then asks for a complete signed statement of the charges and facts in full detail. Respondent answered Question 17, "no." On July 28, 1986, Respondent sent a notarized letter to Petitioner concerning the July Application. In the letter, he elaborated upon the circumstances surrounding the answer to an unrelated question, but did not elaborate upon the above-described answers Respondent did not answer accurately Question 19 on the March Application. Over a year earlier, Respondent had been charged with fraudulent dealing. Respondent had no basis for omitting this item from the application because, even though he had not received the recommended order, the case obviously was still pending at the time of submitting the March Application. Respondent's incorrect answer was an intentional attempt to conceal from Petitioner the license-revocation proceeding. Although Respondent's answer to Question 16 on the July Application may have been accurate because he had relinquished his license, his answer to Question 17 was inaccurate. Respondent testified that he understood that the Final Order, which had just been issued, had not yet taken effect, so that his license had not yet been revoked. However, without further elaboration, the answer to Question 17 was incomplete and misleading, regardless of Respondent's understanding of the technical status of his license. Respondent knew that his answer was incomplete and would mislead Petitioner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, enter a Final Order revoking the mortgage broker's license of Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4380 Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-7 Adopted or adopted in substance. 8 Rejected as irrelevant. 9-29 Adopted or adopted in substance. 30-32 Rejected as subordinate and recitation of testimony. 33-34 Rejected as legal argument. 35-36 Adopted. 37-38 and 40 Rejected as legal argument. 39 and 41-42 Adopted or adopted in substance. Rejected as legal argument. Rejected as irrelevant. 45-50 Rejected as recitation of testimony. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-7 Adopted or adopted in substance. 8 Rejected as irrelevant. 9-13 Adopted. 14 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 15-21 Adopted or adopted in substance. 22-23 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 24-29 Adopted or adopted in substance. 30-31 Rejected as recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 34-38 Rejected as irrelevant. 39 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. James 258 East Altamonte Drive Altamonte Springs, FL 32701 Elise M. Greenbaum Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 501 Orlando, FL 32801 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. STEPHEN P. MCCRADY AND LANDMARK REAL ESTATE AND INVESTMENTS, 86-001145 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001145 Latest Update: Aug. 19, 1986

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Landmark Real Estate and Investment Exchange, Inc. (Landmark), was a corporation licensed as a broker. It holds license number 0170938 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Respondent, Stephen P. McCrady, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0227524 by petitioner. McCrady was also the qualifying broker and officer of Landmark. License renewal fees have apparently not been paid by respondents since 1984 and their licenses are accordingly considered to be inactive. However, such licenses can be reactivated by respondents paying the required fees and completing any necessary continuing education requirements. At the present time, McCrady's license has a status of "pending litigation" because of the instant proceeding. On October 28, 1983, the Division (then the Florida Real Estate Commission) entered a Final Order against respondents in which respondents were reprimanded and ordered to pay a $500 fine within thirty days from the date of order. This fine was never paid. On April 3, 1984, respondent McCrady filed a chapter 7 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. On September 17, 1984, that Court entered a Discharge of Debtor order which released the debtor (McCrady) "from all dischargeable debts" and declared null and void certain other debts. The order further provided that "all creditors who [sic] debts are discharged ... (or) whose judgments are declared null and void ... are hereby enjoined from commencing, continuing or employing any action, process or act to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor." Respondent Landmark did not file a petition nor was it a party to McCrady's bankruptcy proceeding. When the agency Final Order was entered, McCrady could not afford to pay the $500 fine. However, he telephoned a Division attorney and asked if he could pay the fine by installments. He was told he could not do this. Shortly afterwards he filed for personal bankruptcy. It was his impression that the bankruptcy proceeding discharged all debts, including the $500 administrative fine. McCrady did not advise the Division that he had filed for bankruptcy until after the complaint in this proceeding had been filed. McCrady intends to again use his real estate license in the future. Because of serious personal and financial problems, he has not used the license for several years.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondents be found guilty of violating Rule 21V-10.31, Florida Administrative Code, and Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), and that they each be required to pay $250 within thirty days from date of the final order in this proceeding to satisfy the terms of the Final Order previously entered on October 23, 1983. Otherwise, their licenses should be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1145 Petitioner: Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan J. Hartman, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ronald R. Rogowski, Esquire 628 S.E. 5th Avenue Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Mr. Harold R. Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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