The Issue The issue in this case is whether discipline should be imposed against Respondent for operating on an expired public lodging establishment license, an offense which is deemed by rule to constitute operation without a license.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. Lakeside is an apartment building with 19 units located at 1048 Northeast 18 Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304- 2408. The Division issued Lakeside a license, numbered 16- 10553-H, to operate as a public lodging establishment. According to information in the Division's official database, as reproduced in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 1/ the "current license expiration date [for Lakeside's license] is December 1, 2000." On July 20, 2000, Division employee Robert Shaw conducted a routine inspection of Lakeside and found the apartment complex to be open and operating. On a Lodging Inspection Report that he prepared on that date, 2/ Mr. Shaw noted two minor violations, neither of which is at issue here. On the same form, Mr. Shaw inscribed the date that Lakeside's license would expire, as shown below, in the blank spaces provided for that purpose in a line that read: REMINDER: Your license expires 12 /01 /00 Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Mr. Shaw testified, however, that at the time of this inspection, he did not know whether or not Lakeside was licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Lakeside Apartments. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2001.
Findings Of Fact By Stipulation filed September 11, 1986, the parties agreed to findings of fact 1-11. Donna Sawyer filed a preliminary application to participate in the state lottery for liquor license on January 20, 1984, on Department of Business Regulation form No. 747L. On September 18, 1984, Donna Sawyer was notified by Respondent that she had been selected in the lottery held on September 12, 1984, to be eligible to apply for a state quota liquor license. That on or about November 2, 1984, Donna Sawyer, acting through her wholly owned corporation, Sarasota County Liquors, Inc., filed a sworn "application for Alcoholic Beverage License" (Department of Business Regulation Form No. 700L), with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. That application included a description of a location which was to be the licensed premises. A Personal Questionaire, Department of Business Regulation Form 710L, was also included by Petitioner with said application. The license application was denied by Respondent on March 8, 1985. The grounds for the denial as stated in the denial letter were Petitioner's failure to provide: (1) proof of right of occupancy to the premises Petitioner was seeking to license; (2) verification of financial investment; (3) business name, and (4) sketch of the premises affixed to the application. On April 10, 1985, Sandra Allen, Esquire, acting on behalf of Petitioner, requested an administrative hearing in order to contest the March 8, 1985, denial of the subject license. Joseph Forbes, Esquire, of Gainesville, Florida, was then retained by Petitioner to resolve the denial of the requested license, which was then pending before the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, as an informal administrative proceeding, pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. In this capacity, Forbes, among other things filed a Motion for Continuance and Stipulation in this case attached to a June 6, 1985 cover letter. Forbes thereafter reached an agreement in the informal proceeding with Thomas Klein, Esquire, then counsel of record for Respondent, evidenced by letter dated October 1, 1985, which in its relevant portions indicated: This is to continue our telephone conversation of October 1, 1985, in which the following was discussed and agreed upon: Sarasota Liquors - your client will have 45 days from the date of this letter to cure the defects set forth in the March 8, 1985 letter of denial. Please direct your client to respond to the Tallahassee office. In order to rectify the original deficiencies causing the license denial, Petitioner re-filed an Application for Alcoholic Beverage License, Department of Business Regulation Form 700L, including exhibits, with Respondent, on or about November 13, 1985. Petitioner's re-filed license application was denied by Respondent on February 19, 1986, for two reasons: (1) "Application incomplete as applicant does not have right of occupancy to the premises for which she is seeking to license," and (2) "Division is unable to fully investigate applicant's financial documentation." On or about November 4, 1985, while searching for a location to submit as the licensed premises, in the re-filed application of November 13, 1985, Donna Sawyer and Ocie Allen met with Alton Allen at 258 S. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida, who was an agent for Walter Spector, owner of several retail store spaces at that address. Ocie Allen, acting on behalf of his corporation, Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, entered into a lease for a store at 258 S. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida. On or about November 4, 1985, Ocie Allen, acting on behalf of his corporation Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, purportedly subleased the premises at 258 S. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida to Petitioner. That Petitioner had submitted a letter dated November 4, 1984, signed by Jim Irey, as President of Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc., which is attached to the November 13, 1985 application, which stated that certain financial support would be available to the subject alcoholic beverage sales contemplated by Petitioner. That as a result of the investigation following the November 13, 1985 application, Respondent was "unable to fully investigate applicant's financial documentation," since Respondent's agents were unable to locate Jim Irey or his company at the address indicated on the November 4, 1984 letter. Based upon the evidence presented, the following additional findings of fact are made: Donna Sawyer's preliminary application to participate in the state lottery for a quota liquor license included instructions to the applicant that it was the first part of a two part application and that the second part would require proof of occupancy for the premises to be licensed. The second part of the application was that license application filed with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco on November 2, 1984, and again on November 13, 1985. As part of the notification that she was eligible to apply for a state quota liquor license, Donna Sawyer was advised that she had 45 days to file a full and complete application and that if she failed to do so, this failure would be deemed as a waiver of her right to file for a new quota liquor license. The letter also advised her that the Division had 180 days from the date of the drawing to act upon her application. The Petitioner's first quota liquor license application was denied on March 8, 1985. March 8, 1985, was within 180 days of the applicable lottery drawing held on September 12, 1984. The agreement of the parties to resolve the March 8, 1985, denial of the subject license evidences an tacit agreement by the parties to waive any applicable time limits existing at that time in order to allow the Petitioner to resubmit a corrected application within 45 days as allowed by the Thomas Klein letter of October 1, 1985. The Division investigated the Petitioner's second application and determined that the applicant did not have a right of occupancy to the premises sought to be licensed, 258 Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida, because Petitioner only had a purported sublease for the subject premises from Ft. Myers A & T Corporation. Ft. Myers A & T Corporation had obtained a lease for the property on November 4, 1985, from Walter Spector, deceased at the time of the administrative hearing. Said lease between Walter Spector, lessor, and Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, lessee, provided that subleases must be approved by the lessor and be in writing. The Petitioner did not produce evidence of written authorization by Walter Spector to allow Ocie Allen or Ft. Myers A & T Corporation, Inc., to sublease the subject premises to the Petitioner or to any other person. The only evidence of such authorization was the hearsay statement by Ocie Allen that Walter Spector had orally given such authorization. Furthermore, Mr. Alton Allen, then agent for Mr. Spector for leasing this property testified he had no knowledge that Mr. Spector was ever informed of a sublease. Therefore it is found that the sublease violated a material provision of the underlying lease from Walter Spector to Ft. Myers A & T Corporation. Mr. Ocie Allen, agent for the Petitioner and Donna Sawyer, testified and it is found that there was no intention for the Petitioner to operate an alcoholic beverage license at the 258 Tamiami Trail location. Petitioner's November 13, 1985, license application was also denied on February 19, 1986, for: Application incomplete as . . . the Division is unable to fully investigate applicant's financial documentation. This denial was due to the Division's agents being unable to verify the availability of financial funding from Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc. The Petitioner had submitted a November 9, 1984 letter from that corporation in its November 13, 1985 license application offering certain funding. Upon checking phone directories and making attempted telephone calls to the source named in that letter, the Division was not able to find the named business as source of funding. The Division further investigated Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc. as an alleged source of funding by sending an agent, Robert B. Baggett, to the address supplied by the applicant in a November 9, 1984 letter from Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc., only to find that no such business was located there and no neighbors knew of a new location. Sandra Allen, Esquire, testified that the source of the funding at the time of the second application was a new company run by the same person who was behind Florida Home Equity of Lee County, Inc., which was named as the source in the November 9, 1984 letter. However, this new company's name and address and verification of continued financial support to the Petitioner could not reasonably be determined by the Division and no evidence was presented that the Division had ever been provided with said new company's name or location prior to the denial of the second license application. Contradictory testimony was presented by Lt. Ewing and Sgt. Mills as to the existence of a policy requiring a "14 day" deficiency notice letter to applicants. It is clear that that policy was not recognized in the office supervised by Sgt. Mills. It was also not established that Lt. Ewing had the authority to set or enunciate policy for the Division.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request that she be reissued a medical technologist license without taking an examination should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this proceeding, Petitioner, Norma Howell, seeks to have her medical technologist license reactivated after it was rendered "null" by operation of law on June 30, 1996. A Notice of Intent to Deny Application for Licensure was entered by respondent, Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel (Board), on March 21, 1997. Because Petitioner requested that the Board grant a variance or waiver of the rule requiring her to take an examination in order to be relicensed, the Board reconsidered the matter at its April 3, 1997, meeting. On April 11, 1997, the Board entered its Notice of Intent to Deny Variance or Waiver on the ground Petitioner had not demonstrated that she would suffer a substantial hardship or that the application of the rule would affect her in a manner significantly different from other applicants for licensure. On May 9, 1997, Petitioner filed a request for a hearing in which she contended that the statute relied upon by the Board for denying her request "did not apply to her case" and that the Board "did not comply with the 90-day notification requirement of the statute which it relied upon to nullify her license." Petitioner has been practicing in the field of medical technology for some thirty years and she has practiced in Florida for at least nine years. Until this controversy arose, she held medical technologist supervisor license number JC-0026722. Prior to July 1, 1994, medical technogist licenses were subject to the regulatory authority of the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). At that time, licenses were issued for two-year periods, and if not renewed, they "automatically" reverted to an inactive status. Section 483.819, Florida Statutes (1993), provided that if a license was inactive for less than one year, it could be reactivated by payment of a late renewal penalty. If the license was inactive for more than one year but less than five, it could be reactivated "upon application" to HRS and proof that the licensee had completed 15 hours of continuing education requirements for each year the license was inactive, but not more than a total of 65 hours. If a license was inactive for more than five years, it was automatically suspended, but one year prior to the date the suspension took effect, HRS was required to give written notice to the licensee. Once suspended, a license could not be reactivated unless a licensee met all "requirements for reinstatement." Among other things, HRS possessed the discretionary authority to require reexamination before reinstatement. Effective July 1, 1994, Section 483.819, Florida Statutes (1993), was repealed, and regulatory authority over medical technologist licensees was transferred from HRS to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR). In addition, a new Section 455.271, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), was created to provide new requirements relative to the inactive and delinquent status of all professional licenses, including those for medical technologists. Section (5) provided that the "[f]ailure of a licensee to renew before the license expires shall cause the license to become delinquent in the license cycle following expiration." Section (6) provided that: a delinquent status licensee must affirmatively apply with a complete application, as defined by rule of the board, or the department when there is no board, for active or inactive status during the licensure cycle in which a licensee becomes delinquent. Failure by a delinquent status licensee to become active or inactive before the expiration of the current licensure cycle shall render the license null without any further action by the board or the department. (Emphasis added) The same subsection provided that once a license was rendered "null," any subsequent licensure "shall be as a result of applying for and meeting all requirements imposed on an applicant for new licensure." In other words, a licensee would have to retake the examination in order to be relicensed. As a safeguard to automatic cancellation of a delinquent license, however, new Section 455.273 (Supp. 1994), provided that "[a]t least 90 days before the end of a licensure cycle, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation shall . . . [f]orward a notice of pending cancellation of licensure to a delinquent status licensee at the licensee's last known address of record with the department." Against this statutory backdrop, Petitioner's license was due for renewal on June 30, 1994, when her latest biennial cycle ended. Because the license was not renewed, it became delinquent under the terms of Section 455.271(5). Therefore, it was incumbent on Petitioner to seek active or inactive status before the end of the next licensure cycle, or by June 30, 1996, or have her license rendered "null" by operation of law. It is noted that Petitioner was one of approximately 2,000 licensees whose license was not renewed at the end of the June 30, 1994, licensure cycle and thus became delinquent. In January 1992 Petitioner relocated from Florida to Mississippi in order to care for her elderly mother. She continued working as a medical technologist in Mississippi. When her license came up for renewal on June 30, 1994, Petitioner had no need for an active Florida license and therefore did not renew it. She assumed, however, that she could keep it in an inactive, delinquent status for up to five years under the terms of Section 483.819, Florida Statutes (1993). Petitioner acknowledges that she became aware of the new law in general terms, but not in specifics, in June 1995. This occurred when the Board her sent a Notice to Delinquent and Inactive Licensees advising that changes in the law had been made and that "the changes affected the manner in which licensees regulated under Chapter 483, F.S., clinical laboratory personnel, may reactivate a license or request to be placed on inactive status." The notice further provided that if Petitioner "would like to receive an application to reactivate (her) license or to be placed on inactive status," she should fill out a form at the bottom of the Notice and return it to the Board. There was no mention in the Notice that Petitioner's license would become "null" by operation of law if she did not take affirmative action by June 30, 1996. In response to the Notice, on June 16, 1995, Petitioner filed the Notice and form with the Board requesting that she be sent an application to place her license in an inactive status. The Board says that the Notice described in finding of fact 8 was a part of a packet of information attached to a form letter sent to all delinquent status licensees on May 27, 1995. According to a Board representative, the form letter contained an admonition to licensees that unless they reactivated their licenses by June 30, 1996, their licenses would be null and void. However, the actual contents of the letter are not of record. This is because the letter was not identified by Respondent's counsel as an exhibit in the prehearing stipulation; it was not a part of the Board's official file pertaining to Petitioner; opposing counsel had no notice that such a letter existed or would be used as evidence at hearing; and thus it was not received in evidence. Even though the form letter was sent some thirteen months before the licensure cycle ended, the Board takes the position that it constituted the statutory notice of pending cancellation required by Section 455.273(1)(b) to be sent to each delinquent status licensee "at least 90 days before the end of the licensure cycle." Board records do not establish that Petitioner received the form letter, and she denies having received any statutory notice of pending cancellation. Approximately two thousand (out of eighteen thousand) licenses under the Board's jurisdiction became delinquent because they were not renewed by June 30, 1994. While the number that were automatically cancelled on June 30, 1996, by operation of law is not of record, only four licensees, including Petitioner, have asked that their licenses be reinstated because of cancellation. Given this unusual circumstance, it is reasonable to accept Petitioner's testimony that she did not receive a notice of cancellation as required by law. This omission by the Board, while unintentional, constituted a material error in procedure which occasioned serious prejudice to Petitioner. In addition to filing the form on June 16, 1995, Petitioner also sent a letter to the Board on June 23, 1995. The letter stated, in pertinent part, as follows: Please place my Medical Technologist Supervisor's Lic # JC 0026722 on inactive status until further notice. I am presently residing in Mississippi. Enclosed is the required fee of $25.00 plus copies of Continuing Education certificates; 39 hrs. The letter provided her most current address in Mississippi, and it contained a postscript that "[i]f an additional form is necessary please advise." By letter dated June 28, 1995, the Board acknowledged receiving Petitioner's letter and check. In the letter, a Board representative advised petitioner that her "request for inactivation of licensure . . . cannot be processed" because she had sent an incorrect fee and a formal application had to be completed. The letter indicated that an application to reactivate her license was also enclosed. Apparently in response to the June 16, 1995, request for an application form, on July 14, 1995, the Board sent Petitioner another reactivation application. Because Petitioner did not want to reactivate her license, but she only wanted to place her license in an inactive status, she did not complete the application at that time. Again, however, she assumed that her license could remain inactive for up to five years after June 30, 1994, without placing it in jeopardy. Petitioner received no further advice, oral or written, from the Board until after she filed a Reactivation Application with the Board on December 19, 1996, together with a $470.00 fee and proof of 39 hours of continuing education. She did so at that time since she had been offered a job in Florida and intended to relocate to this state. On December 20, 1996, Petitioner and the Board's administrator spoke by telephone regarding Petitioner's application. Among other things, Petitioner was told that her license was null and void by operation of law since she failed to reactivate her license by June 30, 1996. On December 27, 1996, the administrator sent Petitioner a letter in which she reconfirmed this fact, but advised that the matter would be taken up by the Board. Petitioner asked that an exception be made since she lived out-of-state and had never received notice of cancellation. The Board later denied her request. Rule 59O-7.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, prescribes the examination requirements for licensure as a supervisor. The purpose of the underlying statute is to ensure minimum competency of all persons engaging in the profession. Petitioner has satisfied this purpose by having successfully practiced in the field for some thirty years and being certified in five specialties. In addition, during the period of time in which her license was delinquent, she successfully completed all necessary continuing education courses. If the request for a variance or waiver is denied, Petitioner will suffer economic hardship since she will be unable to practice her profession in Florida until she passes an examination. More specifically, she will be unable to accept a pending job offer as a medical technologist supervisor. Unusual circumstances are present here. Of the two thousand licensees in a delinquent status after June 30, 1994, only Petitioner has contended that she failed to receive the statutory notice of cancellation. To her detriment, the license was subsequently cancelled by operation of law. The literal application of the rule requiring an examination would unintentionally penalize Petitioner's good faith efforts to reactivate her license. Because it is presumed that all other licensees in a delinquent status received notice of pending cancellation, Petitioner will be treated in a manner significantly different from the way the rule affects other similarly situated persons seeking licensure. That is to say, any other persons requesting relief from the rule because of automatic cancellation on June 30, 1996, would have been on notice that unless they renewed their license by that date, they would be subject to the terms of the rule. Petitioner had no such notice. Therefore, fairness requires an exception. Petitioner has paid all filing fees and completed all continuing education courses necessary for reactivation. If her request is ultimately denied, she is entitled to a refund of her fees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for a waiver or variance from Rule 59O-7.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, and reinstating her license number JC-0026722. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric G. Walker, Executive Director Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2200 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Michelle L. Proctor, Esquire 7637 State Road 52 Bayonet Point, Florida 34667 Edwin A. Bayo, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact Thomas Lietch, Respondent, is a licensed pharmacist, having been issued license number 0007613 and was so licensed at all times material hereto. On April 11, 1983, Respondent pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County of the offenses of possession of Dextropropoxyphene and possession of a controlled substance outside its proper container. Adjudication of guilt was withheld by the court and Respondent was placed on five years probation. Following the arrest of Respondent on or about January 21, 1983 and before his trial, Petitioner investigated the incident in which Respondent had been arrested for having two Darvon tablets in his pants pocket outside the container in which they were or should have been dispensed. When questioned by the investigator regarding the origin of the Darvon Respondent replied one time that he obtained them on prescription from his doctor and on another occasion replied that he may have obtained them from the pharmacy where he works. The doctor who Lietch stated had prescribed the Darvon was contacted and reported that he may have prescribed Darvon for Respondent when he treated Respondent some time ago; but, if he did, the prescription was written no later than September 1979, more than two years before Respondent's arrest. When this evidence was presented to the Board of Pharmacy the board failed to find probable cause that the Florida Pharmacy Act, Chapter 465, Florida Statutes, was violated. Following Respondent's trial in the Circuit Court the offense here alleged was charged. Respondent presented three witnesses, one of whom owns the pharmacy where Respondent has worked for more than one year. He has had no problem with Respondent's work and considers him a good employee and a competent pharmacist. Another witness is a licensed pharmacist in Florida who opined that possession of two Darvon tablets out of the container in which they were dispensed does not affect the person's ability to practice pharmacy; however if a pharmacist had unauthorized possession of a controlled substance outside the pharmacy that would constitute a violation of the Pharmacy Act. Respondent's third witness was his probation officer who testified that Respondent has fully complied with the terms of his probation and has exceeded the number of hours of community work required by the conditions of probation.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed to practice cosmetology in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CL-0122685, although as of June 30, 1984, Respondent's license reverted to inactive status since it had expired and was not renewed. Respondent was duly notified of the final hearing in this case both at her last address of record in Petitioner's file and also at the address shown on her Election of Rights form. On October 16, 1984 Marjorie May, an inspector employed by Petitioner, inspected a salon known as One Hair Place located at 2014A Drew Street, Clearwater, Florida. The inspector discovered that Respondent was working as a cosmetologist without a current active license. A work station was set up for Respondent in the salon and there were entries in the salon appointment book for her on that day. Respondent admitted to the inspector that she was working at the salon without a current active license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00). DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation . 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Diane Kilpatrick 2014-A Drew Street Clearwater, Florida 33515 Diane Kilpatrick Fisher 3950 78th Avenue Pinellas Park, Florida 33565 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Myrtle Aase, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Cosmetology 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether or not the, Respondent, Buenaventura Lakes Country Club, Inc., may be issued Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2, for use at 301 Buenaventura Boulevard, Kissimmee, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner and Respondent stipulated and agreed to the underlying facts which they deemed to have necessary application in considering the question of the propriety of the Respondent issuing the Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2 to the Petitioner for use at 301 Buenaventura Boulevard, Kissimmee, Florida. Notwithstanding the lack of dispute in facts surrounding this issue, the Respondent and Petitioner have requested the undersigned to examine those facts and to offer conclusions of law on the dispute. In the course of the presentation, it was agreed that Mr. Norman J. Smith, attorney for the Petitioner, would be allowed to set forth the factual stipulation for the record. Mr. Smith indicated that the official description of the license was, Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2. It was stated that the Petitioner is now a qualified motel and restaurant as set forth in Florida Statute, 561.20, which describes those establishments which would qualify for a "special" beverage license. It was further indicated that when the license in question was issued originally it was not issued to such a qualified hotel, motel or restaurant as set forth in Florida Statute, 561.20, which established the requirements for issuance of a "special" beverage license, and that when the subject license was transferred to the present location, that the motel and restaurant, at the present location, was not such a qualified hotel, motel or restaurant in accordance with Florida Statute, 561.20, which established those requirements for issuance of a "special" beverage license. However, as of October 21, 1975, and as of the application date for license transfer, filed by the Petitioner, by improvements and physical changes to the edifice, (location where the license currently is housed), would meet the definitional requirements of Florida Statute, 561.20, which sets forth the qualifications for "special" beverage licenses to be issued to a hotel, motel or restaurant. This qualification referred to as of October 21, 1975, and as of the date of application, applies to the section on hotels/motels and restaurants. That is to say the establishment would qualify under the standards for a hotel/motel or under the standards for a restaurant. It was further established that the application which was filed by the Petitioner was duly filed with the Division of Beverage upon form, DBR-704L, which is the application for the transfer of an alcoholic beverage license in this type request. Mr. Smith stated that the Petitioner understood that the letter of August 21, 1975, from the Director of the Division of Beverage, addressed to the Petitioner, stated the only basis for denying the application which had been filed by the Petitioner, and Mr. Hatch, attorney for the Respondent, agreed that there were no other grounds for disapproving the license application other than the one established in the letter from Mr. C. A. Nuzum, Director of the Division of Beverage. It was more specifically developed that the language which was relied upon to deny the application was that language set forth in Florida Statute, 561.20(2)(a)(3), "... However, any license heretofore issued to any such hotel, motel, motor court, or restaurant or hereafter issued to any such hotel, motel, or motor court [including a condominium accommodation] under the general law shall not be moved to a new location, such license being valid only on the premises of such hotel, motel, motor court, or restaurant." Mr. Hatch, in behalf of the Respondent, agreed to the accuracy of the depiction of the stipulation as stated for the record by Mr. Smith. The parties through their respective attorneys then offered oral argument on the law as it relates to the Petitioner's request for issuance of a license at the aforementioned location. Additionally, Mr. Bishop, a licensing supervisor with the Division of Beverage, was called to testify concerning his interpretation of the operation of Florida Statute, 561 as it pertains to license applications, moves, and transfers. One further item was offered in the way of a stipulation, and that is an agreement on the part of Mr. Smith, for the Petitioner, to allow examination of two memoranda offered by the Respondent as part of its argument. Mr. Smith indicated that he had a copy of the memoranda and that he had no objection to the use of that memoranda in the way of argument in behalf of the Respondent. Upon that representation the undersigned was provided with a copy of the Respondent's memoranda and has considered the same in addressing the legal issue.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application for transfer as filed by the Respondent, Buenaventura Lakes Country Club, Inc., to transfer Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2 from its present location to 301 Buenaventura Boulevard, Kissimmee, Florida, be granted. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Norman J. Smith, Esquire Brinson and Smith, P. A. Post Office Drawer 1549 Kissimmee, Florida 32741 William A. Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation Division of Beverage 725 Bronough Street Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the Respondent, Larry Lyles, was the holder of Florida Beverage License No. 26-2105, license series 2ABS. The licensed premises to which this license was issued is Larry and Gail's Pool Hall, 306 West Eighth Street, Jacksonville, Florida. On August 11, 1982, Mr. Keith Bernard Hamilton, a beverage officer for the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, went to the licensed premises pursuant to an assigned drug investigation. Officer Hamilton, after entering the licensed premises, purchased a beer from Gail Thomas a/k/a Patricia Ann Thomas. Gail Thomas was tending bar. After purchasing the beer, Officer Hamilton sat in a chair approximately 20 feet from the bar, and a few minutes later, approached a young man named Larry and asked about buying some smokes". "Smokes" is a term commonly used to refer to marijuana. Larry asked him how much he wanted and whether he had the money with him. Officer Hamilton stated he wanted two (2) bags and that he did have the money. Officer Hamilton then gave Larry $10 and Larry walked over to a young man named Hamp. Larry handed Hamp the $10 in currency and Hamp handed Larry two small manila envelopes. This exchange took place approximately five feet from the bar in the presence of Gail Thomas. Gail Thomas was one of the owners of the bar. The conversation between Officer Hamilton and Larry was in a normal tone of voice and could have been easily overheard by Gail Thomas and others in the bar. After receiving the two () manila envelopes from Hamp, Larry handed them to Officer Hamilton. Later, lab analysis revealed that these two envelopes contained cannabis, a controlled substance under Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On August 20, 1982, Officer Hamilton returned to the licensed premises. After entering, he purchased a beer from Gail Thomas and began playing pool. When Gail Thomas began cleaning a table near the pool table, he asked her if anyone had "smokes". She said no but that someone next door might. She then indicated she was going next door to get change. She left, and upon returning, she informed Officer Hamilton that a man next door had some "smokes". She then asked if he wanted her to get some for him. He said yes and gave her $20 in currency. She left and came back with two manila envelopes and two $5.00 bills as change. Later, lab analysis revealed that the two manila envelopes contained cannabis, a controlled substance under Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On August 21, 1982, Officer Hamilton again visited the licensed premises, and upon entering, purchased a grape soda from Gail Thomas. He saw the young man named Hamp shooting pool and walked over to him and asked him about purchasing some smokes. Hamp said he had some real good stuff and that if he didn't like it, he would buy it back. Officer Hamilton then purchased one manila envelope from Hemp. The exchange took place in the presence of Gail Thomas, who was nearby cleaning tables. After the exchange, Hemp suggested to Officer Hamilton that he try some of the material in the envelope there in the bar. Officer Hamilton declined and Hamp told him "It's okay, Gail doesn't care". Later, lab analysis revealed that the envelope purchased from Hemp contained cannabis, a controlled substance under Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. At the time of each of the purchases on August 11, 20, and 21, 1982, Gail Thomas was the only bartender or person actually working in the licensed premises. Officer Hamilton never observed another employee or person supervising or maintaining in any way the licensed premises.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's alcoholic beverage license be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James N. Watson, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Larry Lyles 306 West Eighth Street Jacksonville, Florida R. R. Caplano, Captain Division of Beverage Post Office Box 5787 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Mr. Gary Rutledge Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Howard M. Rasmussen Executive Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should deny Respondent's application for a yacht salesperson's license on the ground that Respondent failed to furnish proof of his good moral character in violation of Section 326.004(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999). (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating yacht and ship salespeople and brokers and for administering and enforcing Chapter 326. Respondent is a licensee applying for renewal of a yacht salesperson's license. Respondent applied for and the Division approved Respondent's initial yacht salesperson's license in 1995. Pursuant to Section 326.004(1), yacht salesperson's licenses are valid for a two-year period. In addition, Respondent formerly held a state contractor's license and a real estate broker's license from Petitioner's agency. The Construction Industry Licensing Board ("CILB") is a division of Petitioner. The CILB served Respondent with an administrative complaint regarding his contractor's license in March 1997. In 1998, the Florida Real Estate Commission ("FREC") revoked Petitioner's real estate license. The Division did not become aware of the administrative proceedings against Respondent's construction and real estate licenses until August 1998. By final order issued March 19, 1998, the CILB fined Respondent and suspended his state contractor's license for five years. The CILB found that Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(h)(2), (k) and (m). Respondent committed mismanagement that caused financial harm to a customer by accepting deposit money but failing to perform on the contract; abandoned the construction project under contract by failing to begin construction for a period of five months; and engaged in deceitful conduct in the practice of contracting. The CILB also found that Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(n) by committing incompetence and misconduct in the practice of contracting. The victims in Respondent's CILB case received $22,845.00 from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund as compensation for the harm they suffered due to Respondent's violation of Section 489.129(1)(h)(2). Respondent's obligation to pay restitution to the victims was discharged in bankruptcy. Respondent is still paying the fines and interest ordered in the CILB license suspension case involving his construction license. After the CILB suspended Respondent's contractor's license, FREC, another division of Petitioner, issued an administrative complaint seeking to revoke Respondent's real estate broker's license on the ground that the CILB had suspended Respondent's construction license. Respondent voluntarily surrendered his real estate broker's license for revocation. By final order dated August 19, 1998, FREC revoked Respondent's real estate broker's license. Respondent timely applied for, and the Division approved, the renewal of Respondent's yacht salesperson's license in August 1997. On this renewal application, Respondent answered "N" to question number four which asked whether there were any cases pending against the applicant. In August 1999, Respondent timely applied for renewal of his yacht salesperson's license. Petitioner denied the application on the sole ground that Respondent failed to show that he is of good moral character in violation of Section 326.004(6)(a). Petitioner determined that Respondent failed to show good moral character based on the CILB suspension of Respondent's contractor's license, FREC's revocation of Respondent's real estate license, and Petitioner's conclusion that Respondent had answered question four on his 1997 renewal application untruthfully in violation of Section 326.006(2)(f)1. Petitioner relied solely on a review of the documents in its file and did not conduct an independent investigation or interview Respondent. Respondent did not falsely answer "no" to question four on his 1997 renewal application. Question four asked, in relevant part: Has any judgment or decree of court been entered against you or is there now pending any case, in this or any other state, in which you were charged with any fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Question four limited its scope to judgments, decrees, and cases pending in any court in this or another state and did not ask for disclosure of administrative proceedings. Administrative agencies, including DOAH, are not courts. The administrative complaint filed against Respondent in March 1997 was not a case pending in a court in this or another state. As Petitioner noted on its Investigative Report, ". . . a final order of an agency is not a judgment or decree of court." Respondent construed question four on his 1997 renewal application to be limited to courts. Respondent's interpretation was reasonable and valid. It was not intended to deceive Petitioner. In August 1998, an attorney for FREC informed Respondent that he should disclose administrative proceedings in addition to court cases. Respondent immediately informed Petitioner by telephone and letter of the pending administrative proceedings. In the renewal application filed in 1999, Respondent disclosed the suspension of his construction license, the revocation of his real estate license, and answered "yes" to question four on the application. In an effort toward full disclosure, Respondent answered "yes" to question three when Respondent should have answered "no." Question three asked Respondent if he had been convicted of a crime. The only finding from the suspension of Respondent's construction license by the CILB and the revocation of Respondent's real estate license by FREC that is at issue in this case is a finding by ALJ Daniel M. Kilbride that Respondent committed fraud and deceit by adding a provision for a commission at the end of a construction contract entered into on December 23, 1994. By final order entered on March 16, 1998, the CILB adopted the Recommended Order of Judge Kilbride. The judicial doctrine of equitable estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, bars the re-litigation of factual and legal issues common to both the CILB case and this case. Therefore, the finding that Respondent committed fraud and deceit in 1994 cannot be litigated in this case. The good moral character of Respondent was not at issue in the license suspension case decided by Judge Kilbride. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to present evidence of his good moral character in this case including evidence that explains and mitigates the circumstances of the 1994 transaction in an effort to show that Respondent does not now lack good moral character. The sales commission at issue in the 1994 transaction was to be paid out of Respondent's proceeds from the construction contract. It was not an additional expense to be paid by the buyers. It did not increase the construction price of the house. The commission was to be paid by Respondent for services provided by Castle Real Estate on behalf of Respondent. The buyers did not object to the insertion of the commission provision at the end of the contract. The buyers did not object to the commission being paid at closing. The construction lender released the funds for the commission as part of the construction draw Respondent received. The funds were not separately identified, and Respondent had no knowledge that the lender had released the funds as part of the construction draw. Respondent was an active builder in the local real estate market. He had constructed several "spec" homes. When the real estate market declined, Respondent incurred financial problems attributable to subcontractors and was unable to service the debt he owed on the "spec" homes. Respondent declared bankruptcy in 1996. The buyers in the 1994 transaction did not make any request for refund until after Respondent had declared bankruptcy. Respondent could not make preferential payments to creditors after he declared bankruptcy. More than five years have passed since the 1994 transaction. Even if Respondent lacked good moral character in 1994, he now possesses good moral character. Respondent is now in stable financial condition. Respondent has made all payments due under the license suspension order in a timely manner. Respondent is a licensed captain in the Coast Guard Auxiliary. He has served as a commodore of the local boating club and as a former public affairs officer in charge of public education for the local flotilla. Respondent has conducted himself with integrity in all of his yacht sales. Respondent enjoys an excellent reputation in the boating community for honesty and integrity. Respondent's knowledge about yachts is above average. Over a span of 15 years, Respondent has held licenses with the state as a mortgage broker, real estate salesman, and real estate broker. During that time, no complaints have ever been filed against Respondent for his activities under those licenses. The revocation of Respondent's real estate license was based on the suspension of Respondent's construction license by the CILB. The complaint filed against Respondent's construction license involved a single isolated transaction that occurred more than five years ago for which there were significant mitigating circumstances.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent has good moral character, within the meaning of Section 326.004(6)(a), and renewing Respondent's yacht salesperson's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ross Fleetwood, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Scott K. Edmonds Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Thomas C. Houck, Esquire 312 South Harbor City Boulevard Melbourne, Florida 32901 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
