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ATLANTIC INVESTMENT OF BROWARD vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 00-000224BID (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jan. 12, 2000 Number: 00-000224BID Latest Update: May 02, 2000

The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation's intended action to reject all quotes and re-advertise Lease No. 550:0318 was illegal, arbitrary, fraudulent, or dishonest.

Findings Of Fact In October of 1999, the Department advertised for office space for use as the Toll Data Center - Audit Section, Office of Toll Operations (Toll Office) located in Broward County. The lease was clearly advertised as a negotiated lease. It was not advertised as a competitive bid lease. Under the negotiated lease process before letting any lease, the Department must submit to the Department of Management Services (DMS) a Request for Space Need (RSN) and Letter of Agency Staffing (LAS). From DMS the Department receives the authority to directly negotiate a lease for space under 5,000 square feet with prospective lessors. 1/ Consistent with procedure, the Department received approval of the RSN on October 18, 1999. Pursuant to statute, DMS has strongly suggested that prior to selection of the apparent successful lessor, the Department should obtain a minimum of three documented quotes for a lease that has not been competitively bid. The Department has consistently followed that suggestion in negotiated leases. Under special circumstances, where it is clear it is improbable that three quotes cannot be obtained, the Department may waive its requirement that three documented quotes be received. However, the agency must certify to DMS that attempts to receive the required number of documented quotes were unsuccessful and/or special circumstances exist to negotiate the lease with less than three quotes. In this case, no special circumstances exist. In an effort to obtain more than the minimum three documented quotes, the Department opted to advertise for lease space on the Internet. The Internet is utilized by the DMS, among other state agencies, to disseminate information provided in the RSN to the private sector. Additionally, the Internet site may also be used by the private sector to provide notice of space they have available for review by the agency seeking space. A total of three submittal packages were distributed for Lease No. 550:0318. Despite the Department's advertisement over the Internet, only two requests for quote submittal packages were received. Of the three quote submittal packages distributed, the Department received only one documented quote in response to the advertisement for the Toll Office. Atlantic Investment submitted a Quote Submittal Form to the Department in late October for office space in North Fort Lauderdale. Atlantic Investment became aware of the Department's advertisement for lease space from Sheldon M. Schermer, employed by Atlantic Investment as its real estate agent. Mr. Schermer learned of the Department's need for lease space from an advertisement placed on the Internet. On November 8, 1999, the Department informed Atlantic Investment via Sheldon M. Schermer, Real Estate Agent for Atlantic Investment, of the Department's intent to reject all quotes and re-advertise for Lease No. 550:0318. This decision was not arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or dishonest and well within the Department's discretion and procedures for negotiated leases. The basis for the decision was the Department's modification of the lease specifications pursuant to a recommendation by DMS to modify the lease space terms to hopefully generate more interest and more quotes. In a competitive negotiation, DMS was aware of agencies who modified leases and advertised as many as five times before three documented quotes were received. Moreover, the evidence showed that the Broward County commercial real estate market could easily generate three quotes for the space required by the Toll Office.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petitioner's protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2000.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57255.249
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. WAYNE E. BELTON AND BELTON AND BELTON ASSOCIATES, 81-002794 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002794 Latest Update: Sep. 07, 1982

The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether the Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section s. 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), by inserting an option provision into a lease agreement without the specific authorization of the tenants and subsequent to the tenants signing the original agreement. At the hearing, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-10 were offered and admitted into evidence. Leslie and Glenn Strickland, the tenants and complainants, testified on behalf of the Petitioner. Wayne Belton testified on his own behalf. Proposed Recommended Orders have been submitted by the parties. Those findings not incorporated in this Recommended Order were not considered relevant to the issues, were not supported by competent and substantial evidence or were considered immaterial to the results reached.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent Wayne E. Belton is a licensed real estate broker with his principal place of business at 337 Northeast Second Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. On or about November 23, 1979, the Respondent prepared a one-year rental agreement or lease for property located at 2717 Southwest Sixth Street, Delray Beach, Florida, which was owned by Mrs. Margaret Finlay. Mr. and Mrs. Glenn Strickland executed the agreement as the tenants. The lease was prepared pursuant to an open listing by the owner for either sale or lease. When the Stricklands signed the original agreement it did not contain any provision concerning purchasing the property in the future through an option agreement. Although the Stricklands had discussed an option agreement with the Respondent, they did not specifically agree to an option agreement which required the deposit of additional monies in escrow which would not be refunded if the option were not exercised. The owner of the property, Mrs. Finlay, was primarily interested in selling the property and demanded that Respondent obtain a binding option from the Stricklands. When faced with the conflicting demands of the tenants and the owner, the Respondent inserted an option provision in the lease agreement after the Stricklands had signed the original lease which did not contain such a provision. When the Stricklands failed to deliver the $1,500 option money required by the option provision, Mrs. Finlay, through her attorney, threatened to take legal action against the Respondent. In response to the owner's demand, the Respondent through his attorney, demanded that the Stricklands pay $1,500 for the option pursuant to the lease agreement. When the Stricklands received the demand letter from Respondent's counsel, they contacted an attorney who eventually settled the matter. The Stricklands were required to expend $138.00 in attorney's fees to correct the problem caused by the Respondent. The Respondent admitted inserting the option provision into the lease agreement after the Stricklands executed it, but denied acting with any intent to alter the agreement contrary to what he believed the parties intended. Rather, the Respondent believed that he was remedying his original omission to conform to what he believed the parties had orally agreed to.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) and imposing a reprimand and an administrative fine. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Stephen G. Melcer, Esquire Suite 500 First Bank Building 551 Southeast Eighth Street Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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SAILFISH CLUB OF FLORIDA, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 84-000862RX (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000862RX Latest Update: Sep. 18, 1984

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced in this proceeding, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Sailfish Club of Florida, Inc. is a nonprofit Florida corporation which operates a 550-member private club in Palm Beach County, Florida. Its facilities include a swimming pool, large dining room, cocktail lounge, private dining rooms, card rooms and a marina with three docks and 62 slips. Petitioner's annual membership dues are $925 per member. The marina docks are constructed over 94,815 square feet of submerged lands owned by the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The wet slip space comprises 2,531 linear feet. Marina slips are available to members only and are rented at $39.69 per linear foot per year. Prior to March 10, 1970, it was the policy of the Board of Trustees to permit the use of sovereignty submerged lands without charging annual fees. At present, all docks, piers and other structures on sovereignty lands in existence prior to March 10, 1970, are "grandfathered" and are not subject to the current lease requirements until January 1, 1998. On March 10, 1970, the Board of Trustees adopted a new policy providing for the licensing of private interests desiring to occupy sovereignty lands in conjunction with the operation of marines, charter boat docks and other commercial mooring facilities. The licenses were to be issued upon payment of no less than two cents per square foot annually for sovereignty land severed from public use, and each license was to be renewable annually after receipt of the appropriate fee. On August 25, 1970, petitioner and the Board of Trustees entered into a license agreement whereby petitioner was permitted to construct, install and operate a marina and commercial dock facility upon sovereignty lands. Petitioner agreed to pay the Board two cents per square foot of the sovereignty lands occupied. Section 5 of the license agreement provided as follows: "This License shall be renewable annually if the Licensee has complied with all the terms and conditions of this License, including payment of the annual license fee. The license fee for renewal shall be no less than the original fee. The Board shall not increase the license fee by more than 10 percent in any one renewal term." Section 6 allows the licensee a 90-day grace period after expiration to renew the license. Most, if not all, license agreements entered into between 1970 and 1975 contain this language. In reliance upon that license agreement, petitioner expended some $205,000.00 for construction of docks and other facilities solely related to the marina function of the Club. Each year thereafter, beginning in August of 1971, petitioner renewed its license for a period of one year by tendering the license fee of two cents per square foot for the 94,815 square feet of submerged land occupied by the marina. From 1970 until 1980, petitioner paid annual license fees of $1,896.00. Beginning in 1980, the Department started increasing its annual marina license fee by ten percent, as permitted under the license agreement, and petitioner paid the increased annual fee. Around 1975, the Board of Trustees and DNR discontinued issuing licenses and shifted to leases for the use of sovereignty submerged lands. The form sovereignty submerged land lease agreement provided that "renewal of this lease is at the sole option of the Board of Trustees or its legally designated agent." Nevertheless, the Department continued to renew existing licenses upon the tender of the annual fees. By letter dated June 30, 1982, the DNR informed petitioner that its marina license fee would increase each year at the rate of ten percent, and suggested that petitioner may wish to convert its license into a five-year lease. Petitioner declined the suggestion and remitted its annual renewal fee for its license. In August of 1983, the petitioner paid to the DNR fees in the amount of $2,776.37 for its 1983-94 annual marina license. On August 1, 1983, the DNR adopted amendments to Chapter 16Q-21, Florida Administrative Code, which governs sovereignty submerged lands management. The amendment included in the list of activities for which a lease would be required "Existing licenses upon the date of expiration or renewal." Rule 16Q-21.05(1)(b)4, Florida Administrative Code. Marina leases were to be handled under the standard lease provisions, which include a term of up to 25 years "renewable at the option of the Board." Rule 16Q-21.08. The annual standard lease fee, as amended in August 1983, was to be computed at a statewide base rate of $0.065 per square foot, with an additional 20 percent of the lease fee to be charged for the first annual fee, and the per square foot base rate to be revised each year. Marinas open to the public on a first come, first serve basis were permitted a 30 percent discount per square foot per year. Rule 16Q-21.11(1), Florida Administrative Code (1983 Annual Supplement). By letter dated November 14, 1983 petitioner was informed by the DNR that due to the new rule amendments, specifically section 16Q-21.05(1)(b)4 which requires a lease for existing licenses upon the date of expiration or renewal, petitioner would need to obtain a sovereignty submerged land lease in order to continue to legally operate its facility. Petitioner was further informed that its license fee was current until August 25, 1984, and that it would be billed for the difference between the license fee and the new rate required under the lease. The DNR warned petitioner that if it did not receive petitioner's lease application within 90 days, it would assume petitioner no longer desired to maintain the legal use of the facility and would proceed under the removal of structures provisions of petitioner's license. Petitioner did not submit a lease application to the DNR. Had petitioner converted to a lease, the annual lease fee would have been $6,162.98, plus the 20 percent surcharge of $1,232.59 for the first year of the lease. A $200.00 processing fee would also have been required. In the February 24, 1984 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (Vol. 10, No.8), the DNR gave notice of its intent to amend Rule 16Q-21.11 relating to standard annual lease fees. The purpose of the amendment is "to establish a framework for more equitable compensation to the Board of Trustees. . for exclusionary uses of state-owned submerged lands." While the prior rule provided for an annual lease fee computed at a statewide base rate of $0.065 per square foot, the amendment establishes a new formula of seven percent of the "total potential annual revenues from the wet slip rental area or the base fee, whichever is greater." The total potential revenues are to be calculated "by multiplying the total number of linear feet for rent in the wet slip rental area times the weighted average monthly per linear foot rental times 12. The weighted average per linear foot rental will be derived from the monthly rates (seasonal rates included). Any ancillary charges, such as membership fees, dues, or miscellaneous fees which are required to rent a wet slip, shall also be proportionately factored into the average monthly rate." Rule 16Q-21.11(1)(a)1. The proposed rule provides that the monthly rental rates used to determine the weighted average will be derived for posted price sheets or other information from the previous year certified as true and correct by the lessee. The calculated rate is to be reviewed and adjusted annually on the anniversary date of the lease. A full copy of the challenged proposed rule is attached to this Order. In early 1982, the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, appointed a "Blue Ribbon Marina Committee" to review Florida's marina policies and to develop a policy to establish a new formula for submerged land lease fees. The 14-member Committee included representatives of county government, a regional planning agency, environmental interests, marine industries, marina owners, general citizenry, boating interests and developmental interests. The Director of the Florida Sea Grant College Program, Dr. James Cato, served as the Committee's Chairman, and designated DNR personnel served as its staff. After meeting monthly from May through October and holding seven public workshops, the Blue Ribbon Marina Committee issued its final report in January of 1983. It was the final recommendation of the Committee that while there should be some differential charges (i.e., for activities in aquatic preserves, between revenue generating, income related uses and non-revenue generating, non-income related uses), the differential should not be geographic and the method for determining lease fees should be a simple statewide base rate. The committee recommended a base rate of 5 cents per square foot per year, with capped increases tied to the Consumer Price Index. The Blue Ribbon Marina Committee's recommendations were not accepted by the Board of Trustees. Instead, an interagency task force comprised of the Executive Directors of the DNR, the Department of Revenue and the Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting, plus staff, was formed to report back to the Board of Trustees with recommendations on fee structures. Without holding any public meetings or listening to witnesses, this task force originated the lease fee formula found in the proposed rule. The task force elected to utilize the "total potential annual revenues from the wet slip rental area" as the basis for its 7 percent formula, in lieu of a percentage of pure gross revenue approach, primarily to avoid auditing problems. It was believed that it would be too difficult to separate out revenues received from grandfathered structures or other facilities not related strictly to wet slip rentals. In effect, total potential annual revenues were assumed to be identical to actual gross revenues. The Economic Impact Statement (EIS) prepared for the proposed amendments to Rule 16Q-21.11 estimates in detail the cost to the DNR to implement the new lease fee formula. In estimating the costs to those persons directly affected by the proposed rule, the EIS generally notes that there will be an increase in fees for certain existing and new lessees, makes a broad generalized estimate of an average increase of $378.00 per lease and recognizes that the exact individual lease fee increase will vary greatly among lessees. The EIS notes that increased costs to the boating public utilizing marina facilities could be anticipated. Finding that lease fees based on five to twelve percent of gross revenues are economically viable, the EIS concludes that the proposed rates are economically feasible. The EIS contains no estimate of the effect of the proposed rule upon competition within the marina industry. It is noted in the EIS that submerged land leasing practices utilized in other states were reviewed and a comparison of those practices is attached to the EIS. Of the eleven states reviewed, none utilized a percentage of potential revenue approach. Other practices included lease fee structures based upon appraised market value of the adjacent upland, percentages of actual gross revenues, uniform base rates per square foot and flat permit charges. In Florida, there are considerable variations among commercial marines as to rental fees charged for wet slips, the level of services provided, utilization or occupancy rates, services and amenities located on the upland property and costs of operation, taxes, insurance and utilities. Wet slip rental rates are generally based not only upon the value of the submerged land in terms of its location, convenience and access to recreational waterbodies. Rental rates also take into consideration the value of the upland property in terms of its geographic advantages, the value of the improvements to the upland property and amenities available thereon, and the value of the improvements to the submerged land in terms of the structures and services offered, as well as the costs of operation of the docking facility. The slip rental fees are also dependent upon whether the particular marina is financially supported entirely by wet slip rentals or whether other services, such as repair and maintenance fees, fuel charges, charges for dry storage, or even upland facilities and activities comprise the bulk of its revenues. It is thus possible for two adjacent marinas or docking facilities which occupy the exact same amount of sovereignty submerged land to have a wide variance in the fees charged for wet slip rentals. Under the proposed total potential revenue formula lease fees per linear foot may vary from marina to marina in the same geographic location, depending upon the weighted average per linear foot of slip rental charged by each marina in the preceding year.

Florida Laws (4) 120.54120.56120.57253.03
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PERRINE MARLIN, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 90-004413BID (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 18, 1990 Number: 90-004413BID Latest Update: May 08, 1991

Findings Of Fact The department hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the findings of fact set forth in the Recommended Order.

Conclusions This cause came on before me for the purpose of issuing a final agency order. The Hearing Officer assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) in the above-styled case submitted a Recommended Order to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). A copy of that Recommended Order is attached hereto. RULING ON EXCEPTIONS FILED BY PROCACCI In this proceeding the parties stipulated that the issues to be decided were: one, whether the department's decision to reject all bids was improper and; two, if rejection was improper, which bidder should be awarded the lease contract. (See Recommended Order, page 3 and 28.) In his exceptions, Procacci now seeks to disregard the second prong of the stipulation and asserts that only a review of the record - basis of the initial rejection decision is appropriate. This view is inconsistent with the nature of a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, proceeding, a de novo, evidentiary hearing, which gives all substantially affected persons the opportunity to change the agency's mind.1 Capeletti brothers vs. State, 432 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). This bid protest proceeding commenced in June 1990, and by law the solicitation process was stopped. Section 120.53(5)(c), Florida Statutes. Competent, substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer's recommendation that the Lima proposal be accepted. The exceptions are rejected.

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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ELIZABETHAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 84-004440 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004440 Latest Update: Oct. 21, 1985

Findings Of Fact On or about March 8, 1984, Elizabethan Development, Inc. (Elizabethan) submitted a bid in response to an invitation to bid on lease number 590:8032. This bid was a "flat bid" providing for the same cost of $10.05 per square foot for each of the ten years under the basic lease, and the same amount during the five year renewal period. The annual rental costs under Elizabethan's bid for 13,424 square feet of leased space would have been $134,911.20 per year. On or about March 7, 1984, Kenneth R. McGurn (McGurn) submitted a bid in response to an invitation to bid on lease number 590:8032. As submitted, McGurn's bid contained three different proposed rental rates, but he subsequently withdrew two of these proposals. His remaining bid was a "front- end loaded bid" providing for a higher cost per square foot in the early years under the lease, and a lower cost at the end of the ten year term of the basic lease which would then be lowered even more during the five year renewal period. Prior to submitting his bid, McGurn contacted Respondent and was told that a front-end loaded bid was acceptable, and further that it would be evaluated using an "average cost" methodology. Specifically, McGurn's bid called for a cost of $13.00 per square foot in years one through nine, $6.00 per square foot in the tenth year, and 3.00 per square foot during each year of the five year renewal period. The annual rental costs for 13,424 square feet of lease space during the first nine years would be $174,512, during the tenth year $80,544, and during the renewal period $40,272. By adding these annual rental costs and then dividing by the fifteen year term of the basic lease plus renewal periods, the average annual rental costs under McGurn's bid were determined to be $123,501. The bids submitted by Elizabethan and McGurn were for "turnkey" construction of administrative offices and clinics for Respondent's Children's Medical Services in Alachua County. A third bid was also received for this lease from Hobco, Inc. All bids were submitted timely and were then reviewed by Respondent for responsiveness and to determine which was the lowest responsive bid. Respondent determined that McGurn had submitted the lowest responsive bide, and on May 7, 1984, informed the three bidders of its intent to award lease number 590:8032 to McGurn. However, since the initial rental rate proposed by McGurn of $13.00 per square feet exceeded the approved zone rate by more than ten percent, the matter still had to be presented to the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as head of the Department of General Services, for their approval prior to an actual award. On September 6, 1984 the award of the lease was considered by the Governor and Cabinets, and following discussion about the front-end loading in the McGurn bid, Respondent and staff of the Department of General Services were directed to reevaluate the bids, including utility costs associated with each. Respondent also began negotiations with McGurn to modify his front-end loaded bid in order to provide a flat rate equal to the average square foot cost over the fifteen year period of the front-end bid. On September 14, 1984, McGurn informed Respondent that he was modifying his bid "to provide that the average bid amount of $9.20 per square foot is paid equally over the 15 year period." This brought the rental rate under his bid within ten percent of the approved zone rate and obviated the necessity of obtaining the approval of the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as head of the Department of General Services, before Respondent could make an award. Nevertheless, Respondent proceeded to prepare to report back to the Governor and Cabinet on this item at their next meeting, September 20, 1984, and developed the reevaluation of utility costs under these bids that had previously been requested. George A. Smith, a representative of Respondent, testified that prior to the meeting on September 20 it was his impression that the item would be pulled from the agenda since the modified average bid amount of $9.20 per square foot was within ten percent of the approved zone rate, and he so advised McGurn. As a result, McGurn did not attend the meeting of the Governor and Cabinet on September 20, 1984. At the meeting, both Respondent and staff of the Department of General Services asked that the item be withdrawn from the agenda. After discussion, the item was withdrawn with an indication from a representative of Respondent that all bids would be rejected and the lease rebid. Thereafter, Respondent did reject all bids, and Petitioners timely filed their requests for a hearing. The discussion which took place at the Cabinet meeting on September 20, 1984 included the methodology used by Respondent in evaluating these bids. Specifically, thee Respondent's practice of using the "average cost" method to evaluate bids was questioned and an alternative, "present value", was discussed. This discussion did not result in any formal action at the September 20 meeting concerning the methodology to be used by state agencies in evaluating bids, but did surface an issue which was felt to be worthy of further review and examination. The discussion did contribute to Respondent's decision to reject all bids, which was the course of action that it considered to be in the best interest of the state. A representative of Respondents reported to the Governor and Cabinet during this discussion that using the present value method of evaluating bids with a prevailing interest rate of 11.44 percent, the third bidder Hobco, Inc., would actually have been the low bidder. By this time, however, Hobco had withdrawn from the bid process. The Invitation to Bid to which Petitioners responded contained the following provision: The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services reserves the right to reject any and all bids, waiver any minor informalities or technicality in bids received, and to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and best; and, if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent issue a Final Order rejecting all bids and otherwise denying the relief sought by Petitioners. DONE and ENTERED this 21th day of October, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21th day of October, 1985. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 84-4440 and 55-0842 Rulings on Petitioner McGurn's Proposed Findings of Fact: (Petitioner has not complied with Rule 22I-6.31(3) by failing to include citations to the record supportive of proposed findings. Nevertheless, rulings thereon have been made.) 1-3 Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence. Hearsay alone is not sufficient to support a finding of fact. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2, 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4 as to the "responsiveness" of McGurn's bid, but otherwise rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, 5. Adopted in Finding of fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5, except for the statement that "such agreement by Kenneth R. McGurn removed the objections of the front end load . . ." since this is argument rather than a proposed finding of fact and is also not supported by the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Adopted in Finding of Fact 6, 7 with the exception of the statement after the word "notwith- standing" which is rejected as argument which is not based upon competent substantial evidence in this record. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Adopted in Adopted in Finding of Fact 7 with the exception of the phrase "an arbitrarily selected date" which is argument rather than a proposed finding of fact. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 16-17 Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence in this record. 8 Rejected as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence in this record. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1,2 Adopted in Finding of Fact 1-3. Adopted in Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as a conclusion of law rather than a proposed finding of fact. 5,6 Rejected as unnecessary other than as adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 11,12 Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. The record does not establish that the "Governor and Cabinet strongly recommended" any action, only that a discussion took place during which Respondent independently announced its decision to reject all bids. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 15,16 Rejected as argument rather than proposed findings of fact. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: James J. Traviss, Esquire Post Office Box 1396 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1396 Linda C. McGurn, Esquire Post Office Box 2900 Gainesville, Florida 32602 David P. Gauldin Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.577.20
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. IGNACIO J. ALVARADO, 85-001344 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001344 Latest Update: Aug. 26, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed real estate salesman with license number 0364554. On or about August 13, 1982, Richard J. and Gav Greco entered into a lease purchase agreement with James C. and Phyllis Waid for residential property located at 1685 Markham Woods Road, Longwood, Florida. The purchase price of the Waid property was $190,000 towards which the Grecos made a $10,000 non-refundable deposit and agreed to pay a monthly rental of $1000. On or about November 14, 1982, the Grecos executed an Agreement with Respondent and his wife by which the Grecos assigned all rights and privileges relating to the lease and purchase of the residence at 1685 Markham Woods Road to the Alvarados. The consideration to be given for this Agreement was a payment of $10,000 by the Alvarados to the Grecos, with $5000 payable upon signing of the Agreement and $5000 payable within six months. The Alvarados, as assignees, agreed to abide by all provisions of the lease purchase agreement and were to make their first $1000 monthly lease payment to the Waids on December 4, 1982. Respondent gave Richard J. Greco a check in the amount of $5000 dated November 14, 1982 and requested that he hold the check for a couple of days before depositing it. Greco complied with the request, but was advised on December 3, 1982 that Respondent's $5000 check had been returned unused by Respondent's bank due to the fact that Respondent's account had been closed. Respondent has never paid the Grecos any part of the $10,000 due them under the assignment executed November 14, 1982. Respondent made no monthly lease payments on the property to the Waids. By letter dated February 25, 1983, James C. Waid notified the Grecos and the Alvarados that the lease purchase agreement was in default and that the $10,000 deposit paid by the Grecos was being forfeited because the rent was in arrears. The Grecos paid the Waids an additional $4000 on March 1, 1983, which represented the unpaid lease payments, for a general release from all obligations under the lease purchase agreement. Respondent and his wife executed a promissory note on March 1, 1983 whereby they agreed to pay the Grecos $10,000 on or before March 16, 1983, but no payments have ever been made pursuant to this promissory note. The Grecos brought suit against Respondent and his wife for damages arising out of this transaction, and obtained a Final Judgment on June 30, 1983 in Case No. 83-1191-CA-03-P, Circuit Court in and for Seminole County, in the amount of $15,101.28. The Grecos have not been able to execute this Final Judgment and therefore no payments on this judgment have been made to them by the Respondent or his wife. At the time of this transaction, the Alvarados were family friends of the Grecos. Richard J. Greco entered into this transaction with Respondent primarily because of the personal acquaintance and not because Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman. However, Greco knew that Respondent was licensed and therefore assumed that he was a man of integrity who would deal fairly with him in this real estate transaction.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a Period of one (1) Year. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, Fl. 32802 Ignacio J. Alvarado 5166 Glasgow Avenue Orlando, Fl. 32819 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Fl. 32802 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs IRVING HALSEY BRAIN, JR., 90-003228 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida May 24, 1990 Number: 90-003228 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 1990

The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of failure to account for and deliver funds to the person entitled thereto and/or guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, or dishonest dealing in a business transaction.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Irving Halsey Brain, Jr., was licensed as a real estate broker, and, with his wife, owned the stock of Jay Hearin, Inc. On October 10, 1983, Respondent negotiated a lease of property between Emily R. Hammer, lessor, and Suncoast Heat Treatment, Inc., lessee, (Exhibit 1) for a period of three years, beginning November 1, 1983, at an initial rental of $2,225 per month plus sales tax with annual adjustments for changes in the consumer price index, and the option to renew the lease for an additional three years at the expiration of the initial lease period upon the same terms and conditions. This lease was renewed November 1, 1986, to expire October 31, 1989. On May 22, 1986, Respondent negotiated the lease agreement between Emily R. Hammer, lessor, and Whitaker Roofing, Inc., lessee, for a building for a period of one year from June 1, 1986 to May 31, 1987, at a monthly rental of $1,250 per month plus sales tax, with options to renew the lease in 1987 and 1988 on similar terms and conditions with adjustment to the rent based upon the consumer price index. Both of these leases provided in clause 21 that the lease was procured through the efforts of Jay Hearin, Inc., who was to collect all rentals coming due from which, as compensation for procuring the lease, the lessor authorized Jay Hearin, Inc., to deduct 8 percent on the Suncoast Lease and 7 percent on the Whitaker lease and remit balance to lessor. Jay Hearin, Inc., was also authorized to pay any invoices applicable to the leased premises which had been approved by the lessor and to deduct the amount so paid. In February and March, 1987, Whitaker roofing did not remit rent payments to Hearin Realty, and the monthly computer printout Owner's Statements to Mrs. Hammer show only rental payments from Suncoast. However, the monthly statement for April 1987 shows Whitaker made the February, March and April payments, and these payments were remitted to Mrs. Hammer. The May and June statements do not show payments from Whitaker and, due to an office error, the June payment from Suncoast was not remitted to Mrs. Hammer. The July statement shows receipt of rent from Whitaker for May and June and for Suncoast for July. No rental payments were received from either tenant in August, and the September statement reflects payments from Suncoast for August and September. During this period of sporadic collections, Mrs. Hammer became upset at not getting her full rental payments, and attempted several times to contact Respondent Brain without success. Brain testified he also tried to contact Mrs. Hammer without success. Mrs. Hammer telephoned the tenants about their rental payments, and they told her they had paid Respondent. In August 1987, Mrs. Hammer engaged another real estate agency to manage the property for her and unilaterally terminated her contract with Respondent contained in Exhibit 1. The new agent advised the tenants to submit rentals to him. On the September 1987 Owner's Statement, Respondent listed the Suncoast rental payments for August and September, deducted his commission, added the June payment which had not been remitted, deducted the rental commission for the balance of the lease for both Suncoast and Whitaker and submitted to Mrs. Hammer a check for the balance of $463.63. This was not accepted by Mrs. Hammer, and she engaged the services of an attorney who filed suit against respondent and Jay Hearin, Inc. The suit alleged failure to remit rents for the months of June, August and September 1987, from Suncoast in the total amount of $6,955.14 and converting these payments to his own use; and for converting rental payments from Whitaker Roofing for the months of July and August 1987, in the total amount of $2,486.06 to his own use. This complaint alleged these conversions of funds constituted civil theft and demanded triple damages (Exhibit 3). Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, Respondent submitted a letter (Exhibit 5) to Mrs. Hammer's attorney, Stephen Evans, on February 18, 1988, contending Mrs. Hammer had failed to comply with the terms of the lease agreement. The attorney for Mrs. Hammer obtained a default judgment against Respondent for triple the sums alleged to have been converted in the total amount of $28,353.60 plus costs of $105.00 and attorney's fee of $680.00 (Exhibit 2). Respondent then obtained the services of an attorney but was unable to get the judgment set aside (Exhibit 7). In 1989 Respondent submitted, through his attorney, $7,200.00 to Mrs. Hammer which apparently represents the figures shown on the September 1987 Owner's Statement without a deduction for future commissions plus interest and attorney's fees. Prior to the filing of this administrative complaint Jay Hearin, Inc., filed for bankruptcy and has been declared bankrupt. In his proposed recommended order, Respondent indicated he has also filed personal bankruptcy, but no evidence in this regard was presented at the hearing.

Recommendation It is recommended that the charges contained in the administrative complaint filed April 26, 1990 against Irving Halsey Brain, Jr. be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1990. Appendix Accepted Rejected. Respondent was licensed as a broker Accepted Accepted, however, the provision quoted from the lease is Rejected as not being an accurate quote. Rejected. See Exhibit 4. Accepted only insofar as included in HO's #6,7, and 8 Accepted Accepted Treatment accorded Respondent's proposed findings: 1, 2, 3, and 4 Rejected as unsupported by evidence presented at this hearing. Accepted Accepted but for last sentence which is a legal conclusion, not as a fact. Accepted Accepted Accepted only insofar as included in HO's #6,7, and 8 (?) Accepted Accepted Accepted to the extent Respondent submitted $7,200 to Mrs. Hammer. Rejected. Evidence was presented that Jay Hearin, Inc. filed for bankruptcy, but the record does not indicate Respondent filed personal bankruptcy. Rejected as legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Irving Halsey Brain, Jr. 334 State Street Commerce, GA 30529 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA vs JAMES R. THERRIEN, 10-006553 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jul. 29, 2010 Number: 10-006553 Latest Update: May 09, 2012

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (BOT) should charge Respondent with lease payments and fine him for unauthorized use of sovereignty submerged lands under the Halifax River in Daytona Beach.

Findings Of Fact Respondent owns residential property on the Halifax River in Daytona Beach. In 2004, he entered into a Sovereignty Submerged Lands Lease with BOT to allow him to construct a single-family dock structure into the Halifax River from his property. In 2007, he entered into a Modification to Increase Square Footage (Modified Lease). The Modified Lease covered 2,714 square feet, required an annual lease fee of $423.89, and expired on November 16, 2008. The Modified Lease provided for a late charge equal to interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the due date until paid on any lease fees not paid within 30 days from their due dates. There was no evidence that any lease fee under the Modified Lease was not paid or paid late. In August 2008, BOT attempted to have Respondent enter into a Lease Renewal. He did not renew his lease, and the Modified Lease expired on November 16, 2008. Respondent paid no lease fees for 2008/2009. In September 2009, BOT again attempted to have Respondent enter into an updated Lease Renewal at an annual lease fee of $436.78 and pay current and past due lease fees. BOT placed Respondent on notice that his failure to do so could be considered a willful violation of Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, which could subject Respondent to administrative fines of up to $10,000 a day. Respondent did not renew his lease or pay any lease fees. Instead, he complained (as he claims to have since 2005) that a stormwater outfall structure installed by the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1998 approximately 100 feet to the north (upriver) of his dock structure, at the end of Ora Street, was not functioning properly and was allowing silt to enter the river, shoaling the water in the area of Respondent’s dock structure (and elsewhere in the vicinity) and eventually making it impossible for Respondent to moor his boat at his dock structure and navigate to the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW). The DOT outfall structure at Ora Street has been in existence since the 1950’s. In 1998, DOT added a silt box, which is not functioning properly and is allowing silt to enter the river. The evidence is not clear whether silt from the DOT outfall structure was entering the river before 1998. In 2010, BOT informed Respondent by certified mail that it had contacted the DOT at Respondent’s request and determined that DOT was planning to clean and monitor the outfall structure after August 2010 but had no plans to dredge sediment from the river. BOT also placed Respondent on notice that he was in violation for not renewing his lease and paying all current and past due fees, and that he would be fined and required to remove his dock structure if he did not come into compliance. This certified letter was designated an NOV. The evidence was not clear when the letter was sent to Respondent, but it is clear that Respondent has continued to refuse to renew the lease, or pay any fees, and has not removed his dock structure. BOT takes the position in this case that Respondent must pay: the Lease Renewal annual lease fee of $436.78 for 2008/2009, plus the Lease Renewal late charge equal to interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from November 30, 2010; and an annual lease fee of $448.49 for 2009/2010, plus a late charge equal to interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum on the $448.49 from November 29, 2009. The evidence did not explain how the annual lease fees for the years 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 were determined. (But see Florida Administrative Code Rule2 18- 21.011(1)(b)10.b., set out in Conclusion of Law 24, which may explain how the annual lease fees were determined.) Invoices in evidence charge Respondent a total of $1,283.22 through July 30, 2010: $436.78, plus tax, for a total of $465.17 for the year 2008/2009; $448.49, plus tax for a total of $477.64 for the year 2009/2010; and $36.18 of interest on the $448.49. BOT also takes the position that Respondent must either: enter into a lease for the year 2010/2011 and beyond; remove part of his dock structure so that he will preempt only 1,150 square feet of sovereignty submerged land (so as not to require a lease, but only a cost-free consent of use); or remove the entire dock structure. BOT also seeks the imposition of an administrative fine under Rules 18-14.002 and 18-14.005(5). In its First Amended NOV, BOT sought a fine in the amount of $2,500; in its PRO, BOT seeks a fine in the amount of $2,500 for the first offense and $10,000 per day from the issuance of the NOV for repeat offenses. Respondent believes he should not be required to pay any lease fees or fines because of his inability to use his dock structure due to the shoaling of the river caused by the malfunctioning DOT outfall structure. Respondent believes it is DEP’s responsibility to require DOT to remove the silt from the river and make the outfall structure work properly. He believes this is required by the state and federal constitutions, statutes, and rules, and by an unspecified “federal bond issue” or “federal bond agency.” DEP takes the position that the silting from the outfall structure and its adverse impact on Respondent’s ability to use his dock structure is irrelevant because the requirement of a lease is based on preemption of sovereignty submerged land, not on the lessee’s use of the land. DEP also believes that, under an operating agreement among governmental agencies, the St. Johns River Water Management District (SJRWMD), not DEP, is the agency responsible for enforcing the applicable environmental laws and permit conditions against DOT. DOT has indicated to the parties that it is in the process of modifying the outfall structure so that it functions properly but that it does not have the money to remove silt from the river. DEP personnel visited the site at approximately 11:00 a.m. on July 16, 2010, and measured the water in the vicinity of the terminal platform and slips of Respondent’s dock structure to be approximately 36 inches deep, which is deep enough for navigation. DEP did not take measurements in the slips of the dock structure, between the terminal platform and Respondent’s property, or between the vicinity of the terminal platform and the ICW. The evidence was not clear what the tide stage was at the Respondent’s dock structure when DEP measured the water depth. DEP called the tide stage low, or near low, based in part on tidal charts for Ormond Beach and the Halifax River indicating that the tide was low at 11:21 a.m. and high at 4:10 p.m. on July 16, 2010. However, the persuasive evidence was that the tidal chart applied to locations at the beach, and there is a difference in the tides at Respondent’s dock structure and at the beach. It does not appear that the tide was dead low or near dead low at Respondent’s dock structure at 11:00 a.m. on July 16, 2010; it probably was between low and slack, possibly a half foot higher than dead low. Regardless of the measurements taken by DEP on July 16, 2010, Respondent testified that he is not able to operate his boat from his dock structure consistently due to shoaling from the silt. He testified that, as a result, he kept his boat at a marina for a year at a cost of $7,000 but cannot afford to continue to do so.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that BOT enter a final order: (1) that, within 10 days, Respondent sign the appropriate lease renewal and send it, along with $1,283.22 in past due lease fees and interest owed BOT, plus the lease payment for 2010/2011, by cashier’s check or money order made payable to the “Internal Improvement Trust Fund,” with a notation of OGC Case No. 10-1948, sent to 3319 Maguire Boulevard, Suite 232, Submerged Lands and Environmental Resource Program; or (2) that, within 20 days, Respondent remove his dock structure or at least enough of it to preempt no more than 1,150 square feet of sovereignty submerged; and (3) that, within 30 days, Respondent pay BOT a fine in the amount of $2,000, by cashier’s check or money order made payable to the “Internal Improvement Trust Fund,” with a notation of OGC Case No. 10-1948, sent to 3319 Maguire Boulevard, Suite 232, Attention David Herbster, Program Administrator, Submerged Lands and Environmental Resource Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2010.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68253.04 Florida Administrative Code (2) 18-14.00218-21.011
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MICHAEL RICHTER vs FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 95-003226 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 28, 1995 Number: 95-003226 Latest Update: Jan. 27, 1999

The Issue Whether the petitioner's application for renewal of his community association manager's license should be granted or denied.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Richter is a licensed community association manager, having been issued license number 1,439 by the Department in 1988. Mr. Richter's community association manager's license was renewed by the Department in 1990 and 1992. Mr. Richter is also licensed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation as a real estate broker and as a Certified Public Accountant. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, through its Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, is the state agency charged with the administration of chapter 468, part VIII, Florida Statutes, and is specifically responsible for reviewing and approving applications for renewal of community association manager's licenses. The Bureau of Condominiums carries out this function. Community association manager's license renewal applications for the 1994 renewal year were required to be postmarked no later than September 30, 1994. On or about September 15, 1994, Mr. Richter mailed his completed 1994 license renewal application to the Department, together with a check made payable to the Department in the amount of $50.00, the required license renewal fee. In late November 1994, Mr. Richter telephoned the Department and inquired about the status of his renewal application. He spoke with Donald Sapp, an employee of the Bureau of Condominiums, who told him that the Department was behind in processing renewal applications for community association manager's licenses. The Department completed processing applications for the 1994 renewal period in mid-January 1995. On February 17, 1995, Mr. Richter telephoned the Bureau of Condominiums and advised Mr. Sapp that he had not received his 1994 license and that the check he wrote for the fee had not cleared his bank. Mr. Sapp stated that he would look into the matter and call Mr. Richter back. On February 21, 1995, Mr. Sapp telephoned Mr. Richter and advised him that the Department had no record of having received his 1994 license renewal application and check. Mr. Sapp asked Mr. Richter to send the Department a copy of his check register for the period including September 15, 1994, a copy of his bank statements for September, October, and November 1994, and a copy of a stop payment order on the check he wrote for the license renewal fee. On February 22, 1995, Mr. Richter sent Mr. Sapp, via Airborne Express, a copy of his check register and of the requested bank statements. He refused to place a stop payment order on his check, however. On March 10, 1995, Mr. Richter sent the Department a replacement check in the amount of $50.00 for the 1994 license renewal application fee. This check was received and, in accordance with standard procedure, deposited by the Department. Mr. Richter completed all of the continuing education hours required for license renewal prior to September 30, 1994. Mr. Richter has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he timely mailed his 1994 license renewal application and that he should be granted a community association manager's license for 1994-1996.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order finding that Michael Richter's 1994 community association manager's license renewal application was postmarked prior to the September 30, 1994, deadline and granting Mr. Richter's application for a renewal license for 1994-1996. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of April 1996. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April 1996.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.60468.433
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ELIZABETHAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 84-000614BID (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000614BID Latest Update: Sep. 05, 1984

Findings Of Fact This case concerns what is-called a "Turnkey Lease". The program was developed by the State of Florida in 1971. It encompasses a situation where by agencies seeking space for their operations may, after a specific need is determined that cannot be filled by existing adequate space, solicit competitive bids from developers for the provision of land and the construction of a building thereon sufficient to-meet the agency's needs, for lease specifically to the agency requesting it. The Bureau of Property Management within DGS was given the initial responsibility to develop the guidelines, promulgate the rules, and seek statutory authority for such a program. The Bureau's current role is to work with agencies requesting this program. The agency certifies the need to the Bureau in addition to the fact that there is no available existing space present. The Bureau then determines agency needs and gives the agency the authority to solicit the bids for the turnkey project. Once the bids are then received, evaluated, and a recommendation for an award is forwarded by the agency to DGS, DGS reviews the supporting documents required by the provision of the Florida Administrative Code and either concurs or does not concur in the recommendation. If DGS concurs, the submitting agency is notified and is permitted to then secure the lease. Once the lease has been entered into; it is then sent back to DGS for review and approval as to the conditions; and thereafter the plans and specifications for the building are also referred to DGS for review and approval as to the quality and adequacy as well as code compliance. Section 255.249 and Section 255.25, Florida Statutes, set forth the requirements for soliciting and awarding bids for lease space in an amount in excess of 2,500 square feet. This provision requires that an award of this nature be made to the lowest and best bidder, and DCS utilizes that standard in evaluating and determining whether or not it will concur with an agency's recommendation. In the instant case, DHRS advertised for bids for the construction of office space in Palatka, Florida for its District III facilities. Before seeking to solicit bids, the District III staff conducted a search for other possible existing space within a five mile radius of the downtown area and located no adequate facilities. Thereafter, a Certification of Need was processed for a solicitation of proposals and approval was granted by DGS to follow through with the solicitation. A preproposal conference was advertised and held on October 14, 1983, and after project review by those present at the conference, bid opening date was set for November 22, 1983. Thirty-two bid packages were distributed and twelve bidders submitted proposals. The public bid opening was held as scheduled at 2:00 p.m., on November 22, 1983, in Palatka, Florida by Robert E. Litza, Facilities Services Coordinator for DHRS District III. Of the bids submitted by the twelve bidders, the lowest hid was rejected because of the failure of the bidder to comply with the requirements of the bid package. Of the remaining eleven bids, the four lowest were evaluated with the understanding that additional higher bids would be evaluated if the four lowest bids were found to be unacceptable. Among the four bids considered were bids of Chuck Bundschu, Inc., Kenneth R. McGurn, one of the Intervenors (McGurn submitted five prices scheduled for his bid and of these, only one was considered); Elizabethan, Petitioner herein; and TSU. Only three bids are pertinent to the discussion here. They are #8-C (McGurn); #11 (Elizabethan); and #12 (TSU). In pertinent particulars, these bids provided as to rental costs: 8-C 11 12 1st yr $14.00/$220,808 $8.95/$ 61,916.10 S 7.16/$ 49,532.88 2nd yr 14.00/ 220,8088 8.95/ 141,159.40 7.35/ 115,924.20 3rd yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 7.62/ 120,182.64 4th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.08/ 127,437.76 5th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.33/ 131,380.76 6th vr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.59/ 135,481.48 7th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 8.86/ 139,739.92 8th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 9.19/ 144,944.68 9th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 9.58/ 151,095.76 10th yr 14.00/ 220,808 8.95/ 141,159.40 10.09/ 159,139.48 Renewal Option 1st yr3.00/47,316 9.93/ 156,615.96 10.51/ 165,763.72 2nd yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 10.99/ 173,334.28 3rd yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 11.48/ 181,062.56 4th yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 11.99/ 189,106.28 5th yr3.00/47.316 9.93/ 156,615.96 12.51/ 197,307.72 Total Basic Overall Lease 1-15 yrs $1,971,500 $2,115,430.50 $2,181,434.12 Average Sq.Ft. for 15 yrs $8.60 $9.20 $9.58 A recommendation by the evaluation committee which met at DHRS District III, that McGurn's bid be selected, was forwarded to DGS in Tallahassee through the Director of DHRS's General Services in Tallahassee on December 22, 1983. The terms of the successful bid and the reasons for its being considered lowest and best are discussed below. The successful bid for the lease in question, lease number 590:8030, upon completion of the committee's evaluation was also evaluated by Ms. Goodman in the Bureau of Property Management of DGS. She also considered the McGurn bid to be the lowest and best of the eleven non-disqualified bids. In that regard, not only Mr. McGurn's bid but all of the twelve bids received were considered and reviewed not only at the local level but at DHRS and DGS headquarters as well. In her evaluation of the proposal and the bids, Ms. Goodman considered the documentation submitted by DHRS. This included a letter of recommendation supported by a synopsis of all proposals, the advertisement for bids, and any information pertinent to the site selection process. In determining the McGurn's bid was the lowest as to cost of all the bids, Ms. Goodman compared the average rate per square foot per year for each. This did not take into con- sideration pro-ration of costs per year, but strictly the average over the fifteen year probable term of the lease (ten years basic plus five year option). According to Ms. Goodman, this same method of calculating cost has been used in every lease involving a turnkey situation and in fact in every lease since 1958 - as long as she has been with DGS. This particular method, admittedly, is not set forth in any rule promulgated by DGS. However, the agencies are instructed by DGS to advertise and bidders to bid on an average square foot basis, the basis utilized by Ms. Goodman and her staff in analyzing the bids submitted. In that regard, the request for proposals does not, itself, indicate how the calculation of lowest cost would be made by DHRS and DGS but it does tell prospective bidders what information to submit. This procedure has been followed exclusively in situations like this for may years and many of the bidders here have bid before using this same system. All bidders are considered on the same footing in an evaluation. They are notified of what information will be considered along with that of all the other bidders. Further, anyone who inquires as to the basis for evaluation will be given a straight and complete answer as to the method to be used. Petitioner contends that McGurn's bid does not conform to either the normal bidding procedure followed by contractors in this type of procurement over the past years or to the normal bidding procedures adopted by Respondent, DHRS. It urges that the questioned bid is non-responsive and front-end loaded to the detriment of DHRS. With regard to the front-end loading objection, Mr. Taylor, testifying for Petitioner, attempted to indicate by graphic evidence that Elizabethan's bid, which he claims is not front-end loaded, is cheaper to the State than that of McGurn. Due to the large rental cost of the McGurn bid in the opening years of the lease, the State would have to borrow money to make the large rental payments; the interest cost of which, when added to the $3.00 cost in the option years, raises the cost considerably and makes the bid not the lowest. Though Mr. Taylor testified to this he failed to produce any independent evidence to support it. In addition, Taylor urges, under the McGurn schedule, McGurn would recoup his entire construction debt (approximately $423.00 plus interest) in the first four years of the lease: Comparing the two bids, it appears that the State would pay McGurn approximately $494,500.00 more than it would pay Elizabethan for the same period during the first seven years of the lease. Considering this, it is Taylor's belief that McGurn's profit after the fourth year is excessive. He contends also that when, after the tenth year, McGurn's rental rate drops to $3.00 per square foot for the remaining five years which constitutes the option period of the lease, the State could not afford to leave the low figure and as a result, the ten year lease is converted to a l5 year lease which is unresponsive. Further, the $3.00 figure for the last years, which would ostensibly show a loss to McGurn, is misleading in that there would be sufficient income from the advance profit garnered in years 5 to 10, when invested, to cover the soft costs and more in these later years. Admitting that because of its involvement in other turnkey projects in Florida, Elizabethan is aware of the State policy on cost evaluation, Taylor contends that while his bid does not violate State policy, McGurn's bid does because it would be fiscally irresponsible for the State to pay so much up front. This conclusion is his opinion, however, and not supported by any independent evidence. Both expert witnesses, Respondents Scott and Perry, who testified for the Intervenor, TSU, agree that the present value of money should be considered in evaluating rental costs. Their major point of difference is in the percentage of discount rate to be applied. Dr. Perry urges that use of the 10% rate mandated by the U. S. Government in its procurements of this nature. Dr. Scott, on the other hand, considers this to be too high and urges a rate in the area of 3% be used. The significance of this is that at the lower of the range spread, McGurn's bid is lowest. At the higher end, TSU's bid is lowest. From 5.7% up to below 6%, Petitioner's bid is lowest. Whichever would be appropriate, the State has not adopted the present value of money methodology and the policy followed by the State is not to consider that methodology in analyzing costs. State policy is to use only the average rental methodology. There is, in addition, no prohibition against front- end loaded bids encompassed within this policy. By the same token, there is nothing in the bid package issued to all prospective bidders that in any way stipulates the method of computing lease costs or prohibits from loaded bids. DGS zone rates, criteria stipulating the maximum agencies can send on rent without approval by DGS, are not part of the bid package and do not constitute a factor in determining whether a bid is conforming or not. These zone rates may be waived by DGS at the time the proposed award is submitted for DGS approval. In practice, within the memory of Joseph Lambert, HRS' Administrator of Facilities Services, who administers the Department's leasing program, he cannot recall DGS ever denying a DHRS request for waiver of the maximum zone rate in any case where it was pertinent. In this case, since the lease payments at-least in the second through tenth years-of the McGurn bid exceed the zone limits, the award would have to be approved by the Governor and Cabinet in addition to DGS. It has not yet been placed on the Cabinet agenda because of the protests filed. As was stated before, there are no rules governing the evaluation of bids for leases of this nature. Oral instructions given to each agency, when applied here, reveal that the McGurn bid, as was seen above, has an average cost of $8.86 per square foot per year. TSU's bid costs $9.58 per square foot per year, and Elizabethan's bid costs $9.29 per square foot per year. These same calculations are followed on all turnkey and non- turnkey leases in the State. The reason the State uses this process instead of the present value of money methodology is that it is easy. DGS statistics indicate that at least 50% of the landlords in the approximately $32,000,000 worth of leases presently existing with the State are "Mom and Pop" landlords. These people are not normally trained lease evaluators. By using the straight average rental rate method, there are no arbitrary variables. It has always worked because people can understand it and all agencies which lease property in the State follow this procedure. In the opinion of Ms. Goodman, the costs involved in utilizing the present value of money methodology would far outweigh the paper savings to be gained, notwithstanding the testimony of Dr. Perry to the contrary. With regard to the option issue, it was the position of DGS in reviewing the proposals that the very low $3.00 lease cost per square foot in the last five years (the option period) did not make the McGurn bid unresponsive. There were no limits imposed upon the bidders except that a five year option to a ten year lease be included. Were it not there, the bid would be unresponsive. DGS would issue approval for a ten year lease with a five year option but not a fifteen year lease. Ms. Goodman cannot recall a situation in which an option was not exercised by it if the need for the space continued though there have been some instances where option costs have been renegotiated.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore; RECOMMENDED THAT DHRS License Number 590:8030 be awarded to Kenneth R. McGurn. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of September, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkwav Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood 8Oulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Morgan Staines, Esquire 2204 East Fourth Street Santa Ana, California 92705 Thomas D. Watry, Esquire 1200 Carnegie Building 133 Carnegie Way Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Steven W. Huss, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Thomas, Executive Director Department of General Services 115 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary J. Anton, Esquire P.O. Box 1019 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Harden King, Agency Clerk Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (9) 106.28120.53120.54159.40216.311255.249255.25916.10924.20
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