Findings Of Fact Ernest Brown is a registered real estate salesman holding a registration issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Brown received notice of the instant hearing as required by the statutes and rules. His probation officer testified she had contacted him and he had advised her that he would not attend the proceedings. Brown was placed on probation with an adjudication of guilt withheld by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, on January 25, 1989 (see Exhibit 2). Paragraph 10 of the conditions of probation requires that Brown serve 180 days in the Pinellas County Jail on weekends from 7:00 p.m. Friday until 7:00 p.m. Sunday. Because of the appeal of his case, Brown did not begin serving this jail term until August 24, 1989. He has served 72 of the 180 days according to the records of his probation officer. Brown is currently in the custody of the State's probation department.
Recommendation The Board's counsel advised the Hearing Officer after hearing that Respondent had surrender his license. This constitutes an ex parte communication of which notice is hereby given to all parties. This fact is immaterial to consideration of the matter at hand. The Board has long taken the position, quite correctly, that surrendering of a license did not impair jurisdiction to consider violations of its statutes by a licensee while licensed. Similarly, surrender of a license cannot terminate the Hearing Officer's consideration of the matter after hearing. The instant case was duly heard and the Recommended Order prepared prior to receipt of any pleadings relative to surrender by Brown of his license. At this point, the Board may accept surrender of the license and dismiss the Administrative Complaint, in which case Brown would be considered not to have had any disciplinary action against him, or the Board may enter its final order based upon the record and this Recommended Order. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the license of Ernest Brown. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Ernest B. Brown 2027 Thirteenth Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33172
The Issue Whether Rule 33-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Richard Charles Gaston, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent stipulated that the Petitioner has standing to institute this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Rule 33-7.005, Florida Administrative Code. Section 944.292, Florida Statutes, provides that the civil rights of persons convicted of a felony as defined in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution of the State of Florida, are suspended "until such rights are restored by a full pardon, conditional pardon, or restoration of civil rights granted pursuant to s. 8, Art. IV of the State Constitution." Section 8, Article IV of the Constitution of the State of Florida, authorizes the Governor to grant pardons restoring civil rights with approval of three members of the Cabinet. The initiation of the process for consideration of whether an inmate should have his or her civil rights restored pursuant to Section 8, Article IV of the Constitution of the State of Florida, is governed by Section 944.293, Florida Statutes (1989). Section 944.293, Florida Statutes (1989), provides the following: Initiation of restoration of civil rights. --With respect to those persons convicted of a felony, the following procedure shall apply: Prior to the time an offender is discharged from supervision, an authorized agent of the department shall obtain from the Governor the necessary application and other forms required for the restoration of civil rights. The authorized agent shall insure that the application and all necessary material are forwarded to the Governor before the offender is discharged from supervision. In implementing Section 944.293, Florida Statutes, the Respondent has promulgated Rule 33-7.005, Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rule"). The Challenged Rule provides, in pertinent part: Discharge of an Inmate. When an inmate has completed all combined sentences imposed upon him or is released by parole, pardon or court order, the Secretary or his designated agent shall furnish such inmate with a certificate of discharge upon his release from custody. All qualified inmates shall be given the opportunity at the time of their release to complete an application for restoration of civil rights, Form DC4-322, Restoration of Civil Rights. Form DC4-322 is hereby incorporated by reference. A copy of this form may be obtained from any institution or from the Bureau of Admission and Release, Department of Corrections . . . . The Respondent releases approximately 40,000 to 45, 000 inmates each year. The release of an inmate, including an inmate convicted of a felony, involves a somewhat lengthy process and the completion of a number of forms, including a form for restoration of civil rights. The date upon which an inmate is to be released from prison becomes "frozen" seven days prior to the inmate's release. Even after the release date is determined and considered "frozen", however, that release date may be modified because of conduct of the inmate after the date is "frozen" but before the inmate is actually released. The completion of the forms necessary to institute a determination of whether an inmate's civil rights should be restored begins approximately 120 days prior to the inmate's projected release. Pursuant to the Challenged Rule, the Respondent has designated an employee of the Respondent at Marion Correctional Institute to interview inmates to be released and provide a Form DC4-322, Restoration of Civil Rights (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), to inmates to be released. A completed Application is mailed by the Respondent to the Florida Parole Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") on the date that the inmate is released from prison. The Respondent does not send the completed Application until the day the inmate is actually released from prison because the release date may change at any time prior to the actual time the inmate is released. The weight of the evidence failed to prove, however, that the Respondent cannot inform the Commission after it has forwarded an application that the inmate's proposed release date has been modified or that the Commission would not ignore an application upon such notification. Some, but not all, inmates convicted of felonies may not be eligible for restoration of their civil rights at the time of their release from prison; these inmates are subject to supervision after leaving prison. Some inmates convicted of felonies, such as the Petitioner, have, however, completely served their sentences and are released from all supervision at the time they are released from prison. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that such inmates are not eligible for restoration of their civil rights immediately upon their release from prison.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: As of the hearing date of March 15, 1982, the commission had not prepared subject-matter indices of its Orders entered after January 1, 1975 resulting from: petitions for rulemaking; hearings held pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. determinations relating to presumptive and effective parole release dated (parole grants) or parole revocations; petitions for a declaratory statement issued prior to approximately July of 1981, or other final orders not otherwise defined. Other than as referred to in paragraph 2 of these Findings of Fact, the Commission has not produced indices of its current 1981 orders. (TR. 9) Neither the Commission's General Counsel nor the Planning and Evaluation Director, both of whom receive their assignments of duties and responsibilities from the Commission, have been directed by the Commission to prepare a subject- matter index of final Commission orders issued pursuant to hearings held under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, or petitions for rulemaking. (TR. 34, 35, 37 & 104) The Commission's General Counsel and Planning and Evaluation Director would prepare such indices only if directed to do so by the Commission. (TR. 35 & 104) The General Counsel's office has been directed by the Commission to prepare an index of declaratory statements issued by the Commission. With the aid of an assistant counsel, the Commission's General Counsel has prepared a subject-matter index of declaratory statements purportedly issued as of September 30, 1981. (Appellant's Exhibit 3) This index utilizes key words or topics, without further citation to statutes or rules. It includes all declaratory statements issued by the Commission during the approximately ninety- day period prior to September 30, 1981. The General Counsel, who has been in that position since March of 1980, was aware of no other declaratory statements issued by the Commission or petitions for a declaratory statement submitted to the Commission. (TR. 108) A draft of an update to the subject-matter index for declaratory statements issued after September 30, 1981 has been prepared and was expected to be in final form within thirty days of March 15, 1982. The Office of General Counsel will prepare and produce an updated subject-matter index of declaratory statements on at least a quarterly basis. (TR. 101-103) As indicated by the opinions rendered in the case of Turner v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 379 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1980) aff'd, 389 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1980), and various issues of the Florida Administrative Weekly, 1/ petitions for a declaratory statement have been received and ruled upon by the Commission prior to July 1, 1981. As noted above, the witnesses presented by the Commission to testify in this proceeding had not been assigned the task of preparing subject-matter indices for orders on petitions for rulemaking, orders following hearings conducted pursuant to section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and other final agency decisions which are equivalent to "orders". Involved in the preparation such indices would be a review of the file and a development of a subject heading or headings for each such order. The Commission presented no further evidence regarding the practicability or cost of preparing such indices or any lack of public benefit to be derived from access to such indices. Absent such evidence, it is specifically found that it would not be impracticable, unduly time- consuming, or cost-prohibitive for the Commission to prepare or produce subject- matter indices of its Orders resulting from petitions for rulemaking, Section 120.57 hearings or other final agency decisions which are equivalent to "orders." Whatever inconvenience such indices cause the Commission in terms of time and costs of preparation are far outweighed by the public benefit to be derived from accessibility to the Commission's interpretations of the law and development of agency practice and incipient policy. The Commission has failed, without sufficient justification, to comply with the Court's mandate and Order dated September 3, 1981, to "forthwith prepare and report that it has prepared indices of its declaratory statements and of petitions to the Commission for rulemaking" and has further failed to comply with its own approved proposal to produce induced of current 1981 orders on or before November 30, 1981. Because of a change in the statutes effective January 1, 1979, with respect to the granting of parole and the establishment of presumptive and effective parole release dates, orders of the Commission entered prior to that date have no relationship to orders entered after that date. Therefore, the public would gain no present benefit from an index of parole granting orders entered prior to January 1, 1979. The appellant, Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. , has withdrawn its request to have the Commission index parole granting orders issued from January 1, 1975 through December 31, 1978. (TR. 12 & 13) As to the period between January 1, 1979 through December 31, 1980, it would be beneficial to the public to have access to an index of only those parole granting orders which contain a reference to a constitutional provision, statute or rule, since such orders may contain the agency's interpretation of the law or incipient policy. The parole revocation process has not changed since 1975. It would be beneficial to the public to have access to all those parole revocation orders of the Commission entered since 1975 which contain a reference to a constitutional provision, statute, or a rule. Jay D. Farris, the Commission's Planning and Evaluation Director, has been appointed by the Commission to be in charge of the indexing project as it relates to parole granting orders (which includes Commission determinations on presumptive and effective parole release dates) and parole revocation orders. This assignment is in addition to his other duties which include the drafting of all legislation for the Commission, lobbying, acting as a part-time clerk of the Commission, preparing complex case analysis for the Commission, the drafting of proposed rules, holding public hearings for proposed rules and training Commission hearing examiners when there are rule changes. Mr. Farris has only a secretary on his staff. (TR. 28, 29) Since the District Court entered its opinion on November 26, 1980 (petition for rehearing denied on January 8, 1981) reported at 391 So.2d 247, the Commission, through Mr. Farris, has conducted an investigation into the number of Commission actions which could possibly fall within the parameters of the Court's ruling regarding the prepartion of subject-matter indexing. It was determined that a minimum of 600 actions per week would fall under the purview of that decision. A private indexing firm would charge approximately $1.00 per action to review the data and produce an index. (Tr. 16) Determining that this cost would be prohibitive, Mr. Farris has been working with the Bureau of Management Information Systems (MIS) of the Department of corrections to prepare a computer program which would meet the Commission's indexing requirements. By statute, the department of Corrections maintains the sole offender-based information and records system for the joint use of the department of Corrections and the Commission. Section 20.315(20) Florida Statutes. The function of the Bureau of Management Information Systems of the Department of Corrections is the automation of departmental records for ease of retrieval and management information. To accomplish this function, the Department of Corrections shares a computer with the Supreme Court of Florida, with the Department owning 67 percent and the supreme Court owning 33 percent of the computer. The computer itself is located in the basement of the Supreme Court, but the Department of Corrections has approximately 40 terminals located in its headquarters in Tallahassee and in excess of 100 terminals located throughout the State. The computer maintains a complete offender record of each Florida inmate. This record includes the inmate's date of birth, race, sex, the offense for which he or she is incarcerated, other offenses, gain time accrued, presumptive, projected and current release dates and FDLE and FBI numbers. Without the prior preparation of a specific program by the Bureau of MIS, it is not possible to retrieve from the computer any generic information on Florida inmates. For example, while the computer presently has the ability to produce a screen view of the record of any particular inmate, it cannot search through its entire data base and produce screen printouts of the names of all those inmates meeting any particular criteria, such as those serving a mandatory 25-year capital life sentence. (TR. 91-94) The records of 53,700 offenders are presently contained in the computer's data base, with some 24,000 records being for active inmates. (TR. 93) In December of 1981, the Commission, through Mr. Farris, entered into discussions with Reynold L. Ferrari, the Chief of the Bureau of MIS for the Department of Corrections, and his staff regarding the subject of utilizing the computer system to produce and maintain a subject-matter index for Commission orders concerning the granting and/or revocation of parole. A basic technical problem presently exists in the computer program utilized by the Department of Corrections. The computer is only designed to handle single actions taken by the Commission on any particular day. Often, multiple separate actions by the Commission are taken in one day on a particular inmate, and the present computer programming does not allow multiple entries at one point in time. This problem is one of systems design and involves more than reprogramming. It involves a definition of a new data base that will have to be created for the Commission, and then programming it to provide the input capability to add additional data and defining the output reports that are required. (TR. 90) Once a systems design is accomplished and all the relevant data is in the computer, it will take about three weeks or less to produce a program that would result in a printout format similar to that developed and utilized by the Commission in its declaratory statement index. (Appellant's Exhibit 3, TR. 79, 84, 85) The Commission has not specifically or formally requested the Department of Corrections to resolve the multiple-action problem. It has simply asked the Department to look into the problem and estimate the length of time it would take to accomplish certain results. (Appellee's Exhibit 2) Mr. Ferrari has informed the Commission that he would need an exact and specific definition of the output required by the Commission and would work with the Commission and its staff in achieving the desired goals. (Appellee's Exhibit 3, TR. 89, 90) The answer to how long it would take to redesign the system is dependent upon a detailed definition of the information needed by the Commission. (TR. 98) A detailed statement of what is required by the Commission has not been provided to the Bureau of MIS. (TR. 99) The only evidence adduced by the Commission as to its time frame for providing the format the Commission requires was the statement of Mr. Farris that "I would like to have had it done some time ago, but just as soon as I possibly can. This has received a great deal of priority, I must say." (TR. 72) The Commission did make a budget request for two new positions--a data entry operator and a clerk typist III--in order to comply with indexing requirements and to augment their data input ability. (TR. 74, Appellee's Exhibit 4) Presently, the only information being provided by the Comission to the computer data base is current, single Commission action regarding presumptive parole release dates (PPRD) and the inmate's next interview date. Included within the PPRD information presently being put into the computer is a code which makes reference to aggravating factors contained in the Commission's rules. (TR. 69, 70) Prior Commission's actions regarding PPRDs have not been put into the computer data base. The manner in which this information will be retrieved or the printout format has not been developed yet. (TR. 52, 53) It is expected that the format will be similar to that developed for the index of declaratory statements. (Appellant's Exhibit 3). The Commission has not requested the department of Corrections to produce any particular format for a subject-matter index of parole granting or parole revocation orders (TR. 53, 54) and no evidence was tendered as to when such a request would be made. Mr. Farris, the person responsible for such indices, could give no specific date for the production of such indices (TR. 38) While the Commission has not prepared a final proposed style of indexing for Commission actions regarding presumptive and effective parole release and parole revocations, it is expected that such indices would be broken down by topic similar to that prepared by the Commission for declaratory statements. It is not known whether such indices will include citations to constitutional provisions, statutes or rules. (TR. 64) According to Mr. Farris, "the specification of the nature of the index is yet to be determined." (TR. 66) RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COURT The undersigned, as the appointed commissioner of the Court, has been charged with the responsibility to take evidence and report recommendations to the Court with respect to a determination of the following issues: The practicability of the Commission preparing indices of its orders entered from 1975 through 1980; and The reasonableness of the schedule proposed by the Commission in light of the proposed contents of the indices, the cost of preparation, and the public benefit to be gained therefrom. Prior to addressing those issues, it must first be noted that, with the exception of preparing a subject-matter index for a portion of its declaratory statements, the evidence adduced at the hearing illustrates that the Commission has made absolutely no effort to produce indices of its current 1981 orders. This action is contrary to the Court' s original mandate as well as Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Court's Order entered on September 3, 1981. There has been absolutely no evidence adduced in the proceedings before the undersigned as to a legitimate reason or justification for such noncompliance with the Court's directives. Indeed, the evidence illustrates that the Commission has simply not directed its attention to this important matter. Any problems attendant to the computer system utilized by the Department of Corrections should have absolutely no effect upon the ability of the Commission to immediately prepare subject- matter indices for all its Orders resulting from petitions for a declaratory statement, hearings conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, petitions for rulemaking or other matters which result in the issuance of the functional equivalent of an "order" as it is defined in Section 120.52(9). Florida Statutes. Turning now to the issues addressed in Paragraph 3 of the Court's September 3, 1981 Order, it is concluded from the evidence adduced at the hearing that it would not be impracticable or cost-prohibitive for the Commission to immediately prepare indices, whether arranged by subject matter and/or citations to constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions, for its Orders entered from 1975 through 1980 in those matters arising from: petitions for a declaratory statement, proceedings conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, petitions for rulemaking, and cases, such as the instant proceeding, which result in the functional equivalent of an "order" as defined in Section 120.52(9), Florida Statutes. The public benefit to be gained from such indices is obvious since such Orders are indicative of an agency's interpretation of the laws under which it operates and can indicate incipient agency policy as developed on a case-by-case basis. The Commission has made no good-faith effort or diligent attempt to comply with its own schedule for the accomplishment of the preparation of indices for the Orders listed above and neither the contents, costs, or practicability of preparing such indices justify the time frame proposed. With respect to the remaining Orders issued by the Commission between 1975 and 19890--those involving parole grants and parole revocations--it is concluded that an index of Orders on parole grants entered prior to 1979 would not be beneficial to the public due to the drastic change in the law which became effective on January 1, 1979. It is further concluded that only those post-1974 Orders concerning parole parole grants which contain a reference or citation to a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision would contain information beneficial to the public. Therefore, an index limited to such Orders would satisfy the requirements of Section 120.53(2)(c), Florida Statutes. The Commission has failed to adduce evidence that the preparation of a subject-matter and/or citator index for its Orders entered after January 1, 1975 involving parole revocation and its Orders entered after January 1, 1979 involving parole grants would be either impracticable or cost-prohibitive. While the computer system will need to be redesigned to accomplish multiple- entries in cases where the Commission takes more than one action on the same date regarding a single inmate, it is possible to make this change. The Bureau of Management Information Systems stands ready and able to effectuate such a design change and is simply waiting for a specific and detailed definition of the information sought to be retrieved by the Commission. Again, from the evidence adduced at the hearing, it appears that the Commission has simply made no diligent or good-faith effort to determine the format of the required indices or the information it desires to accomplish the indexing task. In summary, it is concluded that the Commission, along with the joint assistance and efforts of the Department of Corrections, presently has or can quickly obtain the capability of preparing indices of all Orders entered from 1975 through the present date. The Commission presented no evidence that the preparation of such indices would be cost-prohibitive, or that, other than its lack of attention to the matter, the contents of the indices would make the task unduly time-consuming or would otherwise render the indexing requirement prohibitive. With the exception of pre-1979 parole granting Orders and Orders granting or revoking parole which contain no reference to a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, the public will benefit from an index of, and consequently access to, all Orders of the Commission. In order to accomplish the indexing task, the Commission need only render a determination of the format for each index and provide the staff to either review the files containing the Commission Orders or provide the necessary input to the computer system so that the required information can be retrieved from the computer. The evidence presented by the Commission illustrates that not only has the Commission failed to adhere to its own proposed schedule of compliance with the law, the schedule proposed is unreasonably lengthy in terms of the contents, cost and information presently available, as well as the public benefit to be derived from the production of the indices. Respectfully submitted and entered this 4th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1982.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Real Estate Commission operates within the Department of Business and Professional Regulation and is the entity responsible for certifying to the Department that an applicant for licensure under Chapter 475 is qualified to practice as a real estate broker or salesperson. Sections 475.02 and .181, Florida Statutes. On or about January 24, 1997, Mr. Dempsey submitted to the Commission an application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Mr. Dempsey answered "yes" to Question No. 9 on the application, which asks in pertinent part: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" He attached the details to his application. Mr. Dempsey answered "yes" to Question No. 10(a) on the application, which asks in pertinent part: "Has any judgment or decree of a court been entered against you in this or any other state, . . . in which you were charged . . . with any fraudulent or dishonest dealing?" Mr. Dempsey attached the details of a 1988 conviction for mail fraud to his application. On December 12, 1983, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, revoked Mr. Dempsey's probation and sentenced him to two years imprisonment based on his plea of guilty to three counts each of uttering a forged instrument and of second degree grand theft, one count of forgery, and one count of failure to redeliver a hired motor vehicle. On July 9, 1986, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, sentenced Mr. Dempsey to three and one-half years imprisonment based on his plea of guilty to one count of robbery, one count of aggravated battery, one count of possession of cocaine, two counts of forgery, two counts of uttering a forged instrument, and two counts of second degree grand theft. On or about May 31, 1989, Judge Roettger of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced Mr. Dempsey to three years confinement based on a guilty plea to one count of mail fraud. The court withheld imposing a sentence of confinement on Mr. Dempsey for another count of the indictment, and sentenced him to five years probation, to run concurrently with the sentence of confinement. On December 21, 1990, Judge Moreno of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced Mr. Dempsey to fifteen months' imprisonment based on his plea of guilty to one count of escape. The sentence of imprisonment was suspended, and Mr. Dempsey was placed on a three-year term of supervised release. On January 29, 1992, Mr. Dempsey appeared in the Dade County Court and pled not guilty to one count of soliciting for prostitution. He was found guilty and sentenced to attend an AIDS course and to have an AIDS test. On May 27, 1992, Judge Moreno of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida revoked Mr. Dempsey's supervised release and sentenced him to one-year imprisonment for violation of the terms of his supervised release. On July 9, 1995, Judge Roettger of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida revoked Mr. Dempsey's probation and sentenced him to imprisonment for five years for violation of the conditions of his probation. On January 14, 1997, Mr. Dempsey was paroled by the United States Parole Commission and released from the Marianna Federal Correctional Institution. His parole expires May 14, 2000. Since January 23, 1997, Mr. Dempsey has been employed by Westgate Resorts, a timeshare resort in Miami, Florida. In July 1997, he was promoted to manager. Since he was found guilty in 1988 of mail fraud, Mr. Dempsey's only criminal conviction was for the misdemeanor of soliciting for prostitution. His other offenses were violations of the terms of his supervised release on the charge of escape and of his probation on the charge of mail fraud. The evidence presented in this case is not sufficient to establish that Mr. Dempsey, at this time, is of good character and trustworthiness and has a reputation for fair dealing. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Mr. Dempsey has been convicted of crimes involving forgery, grand theft, and mail fraud.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying the application of Lloyd Robert Dempsey for licensure as a real estate salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Lloyd Robert Dempsey, pro se 5577 La Gorce Drive Miami Beach, Florida 33140-2137 Andrea D. Perkins Assistant Attorney General Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Agency is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been since January 5, 1981, a medical doctor licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. His license number is ME 0037656. In or about February of 1988, a complaint was made against Respondent alleging that he engaged, or attempted to engage, in the practice of medicine in this state without an active Florida license. The complaint was reviewed by the Probable Cause Panel of the Board, which disposed of the matter by issuing, on April 23, 1988, the following Closing Order: THE COMPLAINT: Complainant alleges that the Subject of the investigation practiced or attempted to practice medicine without an active license in violation of Section 458.327 (1)(a), Florida Statutes. THE FACTS: Investigation substantiated the allegations in that Subject's license to practice medicine expired December 31, 1987, and was placed in an inactive status. Subject practiced medicine with an inactive license until approximately February 5, 1988, before he took steps to renew his license. THE LAW: Based on the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that Subject violated Section 458.327(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and there- fore is in violation of Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes. However, as Subject's license was inactive for a period of less than six months, this case should be closed by issuing Subject a Letter of Guidance. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the complaint be, and the same is hereby CLOSED with a Letter of Guidance. In January of 1991, the Agency's predecessor, the Department of Professional Regulation, issued a 22-count Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that, in connection with his dealings with 11 patients in 1989 and 1990, Respondent violated subsections (1)(g)(Counts Twenty-One and Twenty-Two), (1)(m)(Counts Ten, Thirteen and Eighteen), (1)(q)(Counts Two, Five, Eight, Eleven, Fifteen and Nineteen), (1)(t)(Counts One, Four, Seven, Twelve, Fourteen, Sixteen and Twenty) and (1)(v)(Counts Three, Six, Nine and Seventeen) of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes. Proceedings on these allegations were conducted in accordance with Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. On August 24, 1992, the Board issued a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in each of the 22 counts of the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him for having committed these violations. That portion of the Final Order addressing the Respondent's punishment provided, in pertinent part, as follows: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: Respondent's license to practice medicine is REPRIMANDED. Respondent shall pay an administrative fine in the amount of $5000 to the Board of Medicine, Department of Professional Regula- tion, within 3 years of the date this Final Order is filed. Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida is placed on PROBATION for a period of 3 years, subject to the follow- ing terms and conditions: . . . f. Respondent shall not practice except under the indirect supervision of a physician fully licensed under Chapter 458 who has been approved by the Board or its Probation Committee. Absent provision for and comp- liance with the terms regarding temporary approval of a monitoring physician, as provided below, Respondent shall cease pract- ice and not practice until the Probation Comm- ittee or the Board approves a monitoring physician. Respondent shall have the monitoring physician with Respondent at the first probation appearance before the Probation Committee. Prior to the approval of the monitoring physician by the Committee, the Respondent shall provide to the monitoring physician a copy of the Administrative Comp- laint and Final Order filed in this case. Failure of the Respondent or the monitoring physician to appear at the scheduled Probation Committee meeting shall constitute a violation of this Order. Prior to the approval of the monitoring physician by the Committee, Respondent shall submit to the Committee a current curriculum vitae and description of the current practice from the proposed monitoring physician. Said materials shall be received by the Board office no later than fourteen days before the first scheduled probation appearance. The attached definition of a monitoring physician is incorporated herein. The responsibilities of the monitoring physician shall include: Submit semi-annual reports, in affidavit form, which shall include: Brief statement of why physician is on probation. Description of probationer's practice. Brief statement of probationer's comp- liance with terms of probation. Brief description of probationer's relationship with monitoring physician. Detail any problems which may have arisen with probationer. Respondent shall be responsible for ensuring that the monitoring physician submits the required reports. Be available for consultation with Respondent whenever necessary, at a frequency of at least once per month. Review 50 percent of Respondent's patient records selected on a random basis at least once every other month. In order to comply with this responsibility of random review, the monitoring physician shall go to Respondent's office once every other month. At that time, the monitoring physician shall be responsible for making the random selection of the records to be reviewed by the monitoring physician. Review all patient records of patients treated with Schedule II-V controlled substances. Receive and review copies of all Schedule II-V controlled substance prescriptions in order to determine the appropriateness of Respondent's prescribing of controlled substances. Report to the Board any violations by probationer of Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. . . Respondent shall submit semi-annual reports in affidavit form, the contents of which shall be specified by the Board. The reports shall include: Brief statement of why physician is on probation. Practice location. Describe current practice (type and composition). Brief statement of compliance with probation terms. Describe relationship with monitoring/ supervisory physician. Advise Board of any problems. . . Respondent may prescribe Schedule II-V controlled substances with the restrictions set forth below: Respondent shall utilize sequentially numbered triplicate prescriptions in the prescribing of said controlled substances. Respondent shall provide one copy of each prescription for said controlled substances to the Department's investigator within 30 days. Respondent shall, within two weeks after issuance, provide one copy of each prescription for said controlled substances to his monitoring/supervising physician. Respondent shall maintain one copy of each prescription for said controlled sub- stances in the patient's medical record. This copy may be a xerox copy. During this period of probation, semi- annual investigative reports will be compiled by the Department of Professional Regulation concerning Respondent's compliance with the terms and conditions of probation and the rules and statutes regulating the practice of medicine. . . . At a meeting held November 18, 1992, Respondent received the approval of the Probation Committee to have Oliver Anderson, M.D., serve as his monitoring physician. Both Respondent and Dr. Anderson appeared before the Probation Committee at this November 18, 1992, meeting. Dr. Anderson is in his late seventies. Like Respondent, he has a general family practice. He and Respondent have known each other for over ten years. Dr. Anderson first visited Respondent's office, in his capacity as Respondent's monitoring physician, in February of 1993. At the outset of the visit, Dr. Anderson asked for, and was given, a list of all the patients that Respondent had seen in the last two months. From the list, he randomly selected the names of 71 patients (which was one half the number of patients on the list). He then obtained from Respondent, and thereafter reviewed, the records Respondent maintained on these 71 patients. Dahna Schaublin, a Department investigator, was assigned to serve as Respondent's probation monitor. On or about February 10, 1993, she prepared and transmitted to her supervisor, Crystal Griffin, an investigative report concerning Respondent's compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation. In her report, Schaublin stated the following: A Final Order was filed on 8/24/92 regarding John Jackson, M.D. for prescribing Dilaudid to patients in 1989, violating FS. 458.331 (1)(q)(v). The Probation term is 08/24/92 to 08/23/95. Dr. Jackson was contacted and presented to the Miami BIS on 01/27/93 for an interview. He brought copies of prescript- ions for controlled drugs prescribed in Dec/ 1992-Jan/1993. Dr. Jackson did not have copies of other prescriptions with him stating he mailed one copy to the Board of Medicine and one copy to his physician monitor. Dr. Anderson, a family practitioner, is supervis- ing physician. Dr. Anderson has only been to Dr. Jackson's office on one occasion (the Order states he should review 50 percent of patient records on a random basis, and shall go to Dr. Jackson's office once every other month). Dr. Jackson decided to xerox each daily chart for each patient seen in the office and then mail Dr. Anderson a copy of the treatment chart (for that one occasion). Dr. Jackson stated that the reason he is not following the Order to the letter is because it was difficult for Dr. Anderson to review 50 percent of his patient records in person every month. We told Dr. Jackson this practice was contrary to the Final Order and we suggested he inform the Probation Committee. Dr. Jackson has not paid his $5000 yet, stating that he has 5 years to do so. Dr. Jackson has gone before the Probation Committee two times. Griffin inadvertently failed to forward Schaublin's investigative report to the Probation Committee. Accordingly, the Probation Committee took no action in response to the allegations made in the report. Respondent did not provide Schaublin with copies of prescriptions he wrote in February and March of 1993, "within 30 days," as required by paragraph 3k(2) of the Board's August 24, 1992, Final Order. It was not until April 14, 1993, that Respondent furnished Schaublin with copies of these prescriptions (which were written on numbered prescription forms). Respondent wrote prescription numbers 1041 through 1047 in April and May of 1993 (more specifically, prescription number 1041 on April 12, 1993; prescription number 1042 on April 14, 1993; prescription number 1043 on April 24, 1993; prescription number 1044 on April 26, 1993; prescription number 1045 on April 30, 1993; prescription number 1046 on May 2, 1993; and prescription number 1047 on May 12, 1993). These prescriptions were not among those that Respondent furnished copies of to Schaublin on April 14, 1993, however, none of them were written 30 days or more prior to April 14, 1993. On or about March 17, 1993, Respondent submitted his first semi-annual probation report to the Department. In the fourth paragraph of his report, Respondent asserted the following: I have complied fully with the terms of my probation. I have taken the course "Protecting your Practice" at the University of South Florida. I meet as scheduled with my monitoring physician Dr. O.D. Anderson whose letter will be Coming soon to you. We cover for each other every week taking calls on Wednesdays for Dr. Anderson and Thursdays for myself. We also alternate taking calls for each other every other weekend. We discuss patient care, as per the order, for all scheduled prescriptions written. In his report, Respondent did not indicate that there were "any problems" concerning Dr. Anderson's compliance with the provisions of the Board's August 24, 1992, Final Order which prescribed the responsibilities of Respondent's monitoring physician. Dr. Anderson submitted to the Department his first semi-annual report concerning Respondent's probation on or about June 13, 1993. In the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of his report, Dr. Anderson asserted the following: In my opinion, Dr. Jackson has been very sensitive to the Administrative Complaint and Order of the Department of Professional Regulation. This has been demonstrated by his good attitude in my visits with him, and in his compliance with providing for me duplicate copies of his Numbered Schedule II-V prescriptions. Dr. Jackson and his office personnel have been very responsive in allowing my random selection of charts for review on my visits to his office. With his wife's support, Dr. Jackson has complied well with the requirements of his probation. Although he indicated otherwise in his report, Dr. Anderson had made only one visit to Respondent's office in his capacity as Respondent's monitoring physician. It was not until September of 1993, that he next visited Respondent's office in his capacity as Respondent's monitoring physician. In conducting his review during this visit, he followed essentially the same procedure that he had followed during his February visit. In September of 1993, Respondent filed with the Board a Petition for Early Termination of Probation on the grounds of "1) hardship due to changed circumstances; and 2) fulfillment of purposes of penalty." In his petition, Respondent asserted that he had "fully complied with the requirements of probation with the exception of the fine." He did not mention that he had failed to provide Schaublin with copies of the prescriptions he wrote in February and March of 1993, "within 30 days," as required by paragraph 3k(2) of the Board's August 24, 1992, Final Order or that Dr. Anderson had failed to make the number of office visits required by paragraph 3f(3) of the Final Order. Dr. Anderson wrote a letter, dated October 21, 1993, in support of Respondent's petition. The letter read as follows: This is an interim report following the first semi-annual report dated May 19, 1993, which I submitted. I was appointed monitoring physician for Dr. Jackson at the Miami November 18, 1992, meeting of the Probation Committee of the Department of Professional Regulation. Again I have reviewed the Administrative Complaint dated January 24, 1991, and also the Notice of Right to Judicial Review, and Certificate of Service signed August 24, 1992, which were received by Dr. Jackson. He is on probation for the inappropriate prescribing of Dilaudid to eleven patients in 1989. Dr. Jackson continues his good care of his private patients, and the Insurance PPO and HMO patients here in Hialeah, Florida. In my opinion Dr. Jackson has been very sensitive to the Administrative Complaint and Order of the Department of Professional Regulation. This has been demonstrated by his continuing compliance with providing for me the duplicate copies of his Numbered Schedule II-V prescriptions. Dr. Jackson continues to be very responsive in allowing my random selection of charts for review on my visits to his office. Dr. Jackson continues to be very aware of which medications fall into Schedule II-V. We both have copies of the Drug Abuse Prevent- ion and Control Schedule II-V list. This letter is written to support Dr. Jackson's release from probation. In my opinion he is worthy of release as demonstrated by his continuing compliance. The Board considered Respondent's petition at its October 1-3, 1993, meeting. Both Respondent and Dr. Anderson addressed the Board during this meeting. Dr. Anderson told the Board that, in his opinion, Respondent had "corrected all his past difficulties very effectively." By letter dated October 6, 1993, from Crystal Griffin, Respondent was informed of the Board's action. The letter read as follows: This is to inform you that the Florida Board of Medicine, in a meeting held October 1-3, 1993, . . voted to: Terminate your probation; however, you will be required to pay your administrative fine by August, 1995 and complete 300 hours of community service per year for a period of 2 years. Furthermore, you are required to submit a plan for your community service. You should receive an Order shortly. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact the Board office at (904) 488-0595. Sometime after the Board's October 1-3, 1993, meeting, but before the Board had issued the written order promised in Griffin's October 6, 1993, letter to Respondent, Schaublin first learned about Respondent's petition and the Board's action thereon. Thereafter, on December 7, 1993, she filed an investigative report concerning Respondent's compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation from the time of her last investigative report. In her December 7, 1993, report, she stated the following: Monitoring of the Subject's Probation is impeded because Dr. Jackson's failed to comply with terms of the Probation Order. The Final Order states: "k. Respondent may prescribe Schedule II-V controlled substances with the restrictions set forth below: (2) Respondent shall provide one copy of each prescription for said controlled substances to the Department's investigator within 30 days." Dr. Jackson: Did not provide copies of controlled substances prescriptions for February/March until April 14, 1993. There are 6 missing prescription forms from numbers 1041 to 1047. Dr. Jackson has failed to provide prescriptions for October/November 1993. This investigator met with Dr. Jackson at the Miami BIS on January 27, 1993 and requested copies of prescriptions be sent to this office within the 30 day time frame as mandated in the Final Order. A U.C.F. was issued by this Investigator on 12/7/93. This Investigator spoke with Constance Campbell on December 06, 1993 regarding Dr. Jackson's lack of compliance with the terms of the Final Order. We reported on 2/10/93 that Dr. Jackson's monitoring physician was not visiting his office "every other month" and making "random selection of the record[s]" as outlined in the Final Order f.(3). We are attaching copies of prescriptions for Controlled drugs for the months February 1993 through September 1993. On May 24, 1994, the Board issued a written order terminating Respondent's probation. The order provided as follows: THIS CAUSE came on before the Board of Medicine (Board) on October 3, 1993, in Miami, Florida for the purpose of considering Respondent's request to terminate the probation imposed by the Board's Final Order filed August 2 [sic], 1992. Upon review of the request, the testimony and evidence offered in support thereof, the recommendation of the Board's Probation Committee, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Respondent's probation shall be terminated. However, Respondent is still required to pay the administrative fine of $5,000.00 imposed by the previous Final Order and said fine must be paid by August 2, 1995. Furthermore, Respondent is required to complete 300 hours per year of community service in an area where medical services are needed during each of the next two years. This Order shall take effect upon filing with the Clerk of the Department of Professional Regulation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations of subsection (1)(x) of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes, alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, with the exception of the alleged violation relating to the submission of copies of prescription numbers 1041-1047, and disciplining him for having committed these violations by fining him $2,500.00, suspending his license for a period of 30 days and placing him on probation for a period of two years (subject to those terms and conditions the Board deems appropriate) beginning immediately after the end of the suspension. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of December, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 1995.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a 47-year old resident of Hollywood, Florida. He is married and has a five-year old step-daughter. His wife's father is the minister of the First Methodist Church in Hollywood. Petitioner is an active member of his father-in-law's church. In recent years, he has volunteered a significant amount of his time to perform tasks on behalf of the church. Petitioner is now, and has been since June of 1997, employed as a salesperson by Rex Yacht Sales (Rex) in Fort Lauderdale. As a salesperson for Rex, he sells new boats and he also sells used boats that are 32 feet or less in length.3 Approximately, 75 percent of the sales he makes are of used boats. Petitioner specializes in the sale of sailboats. He possesses a considerable amount of knowledge concerning sailboats as a result of the years (since he was a young child) that he has devoted to sailing. Petitioner owned, lived aboard, and captained a sailboat named the "Wave Dancer" from 1975 until the late 1980's. He acquired the "Wave Dancer" in return for his participation in an illicit drug smuggling operation. In 1975, when he was still living in his hometown of Port Washington, New York, Petitioner was approached by a childhood friend, Dan Locastro. Locastro advised Petitioner that he (Locastro) and his associates wanted to buy a sailboat to use to transport marijuana from St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands to the New England coast. Locastro promised Petitioner that, if Petitioner were able locate a sailboat for them to purchase and if he thereafter successfully captained the newly purchased sailboat on its journey to and from the Virgin Islands, Petitioner could keep the sailboat. Approximately a month later, Petitioner notified Locastro that he had located a sailboat for Locastro and his associates. The sailboat was the "Wave Dancer." Locastro and his associates subsequently purchased the "Wave Dancer." They purchased the boat in the name of Richard Harrison. Following the purchase of the "Wave Dancer," Petitioner, accompanied by Locastro, sailed the boat to an island near St. Thomas. There, 500 pounds of marijuana were loaded onto the "Wave Dancer." Petitioner then sailed the boat to the New England coast, where he delivered the marijuana. Petitioner participated in this illicit smuggling operation because he wanted his own sailboat. He was neither arrested, nor charged, for having participated in this operation. As promised, Petitioner was allowed by Locastro and his associates to keep the "Wave Dancer" after the conclusion of operation. The boat was subsequently titled in Petitioner's name. For approximately 12 or 13 years, Petitioner (who was then single) lived in the Caribbean aboard the "Wave Dancer." He earned a living by taking tourists (usually one couple at a time) out in the water on his boat. In the late 1980's, Petitioner decided to return to the United States to live with and care for his parents, who, because of their advanced age, required his assistance. Before moving back to the United States, Petitioner put the "Wave Runner" up for sale. He was unsuccessful in his efforts to sell the boat. He discussed with a friend of his, Ken Fish, the possibility of Fish purchasing the boat for $50,000.00, but no sale was consummated. Petitioner was still the owner the "Wave Runner" when he flew to the United States and moved in with his parents (in their home). He left the "Wave Runner" behind in the Virgin Islands in the care of his friend Fish. Approximately nine months after he left the Virgin Islands, Petitioner received a telephone call from Fish, who indicated that he was having financial difficulty and that he wanted to use the "Wave Runner" in a "marijuana scheme." Approximately six months later, Fish again telephoned Petitioner. This time he told Petitioner that he wanted "to do a cocaine smuggling venture with [the "Wave Runner]." At first, Petitioner told Fish that he (Fish) was "out of his mind." Later during the conversation, however, Petitioner relented and agreed to allow Fish to use the "Wave Runner" in the proposed "cocaine smuggling venture." Petitioner gave his permission without receiving any promise from Fish that he (Petitioner) would receive anything in return. The "cocaine smuggling venture" was unsuccessful. The "Wave Runner" was seized by authorities in Martinique. In the spring of 1991, in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR- HIGHSMITH, Petitioner was criminally charged by the United States government for his role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. Petitioner's role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" was limited to permitting Fish to use the "Wave Runner" to transport cocaine into the United States. After his arrest in May of 1991, Petitioner agreed to, and he subsequently did, cooperate with federal authorities by participating in federal undercover drug enforcement operations under the supervision of federal agents. At times during these operations, he was required to place himself in situations where his personal safety was compromised. In or around January of 1994, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91- 349-CR-HIGHSMITH to one count of conspiracy to import cocaine. On January 30, 1995, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of said crime and, as punishment, placed on probation for five years and fined $17,500.00. Such punishment constituted a substantial downward departure from the range provided in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge explained that he was "constrained to substantially modify the sentence in this case downward" because of the risks Petitioner had taken to assist federal authorities in their drug-fighting efforts. Although under no legal obligation to do so, Petitioner continued to provide similar assistance to federal authorities (at a substantial personal risk) after his sentencing. In September of 1996, Petitioner filed with the Department an application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. Question 13 on the application form read as follows: CRIMINAL HISTORY: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? NOTE: This question applies to any violation of the law of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. Yes No The application form instructed those applicants whose answer to Question 13 was "Yes" to "attach [their] complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or [were] pending." On the application form that he submitted to the Department, Petitioner answered "Yes" to Question 13, but he did not attach the required signed statement. He merely appended to the application form a copy of the judgment entered in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On or about October 1, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioner: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Section of General Regulation is in receipt of your application for a yacht Salesman. A review of your application has disclosed the following deficiencies: You answered Yes to question 13 which asked "Have you been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" The paragraph under question 15 further states "If your answer to question 13, 14, 15 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." You will need to submit a signed statement of the charges and facts, within twenty-one (21) days to this office before your application can be checked for form. Should you have any questions, please contact me. After receiving the Department's October 1, 1996, letter, Petitioner telephonically requested additional time to respond. By letter dated December 13, 1996, Petitioner's attorney, John J. Lynch, Esquire, responded on Petitioner's behalf to the Department's October 1, 1996, letter. Lynch's letter, which was received by the Department on December 17, 1996, read as follows: I represent the Applicant, Richard E. Parker. In response to concerns raised by Richard Parker's application's disclosure of charges and crimes and the results thereof, please consider the following as part of the application process: The subject matter was limited to involvement in a conspiracy to import controlled substances. Mr. Parker voluntarily entered a guilty plea in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami, Florida, in an action entitled, "United States v. Richard Parker" Criminal No. 91-349-CR- Highsmith. Upon being aware of potential liability, he cooperated fully with the U.S. Government. During a four-year period, he provided extensive assistance to the U.S. Government in ongoing investigations and provided training and resources to special agents. Mr. Parker's participation as a Government agent put him at considerable risk. His case remains under court seal to protect information which may be used by the Government in future criminal prosecutions. I cannot provide a complete transcript of the court proceedings without jeopardizing Mr. Parker's safety. To appreciate Mr. Parker's significant assistance to the U.S. Government, a portion of the Honorable Judge Highsmith's sentencing comments has been enclosed. Pages 11, 12, 14 and 15 of the sentencing memorandum specify the efforts made by Mr. Parker, and recognized by the Court to rectify his prior conduct. (Note: All individuals, other than Mr. Parker, have been redacted to preserve a measure of safety since the matter remains under court seal). In recognition of [his] assistance, Mr. Parker was placed on probation for five years and fined on January 30, 1995. The fine was paid and probation has commenced. I trust this supplemental response answers concerns regarding this unfortunate episode in Mr. Parker's life. As his attorney asserted in the foregoing letter, as of the date of the letter, Petitioner had paid the $17,500.00 fine imposed in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On January 17, 1997, the Department issued its Notice of Intent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure. On February 12, 1997, Petitioner requested a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the matter. On August 12, 1997, Petitioner filed a motion in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH requesting that "his period of probation [be reduced] from a term of 60 months to a term of 32 months thereby terminating his probation on September 30, 1997." In support of his motion, he stated the following: On January 30, 1995, Richard Parker was sentenced by this Court to five years probation for his participation in a cocaine conspiracy. The Court imposed this lenient sentence because of the extraordinary cooperation Richard Parker had rendered (a transcript of the sentencing is attached hereto as Exhibit A). As part of his cooperation Parker had gone to Columbia in a sailboat, at great personal risk and with no protection from law enforcement, and developed a case involving significant arrests, convictions, and seizure of cocaine. Since sentencing Parker has remarried and complied with all terms of probation. Parker had promised the agents and the Court that his cooperation would continue regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. True to his word, following sentencing, at the request of the DEA, Richard Parker traveled alone to Columbia and negotiated the location in the Caribbean Sea for an air drop of 300 kilos of cocaine. Parker then captained a sailboat and traveled to Dominica and Barbados, St. Kitts and the British Virgin Islands with DEA agents on board and participated in the recovery of the 300 kilos of cocaine as it was dropped from a plane in 50 kilogram packages. Parker received no payment for this cooperation. Parker rendered substantial assistance to the Government after sentencing because of his moral commitment to cooperation as a form of restitution, because of his sense of obligation and gratitude, and because he had given his word to the Government and this Court. It is now over 2 1/2 years since Parker was sentenced. Parker has complied fully with all conditions of probation. Parker has committed himself to building a productive law-abiding life. The Count may well recall that Parker's marriage ended during his cooperation and sentence. Parker has recently married again becoming the father of a four-year old in the process. Parker has spent his life working on and sailing boats. Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a license to be a yacht salesman. The issuance of these licenses in Florida is regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR). The DBPR has denied Parker's request for a license citing Parker's conviction as irrefutable proof of moral turpitude as a basis for denial. Parker has petitioned for review and a hearing before an administrative law judge is scheduled for October 14, 1997. Undersigned counsel has been advised that the hearing scheduled for October 14, 1997, will be the final hearing regarding Parker's petition for a license to sell boats in the State of Florida. Regarding this issue, undersigned counsel has become aware of an administrative decision where an application for a license as a yacht and ship salesman was granted by DBPR to an applicant who had been convicted of a drug felony, sentenced to probation and had been terminated from probation. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes v. Orr, Docket No. YS95025 (Final Order No. BPR-95-03991, 7/20/95). It is respectfully submitted that evidence of successful completion of probation by Parker prior to the time of final hearing on October 14, 1997, will either result in the DBPR rescinding their denial of Parker's application or a reversal of DBPR's denial by the administrative law judge. Assistant United States Attorney John Schlessinger has conferred with the United States Probation Officer Anthony Gagliardi regarding this motion and has authorized undersigned counsel to state that the United States has no objection to a reduction of probation from 60 months to 36 months. Richard Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a yacht salesman license so that he can support himself and his family. Richard Parker, through his cooperation, has rebutted any presumption of moral turpitude that attached to his conviction and has affirmatively and courageously demonstrated good moral character; Richard Parker has honored and will continue to honor his pledge to the United States and to this Honorable Court never to break the law again. . . . The Final Order in the Orr case, which was referenced in Petitioner's Motion to Modify Probation, contained the following "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law":
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1997.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is presently incarcerated at Sumter Correctional Institution near Bushnell, Florida. Sumter Correctional Institution is a prison maintained by the Florida Department of Corrections. Petitioner was convicted for two separate robbery offenses based upon guilty pleas. He was sentenced to a prison term of ten years in connection with each conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. Petitioner is presently incarcerated based upon these convictions. Petitioner was interviewed by an Examiner of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of establishing a recommended presumptive parole release date on February 26, 1981. Under rules of the Parole and Probation Commission then in effect, the Examiner was to consider the gravity of the offense for which the Petitioner was sentenced, establish a "salient factor score" and consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The Examiner classified the offense as "high-robbery" and set the salient factor score at "1." Under Commission rules then in effect, the guidelines for a time range ("matrix time range") for that offense characteristic and salient factor score was fourteen to nineteen months. The Examiner recommended setting the presumptive parole release date at the longest period within the time range (nineteen months) and additionally recommended that several aggravating circumstances be considered. These circumstances were the existence of a concurrent sentence for robbery for which the Examiner recommended an additional nineteen months, the fact that a gun was used in one of the robberies for which the Examiner recommended an additional six months, and the fact that a knife was used in the other for which the Examiner recommended an additional six months. The Examiner thus recommended that the Petitioner serve a total of fifty months in prison and that his presumptive parole release date be set at March 13, 1984. Petitioner requested review of this recommendation before the Parole and Probation Commission. The Commission took final action on the review request on April 1, 1981, and affirmed the recommendation. Commission Rule 23-19.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, has been amended since it was applied to the Petitioner. The rule as it existed when the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date was established provided: If present offense of conviction involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level shall be based on the most serious of the offenses, and the other offenses may be used as aggravating factors. This shall be applied to both consecutive and con- current sentences. This rule continues to substantially affect Petitioner since it provided the basis for the setting of his presumptive parole release date. In adopting this rule, the Commission sought to develop criteria to predict the likelihood of successful parole. The presence of multiple sentences for multiple criminal behavior was considered an important factor in determining the likelihood of a successful parole experience.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida. As of the date of final hearing in this cause, Petitioner Durham was classified as "close" custody pursuant to Rule 33-6.09, Florida Administrative Code. Although Petitioner Durham's reclassification questionnaire score was initially five points, which would have qualified him for classification as "medium" custody, Respondent used the override provision contained in Rule 33-6.09 to classify Petitioner Durham as "close" custody by virtue of his poor institutional adjustment. Petitioner Adams was likewise classified as "close" custody at the time of final hearing. Petitioner Adams' numerical score on the inmate reclassification questionnaire would have classified him as "medium" custody, but the override provisions of Rule 33-6.09 were utilized in Mr. Adams' case to reclassify him as "close" custody by virtue of the fact that his sentence expiration date is 1990, and at the time of his reclassification he had not served 20 percent of his sentence. Petitioner Piccirillo was classified as "medium" custody at the time of final hearing. His numerical score on his inmate reclassification questionnaire was three points, which would have qualified him for "minimum" custody had this score not been overridden by virtue of the fact that Petitioner Piccirillo escaped from Department of Corrections custody on November 17, 1979, while in a minimum custody setting. Petitioner Farrell was classified as "minimum" custody at the time of final hearing in this cause, and his presumptive parole release date is set for July 24, 1984. It was stipulated at final hearing in this cause that none of the policy and procedure directives challenged in this cause had been promulgated by Respondent as rules, pursuant to the requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. It is also apparent from the face of the various challenged policy and procedure directives that they have statewide applicability at all institutions administered by the Department of Corrections. On or about May 6, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.22, which was subsequently revised on November 30, 1979. This directive is entitled "Reclassification and Progress Reports," and purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in various sections of Chapters 921, 944, 945, and 947, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge two sections of this directive as unpromulgated rules. The first of these is contained in Section X, entitled "Sources of Information," which provides as follows: It is essential that Progress Reviews Reports be accurate, concise and usable. Compiling up-to-date information to go into the report is as important as writ- ing the report. The following source of information should be utilized by the Classification Team in compiling information for the report. Various evaluation Reports (verbal or written) to include work super- visors, medical, dental, education, recreation, quarters, religious, per- sonal observations, etc Nowhere in either the cited chapters of the Florida Statutes or Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, are there any specific requirements for information to be considered by the Classification Team in compiling an inmate progress report. Department personnel utilized the above quoted section of the challenged directive in preparing reports on inmate progress. The second section of Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.22 challenged in this proceeding is XVI, entitled "Recommendations for Parole or Pre-Parole Work Release," which provides as follows: The Department may in selected cases recom- mend to the Florida Parole and Probation Commission that an inmate be placed on parole or pre-parole work release. How ever, note should be made of an inmate's Presumptive Parole Release Date(PPRD) when considering such possibilities. If it is felt that such significant progress has taken place since the setting of the PPRD that it should be moved forward to an earlier date, then such recommendations should be made to the Parole Commission in a full Progress Report setting forth the basis for recommending a change in the PPRD. If at the time of the Progress Review/Report the team does not see the justification in recommending the PPRD be changed then no comment will be required. All reports contaning [sic] parole or pre-parole work release recommendations will be reviewed and signed by the Classification Supervisor and forwarded to the Superintendent for his concurrence or disapproval. The Superintendent will indicate his decision by placing his signature on the appropriate line of the block to be added at the close of the Progress Report format. Upon approving a parole or pre-parole work release recommendation, the Superintendent will prepare a cover letter of endorsement which will be attached to the normal distribution of the Progress Report and for warded directly to the Parole Commission. The above-quoted language from Section XVI of Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.22 is virtually identical to the language contained in Rule 33-6.09(7)(m) , Florida Administrative Code. On or about September 30, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.31, entitled "Community Study and Volunteer Service." This directive purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge as rules the following provisions contained in Section III, entitled "Selection": C. The Classification Team should determine if the inmate meets criteria for eligi- bility described in the Program Directive Community Services Programs. When com- parable study programs are available at the institution, community study should not be considered. On-the-job training programs which are limited in scope are not considered comparable. The educational personnel of the Depart- ment should be Particularly involved in referring inmates for community study since they are in a position to evaluate the inmate's desire, ability, and past performance in the education program. The educational personnel will ensure the availability of the requested course of study or training prior to Classification Team action. Inmates considered for community study must have financial assistance from one or more of the following sources for tuition, books and clothing: Vocational Rehabilitation Veterans benefits Personal finances Committed support by the inmate's family Approval for a government grant Proof of financial support must accompany each application. Inmates are not to borrow money from any university, college or private organiza- tion for the purpose of financing their education. Nowhere in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, or Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code, are the above-cited requirements of Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.31 contained. On or about April 27, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.40, which was subsequently revised on March 10, 1982. This directive, entitled "Community Work Release general Policies and Procedures" purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge as an umpromulgated rule Section IXB of the directive which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The Department will permit consideration for work release 18 months prior to release. However, normally such consideration will be given within the last nine months prior to the presumptive parole release date or expiration or[sic] sentence. Should special cases arise which warrant attention prior to the nine months remaining, consideration will be given on an individual basis when there appears[sic] to be appropriate reasons for such. Special cases must be recommended by the Classification Team, approved by the Superintendent and Regional Director, and then forwarded to the Central Office where a Special Review Committee will make the final decision. . . . (Emphasis added) The underlined portion of Section IXB quoted above appears nowhere in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, or in Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. On or about November 30, 1979, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07-90, entitled "Inmate Participation in Outside Activities." This directive purports to be issued pursuant to authority contained in Section 945.21, Florida Statutes. Petitioners in this cause challenge as an umpromulgated rule Section IV of the directive, entitled "Distance Limitations," which provides as follows: The following distance limitations are established as maximums but may be reduced by the Superintendent: Travel to attend civic or religious meeting except the annual statewide meetings will be limited to 100 miles one way. Travel for fund raising projects will be limited to 35 miles one way. Travel to all statewide meetings will be approved by the Regional Director with concurrence of Assistant Secretary of Operations. Nowhere in Section 945.21, Florida Statutes, nor in validly adopted rules of Respondent do the specific requirements contained in Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.90 appear. On or about January 25, 1980, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.42, which was subsequently revised on February 26, 1982. This directive, entitled "Furlough Procedures," purports to be issued pursuant to authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33.9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge the entirety of this directive as an unpromulgated rule. The directive establishes a special review team to review furlough applications; makes Florida furlough procedures applicable to federal inmates in interstate compact cases placed with the department; establishes types of furloughs which may be granted; establishes eligibility criteria for selecting inmates for furloughs; sets time and distance limitations for furloughs; establishes the maximum number of furloughs for which inmates may be eligible; establishes verification requirements; establishes clothing requirements while inmates are on furlough; establishes types of transportation available for inmates on furlough; establishes release and check-in procedures; and, finally, establishes a procedure for termination of furloughs in the event of a violation of a furlough agreement. None of the specific requirements contained in Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.42 are contained in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code, or any other properly promulgated rule of the Department of Corrections.
