Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by Lawrence P. Stevenson, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Respondent’s Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Petitioner, George Moore Chevrolet, Inc., be permitted to relocate its dealership to 10979 Atlantic Boulevard, Jacksonville (Duval County), Florida 32225, for the sale of the line-make Chevrolet (CHEV), upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. Filed October 19, 2010 11:37 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ORDERED this Z, 7 —day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ‘ARL A. FORD, Direct Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division, of Motor Vehicles this day of October, 2010. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. Copies furnished: John H. Holley, Esquire Shutts & Bowen, LLP 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 804 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos Latour General Motors Company 100 GM Renaissance Center Detroit, Michigan 48265 George H. Moore George Moore Chevrolet, Inc. 711 Beach Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32250 Lawrence P. Stevenson Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent William C. Widner has been with the City of Clearwater Fire Department for 21 years. For the past ten years, he has been assigned to Engine 48 as a fire lieutenant. His record is free from any type of disciplinary action. When a call is received concerning a medical emergency, it is proper to dispatch both a rescue unit and a fire engine to the scene. The standard operating procedure for emergency calls for fire vehicles is that the time to clear the station should not exceed 45 seconds. If there are questions concerning the dispatch, the officer in charge is to contact the dispatcher while in route to the scene of the emergency and make inquiry at that time. Also, a lieutenant, by himself, cannot change, modify or refuse to respond to a dispatch. Only a captain or the dispatcher can change the required response, or, another unit can announce that they are closer to the scene and will respond. The average response time between dispatch and arrival at the scene is four minutes. When a dispatch is given, a grid number for the destination is announced. All fire engines are equipped with map books demonstrating the location of the scene in relationship to the grid number given. On August 5, 1985, at approximately 2050 hours, the Clearwater Police Department Communications Center received an emergency call reporting a subject having a heart attack at 2720 Morningside Drive. Safety Harbor Rescue 52 and an ambulance were dispatched by telephone. At approximately 2055 hours, Engine 48 was radio dispatched to 2720 Morningside Drive. Respondent advised by radio that Engine 48 was responding to the call. Approximately 22 seconds after receiving the dispatch and 14 seconds after initially responding to the dispatch, respondent Widner telephoned the dispatcher and advised him that 2720 Morningside Drive was Engine 49's territory. Respondent did offer to go, however. The dispatcher stated that "this was a screwed up mess," but advised respondent that the computer recommended Engine 48. Respondent replied that he should go if Engine 49 was out. After further conversation, the dispatcher stated, "it made sense to me that 49 would go but it said 48." When respondent inquired as to who was to go, the dispatcher said "Oh hell, I might as well page somebody else." This conversation between the respondent and the dispatcher lasted 43 seconds and concluded 1 minute, 9 seconds from the end of the original dispatch. The dispatcher then radio-dispatched Engine 49 to 2720 Morningside Drive. Engine 49 advised that it was responding at approximately 2057 hours, 38 seconds, or two minutes, 22 seconds after the original dispatch was given to Engine 48. After speaking with the dispatcher, respondent and his superior officer, Captain Evans, checked the map for the 2720 Morningside Drive address. Upon learning that that address was, indeed, within Engine 48's territory, respondent and his crew immediately got in the truck and left the station. Captain Evans notified the dispatcher at 2059 hours that Engine 48 was responding to the call. When respondent arrived at the scene, Engine 49 and the rescue unit were already there. He attempted to radio in his arrival as soon as he got there, but the air waves were busy. He announced his arrival on his portable unit as he was walking up to the house. The evidence does not conclusively establish the exact time that respondent's arrival on the scene was reported to the dispatcher. Engine 49 did report its arrival before Engine 48's arrival was reported. Based upon the totality of the evidence, it is found that between 7 1/2 and 8 1/4 minutes elapsed between the time of the original dispatch to Engine 48 and the time of Engine 48's arrival at the scene. There are two Morningside Drives in the City of Clearwater. The residence located at 2720 Morningside Drive is within Engine 48's response zone, and is located 2.1 miles from Engine 48 and 3.0 miles from Engine 49. The other Morningside Drive is located in Morningside Estates and is within the response zone of Engine 49. When respondent first received the dispatch, he thought the address was located within the Morningside Estates subdivision. Upon leaving the station, an immediate right or left turn is required, dependent upon which Morningside Drive is being sought. Respondent's Captain Evans immediately conducted a fact finding session upon respondent's return to the station, and determined that respondent had failed to follow a direct order. A follow-up interview was conducted. It was determined that, upon receiving the initial dispatch, respondent should have proceeded directly to the engine and looked at the grid map, should have cleared the station within 45 seconds in accordance with standard operating procedures, should have reached the scene within 4 to 4.5 minutes and that, due to respondent's phone conversation with the dispatcher, two fire engines were sent on a call that required only one engine. Based upon those findings, the Fire Department concluded that respondent's productivity, workmanship, and efficiency with regard to the emergency response were not up to required standards for performance, and a two-day suspension was requested. The request for a two-day suspension was referred to the Affirmative Action Office, which conducts a fairness review of proposed disciplinary action and makes a recommendation to the City Manager, who takes final disciplinary action. After interviewing respondent concerning the August 5th incident, the Affirmative Action Office initially concluded that a two-day suspension was very harsh under the circumstances and recommended a letter of reprimand instead. Thereafter, Assistant Fire Chief Meyer contacted the Affirmative Action Office and provided the investigator with further information. The investigator was informed by Assistant Chief Meyer that respondent had been at that station for 10 years and should have been familiar with the addresses within his territory. He further advised her that the computer system utilized to determine which station should receive a particular call had been in effect for two years and discrepancies had been corrected. Meyer informed the investigator that lieutenants had been instructed not to argue with the dispatcher, to immediately respond to a call and that the proper response time in this instance should have been 4 minutes. This information from Meyer caused the Affirmative Action Office to amend its recommendation for disciplinary action to a suspension for 11.2 hours. The City Manager followed that recommendation and gave Notice of Suspension in accordance therewith. The Notice listed the three charges referenced in the Introduction as grounds for the disciplinary action taken, and established the date and time for the suspension to occur. In a separately related incident occurring in 1983, Lieutenant Handura with the City of Clearwater Fire Department received a letter of reprimand for not responding to a dispatch. In that incident, Handura was dispatched but, because he had a tour group of school children at his station and knew that a rescue unit had also been dispatched, he called the rescue unit and determined that he was not needed. He thereupon called the dispatcher and advised him that the rescue unit was responding to the call and that he would not respond.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's appeal be dismissed and that a Final Order be entered confirming the disciplinary action of an 11.2 hour suspension, without pay. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th of July 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July 1986. APPENDIX (CASE NO. 86-0236) The proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties have been carefully considered and are accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner 11. Partially rejected as being argumentative as opposed to a factual finding. Respondent 3-5. While these findings are partially correct, they are an incomplete recitation of the events which transpired. 6. Rejected; See Paragraph 5 in Findings of Fact. 7 and 8. Rejected as a legal conclusion as opposed to a factual finding. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles A. Lance Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748 Stuart M. Rosenblum, P.A. 220 South Garden Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516 City Manager City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748 Civil Service Board City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is licensed as a dealer of special fuel pursuant to Florida Statutes 206 and has been assigned license Number 1627. The pertinent sections of Florida Statutes which are applicable to this case are ss206.86(1), (6), (8), 206.87, 206.89, 206.93, 206.94 and Ch. 212. The pertinent rules of the Department of Revenue applicable to special fuels sales involved herein is 12A-2.03. The deposition of Albert Colozoff and all answers to interrogatories and responses to requests for admissions are admissible as evidence and are to be made a part of the record in this cause. The Petitioner sold special fuels to Zamora Truck and Car Services, Roberts Equipment Company and Florida Petroleum, Inc. Petitioner was assessed by the Respondent for tax on 1,979,201 gallons of special fuel sold by it and paid tax and interest as set forth in the letter attached hereto as Exhibit A. That no penalty paid on any of the tax paid pursuant to that letter. That Petitioner did not remit taxes that were due during the month the sales of special fuel were reported on any of the sale to Zamora, Roberts or Florida Petroleum or the remaining 1,417,263 gallons sold. Zamora and Roberts represented to Belcher that they were purchasing all special fuel from Belcher for exempt agricultural use. Due to past dealings and delivery of the special fuel to a farm, Belcher believed and relied upon the facts represented to it by Zamora and Roberts. However, Belcher did not obtain written documentation of this agricultural use from Zamora or Roberts and did not furnish the Department with any such written documentation. Belcher did not obtain resale certificates or exemption certificates or dealer license numbers from Zamora, Roberts or Florida Petroleum. Nor did the report forms filed by Belcher contain resale certificates, exemption certificates or dealer license numbers from Zamora, Roberts or Florida Petroleum. An employee of the Department advised Belcher that Zamora and Roberts were under investigation for fraudulent failure to report taxes. Belcher paid sales tax on sales of special fuel in the amount of $18,589.53 on the sale of 538,030 gallons of special fuel. Zamora is not a licensed dealer of special fuels. Florida Petroleum is not a licensed dealer of special fuel. Roberts is not a licensed dealer of special fuel. Belcher did not fraudulently file incorrect monthly special fuels reports. The Department of Revenue audited Belcher and computed tax, penalty and interest due as set forth in the documents attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Department of Revenue advised Belcher of its duties regarding reporting requirements in the letters from L. N. Thomas attached as Exhibit C.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's assessment be upheld with respect to Petitioner's tax deficiency, penalty and interest as set forth in the assessments with adjustments to be made for payments paid by Petitioner under the "sales tax" theory. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Mail: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James R. McCachren, Jr., Esquire Ervin, Varn, Jacobs, Odom & Kitchen Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William D. Townsend, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Frank Pope incorporated Porcine Motors Inc., in 1972, and has operated a used car lot at 16928 South Dixie Highway under that name since that time. He also leases cars. In 1974 the annual corporate report was not filed by Perrine Motors Inc., and the corporation was dissolved, by proclamation. Pepe was unaware that his corporation had been dissolved. In about 1978, Pepe leased part of his used carlot to James P. Fashik, who also sold used cars under the name of "Jamiel." This lease extended until 1980, when Fashik's sister, on October 1, 1980, obtained a corporate charter in the name of Perrine Motors, Inc., and opened a used car lot et 17750 South Dixie Highway. This lot is operated by Fashik. The sign on the business at 17750 South Dixie Highway is "Jamiel's at Perrine Motors" with the same size lettering throughout except for "at", which is smaller lettering. At all times from 1972, until recently, the signs at the used car lot at 16928 South Dixie Highway read "Perrine Motors." After obtaining the corporate name, "Perrine Motors, Inc.," the new corporation advised Pepe that he could no longer use that name. On November 17, 1980, Pepe was issued a corporate charter in the name of "Frank Pepe's Perrine Motors, Inc." It is this name that Petitioner seeks to have rescinded. To prove the deceptive similarity of these names, Petitioner called three witnesses besides Fashik. Ludwig Blaha purchased two cars from Jamiel while he was located at 16920 South Dixie Highway and attempted to call him after his relocation to explain he would be late for a monthly payment. He used the phone number on the card he obtained from Jamiel and testified the phone was answered by someone at Pepe's who said, "Jamiel is dead." The phone number on the card was Fashik's number which did not stay at 16928 South Dixie Highway after Fashik left. When Blaha drove down South Dixie Highway, he readily found Jamiel at his new location. Jack Coler was advised that Fashik needed an accountant and attempted to call him for an appointment. He looked in the yellow pages of the telephone directory and called the number listed for Perrine Motors. This number was answered at Pepe's. Coler then drove to Fashik's business location at 17750 South Dixie Highway. Michael Johnson, in April, 1981, left a deposit check at Perrine Motors, Inc., on a car he was interested in. He shortly thereafter changed his mind and attempted to call Perrine Motors, Inc. to toll them not to deposit his check. He called the number in the phone book and got Pepe's. He dialed information and called the number given. He again got Pepe's. He then drove down to Perrine Motors, Inc. at 17750 South Dixie Highway. The yellow pages section of the Miami telephone directory was printed before Perrine Motors, Inc. was incorporated October 1, 1980. It was sometime later before the necessary information was presented to the telephone company so the correct phone number for Perrine Motors, Inc. could be obtained from the information operator. The signs at 16928 South Dixie Highway were not changed to read "Frank Pepe's Perrine Motors" until after April 1 1981 although Pepe testified he contracted with a painter to change the signs shortly after he incorporated on November 17, 1980. While operating his used car business at 16928 South Dixie Highway, Fashik was using Pepe's address, premises and license. He now claims that after he acquired the right to use the name "Perrine Motors, Inc.", the name "Frank Pepe's Perrine Motors, Inc." is deceptively similar to "Perrine Motors Inc." As a result of this similarity, some of his advertising benefits Pepe, some of his supplies and billings are misdirected, and the telephone book shows Perrine Motors located at Pepe's address. At the time of the hearing, the yellow pages had not yet been reprinted to correctly reflect the address of Perrine Motors, Inc. at 17750 South Dixie Highway, but when next reprinted, it will contain the correct telephone number and address.
The Issue Whether the petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 120.53(5)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner filed bids for ITB No. 4-600-370-K which, if responsive, were the apparent low bid for the Class 3 bid and next to lowest for Class 4 and 5 categories of copier equipment listed in the ITB. [Petition, page 8] On October 16, 1995, the Department posted the intended awards and disqualified all three of Petitioner's bids as nonresponsive. [Petitioner's memorandum in opposition to Respondent's motion for summary recommended order (MEMO), paragraph 1] The Petitioner filed a notice of protest against the disqualification of its bids on October 19, 1995. [MEMO, paragraph 1] The petition for formal hearing was filed with the Department on October 30, 1995. [MEMO, paragraph 1] The petition for formal hearing alleged, in part: SUMMARY OF GROUNDS FOR PROTEST ...The Division of Purchasing ("Division") disqualified all three of Petitioner's bids on vague grounds identified by three words: "Disquality -- Manufacturers Certification. " See Ex. 3 hereto at 1. There are two provisions in the ITB that require the "certification" of the Original Equipment Manufacturer ("OEM"). See Ex. 1 hereto at 3 and 32. Since the State has not seen fit to adequately identify which provision(s) are at issue, Petitioner is required to address both provisions that might apply. Both of these requirements are completely arbitrary, irrational and, most importantly, anticompeti- tive, for the reasons described further in Section 3 below. The "certification" require- ments are arbitrary and irrational because they are not designed to obtain the equipment at issue for the lowest price. Indeed, they ensure that the State will pay higher prices than it would without the requirements. Neither are the "certification" requirements rationally related to the quality of the equip- ment that was bid by Petitioner or the other bidders, including the OEMs. Finally, these requirements are blatantly anticompetitive be- cause they place the right to exclude all other competitors in the hands of the OEMs, which can deny such certification with impunity, ensuring that only those OEM bidders will prevail, as was the outcome here. This preferential treat- ment not only runs counter to the express intent of the legislature to promote free and open competition, it also raises serious anti- trust concerns. Disqualification of Petitioner's bids on the grounds presented by the Division should be reversed and the contract awards should be adjusted accordingly. * * * The preferential treatment provided to Xerox, Kodak, and other OEMs by insertion of the "certification" requirements in this ITB is consistent with a longstanding history of such anticompetitive treatment of independent providers of the equipment and service at issue, resulting in higher prices (but not necessarily higher quality) for the State's taxpayers. Petitioner's recent experience in dealing with the State on these matters is also consistent with this pattern of bias toward OEMs. * * * 3. BASIS OF PROTEST A. The Division of Purchasing Has Acted Arbitrarily and in Restraint of Trade * * * Petitioner has identified two potentially applicable provisions that the Division could be relying on for its disqualification decision. First, in the ITB's definition of "acceptable equipment" it states that bids for classes 3, 4, 5 and 6 shall be for "new and newly remanu- factured equipment only," and that "newly remanufactured equipment must be certified by the manufacturer." Ex. 1 at 3. This pro- vision also states that "remanufactured" equip- ment is not acceptable. Second, the ITB requires certification by the manufacturer as to the copy speed, recommended monthly copy volume, and other basic specifications of the equipment models being bid. Ex. 1 at 32. Both of these provisions are irrational, arbitrary, and clearly anticompetitive. * * * The Division's definition of acceptable equipment bears no relationship to the actual remanufacturing processes used by Petitioner or Xerox. Even if Xerox certifies its own "remanufactured" equipment, the State only receives assurances that the remanufacturing process used by Xerox meets certain standards. Petitioner certifies that its equipment meets certain quality and performance standards, just like Xerox does. There is no rational reason why self-certification of the equipment at issue would provide any different assurances of quality for the State. * * * 2. Certification by the OEM of Copy Speed and Other Basic Specifications Petitioner provided a sworn verification that its equipment meets the copy speed, recommended monthly copy volume, and other minimum specifications for each category of equipment for which it submitted bids. Its certification is based on the same procedures used by Xerox to certify its own equipment. There is no rational reason why that certifi- cation cannot meet the needs of the State. To insist upon certification only from the OEM is an arbitrary and anticompetitive requirement not related to quality or designed to achieve the lowest price. * * * This requirement also is blatantly anticompet- itive. Petitioner is in direct competition with Xerox for the sale and maintenance of the equipment at issue. It is irrational for the Division to expect Xerox to provide such certification to its competitors, even as to this type of uncontroversial information unless award to Xerox is the intended goal. The ITB required a manufacturer's certification which specified a notarized certification of the copy speed, recommended monthly copy volume, and other minimum specifications for the equipment bid. [Exhibit 1 to the Petition] The bids submitted by Petitioner included a certification executed by Advantage's president, Jane Beekmann. [MEMO, paragraph 3] The equipment specified by Advantage was manufactured by Xerox but was remanufactured by Advantage. [MEMO, paragraph 3, and as represented by Petitioner's counsel] Advantage maintains it may certify its remanufactured equipment in the same manner that Xerox certified its equipment. [MEMO, paragraph 5] The ITB provided, in pertinent part: ACCEPTABLE EQUIPMENT ...Bids for Classes 3, 4, 5 and 6 shall be for new and newly remanufactured equipment only. In Classes 3, 4, 5 and 6 newly remanu- factured equipment must be certified by the manufacturer. The ITB further provided, at page 32: This is to certify the manufacturer's recommended monthly volumes and certified copy speed (specify from the glass or document feeder) for the machines listed below. Monthly volume indicates the number of copies which can be made per month by the machine without causing excessive downtime. It does not necessarily denote the maximum number of copies that can be made by that particular machine. NOTE: This must be executed by the manu- facturer and must be notarized. Dealers are not authorized to sign this certification form. Failure to submit this certification with your bid shall result in disqualification of bid. The certifications provided by Petitioner identified the machines proposed by Advantage as the Xerox 5100, the Xerox 1090 w/finisher; and the Xerox 1075 w/finisher. Each of these certifications identified Advantage as the name of the manufacturer. [Exhibit C to the motion not disputed by Petitioner] Petitioner did not manufacture the Xerox 5100, the Xerox 1090 w/finisher; or the Xerox 1075 w/finisher. [Petitioner represents it is the remanufacturer, MEMO, paragraph 2] Petitioner maintains, and for purposes of this order it is accepted, that Advantage is the remanufacturer of the Xerox 5100, the Xerox 1090 w/finisher; or the Xerox 1075 w/finisher. [MEMO, paragraph 2] Petitioner did not timely challenge the specifications for ITB No. 4- 600-370-K.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of General Services enter a final order dismissing the petition of Advantage as an untimely challenge to the ITB specifications. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Cindy Horne Assistant General Counsel Department of General Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 J. Daniel Leftwich Berry & Leftwich 2000 K Street, Northwest. Suite 450 Washington, D.C. 20006 James Leech Post Office Box 7473 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338 Lawrence P. Stevenson Hume F. Coleman HOLLAND & KNIGHT Post Office Drawer 810 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue In this case, Petitioner has challenged Respondent's choice of responsive low bidders related to bid solicitation for contracts pertaining to four classes of diesel engine rebuild programs. In particular, Petitioner alleges that in all four classes the low bidder, and in two instances, the second low bidder, in settings in which the Petitioner was second low bidder or third low bidder respectively, have failed to meet specifications and are not entitled to the award of contracts. Petitioner asserts that it can meet the terms of the contract and was prepared to meet those contract terms upon the Respondent's opening of the bids. Petitioner questions Respondent's failure to confirm that each prospective bidder was capable of meeting each specification within the bid solicitation document prior to bid opening or, at the latest, at the point when the bids were opened. Concomitantly, Petitioner contends that it was inherently unfair for the Respondent to confirm the ability of the low bidders to comply with the specifications following bid opening and in the face of challenges to the qualifications of the apparent low bidders offered by unsuccessful bidders.
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Transportation, invited bids from forty firms related to a program for rebuilding certain diesel engines owned by the Department. These firms were initially seen to have the necessary expertise to provide the rebuild service. There were 16 specific types of engines which the Department wished to have rebuilt pursuant to separate contracts. There was a seventeenth category which dealt with miscellaneous types of engines described as "others." The bid document set forth that those individuals who were interested in submitting bids for the diesel engine rebuild program must be able to comply with a number of requirements. Among those requirements was the requirement in the section of the bid documents pertaining to engine rebuild specifications which, under the subsection for parts and services, indicated that "the Contractor must rebuild the engine according to the Original Equipment Manufacturer's (OEM) rebuild procedures and specifications." Furthermore, the bidders were to comply with certain facility requirements, which were: * * * The Contractors facility must have the following minimum machine equipment and tools: Vat-type hot tank for engine block cleaning Magnaflux machine (minimum 2000 amp hr) Connecting rod reconditioners Pin boring machine Flywheel surfacer Cylinder boring and honing equipment Engine block align boring machine Surfacer for heads and blocks Dynomometer OEM specified service tooling for engine series quoted OEM service manuals for engine series quoted It was noted in the specifications pertaining to necessary facility requirements that the machinery must have the capacity to perform the work on the engines that were specified in the bid solicitation. Finally, it was a requirement that the subcontracting work meet this restriction: All machine and rebuilding work must be performed in the Contractors shop, with the exception of fuel pump and fuel injector rebuilding, and crankshaft and camshaft grinding. Requirements set forth in the previous paragraph did not indicate whether it was necessary for the bidder to have the service items on hand at the time that the bid responses were offered, at the time the bid opening was conducted, or at the point at which a written contract was entered into between the Department and a successful bidder or before commencing the work. The assumption on the part of the Department employee who was responsible for the bid solicitation process was to the effect that bidders would be considered in compliance with these requirements if they were able to comply with all conditions at the point at which the contract documents were executed between the successful bidder and the Department or before service work commenced. This interpretation was given by Mark Sawicki, who was responsible for arranging to have the Department's diesel engines rebuilt. Sawicki did not feel that any attempt at prequalification by inspection of the forty prospective bidders was in the best interests of the Department. He felt that an attempt at prequalification of forty potential bidders was an extravagance which the Department could not afford. Having described the requirements that the Department had in mind through the bid document, Sawicki assumed that the contractors whom he had preselected without inspecting their facilities could meet specifications if they responded to the bid solicitation. When the bids were opened on June 17, 1986, eleven separate bidders had responded to the invitation. Some of the bidders responded to each category of engine sought for contract and others responded to select categories. Petitioner offered its response to all but one category of engines. It was not the apparent low bidder in any category. In its protest, Petitioner has questioned the Department's intent to award contracts to the apparent low bidders in the engine classes number 3208, number 1150, number 1160 and the miscellaneous category described as "others." The apparent low bidder in the engine class number 3208 was Coastal Power. In the miscellaneous class of engines, the apparent low bidder was First Coast Truck. In those two engine classes, the Petitioner was shown to be the second low bidder. In the engine class numbers 1150 and 1160, the apparent low bidder was Coastal Power, the second low bidder in those engine categories was Zabatt and Petitioner was the third low bidder. Sawicki made an inspection of the facilities of Coastal Power on June 19, 1985, and confirmed that the low bidder had the requisite facility to comply with the requirements of the bid document pertaining to machinery, etc. for the engine classes in dispute. Sawicki also confirmed that the Zabatt facility met requirements. Inspection of Zabatt was made on June 19, 1986. Although the Dynomometer available to Zabatt was in a facility next door, the Dynomometer would be operated only by personnel from Zabatt and was accessible to Zabatt routinely. After bids were opened, another employee from the Department made similar efforts at confirmation of the acceptability of the facility at First Coast to rebuild the miscellaneous class of engine. The president of First Coast Truck has also given an indication of its equipment in correspondence addressed to the Department on July 10, 1986. It was not established at what point in time these companies were first able to meet the requirements related to facilities and equipment, whether it be at the point of offering their responses to the bid advertisement, at the point of bid opening or on the day that the facilities were inspected by employees of the Department. Obviously, these bidders could have met the bid requirements for facilities and equipment prior to contracts' being completed between the successful bidders and the Department, in that contracts have not been executed pending the outcome of this hearing. No competent evidence was presented which identified what equipment Petitioner had on hand to comply with the bid requirements or when the equipment was acquired.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Notice of Withdrawal of Intent to Establish Dealership, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and no license will be issued to Power Group International LLC and Jay Stewart d/b/a A Plus Carts and Parts to sell the line-make manufactured by Guangzhou Panyu Huanan Motors Group Co., Ltd. (GUNG) at 16100 San Carlos Boulevard, Fort Myers (Lee County) Florida 33908. Filed October 1, 2010 4:41 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ORDERED this _/ Fy of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CARL A. FORD, Direct Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this_/4t_ day of October, 2010. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: Dean Bunch, Esquire Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Jay Stewart A Plus Carts and Parts 16100 San Carlos Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Lynda Stewart Grandpa’s Cycle Center, Inc. 3596 Fowler Street Fort Myers, Florida 33901 William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue Whether the Respondent's decision to reject the bid submitted by the Petitioner in response to Invitation to Bid # 03-DC-7514, Maintenance and Repair of Emergency Generators, was contrary to the Respondent's governing statutes, the Respondent's rules or policies, or the specifications in the Invitation to Bid.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On June 23, 2003, the Invitation to Bid ("ITB") for Bid No. 03-DC-7514 was advertised and also mailed to prospective bidders on the bidding list maintained by the Department. The ITB solicited bids for the maintenance and repair of emergency generators in correctional facilities, and separate bids were to be submitted for Regions I through IV. All Power Generators submitted its bid by the deadline of 2:00 p.m. September 15, 2003, together with four other bidders, including Pantropic. Both All Power Generators and Pantropic bid only on the part of the ITB relating to work in Region IV. When the bids were opened, the annual costs stated by the bidders for each region covered by the ITB were read and recorded. All Power Generators' cost total was lower than that of Pantropic, and All Power Generators was the apparent lowest responsive bidder. After the bids were opened, Department personnel reviewed the cost tabulations to confirm their accuracy and reviewed the other documentation required by the ITB, including the Certification/Attestation for Mandatory Statements, the Certification/Attestation of Executive Summary Statements, and the Bidder's Background Summary, to ensure the bidders' responsiveness to the requirements of the ITB. As a result of this review, the Department's Procurement Manager determined that All Power Generators did not meet the three years' business/corporate experience requirement of the ITB. The Procurement Manager recommended that the contract be awarded to Pantropic, the next lowest bidder. This recommendation was accepted, and the Department noted on the Bid Tabulation form its intent to award the contract for Region IV to Pantropic and its determination that All Power Generators did "not meet required experience criteria." In Section 1.3 of the ITB, "mandatory responsiveness requirements" are defined in pertinent part as follows: "Terms, conditions or requirements that must be met by the bidder to be responsive to this ITB. These responsiveness requirements are mandatory. Failure to meet these responsiveness requirements will cause rejection of a bid. . . ." (Emphasis in original.) Section 4.3.6 of the ITB provides in pertinent part: The Department shall reject any and all bids not meeting mandatory responsiveness requirements. In addition, the Department shall also reject any or all bids containing material deviations. The following definitions are to be utilized in making these determinations: Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements: Terms, conditions or requirements that must be met by the bidder to be responsive to this ITB. These responsiveness requirements are mandatory. Failure to meet these responsiveness requirements will cause rejection of a bid. Material Deviations: The Department has established certain requirements with respect to bids to be submitted by bidders. The use of shall, must or will (except to indicate simple futurity) in this ITB indicates a requirement or condition which may not be waived by the Department. A deviation is material if, in the Department's sole discretion, the deficient response is not in substantial accord with this ITB's requirements, provides an advantage to one bidder over other bidders, has a potentially significant effect on the quantity or quality of items or services bid, or on the cost to the Department. Material deviations cannot be waived and shall be the basis for rejection of a bid. (Emphasis in original.) The Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements are set forth in Section 5.1 of the ITB, which provides in pertinent part: The following terms, conditions, or requirements must be met by the bidder to be judged responsive to this ITB. These responsiveness requirements are mandatory. Failure to meet these responsiveness requirements shall cause rejection of a bid. Any bid rejected for failure to meet responsiveness requirements will not be reviewed. * * * It is mandatory that the bidder sign, have certified by a notary public and return, under Tab 1, the "Certification/Attestation for Mandatory Statements" (ATTACHMENT 1), which includes the following statements: Business/Corporate Experience: A statement certifying that the bidder/contractor has business/corporate experience of at least three (3) years relevant to the provision of generator maintenance and repair, within the last five (5) years. Authority to Legally Bind the Bidder: A statement certifying that the person signing form PUR 7031 [the Bidder Acknowledgment] and all other forms is the person in the bidder/contractor's organization responsible for, or authorized to make, binding decisions as to the prices bid. Juan R. Garcia signed the form PUR 7031 and the Certification/Attestation for Mandatory Statements as President and owner of All Power Generators, and these documents were duly notarized. The Certification/Attestation for Mandatory Statements form signed by Mr. Garcia contains the following statement: "This is to certify that the bidder/contractor has business/corporate experience of at least three (3) years relevant to the provision of generator maintenance and repair, within the last five (5) years." Mr. Garcia also signed the Certification/Attestation of Executive Summary Statements, wherein he certified that "the bidder is a corporation" that is "registered to do business in Florida." Finally, Mr. Garcia completed the Bidder's Background Summary for All Power Generators in which he stated that All Power Generators was established in 2001 as a corporation whose primary business was to service and repair generators. All Power Generators has been doing business for approximately two and one-half years. Mr. Garcia has worked for 21 years repairing and maintaining generators. Prior to organizing All Power Generators, Mr. Garcia was the service manager for a company called Power Depot. His primary job at Power Depot was repairing and maintaining generators, and, among other technical qualifications, he is certified by Kohler to work on the generators it manufacturers. All Power Generators has five employees, including Mr. Garcia, who have between 8 and 22 years' experience maintaining and repairing generators. It is of critical importance that the Department's emergency generators be properly maintained and promptly repaired. When there is a power outage in one of the Department's correctional facilities, emergency generators automatically start and provide emergency power to operate security systems, food service operations, water wells, wastewater plants, and emergency lighting. Under the ITB, response time is 24 hours for non-emergency repairs and four hours for emergency repairs. The bidder/contractor who is awarded the contract to maintain and repair emergency generators used in the correctional facilities must have employees who are technically proficient in maintaining and repairing generators, but, because of the short response time for repairs and the numerous correctional facilities covered by the contract, especially in Region IV,1 the Department requires that the bidder/contractor also have business/corporate experience in managing contracts and coordinating the necessary maintenance, routine repairs, and emergency repairs of the generator systems. The evidence presented by All Power Generators is not sufficient to establish that its bid satisfied the mandatory requirement that the bidder/contractor have a minimum of three years' business/corporate experience. All Power Generators was organized in 2001 and has been in business only two and one-half years. Even though Mr. Garcia has many years of technical experience in the repair and maintenance of generators, All Power Generators does not have the business/corporate experience required by the ITB.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a final order denying the bid protest of All Power Generators Corporation and dismissing the Petition filed by All Power Generators Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2004.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by June C. McKinney, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s letter of withdrawal of protest of the establishment of AutoNation Dodge of Pembroke Pines, Inc., a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, AutoNation Dodge of Pembroke Pines, Inc. be granted a license for the sale and service of Jeepr passenger cars and light trucks manufactured by Chrysler (JEEP) 13601 Pines Boulevard, Pembroke Pines (Broward County), Filed January 27, 2012 3:47 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Florida 33027 upon compliance with all applicable requirements of section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. DONE AND ORDERED this A‘! day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. skill, Assistant Deputy Director Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this | __ day of January, 2012. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Ycense Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. MDM/jde Copies furnished: Thomas H. Yardley, Esquire Law Office of Thomas H. Yardley 1970 Michigan Avenue, Building D Cocoa, Florida 32922 Phil Langley Chrysler Motors, LLC 10300 Boggy Creek Road Orlando, Florida 32824 R. Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Forehand Brandes, LLP 800 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dean Bunch, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 June C. McKinney Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS MASSEY-YARDLEY CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., Petitioner, vs. Case No. 11-6492 CHRYSLER GROUP CARCO, LLC, AND AUTONATION DODGE OF PEMBROKE PINES, INC., Respondents.
