Findings Of Fact The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on August 23, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on September 13, 2010, and the Order Closing File which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the Petition for Request of Hearing, and the Order Closing File, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On August 23, 2010, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 10-341-1A to AN & YA CONSTRUCTION, INC. 2. On August 23, 2010, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was personally served on AN & YA CONSTRUCTION, INC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On September 13, 2010, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 10-341-1A to AN & YA CONSTRUCTION, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $75,724.80 against AN & YA CONSTRUCTION, INC. 4. On September 20, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on AN & YA CONSTRUCTION, INC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On October 8, 2010, AN & YA CONSTRUCTION, INC filed a Petition for Request of Hearing (“Petition”) with the Department in response to the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. On November 24, 2010, the Petition was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 10-10421. 7. On April 28, 2011, an Order Closing File was entered in Division of Administrative Hearings Case. No. 10-10421. A copy of the Order Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment, or retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 4(1)(a)(1).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 16. Petitioner is an African-American female and filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Respondent engaged in race, color, and gender discrimination; retaliation; and the creation of a hostile work environment. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 16. Respondent operates a car dealership and is in the business of selling and servicing new and used automobiles and trucks in several states, including Florida. Respondent was not Petitioner's employer. Petitioner was a temporary worker during the relevant period, and her employment contract was with an employment agency. No written employment contract existed between the parties to this proceeding. The employment agency paid Petitioner, and Respondent paid the employment agency. The employment agency assigned Petitioner to Respondent from January 13 through January 23, 2004. Other than Petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony, there is no written or other evidence that Respondent intended Petitioner’s temporary assignment either to become a permanent position or to last for six weeks. The fact-finder finds the testimony of Petitioner to be less than credible and persuasive. From January 13 until January 21, 2004, Petitioner worked at Respondent's Tampa office at Lexus of Tampa Bay located on North Dale Mabry Avenue, Tampa, Florida. Respondent transferred Petitioner to its office at Lexus of Clearwater, Florida, on January 21, 2004, and terminated the assignment from the employment agency on January 23, 2004. The termination of assignment occurred in Pinellas County, rather than Hillsborough County, Florida. Petitioner began her assignment at Lexus of Tampa Bay on January 13, 2004, as a receptionist. Respondent paired Petitioner with Ms. Mary Ann Browne, a full-time receptionist and Caucasian female. Respondent charged Ms. Browne with training Petitioner in the responsibilities of a receptionist. Petitioner alleges that Ms. Browne engaged in unprofessional conduct during the 10 days she trained Petitioner. The unprofessional conduct, according to Petitioner's testimony included "racial undertones." For example, Ms. Browne asked Petitioner why, "Black people are all family, cousins, sisters, brothers." Petitioner responded, "Don't ask me. I wouldn't be that black." Ms. Browne allegedly stated aloud that two female employees who hugged in greeting each other were lesbians. Ms. Browne allegedly called another African-American employee a "pimp" and referred to an Hispanic employee as a "macdaddy." The fact-finder does not know the meaning of the term "macdaddy," or even how to spell the term, and the record does not provide an adequate definition or spelling. Ms. Browne allegedly referred to homosexual customers as "flamers." Finally, Ms. Browne allegedly engaged in threatening physical behavior by tossing items at Petitioner across the reception desk. No one but Petitioner heard the alleged racial and sexist comments by Ms. Browne or witnessed the physically aggressive behavior. The preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing of discrimination or retaliation. Nor does the preponderance of evidence show that Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment. Finally, a preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice. The evidence of Ms. Browne's conduct consists of Petitioner's testimony and a diary that Petitioner created contemporaneously with the acts Petitioner attributes to Ms. Browne. No other employees at Lexus of Tampa Bay witnessed the events evidenced in Petitioner's testimony and diary. Ms. Browne left her employment with Respondent in the fall of 2004 and did not testify. Ms. Toni Davis, now Ms. Toni Scotland, was a receptionist during part of the relevant time but was not present during the entire time because she was being promoted to a position in accounting. Ms. Scotland did not recall any improper behavior by Ms. Browne in 2004. The Investigative Report based its recommendation of a finding of cause on statements attributed in the Report to then Ms. Davis and the documentation of the disciplinary action taken by Respondent against Ms. Browne. However, Ms. Scotland testified that she did not recall being contacted by an investigator for the Board and denied making any statements to the investigator. The investigation took approximately 3.5 years to complete because the investigator is the only investigator for the Board and because the investigator suffered a heart attack during the investigation. At the hearing, the testimony of the investigator concerning statements he attributed to Ms. Scotland, also Ms. Davis, was vague and sparse and is less than credible and persuasive. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent is responsible for the acts Petitioner attributes to Ms. Browne. Petitioner complained to her employment agency about the conduct of Ms. Browne. The employment agency notified Respondent, and Ms. Helene Ott, the supervisor at the time, interviewed both Petitioner and Ms. Browne on January 19, 2004. The only complaint made by Petitioner to Ms. Ott on January 19, 2004, was that Ms. Browne went to the break room to bring back a drink in separate disposable drink cups for Ms. Browne and Petitioner. Upon returning with the drinks, Ms. Browne told Petitioner that Ms. Browne had spit in Petitioner's cup. Petitioner did not tell Ms. Ott that Petitioner witnessed Ms. Browne spit in the cup. Petitioner's version of events changed at the hearing. Petitioner testified that she saw Ms. Browne spit in Petitioner's cup. Petitioner testified that Ms. Browne offered to refill the cup Petitioner already had on the receptionist desk, grabbed the cup, stood, drew up a large volume of spit from deep in Ms. Browne's throat, and let the long volume of liquid drop into Petitioner's cup in full view of Petitioner. Petitioner further testified in tears that she stated repeatedly to Ms. Browne, "Give me back my cup!" The foregoing testimony of Petitioner is less than credible and persuasive. The fact-finder is not persuaded that any reasonable person would have wanted Ms. Browne to return the cup. The cup was a disposable cup from the vending area which was of no value to Petitioner. Petitioner did not relate this version of the events to Ms. Ott when Ms. Ott investigated Petitioner's complaints on January 19, 2004. The version of events that Petitioner related to Ms. Ott on January 19, 2004, is consistent with the contemporaneous account by Mr. Browne. When Ms. Ott interviewed Ms. Browne on January 19, 2004, Ms. Browne admitted that she told Petitioner she had spit in Petitioner's cup when Ms. Browne returned from the vending area to the reception desk with Petitioner's drink. Ms. Browne also admitted to engaging in offensive language, offensive commentary about customers, and unprofessional conduct. A preponderance of evidence does not show that Respondent created or fostered a work environment that was hostile toward Petitioner. On January 19, 2004, Ms. Ott issued a written counseling/final warning to Ms. Browne for her use of “offensive language, offensive commentary about customers, and unprofessional conduct.” The disciplinary action advised Ms. Browne that any further misconduct would result in the termination of her employment. On January 20, 2004, Ms. Ott interviewed Petitioner again concerning additional complaints from the employment agency. Petitioner told Ms. Ott that Ms. Browne used vulgar and unprofessional language, but Petitioner did not state to Ms. Ott that Ms. Browne made racial or sexist comments. On January 21, 2004, Ms. Ott needed to fill another temporary vacancy at Lexus of Clearwater. Ms. Ott asked Petitioner to go to Clearwater, and Petitioner went to the Clearwater office voluntarily. Respondent ended the employment agency assignment on January 23, 2004. Ms. Ott described Petitioner’s performance as “very good." On January 23, 2004, Ms. Ott offered to write a letter of reference for Petitioner. Ms. Ott told Petitioner that Ms. Ott would consider Petitioner for a position at Lexus of Tampa Bay or Lexus of Clearwater if the need arose.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order issued in this proceeding should find that Respondent is not guilty of the allegations made by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Leslie P. Stokes 4714 Pleasant Avenue Palm Harbor, Florida 34683 Gail P. Williams Hillsborough County Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601-1110 Andrew Froman, Esquire Alva L. Cross, Esquire Fisher & Phillips LLP 401 East Jackson Street, Suite 2525 Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of her race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Findings Of Fact FL Hud Bayside, LLC, is a limited liability company doing business as Bayside Manor (Bayside Manor or Respondent). The company is also known as Bayside Manor Nursing Home, the named Respondent in this action. Respondent is a long-term nursing-care facility. As such it provides nursing care and health-care services to its residents. Petitioner, Cheryl Glovette Cobb, is an African-American female. As such, she is a member of a protected class under chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Sometime in November 2009, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA). Upon being hired, Petitioner received a copy of Respondent’s employee handbook. The handbook contained Respondent’s policies and procedures, including its progressive discipline policy. Respondent’s discipline policy applies progressive discipline for conduct that it does not consider to be grounds for immediate termination. Such offenses are classified as Category II violations. Category II violations include violations of the tardiness or absenteeism policy and poor work quality. Category II violations, also, include failure to take lunch breaks at scheduled times and failure to return from lunch breaks within the 30-minute time allotted for such breaks. Additionally, Category II violations include any use of a cell phone in residential care areas. Due to the fact that the quality of nursing and health care services depends on consistent maintenance of routine schedules, Respondent maintains strict attendance and tardiness requirements. For example, CNAs are expected to start their lunch breaks at their scheduled times and return from those breaks within the 30 minutes allotted for such breaks. A CNA’s failure to start the lunch break on time or return within 30 minutes can create problems because it causes delays in resident care and results in other CNAs not being able to take their breaks as scheduled. Similar care problems occur when a CNA is late for work. CNAs from the earlier shift must stay past the end of their shift until the late employee arrives. For these reasons, Respondent's tardiness policy requires employees to appear at work at their scheduled starting time and maintain their scheduled break times. There is no grace period allowed and repeated tardiness subjects an employee to discipline. Similarly, Respondent’s attendance policy subjects employees to discipline for excessive absences. Excessive absences are defined as two absences in 30 days. Further, a doctor’s note indicating that an associate was not able to appear for work does not prevent Respondent from considering an absence as excessive. None of these policies were shown to be a pretext for discrimination. Under the discipline policy, a first Category II violation subjects an employee to a written warning. A second written warning is optional for a second Category II violation. However, a third Category II violation within a 12-month period subjects an employee to suspension pending an investigation followed by termination, if the investigation confirms the policy violations. In addition, Respondent maintains a “Counseling Reports” policy. This policy allows supervisors to informally counsel employees when they commit their first policy violation without having to issue a more formal associate memorandum. It is intended to be used in situations where an employee has not previously received any formal disciplinary action. At some unknown time prior to February, Petitioner overheard Amber Jordan, LPN, who is white, tell someone she was talking to that she thought blacks were ignorant and slow to learn. Nurse Jordan denies making such a statement. However, the context of the statement was not established and no other evidence regarding the statement was introduced. Importantly, this isolated statement, while inappropriate, was not reported to any supervisor or management personnel, and was not shown to relate to any later actions taken by the employer at issue in this proceeding. On February 2, 3, 4, and 7, 2011, Petitioner was late for work. Petitioner was late because of issues pertaining to her children boarding the school bus in the morning. However, such personal issues did not excuse the fact that she failed to appear for work as scheduled. On February 19, 2011, Assistant Director of Nursing (ADON), Regine Malebrenche Smith, who is black, issued Petitioner an informal Counseling Report due to excessive tardies in a 30- day period. Petitioner was counseled instead of formally disciplined because Respondent’s Director of Nursing (DON), Heidi Duncan, who is white, wanted to work with Petitioner informally to improve her attendance without issuing written discipline in order to give Petitioner time to solve the bus issues regarding her children. There was no evidence that demonstrated Respondent's actions were discriminatory. While Petitioner's tardiness did improve, unfortunately, she continued to be late and absent from work due to her children. In fact, during a 30-day period in March and April, Petitioner was absent three times and tardy five times. Given these violations of Respondent's absence and tardiness policy, on April 15, 2011, Petitioner received a first written warning for these violations. Again, there was no evidence that Respondent's actions were discriminatory or a pretext to cover discrimination. Sometime thereafter, the evidence showed that Petitioner failed to reposition a patient who became soaked in her own urine as a result of not being monitored and repositioned appropriately. At hearing, Petitioner denied that the resident was soaked in her own urine or that Petitioner had any responsibility for the resident becoming soaked. Petitioner admitted the resident was very wet. She claimed the fluid was not urine but saline solution from an inappropriately inserted IV completed by Amber Jordan. However, the better evidence demonstrated that it was not possible for the resident to have been soaked when Nurse Jordan inserted an IV into the resident as Petitioner alleged. There simply is not enough liquid involved in the process of inserting an IV to have soaked a resident in fluid. On April 22, 2011, Petitioner received a second written warning for poor work quality regarding this incident from the DON. Again there was no evidence that Respondent's actions were discriminatory or a pretext to cover discrimination. On April 23, 2011, Lauren Lauletta, Respondent’s risk manager, was working as the nurse on duty. While conducting rounds throughout the facility, Ms. Lauletta observed Petitioner’s cell phone in her lap when she was supposed to be feeding a resident that suffered from dementia. Having the cell phone out in a patient area violated Respondent’s cell phone policy. However, even though Petitioner was subject to formal discipline pursuant to Respondent’s progressive discipline policy, Ms. Lauletta elected to informally counsel Petitioner. She reminded Petitioner that she needed to comply with the cell phone policy and notified Petitioner that future violations could result in more severe disciplinary action. On another occasion, the ADON verbally counseled Petitioner regarding her use of a cell phone when she observed Petitioner with her cell phone out while she was feeding a resident in the dining room. The date of this incident was not clear from the evidence. However, it occurred after the incident with Ms. Lauletta. Additionally, on May 27, 2011, the ADON hosted a Team Talk that discussed multiple issues. The Team Talk included a reminder to the employees that they must avoid using their cell phones in resident-care areas. During May and June 2011, Petitioner failed to leave for her lunch breaks as scheduled and failed to return from her lunch breaks in a timely manner. Petitioner admitted she did not always maintain her lunch schedule and the evidence demonstrated that such failure had occurred more than 20 times in a 30-day period. On June 28, 2011, Respondent issued Petitioner her “second written warning” based upon her failure to comply with the Respondent's lunch break policy. However, Respondent elected not to terminate Petitioner. Petitioner was notified that any additional policy violations could result in her suspension and possible termination. Again, there was no evidence that Respondent's actions were discriminatory or a pretext for discrimination. On July 4, 2011, Nurse Jordan observed Petitioner sitting in a resident’s room while using her cell phone. The resident’s room was considered a resident-care area. At the time Ms. Jordan saw Petitioner using her cell phone, the DON was walking behind Ms. Jordan and also observed Petitioner standing up and placing the cell phone in her pocket. On July 5, 2011, Petitioner was suspended pending an investigation into her use of the cell phone since this was her fourth Category II violation in a 12-month period. Prior to making a final decision regarding Petitioner’s employment, the DON spoke with the ADON regarding the appropriate discipline. The two considered Petitioner’s disciplinary history and the previous warnings Petitioner had received as a result of her prior violations of the cell-phone-use policy. The DON also spoke with multiple individuals, including Ms. Lauletta, about Petitioner’s prior use of a cell phone in resident-care areas. At the conclusion of her investigation, the DON determined that Petitioner had violated company policies by using her cell phone in a resident-care area and that she was subject to termination because she had progressed through the company’s disciplinary policy. There was no evidence that Respondent's actions were discriminatory or a pretext for discrimination. Prior to her termination, Petitioner appeared at the facility to speak with Mary Reid, Respondent’s administrator. During the meeting, Petitioner asked to keep her job. At no point during the meeting did Petitioner notify Ms. Reid that she thought her discipline was discriminatory, report that she was being discriminated against because of her race, or assert that she was being retaliated against because of her race. Similarly, prior to her termination, Petitioner never notified any supervisor or manager that Nurse Jordan made any allegedly discriminatory statements or that Nurse Jordan discriminated against her in any way. Moreover, there was no evidence that the one statement alleged to have been made by Nurse Jordan related in any way to Petitioner's disciplinary issues. Instead, Petitioner simply claimed that her discipline was unfair. Likewise, Petitioner never complained to the DON, ADON or any other management personnel about being treated differently than other similarly situated employees because of her race. Indeed, Petitioner failed to identify any other CNAs who were not terminated after progressing through Respondent’s progressive discipline policy. Given these facts, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she was discriminated or retaliated against by Respondent. Therefore, the Petition For Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 violet.crawford@fchr.myflorida.com Cheryl Glovette Cobb 1101 West Cross Street Post Office Box 19055 Pensacola, Florida 32503 David Patrick Steffen, Esquire Constangy, Brooks and Smith, LLP 100 North Tampa Street Tampa, Florida 33601 dsteffen@constangy.com Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether Petitioner, Nu Way Drywall, LLC, was in violation of the workers' compensation requirements of Sections 440.107 and 440.38, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by failing to secure workers' compensation coverage for its subcontractors and/or employees of its subcontractors; and (2) if yes, what penalty should be assessed against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact On April 15, 2008, Germaine Green, a compliance investigator for the Department, conducted a random compliance check of a work site where an office building was under construction. The work site was located at 698 South Tamiami Trail in Osprey, Florida. During the compliance check, Ms. Green observed three men hanging metal framing for the interior walls. One of the men at the work site identified himself as Ted Webb and told Ms. Green that he was in charge of the framing work being done and that the other two men working with him were his sons. Mr. Webb told Ms. Green that his company, Ted Webb, Inc., had workers' compensation coverage through an employee leasing company, Howard Leasing. Ms. Green telephoned the leasing company and was told that the contract with Ted Webb, Inc., had been terminated or had lapsed in December 2007. Ms. Green then checked the Department's computerized database known as Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS). The information maintained in CCAS allowed Ms. Green to determine whether Mr. Webb or his sons had workers' compensation coverage or exemptions from such coverage. After checking CCAS, Ms. Green determined that Mr. Webb and his company did not have workers' compensation coverage and that Mr. Webb and his employees had no exemption from such coverage. Upon making this determination, Ms. Green issued a Stop-Work Order. Mr. Webb advised Ms. Green that Nu Way Drywall, LLC ("Nu Way"), had subcontracted with him or Ted Webb, Inc., to perform the framing services at the work site. Under Florida law, a subcontractor that does not have workers' compensation coverage becomes the "statutory employee" of the contractor that hired the subcontractor. Upon being told that Mr. Webb was working for Nu Way, Ms. Green checked CCAS to determine if that company had active workers' compensation exemptions for any of its employees. Ms. Green's review of CCAS revealed that Nu Way had an exemption for only one person, Alex Rivera, the managing member of the company. Ms. Green contacted Mr. Rivera to determine whether he had received documentation that Mr. Webb had workers' compensation coverage prior to Mr. Webb's beginning work on the Osprey project. Mr. Rivera reported that he had received information in the past that indicated that Mr. Webb had workers' compensation coverage. However, Mr. Rivera told Ms. Green that he had obtained information regarding Mr. Webb's workers' compensation coverage before Mr. Webb began work on the subject work site. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Nu Way had workers' compensation coverage through an employee leasing company, Employee Leasing Solutions. However, when Ms. Green called the leasing company, she was advised by someone with the company that Mr. Webb and his two sons were not listed on the employee roster for Nu Way. Therefore, they were not covered by Nu Way's workers' compensation coverage. Employee leasing companies provide workers' compensation coverage for their clients, but coverage is provided only to employees that the client company specifically identifies. Because Mr. Rivera could not provide proof that Mr. Webb and his sons had workers' compensation coverage pursuant to Chapter 440, Ms. Green issued a Stop-Work Order for Specific Worksite Only ("Stop-Work Order") to Nu Way on April 15, 2008. The Stop-Work Order was posted at the work site and served on Mr. Rivera on April 16, 2008. On the day that Ms. Green served the Stop-Work Order on Mr. Rivera, she also served on him a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation ("Request for Business Records"). The Request for Business Records requested that Mr. Rivera provide the business records of Nu Way to the Department so that it could determine the employer's payroll for the period of April 17, 2005, through April 16, 2008, for the calculation of the penalty provided in Subsection 440.107(7). In response to the Department's Request for Business Records Documents, Mr. Rivera provided Nu Way's business records, which included Nu Way's canceled checks. In auditing the business records, Ms. Green discovered that in addition to making payments made to Ted Webb, Inc., in 2006 and 2008, Nu Way had also made payments to two other companies that did not have valid workers' compensation coverage for their employees when they worked for Nu Way. According to its business records, Nu Way paid Santis Drywall and Construction (Santis) $36,890.00 between July 28 and August 11, 2006, and paid Hernandez Chico Drywall (Hernandez) $260,972.50 between March 17 and April 28, 2006. During the time period Nu Way made those payments to Santis and Hernandez, neither of those companies had valid workers' compensation coverage. After auditing Nu Way's business records, Ms. Green prepared a spreadsheet that included the payments made to uninsured subcontractors or companies during the relevant time period of April 17, 2005, through April 16, 2008. Ms. Green calculated the penalty by dividing the payroll for each uninsured subcontractor by 100 and then multiplied that number (the dividend) by the "approved manual rate" for drywall work for the year in question. Each product of 1/100 of the payroll and the approved manual yielded the "evaded premium" that Nu Way should have paid for each uninsured subcontractor in the years in question. The amount of the "evaded premiums" were then multiplied by 1.5 and then added together to determine the total penalty amount. Applying the formula prescribed in Subsection 440.107(7)(d), Ms. Green determined that the total penalty assessment against Nu Way was $76,215.95. On April 17, 2008, Mr. Rivera was served with the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, which showed that the total penalty assessment against Nu Way was $76,215.95. That same day, Mr. Rivera, on behalf of Nu Way, entered into an agreement with the Department to pay ten percent of the penalty assessment in one lump sum payment and to make 60 interest-free payments for the balance. After Mr. Rivera signed the agreement, the Department issued an Order of Conditional Release from the Stop- Work Order ("Order of Conditional Release"). The Order of Conditional Release allowed Nu Way to resume work at the work site, subject to his complying with the terms of the agreement. When Ms. Green served the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Mr. Rivera, she discussed the penalty assessment with him and also allowed him to review the spreadsheet for accuracy. Mr. Rivera reviewed the spreadsheet, but did not find any errors. In preparing for this hearing, Ms. Green reviewed the spreadsheet and discovered that she had mistakenly included some payments made by Nu Way. By mistakenly including certain payments on the spreadsheet, the payroll amount used to calculate the penalty assessment was higher than it should have been. After discovering the mistake discussed in paragraph 20, Ms. Green prepared a new spreadsheet, which did not include the payments that had been mistakenly included in the initial spreadsheet. Ms. Green then recalculated the penalty assessment and properly determined the corrected penalty assessment to be $72,963.77. The Department prepared a Proposed Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment showing that the correct penalty assessment for Nu Way is $72,963.77. As of the date of this proceeding, the Department had not served the Proposed Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Mr. Rivera. However, at hearing, Mr. Rivera indicated that he did not object to this amendment as it reduced the penalty assessment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order: Finding that Petitioner, Nu Way Drywall, LLC, failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation for its employees in violation of Subsections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes; and Assessing a penalty of $72,963.77 against Nu Way Drywall, LLC. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2008.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At some time prior to August of 2013, the Petitioner and Respondent discussed the Petitioner’s potential employment as a “Pharmacy Sales Representative” for the Respondent. The Respondent eventually offered such employment to the Petitioner, the terms of which were set forth in a letter (hereinafter “agreement”) from the Respondent (identified therein as “SCP, LLC” or “company”) to the Petitioner. The agreement stated as follows: Your job title will be Pharmacy Sales Representative and your duties include all aspects of sales and marketing to physicians and patients SCP, LLC can provide for. You will be responsible for producing leads and establishing new pharmacy sales as well as maintaining all existing accounts. You will report to members of SCP, LLC. You may be assigned other duties as needed and your duties may also change on reasonable notice, based on the needs of the company and your skills, as determined by the company. The agreement provided that the Petitioner would be paid an annual base salary of $45,000, and a commission “based on the total sales of compounded products sold to all accounts you are managing.” The salary was to be paid bi-weekly. The commission was to be paid quarterly. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would receive an additional $250 per month for the purposes of obtaining private health insurance, and that the additional payment would cease if a company health insurance plan became available to employees. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would also have access to an expense account, including a company credit card, and receive either a car or a paid car allowance from the Respondent. The agreement specifically provided as follows: YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY IS AT-WILL. IN OTHER WORDS, EITHER YOU OR THE COMPANY CAN TERMINATE YOUR EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE. According to the agreement, the Petitioner’s employment was to commence on September 3, 2013. Although the Petitioner was dissatisfied with the salary structure offered by the Respondent and believed that the offer was below her market value, the Petitioner signed the agreement on August 1, 2013, and accepted the employment terms set forth therein. The Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with her income was a continuing issue during her employment. The Petitioner repeatedly requested that her base salary be increased, but the Respondent was unprofitable and was unwilling to agree to the Petitioner’s request. Although the Petitioner initially developed some marketing materials for the Respondent, the Respondent was not satisfied with the Petitioner’s overall job performance. Additionally, there appears to have been disagreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent as to the responsibilities of her employment, including continuing friction between the Petitioner and her supervisor. On several occasions, the supervisor requested that the Petitioner come into the office during working hours to meet with him. The Petitioner apparently believed that her time was better utilized meeting with prospective clients; however, some of the prospective clients sought products that, for a variety of reasons, the Respondent could not supply. In any event, rather than come into the office as requested by her supervisor, the Petitioner chose to communicate with him by “after hours” email or by telephone. The supervisor was dissatisfied by the Petitioner’s failure to comply with his request. At some point in December of 2013, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner’s performance was not satisfactory and that a change needed to occur. The Petitioner was advised of the Respondent’s dissatisfaction in a meeting on December 5, 2013, between the Petitioner and a representative of the Respondent. After being advised that some type of change was going to occur, the Petitioner raised a number of complaints about her supervisor. The Petitioner complained that the supervisor used profanity, that he had hung up on her during a telephone call, and that, on one occasion, he had patted her on the head in an apparently demeaning manner. The Respondent had a written “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment. The policy prohibited any form of retaliation against an employee who complained that he or she was a target of harassment. The Respondent also had a written “open door” policy that provided a specific procedure for resolving employment-related disputes. The Petitioner was specifically advised of such policies during an orientation process that occurred at the commencement of her employment with the Respondent. Additionally, the Petitioner received written copies of all relevant policies from the Respondent’s human resource director. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 5, 2013, that her employment was in jeopardy, the Petitioner advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she objected to the supervisor’s alleged behavior. After the meeting on December 5, the Petitioner wrote an email to company officials dated December 17, 2013, wherein she asserted that she had “closed” a number of accounts on behalf of the Respondent, and suggested that her contribution to the company was being undervalued. She also requested reevaluation of her compensation because she believed the commission structure was inadequate. The Respondent apparently disagreed with the Petitioner because few actual sales resulted from the Petitioner’s “closed” accounts. Accordingly, during a meeting with Respondent’s representatives on December 20, 2013, the Petitioner was advised that her employment was officially being terminated. Central to the Respondent’s decision was the lack of revenue generated by the Petitioner’s sales and the unprofitability of the company. The Petitioner’s failure to comply with the requests of her supervisor also provided a basis for her termination from employment. During the meeting on December 20, the Petitioner restated the complaints she had first addressed during the meeting on December 5, and raised a number of additional complaints, including allegations of harassment or sexual harassment by her supervisor or another employee. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 20, 2013, that her employment was being terminated, the Petitioner had advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she had been harassed in any manner by her supervisor or by any other employee of the Respondent. The alleged perpetrators of the harassment dispute the Petitioner’s assertions. The evidence fails to establish that any of the alleged acts of harassment or sexual harassment actually occurred. In a memorandum to the Petitioner dated December 20, 2013, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that her termination package would include salary payments for three weeks (one week of “final” pay and two weeks of severance pay), additional payment for 27 hours of accrued paid time off and unused comp time, and a total commission payment of $31.97. By letter to the Respondent dated December 27, 2013, the Petitioner restated the alleged harassment referenced herein and requested that she receive an additional two weeks of severance pay. The Respondent ultimately paid the Petitioner a total of four weeks of severance pay. The evidence fails to establish that the termination of the Petitioner’s employment by the Respondent was related to any complaint of harassment or sexual harassment, or was retaliatory in any manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Cheyanne Michelle Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Christina Harris Schwinn, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Antonios Poulos, Esquire Poulos Law Firm 1502 West Busch Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent at a boys' detention center in Hillsborough County when he was accused by a resident thereof of having physically abused him. The matter was reported to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' Abuse Register and, thereafter, Petitioner requested a hearing under Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on the Department's denial of his request to amend or expunge the report of abuse. A formal hearing was thereafter held on the matter before the undersigned who, on January 10, 1994, entered a Recommended Order to the effect that the abuse report be amended and closed without classification, since the evidence presented at the hearing did not establish that Petitioner has abused the resident. This Recommended was subsequently sustained by the Secretary who, in his Final Order dated July 7, 1994, so ordered. Thereafter, Respondent's counsel sought reimbursement for the attorney's fees and costs expended by Respondent under the provisions of Section 111.07, Florida Statutes. In response, the Hillsborough County Attorney concluded that Petitioner was not a permanent County employee but a relief employee, and, thereby, was not entitled to reimbursement. By Petition dated September 28, 1994, a copy of which was not forwarded to a representative of the Board of County Commissioners or any representative of Hillsborough County, Petitioner now seeks reimbursement in the amount of $1,500.00 for attorney's fees and such other relief as the "Court" may deem fit and proper. By Order to Show Cause dated November 28, 1994, the undersigned directed counsel for Petitioner to advise the undersigned in writing by December 10, 1994, of the jurisdictional basis for its claim against the Board of County Commissioners before the Division. No response has been forthcoming.
The Issue Whether respondent committed the violations alleged in paragraphs 3(b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Kinder Kastle Day Care Center (Kinder Kastle), located in Bradenton, Florida, is licensed to operate as a child day care facility under Chapter 402, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10M-12, Florida Administrative Code. On June 17, 1987, and on July 17, 1987, Kinder Kastle was inspected by Laura D. Winfrey to determine whether Kinder Kastle was in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 402, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10M-12, Florida Administrative Code. When Ms. Winfrey inspected Kinder Kastle on June 17, 1987, there was one staff person in the room with 10 babies between one year and 18 months old. On July 17, 1987, when Ms. Winfrey reinspected the facility, there was one staff person responsible for nine babies between the ages of one year and 18 months. The staff person present in the room advised Ms. Winfrey of the children's ages. During the inspection of June 17, 1987, Ms. Winfrey noted that the exit lights were not turned on. At the time of reinspection on July 17, 1987, the exit lights still were not lit. However, the rooms where the exit lights were located had windows. Therefore, because the facility was only used during the daytime, the exit lights were visible even when they were not turned on and the regular lighting was off. Ms. Pillsbury, the respondent, testified that she had attempted to have the exit lights fixed in early July, so they would be continuously lit, but due to equipment that had to be ordered and other difficulties, the lights were not permanently turned on until October of 1987. During both inspections, Ms. Winfrey noted that respondent was using two different types of baby gates to block interior doorways. Ms. Winfrey considered that one of the gates was unsafe because it was not approved by the Consumer Product Safety Board. 1/ The gate had a bar and clip type mechanism and had to be moved to the side to allow exit from the room. Ms. Winfrey remembered seeing a bulletin from the Consumer Product Safety Board regarding that particular type of gate; however, she could not remember what was in the bulletin concerning the gate. Ms. Winfrey felt that the gate might be a hazard because it is not permanently attached to the wall. If it were removed from the doorway and set aside, Ms. Winfrey felt that the gate could fall and injure a child. The "approved" gate is of latticed design, consisting of hinged wood slats. The gate is permanently attached to one side of the door and opens and shuts in accordion fashion. Because of the manner of opening and closing, it is very easy for children to get their fingers pinched in the gate. The slats in the accordion gate are not as sturdy as those in the other gate and are more easily broken. There was no competent evidence presented to establish that the accordion gate was safer or more effective than the other gate respondent was using. When Ms. Winfrey inspected the facility on both occasions, she requested random samples of children's files to determine whether they contain the information required. On June 17, 1987, none of the files contained statements outlining respondent's disciplinary policies signed by the children's parents. On July 17, 1987, Ms. Winfrey inspected four files from each age group, and only four of the files had disciplinary policy statements signed by the children's parents. Ms. Pillsbury stated that of the files checked on the second visit, many of the children had not been back to the day care center since the first inspection. However, Ms. Pillsbury picked the files to be inspected by Ms. Winfrey. Ms. Pillsbury stated that all parents did get a copy of a disciplinary statement; however, there was nothing in the files documenting that this had been done. Respondent did not dispute the allegation that she failed to submit a fingerprint card, affidavit of good moral character and Abuse Registry Form within the required time frames in violation of Section 402.3055(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10M-12.002(1)(b)2. and (1)(e), Florida Administrative Code. On June 17, 1987, Ms. Winfrey advised Ms. Pillsbury of the violations she observed and informed Ms. Pillsbury that the violations needed to be corrected by July 17, 1987, when the facility would be reinspected. Kinder Kastle has been cited for violations on previous occasions and has paid an administrative fine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that respondent violated Rule 10M-12.002(1)(b)2. and (1)(e), Florida Administrative Code, Rule 10M- 12.002(5)(a)1., Florida Administrative Code, and Rule 10M-12.008(2)(f)2., Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in paragraphs 3(a), (b), and (e) of the Administrative Complaint; dismissing the charges set forth in paragraphs 3(c) and (d) of the Administrative Complaint; and imposing a total administrative fine of $135 to be assessed as follows: $30 for the Class III violation, $30 for the Other violation, and $75 for the Class II violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1988.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2014),1/ by failing to secure the payment of workers’ compensation as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for the enforcement of the workers’ compensation insurance coverage requirements established in chapter 440. On June 1, 2015, Investigator Abedrabbo conducted a random workers' compensation compliance check at 11422 North 56th Street, Tampa, Florida 33617. During the course of the compliance check, Investigator Abedrabbo observed two individuals installing a stone façade on a building that was under construction at the identified address. It is undisputed that the two individuals observed by Investigator Abedrabbo were, at the time of observation, employed by Respondent. In support of its 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the Department prepared a penalty calculation worksheet showing a total penalty owed of $17,274.30.3/ Respondent does not challenge the accuracy or method of calculating the assessed penalty, but only asserts that the penalty is “too high” and the company cannot afford to pay it.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Cortes Pre Cast Stone and Foam Corp, violated the provisions of chapter 440 by failing to secure the payment of workers’ compensation and assessing against Respondent a penalty in the amount of $17,274.30. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been subjected to discrimination within the meaning of the relevant provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon alleged sexual harassment in the course of her employment and retaliation for her complaints concerning the alleged sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent at times pertinent hereto. It is undisputed that that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and that timeliness and jurisdictional requirements have been met. The Respondent obtained a contract with the United States Navy for a project to be performed at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. It became the contractor for the project in approximately December of 1991. The contract, in pertinent part, provided that the Respondent would provide local cartage trucking services for the Navy on and in the environs of the Pensacola Naval Air Station. The project involved loading and transportation of aircraft parts and related supplies and equipment. The Petitioner was hired as a truck driver, delivering aircraft parts for the naval aviation depot (NADEP). During the course of that employment, there came a time when the Petitioner contended that she had been discriminated against because of her gender. The Petitioner contends that in a meeting in December of 1991, she was told by Terry Meyers, an employee of the Respondent and the Petitioner's supervisor, that she "didn't look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to look for another job. The meeting in which the statements were allegedly made was a meeting called by the Petitioner's supervisor and the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis, to address certain deficiencies in the Petitioner's performance. Another employee, Mr. Braughton, was also counseled at the meeting concerning his performance as a truck driver. His was the same type of employment position as that occupied by the Petitioner. Mr. Braughton is a white male. The Petitioner maintains that she informed a white male employee, Mike Morris, of the statements allegedly made at the meeting and that he immediately made a telephone call to Mr. Frank Moody, the president of the corporation, to put the president and the corporation on notice of sexual discrimination against the Petitioner. The Petitioner, however, was not present when Mr. Morris made that telephone call to Mr. Moody. Even had he made reference to alleged sexual discrimination in his telephone call to Mr. Moody, Mr. Morris only learned of the purported sexually-discriminatory statements from the Petitioner. The Petitioner maintained that Mr. Morris informed her that he had heard the statements made while standing at the door of the room in which the meeting occurred and that Mr. Morris initiated the telephone call on his own volition to Mr. Moody, based upon hearing those statements. Mr. Morris, however, testified to the contrary, stating that the Petitioner approached him and claimed that she was on probation and was fearful of being laid off from employment and that the Petitioner told him of the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements and that he did not hear them himself. He further testified that the Petitioner instructed him to contact Mr. Moody concerning her fears about her job and the alleged discriminatory statements or she would contact "HRO and EEO and have the contract shut down". Mr. Morris, indeed, called Mr. Moody but never mentioned the statements alleged by the Petitioner to have been made to her by Mr. Meyers during the performance evaluation meeting. In fact, it has been demonstrated by Mr. Morris' testimony, which the Hearing Officer accepts as more credible, that the Petitioner never complained to Mr. Morris about a sexually-discriminatory statement or purported sexual discrimination. Mr. Morris, instead, spoke to Mr. Moody about problems he saw occurring in the operation in Pensacola which he attributed to the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis. He told Mr. Moody that Mr. Francis was allowing employees to leave work early without Mr.. Moody's knowledge and still crediting them with working a full day on such occasions which, in effect, cost the corporation additional salary monies which were unearned. The meeting in which the Petitioner was allegedly confronted with the statement that she did not look like a truck driver and had three weeks to look for another job was called and conducted by Mr. Francis and Mr. Meyers was present. It is undisputed that Mr. Moody terminated Mr. Francis shortly after the telephone conversation with Mr. Morris. He replaced Mr. Francis with the current project manager, John Jacobs. Mr. Moody testified that in a telephone conversation with the Petitioner that she never mentioned to him the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements referenced above. Instead, he was told by both Mr. Morris and the Petitioner that she was concerned that she might lose her job because of the results of the meeting with Mr. Francis, in which he told her that she needed to improve her job performance. In fact, the management of the Respondent perceived a genuine job performance problem involving the Petitioner's conduct of her job duties. This was disclosed in the testimony of both Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Morris, where it was revealed that the Petitioner had had a continuing problem performing her job correctly and that Mr. Morris and the management personnel had worked with her constantly during the course of her employment term with the Respondent, taking more time and personal attention with her than with other employees. This was done in order to repetitively explain her job duties and give her additional chances to improve her work performance, in comparison to the lesser degree of attention and remedial help that they accorded other employees. Prior to February 3, 1993, the Petitioner had been employed with the Respondent for over a year. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs established, however, that even though her probationary period had long since elapsed, he still considered the Petitioner to be, in effect, an employee in training because she was deficient in correctly accomplishing all of the duties of her job. She was slow in performing her job duties, including preventive maintenance inspections of her vehicle and in making the "pickups and deliveries" of freight she was required to transport on her truck in the performance of her duties. The counseling session concerning her work performance occurring in December of 1991, referenced above, was during her probationary period. The white male employee, Mr. Rick Braughton, who was also counseled about deficient work performance on that occasion, was informed that he might not remain employed past his probationary period unless his performance improved. The Respondent had a regular practice and procedure, as part of its truck safety and preventive maintenance program, that employees, who were drivers, were required to give a preventive maintenance and safety inspection of their vehicles each day prior to leaving the company facility or terminal to transport aviation parts or other freight. This was regarded as crucial to proper job performance by the employer because of the concern about safety of the drivers and avoidance of damage, and liability for damage, to the expensive equipment and parts which the Respondent was required by its contract to transport, such as expensive military aircraft parts and related equipment. Among these preventive maintenance inspection duties that driver/employees, such as the Petitioner, were required to perform daily was the requirement to check the air in the truck tires and "top off" the tires with the required air pressure, if necessary. 10 Mr. Jacobs established that there came a time when the Petitioner was noted to have failed on multiple occasions, in the same week, to check and air her tires. Finally, upon this deficiency coming to his attention again on February 3, 1993, Mr. Jacobs suspended the Petitioner for a day without pay, for failing to check and air her tires. The Petitioner claims that she was the only employee singled out for this treatment concerning failure to inspect and air her tires. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs is deemed more credible, having observed the candor and demeanor of all of the witnesses, and it is determined that the employer had a good-faith belief that the Petitioner was deficient in this regard and that the reprimand, consisting of the one-day suspension, was justified. It was not demonstrated that, even if the Petitioner's version of events is true and that other driver/employees were not disciplined for failure to air their tires, that such a circumstance occurred as a result of the employer's knowledge of other driver/employees failing to air their tires and arbitrarily choosing not to discipline them. In fact, it was not demonstrated by preponderant, non-self-serving evidence that other employees had not been disciplined for failure to air their tires. In fact, it was not shown, other than by the self-serving testimony of the Petitioner, that other employees had failed to air their tires when required. The other drivers are mostly male, but one is a female. There was no showing that she was treated any differently than the male drivers. In summary, it has been established that the employer accorded the reprimand to the Petitioner because of a good-faith belief that her performance had been deficient, on repeated occasions, in this respect. It is undisputed that prior to the date the Petitioner received the reprimand, consisting of one-day suspension without pay, that the Petitioner had a generally good attitude about her job insofar as management was able to observe. Even though management had had some concerns about her performance and the slow manner in which she was learning certain aspects of her job, with resulting deficient effects upon her performance, management forbore from using these concerns to reduce her performance rating. She received good evaluations of her performance, insofar as her personnel record is concerned, prior to the time she was suspended for one day on February 3, 1993. After the Petitioner received the suspension she developed a "bad attitude" insofar as her perception of management was concerned. She began to complain frequently about vehicle safety or purported concerns she had about the condition of her vehicle related to safety, particularly the truck brakes. Prior to her suspension, she had never complained in this regard. Management also perceived that she appeared to show down her work performance and management came to believe that it was an intentional delay of her work performance on an ongoing basis. Prior to receiving the reprimand, she was never known to complain to management concerning discrimination on account of her gender. She had never informed the project manager or any other supervisory personnel concerning her purported belief that employee Meyers was "following her". Only after she received the reprimand on February 3, 1993 did she elect to file a sexual discrimination charge with the Commission. Mr. Meyers had some supervisory authority over the Petitioner. His job duties also required that he drive his truck around the Naval Air Station and the immediate vicinity in the normal performance of his duties. This circumstance resulted in his being in close proximity to the Petitioner during the course of their respective work days. He contends that he was not purposely following her for the purpose of harassing her. The overall evidence of record reveals, however, that he, indeed, did follow or stop in her vicinity on a number of occasions to observe her work performance. This was not shown to be out of the ordinary scope of his supervisory duties, especially because of management's concern that the Petitioner was not progressing in the learning and performance of her job duties as well as other employees, including the other female driver. The project manager, Mr. Jacobs, felt that the Petitioner's attitude continued to decline after the February 3, 1993 reprimand. He felt that her attitude and performance reached its lowest level on the date she was observed to be loading "unauthorized equipment" (apparently a portion of a helicopter assembly weighing approximately 4,000 pounds) on the flatbed trailer of her assigned work truck. She was not authorized to load that equipment and apparently, according to her testimony, she did so in order to provide a substantial amount of weight on her trailer for the purpose of having her brakes inspected by the quality assurance official for the project. She went to an unauthorized area for approximately one hour to have this inspection performed without the approval of the Respondent's management. Further, it was not necessary, in order to evaluate the brakes on the vehicle for proper function and safety, to have the weight of the unauthorized load placed on the trailer. If, indeed, the brakes had been defective, it would have been entirely possible that the expensive aircraft parts she had placed on the trailer without authorization could have been substantially damaged, the truck or other property could have been damaged, and, indeed, the Petitioner or other persons could have been injured. Additionally, the Petitioner misrepresented the reason she was in the unauthorized area where she had her brakes inspected by Mr. Lett, the quality assurance officer. In this connection, because she had begun to complain repeatedly about the condition of her brakes and her vehicle (after her reprimand), the project manager, Mr. Jacobs, had had certain other employees come in on several occasions at approximately 6:00 a.m., before normal working hours, and before the Petitioner arrived on the job site, to inspect the Petitioner's truck for safety and appropriate preventive maintenance purposes. These employees were not informed that it was the Petitioner's truck they were inspecting at the time they were told to do the inspections. The Respondent was attempting to ascertain the true condition of the Petitioner's truck and determine whether her reports concerning safety problems, particularly with her brakes, were accurate or not. In fact, on the morning of the day when the unauthorized load was placed on the truck and the Petitioner had Mr. Lett perform the inspection of her brakes at the unauthorized area, one of the Petitioner's co-employees had inspected her brakes before she arrived to take custody of her truck that morning. He had determined that the brakes were operating properly. The Petitioner and Mr. Lett apparently felt that the brakes were deficient when they were inspected early in the afternoon of that day. The record does not reveal whether the brakes were deficient when Mr. Lett inspected them or that some change in the adjustment of the brakes or other problem had arisen since the employee inspected them early that morning and found them to be in proper operating order. Be that as it may, management was of the belief on that day and prior thereto that the Petitioner, although reporting brake deficiency problems, did not truly experience such brake deficiency problems with her truck. This belief was based upon management perceptions concerning the Petitioner's attitude after her reprimand and upon the independent, confidential inspections management had other employees do on the Petitioner's truck. Accordingly, whether its belief was accurate or not, management was of the good-faith belief, on the date she was observed loading unauthorized, expensive equipment onto the flatbed truck, in an unnecessary fashion, for the purpose of having her brakes inspected, while being absent from her work assignment for one hour in an unauthorized area, that it had performance-related reasons to terminate her, which it did. This decision was made against the background of the increasingly poor attitude displayed by the Petitioner since her reprimand and because of the continuing problems management had experienced with the Petitioner's job performance since her initial employment one and one- half years previously. Although the Petitioner testified that as early as December of 1991, the management of the Respondent had spoken with her regarding her work performance and she interpreted that meeting as an attack on her gender and not upon her poor work habits, this contention was not verified by any other testimony. Having observed the candor and demeanor of the Petitioner versus that of the other witnesses, it is determined that her testimony is less creditable because of its self-serving nature. Although the Petitioner testified that a comment was made that "she did not look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to find another job, this was not verified through testimony of any other witness. To the extent that any other witnesses testified concerning these statements being made in a belief that discrimination had been exhibited toward the Petitioner, the evidence reveals that this information only came to these people through self-serving reports by the Petitioner herself. Meyers directly contradicts that these statements were made to the Petitioner and he states that he never heard anyone tell her that she had three weeks to look for a job or that she "didn't look like a truck driver". The petitioner provided no testimony or evidence which could show how these alleged statements constituted "sexual discrimination" or how the statements related to her sexual discrimination claim. It was not shown that any member of management, with employment-decision authority, made or condoned such statements even if it had been established that they evidenced gender-based discrimination, which was not done. The Petitioner did not complain of sexual discrimination per se until after she had received a reprimand from management. Likewise, she began to repetitively claim that her equipment was unsafe after the reprimand. The Petitioner may have been overly sensitive to management's concern for safety inspections of her truck because of being reprimanded for safety violations and was afraid she would "get into trouble" with management if she did not constantly report feared safety problems. The fact was established, however, that management had a genuine, good-faith belief that it was being harassed by these repetitive, unsafe equipment reports by the Petitioner, given the then- prevailing atmosphere surrounding the Petitioner's employment, characterized by her less than satisfactory attitude, as perceived by management, and the fact that management's confidential inspections of her equipment did not reveal any safety problems of the type reported by the Petitioner. Finally, it is especially noteworthy that during this period of time when the Petitioner made the claim of sexual discrimination and retaliation based upon her claim, that the Respondent had in its employ, in an identical job position, a female truck driver who had had no unsatisfactory experience by management with her performance, was not subjected to investigative or disciplinary measures, and who is still satisfactorily employed with the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the petition herein in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1459 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact which are not in separately-numbered, discrete paragraphs. The paragraphs contain some proposed findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and some which are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the same subject matter. The proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are intertwined with argument and discussions of the weight of the evidence or testimony. Because the paragraphs in the proposed findings of fact contain both findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and which the Hearing Officer rejects, discrete, specific rulings thereon are not practicable. It suffices to say that all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are subordinate to, but have been considered and addressed in the findings of fact portion of this Recommended Order and have been in that fashion completely ruled upon. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The same considerations are true of the Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Some portions of the findings of fact proposed by the Respondent consist of merely discussions and argument concerning the weight of the evidence and some are acceptable to the Hearing Officer based upon the Hearing Officer's determination of the weight and credibility of the testimony and evidence. Some are rejected as being unnecessary or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact made on the same subject matter. Here, again, this Recommended Order completely and adequately addresses the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, and the Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted to the extent they are not inconsistent with those made by the Hearing Officer and to the extent they are inconsistent therewith, they are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence or as being immaterial, unnecessary, or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry W. McCleary, Esquire 3 West Garden Street Suite 380 Pensacola, FL 32501 Donna Gardner, Esquire 213 South Alcaniz Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
