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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING vs ARECI ROBLEDO, 17-004870PL (2017)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Aug. 28, 2017 Number: 17-004870PL Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent raced animals that were impermissibly medicated or determined to have prohibited substances present, resulting in a positive test for such medications or substances in violation of section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016),1/ as alleged in the administrative complaints; and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter final orders in these proceedings as follows: For DOAH Case No. 17-4870, finding that Respondent committed two violations of section 550.2451(1)(a) and imposing a penalty consisting of a $1,500 fine and suspending Respondent's license for 75 days; For DOAH Case No. 17-4871, finding that Respondent committed three violations of section 550.2415(1)(a) and imposing a penalty consisting of a $1,750 fine and suspending Respondent's license for 60 days; For DOAH Case No. 17-4872, finding that Respondent committed one violation of section 550.2415(1)(a) and imposing a penalty consisting of a $1,200 fine and suspending Respondent's license for 72 days; and For DOAH Case No. 17-4873, finding that Respondent committed one violation of section 550.2415 and imposing a penalty consisting of a $1,200 fine and suspending Respondent's license for 72 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Cathy M. Sellers Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2017.

Florida Laws (9) 120.54, 120.569, 120.57, 120.68, 550.0251, 550.105, 550.2415, 6.01, 90.202

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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs VIRGINIA M. NEWBERRY, 89-004535 (1989)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 22, 1989 Number: 89-004535 Latest Update: Jan. 29, 1990

The Issue Whether Respondent failed to maintain the qualification set forth in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, requiring a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida to have good moral character by unlawfully being in actual or constructive possession of cocaine on or about May 9, 1988, and by introducing cocaine into her body on or about that date.

Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1974, the State of Florida, acting through Petitioner, certified Respondent as a law enforcement officer. Certificate number 02-11734 was duly issued to Respondent by Petitioner. Respondent is a sworn police officer who has been employed as an investigator in the Special Investigations Unit of the Dade County School System for over 14 years. The Special Investigations Unit is a law enforcement agency consisting of approximately 56 sworn officers whose duties include follow-up investigations on internal issues and the investigation of crimes that are committed on School Board property. There is also a uniformed division which patrols certain of the schools in the Dade County system. The sworn officers of the Special Investigation Unit are required to be certified by Petitioner even though they are employed by the Dade County School Board as School Board employees. The sworn officers of the Special Investigation Unit are represented for collective bargaining purposes with the Dade County School Board by the Police Benevolent Association. The labor contract that was negotiated on behalf of Respondent and her fellow sworn officers of the Special Investigative Unit require that each sworn officer take an annual physical to include the giving of a urine sample from the officer to be analyzed for the presence of controlled substances. Respondent was directed by her employer to present herself on May 9, 1988, for an annual physical examination at Mount Sinai Medical Center. Respondent was aware that an annual physical, including a drug test would be required of her. She was given over two weeks advance notice of the exact date the physical examination would occur. On May 9, 1988, Respondent reported to Mount Sinai Medical Center to submit to the annual physical examination required by her employer. She was given a small sterile sample bottle in which she produced a sample of her urine as instructed. Nurse Cheryl Cain, the Mount Sinai employee responsible for the collection of the urine sample from Respondent, received the urine sample from Respondent and promptly divided the urine sample into two smaller sterile bottles and sealed each of the smaller bottles with its cap and with evidence tape. Nurse Cain followed Mount Sinai's procedures in collecting and sealing the urine sample. The sealed bottles containing Respondent's urine sample were labeled so that each bottle was identified as containing Respondent's urine sample. An identifying series of numbers, referred to as that bottle's bar code, was placed on each of the bottles. Bar code number 118856 was placed on one bottle and bar code number 110783 was placed on the other bottle. The two bottles were then placed in a locked box. On May 9, 1988, the sealed bottles containing Respondent's urine sample were picked up by an employee of Toxicology Testing Service and transported to the facilities of Toxicology Testing Service in Dade County, Florida. Mount Sinai used adequate procedures to ensure that Respondent's urine sample was properly labeled, that the chain of custody was properly maintained, and that the two specimen bottles could not be tampered with without detection. On May 19, 1988, sample bottle 118856 was opened by a laboratory analyst employed by Toxicology Testing Service. A small sample of Respondent's urine sample, referred to as an aliquot, was removed from sample bottle 118856 with a sterile disposable plastic pipette and placed in a sterile disposable cup for analysis. The aliquot of Respondent's urine sample was introduced into the analyzer equipment used by Toxicology Testing Service to screen the sample for the possible presence of controlled substances. The sample screened positive for a cocaine metabolite, which is a metabolized derivative of cocaine created by the natural processing of cocaine by the human body. This screening procedure, known as an emit test, produced a result of 71 on the first screening and a 69 when a separate aliquot from sample 118856 was tested. The emit test is conducted using an Hitachi 705 machine, a piece of equipment that is widely used in the industry. As calibrated, a score of 50 is considered a positive score for cocaine. The purpose of the emit test is to screen those samples that will be later analyzed by gas chromatography mass spectrometry method of testing urine samples. A confirmatory analysis of the sample was then conducted utilizing the gas chromatography mass spectrometry method of testing urine samples. This method is over 99.99% accurate and is the accepted method among toxicologists for identifying drugs and their metabolites. The confirmatory analysis confirmed that Respondent's urine sample was positive for the presence of a cocaine metabolite that can only be produced through the ingestion of cocaine. Subsequent testing on June 3, 1988, by Toxicology Testing Services of aliquots from sample bottle 110783, followed the same procedures as those followed for the analysis of aliquots from sample bottle 118856 and produced similar, positive results for the presence of the cocaine metabolite. Toxicology Testing Service used adequate procedures to ensure that Respondent's urine sample was properly identified, that the chain of custody was properly maintained, and that sample bottle 118856 and sample bottle 110783 had not been tampered with. The testing procedures followed by Toxicology Testing Service are widely accepted in the industry. The equipment used by Toxicology Testing Service was in proper working order. The procedures followed in the taking of Respondent's urine sample and in the subsequent analysis of the aliquots from Respondent's urine sample were consistent with the procedures set forth in Rule 11B-27.00225, Florida Administrative Code, which is entitled "Controlled Substance Testing Procedures". Respondent denies that she has ever used or has unlawfully possessed cocaine. Respondent handles cocaine from time to time in the execution of her official responsibilities, but she was unable to point to an incident that may have produced the positive test results through incidental contact with cocaine. Although samples of the currency in use in South Florida have tested positive for the presence of cocaine, Respondent would not have ingested sufficient quantities of cocaine from currency to produce the level of the cocaine metabolite reflected by the testing. On May 23, 1988, Respondent was advised by her supervisor that she had tested positive for cocaine. Respondent immediately gave another urine sample that tested negative for cocaine. Respondent had attended training sessions that taught that cocaine usually cleared the human body after 72 hours. This is a misconception. The speed with which the cocaine metabolite clears the human system depends on many variable factors, including the general physical condition of the person involved, the amounts of liquids consumed by the person, and the amount of exercise by the person. Cocaine metabolite can be detected in the human body more than 72 hours after its ingestion. Respondent failed to offer any plausible explanation for the positive results of cocaine being detected in her system that would permit any conclusion other than the conclusion that she had voluntarily ingested cocaine. Respondent has been an exemplary employee since her initial employment with the Special Investigative Unit. She has never been suspected of drug use by her superiors. None of her fellow officers ever reported that they suspected Respondent of drug use. Respondent has had several commendations during her term of service. Her performance evaluations have always been satisfactory or higher. Based on the charges involved in the pending proceeding, the Dade County School Board suspended Respondent's employment and instituted proceedings to discharge her from its employ. Following an administrative hearing, the hearing officer (who was not employed by or assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings) found that the drug tests that found the positive results for cocaine were not reliable and recommended that Respondent be reinstated to her employment. The finding by the previous hearing officer that the tests were not reliable is not binding here and is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission, enter a final order which finds that Respondent failed to maintained good moral character and which further revokes the certification of Respondent as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUD B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 H. T. Smith, Esquire 1017 N.W. 9th Court Miami, Florida 33136 Jeffrey Long, Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.57, 943.13, 943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (3) 11B-27.0011, 11B-27.00225, 11B-27.005

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CHRISTOPHER BRIAN EDWARDS vs SAPA PRECISION TUBING ROCKLEDGE, LLC, 14-006042 (2014)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Dec. 19, 2014 Number: 14-006042 Latest Update: Sep. 17, 2015

The Issue Whether Sapa Precision Tubing Rockledge, LLC (Respondent), discriminated against Christopher Brian Edwards (Petitioner) on the basis of age.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher Brian Edwards 4605 Ocean Beach Boulevard Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Mary Susan Sacco, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP Suite 1300 300 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Laws (4) 120.57, 120.68, 760.10, 760.11

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R. N. EXPERTISE, INC. vs MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 01-002663BID (2001)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 05, 2001 Number: 01-002663BID Latest Update: Jun. 14, 2002

The Issue The issues in this bid protest are whether, in making a preliminary decision to award a contract for drug screening services, Respondent acted contrary to a governing statute, rule, policy, or project specification; and, if so, whether such misstep(s) was/were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.

Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Request for Proposals On March 14, 2001, the Board authorized the issuance of a request for proposals to solicit offers on a contract for drug screening services. Soon, Request for Proposals No. 149-AA10 (the “RFP”) was issued. The purpose of the RFP, as stated on the first page thereof, was [t]o obtain the services of an organization to conduct applicant and employee specimen collection and drug screening services both to meet the general requirements for collection and drug screening services; and the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA) requirements for collection and drug screening services. These professional services are described in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (Attachment A). The deadline for submission of proposals in response to the RFP was April 10, 2001. Page 3 of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (the “Guide”) explained that applicants and employees are tested in the following circumstances: (1) upon application for full-time employment; (2) when "reasonable suspicion"1 exists to believe that an employee has impermissibly used drugs or alcohol; (3) as part of routine "fitness for duty" medical examinations2; and (4) as a "follow up" to an employee's completion of a drug rehabilitation program. Because the District employs persons performing safety- sensitive functions and persons who hold commercial driver licenses, the District must comply with a federal law known as the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (“OTETA”). Employees covered by OTETA are subject to pre-employment testing, post-accident testing, random testing, reasonable suspicion testing, "return-to-duty" testing (after a positive test), follow-up testing, and annual testing. Guide, pp. 10-14. Unlike other employees, persons falling under OTETA are not subject to blood alcohol screening. Guide, p. 22. The type of drug test that the District most frequently requests involves urinalysis. For alcohol testing, breath analysis is the normal practice. Blood alcohol testing is used infrequently. The RFP did not explicitly disclose the District’s relative demand for these various types of tests. Section V of the RFP prescribed the technical requirements with which proposers needed to comply. Subsection C thereof stated, in pertinent part: The collection site is a place where individuals present themselves for the purpose of providing urine or blood specimens to be analyzed for the presence of drugs or alcohol. Page 15 of the Guide added that "[c]ollection sites shall have all of the necessary personnel, materials, equipment, facilities, and supervision to provide for the collection, security, temporary storage, and shipping or transportation of urine specimens to a certified drug testing laboratory." Section V, subsection K set forth four “location parameters [as] examples of locations which shall comprise the areas for collection and drug screening to insure [sic] convenience for applicants and employees.” These “location parameters” essentially divided the Miami-Dade County service area into quadrants. Section V, subsection L, provided in relevant part: “Mobile collection of specimens will be required at some of the Regional Transportation Centers[.]” The Guide, at page 15, further mandated that "[m]obile collection sites" be equipped and staffed "the same as" other collection sites. Section V, subsection M stated, in part: “A collection site is preferred in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33132, for the convenience of any potential employees who wish to provide specimen collection concurrent with a scheduled interview by the Office of Human Resources.” Section V, subsection N, stated: At least one site in the North end and [sic] of Miami-Dade County and one site in the South end of Miami-Dade County must be available to perform reasonable suspicion testing of employees. The hours of operation of these facilities must be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight. Section VI of the RFP, which addressed the cost of proposed services, instructed that [p]roposals must include an itemization of charges for collection of specimens, initial and confirmatory tests. Such itemized charges will be used in the event a retest is necessary. Retests required as a result of defective equipment, incorrect analysis, or misinterpretation shall be done at the expense of the provider. Section VIII provided that proposals would be “evaluated by [a] selection committee . . . comprised of representatives of the school district, in order to ascertain which proposal best meets the needs of the School Board.” The selection committee (hereafter, “committee”) was to be composed of one administrator each from five separate offices, which were designated in section VIII. Section VIII also established the evaluation criteria to be used by the committee, stating: Evaluation considerations will include, but not be limited to, the following: Responsiveness of the proposal clearly stating an understanding of the work to be performed meeting all the technical guidelines in [the Guide]. Cost may not be the dominant factor, but will have some significance. It will be a particularly important factor when all other evaluation criteria are relatively equal. Documentation of current certification by DHHS; qualifications of laboratory staff members; past experience and record of performance; verification of references. Location of the laboratory and planned method of pick-up from designated collection sites and transportation of specimens according to chain of custody protocol to the drug testing laboratory; turnaround time relative to volume of expected need; accessibility relative to volume of expected need. Primary emphasis in the selection process will be placed on the independence, background, experience, and service of staff to be assigned to the project. Expertise in the areas addressed in the RFP, and the ability to respond in a timely, accurate manner to the district’s requirements is essential. Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collection/testing. The School District reserves the right to reject any and all proposals submitted and to waive irregularities. . . . . Relevant Details About the Proposals Two proposers, Global and RN, submitted timely responses to the RFP. The following is a look at certain terms in their respective proposals. Global’s Proposal Global was the incumbent provider pursuant to a contract that had been entered into on June 11, 1997. Even before the establishment of the expiring contractual relationship, from 1995 forward, Global had provided general drug testing services for the District. In addition to that, Global had performed fingerprint analyses for the District prior to 1995. Thus, Global had a history with the District. In a Fee Schedule included at page VIII-1 of its proposal, Global quoted the following prices for services: Federal Drug Testing for OTETA covered employees $30.00 * * * Breath Alcohol Testing $25.00 After hour Services Flat fee per donor/employee . $75.00 plus regular testing fee Monday — Friday: 5:00 p.m. — 8:30 a.m. Saturday and Sunday All Day Florida Drug Free Work Place for general employee drug testing $25.00 * * * At page V-1 of its proposal, Global listed ten collection facilities, providing their addresses and hours of operation. According to the proposal, only one of these facilities stays open until midnight. Five of them close each weekday at 4:00 p.m., and four at 5:00 p.m. None is open on weekends. Global offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered a site in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And Global offered at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County, satisfying the geographic requirements of subsection V.N. Global’s south-end site, however, closes at 5:00 p.m. and thus fails to satisfy the requirement, also prescribed in subsection V.N., that such facility remain open until midnight. In addition to these stationary facilities, Global offered the services of a mobile unit. Its proposal stated: ON-SITE COLLECTION After Hours Emergency24 hours Operating hours: Monday — Sunday Via Mobile Unit Global described its mobile unit, at page V-2, as a “self contained air conditioned motor coach equipped with 2 bathrooms, blood drawing chair, urine collection equipment, computerized breach alcohol analyzer with ample facilities for a physician to conduct physical exams on DOT (OTETA) employees and yearly re- certification.” Global, in fact, has three of these mobile units. The vans are available for use by all of Global’s clients. Two vehicles are maintained in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, and thus are in position to respond to service calls for the District. The third van is maintained in western Palm Beach County. Because after-hours tests generally are needed in post-accident and reasonable suspicion circumstances, which require a rapid response (within two hours of the incident), the Palm Beach County-based van would not, as a practical matter, likely be deployed for the District. Global does not maintain a mobile unit in Miami-Dade County. B. RN’s Proposal Included in RN’s proposal was the following schedule of costs: RN Expertise charges $27.80 for a 5 panel NIDA drug screen. This charge includes an adulterant panel, 5 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise charges $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. This charge will include an adulterant panel, 8 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. If the School Board does not elect to have an adulterant panel performed on general tests the charge will be $25.00. RN Expertise charges $25.00 for a breath alcohol test. This also includes on- site testing charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise will charge $30.00 for a blood alcohol test. RN Expertise will submit monthly invoices. These invoices will be submitted to the Office of Operation and Records and/or the Office of Professional Standards (OTETA) through a purchase order. The invoices shall reflect service provided to the Board in the prior month. Regarding collection sites and locations, RN’s proposal stated, at pages 12 through 13: Quest Diagnostics [the laboratory that RN proposed to use] has 14 collection sites in the Miami-Dade County area. Please see Appendix B for all maps of locations and zip code map with all locations that have been highlighted for your convenience. RN Expertise, Inc. will provide all on- site drug screen collections and breath alcohol tests. We have numerous certified collectors and breath alcohol technicians throughout the state who specialize in on site testing. All collectors and BATS have been certified by Christine Steele. Please see Appendix C. for certificates of RN Expertise, Inc. and insurance and licenses. Three Quest patient care centers are located very close to the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, 33232. The hours of operation are 7:00 am to 4:30 pm. RN Expertise has arranged three third party sites in the North end of Miami-Dade county and one site in the south end of Miami-Dade County that are available to perform reasonable suspicion and post- accident testing. The hours of operation are from 8:00 am to 12:00 midnight. These addresses are: Workers Compensation Medical Center 17601 N.W. 2nd Avenue Ste S Miami, Florida 33169 Workers Compensation Medical Center 6504 N.W. 77th Court Miami, Florida 33166 Homestead Hospital 160 NW 13th Street Homestead, FL 33030 If these sites are not convenient we can arrange additional sites or provide these tests on an on-site basis. RN offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered sites in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And RN offered at least two sites in the north end of Miami-Dade County and one in the south, all three of which were open from 8:00 a.m. until midnight, thereby satisfying both the geographic and hours of operation requirements of subsection V.N. The Evaluation Committee(s), Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart, and the Evaluations A. The Original Committee To evaluate the proposals, a five-person committee was appointed in accordance with the RFP. Its members were Nelson E. Diaz, Deputy Superintendent, Personnel Management and Services; Gwendolyn Jennings Kidney, Assistant Superintendent, Employee Support Programs; Jose Montes de Oca, Assistant Chief Auditor, Management and Compliance Audits; Michael Fox, Risk Analyst, Risk and Benefits Management; and Patricia Freeman, Director, Business Development and Assistance. This committee arranged to meet for the first time on April 11, 2001. Notice of the meeting was not published in advance; the committee would convene in private. The following staff persons were asked to be present at the April 11 meeting to provide technical expertise, if needed: Vera Hirsh, Administrative Director, Personnel; William Bevan, Executive Director, Personnel Operations and Records; Frederic F. Conde, Executive Director, Office of Professional Standards; and Barbara Jones, Director, Procurement. B. Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart Before the April 11, 2001, meeting, Ms. Hirsh asked Mr. Bevan, as a technical advisor to the committee, to prepare a comparison of the two proposals. At the time, Mr. Bevan was most knowledgeable about the District’s procedures for drug testing, because he had been directly involved in the general drug testing program. Also, through his work experiences, Mr. Bevan had acquired personal knowledge concerning Global. Indeed, Global had listed Mr. Bevan as a reference in its proposal. Mr. Bevan prepared a comparison chart that was distributed to all the members of the committee. The following table contains the substance of Mr. Bevan's comparison chart:3 Item No. GLOBAL RN EXPERTISE 1 TURNAROUND TIME IS NEXT BUSINESS DAY 5 DAYS ON POSITIVE 24 HOURS FOR NEGATIVES 48 HOURS FOR POSITIVES 2 LOCATION IS FORT LAUDERDALE ALTAMONTE SPRINGS 3 PLAN TO DELINEATE OTETA FROM GENERAL GOOD PLAN PLUS ICON BASED DRUG TEST FORM VERY WEAK PLAN VERY WEAK ANALYSIS 4 COST $30.00 DOT BLIND SAMPLES ARE INCLUDED COST $27.80 NO MENTION OF BLIND SAMPLES 5 POLICE $25.00 ALL ALCOHOL TESTS BOTH BREATH & BLOOD ARE $25.00 $26.00 8 PANEL TEST BREATH ALCOHOL $25.00 BLOOD ALCOHOL $30.00 6 COLLECTION SITES 10 TOTAL SITES 14 TOTAL SITES LESS 4 IN BROWARD, 6 FOR BLOOD DRAW ONLY = 4 NET SITES 7 MOBILE COLLECTION DONE BY MOBILE VAN "WILL PROVIDE ON-SITE COLLECTION" 8 EXPERIENCE 4 YEARS WITH M-DCPS NO SUCCESSFUL LEGITATION [sic] AGAINST M-DCPS US SUGAR ? 9 LABORATORY LAB CORP OF AMERICA LATE IN REPORTING RESULTS ONE TIME IN FOUR YEARS QUEST LABORATORIES QUESTIONABLE 10 ADULTERANT TESTING IS PERFORMED BY LAB CORP AT A STANDARD COURSE OF PROTOCOL WITH NO CHARGE FOR THIS PROCEDURE TESTSURE IS BROKEN OUT AS A SEPARATE ENTITY Because of his personal knowledge of and experience with the drug screening program, Mr. Bevan's opinions carried great weight with the committee members. As will become clear, moreover, Mr. Bevan operated as a de facto evaluator. Thus, for good reasons, his comparison chart drew RN’s close and critical attention. It will be examined in detail below. Item No. 1. This item is helpful as a contrast to the others, for here Mr. Bevan did exactly what a technical advisor should do: provide a concise, accurate, and objective summary of details contained in the proposals without making a subjective judgment as to which proposal is superior. Item No. 2. As Mr. Bevan admitted at hearing, the RFP did not include, as an evaluation criterion, the location of a proposer's base of operations. Testifying, he explained that, "in [his] mind, [a proposer's location] was not something that was in the RFP, but it was important to me." Hearing Transcript (“T.”) 59. Of course, it was not Mr. Bevan's place to make subjective judgments about what was valuable in the proposals—— that was for the evaluators. Further, even the evaluators could not properly take into account undisclosed evaluation criteria. Thus, this comparison was irrelevant and consideration thereof was contrary to the RFP and contrary to competition. Item No. 3. This comparison pertained to the evaluation criterion specified in section VIII, subsection F, which provided: Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collecting/testing. Mr. Bevan dubbed RN's proposal "very weak" and Global's "good" primarily because Global's prototype OTETA form had a transparent drawing of a school bus superimposed over the writing, and its sample form for use by school police officers had a simple, freehand outline of an officer drawn on its face, whereas RN's forms did not have such "icons." Mr. Bevan believed that the pictures of the school bus and police officer would prevent the less intelligent applicants and employees from using the wrong form.4 Although reasonable people might disagree with Mr. Bevan's analysis of the respective merits of the proposals on this criterion, his conclusion was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The problem, however, is that Mr. Bevan was not a member of the committee, and his qualitative judgment went well beyond an even-handed explanation of a technical term or process, or an objective summary of the proposals' details. In other words, as this item clearly shows, Mr. Bevan assumed the role of evaluator. Item No. 4. Mr. Bevan's comparison of "blind sample testing" is interesting because the purpose of focusing on this discrete point, among all others relating to the proposers' price quotes for OTETA testing, seems to have been to blunt the advantage that RN otherwise would enjoy for having offered the lower price. (The comparison effectively says, RN's OTETA test is cheaper, yes, but Global adds value by performing blind samples, whereas RN may not provide this service.) Mr. Bevan could have written, however, with equal accuracy, that RN's price for OTETA testing "includes an adulterant panel" while Global's proposal makes "no mention of adulterant panels," which would have made RN's price quote appear even more attractive as against Global's. RN, however, did not complain about this aspect of Mr. Bevan's analysis; consequently, the undersigned has paid little attention to, and based no ultimate factual determinations or legal conclusions on, this item. Item No. 5. According to the Guide, at page 21, school police officers are required to be tested for eight drugs or classes of drugs. This is called an "8 panel" test or screen. Other employees, in contrast, need only be tested for five drugs or drug classes, using a "5 panel" screen. In his comparison, Mr. Bevan balanced Global's supposed price of $25.00 for police tests against RN's quote of $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. Yet, in its Fee Schedule, Global did not specify a separate charge for police tests, 8 panel tests, or 5 panel tests.5 Rather, Global quoted a price of $25.00 for "general employee drug testing." Based on his previous experience with Global, however, Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's charge for police tests would be $25.00, the same as the cost of testing other non-OTETA employees. Mr. Bevan's assumption was dubious at best, even assuming that Global previously had been charging $25.00 for police tests.6 At worst, if Global's historical pricing were ignored (as it should have been, being a fact extrinsic to Global's proposal), Mr. Bevan's assumption was bereft of factual or logical support; it was simply arbitrary. At a minimum, though, Mr. Bevan should have stated, on the comparison chart he provided to the committee, that he was making an assumption in Global’s favor. Without such a qualification, the chart——which purported to compare "apples to apples"——unfairly depicted RN's as unequivocally the costlier proposal on this item, for RN was shown truthfully to have quoted $26.00 for an 8 panel test. Moreover, significantly, Mr. Bevan omitted the fact that RN also had offered a price of $25.00 for an 8 panel screen without an adulterant panel. Thus, not only had Mr. Bevan potentially compared "apples to oranges," he had compounded the problem by making RN's quote for police testing appear higher than it necessarily would need to be. Making the matter worse still, Mr. Bevan represented that Global's price for blood alcohol testing was $25.00 versus $30.00 for the same procedure with RN. Global, however, had not offered to perform blood alcohol tests for $25.00 apiece; it had not quoted any price for such testing. Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's price would be $25.00 based on his past experience with the company. The validity of Mr. Bevan's assumption, again, is questionable;7 at the very least, his assumption should have been disclosed to the committee on the comparison chart. As drafted, without disclosure of Mr. Bevan's Global-friendly assumption, the comparison chart was grossly inequitable to RN, creating the possibly false impression that RN's price for blood alcohol testing was 20% higher than Global's. Finally, in comparing the cost proposals, Mr. Bevan failed to note that Global had quoted a hefty $75.00 surcharge for all "after hour services," meaning tests performed on weekdays between 5:00 p.m. and 8:30 a.m., and anytime on Saturday or Sunday. RN, in contrast, did not similarly propose a 400% price increase for after-hours work, and thus would have been favored by the comparison Mr. Bevan chose not to make. Item No. 6. The issue of collection sites would become crucial. Mr. Bevan's ultimate opinion——that RN had proposed "4 net sites" as against the "10 total sites" offered by Global——was highly subjective and clearly erroneous. To begin, RN's proposal in fact described a total of 17 collection sites——not 14 as Mr. Bevan incorrectly represented. At pages 12 and 13 of its proposal, RN responded sequentially to RFP section V, subsections K (collection sites desired in four quadrants of Miami-Dade County), L (mobile collection required at some Regional Transportation Centers), M (preference for a site near 1500 Biscayne Boulevard), and N (requiring at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County). In response to subsection K, RN proposed to use 14 Quest patient care centers, the locations of which were further described in maps attached to RN's proposal as Appendix B. Three of the 14 Quest centers were represented to meet the preference expressed in subsection M. And RN offered three additional "third party sites" (plainly meaning, in context, sites that were not operated by Quest) to satisfy subsection N. There was and is nothing confusing about RN's response regarding collection sites. No reasonable, fair-minded person, upon reading pages 12 and 13 of RN's proposal, could reasonably conclude that RN was offering a total of only 14 collection sites. Next, four of the Quest sites proposed by RN are located in Broward County. Mr. Bevan decided that these Broward sites should be ignored. The RFP, however, did not prohibit a proposer from offering sites outside Miami-Dade County, and, significantly, RN's proposal satisfied the RFP's technical requirements concerning collection site locations without the Broward sites. Thus, an evaluator (as opposed to Mr. Bevan, who was not one) might have regarded RN's Broward sites either an added value that made RN's proposal more attractive or an unwanted option that neither added to, nor detracted from, RN's proposal. Either way, however, this qualitative decision was not properly Mr. Bevan's to make as a “technical advisor.” Mr. Bevan then subtracted six sites from RN's total because the proposal stated that the sites were available for blood draws only. (In fact, RN's proposal indicated that nine of RN's 17 total sites collected blood samples only; three of the nine are in Broward County and six in Miami-Dade.) Mr. Bevan's decision that "blood only" sites should not be counted was plainly contrary to the RFP, under which blood alcohol testing clearly was a required service. While the evidence showed that the District considers urine collection sites to be much more valuable than “blood only” collection sites, which it views as practically worthless, the RFP nevertheless did not disclose this preference or the relative weight of urine sites versus “blood only” sites. Simply put, the RFP did not allow the evaluators to ignore “blood only” collection sites. At bottom, a fair and balanced comparison (unlike Mr. Bevan's) would have shown that RN had proposed 17 total sites (four in Broward, 13 in Miami-Dade), of which nine (three in Broward, six in Miami-Dade) were "blood only" sites, leaving eight sites (one in Broward, seven in Miami-Dade) that were available for the collection of both urine and blood. An "apples to apples" comparison of Miami-Dade sites available for blood and urine testing would have been Global, ten versus RN, seven. Each evaluator, however, in weighing the relative merits of the two proposals, should have considered RN's ten additional sites——there was no warrant in the RFP for excluding them from the mix à la Mr. Bevan's analysis——and made an independent determination of the value added by those sites. Item No. 7. On this point, Mr. Bevan was unfair to RN——but only a bit. His comparison intentionally drew a distinction between Global's "mobile collection" (the term used in section V.L. of the RFP) and RN's "on-site collection," subtly implying that RN’s proposal might not be responsive, or as responsive as Global’s, to the RFP’s technical guidelines. In fact, however, in its proposal at pages II-2, V-1, V-2, and VIII-1, Global expressly had described the function of its mobile unit as being to provide "on-site" collections; even Global, in other words, considered mobile collection and on-site collection to be fungible concepts. Mr. Bevan's comparison chart thus somewhat unfairly gave Global a gentle semantic boost while concomitantly giving RN a little linguistic gig.8 Standing alone, this comparison would not be noteworthy. Viewed in the light of other, unfair contrasts, however, Mr. Bevan's mobile collection/on-site collection dichotomy takes on a slight hue of partiality.9 Item No. 8. Here, Mr. Bevan made a comparison that was highly unfavorable to RN. One the one side, he portrayed Global attractively as the incumbent vendor that, during a four- year tenure, has not exposed the District to an adverse litigation outcome, and which also provides services to U.S. Sugar (an agricultural concern in South Florida). On RN's side there was only a question mark——nothing more. The meaning was obvious: Global has good credentials, but RN's experience and litigation track record are questionable. This was terribly unfair. RN's proposal included two pages of references listing a number of current clients. Mr. Bevan's explanation at hearing for failing to acknowledge any of RN's references on his comparison chart was that RN's references "were much longer" and would not fit on the page, and that he had "put down what [he] could in the amount of time [he] had." 89. This explanation utterly fails to account for Mr. Bevan's misleading and prejudicial use of a question mark to describe RN's documented experience; it is not credible and is rejected.10 Regarding exposure to lawsuits, Mr. Bevan's comparison was gratuitous. The RFP did not ask for information concerning lawsuits; and the lack of adverse litigation outcomes, while perhaps interesting and even relevant, was not an evaluation criterion. Further, Mr. Bevan was aware of Global's litigation track record not because of information contained in Global's proposal (for such data was not included therein) but because he previously had monitored litigation against the District arising from OTETA testing. Despite relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal for this comparison, Mr. Bevan made no attempt to determine whether RN had exposed a client to an adverse litigation outcome and hence had no idea whether RN had or had not done so. Yet, despite the absence of any basis in logic or fact for such a conclusion, the question mark in RN's column (adjacent to the favorable comment about Global) strongly implied that RN either had omitted material information about litigation or disclosed something disturbing or questionable. The unavoidable net effect of this prejudicial and unfair comparison was to put an exclamation point on the fact that Global had served satisfactorily as the incumbent vendor (and thus was a safe choice)——while portraying RN as a pig in a poke (and hence a gamble). Item No. 9. Mr. Bevan shone a flattering light on Laboratory Corporation of America ("LCA," the laboratory used by Global)——only one glitch in four years!——while labeling Quest Diagnostics ("Quest," used by RN) "questionable." This was problematic for several reasons. First, the RFP did not specify a preference for any particular laboratory. Second, Mr. Bevan's judgment was not based on the respective proposals but on his personal experiences. He had been pleased with LCA's services and preferred that the District continue to do business with that laboratory. But, as the comparison chart pointedly neglected to mention, Mr. Bevan's negative opinion of Quest was based on just one incident in which Quest had been slow in reporting the results of a retest that had been requested by an individual who had initially tested positive at LCA and requested that Quest perform the confirmatory test.11 Third, the judgment expressed on the relative merits of the proposers' laboratories was plainly qualitative; in other words, Mr. Bevan was evaluating the proposals, which was not properly his role, for he was not a de jure member of the committee. Item No. 10. Mr. Bevan's representation to the committee that LCA performed adulterant testing at no cost to the District was not based on Global's proposal, which neither mentioned adulterant testing nor quoted a price for such service, but on his experience with Global. (Incidentally, neither Mr. Bevan's testimony, nor any other evidence, persuasively established that Global or LCA had, in fact, been performing adulterant testing. Rather, the District’s employees assumed that such was the case——as it may, or may not, have been.) Aside from the impropriety of relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal, Mr. Bevan's contrast with RN's proposal ("TestSure is broken out as a separate entity") was both incorrect and incomplete, producing a false, "apples to oranges" comparison. First, as four pages of descriptive information included in RN's proposal made clear, TestSure is Quest's trademark for its adulterant testing protocol, which Quest considers a "breakthrough in technology for the industry." Contrary to Mr. Bevan's statement, TestSure is not a "separate entity." Thus, the apparently-intended implication that RN's price was higher because it was proposing to use a “separate entity” (in addition to Quest) for adulterant testing was untrue. Second, the information provided by RN concerning TestSure, rather than being a negative strike against RN's proposal, as Mr. Bevan's comparison suggested, was (or should have been) helpful in evaluating RN's proposal, a plus. While the committee certainly could have chosen to discount or ignore Quest's glowing review of its own product as puffery, the fact was that while Global's proposal said nothing about adulterant testing, RN had submitted some information on the subject. Finally, Mr. Bevan did not specify that his remark about Global's supposed offer to provide adulterant testing at "no charge" was merely an assumption that, for all that appears in Global's proposal, may or may not be true. This omission was especially unfair to RN because RN had stated explicitly in its cost proposal that an additional dollar would be charged for an adulterant panel——and that the District could save the dollar by electing not to have the panel performed on general tests. An impartial summary would have acknowledged RN's prices for general tests, both with and without an adulterant panel, and noted that Global's proposal was silent as to whether its quote of $25.00 for general testing included an adulterant panel. To state unqualifiedly that Global would provide adulterant testing for free, when its proposal said nothing of the sort, was patently inequitable. The First Evaluation and Recommendation After meeting for two hours on April 11, and having considered Mr. Bevan’s comparison chart, the committee voted to recommend that the contract be awarded to Global. In the minutes of the meeting, it was reported that [b]oth Proposals were evaluated according to the criteria outlined in the proposal. A comparison was made of services provided, locations for testing, cost, and other requirements. The committee recommended that Global MRO be awarded the contract. In addition to providing a reasonable fee schedule, the locations for drug testing, and the prior outstanding service provided by Global MRO, supports the committee’s decision. RN timely protested the intended award, the Board referred the matter to DOAH, and a final hearing was scheduled for July 30, 2001. Before the final hearing, however, the Board determined that the April 11, 2001, meeting might have occurred in violation of the Sunshine Law. Accordingly, the final hearing was postponed to enable the committee to reconvene in a public meeting for the purpose of reevaluating the proposals in compliance with the Sunshine Law. The Second Evaluation and Recommendation The committee met for a second time on September 4, 2001, pursuant to a prior written notice of proceedings. The September 4 meeting was open to the public. Although each of the original members of the committee was asked to return, two of them——Mr. Diaz and Ms. Freeman——were unable to attend the second meeting. In their places appeared subordinates as “representatives,” Pat Parham for Mr. Diaz and Enrique Sacasa for Ms. Freeman. Four members of this committee had no direct involvement in or experience with the drug screening services that were the subject of the contract for which proposals had been solicited. Of the five, only Ms. Kidney was knowledgeable about the program areas and service requirements for which contractual services were being sought. Once again, staff persons were present, ostensibly to answer technical questions. Mr. Bevan and Mr. Conde returned. With them this time were Barbara M. Moss, District Director, Office of Professional Standards; Brenda Miles, Executive Director, Professional and Technical Staffing; and Linda Cantin, Supervisor, Division of Procurement Management. Mr. Bevan did not distribute his comparison chart at the committee’s public meeting and made only a couple of comments there in response to questions. After conferring, the committee found both proposals to be responsive and voted unanimously to recommend that Global be awarded the contract. In the minutes of the September 4, 2001, meeting, it was reported that [t]he committee agreed that both proposals were good, and clearly stated an understanding of the work to be performed. There were concerns expressed, however, regarding [RN’s proposal] in reference to the location and convenience of collection sites. . . . . [Global] was selected because of the larger number of collection sites for urine that are available and the locations of these sites throughout various parts of the county, which would be of convenience to applicants and employees, and its experience. RN’s Protest By letter to the Board’s counsel dated September 6, 2001, RN amended its pending protest of the first recommendation to challenge the second proposed award with a newly-revised statement of grounds.12 As bases for relief, RN asserted that Global’s proposal was materially non-responsive for failure to comply with several of the RFP’s technical requirements; it also alleged that the committee’s evaluation had been flawed in several respects. Ultimate Factual Determinations Certain Ultimate findings of fact have been rendered below under the heading “Conclusions of Law.” This has been done for organizational convenience and for clarity of analysis. Accordingly, the findings announced in paragraphs 114, 120, 130, 134, 156, 159, 161-64, 167, and 169, infra, are hereby incorporated as Findings of Fact, as if fully set forth in the instant section of this Recommended Order.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order rescinding the proposed award to Global. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2002.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569, 120.57, 287.001, 287.012, 287.017, 287.057

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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs ANTHONY E. RICE, 89-004537 (1989)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 22, 1989 Number: 89-004537 Latest Update: Sep. 07, 1990

The Issue The issue for determination at the formal hearing was whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character by unlawfully and knowingly possessing cocaine and introducing cocaine into his body in violation of Subsections 943.13(7) and 943.1395(5), (6), Florida Statutes. 1/

Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (the "Commission") on April 4, 1982. Respondent was employed as a police officer by the Metro- Dade Police Department for approximately seven and a half years as of September 15, 1988. 2/ During 1988, Respondent was assigned to the Miami International Airport. Metro-Dade police officers were subject to annual physical examinations as part of the terms of their employment. The examinations were routinely scheduled on an alphabetical rotation system. Respondent was notified by his employer approximately three weeks prior to the date of his annual physical for 1988. Respondent reported to Mount Sinai Medical Center, Industrial Medicine, for his annual physical on March 2, 1988. In the course of his physical, Respondent was given a sterile specimen cup by Nurse Linda Arama for collection of a urine sample. Respondent provided the urine sample as directed. Respondent's urine sample was processed in a routine manner and tested at about 10 p.m. on March 2, 1988. At the time it was given, Respondent's urine sample was poured into two smaller cups and capped (the "two smaller sample cups"). Each cap was sealed with special security evidence tape designed to disclose any evidence of tampering. Respondent's urine sample was assigned a unique identification number (116958). Respondent's name, date of birth, social security number and identification number were placed on each of the two smaller sample cups and entered on a chain of custody transmittal form. The two smaller sample cups were then stored in a locked metal specimen box. The specimen box was picked up by courier and transferred to Toxicology Testing Service on the afternoon of March 2, 1988. Israel Sanchez, a forensic toxicologist technician employed at Toxicology Testing Service, inspected the two smaller sample cups at about 10 p.m. on March 2, 1988. Mr. Sanchez assigned an additional number (30658) to the two smaller sample cups and noted that the sealed special security evidence tape was in tact. Mr. Sanchez opened one of the two smaller sample cups and dispensed a small portion of Respondent's urine for drug testing. Mr. Sanchez used a Hitashi 705 screening instrument to conduct the drug test. Respondent's urine tested positive for cocaine in two separate tests conducted by Mr. Sanchez. Urine samples that screen positive using the Hitashi 705 screening instrument are also tested by the gas chromatography mass spectrometry method (the "chromatorgraphy test") as a routine procedure at Toxicology Testing Service. John de Kanel, an expert in forensic toxicology, performed the analysis of Respondent's urine sample using the chromatography test. The chromatography test revealed that Respondent's urine sample contained cocaine metabolite ecgonine methyl ester, which is also known as methyl ecgonine. This metabolite is a unique by-product of the processing of cocaine by the human body. Respondent's urine sample contained approximately 225 nanograms per milliliter of cocaine and its metabolites. The results of the chromatography test were consistent with cocaine use. Respondent was notified on March 11, 1988, that he had tested positive for cocaine during his annual physical. The same day, Respondent submitted two urine samples for drug testing on his own initiative. One sample was given to Toxicology Testing Service. The other sample was given to North Shore Hospital where Respondent was referred by Dr. Benton Perry, Respondent's personal physician. Respondent tested negative for both urine samples given on March 11, 1988. It is not likely that an habitual user would have no positive nanogram readings nine days after the habitual use had stopped. Nanogram readings of a sustained user would be approximately 80,000 to 100,000 if use was continued up to the time of testing. Patients undergoing drug rehabilitation typically have positive test results in the low 1000 ng/ml. The quantity of a substance found in a urine sample is estimated by comparing the numerical value found in the sample with the numerical value of a drug screening from a control sample. Control samples are run at 100 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml). A numerical value of 225 ng/ml indicates cocaine was ingested in some way but neither indicates the method of ingestion nor whether cocaine was knowingly ingested. The ingestion of milligram quantities of cocaine approximately 14 hours before a urine sample was given could produce a numerical value of 225 ng/ml. The Commission requires the employing agency to use an immunoassay screen that is capable of a minimum of 300 ng/ml of cocaine or cocaine metabolites. Screening tests are sold commercially with a minimum screening level of 300 ng/ml. The Metro Dade County maximum acceptable level for cocaine or cocaine metabolites is 50 ng/ml. Respondent has never knowingly used drugs or alcohol, and does not smoke cigarettes. Respondent never tested positive for drug use in any of his previous physical examinations during his seven and a half years as a police officer for the Miami Dade Police Department. Respondent never tested positive for drug use as a result of eight random drug tests administered to him after testing positive on March 2, 1988. 3/ Respondent did not drink excessive amounts of water or indulge in excessive exercise either before or after his test on March 2, 1988. The totality of the evidence refuted any inference that Respondent knowingly or unlawfully ingested cocaine prior to his annual physical on March 2, 1988. Respondent's testimony was credible and persuasive. Respondent's actions and conduct before and after his test on March 2, 1988, were not consistent with the actions and conduct of one who knowingly and unlawfully used cocaine.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order finding the Respondent not guilty of the charges in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of September, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 1990.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57, 943.13, 943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.0011, 11B-27.00225

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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs RICHARD D. BEACH, 99-002824 (1999)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jun. 24, 1999 Number: 99-002824 Latest Update: May 23, 2001

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent's corrections officer license is subject to suspension, revocation or other discipline.

Findings Of Fact On August 29, 1996, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that Respondent's corrections officer license should be disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 943, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character by testing positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, which was indicative of the illegal ingestion of a controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On September 5, 1996, Respondent filed an Election of Rights in which he disputed the allegations of the Administrative Complaint and requested an administrative hearing. Thereafter, the case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings on June 23, 1999. The Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at Volusia Correctional Institution (VCI) in early 1991. A corrections officer is a special risk employee in a safety sensitive position. At the time of licensure Respondent passed his drug screen. In 1996, the month of February had 29 days. In February 1996, Warden Bruce Scherer received allegations of possible drug abuse by Respondent from Connie Beach, Respondent's (then) wife. Respondent's wife was also a corrections officer. Ms. Beach had been in the Warden's office asking for a day off to retrieve her belongings from the marital home due to personal problems with Respondent. Upon inquiry of the Warden, the Warden learned that Ms. Beach's brother Carroll Bradshaw had smoked marijuana with Respondent. The Warden called the brother by telephone. The brother confirmed he had smoked marijuana with Respondent several occasions. In response, the Warden asked Respondent to submit to a drug test. Respondent was cooperative and agreed to submit to the drug test. Volusia Correctional Institution does not conduct random drug testing. At no time did Respondent question why he was being asked to submit to a drug test. Bolton accompanied Respondent to the Halifax Hospital facility to submit a urine specimen for drug testing. In testing specimens for marijuana, two tests are conducted; the first of these is an immunoassay screen, and the second is a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) test. The GCMS test is the more definitive test which specifically identifies THC, the major metabolite of marijuana. THC is also the part of marijuana which gives it its psycho-active properties. Cut-off levels are used in the testing process in order to exclude positive test results for persons who may have had accidental (or second-hand) exposure to marijuana. Respondent submitted his first urine sample for drug testing on February 28, 1996. On March 4, 1996, the results on the immunoassay screen came back positive for cannabinoid (marijuana). The sample first tested positive. It then tested about 300 nanograms of THC in the GCMS test. On March 19, 1996, a second test was conducted on Respondent's original urine sample. On March 20, 1996, the results of that test were received and reviewed by Dr. Hung Doan. The GCMS test showed 259 nanograms of THC. The result was confirmatory of the first as positive for marijuana. Dr. Hung Doan is a certified Medical Review Officer (MRO). He is certified as to his knowledge of drugs, their medical usage and ingestion. Dr. Doan is an expert in the field. Dr. Doan was the MRO who reviewed and certified the results of Respondent's two positive drug tests in 1996. The high levels of marijuana detected in the two positive tests of Respondent's urine sample conclusively establish that the results could not have been caused by accidental or passive inhalation of marijuana. The results did not rule out ingestion of marijuana since the evidence showed that about two cigarette sized amounts of marijuana would produce results similar to those found on Respondent's tests. However, the evidence did not show that Respondent had eaten any marijuana. Only multiple "accidental" exposures to, in conjunction with "accidental" ingestion of marijuana could possibly have resulted in the nanogram levels detected in Respondent's urine without his knowledge. Respondent did not produce any evidence beyond speculation to suggest that this might have occurred in his case. Mr. Beach was notified of the first positive test on March 4, 1996, by Mary Yochum, Dr. Doan's assistant. Respondent's response to being told that he tested positive for marijuana was "okay." He was concerned with the result but could not go into detail over the phone because other officers were present. On March 6, 1996, Respondent submitted a separate urine sample for the purposes of having an independent drug test. The results of that test were negative for marijuana. However, this second test occurred seven days after the first urine sample was given. The test only shows Respondent's level of cannabinoid on the latter date had decreased or diluted sufficiently to fall below the cut-off point for such tests. Marijuana can clear the human body's system within days. However, a chronic user of marijuana may take up to 75 days before the drug clears the persons system. It depends on the persons individual metabolism. Carroll Bradshaw is the ex-brother-in-law of Respondent. Mr. Bradshaw is a known drug user and convicted felon. He was last released from incarceration in 1998 after serving time for a cocaine charge. He continues to use drugs to date. Mr. Bradshaw regularly socialized, and smoked marijuana with Respondent. However, he had not smoked marijuana for quite a while before receiving the telephone call from the Warden. Respondent admittedly was familiar with the smell and appearance of marijuana. Respondent would typically supply and prepare the marijuana which he and his brother-in-law smoked while socializing. Respondent kept his stash of marijuana on a "paraphernalia" tray underneath his couch in his home. Respondent's former mother-in-law, who was also familiar with the look and smell of marijuana because of her son's problems, witnessed Respondent smoking marijuana with her son and others. She confirmed the testimony of her son and her daughter as to Respondent's use of marijuana. Given these facts Petitioner has shown clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Chapter 943, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Gabrielle Taylor, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 John Stanton, Esquire 121 1/2 North Woodland Boulevard Suite 3 Deland, Florida 32720 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489

Florida Laws (4) 120.57, 893.13, 943.13, 943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (3) 11B-27.0011, 11B-27.00225, 11B-27.005

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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING vs KIMBERLY A. HUDSON, 05-000601PL (2005)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Feb. 22, 2005 Number: 05-000601PL Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2019

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should discipline Respondent's pari-mutuel wagering occupational license for allegedly preventing authorized personnel from taking a urine sample from a greyhound after a race in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-6.005(9).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency responsible for regulating pari-mutuel wagering in the state. Respondent holds pari-mutuel wagering occupational license number 467790-1021. On August 4, 2004, Respondent was the trainer of record of two racing greyhounds named "Vonda Easy" and "Zito Easy." Both dogs competed in the fourth race of the matinee performance at Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club (the race). Vonda Easy finished first in the race. As the winner of a race, Vonda Easy was subject to mandatory drug testing pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-6.005(1). Veterinary Assistant Mr. Anthony Manfredi met Respondent at the detention enclosure in the finish area for the purpose of walking Vonda Easy and collecting a post-race urine sample. Respondent brought Vonda Easy and Zito Easy to the detention area and refused to walk Vonda Easy without Zito Easy. Respondent effectively interfered with the required urine collection from Vonda Easy by brining two dogs to the detention area and insisting that both dogs walk during the urine collection process in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-6.005(9). Mr. Manfredi asked Respondent to give Zito Easy to someone else while Mr. Manfredi attempted to get a urine sample from Vonda Easy. Respondent told Mr. Manfredi that she was going to walk both dogs together since they were from the same kennel. Another person was not available at the detention area to hold Zito Easy during the urine collection from Vonda Easy. Mr. Manfredi asked Respondent a second time to only bring one dog with her during the urine sample collection process. He informed Respondent that having more than one dog in the urine sample collection area would interfere with his ability to collect a urine sample. Respondent refused to bring only one dog into the urine sample collection area. Rather, Respondent brought two greyhounds with her into the urine sample collection area and effectively prevented the collection of the required urine sample. The purpose of collecting a urine sample from a racing greyhound is to protect the health and welfare of the racing greyhound by testing to see if any impermissible substances are present in the body of the racing greyhound. The collection of a post-race urine sample from a racing greyhound also ensures that the medication rules of the state are being followed. Trainers, including Respondent, must comply with procedures and policies designed to ensure that the correct animal has been sampled and that there is little or no opportunity for any kind of contamination to occur at the test site. Trainer compliance ensures the integrity of the testing process. The procedures and policies for testing animals are set forth in the Greyhound Veterinary Assistant Handbook (Handbook). In relevant part, the Handbook prohibits an owner/trainer from walking two dogs at once in the finish area after a race. The urine sample collection area at the track is limited and does not easily accommodate two dogs. Walking two greyhounds at the same time may cause a sample to go uncollected due to having the presence of the other greyhound. The presence of two dogs increases the likelihood of contaminating a post- race urine sample. The presence of Vonda Easy and Zito Easy in fact prevented the collection of the mandatory urine sample.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-6.005(9), and impose an administrative fine of $1,000 pursuant to Subsection 550.105(5)(d), Florida Statutes (2004). DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefan Thomas Hoffer, Esquire Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Kimberly A. Hudson 5622 Tangerine Avenue, South Gulfport, Florida 33711 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (3) 120.57, 120.69, 550.105 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61D-6.005

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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING vs KIRK M. ZIADIE, 14-004716PL (2014)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 10, 2014 Number: 14-004716PL Latest Update: Jan. 12, 2016

The Issue Whether Respondent raced an animal with a drug in violation of section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2012),1/ as alleged in the Administrative Complaints, and, if so, what sanction is appropriate.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order finding Mr. Kirk M. Ziadie guilty of 18 counts of violating section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-6.002(1); imposing an administrative fine of $18,000; and suspending his license for six years. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2015.

Florida Laws (8) 120.52, 120.54, 120.56, 120.569, 120.57, 120.68, 550.0251, 550.2415 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61D-6.005

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs MICHAEL N. HEIMUR, C.N.A., 08-005800PL (2008)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Nov. 19, 2008 Number: 08-005800PL Latest Update: Jun. 26, 2009

The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a licensed certified nursing assistant, holding Florida license number 113243. On or about December 14, 2008, the Petitioner submitted to a drug screening urinalysis test at the request of an employer, Maxim Healthcare Services (Maxim). The sample was collected at a Maxim facility located at University Park, Florida. The Forensic Drug Testing Custody and Control Form and the urine sample collection container bear handwritten dates of December 13, 2008. At some point, the dates on the form and the container were overwritten to indicate that the sample was collected on December 14, 2008. According to the Respondent's Response to the Petitioner's Request for Admissions, the sample was collected on April 14, 2008. The Petitioner presented an expert witness who testified as to the testing procedures, including custody and storage of the urine samples to be tested. The expert witness' testimony regarding sample collection and transportation, calibration of equipment, sample storage and testing methodology, and reporting of test results, was persuasive and has been fully credited. According to the documentation presented by the Petitioner's expert witness, the sample collection container was received by the testing laboratory on December 15, 2008, with all transportation packaging and the sample container seal intact. According to the expert witness, the test for which Maxim paid, screened for ten drugs, including marijuana. According to the expert witness, the testing equipment was properly calibrated at the time the Respondent's urine sample was tested. The initial immunoassay test result indicated the presence of a recognized by-product of marijuana (delta nine tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid) in the Respondent's urine sample. Because the first result was positive, a second test was performed using a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry device, which confirmed the presence of delta nine tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid in the Respondent's urine sample. The Respondent denied using marijuana. The Respondent asserted that the test results were inaccurate. The Respondent testified that he had a prescription for, and was taking, hydrocodone at the time he provided the urine sample for the test at issue in this proceeding, but that the test results did not indicate the presence of hydrocodone. The Respondent asserted that the test result was either the result of lab error or that the sample was not his urine. The Petitioner's expert witness testified that the screening tests purchased by Maxim included limited testing for opiates and would not have indicated the presence of hydrocodone in the Respondent's urine. Although the Respondent testified that he had been told by Maxim personnel that the test results should have revealed the presence of hydrocodone, the Respondent's testimony in this regard was uncorroborated hearsay and was insufficient to support a finding of fact. Although the Respondent asserted that the sample tested was either not his urine or was otherwise tampered with, the evidence failed to support the assertion. There was no evidence that the sample was tampered with in any manner when the sample was obtained or during transportation to the testing laboratory. There was no evidence that the seal on the sample collection container was not intact at the time the sample was provided or transported. There was no evidence that the sample was stored improperly. There was no evidence that the testing equipment was not properly calibrated or that the tests were improperly performed. The Respondent testified, without contradiction, that over the course of 20 years in nursing work both before and after the tests at issue in this proceeding, his test results have never reported the presence of marijuana.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order assessing a fine of $250, requiring completion of an IPN evaluation, and imposing a 12-month period of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Ana M. Viamonte Ros, Secretary State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Rick Garcia, MS, RN, CCM Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Patricia Dittman, Ph.D(C), RN, CDE Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Megan M. Blancho, Esquire Carla Schell, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Michael N. Heimur, C.N.A. 4901 South Salford Boulevard North Port, Florida 34287

Florida Laws (5) 120.569, 120.57, 464.018, 464.204, 893.03 Florida Administrative Code (2) 64B9-8.005, 64B9-8.006

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CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs CURTIS R. BRUNGARDT, 13-004135PL (2013)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tamarac, Florida Oct. 21, 2013 Number: 13-004135PL Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2014

The Issue Whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was certified as a correctional officer, having been issued Correctional Certificate No. 301820. Respondent has been employed by the Jefferson County Correctional Institution for the past year and a half. During that time, he has submitted to periodic random urinalysis testing as part of his employment. While at work on February 21, 2013, Respondent was informed that he had been selected for a random drug test. He and several other correctional officers were transported by van to LabCorp, located on Blountstown Highway in Tallahassee, to provide a urine sample. Tairra Wolfe is a certified phlebotomist who is employed by LabCorp at the Blountstown Highway location. In addition to being a phlebotomist, she performs DNA and drug testing, as well as processing. Ms. Wolfe described the process that is used at LabCorp when a person comes in for drug testing. First, the person being tested (the donor) brings in a consent form from his or her employer, and signs the consent form. The donor is then taken to the back, where the donor is given a cup for the urine specimen and is then instructed to go into the bathroom to provide a urine specimen in the cup. The tester is not in the bathroom when the specimen is given. After coming out of the bathroom, the donor hands the cup containing the urine specimen to Ms. Wolfe. She then tells the donor to use hand sanitizer, and to wait there. In the presence of the donor, she pours the urine specimen into another container, seals that container, and puts labels over the container. The container is sealed in front of the donor with tape that prevents the specimen from being opened without breaking the seal. Ms. Wolfe then labels the specimen and has the donor initial and date it in front of her. The seal contains a bar code. Respondent’s specimen was assigned a specimen ID of 0582899940. Ms. Wolfe then places the sealed container in a bag, which is also sealed and labeled with the specimen number and bar code, and which is also tamper resistant. The bag containing the specimen is placed in a large box in the processing room. This box is sealed at the end of each day and is picked up by a LabCorp courier. Lastly, the donor signs the chain of custody form in the section entitled “Completed by Donor.” Ms. Wolfe also signs the chain of custody form in the section entitled “Completed by Collector.” The section of the chain of custody form entitled “Completed by Donor” states in part: I certify that I provided my urine specimen to the collector; that I have not adulterated it in any manner; each specimen bottle used was sealed with a tamper-evident seal in my presence; and that the information provided on this form and on the label affixed to each specimen is correct. The chain of custody form for the urine specimen which is at issue in this proceeding is signed by both Ms. Wolfe and Respondent. Respondent’s specimen was transported to a LabCorp forensic drug testing laboratory in Southhaven, Mississippi. Ajai Saini is the lab manager at the Southhaven laboratory. He is responsible for all of the administrative and technical decisions to ensure the quality and timeliness of the laboratory results. He has extensive professional experience in the field of toxicology. The specimen was assigned a unique specimen ID or accession number used to identify that specimen for all processes within the laboratory. The specimen ID labeled as Respondent’s was assigned a specimen ID number of 0582899940. When received by the Southhaven lab, the primary specimen bottle seal was intact. The lab accessioned the bottle into their storage and aliquoted a sample of that bottle for testing. The urine sample was analyzed by LabCorp and a report was generated. The specimen was screened and confirmed positive for both marijuana and cocaine. This result was reviewed and certified. The initial test performed by LabCorp is an immunoassay test used to screen all samples. Any sample that is a presumptive positive by that screening method is then tested by a confirmatory method, i.e., gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. In examining the test results for the sample identified as Respondent’s, Mr. Saini concluded that it tested positive for cocaine and marijuana metabolite. Respondent does not dispute the test results but rather asserts that the samples were mixed up in the Tallahassee LabCorp facility. Respondent testified at hearing that he had been tested several times before but that his experience on February 21, 2013, was different from previous testing days. In particular, there were many more correctional officers being tested that day than on previous occasions, and the process varied from those previous occasions. Typically, the officers signed in at the front counter, and did not sign anything else until later. Respondent asserts that because of the greater number of officers being tested, the officers were given the labels to sign at the front counter before going back to be tested. “I didn’t sign my label because I have already previously signed it out front.” Respondent believes that the urine which tested positive is not his. On cross examination, Ms. Wolfe continued to maintain that the process she described in her testimony is the process she uses every day. She did not recall any variation in this process on any day, and stressed the importance of the donor watching her pour the sample and seal it, and of her watching the donor sign the label and chain of custody form in front of her. While the undersigned found Respondent’s testimony to be credible, it alone was not enough to overcome the clear and convincing evidence presented by Petitioner. That is, that the sample identified as Respondent’s tested positive for illegal substances. Respondent asserts that all previous random drug tests he has taken have been negative, and that he has a good employment record. No evidence was presented to indicate otherwise.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards Commission enter a final order finding Respondent in violation of section 943.1395(7), as defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d). It is further recommended that Respondent’s certification be suspended for a period of 120 days, followed by probation for a period of two years. As condition of probation, it is recommended that the Commission require random drug testing and substance abuse counseling, as contemplated by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.005(7)(c). DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Curtis R. Brungardt (Address of record) Jennifer Cook Pritt, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (8) 112.0455, 120.56, 120.57, 893.03, 893.13, 943.13, 943.1395, 944.474

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