The Issue Whether Respondent's teaching certificate should be revoked pursuant to Chapter 231, Florida Statutes, as set forth in petition, dated November 8, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Robert Marshall Stabler holds Florida Teaching Certificate No. 306751, Graduate, Rank III, valid through June 30, 1981, covering the area of elementary education. He was so licensed on May 9, 1979. (Stipulation.) Respondent was employed in the public schools of Brevard County at Pineda Elementary School, Cocoa, Florida, as a teacher from 1971 to May 1979. Respondent was also employed by Brevard Community College to instruct inmates at the Brevard Correctional Institution at Sharpes, Florida, for several years prior to May 9, 1979. (Testimony of Fisher, Brock, Curtis.) In late April 1979 a correctional officer at the Brevard Correctional Institution received information from a confidential informant, who was an inmate, that Respondent would bring marijuana into the institution on May 9, 1979. On that date, at approximately 6:15 p.m., Respondent entered the correctional facility and was advised by a correctional officer that college instructors were going to be searched that evening. Respondent was asked to submit to such a search and he consented to the same. Respondent was thereupon directed to the nearby "shakedown" room where his briefcase was opened and three packages wrapped in white paper were discovered. At this time, Respondent stated "That's just for my own use." A white envelope containing thirteen five dollar bills was also found in the briefcase. A narcotics officer of the Brevard County Sheriff's Department thereupon weighed and made a standard field test of the material contained in the packages and determined that it was cannabis in excess of 100 grams. The officer then placed Respondent under arrest for introducing contraband upon the grounds of a correctional institution. The packages were thereafter submitted to the Sanford Crime Laboratory for analysis and it was determined that they contained a total of 106.6 grams of cannabis and that two of these packages contained more than five grams of cannabis leaf material. (Testimony of Fisher, Pierce, Steger, Thomas, Boling, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-4.) The regulations of the Brevard Correctional Institution authorize a search of visitors which is normally conducted on a random basis. If consent to search is not given, the non-consenting individual is not permitted to enter the institution. (Testimony of Thomas.) Respondent received outstanding teacher performance evaluations at Pineda Elementary School during prior years and is considered by his principal to be an above-average teacher. Another faculty member at the school characterized him as an "excellent" teacher. He excelled in dealing with students with disciplinary problems and had excellent relations with both students and faculty personnel. He was also considered by his supervisor and a fellow instructor to be the most outstanding teacher at the Brevard Correctional Institution who was highly successful in motivating his students. (Testimony of Curtis, Brock, Walker, Weimer, Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1.)
Recommendation That Respondent's teaching certificate be revoked for a period of four years. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May 1980 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh Ingram, Administrator Professional Practices Council Room 3, 319 West Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Craig Wilson, Esquire 315 Third Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 R. V. Richards, Esquire 1526 South Washington Avenue Titusville, Florida 32780
The Issue What relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations provide Petitioner to remedy the unlawful employment practice that Respondent admits that it committed by refusing to further consider Petitioner's application for employment as a correctional officer once it learned that Petitioner is an insulin-dependent diabetic?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner's Employment at the South Florida Reception Center Petitioner previously worked full-time as a Correctional Officer I at the State of Florida Department of Corrections' (DOC's) South Florida Reception Center, a maximum security facility that houses convicted felons. Petitioner and his coworkers at times were asked to work double shifts. On several occasions, Petitioner was threatened with disciplinary action when he refused to work a second shift immediately following the completion of his regularly assigned shift. Prior to the expiration of his probationary period, Petitioner was advised that he was going to be fired. Petitioner requested, and was granted permission by the Superintendent of the facility, the opportunity to resign in lieu of termination. Petitioner resigned his position effective June 27, 1989. Petitioner's Application for Employment with Respondent In October of 1988, while still employed by DOC, Petitioner applied for a Correctional Officer I position with Respondent. Respondent's official job description for the position describes the nature of the work performed by Correctional Officer I's as follows: This is routine security work in maintaining order and discipline among prisoners held in County correctional facilities. Employees in this class are responsible for receiving and controlling prisoners, preventing escapes and enforcing departmental rules and regulations on an assigned shift at a County correctional facility. Duties include maintaining various records on prisoners, supervising work details, transporting prisoners to a variety of medical or correctional institutions, and ensuring the proper discharge of prisoners. Work occasionally involves an element of personal danger during emergencies and in controlling potentially violent prisoners. Duties are performed in accordance with established departmental regulations and security procedures. Supervision is received from a superior officer who reviews work for compliance with established rules and regulations. These duties are similar to those performed by correctional officers who work at the South Florida Reception Center. There was a delay in the processing of Petitioner's application for employment. On April 12, 1990, Iliana O. Garcia, a Personnel Specialist 2 with Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter, the body of which read as follows: We wish to take this opportunity to thank you for placing your application for the position of Correctional Officer 1 with our Department. The time and effort you devoted to your pursuit of this position is sincerely appreciated, however, at the present time, we regret that we are unable to consider your application further. Many exceptional candidates are seeking limited number of positions and this creates a very competitive situation. Please be assured that our decision in your case was based on very careful consideration of your application and qualifications in direct comparison with all others seeking the position and was not a judgment arrived at lightly. Thank you again for your demonstrated interest in our Department, and we wish you success in your endeavors. On May 9, 1990, Louvenia Lee, the Commander of Respondent's Human Resources Bureau, sent Respondent a follow-up letter explaining in greater detail why Respondent was no longer being considered for the position for which he had applied: On February 26, 1990 you were scheduled for a physical examination at Mt. Sinai Medical Center. This exam was another step in the hiring process for a Correctional Officer. However, on the basis of the physical exam, the results were disqualifying. Therefore, your application with the Corrections and Rehabilitation Department was discontinued. The disqualifying results are in accordance with the physical standards set forth in the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Chapter IX-1. These standards are utilized by other law enforcement agencies in Metropolitan Dade County. Thank you again for your demonstrated interest in our Department and we wish you success in your endeavors. If I can be of further assistance, please contact me at 547-7052. The results of the physical examination that Petitioner had taken were "disqualifying" because they had revealed that Petitioner was an insulin- dependent diabetic. Lost Earnings Had Petitioner been selected to fill the position for which he had applied, he would have had to have first undergone four months of academy training, starting in late July or early August of 1990, before assuming the duties of a Correctional Officer I. He would have received a stipend of $400 for each month that he was in training. Had Petitioner successfully completed his academy training, he would have been placed on the payroll as a Correctional Officer I on December 3, 1990. Had Petitioner remained on the payroll as a Correctional Officer I from December 3, 1990, to January 3, 1993, 3/ he would have earned a total of $54,142.22 ($47,367.16 for the pay periods reflected on Petitioner's Exhibit 7; $804.83 for the two bonus payments reflected on Petitioner's Exhibit 7; $932.86 for the January 21, 1991, through February 3, 1993, pay period; $972.45 for the March 30, 1992, through April 12, 1992, pay period; and $4,064.92 for the four pay periods immediately following the October 26, 1992, through November 8, 1992, pay period). Mitigation At the time he learned that he was no longer being considered by Respondent as a candidate to fill the Correctional Officer I position for which he had applied, Petitioner had applications for employment pending with two other prospective employers, the City of Hollywood and the Metro Dade Police Department. Both applications were for law enforcement officer positions. In August or September of 1990, Petitioner was informed that neither the City of Hollywood nor the Metro Dade Police Department would be offering him a position. The City of Hollywood advised him that the position for hich he had applied had been filled by another of the over 100 applicants for the position. The Metro Dade Police Department told Petitioner that it could not hire him because he was an insulin-dependent diabetic. Some time shortly after receiving his rejection notice from Respondent, Petitioner applied for a correctional officer position with the Broward Sheriff's Office. He did not get the position. The explanation that he was given was that he had failed the polygraph test he had taken. At the outset of the 1990-1991 school year Petitioner began working as a substitute teacher for the Dade County School Board. He continued working as a substitute teacher during the remainder of the 1990-1991 school year, as well as the following school year. The work was sporadic. Frequently, he would not know until the morning of his teaching assignment that he had the opportunity to substitute teach that day. 25. In 1990, 1991 and 1992, Petitioner earned $694.00, $2,212.50 and $2,360.00, respectively, working as a substitute teacher for the Dade County School Board. In 1992, Petitioner also worked for Publix Super Markets, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Publix). His last day of work for Publix was August 14, 1992. Petitioner earned $2,063.78 working for Publix in 1992. From the date he was informed that Respondent had rejected him for employment until January 3, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the "back pay period"), Petitioner was not otherwise gainfully employed, nor did he, with the exception noted above, seek other gainful employment. During the back pay period, there were various advertised openings for correctional officers at the South Florida Reception Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Center"). These positions offered considerably less pay than Petitioner would have received had be been hired by Respondent. Furthermore, the working conditions at the Center were far inferior to those he would have experienced working for Respondent as Correctional Officer I. Petitioner did not apply for any of these advertised positions because he reasonably believed that to do so would be an exercise in futility given that he had been constructively discharged in June of 1989, from a similar position at the Center. Attorney's Fees and Costs On March 25, 1992, after the Executive Director of the Commission had issued a Notice of Determination: Cause and conciliation efforts had failed, Petitioner executed the following written agreement to retain the law firm of Simon, Schindler and Sandberg, P.A., to represent him in the instant matter: I, the undersigned, do hereby retain and employ the law firm of: SIMON, SCHINDLER & SANDBERG, P.A. 1492 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 as my attorneys to represent me, DONALD C. FERRARO, in the petition now pending before the Florida Commission on Human Relations. I fully understand that the fee is based upon an hourly rate of $250.00, which I am obligating myself to pay. I also agree to pay my said attorneys the sum of $100.00 for out-of-pocket expenses. You are authorized to pay or incur liability for all expenses . . . If bills are not paid when due, or a mutually agreeable payment schedule is not made and adhered to, I agree that my attorneys may withdraw as my counsel in any proceeding in which they represent me. Also I agree to bear the cost of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fees, and all other costs. I understand that I will be billed periodically both as to expenses and attorney's fees, and fully agree to pay said bill promptly upon receipt of same. In addition to any other lien contemplated hereunder, we are given a lien on the claim or cause of action, on the sum recovered by way of settlement, and on any judgment that may be recovered, for fees as well as any fund we may have advanced on your behalf for costs in connection with the cause of action. You agree that we have all general, possessory, or retaining liens, and all special or charging liens, known to the common law. If we use the services of an attorney to enforce the terms of this agreement, you agree to pay, in addition to all other sums due us, a reasonable attorney's fee for said enforcement. I further agree that you shall have the right to withdraw from my case: (a) If I do not make the required payments pursuant to this agreement; (b) if I have misrepresented or failed to disclose material facts to you; or (c) if I fail to follow your advice. In any of the foregoing events, I agree to execute any such documents permitting you to withdraw. The Attorney is an officer of the court and is bound by the rules regulating the Florida Bar. The client acknowledges and understands that while an attorney accepts this employment and promises to render professional legal services to the best of his ability during the continuation of this employment, that the attorney makes no warranties, representations or guarantees regarding the favorable outcome, result or successful termination of the representation and that this Retainer Agreement is not "contingent" thereon. The client agrees to fully cooperate with the attorney; to do nothing which would compromise the attorney's professional ethics; and not to request or require the attorney to do anything in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. If the client has misrepresented or failed to disclose any material facts, refuses to follow the attorney's advice, or fails to be available as necessary for preparation, conferences, depositions, hearings or other court proceedings, the attorney may withdraw from representation with leave of court. I acknowledge that you have made no representations or guarantees concerning the outcome of this case. I agree to the above terms and conditions of this Retainer Agreement and further acknowledge that I have received a copy thereof. Pursuant to this retainer agreement, the law firm of Simon, Schindler and Sandberg, P.A., (hereinafter referred to as the "Firm") provided Petitioner with legal representation in this matter. Roger J. Schindler, Esquire, a name partner in the Firm, was the most senior of the Firm's attorneys who worked on Petitioner's case. Schindler is a Florida-licensed attorney who has been practicing law in this state since the spring of 1970. He has litigated numerous civil rights actions. Schindler's hourly fee is $250.00. Through November 11, 1992, Schindler had reasonably spent 49.00 hours performing various tasks in connection with the instant case for which Petitioner has been billed $12,200.00 based upon a reasonable hourly fee of $250.00. Through November 11, 1992, Joe Constant, a Florida-licensed attorney and one of the Firm's associates, had reasonably spent 16.20 hours performing various tasks in connection with the instant case for which Petitioner has been billed $2,673.00 based upon a reasonable hourly fee of $165.00. Through November 11, 1992, another of the Firm's associate attorneys had reasonably spent one hour working on legal research done in connection with the instant case for which Petitioner has been billed $165.00 based upon a reasonable hourly fee of $165.00. Through November 11, 1992, a law clerk working for the Firm had reasonably spent 11.80 hours performing research-related tasks in connection with the instant case for which Petitioner has been billed $885.00 based upon a reasonable hourly fee of $75.00. The Firm has also billed Petitioner a total of $368.22 for costs reasonably incurred through November 11, 1992, in connection with the instant case. Through November 11, 1992, the Firm had billed Petitioner a total of $16,391.22 ($15,923.00 for attorney's fees and $368.22 for costs), but had not received any payments from Petitioner, notwithstanding that, under the retainer agreement, he was responsible to pay the Firm this entire amount regardless of the outcome of the instant case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in Petitioner's Petition for Relief, (2) prohibiting the practice, (3) awarding Petitioner back pay in the amount of $55,742.22, together with prejudgment interest thereon at the statutory rate of 12% per annum, (4) awarding Petitioner reasonable prehearing attorney's fees and litigation costs in the amount of $16,391.22 ($15,923.00 for fees and $368.22 for costs), and (5) awarding Petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs for work performed, and costs incurred, by the Firm in connection with this case after November 11, 1992, in an amount to be determined by agreement of the parties or, in the absence of such agreement, by subsequent Commission order. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of February, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Gary M. Piccirillo ("Piccirillo"), Douglas L. Adams ("Adams"), and George Crain ("Crain") each are inmates who are presently incarcerated and within the custody of Respondent, Department of Corrections. At the time of final hearing in this cause, each of the Petitioners was incarcerated in Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida. At the time of final hearing in this cause, both Petitioner Adams and Petitioner Crain had been classified as "close custody" in accordance with the provisions of Rule 33-6.09(4), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner Piccirillo had been classified as "medium custody" in accordance with that same rule. The custody status of each of these inmates had been reviewed and established within the last six months prior to final hearing. In addition to challenging the validity of Rule 33-9.07(4), Florida Administrative Code, Petitioners also challenge the validity of Department of Corrections' Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.40 issued April 27, 1977, and revised March 10, 1982, as an unpromulgated rule. Specifically, Petitioners contend that Section IXB conflicts with certain provisions of Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and is, therefore, invalid. Specifically the Policy and Procedure Directive in the above referenced section provides that: The department will permit considera- tion for work release 18 months prior to release. However, normally such consideration will be given within the last nine months prior to the presumptive parole release date or expiration or [sic]. . . .
The Issue Whether Petitioner suffered retaliation and reverse discrimination committed by the Department of Corrections in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male who was a probation officer at the Department. He worked in the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit for the first ten years of his career and then transferred to the Seventh Judicial Circuit, based in Daytona Beach, Florida, where he had been employed for about eight and one-half years at the time of the hearing. The Department, in accordance with Section 20.315, Florida Statutes, is the state agency charged with protecting the public through the incarceration and supervision of offenders and the rehabilitation of offenders through the application of work, programs, and services. In early July 1999, Petitioner was working in the Department's probation office on Palmetto Avenue, in Daytona Beach, Florida. He was living with a woman named Tanya Folsom who worked for the Department in its probation program, but not in the same office. He was also romantically involved with a woman named Frances Fredericks, who he later married. At this time, Ms. Fredericks was married to one Mr. Anderson, and was known as Frances Anderson. This triangular relationship became known in the office in which Petitioner worked. Someone in Petitioner's office, who has never been identified, wrote a letter to Ms. Folsom, revealing to Ms. Folsom Petitioner's ongoing relationship with Ms. Frances Fredericks. The letter was written on stationery that was the Department's property, placed in an envelope that was the Department's property, and transmitted to Ms. Folsom via the Department's internal mailing system. Using Department resources for personal business, is contrary to Department policy. When Ms. Folsom received the letter a number of ugly consequences ensued. Ms. Folsom reacted with extreme hostility to the information she received, even though Petitioner claimed that their relationship had devolved into a mere friendship. She evicted Petitioner from the quarters they had been sharing. At a subsequent time, one Mr. Anderson, then Ms. Frederick's husband, confronted Petitioner in the parking lot adjacent to the office in which Petitioner worked, and in the presence of Petitioner's office supervisor, Mr. Seltzer, socked Petitioner in the jaw. The probation officer community, in which Ms. Folsom and Petitioner worked, suffered disruption. Morale amongst the workers was impaired. Petitioner blamed the occurrence of these unpleasant events, not on himself, but on Officer Michael Gallon, a probation officer who worked directly in the court system, and Ms. Velma Brown, his immediate supervisor. He attributed blame to them because he believed that they had rifled his desk and found gifts destined to be given to Frances Fredericks, and believed that one or both of them were responsible for the letter to Ms. Folsom. Both Officer Gallon and Ms. Brown are black. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department demanding an investigation into the use of the Department's stationery that was of a value of about a "half cent," according to Petitioner. He also complained that court officers, both black and white, were underemployed, and suggested that black court officers were afforded advantages not given to white officers. He asked his superiors to investigate the complaint regarding both the letter and the court officer matter. He prevailed upon the office manager to take action and when the office manager declined to open an investigation, he brought the matter to the attention of the circuit administrator, Robert Gordon, and ultimately to the attention of those in the chain- of-command all the way to the Department's Inspector General. Mr. Gordon, in response to the turmoil precipitated by the letter, reassigned Petitioner to DeLand, Florida, a distance of about 30 miles, for 60 days. Petitioner, who referred to his new post in the pejorative, "Dead Land," believed that officers who were moved there, "never came back." Mr. Gordon told Petitioner that he moved him because Petitioner needed a "change of venue." This reassignment occurred the end of July, 1999. Article 9, Section 3, of the Agreement between the State of Florida and Florida Police Benevolent Association (Agreement) states that a transfer should be affected only when dictated by the needs of the agency and only after taking into consideration the needs of the employee, prior to any transfer. Mr. Gordon complied with that requirement, and in any event, did not transfer Petitioner. The Agreement states at Article 9, Section 1 (C), that a move is not a "transfer" unless an employee is moved, " . . . in excess of fifty (50) miles." Petitioner was "reassigned" as that term is defined in Article 9, Section 1 (C), of the Agreement. In any event, Mr. Gordon did not move Petitioner because he was white. He moved him to a different post because Petitioner had created turmoil in the probation officer community in Daytona Beach. In any event, as will be discussed below, whether or not Mr. Gordon complied with the Agreement is immaterial to this case. Notwithstanding Petitioner's beliefs with regard to the outcome of his move to DeLand, he was reassigned back to the Daytona Beach area at the end of 60 days and resumed his regular duties. This occurred around early October, 1999. Petitioner continued to press for an investigation into his allegations. He brought the matter to the attention to Harry Ivey, the regional administrator for the Department and above Mr. Gordon in the chain-of-command. He discussed the matter with a Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Ivey's deputy and believed subsequent to that conversation, that an investigation would occur. In fact, no one in the Department displayed any interest in Petitioner's allegations about the de minimis use of the Department's time and property in the preparation and transfer of the letter, or in his beliefs about the workload problems of the court officers, or his claims of favorable treatment in the case of Officer Gallon and Ms. Brown. In December 2000, Petitioner was assigned to the Ormond Beach Office, which was about six miles from the Palmetto Avenue Office. The Ormond Beach Office had lost a supervisor position due to reorganization and it was determined that Petitioner possessed the skill and experience to replace that senior leadership. The decision to relocate Petitioner was made by Mr. Gordon. In February 2001, Petitioner was transferred back to his old office. A few months later he was promoted to Correctional Probation Senior Officer and moved to another office. Between February 2000 and February 2001, the operative period, over 30 Correctional Probation Officers, Correctional Probation Supervisor Officers, and Correctional Probation Supervisors in the Seventh Circuit, were reassigned. Of these, six were black, four were Hispanic, and 20 were white. Although the four reassignments experienced by Petitioner may have inconvenienced him, Petitioner presented no evidence of any damages. The facts reveal that Petitioner's misfortunes were precipitated by his unwise amorous activities within his workplace. They were not the result of any effort by the Department to retaliate against him or to discriminate against him because he was white.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Amended Charge of Discrimination be dismissed because it was not timely filed. Dismissal on its merits if the June 25, 2001, Charge of Discrimination is determined to have been timely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gayle S. Graziano, Esquire 244 North Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Ernest L. Reddick, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Luis A. Pacheco, Joel Estremera, Felipe Pichardo and Owen D. Denson, are inmates in the custody and control of the Department. The Department is a state agency. On December 26, 1991, the Petitioners filed a Petition for Determination of the Invalidity of an Existing Rule against the First Respondents. The Petition was filed against "John T. Shaw, Superintendent, Glades Correctional Institution, et. al." In the Petition, the Petitioners challenged the validity of "the revision of Glades Correctional Operating Procedure 91-07, sec. 7.09" pursuant to Sections 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petition failed to challenge a rule or an alleged rule of any "agency" as that term is defined in Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes. On January 10, 1992, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered granting a Motion to Dismiss filed by the First Respondents and giving the Petitioners an opportunity to file an amended petition on or before January 21, 1992. No amended petition was filed by the Petitioners on or before January 21, 1992. Therefore, on January 29, 1992, an Order Concerning Proposed Final Orders was entered informing the parties that they could file proposed final orders on or before February 24, 1992, and that this Final Order would be entered on or before March 16, 1992. On February 7, 1992, the Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Determination of Invalidity of An Existing Rule and requested that it be accepted. On February 25, 1992, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered accepting the Amended Petition and informing the parties that this case would be disposed of by a summary final order. In the Amended Petition the Department was named as the Respondent. Although the amended petition indicates that the Petitioners are challenging Rule 33-5.01, Florida Administrative Code, pursuant to Sections 120.52, 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes, in fact the Petitioners are challenging a memorandum issued at Glades Correctional Institution changing Policy and Procedure Directive 3.04.12 (hereinafter referred to as the "Policy and Procedure Directive"). In the Amended Petition the Petitioners allege, in part, the following: Respondent through his designee, John T. Shaw, has adopted exhibit " A " as a rule, which governs petitioners [sic] visitors to select from, " Saturday or Sunday as their regular visiting day. Petitioners are therefore substantially " affected " and this case includes an invalid exercise of delagated [sic] authority because the department of corrections failed to promulgate it's Policy and Procedure Directive number 3.04.12 as a rule, contrary to the requirements of section 944.09, Florida Statutes. The Amended Petition fails to challenge a rule or an alleged rule of any "agency" as that term is defined is Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether Proposed Rule 33.9007(9), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Steven Rivera, Petitioner, is currently serving a prison sentence at Walton Correctional Institution at DeFuniak Springs, Florida. He is on his fifth commitment to prison. Respondent supervises the operation of correctional institutions in Florida and promulgates rules governing the operation of the prisons and various subjects relating to inmates of these prisons. The proposed rule here under challenge provides: Any inmate who is serving his fourth commitment to prison or higher shall be excluded from work release if the inmate has previously been given the opportunity to participate in work release, except that an inmate may be given consideration if the inmate has demonstrated outstanding institutional adjustment and if extenuating circumstances exist. Petitioner has been admitted to the work release program in a prior commitment and, with more than four prison commitments is in the class of prisoner covered by this rule. Accordingly, he has standing to challenge the rule. The work release program is intended to motivate the individual offender toward self improvement, to ease the transition from prison into the community, place the inmate in employment to which he or she may return after release from the institution, permit the offender to contribute towards his own support and the support of his or her family, help determine the prisoner's readiness for parole, preserve family and community ties, and permit the offender to develop or maintain occupational skills. (Exhibit 6) The Florida work release program has been in effect for many years allowing Department of Corrections officers the opportunity to gain experience in the effectiveness and efficacy of the program. First commitment offenders are more likely to benefit from work release than are those who have three or more prior commitments. Inmates who have been given one chance in the work release program and are subsequently recommitted to the prison institution have thereby demonstrated that they did not obtain the anticipated benefit of remaining crime free subsequent to being admitted to the work release program. Following a murder committed by a prisoner who escaped from the work release program at another institution, a Task Force was set up to study the work release program and prepare recommendations affecting this program. As a result of this Task Force's recommendations, wide ranging changes to the rules affecting the work release program were promulgated of which the rule here challenged is only one small subsection. Furthermore, prior to the commission of the crime referred to above, there were approximately 4000 prisoners admitted to the work release program. Legislative changes since that time have limited the maximum number of prisoners admitted to the work release program to 2100. Although Petitioner contends that there is no rule definition of commitment, this is a word that is well recognized in the prison community. As defined by one of Respondent's witnesses in these proceedings, each time a prisoner is committed following a release from a prior commitment whether in Florida or in another jurisdiction, this counts as an additional commitment. If the inmate commits an offense while in confinement, is taken to court and receives an additional sentence, this is not counted as an additional commitment. This method of counting commitments inures to the benefit of the prison inmates. Petitioner also contends that the phrase "has demonstrated outstanding institutional adjustment and if extenuating circumstances exist" is arbitrary and vests unbridled discretion in the prison officials. However, admission to the work release program is a privilege which all prisoners admitted to such program must earn. They earn this privilege by adhering to the code of conduct established for prisoners, by participating in education, drug and alcohol abuse programs, and by other acts contributing to earning gain time. Certain classes of prisoners, e.g. those who have committed serious crimes, sex crimes, and crimes evincing a violent disposition must demonstrate more clearly than does the less violent criminal that he is eligible for work release. No one act can show that one prisoner is better deserving for the limited number that can be admitted to the work release program than is another prisoner. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider innumerable factors to determine which are the prisoners most likely to benefit from work release based upon their history and their current conduct in the prison system. A finite list of factors to be considered in determining those most eligible for work release is impracticable because the list would be too numerous and could still omit factors deserving consideration. The proposed rules, including the rule in issue here, provide that certain prisoners are not eligible for work release; but the rule provides two exceptions to this general disqualification, to wit: those who "demonstrate outstanding institutional adjustment and extenuating circumstances." By providing these exceptions, the rule removes the arbitrary exclusion of certain prisoners from work release regardless of their good conduct in prison and demonstration that they have totally reformed and are most unlikely ever to again commit a crime.
