Findings Of Fact Appellant owns an L-shaped tract of land situated on Lakeview Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. This property contains 4,916 square feet and is presently zoned CG. However, the City is in the process of rezoning this property to RM- 28, High Density Residential, and only RM-28 zoning uses are now permitted. There are no minimum lot sizes for CG zoned property uses except when used for multi-family dwellings, at which time they are required to comply with RM-28 zoning requirements. Minimum lot size for a triplex in RM-28 zoning is 10,000 square feet. The property of Appellant is surrounded by lands owned by Kalmia Condominiums and there is no additional property which can be purchased to make this property conforming. In December, 1973, a tract of land which included the property here involved was purchased by Kalsa from Highland Apartment Management. Kalsa was owned by Sainer, the Appellant here, president of Kalsa and the contractor who built Kalmia Condominiums; and Kalan, an investor who was secretary of Kalsa. In July, 1976, the eastern portion (approximately one- half of this property) was sold back to Highland Apartment Management. Most of the western portion of this property was developed as Kalmia Condominiums and subsequently conveyed to the condominium owners with a north-south easement over the lot here involved to provide access to Lakeview Avenue. In April, 1980, the remainder of the original tract not previously conveyed and which included the land here under consideration was conveyed to Sainer and Kalan, with each owning one-half. No evidence was submitted how the sole ownership of the property here involved vested in Appellant but this issue was not raised at the hearing and, for the purpose of this order, it is assumed Appellant owns the tract as alleged. The principal use of this property has been as a parking lot for the residents of Kalmia Condominiums. Negotiations to sell this property to the Kalmia Condominiums broke down when Petitioner drastically increased the asking price.
The Issue The issues in this case are those announced by the Administrative Complaint brought by the Petitioner against Respondent claiming that the dirt drive entrance to the Ugly Duckling Rent-A-Car at 2555 U.S. 1 South, St. Augustine, Florida, is an unpermitted drive connection used for commercial purposes. It is further alleged that it is, by its nature, a residential driveway that is used in a commercial endeavor and that it does not meet design standards. The stated authority for these accusations are Sections 335.187 and 335.1825, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On October 2, 1979, Leroy E. Wall, Jr., and his wife Freda purchased the property which is in dispute in this case from Alex Hein and Virginia Hein, his wife. That property is located in St. Johns County, Florida, and its dimensions include approximately 300 feet of frontage on U.S. 1, also known as State Road 5. The frontage runs roughly north and south. The east-west depth of the property is approximately 350 to 360 feet. U.S. 1, for about 20 years, has been a four-lane road at this location with a median separating the northbound and southbound lanes. The property in question is on the western side of U.S. 1 and the southbound lane of that highway passes in front of the property. Petitioner holds a right-of-way from the white line on the shoulder of the road 38 feet inward. It has maintenance responsibility for a five foot strip inward from that white line. At the time Mr. Wall and his wife purchased the property in question, there was a residence located on the property with a free standing garage. Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence contains a copy of the warranty deed from the Heins to Mr. Wall and his wife. It also shows a description of the property through a survey done on November 14, 1984. It was the intention of Mr. Wall to have the property rezoned from residential to commercial. In addition, he had intended to build a commercial building and to seek approval of Petitioner for a driveway permit associated with that commercial venture. That driveway permit was approved on November 1, 1979. A copy of the driveway permit may be found in Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. The date of approval of that permit is November 1, 1979. The driveway permit and a small drawing reflect the two paved driveways associated with the intended commercial building. It shows frontage in the amount of 165 feet as opposed to the 300 foot expanse that constituted the entire parcel which Mr. Walk and his wife had bought from the Heins. Nonetheless, Mr. Wall is confident that the Petitioner was made aware of the entire 300-foot expanse when he sought the permit. His recollection of those events is credited. As reflected in Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1, a report and recommendation was made by the zoning board suggesting to the Board of County Commissioners that they approve the rezoning of the subject property. That recommendation dates from December 10, 1979. The zoning change was effected. The residential building and detached garage was used by a tenant of Mr. Wall's who was in the import business. Subsequent to that time Vernard W. Fletcher, Jr., who owns Ugly Duckling Rent-A-Car became a tenant at that location on July 1, 1983. The commercial building that had the two paved drives permitted on November 1, 1979 has four tenants. The dirt driveway which enters U.S. 1 from the residence with the detached garage has been there from the time of the purchase by the Walls from the Heins until the present. Mr. Fletcher has described the peak usage of that driveway as 20 trips per day in 1987. In the period July 1, 1988, through June 15, 1989, the number of trips has dropped to 15 cars a day. Mr. Fletcher's explanation of the number of trips is accepted. July 1, 1988, through June 15, 1989, describes the period from the advent of Section 335.187, Florida Statutes, (1988), until the Administrative Complaint was brought against the Respondent on June 15, 1989, as described in the statement of the issues. As Mr. Fletcher and Mr. Wall both explain, the dirt drive is used mostly for ingress. One of the paved drives associated with the commercial building is used for egress onto U.S. 1. On March 16, 1989, Respondent received notice from the Petitioner that the dirt driveway was an unacceptable access point onto U.S. 1. This correspondence was received by Mr. Fletcher on March 17, 1989. It sets forth the same basis of concern as announced in the Administrative Complaint which was prepared on June 15, 1989. Marshall Sander who is a permit engineer for the Lake City District of the Petitioner testified at the hearing. Although he did not confirm in absolute terms the expectation of the Petitioner as to the type driveway that it would accept for permitting, it is clear that some other form of driveway than the present type is contemplated. Mr. Sander's remarks to Mr. Wall made it obvious that the Petitioner is more likely to look with favor on a paved driveway with deceleration lane than any other form of improvement. This would cost as much as $15,000. A not-to-scale drawing of the immediate area is found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. It depicts the commercial building with its two paved driveways and the Respondent's site with its dirt driveway. It also shows the approximate location of a shopping plaza which was under construction and expected to open in October 1989, which is 500 feet north of the property in question. That shopping center is located on the same side of the road as the property that is at issue. There is a traffic signal at Lewis Point Road and U.S. 1, the location of the new shopping center. That traffic control device protects automobiles which are exiting the location of the Respondent and the commercial properties adjacent to that location which are leased by Mr. Wall. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 is a series of photographs which depict the site in question with descriptions of the exact nature of those photographs specifically set out. Petitioner's Exhibit 8 also contains a series of photographs. The first photograph is one of Moultrie Plaza which has a Publix food store and 14 other tenants with the possibility of 8 additional tenants in the future. This shopping plaza opened in January 1989 and is approximately two miles south of the Respondent's business location. The shopping plaza which is immediately north of the location in question has a Food Lion grocery store, a McDonald's restaurant, a bank and several other retail shops. It is located on the same side of U.S. 1. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9 contains other pictures associated with the basic location of the business in question. Mr. Sander's concern about the use of the dirt driveway in a commercial application relates to the edge of pavement drop-off and the formation of ruts that develop with the kick-out by wheels that spin as cars are leaving or pulling into the location and under braking, and the fact that they slide and move the gravel material in the dirt driveway. In his analysis this creates a possible safety hazard. There is no evidence that any accidents have ever occurred because of the use of this dirt driveway or any safety problem associated with its use. Mr. Fletcher and Mr. Wall have no recollection of such events and the Petitioner presented no indication that accidents or other safety problems had occurred. Mr. Sander also was of the opinion that Mr. Wall should have revealed the existence of the additional 135 feet of frontage when the 165 feet of frontage associated with the commercial building was set out in the attachment to the permit for the two paved driveways that have been mentioned before. Again, the facts are found that the 300 foot frontage was made known to the Petitioner based upon the testimony given by Mr. Wall. Section 385.187(1), Florida Statutes (1988), provides that unpermitted connections to the state highway system, to include U.S. 1, in existence before July 1, 1988, which had been in continuous use for a period of one year or more do not require permits. The dirt driveway was in existence before July 1, 1988, and was in continuous use for a period of one year or more. However, that same section speaks in terms of the ability of the Petitioner to require a permit in those instances where the connection undergoes a significant change in the use, design, or traffic flow of the connection or of the state highway that provides access. Beyond July 1, 1988, the use, design, or traffic flow of the driveway connection has not significantly changed. The use and design of the state highway has not significantly changed. The point of dispute is whether the traffic flow on that state highway has changed in a significant way. Notwithstanding the existence of two residential developments known as St. Augustine South and St. Augustine Shores, the two shopping plazas that have been described and other activities in the general vicinity, it was not shown that the traffic flow had increased in a significant way beyond July 1, 1988, up until June 15, 1989, the point at which the administrative complaint was brought or for that matter up until the time of the final hearing. Moreover, as stated, there is no suggestion that the driveway has presented a safety hazard in that time frame, particularly not when taking into account the preference to use the paved drives associated with the commercial building in the egress. That usage is facilitated by the fact that some of the equipment that is being rented is brought up one of the paved driveway exits from an area behind the commercial building. This set of circumstances is considered in light of the fact that the traffic signalization at Lewis Point Road and U.S. 1 protects a person entering U.S. 1 southbound.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-3898 Petitioner's Facts Petitioner's facts in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 5 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 6 is accepted but it is not essential that it be found as a fact. Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Facts Respondent has described facts it wishes to have found in two categories. Those categories are a preliminary statement of facts not in dispute and a category associated with the issues deemed to be in dispute. These suggested facts are subordinate too the facts found in the recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Frederick L. Rice, Esquire 5611 St. Augustine Road Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Ben Watts, Interim Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact On January 2, 1992, Petitioner commenced an action in federal district court pursuant to the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Action ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 621, et seq. The summons and complaint were not served upon Respondent until May, 1992. By statute, the filing of said federal action stayed the matter pending before the Florida Commission on Human Relations. 29 U.S.C. Section 633(a). Petitioner could have but did not bring an age discrimination claim under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, in his federal court case. On February 23, 1993, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida entered an order granting summary judgment for Respondent, Grumman Aerospace Corporation against Petitioner George E. Stolworthy. The district court held that "there is simply no evidence that Plaintiff's termination was motivated by a discriminatory intent on the part of the Defendant. Petitioner appealed the decision of the District Court to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal. On or about February 14, 1994, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's order of summary judgment. Mr. Stolworthy's claim of age discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations arises out of the same common nucleus of operative facts as his age discrimination claim in federal court. Both cases allege age discrimination in the termination of Petitioner's employment. All of the issues in this case were decided in favor of Respondent by the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, on February 23, 1993. The district court held that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner. The district court's decision was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal on February 14, 1994. That decision effectively resolves this matter either through the doctrine of res Judicata or collateral estoppel. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed and jurisdiction relinquished to the commission for entry of the appropriate final order. Finally, Petitioner was aware that he commenced an action against the Respondent herein in federal district court alleging violations of the ADEA and involving the same set of operative facts before the administrative hearing was held in February 13, 1992. At the time of the hearing, Respondent's counsel was unaware that Petitioner had commenced the aforementioned lawsuit. Additionally, neither Petitioner nor his counsel advised the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Hearing Officer of the initiation of the federal lawsuit. Rather, Petitioner, through his counsel, continued to file documents with the Division in violation of Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Petitioner pursued the instant action for an improper purpose knowing full well that the agency's jurisdiction should have been suspended, and could only have intended to improperly harass Respondent; to improperly utilize the Divisions hearing process for either discovery for the federal case or a trial run for the federal case; to improperly cause needless increase in the cost of the litigation to Respondent; and to improperly waste this agency's time. Respondent incurred attorney's fees and costs and expenses in the amount of $13,506.39 dollars. Moreover, after review of the transcript and evidence in this case it is clear that this action had no basis in fact or law and was therefore frivolous in nature. Therefore Respondent is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $13,506.39.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 67 Countryside, Tract 60, which fronts on Atwood Court, with a small side (approximately 45 feet) facing Landmark Drive. Landmark Drive is a main thoroughfare with heavy traffic expected to increase as the area continues to grow. Landmark Drive is a non-addressed street on which a property owner would be permitted to erect a four-foot high fence on the property line. If Petitioner moved the fence 25 feet back from the property line the zoning regulations would permit the erection of a six-foot high fence. Moving the fence this far would place the fence some 50 feet from the right-of-way of Landmark Drive and would take up so much of Petitioner's property that his future plans to install a swimming pool would be thwarted. In the one and one-half mile stretch of Landmark Drive in the vicinity of Petitioner's property only two fences have been erected which required variances and those encroach only one or two feet into the setback line. At the same time Petitioner's request for variance was denied the board granted a variance to another owner in the same subdivision who had put up a fence without getting a variance. There, the board found it would constitute a hardship to require that landowner to remove or relocate his fence since a swimming pool was also involved. Other applications for variances to erect fences on property fronting on Landmark Drive have been denied in the past.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on January 7, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, which has an extremely limited factual record and is replete with hearsay, Petitioner, Thornton Alan Bline, who was 52 years of age in October 1997, contends that Respondent, Automax and Pearson Group, unlawfully terminated him on account of his age. Respondent denies the allegation and contends that Petitioner was terminated because of poor performance. A preliminary decision on the merits of the claim was never reached by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Respondent is a car dealer that began business in the summer of 1997. Although there is no specific evidence on the issue of whether Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the law, monthly compensation reports received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2 reflect that during August and September 1997, Respondent employed five team leaders, including Petitioner. Thus, the total number of employees would have been greater. Even so, the record does not show the precise number of persons employed by Respondent, and the undersigned is unable to determine if Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the law and thus subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on May 30, 1997, as a floor manager. That position required Petitioner to manage a small team of salespersons who assisted customers in purchasing automobiles. The team's performance was measured by the number of automobiles (units) sold each month. In August and September 1997, Petitioner's team had the lowest sales volume of any team. More specifically, in August 1997, out of 80 units sold by all teams, Petitioner's team sold only 10 units; in September 1997, out of 97 units sold by all teams, Petitioner's team sold only 4. At hearing, Petitioner agreed that these numbers were accurate and that his sales "were down" during that period of time. On October 1, 1997, Petitioner was summoned to the office of the general manager, "Bud" Holian, who advised him that he was being terminated due to low sales performance. At that brief meeting, Holian explained that he "felt bad" about the decision, especially "with all [Petitioner had] done," but that he had to let Petitioner go. Petitioner contended that during the conversation, Holian had also stated that the company needed "someone younger and fresher to liven up the team." He further contended that another floor manager named "Rick" overheard the conversation and could confirm these remarks. However, Rick did not appear and testify. Neither was there was any other corroborating or independent evidence to confirm this allegation. Holian, who is older than Petitioner, denied making the comment. He also established that after Petitioner was terminated, he hired two other salesmen who were older than Petitioner. Finally, the record does not show who replaced Petitioner and the age of that individual. In light of the foregoing, there is insufficient evidence to find that Respondent's employment decision was grounded on discriminatory animus in any respect, or that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer in its actions. Rather, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that Petitioner was terminated solely because of poor sales performance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thornton Alan Bline 5720 Northeast 4th Street Ocala, Florida 34470 Bernard B. Holian, General Manager Automax and Pearson Group 1918 Southwest 17th Street Ocala, Florida 34470 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Appellants are the owner of the residence located at 1387 Lemon Street, Clearwater, Florida, having purchased the property in October 1991. The residence is a 3-bedroom 2-bath house containing approximately 1600 square feet. On the back of the property and adjacent to the house is a patio and screen porch. The proposed storage shed would be located some 10 feet from the screened room and rest on concrete blocks. The proposed storage shed is 10 feet by 14 feet and would extend into the 7 feet utility easement in the rear of the property and come within 2.83 feet of the real property line. The Clearwater Building Code requires a 10 foot setback from the real property line. Accordingly, Appellants have asked for a 7.17 foot variance. Appellants intend to store books and records in this shed, if approved, as they contend there is insufficient room in the house for these records. Appellants engaged the services of a person observed erecting a gazebo a few blocks away to construct the storage shed. The contractor employed by Appellants apparently was not licensed and when Appellant asked the contractor if he needed a permit for the storage shed the contractor advised that he didn't pull permits. Appellants engaged the contractor to construct the storage shed without making any inquiries to the city building department to ascertain if a permit was required. After the structure was nearly completed a stop work order was posted on Appellants residence because no permit had been issued for the work. When Appellants applied for a permit it was learned that the proposed building would encroach into the setback and that a variance would be required before the permit could be issued. When the variance was applied for the Planning and Zoning Board denied the variance for the stated reason that the application did not meet the requirements of Section 137.012 of the Land Development Code of the City of Clearwater. These proceedings involve Appellants' appeal from that denial. Appellants' lot is neither square nor rectangular having a slight curve generated by Lemon Street in front and the rear property line runs at an oblique angle with the side property lines which run north and south. However, this rear property line is only a few degrees from being perpendicular to the side property lines. The plat plan accompanying the variance request shows none of the lots in the vicinity of Appellants lot to be truly rectangular and are little different in shape than is Appellants' lot. Appellants' backyard is quite small with the southeast corner of Appellants' house approximately 15 feet from the rear property line. A spa located in the southwest corner of this lot appears from Exhibit 2 to be approximately 10 feet from the rear property line. Appellants propose to have the storage shed painted to look like the house and to be firmly secured against heavy weather. Appellants contend that it would constitute a hardship if they are not granted the requested variance. Appellants also contend that their property is unique; but unless the location of the house near the rear property line constitutes a unique situation, no other evidence was presented that their lot is substantially different from all of the other lots in the vicinity. When Appellants moved into this house they found that the previous owners had used the southeast portion of this lot for storing old lumber and other junk which Appellants cleaned up to make room for the proposed storage shed. They contend the proposed shed is a vast improvement over the clutter formerly existing in this location.
Findings Of Fact On May 20, 1986, Petitioners submitted a request for two variances concerning property located at 761 Bruce Avenue, Mandalay Subdivision, Block 24, Lot 7 in the City of Clearwater. The property is zoned RS-8 (single family residential). The variances requested were for the construction of a garage 4.8 feet from the rear set-back line, rather than the required set-back of ten feet, and 4.2 feet from the side set-back line, rather than the required set-back of five feet. On June 12, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board granted the variance of the side set-back requirements, but denied the requested rear set- back line variance. The Petitioners own the property in question and also own the property directly behind the subject property which backs up to the rear property line. There is presently a one story frame house on the property, as well as a small cottage to the rear of the property. The cottage is 12.7 feet wide by 16.5 feet deep. Petitioners want to construct a garage next to the cottage on an existing concrete slab. The dimensions of the garage shown in their application are 12 feet wide by 16.5 feet deep. At one time a garage was attached to the cottage but now only the concrete slab remains. If the rear set-back line variance is granted, the Petitioners will be able to construct the garage with rear and front walls attached to, and flush with, the cottage. If the rear set-back variance is not granted, the garage will have to be moved forward on the property and will only partially connect to the cottage. The Petitioners will not be prevented from building the garage if the variance is denied, but will simply have to move it forward rather than attaching it fully to the cottage. It is the Petitioners' intent to use the garage primarily for storage. Yvonne Ulfers denied any intention of expanding the existing cottage, or using this variance to add another room on the cottage. If the rear set-back line variance is denied, Yvonne Ulfers testified that she would construct the garage anyway, but would move it forward on the property and would also make it deeper than the 16.5 feet proposed in her application. She stated repeatedly that she would deepen the garage by extending it all the way down the side line of her property toward the frame house in the front. The Petitioners offered no evidence concerning conditions unique to this property, or hardship that would result if the variance is not granted. There is also no evidence that this variance is the minimum necessary to construct the garage on the subject property. To the contrary, there is no dispute that the garage can be built without the rear set-back line variance.
Findings Of Fact In 1987, the Respondent DOT began its review of the public roads within Glades County in order to assign maintenance and jurisdictional responsibility in accordance with the current functional classification of each road. By law, the DOT is required to conduct such a review every five years. Section 05040 of State Road 78 is located within the unincorporated area of Glades County. This paved, two-lane road segment is 14.8 miles in length, and predominantly runs in an east-west direction. Approximately two miles of the eastern portion veers to the north, where the segment then connects with State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27). The western terminus of this road segment adjoins State Road 29, and the eastern terminus as mentioned previously, adjoins State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27). There is a radical change in direction at both ends where the segment connects with the two adjacent roads. At the western terminus, State Road 29 runs in a southwesterly to northeasterly direction. The southwesterly portion of State Road 29 runs in a southwesterly to northeasterly direction. The southwesterly portion of State Road 29 enters into Hendry County and extends to LaBelle, the county seat. At the eastern terminus, State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27) runs for approximately five miles before it reconnects with another portion of State Road 78 which runs in a northeasterly direction around the border of Lake Okeechobee into Okeechobee County, and onto the City of Okeechobee, the county seat. Through the use of approximately four miles of the southwesterly portion of State Road 29 and approximately five miles of the easterly portion of State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27), State Road 78 becomes a transportation corridor which connects Hendry County, Glades County, and Okeechobee County. This corridor is used by members of the Gulf Citrus Growers Association in Hendry County to transport citrus to market in other parts of the state. State Road 29 and State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27) are functionally classified as arterial roads on the state highway system. During the functional classification evaluations within Glades County, Section 05040 of State Road 78 was reviewed by DOT. As part of the process, an inventory worksheet was used to determine how the road would be classified under the current scoring system. A Rural Arterial Inventory Worksheet (Respondent's Exhibit 15) was used to determine the roadway's System Attribute Score (SAS). As part of the evaluation process, the system element coefficient must be located within Table Number 4 of Chapter 14-12, Florida Administrative Code. The Administrator of Transportation Data for District 1 correctly determined that the system element coefficient was 5, and the rural element number was 12. The first attribute reviewed on the worksheet in order to obtain the SAS was the Traffic Factor. Under the definitions found in Table 1 of Chapter 14-12, Florida Administrative Code, the Traffic Factor is calculated by multiplying the Average Daily Traffic Count by the county's normalizing coefficient Tpd of 1.73. Again, the administrator correctly assessed the value of 2,782 on the worksheet. Usually, a score below 3,000 under the Traffic Factor results in an evaluation score of "zero" on the Rural Arterial Inventory Worksheet. However, Table Number 1 of Chapter 14-12, Florida Administrative Code, notes that when 50% of traffic volume is non-local traffic, a score of "one" is placed on the worksheet instead of a "zero." Competent and credible testimony presented at hearing from local citizens, who had the opportunity to know the composition of the traffic on the road segment, revealed that a relatively small percentage of Section 05040 of State Road 78 traffic was local. The majority of the traffic was comprised of out-of-county motorists. Based upon this testimony, the Traffic Factor score on the worksheet should be changed from "zero" to "one." The second attribute reviewed on the worksheet was the Access Factor. This score is calculated by dividing the average daily traffic (ADT) by the number of access points per mile. Instead of using available information with the DOT or asking for information from local authorities regarding this attribute, the administrator grossly overestimated that the road segment contained twenty access points per mile. No reasonable basis was presented at hearing by the administrator for his "estimate" of twenty access points per mile on a rural segment in one of the more remote and under populated areas within his district. The videotape presented at hearing clearly demonstrates that there are not twenty access points per mile on this roadway. Unrefuted testimony presented at hearing revealed that approximately twenty-five families reside along this 14.8 mile stretch of road. There is also a large rock mine, a cemetery, and the county landfill. Respondent's Exhibit 5, the General Highway Map of Glades County, shows that a DOT facility is located on this road segment. There are four roads which intersect the road segment and one railroad grade crossing. A locked gate at the Caloosahatchee Rock Mine has a driveway which connects to the road. To deny the road segment the minimum score of "one" on the access factor, the DOT would have to estimate in its calculation that there are more than ten access points per mile on this road. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, there are far less than ten access points per mile on this road segment. Therefore, the Access Factor score on the worksheet should be changed from "zero" to "one." The Trucks and Network Factor attributes which each received a score of "one" from the administrator. These scores were not challenged by Petitioner. The Extent of Road attribute was not properly tested by the administrator. Under Rule 14-12.015(2), Florida Administrative Code, the entire State Road 78, along with the southwesterly portion of State Road 29, and the eastern portion of State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27) should be utilized for the Extent of Road (miles) measurement. As the entire length of the extended transportation corridor exceeds twenty miles, the score should be "one" instead of "zero." The Mobility Attribute was not properly assessed. Rule 14-12.015(2), Florida Administrative Code, allows the extended transportation corridor to be used to determine the total number of counties in which the road is located. Testimony presented at hearing regarding the use of the road segment as part of the transport route of citrus from Hendry County through State Road 78 in Glades County to Okeechobee County supports the finding that the road is located in three counties. The score as to the Mobility Attribute should be changed from "zero" to "one." Section 05040 of State Road 78 is in an overall physical condition which is at least commensurate with contemporary roads of like age and existing functional classification (rural major collector) within Glades County.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order that the Department's functional classification of the road segment was incorrect, that the functional classification of the road as a rural minor arterial be reinstated, and that the jurisdiction over the road remain with the Department. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of October 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1227 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Rejected. Not a factual finding. Accepted. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Statement of the Issues. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #19. Accepted Accept the first sentence. The second sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that the Hearing Officer found the road to be improperly classified. The rest is rejected as conclusionary. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. The financial ability provision within the statute was repealed, and a determination cannot be made on the basis of factors outside rule or statute. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accept the first two sentences. The third sentence is rejected. See HO #2. Fourth sentence is accepted. See HO #5. Fifth sentence is accepted. See HO #7. Sixth sentence is rejected. See HO #7-#18. Seventh sentence is accepted. See HO #8. Eighth sentence is rejected. Improper conclusion. Ninth sentence is accepted. See Conclusions of Law. Tenth sentence is accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See HO #19. Rejected. The financial ability provision within the statute was repealed, and a determination cannot be made on the basis of factors outside the rule or statute. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Rider, Esquire Post Office Box 608 Lake Placid, Florida 33852 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, P.E., Interim Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 =================================================================
