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MCARTHUR HELMS vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 92-001887RX (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 26, 1992 Number: 92-001887RX Latest Update: Jun. 12, 1992
Florida Laws (2) 120.52120.68
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs SCOTT R. BLAIR, 92-007357 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Dec. 09, 1992 Number: 92-007357 Latest Update: Jul. 25, 1995

The Issue The issue for determination at final hearing was whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaints and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Scott R. Blair (Respondent Blair) was certified by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Petitioner) as a correctional officer, having been issued correctional certificate number 30982 on December 22, 1989. At all times material hereto, Charles A. Piazza (Respondent Piazza) was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer, having been issued correctional certificate number 25166 on August 11, 1988. At all times material hereto, Robert C. Singleton, Sr. (Respondent Singleton), was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer, having been issued correctional certificate number 71355 on August 24, 1988. At all times material hereto, Thomas A. Sayed (Respondent Sayed) was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer, having been issued correctional certificate number 98281 on March 27, 1987. At all times material hereto, all of the Respondents were employed as correctional officers with the Martin County Sheriff's Department in the Martin County Detention Center. In or around December 1989, a new Detention Center was constructed and opened. Prior to that time, the old Detention Center, called the "stockade," was located in Indiantown approximately 19 miles from the site of the new facility. The stockade contained a commissary which was used by both inmates and correctional officers. The commissary was a separate area of the stockade, which contained a variety of snack foods, cigarettes, and sodas for the benefit of the inmates of the facility, who could purchase the items with monies maintained in their individual accounts controlled by the Detention Center. 3/ None of the inmates had unsupervised and continuous access to the commissary. Even though the commissary was for the benefit of the inmates, correctional officers from time to time would remove items from it. There existed an unwritten honor policy that any item removed by a correctional officer would have to be paid for by that officer. A container was placed in the commissary and a correctional officer would place money in the container for the item removed. If an officer was unable to pay for the item at the time of its removal, a supervising officer could approve payment at a later time. An inventory was performed on a weekly and monthly basis, with no shortage of money being reported. This honor policy was well known to and acquiesced in by the commanding officer of the stockage, Major Murphy. Respondent Singleton, who was employed at the stockade, frequently used this honor policy. He would remove items from the commissary and put money in the container for the items. At times, he would not be able to pay for an item until payday, and he was allowed to pay for the item at that time by his superior officer on duty at the time. Respondent Blair was also employed at the stockade and used this honor system. When the new facility opened in or around December 1989, the commissary structure and procedure pertaining to inmate use remained the same, but the procedure pertaining to correctional officer use was changed by Major Murphy. Although the commissary continued to be for the benefit of the inmates, no longer were the correctional officers suppose to utilize it. The container for payment by the correctional officers for items removed no longer existed. Now, the correctional officers were suppose to obtain their items from an area within the new Detention Center specifically set-aside for them, which was separate and some distance away from the commissary. This area contained coin-operated machines which contained a variety of snack foods, cigarettes and sodas. However, although there was suppose to be this new policy, no one, other than administrative personnel and high ranking correctional officers, were aware of the change. No written policy was issued for the new facility to countermand the unwritten policy used at the stockade. This nonaction resulted in no notification to the correctional officers of the new policy. Without the written policy, some correctional officers who worked at the stockade continued their practice in the new facility of removing items from the commissary even though no container existed in which the officers could pay for the items removed. In particular, at the new facility one correctional officer on the night shift had removed some items from the commissary. Being unsure as to how to pay or who to pay for the items, he waited the next morning, before going home, for the person who purchased items for the commissary, so that he could pay for the items. The commissary purchasing person worked only on the day shift. At that time, he was notified by the commissary purchasing person that he no longer could obtain items from the commissary, but she did accept his money for the items and informed the officer's superior of the incident. Then and only then did he become aware of the policy change. Major Murphy continued as the commanding officer at the new Detention Center. He too used the commissary and the honor policy. At the stockade he would order boxes of cigars through the commissary, either prepaying for them or paying for them when they came in. He continued this practice at the new facility, which was at odds with his new unwritten policy of prohibiting correctional officers from using the commissary. Everyone was aware of Major Murphy's practice. Approximately a year and a half after the new facility opened, on June 13, 1991, through an inmate informant, Major Murphy became aware of possible inmate theft of cigarettes from the commissary. The alleged theft occurred the night before on June 12, 1991, which was the usual periodic time that inmates' requests for commissary items were filled by other inmates under the supervision of correctional officers. The inmates who were assigned to fill inmate requests from the commissary were questioned by an officer assigned to the investigation by Major Murphy. Implicated by the inmates interviewed in the June 12, 1991 theft of cigarettes were themselves, other inmates and several correctional officers, including Respondents. Besides officers actually removing cigarettes, one inmate was allegedly directed by one officer to deliver some cigarettes to another room and by another officer, Respondent Piazza, to deliver some cigarettes to her. Possible officer theft was a surprising development. On the basis of only the inmates' statements, on June 13, 1991, Respondents were notified to report to Major Murphy without notifying them about the nature of the meeting. The written procedure for investigating officers was not followed. Major Murphy dictated the procedure to be followed in the investigation. Respondents Blair, Piazza and Sayed met with Major Murphy and two of his ranking officers. Major Murphy did all the talking at the meeting. He cited the theft statute, notified them of the allegation against them and instructed them to tell what they had done. Major Murphy further told the Respondents that, if they did take the cigarettes, it would be the most expensive pack of cigarettes that they had ever had. At least one of Major Murphy's ranking officers perceived this statement by Major Murphy as a threat to the Respondents. Only Respondent Blair admitted to removing, but not stealing, two packs of cigarettes after changing his story several times as to how many packs he had removed. Respondent Sayed denied taking anything but at the conclusion of the meeting requested to meet with Major Murphy privately. In that private meeting, with one of Major Murphy's ranking officers also present, Respondent Sayed admitted to removing, but not stealing, two packs of cigarettes and attempted to give Major Murphy the money for the cigarettes. Major Murphy refused to take the money. Respondent Piazza denied taking any cigarettes from the commissary. Respondent Singleton was late for the meeting because he had not received notification of it. Again, Major Murphy did all the talking. He gave Respondent Singleton the same introductory comments regarding the theft statute, what was alleged, and requested his story of what happened. When Major Murphy completed his comments, Respondent Singleton admitted that, during his night shift, he had taken, but not stolen, a pie to eat because he lacked change for the machines and had intended to pay for the pie later. Respondent Singleton also admitted that in the past he had removed snack items from the commissary but had paid the commissary purchasing person for them later. 4/ His statement pertaining to paying for the items later is found not to be credible. If he had engaged in this type of conduct, it is reasonable to assume that the commissary purchasing person would have informed him that he could no longer engage in such conduct, as she had done with the correctional officer discussed in Finding of Fact 15. Respondents were suspended from their positions that same day and subsequently terminated. Prior to the meeting with Major Murphy, there was nothing other than the statements by inmates to connect the Respondents to the theft of cigarettes from the commissary. Moreover, no inventory was performed on the commissary items. No evidence existed to show that any unauthorized items had been taken from the commissary or that Respondents had taken any items from the commissary. Even though Major Murphy found the inmates' statements, standing alone, credible to initiate an investigation against the Respondents and personally question them, he failed to find these same statements from these same inmates credible to investigate any of the other correctional officers named in the statements and question them. Furthermore, no other correctional officer named on that evening shift was disciplined by Major Murphy. One of the inmates from whom the so-called credible statements were taken testified at the hearing that, when he assisted in the new commissary, it was not uncommon for correctional officers to remove items from the commissary. 5/ At the hearing, the inmate refused to name correctional officers other than those named in his investigative statement, which included Respondents Blair, Piazza and Sayed, because he was fearful of what might happen to him at the new Detention Center at which he was now again incarcerated. Importantly, before he agreed to give a statement during the investigation in which he named officers, he was told by the investigating officer that other inmates had already given statements and named officers. The inmate's testimony at hearing is found to be credible. Regarding Respondent Piazza, this inmate was directed by Respondent Piazza to take some cigarettes to another room within the facility where other officers were located, but none of whom personally accepted or received the cigarettes. Approximately four days after the Respondents' meeting with Major Murphy, on June 17, 1991, he issued a written memo regarding correctional officers removing items from the commissary. Major Murphy indicated in the memo that through an investigation, without revealing the nature of the investigation, "apparently there was a practice of correctional employees removing items from the commissary, on all four shifts, without paying for them but that the practice would not be tolerated." Moreover, he further indicated that employees who had participated in the practice could remain anonymous and pay for the items, describing the procedure to follow, and that in the future a container would be placed in the commissary for the correctional employees who remove items to pay for them at the time they are removed. It is inferred from Major Murphy's memo that he believed, and it is found, that it was common practice for correctional officers to remove items from the commissary without paying for them as described by the Respondents. Even though other correctional officers who participated in the practice were provided an opportunity to pay for the items they had removed from the commissary, Major Murphy denied the Respondents this same opportunity. Prior to the memo of June 17, 1991, and after Major Murphy's meeting with the Respondents, another officer who was named in an inmate statement admitted to Major Murphy that he had removed a cigar from the commissary without paying for it. No disciplinary action was taken against that officer. Also, additional correctional officers were named in additional statements by one inmate. Major Murphy determined the extent of the investigation (limited only to the evening of June 12, 1991), and who would be investigated and disciplined (only Respondents and the inmates). Before issuing the memo of June 17, 1991, Major Murphy had decided not to pursue an investigation of any additional correctional officers because he believed that the disciplining of Respondents had sent a message to the other officers that the practice would not be tolerated and because he did not want to have to suspend and possibly terminate the majority of his staff. No criminal charges were recommended or filed against Respondents. The investigating officer recommended, and Major Murphy agreed, that the incident did not warrant theft charges. Respondents have not been employed as correction officers since June 13, 1991. Respondents have no prior history of disciplinary action. The inmates who stole cigarettes on the evening of June 12, 1991, were also disciplined.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order Reprimanding the Respondents. Placing the Respondents on probationary status for six months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of June 1994. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June 1994.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57812.014943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.001111B-27.005
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WILLIAM VAN POYCK vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 91-002292RP (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 15, 1991 Number: 91-002292RP Latest Update: Dec. 10, 1991

The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?

Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, William Van Poyck, and the Intervenor, Robert David Roy, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner and the Intervenor are subject to the rules of the Respondent. The evidence failed to prove that the Petitioner and Intervenor are, or have been, placed in administrative confinement by the Respondent. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, the Florida Department of Corrections, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, a rule of the Respondent, governs the placement of an inmate in "administrative confinement". "Administrative confinement" is "the removal of an inmate from the general inmate population for . . . " various specified reasons. Rule 33-3.0081(1), Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated September 27, 1990, the Respondent advised the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee"), of proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Be letter dated November 5, 1990, M. Catherine Green, an attorney with the Committee, informed the Respondent that a review of the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, had been completed. Ms. Green also informed the Respondent of certain "technical errors" and "substantive errors" that she found with Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Green indicated that a "substantive error" referred to "errors which will result in recommended objections to the committee unless they are eliminated prior to adoption." Among the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code: (3) Placement in administrative confinement shall be for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 9 was, in pertinent part, as follows: What does "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" mean? This has the effect of not notifying the inmate of the length of time in which he will be in administrative confinement and the criteria to be considered in releasing him or her. The rule discusses criteria for placing inmates in administrative confinement, but sets no criteria other than "desired results" as to when an inmate shall be released. If the two criteria are the same, please make that clear. Another of the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after an informal hearing when no reasonable alternative exists. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. Rule 33-3.0081(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, provides for review of the senior correctional officer's "informal hearing" and Rule 33-3.0081(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides for a 48-hour delay in the "informal hearing" in case of certain emergencies. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 11 was, in pertinent part, as follows: Please provide a cross reference to the rules of procedure for an informal hearing. Does the review procedure conflict with provisions of Chapter 33-29, F.A.C.? Please clarify what the phrase "when no reasonable alternative exists" means in reference to an inmate's confinement after an informal hearing. . . . . In a letter dated January 23, 1991, the Respondent, through a Senior Attorney, responded to Ms. Green's comments. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, was made: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replace it with "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replacing it with the phrase "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the circumstances under which an inmate placed in administrative confinement will be returned to the general inmate population. Under Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, prior to the proposed amendment, "the shortest time possible" occurred when the factors which necessitated placing an inmate in administrative confinement no longer applied. The proposed amendment merely clarifies when "the shortest time possible" has occurred. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, was also made in the January 23, 1991, letter: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "an informal hearing" and insert "being advised of an incident or situation which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the terms "informal hearing" and replacing them with the following underlined language: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after being advised of a situation or incident which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution, if the situation cannot be resolved. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. . . . The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the manner in which an inmate is informed that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The "informal hearing" previously required in Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, required no more than the proposed amendment provides for. By eliminating the terms "informal hearing" the proposed rule amendment eliminates any confusion as to whether some more formal process is to be followed by the Respondent in informing an inmate that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which contained the proposed amendments at issue in this proceeding was subsequently filed by the Respondent with the Bureau of Administrative Code, for publication, and with the Committee. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking included the following "purpose and effect" clause: The proposed amendments are needed in order to correct technical and substantive errors noted by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. The proposed amendments provide clarification of policies and procedures regarding administrative confinement and protective management. The purpose and effect clause is consistent with the substantive changes to Rule 33-3.0081(3) and (4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding are arbitrary or capricious. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any of the suggestions concerning Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, made by Ms. Green were ever approved, adopted, or reviewed by the Committee. In fact, Ms. Green indicates in her letter that "substantive errors" she perceived would be recommended as objections to the Committee only if they were not eliminated prior to adoption. Since the "substantive errors" at issue in this proceeding were eliminated, they were apparently never recommended or considered by the Committee.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.54120.545120.6820.315944.09
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JOSEPH REDMAN, NYADZI D. RUFU, S. B. RIDLEY, AND JIMMY L. ROGERS vs. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 83-003889RX (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003889RX Latest Update: Jun. 12, 1984

The Issue This case arises out of a challenge by the Petitioners to the validity of Rule 33-3.02(6), Florida Administrative Code; Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13, and Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure No. 81-82. The Petitioners specifically challenge the validity of those portions of the above- provisions relating to the issue of clothing to the inmates. At the final hearing, Petitioners, Joseph Redman, Nyadzi D. Rufu and Jimmy L. Rogers, testified on their own behalf and also called as witnesses Charles Connors and Paul Gunning. Petitioners offered and had admitted into evidence five exhibits. Respondents called no witnesses and offered no exhibits into evidence. The Petitioner S. B. Ridley, did not appear at the formal hearing. The Hearing Officer was informed by one of the other Petitioners at the formal hearing that Mr. Ridley had been transferred to Polk Correctional Institution. Mr. Ridley was given due notice of the hearing held on February 17, 1984, and has filed no pleading or motion with the undersigned Hearing Officer seeking either a continuance or other relief. The Petitioners and counsel for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings and conclusions are inconsistent with this order, they were rejected as unsupported by the evidence or as unnecessary to a resolution of this cause.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Joseph Redman, Nyadzi D. Rufu and Jimmy L. Rogers are inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida. On November 5, 1982, as Petitioner Rogers was being released from disciplinary confinement, he entered the laundry to obtain another pair of state issued pants, socks and underwear. The name tag was coming off of his jacket and because of this it was confiscated. He asked for another jacket and was told he could not be issued one. He was eventually issued another jacket which was also confiscated. For a period of time, Petitioner Rogers had no jacket for those times when he was required to walk and be outside in the cold. The laundry manager at Union Correctional Institution is responsible for the issue of all clothing to the prisoners. The manager follows Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure 81-82 in issuing clothing an Union Correctional Institution. That operating procedure provides in relevant part: 81-82.1 Purpose This memorandum is published as a guide in the issuance of inmate clothing, and the providing of laundry facilities for the inmate population. 81-82.2 Authority Florida Statutes 945.21, 944.09 section 20.315 Department of Corrections Administrative Rules, Chapter 33-3.02(6). 81-82.3 Clothing Issue Each inmate shall be issued the following clothing items: 3 each Blue Shirts 3 pairs Blue Trousers 1 each Web Belt 1 pair Boxer Shorts 1 pair Socks 1 pair Shoes, High Top. Inmates assigned to the Food Service Departments and Canteens shall be issued one additional suit of clothing because of their having to work on Sundays, enabling them to change clothing daily. 81-82.6 Special Issue Inmate Jackets are issued in October of each year and picked up for storage in April. An inmate may have his jacket laundered on any Friday. Hats, caps, and other special clothing items are issued to the Department Supervisor for distribution to the work squad. The Supervisor is responsible for those items of issue. 81-82.7 Miscellaneous Information The Laundry Manager/Clothing Officer shall maintain a record of the various clothing items issued to each inmate. If clothing issue is abused, either through neglect or by intent, the officer will initiate appropriate action. The official inmate uniform throughout the institution is issue blue shirt and trousers. Inmates assigned to the following areas are issued white shirts and trousers in lieu of the regular blue uniform: Food Service Administration Building Workers Main Gate Workers Utility Man on each Close Supervision Squad (For Identification) Canteen Workers. Each inmate who turns in a jacket (at the end of winter) shall be issued a pair of hemmed walking shorts for wearing on the athletic field or after hours in the housing area. The manager was not aware of and has not utilized Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13, in issuing clothing at Union Correctional Institution. That policy and procedure directive provides in relevant part: AUTHORITY: Section 20.315, 944.09 and 945.21, Florida Statutes Department of Corrections, Administrative Rules, Chapter 33-3.02(6) PURPOSE: The purpose of this Directive is to establish a uniform procedure for issuing inmate clothing and linens. This will enable the Department to control the costs of clothing and linens in a more economical manner. GENERAL: Appropriate internal measures will be taken by each operating location to implement the provisions of this Directive. It is the Department's expressed intent that all inmate clothing be appropriately fitted and suited for the environment and that Departmental facilities provide sufficient laundering facilities to ensure that appropriate health standards are maintained. The clothing and linen will be exchanged on a one for one basis after the initial issue. Should an inmate intentionally damage or destroy his/her uniforms, appropriate action should be taken by the Superintendent to reimburse the State, if possible. It is imperative that the custodial staff be well informed of the provisions of this Directive and any exceptions or deviations from this Policy set forth will have to be approved by the Regional Director. STANDARD CLOTHING ISSUE (MALE): Each male inmate may be issued the items of clothing and linen specified below. The phrase "Maximum Clothing Issue" is used in this Directive to permit the substitution of personal clothing or to permit the issuance of less than maximum quantities where appropriate. Unless otherwise designated, the inmate will not have excess clothing and linens in his possession. Each inmate will be responsible for the clothing and linen issued to him. Maximum Clothing Issue - Blues and Whites Items Quantity Shirts 3 for 5 day post 5 for 7 day post 3 for 5 day post 5 for 7 day post Maximum Clothing Issue - Other Items Items Quantity Undershorts 3 pairs Undershirts/T shirts 3 Socks 2 pairs (changed daily) Belt with Buckle 1 Shoes 1 pair Jacket (winter only) 1 Long underwear (winter only for outside detail) 2 Regions III, IV and V may substitute two sweatshirts for two pairs of long underwear for winter use. E. Clothing - Special Items such as food service linens, coverall's aprons, cooks' caps, gloves, rubber boots, raincoats, athletic uniforms, barber and butcher jackets, straw hats and safety helmets shall be considered tools of the trade and will be issued directly to the department requiring them. The superintendent will, on recommendation and justification by department head, determine what items are to be purchased and issued to inmate. All items issued on a departmental basis that can be appropriately marked shall have the standardized department initials stenciled on the item. It will be the responsibility of the superintendent to establish a laundry schedule for these items. Only those inmates who work outside for eight hours each day are issued long underwear during the winter months. The inmates do not go outside when the temperature is below 40 degrees. The laundry does not issue raincoats to the inmates. The raincoats are under industry inventory and each department can draw raincoats out of that inventory. The raincoats are paid for by the department drawing them out and the work supervisor from that department issues them to the inmates. Raincoats are sold in the canteen at Union Correctional Institution. The laundry stocks long underwear but no longer stocks T-shirts. The laundry does not stock sweatshirts. There are two types of blue uniforms. The laundry issues coveralls to special jobs but no coveralls are issued to inmates personally. It is within the laundry manager's discretion as to when he issues new clothing as opposed to used clothing. It is the laundry manager's responsibility to remain within his budget for the year. T-shirts are not included in the list of clothing issue items in Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure 81-82. This may be due in part to budget restrictions. T-shirts are included in the "maximum clothing issue" list in Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13. Practically every inmate in Union Correctional Institution is required to go outside in order to go to work or to school. The inmates must also go outside in order to go to the chow hall or the clinic. The west unit is approximately a 4 or 5 minute walk from the chow hall. Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure No. 81-82 is signed and issued by the Superintendent of UCI and cites as its authority Florida Statutes 945.21, 944.09, Section 20.315, and Rule 3303.02(6), Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent has not contested the fact that the operating procedure was not promulgated in accordance with the requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. There was no evidence presented as to the procedures followed in adopting the Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.54120.5620.315944.09
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EMORY L. MOSLEY vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 03-000137 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 16, 2003 Number: 03-000137 Latest Update: Nov. 21, 2003

The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by the Department of Corrections based on race, religion, disability, age, or in retaliation for participation in an activity protected under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Emory Mosley, is an African-American male (Petitioner). In 1989, Petitioner was hired as a correctional officer by Respondent, the Department of Corrections (Department). Initially, he was assigned to the main unit at Madison Correctional Institution in Madison, Florida. By all accounts, during his first nine years with the Department, Petitioner was well liked by the institution's administration and his fellow officers. He was thought of as a hardworking professional officer and as one of the best officers at Madison Correctional Institution. New officers were routinely sent to Petitioner for him to train. In general and during Petitioner's employment, officers are assigned to different shifts and work assignments at Madison Correctional Institution so that officers can become familiar with all aspects of the Madison Correctional system. However, Petitioner was allowed to remain at the same post and shift for his first nine years. Over nine years, such permanence in Petitioner's assignment caused some resentment among other staff because of the perceived favoritism exhibited by the administration toward Petitioner. At some point in his ninth year with the Department, Petitioner began to perceive problems with other staff members. He concluded that certain rules were not being followed and began to believe that co-workers were in some manner conspiring against him, abusing inmates, and/or committing crimes related to their duties at the institution. His relationships with co-workers became strained. Staff and inmates began to complain about Petitioner's behavior toward them. During this time, Petitioner also complained to the warden about rule violations by staff. However, the details of these complaints were not revealed at the hearing. Petitioner's complaints did appear to be in the nature of "whistle-blowing." The evidence did not demonstrate that any of Petitioner's complaints involved any activity protected under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. In July 1999, Colonel David McCallum transferred Petitioner to the Madison Correctional Institution work camp. The work camp was located a few hundred yards away from the main unit. The duties of a correctional officer at the work camp are primarily the same as those at the main unit with the difference that there are significantly fewer inmates at the work camp. As a result, many officers feel that the work camp is somewhat more relaxed and an "easier" assignment than an assignment at the main unit. To some officers, it is a desirable assignment. To other officers, it is not a desirable assignment. Opportunities for promotion are not diminished at the work camp; pay and benefits remain the same. The evidence did not show that transfer to the work camp was an adverse employment action on the part of the Department. Colonel McCallum, who thinks highly of Petitioner, transferred Petitioner to the work camp because he believed that Petitioner needed a change of scenery because of the problems he was having with staff and inmates at the main unit. He believed that he was doing Petitioner a favor by transferring him because of the more relaxed atmosphere at the work camp. The transfer was also made due to complaints from staff that Petitioner was receiving preferential treatment in that he was allowed to maintain the same post and shift for such a long period of time. Colonel McCallum was not aware of any complaints by Petitioner to the warden of alleged rule violations at the time that Petitioner was transferred. The evidence did not show that Petitioner was transferred in retaliation for any activity protected under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's supervisor at the work camp was Lieutenant Patricia Herring, an African-American female. Herring emphatically denied at the hearing that the work camp was in any manner run as a type of concentration camp as opined by Petitioner and did not relate any race relation problems at the camp. The camp was run in a less strict manner than the main unit, especially in relation to the procedure used during the counting of inmates. These more relaxed methods greatly disturbed Petitioner, and he constantly agitated the work environment about such relaxed methods that he perceived as "rule violations." Herring testified that Petitioner was insubordinate and disrespectful to her during his time at the work camp. She believed that his disrespect came from his unhappiness with having a female supervisor. Petitioner received a written reprimand as a result of his insubordination and disrespect toward Herring. Unquestionably, Petitioner and Herring had a serious conflict between their personalities. There was no evidence that any conflict was based on discrimination or retaliation. Ms. Herring also testified that Petitioner received the same treatment as all other officers, vis-à-vis, shift and post assignments. There was no substantive evidence that Petitioner was treated differently in the assignments he was given at the work camp. There was no evidence that Petitioner sought accommodation for his diabetes or high blood pressure. Petitioner retired from the Department, effective December 1, 1999. He admitted at hearing that his retirement date had nothing to do with any actions allegedly taken against him by the Department; rather, he planned to retire on December 1, 1999, well before any problems with the Department began because that date ensured that he would receive retirement benefits based on ten years of service. There was no substantive evidence presented at the hearing that Petitioner was discriminated or retaliated against. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Emory L. Mosley Post Office Box 8 Monticello, Florida 32345 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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CARL B. CRIBBS, DOUGLAS L. ADAMS, ET AL. vs. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 84-001483RX (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-001483RX Latest Update: Oct. 05, 1984

Findings Of Fact At the time of the formal hearing in this proceeding, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution. Union Correctional Institution Policy Memorandum No. 65, issued June 7, 1976 and revised and effective since October 23, 1980, provides in pertinent part that: Inmates are prohibited from using typewriters for personal correspondence or for matters other than "official state business." Violation of that Policy Memorandum may constitute a basis for disciplinary action. Petitioners have had mail returned to them because it was typewritten. (Petitioners' Exhibits 3, 4, and 5) Based on the returned mail to Petitioners, all of them have been substantially affected by the operation of the subject Policy Memorandum. As example, Petitioner Adams had several cards returned as being prohibited and was advised that if he questioned the return of those cards, he would be confined as a disciplinary action for questioning the operation of the rule as it relates to the returned cards. Additionally, Petitioner Adams lost a Clerk's job in the Law Library because he typed letters. Adams' dismissal resulted in lost "gain time" since he was dismissed for typing letters violation of Policy Memorandum No. 65. Petitioner Holland filed an application for a grant to a community college which was returned because it was typed in violation of Policy Memorandum No. 65. Finally, Petitioner Cribbs was unable to attend a favorite aunt's funeral because his request was typewritten and it was returned as being in violation of Policy Memorandum No. 65. The employees at Union Correctional Institution adhere to Policy Memorandum No. 65 strictly and employees who are derelict in their responsibilities covered in implementing that policy are subject to disciplinary action. UCIPM 65.5. (Petitioners' Exhibit 1) UCIPM 65 is a department policy, never promulgated as a rule, uniformly applied throughout Union Correctional Institution. It is, by its own terms, virtually self-executing and intended to require compliance. It therefore has the consistent effect of law.

Florida Laws (2) 120.52120.56
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs LENORA R. ANDERSON, 04-002954PL (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clewiston, Florida Aug. 19, 2004 Number: 04-002954PL Latest Update: May 12, 2005

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Anderson is a certified correctional officer, certified by Petitioner. Her certificate number is 190482. At the time of the incident at issue, Anderson was working for the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. On May 27, 2003, Patricia Johns (Johns) was in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Clewiston, Florida. Johns was taking groceries she had purchased from a shopping cart and placing them in her vehicle. She placed her sweater and her purse in a shopping cart while she was loading the groceries. Johns retrieved her sweater from the cart, but left her purse in the cart. She pushed the cart with the purse in it between her vehicle and another vehicle, got into her vehicle, and left the parking lot. A few seconds later Anderson pulled into Johns' parking space. Anderson's vehicle bumped the shopping cart, pushing it forward a couple of feet. She got out of her vehicle, went over to the cart, and removed the purse. Anderson, while wearing her correctional officer uniform, placed the purse in the backseat of her vehicle, took her son out of the vehicle, and went into Wal-Mart. She did not take the purse into Wal-Mart and attempt to locate the owner. The purse was a Tommy Hilfiger brand valued at $50. Inside the purse was a wallet with $18 in cash, a credit card, and blank checks. A cellular telephone valued at $350 was also in the purse. Anderson picked up some prescriptions at Wal-Mart, returned to her vehicle, and eventually returned home. She knew that the purse did not belong to her, but claimed that she was planning to turn the purse in at the police department the next day. Her claim that she was going to turn the purse into the police is not credible based on later actions. Sometime after she had returned home, she remembered she had put the purse in the back of her vehicle and asked her fiancé to get the purse. When he went to retrieve the purse, only the wallet remained minus the cash. During the time that Anderson left Wal-Mart and the time that her fiancé discovered that the purse, cash, and cellular telephone were missing, both Anderson and her fiancé had driven the vehicle while carrying other passengers. Anderson did not remove the purse, cash, and cellular telephone from the vehicle. She believes that one of the other passengers who had been riding in her vehicle on May 27, 2003, took the purse, cash, and cellular telephone. The next day, Anderson placed the wallet in a zip-lock plastic bag and dropped it in a drop box at the post office. She did not notify the owner of the purse that she had taken the purse from the Wal-Mart parking lot, and did not notify the police until later that she had taken the purse. Johns reported to the police that her purse had been stolen. An investigation ensued, and it was learned based on a video tape of the Wal-Mart parking lot on May 27, 2003, that Anderson had taken the purse. A police officer attempted to contact Anderson by telephone concerning the incident. On June 9, 2003, Anderson gave a taped interview to police officers, in which she admitted taking the purse out of the shopping cart and placing it in the backseat of her car. She was arrested for grand theft and released on the same day after posting a bond. An information for grand theft, a third degree felony, was entered against Anderson on August 13, 2003. She agreed to make restitution in the amount of $419, and a Notice of Nolle Prosequi was entered on December 5, 2003. As a result of the incident at issue, Anderson was dismissed from her position as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. She is sincerely sorry for her actions and has made restitution for the property taken.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lenora R. Anderson is not guilty of a violation of Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that she failed to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011; and imposing the following penalties as set forth in Subsection 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2003): issuance of a written reprimand and placement of Respondent on probation for two years under conditions as specified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57943.13943.133943.139943.1395
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs DANIEL W. DONOVAN, 10-002158PL (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Apr. 20, 2010 Number: 10-002158PL Latest Update: Jul. 29, 2010

The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be used?

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by the Commission, having been issued Correctional Officer Certificate number 144670. On or about January 14, 2009, Respondent was employed by Tomoka Correctional Facility (Tomoka). He had been employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) for approximately 15 years. At some point during the day, Inmate William Cash became disorderly and disruptive in his cell, and a psychological emergency was called. Officer James Hinds and Respondent came to Cash's cell to transport him to a holding cell where he could be seen by a psychologist. In preparing for the transfer, Respondent and Officer Hinds restrained Inmate Cash using handcuffs, leg irons, a waist chain, and a black box which secured Cash's handcuffs. After restraints were applied, Inmate Cash was transported to a holding cell, with Captain Darlene Taman observing the transfer. Consistent with DOC protocols, the transfer of Inmate Cash from his cell to a holding cell was videotaped. Once they arrived at the holding cell, Respondent had Inmate Cash sit down on a bench in the cell. Inmate Cash attempted to twist and pull away from Respondent's grasp. In response, Respondent reasserted his grip and raised one arm, placing his hand against Inmate Cash's neck. The inmate continued pulling away from Respondent until he was lying down on his side. Respondent did not report the incident to his Captain or complete any type of incident report regarding the events occurring in connection with the transport. Captain Taman did not actually see the interaction between Respondent and Inmate Cash, because she was attempting to monitor several situations simultaneously. Consistent with DOC procedure, the warden at Tomoka reviewed the videotape of the transfer. After reviewing the videotape, the warden filed a complaint with John Joiner, Senior Prison Inspector with the DOC Office of Inspector General to investigate whether there was excessive use of force with respect to the interaction between Respondent and Inmate Cash. A use of force occurs when a correctional officer touches an inmate who is offering resistance, applying force to overcome the inmate's resistance. Touching alone does not constitute use of force. It is the application of force to overcome resistance that is key to determining whether a use of force has occurred. When a use of force occurs, a correctional officer is required to report the use of force to his or her commanding officer; to complete a Use of Force report; and to complete an incident report on the use of force. Use of Force reports are to completed within 24 hours. Correctional officers are trained regarding use of force and the required reporting of use of force on an annual basis. Respondent did not report the incident to his supervisor and did not complete a use of force report. In his view, no use of force occurred because Inmate Cash was pulling away from him and he was not applying force to overcome Inmate Cash's resistance. According to Respondent, he attempted to get a better grip on Inmate Cash and then allowed him to lie down on his side on the bench where he was sitting. He described the event as follows: MR. DONOVAN: . . . Use of force, because you place your hands on an inmate, it does not necessarily incur a use of force. It is the resistance to that, me overcoming his resistance is what determines if there is or is not a use of force. The inmate initially pulled away from me. I reasserted my grasp and put my arm up to defend myself. Like I indicated in my interview, that is why my arm went up. He sat back down on his own and he pulled away and started leaning down on the bench to lay down. And after he got down on the bench, after the whole thing was over is when I gave him more orders to stop pulling away, because he continued to pull away from me. I knew he was restrained -- completely restrained, i.e., leg irons, black box, the waist chain and the -- the handcuffs, which is why I didn't use the force. I just wanted to be sure that I had control of the situation, that I had control of him, so that I didn't get hurt or he didn't get hurt. I have been kicked by inmates. I have been spit on and head-butted by inmates, who were completely restrained, such as Mr. Cash was restrained that day. And I know through my training, that just because you touch an inmate, it's not use of force; that you have to -- you have to overcome the resistance that he's presenting to you in order for it to be a use of force. I did not do that. I did not force him to sit down. As he tugged away, he sat down on his own. And then after I reasserted my grasp to make sure that I had ahold of him and was in control of the situation, he laid down on his own. I do not know why; if it was just an attempt to continue to try to get away from me. However, he did all of that on his own. I did not push him down. The video of the incident was observed by both Captain Taman, Respondent's supervisor, and by Inspector Joiner. Both believed, as did Officer Hinds, that the exchange between Respondent and Inmate Cash involved a use of force. It is found that there was a use of force, but that the force used was not excessive. Inspector Joiner interviewed Respondent as a part of the investigation of the incident on January 19, 2010. His response during the interview was consistent with his testimony at hearing: that he did not file a report on use of force because he did not believe a use of force occurred and that, in his view, there was nothing to report. Respondent's testimony was candid, credible and sincere. He believed what he said in the interview and at hearing. However, his ultimate conclusion regarding the use of force was in error.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel W. Donovan Kerra A. Smith, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (10) 119.071120.569120.57776.05776.07837.02943.12943.13943.1395944.35 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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DOUGLAS L. ADAMS vs. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 85-003728RX (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-003728RX Latest Update: Dec. 27, 1985

Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.

Florida Laws (4) 120.52120.54120.56120.68
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