Findings Of Fact Petitioner's house at 2926 Heather Trail, Clearwater, Florida, is located on a triangular-shaped lot, was constructed in 1979, has four bedrooms and three baths, and contains at least 2,500 square feet. The property is zoned RS-100, which is single family residential. The lot on which this house is constructed contains 19,000 square feet. The minimum lot area in RS-100 is 10,000 square feet. Petitioner desires to construct a fifth bedroom on the rear of the house. This 12' x 26' addition would encroach some ten feet into the 20-foot setback at the rear of the property. Constructing the addition, as proposed, would maintain existing roofline, thereby facilitating construction. Petitioner's family has increased by one child since he bought the house in 1981. The proposed additional bedroom will contain 312 square feet. The average size bedroom in the Clearwater area is approximately 140 square feet. The property to the north of Petitioner's property is public parkland. No other properties in the area have additions extending into any of the setback areas; however, none of Petitioner's neighbors object to the granting of the variance.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating skilled nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the underlying case, the Petitioner operated or controlled three licensed skilled nursing facilities: Harborside Healthcare-Pinewood, Harborside Healthcare-Sarasota, and Harborside Healthcare-Naples. In October of 2001, the Agency filed Administrative Complaints against the Petitioner's three facilities. As to each complaint the Agency relied upon its interpretation of Section 400.121(3)(d), Florida Statutes. The Agency's interpretation of the statute went beyond the plain and unambiguous language of the law. Moreover, such interpretation had not been promulgated by rule. If the interpretation was intended to be the policy of the Agency, the implementation of the policy was not authorized by the statute. The Petitioner pursued three legal strategies: it filed an injunction proceeding in circuit court, a petition to challenge the unpromulgated rule, and vigorously defended the administrative actions filed against its facilities. In so doing, the Petitioner incurred legal expenses and costs necessitated by the Agency's implementation of a policy that had not been established through rule-making procedures. Petitioner's rule challenge alleged that the Agency had failed to follow any rule-making procedures; had enlarged, modified, and contravened the specific provisions of the law; and had implemented a policy that was arbitrary and capricious. Due to the severity of the penalties the Agency sought to impose against the Petitioner, the damage to its reputation in the communities it served, and the resident fear and uncertainty at the facilities, the Petitioner sought and was granted an expedited hearing on the rule challenge. The "Wherefore" clause of the Petitioner's rule challenge clearly stated that Petitioner sought an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes. Petitioner had retained outside counsel to pursue each of its legal strategies. On October 31, 2001, a Final Order was entered in the underlying case that directed the Agency to cease and immediately discontinue all reliance on the policy that had not been promulgated through rule-making procedures. That Final Order has not been appealed. The Final Order did not retain jurisdiction for purposes of addressing the Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees and costs. The instant case was opened when the Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs subsequent to the entry of the Final Order in DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU. The matter was assigned a new case number as is the practice of the Division of Administrative Hearings in ancillary proceedings. Accordingly, the instant case, DOAH Case No. 01-4283F, was designated a "fee" case (hence the F at the end of the case number). The initial order entered through the DOAH clerk's office erroneously designated that the fees were sought pursuant to Section 59.11, Florida Statutes. Nevertheless, after the time for appeal of the Final Order (DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU) had elapsed, the matter was scheduled for final hearing. Carole Banks is an attorney employed by the Petitioner as an in-house counsel and director of risk management for the three facilities identified in this record. Ms. Banks is also a registered nurse and has been a member of the Florida Bar since April of 1998. Ms. Banks receives a salary from the Petitioner and is required to perform duties typically associated with her full-time job. Due to the filing of the Administrative Complaints against the facilities, Ms. Banks was required to expend additional time to assist outside counsel to defend the facilities. A portion of that time was attributable to the rule challenge case (DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU). Based upon the testimony of this witness and the exhibits received into evidence it is determined Ms. Banks expended 19.8 hours assisting in the prosecution of the rule challenge case. An appropriate rate of compensation for Ms. Banks would be $150.00 per hour. There is no evidence, however, that the Petitioner was actually required to pay Ms. Banks overtime or an appropriate rate of compensation for her additional work. K. Scott Griggs is an attorney employed by the Petitioner. Mr. Griggs serves as vice president and General Counsel for the Petitioner and is located in Massachusetts. Mr. Griggs did not testify, was not available to explain his time-keeping records, and none of the exhibits in this cause indicate how Mr. Griggs is compensated for his services or what his specific duties entail. While it is certain Mr. Griggs assisted counsel in the prosecution of the underlying case, without relying on hearsay, no determination as to the amount of time spent and the hourly rate that should be applied to such time can be reached. In order to fully protect the Petitioner's interests and those of its residents, the Petitioner retained outside counsel in the underlying case. The law firm of Broad & Cassel was hired to defend the administrative actions, seek injunctive relief, file the underlying case, and pursue other administrative remedies to assist the client. By agreement, Petitioner was to pay the following hourly rates: partners were to be compensated at the rate of $245.00 per hour, associates were to receive $175.00 per hour, and paralegals were entitled to $90.00 per hour. In this case, four partner-level attorneys from Broad and Cassel expended time in furtherance of the client's causes. After reviewing the time records and testimony of the witnesses, it is determined that the partners expended at least 172.6 hours associated with the underlying rule challenge. Additionally, an associate with the Broad & Cassel firm expended not fewer than 12.1 hours that can be directly attributed to the rule challenge case. Additional hours expended contributed to the success of the rule challenge. The Petitioner also incurred costs and expenses associated with the rule challenge. A paralegal expended 4.6 hours (with a $90.00 per hour rate) making copies of the documents used at the hearing. Other costs included court reporter fees, transcripts, telecopy charges, and expert witness fees. It is determined that the Petitioner has incurred $5819.15 in recoverable costs associated with this case and the underlying rule challenge. The hourly rates sought by the Petitioner are reasonable. The time and labor expended by the Petitioner to vigorously protect its legal interests was reasonable given the severity of the penalty sought by the Agency and the circumstances faced by the client. The Petitioner benefited from the efforts of counsel. Due to the time constraints and immediate ramifications faced by the Petitioner, special time and requests were made of the attorneys performing the work for the underlying case. In some instances, the attorneys were required to devote an extensive amount of time to address the client's interests to the exclusion of other work. This was the first time the Broad & Cassel firm had been retained to represent the client. As a result, the attorneys did not have the benefit of a long-term understanding of the facilities and the client's needs. The Broad & Cassel firm and the attorneys assigned to this matter have considerable experience and demonstrated considerable skill, expertise, and efficiency in providing services to the client. Had the Petitioner not prevailed, its ability to honor its hourly agreement with counsel may have been jeopardized. The Agency's expert recognized the difficulties presented by the case and opined that a proper fee would be $42,908. Such amount did not include attorney time spent in preparing for, conducting the fee hearing, or post-hearing activities. Such amount did not cover the amounts depicted in the billing statement from the Broad & Cassel firm. The Petitioner was required to retain expert witnesses to address the fees sought. The calculation of attorney's fees in this cause is complicated by the fact that none of the fees sought would have been incurred by the Petitioner had the Agency not implemented an unlawful policy. That is, had the non-rule policy not been utilized to support Administrative Complaints against the three facilities, none of the fees sought would have been incurred. The Petitioner presented a "shot-gun" approach pursuing every avenue available (including the underlying rule challenge) to dissuade the Agency from pursuing its action against the facilities. Only the rule challenge proved successful. Had the rule challenge not proved successful, residents would have been relocated from their homes. The Petitioner would have incurred extensive financial loss. William E. Williams and Carlos Alvarez testified as experts on behalf of the Petitioner. Their testimony has been considered and their opinions regarding the reasonableness of the fees sought by Petitioner has been deemed persuasive. Based upon the totality of the evidence presented, it is determined that the Petitioner prevailed in the rule challenge. The Agency has not demonstrated that the non-rule statement was required by the Federal Government to implement or retain a delegated or approved program or to meet a condition governing the receipt of federal funds. The formal hearing for fees in this cause lasted 4.75 hours. Petitioner's counsel expended time in preparation for the hearing and in post hearing activities. A reasonable fee associated with that time would not be less than $15,000.00.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns the residence located at 19 Heilwood Avenue, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is zoned RM-20 (high density residential). Petitioner requests a front and side setback variance, lot density variance, variance to impermeable lot coverage, and a variance to add 275 square feet of living area to a nonconforming structure. The existing property extends into the setback area on both the front and one side and exceeds the impermeable lot coverage and the house coverage currently allowed by the building code. Petitioner proposes to extend the entire front of the house to the line of the screen porch which now intrudes into the front setback 8.5 feet. This would reduce the front setback across the entire front of the house from the code prescribed 25 feet to 16.5 feet. The west side of the house now encroaches two feet into the code prescribed five feet, leaving only three feet setback on this side. To extend this side towards the front by 8.5 feet, a side variance of two feet is required for this extension. By adding 275 square feet to the area of the house, the lot coverage would be increased to 46.2 percent. The maximum coverage allowed by the code is 42 percent. By adding 275 square feet of impermeable area to the lot, the percent of the lot coverage with impermeable surface would increase to 95 percent. The maximum impermeable lot coverage permitted by the code is 65 percent. Petitioner contends he only wants to "square" up his house and to make the entire front of the house intrude into the setback area by 8.5 feet; that this addition will improve the looks and usability of the house; and that there is no objection by the neighbors.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioners based on race regarding the renting of a house.
Findings Of Fact LM Rentals owns 80 houses, which it rents. Mr. Peeples manages LM Rentals. LM Rentals contracts with Vantage to provide management of the rental properties, and Ms. Mossow is employed by Vantage. LM Rentals rented a house to the Odoms for approximately eight years, beginning in 2003. Mrs. Odom is a Native American. Mr. Odom is White and is not a Native American. No evidence was presented to establish that either anyone from LM Rentals or Ms. Mossow was aware that Mrs. Odom is a Native American. Mrs. Odom's physical appearance, her speech, and her surname could reasonably lead one to think that she is not a Native American. Her appearance would lead one to believe that she is White. The application which the Odoms filled out to rent the house did not require the Odoms to state their race. Mrs. Odom never informed employees of LM Rentals or Ms. Mossow that she is a Native American. Mrs. Odom claims that her children have darker skin than she, and, therefore, Ms. Mossow and employees of LM Rentals should have known that she is a Native American by looking at her children. However, no testimony was presented that Ms. Mossow or anyone from LM Rentals ever met Mrs. Odom's children prior to the filing of the discrimination complaint. Ms. Mossow did not meet any of Mrs. Odom's children until a short time before the final hearing when she delivered copies of exhibits to the Odoms' home. Mr. Peeples, the representative of LM Rentals, did not meet the Odoms' children and never met the Odoms until a few days before the final hearing. The house which the Odoms rented from LM Rentals developed a mold problem. Instead of bringing the mold problem to the attention of Ms. Mossow or anyone at LM Rentals, the Odoms contacted the Polk County Health Department (Health Department), which sent an environmental specialist to investigate the mold situation in January 2010. LM Rentals received a letter from the Health Department concerning the mold. LM Rentals hired a third-party testing company to test the house for mold. The coils on the air conditioner were replaced. The Odoms were not satisfied and requested that Ms. Mossow find them another rental house in the same school district in which they currently resided. LM Rentals has an average vacancy rate of five percent, which equates to about four houses at any given time. At the time that the Odoms requested to be relocated, there was only one house vacant in the school district which the Odoms wanted. The Odoms did not like the house and refused to relocate. Mrs. Odom claims that there were other houses available, but could not point to any specific house. Her claim is based on sheer speculation. The Odoms requested that the carpet be replaced, but, based on the tests of the third-party testing company, LM Rentals refused to do so. About the time they were having the mold problems, the Odoms' daughter was suspended from school. Mrs. Odom attributes the suspension to discrimination by Respondents. Mrs. Odom called, as a witness, the teacher who made the referral which resulted in Mrs. Odom's daughter being suspended. The teacher did not know Ms. Mossow and did not know Mr. Peeples. The teacher, who is also an attorney, was not sure if she had ever represented LM Rentals in the past as an attorney. The suspension was totally unrelated to any mold problems and any alleged discrimination. Mrs. Odom also claims that her son was arrested for disorderly conduct about the time of the mold problem, and she lays the arrest at the door of Respondents. Her rationale for her claim is that the arrest happened at the time they were dealing with the mold issues and that LM Rentals knew people. There is not a scintilla of evidence to connect the arrest of the Odoms' son to any actions by Respondents. In April 2010, during the period in which the mold was an issue, a code enforcement inspector saw a small grill on the Odoms' driveway, which was apparently a code violation. The inspector told the Odoms that the grill needed to be removed. LM Rentals received a letter from the code enforcement department stating that LM Rentals would be fined if the violation was not corrected. Ms. Mossow contacted the Odoms in an attempt to get the grill removed in order to avoid being fined. Mrs. Odom claims that Ms. Mossow and LM Rentals caused the code enforcement inspector to come to the Odoms' home and ask that the grill be removed. Mrs. Odom's claim is without merit. It is unlikely that Ms. Mossow or LM Rentals would request a code enforcement inspector to find a code violation which would result in LM Rentals, as owner of the property, being fined. No evidence was presented to show that Respondents treated non-minorities any differently than the Odoms were treated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Lawrence and Candace Odom's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN BELYEU KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns a beachfront home at 816 Eldorado Avenue, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is zoned RS-50, which is single family residential. To the rear of the property is the Gulf of Mexico. Petitioner's house is located on the setback line 25 feet from the front property line abutting Eldorado Avenue. All other homes in the vicinity have been granted variances to encroach into the front setback area. The houses to the north and south of Petitioner's home have encroached into the setback area to within ten feet of the front property line abutting Eldorado Avenue. Storms in the past have taken approximately 25 feet from the rear of Petitioner's property (as well as from the rear of adjacent property). In 1978 Petitioner added a Florida room to the south side of her house. By this application Petitioner seeks to construct a single car garage on the southeast part of her home extending eastward to within eight feet of the property line. Accordingly, a variance of 17 feet is requested. Respondent concurs that a variance of 15 feet should be granted to allow Petitioner to encroach into the setback area as much as has been authorized for others in the district. As proposed the rear of the garage would be three feet west of the front of Petitioner's house. Moving the garage further back would block the windows of Petitioner's Florida room. A garage with overall length of 20 feet with the rear of the garage three feet west of the front of the house would extend 17 feet into the setback area abutting Eldorado Avenue. This same garage with an overall length of 20 feet would have an inside dimension of 19 feet if both front and rear walls were six inches thick. A smaller depth garage would preclude the closing of the garage door for a large car and be impractical for other than a subcompact car. Petitioner's purpose for constructing the garage is to protect her car from the salt spray to which it is now subject parked in the open at this residence. Salt spray accelerates the rusting of metal on which it falls. No objection to the granting of the requested variance was submitted by any property owner in the vicinity. One of these property owners, who has owned property in the area for 30 years, testified that variances have routinely been granted property owners in this area because erosion of the beach has reduced the lot sizes and such variances have become essential.
The Issue This matter concerns the request by the Petitioner James A. Connell to be granted variances within the meaning of Section 131.016(b), City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations. In particular the Petitioner has asked that he be given a variance from the side yard setback requirements for narrow parcels established by Section 131.200(b)(3)a.2., City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, and a variance to the requirements of Section 131.200(b)(3)e., dealing with clear space. The zoning classification in question is RM-8, as set forth in Section 131.048, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations.
Findings Of Fact On November 17, 1980, the Petitioner, James Connell, filed an application requesting a variance from the side setback requirements of Section 131.200(b)(3)a.2., City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, asking for a reduction from 30 feet to 10 feet and further requesting that the clear space requirement of having only one side yard setback to be used for parking, with the other side yard setback for clear space from street to water, with the further possibility that that space be used for driveways of parking below street grade, as stated in Section 131.200(h)(3)c., be modified to grant the Petitioner a variance. The extent of this latter variance would be for clear space offered in the center portion of the project which gives 24 feet in width essentially unobstructed clear space, with an additional 20 feet space street to water on each side of the 24 feet unobstructed space, which north/south 20 foot expansions are constituted of driveways for the eight (8) proposed dwelling units to be constructed by the Petitioner. The real property under consideration is owned by the Petitioner and zoned RM-8 within the meaning of Section 131.048, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations. The address is 1012-1016 North Osceola Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. This case was presented before the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, on March 25, 1981, following a public hearing of January 15, 1981, in which the Board of Adjustment and Appeal on Zoning, City of Clearwater, Florida, had made an adverse ruling to the position of the Petitioner. The tape of the proceeding on January 15, 1981, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence. The site plan of the project in question has been reviewed by the Resource Development Committee of the City of Clearwater with a recommendation for approval of the project, conditioned upon the attainment of variance exceptions. A copy of the application for variance may be found in the City of Clearwater's Composite Exhibit No. 4, admitted into evidence. Through that application form, and in the course of the hearing, the Petitioner expressed concern about the survival of two 36 inch in diameter mature oak trees located on the property in question and also mentioned that the drop in elevation of the eastern side of the property front on Osceola Avenue North to the waterward western extreme of the property at Clearwater Harbour becomes dramatic approximately two thirds from the eastern extent of the property line making utilization of the latter third to the west difficult. In combination, this topographical reality and the location of the two oak trees, according to the Petitioner, would make it difficult to construct a project oriented to the center of the property, in an effort to comply with the "clear space" requirements. The Respondent, City's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence, is a site plan which depicts the Petitioner's proposals and it shows that lot to be approximately 160 feet in width and from 355 to 360 feet in length, the width relating to a roughly north/south orientation and the length a roughly east/west orientation. The drawing depicts the proposed ten foot side setback, the 24 foot clear space with additional 20 feet north/south associated with the driveways. The proposal would leave in tact the aforementioned oak tree or trees located in the approximate center of the 24 foot vista space. (In that connection, although the Petitioner has attempted by his plan to save some of the trees, the plan as drawn for unit four of the eight unit townhouse complex depicts the removal of a 40 inch oak tree.) The lot drops from a 26 foot to a 17 foot elevation from the street to Clearwater Harbour. The effect of that drop would be to limit the percentage of an automobile that could be seen if located in a driveway toward the waterward side of the site. The Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 and the City's Composite Exhibit No. 2 are photographs of the building site. Through the hearing process no one has objected to the grant of the variances in question and one person who resides In the neighborhood spoke in favor of the project.
The Issue Were the procedures followed by the Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES) in evaluating the proposals for Diversity Training fraudulent, illegal or arbitrary?
Findings Of Fact In January 1994, the Department issued a request for proposals to provide diversity training. The Petitioners, Hallas and Lyca, and the Intervenor, Davis, all submitted proposals to DLES for evaluation. Intervenor, J. Davis and Associates represented by Julius Davis its principal officer, had presented proposals and bids earlier on previous Request for Proposals, and had complained informally to the Department about the procedures used which he had identified as unfair and potentially illegal. The Department posted the scores of its evaluation of the proposals and awarded the contract to New Day. Gail Hallas discovered that the scoring of the various elements of the proposals was not in accord with values established in the RFP. She also determined there were errors in the totalling of the scores in Hallas' evaluation. She brought this to the attention of Barbara Chance who was the procurement chief for the contract. Although Ms. Chance was initially incredulous, DLES determined there were errors, reevaluated the proposals and reposted the results. Hallas and Lyca both filed timely protests of the Department's conduct in evaluating the proposals and awarding the contract. The diversity training project manager was Aaron Weeks. Mr. Weeks participated in the conference held by the Department to present the RFP and answer questions. The daughter of Geraldine Thompson, the president of New Day which was awarded the contract, is or was engaged to Aaron Weeks. This relationship was made known previously to the contracting and procurement representative of DLES by Julius Davis, the Intervenor, and was the subject of articles in the local paper. Hallas also introduced a report of the Inspector General which brought this matter to the attention of the DLES. New Day included a portion of a letter from the Secretary of Labor on Department letterhead which was a testimonial about New Day's performance on prior contracts. When the evaluators reevaluated the proposals using the scale published in the RFP, the scores of evaluators Berryman and Branton differed inexplicably from their original evaluations, and were not a mathematical interpolation of the original scores. See Petitioner's Exhibit V, which is attached* and made a part of this order. *NOTE: Exhibits V is not a part of this ACCESS document but is available for review in the Division's Clerk Office. Lyca was the second lowest qualified bidder on the project. Lyca was an experienced diversity trainer and had experience in bidding for such projects. As part of its post bid process, Lyca sought certain information to which it was entitled to refine and improve its bidding/proposal process. Lyca was unable to obtain easily information generally provided to bidders. Hallas did the same thing and met with the same or similar impediments. When Lyca and Hallas sought to protest the award, they both got erroneous information from representatives of DLES and were unable to get appropriate information about filing a protest. Hallas accidently discovered the second posting and was able to timely file its protest. Ms. Carter's review of the evaluations forms of her proposal indicated that she was not a minority business enterprise. This was a scored point of evaluation. The forms did not indicate whether the evaluators had considered whether a business was a minority business enterprise. Evaluation of responses appeared to be based upon evaluation sheets and not on criteria in the RFP. There were numerous transpositions and similar arithmetic errors made by the evaluators. None of the errors inured to the benefit of the Petitioner Hallas. Lyca lost revenues and had expenses in filing the RFP. Hallas submitted a detailed proposal containing 111 pages. Her staff represented all areas of diversity, racial, gender, sexual orientation, disability and age. The RFP reflected that diversity of trainers was to be considered, however, Hallas scored lower than New Day which had only racial and gender diversity differences. The reevaluation was suppose to be conducted on the same proposals using the same criteria. Only the number of points assigned each element changed. Gail Hallas obtained copies of the evaluator's first evaluations and their reevaluations, and prepared an extract of their scores comparing the results. See Petitioner's Exhibit V, attached. This extract revealed that three of the evaluators made a mathematical conversion of their first scores to arrive at their second scores, one without error and the other two with minor errors. The evaluations of Berryman and Branton were significantly different on the reevaluation. A review of Exhibit V reveals, for example, that on the second evaluation, Branton evaluated Davis, Human X, and L.O. Wilson as having a total of 35, when Davis and Human X had 40 and L.O. Wilson had a 45 on the first evaluation. On the other hand, the scores for Hallas and Lyca remained almost identical: 27 vs. 29 and 67 vs. 67 respectively. More importantly, Branton's evaluation of Hallas on both occasions was much lower than the rating of the other evaluators (27 and 29), less than one half of score given Lyca (67) by Branton. While this may appear good for Lyca, it virtually eliminated Hallas from consideration. However, Berryman, whose scores of all the proposals were markedly lower than the other evaluators, scored Lyca as her third highest, but so low (28) as to eliminate Lyca. Only New Day received high scores from all the evaluators in both evaluations. All of the other competitors received at least one very low score, which effectively eliminated them from consideration, and the single low scores given by to Lyca and Hallas respectively by Berryman and Branton were inconsistent with their other assessments as indicated above. This technique had been used previously to insure that awards went to New Day, and had been the cause of Davis' earlier informal protest to the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED that: The subject contract not be awarded to New Day, The contract not be awarded to the next highest bidder which was Lyca because the manner in which the proposals were evaluated was tainted, and That prior to reinstituting the RFP, the process be sanitized and insulated from persons having any conflicting interests regarding this RFP and its evaluation. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1994. APPENDIX CASE NO. 94-2354BID Petitioners' proposed findings were read and considered. The following list indicated which findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Paragraphs 1 through 6 Adopted Paragraph 7 Rejected as preliminary statement. Respondent's proposed findings were read and considered. The following list indicated which findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Paragraphs 1 through 4 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lyca Associates, Inc. Lynda V. Carter, President Suite B-6 4403 Vineland Road Orlando, FL 32811 The Hallas Group Gail Hallas, Owner 6822 22nd Avenue N, Suite 329 St. Petersburg, FL 33710 Mr. Julius Davis J. Davis and Associates, Inc. Human Resources Management Consultants 2371 Sunderland Avenue, Suite 4 Wellington, Florida 33414 Edward A. Dion, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2189 and Carolyn Davis Cummings, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2189 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32308
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the entitlement of the Intervenors, Mr. and Mrs. Mayer, to be granted zoning variances, in keeping with the provisions of Section 131.016(e), City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, to vary from the conditions set forth in Section 131.044, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, dealing with the area and dimension regulations for RS-50, Single-Family Residents. In particular, the Intervenors would request that the front setback line be reduced from 25 feet to roughly feet and that a variance concerning the area covered by the dwelling be increased from 25 percent to 33.7 percent. 1/
Findings Of Fact On November 12, 1980, the Intervenors requested that they be granted the variances set out in the Issues Statement of this order. The terms and details of that variance application may be found as part of the City's Composite Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. A public hearing was conducted on this request and that hearing was held on January 15, 1981. The taped transcript of that hearing may be found as the City's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Following that hearing, a decision was made by the Board of Adjustment and Appeal for the City of Clearwater, Florida, to grant the variance requests. The Petitioners in this cause were opposed to that grant of variance and requested a hearing. The matter was forwarded from the City of Clearwater to the Division of Administrative Hearings and on March 25, 1981, a hearing de novo was conducted to consider this dispute. At the time of the hearing, the Petitioner, Barbara Beakes, was presented as a witness and identified the claim of the Petitioners as being one of opposition to the project in question which requested variances, for reason that it obscured her view of the water; caused a decrease in the value of her property and in addition to her attorney, expressed opposition to the area of coverage to be involved with the proposed building project of the Intervenors and to the front setback line at issue. The Intervenors, Ray and Christine Mayer, who reside at 940 El Dorado Avenue, Clearwater Beach, Florida, through their project, would desire to construct a garage which would be approximately 15.4 feet from the front property line as opposed to the 25 foot front setback line required of the City of Clearwater. The construction in question would not advance the building line in the direction of the street. Moreover, the distance from the street to the front of the building had originally been 13.1 feet when present front setback lines were not in effect. The Intervenors have also requested what they deemed to be a variance from the requirement of maximum lot coverage by their residence, varying it from 25 percent to the 33.7 percent proposed by their construction. As stated in a preceding footnote, it was determined at the hearing that the new requirement for maximum lot coverage is 42 percent and it having been agreed by the parties that the area coverage in question is only 33.7 percent, the necessity for variance on that issue no longer exists. Intervenors' Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, are photographs depicting the nature of the structure in question in various stages of construction and modification. Notwithstanding the Petitioner Beakes' complaint that her view was obstructed by the construction, there was no specific proof related to the clear space requirement of Section 131.200, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Requirements, and in fact her view is already obstructed by a fence which now exists on the Mayers' property and the constriction proposed by the Mayers would not materially change that circumstance. The proof on the issue of decreased property value offered by Petitioner Beakes does not seem to be a specific criterion addressed by the variance ordinance.
The Issue The issues to be decided in this case are those associated with the question of whether the Respondent is required to have a permit for the connection of his business property to State Road 206 or is exempt from that requirement. See Section 335.187, Florida Statutes. If he is required to have a permit the issue becomes the acceptability of his current drive, i.e., does it comply with the commercial use design criteria contemplated by Chapter 335, Florida Statutes, and further described in the Florida Department of Transportation "Policy and Guidelines for Vehicular Connections to Roads on the State Highway System," February, 1985, which was recognized and incorporated by reference through Rule 14- 15.013, Florida Administrative Code. These issues are raised through an alleged violation of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code set out in the Notice to Show Cause which was forwarded to Respondent from Petitioner leading to the formal hearing. The date of that Notice to Show Cause was July 18, 1989. Within the statement of violations there were also allegations concerning irregular signs as alleged under Section 479.11(8), Florida Statutes, associated with the commercial activities by Respondent and the unauthorized parking on the right-of-way at State Road 206 in violation of Section 337.406, Florida Statutes. These latter allegations were conceded by the Respondent at hearing and are resolved through those concessions.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the hearing Respondent operated a roadside fruit and vegetable stand at property adjacent to State Road 206 in St. Johns County, Florida. In addition to fruits and vegetables, by local ordinance of St. Johns County, Florida, he is allowed to sell poultry and fish. There is no indication that he has taken advantage of that opportunity other than to sell fresh shrimp from a cooler during 1989. In addition to these products he sells honeys, jellies, and jams. He also sells soft drinks from a dispensing machine. A mainstay in his business is peanuts which he sells fresh. Another product sold is pork skins. The drink machine that is described was added in March, 1989. Before that time he sold fountain drinks and cold drinks that were dispensed from a cooler. He has always had soft drinks available from the inception of his operation of the roadside stand. That began in March, 1985. At the time the Respondent purchased the property there was an operation ongoing whereby fruit was being sold on two tables. Respondent replaced those structures with a portable trailer which was anchored to the lot, and display and sell of fruit on a 16-foot table and use of an 8-foot table upon which tomatoes were displayed and sold. The trailer was used to store his products over night. The trailer described was a pop-up camper trailer. The principal products being dispensed at that time were peanuts, vegetables, and tomatoes. Through Ordinance No. 86-68, passed by St. Johns County, a copy of which may be seen as Respondent's exhibit No. 1, the property was recognized as C1, commercial intensive, with the conditions that the property would be limited to outdoor sale of produce, vegetables, fruit, poultry, and fish. It was also stated that there would be no access/egress to United States Highway 1, which is also known as State Road 5. This property is located at the intersection of State Road 5 and State Road 206. Present access/egress to the property is from State Road 206 and that has been the situation since Respondent purchased the property. The ordinance described dates from August 12, 1986. Over time Respondent has taken a number of steps to improve his business. In March, 1988, Respondent obtained permission from St. Johns County to place a storage shed on his property. In August of that year he obtained permission to install a metal awning or carport of dimension 18 feet by 45 feet which is anchored to the ground. At that same time he placed the body from an old milk truck on the property for purposes of cold storage. In March, 1988, he had received an electrical permit from St. Johns County. Prior to that time he did not have electricity. In the spring of 1989, a well was drilled to provide running water. Prior to that time Respondent used bottled water. Respondent's composite exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence describes various permits obtained from St. Johns County. If Respondent was required to remove the structures on his property it could be done in three days. This goes to identify the nature of the structures and to demonstrate that they are not permanent fixtures to the realty. According to Respondent, whose testimony is accepted, the business that he is experiencing at present has remained fairly constant in dollar amounts. He does not sell as many peanuts as he did before. Concerning traffic, Respondent indicates, and his testimony is accepted, that the number of cars that are located at his business would be a maximum of 12 on a busy Sunday afternoon and that at most times there are one or two cars. The hours of the business are from 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. in the winter time and somewhat longer in the summer time. The business is open seven days a week. A rough description of the nature of the property by design may be found in the documents contained in Respondent's exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The property is approximately 280 front feet and 280 feet at the rear with 41 feet on each side. The frontage runs approximately east-west on State Road 206 and one of the sides abuts State Road 5. The basic design of the driveway entrance from State Road 206 is also set out in those drawings. As Marshall W. Sander, engineer in the permit department for Petitioner in its St. Augustine, Florida, maintenance office, explains the driveway is an unimproved dirt shell connection. This is the same driveway that was there at the time that Respondent purchased the property and has remained in that state since that time. Notwithstanding Mr. Sanders' concern that the driveway is not up to current commercial business criteria for access/egress, there have been no accidents as a result of access/egress from the business. There are two turnouts or turn- ins into the property. Mr. Sander believes that at least one paved driveway is needed leading into the property. The dimensions of that drive would be 24-foot wide which allows a 12-foot wide lane in and a 12-foot wide lane out. This impression of Mr. Sander is drawn in the face of the Respondent's presenting himself at the office of Petitioner in St. Augustine, Florida, with an application and plan showing the intention to improve the property to include restrooms, a beer and wine cooler with parking on site. Under those circumstances Mr. Sander felt it necessary to improve the drive connection. At hearing there was no suggestion that restrooms are available on the premises or will be in the near future, nor was there any indication that a beer and wine cooler would be installed. Therefore it cannot be said that the basic nature of the business has changed from its inception to the present. Mr. Sander concedes that within the records of the Petitioner there are no indications that the business has increased by way of records concerning traffic flow or otherwise. His remarks about increased traffic at Dupont Center is not specific enough to gain a useful impression of that circumstance. Mr. Sander relies upon the observations of the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the St. Johns County Public Health Unit as were testified to by George L. Sigman, Environmental Health Director II for that organization. He also spoke to certain records of the health unit which may be found as Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. Nothing about his testimony or that exhibit identifies a noteworthy change in the basic nature of the business from Respondent's establishment of the roadside stand in March, 1985 until the present. Throughout the existence of his business Respondent has operated without the benefit of a driveway permit issued by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and in view of the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: By way of disposition of the Notice to Show Cause, that a Final Order be entered which recognizes the concessions made by the Respondent concerning the sign in question, calling for its removal if still in existence and his acknowledgment of the problem of parking on the right-of-way and which absolves the Respondent of any necessity to obtain a driveway permit. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning proposed facts. Petitioner' s Facts Paragraphs 1 and 2 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence in Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is contrary to facts found. The third sentence is subordinate to facts found. Sentences 4 and 5 depict testimony as opposed to suggesting fact finding. However, the last sentence in that paragraph is one upon which facts were found in the Recommended Order. Respondent' s Facts Paragraphs one and two pertain to withdrawal of the request for hearing concerning signs and parking and are not part of fact finding. The first sentence in paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The remaining sentence is legal argument, as are paragraphs 4 and 5. Paragraphs 6-11 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 12 is not relevant. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Leo O. Myers, Esquire Post Office Box 1621 Jacksonville, FL 32201 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
