The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race and/or disability by terminating his employment in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent manufactures rubber hoses for the automotive industry. Petitioner is a black male who began working for Respondent on February 17, 1999. Petitioner's job as a molder required him to work with his hands and arms pinning rubber hoses onto metal pins and removing the hoses from the pins after they cooled down. The job was dangerous and physically stressful to Petitioner's hands and wrists. After working for Respondent for approximately three months, Petitioner suffered a job-related injury. Respondent sent Petitioner to a physician who diagnosed Petitioner as having sprained hand and wrist muscles. The physician prescribed anti-inflammatory medicine for Petitioner and recommended that he return to work on light duty. For the next several months, Petitioner worked as a molder in an area of Respondent's plant that caused less physical stress on the muscles and ligaments in Petitioner's hands and wrists. Petitioner had no problems working in that area. In time, Respondent began to experience a decrease in the number and type of orders that it received from its customers. The change in demand for Respondent's products resulted in a reorganization of the production line, a smaller number of available positions, and in some cases, layoffs of employees. Eventually, Respondent moved Petitioner's work station back to his original position which was physically more stressful. After a couple of months, Petitioner suffered another work-related injury. Respondent told Petitioner that he would have to continue working as assigned because there was no other work or lighter duty available. Petitioner continued to work in the more physically stressful area of Respondent's plant. On one occasion, Respondent took Petitioner to the hospital because he was experiencing pain. Petitioner did not go back to work until he saw a physician who specialized in treating Petitioner's type of injury. Petitioner eventually was diagnosed as having bi- lateral carpel tunnel syndrome. The doctor recommended that Petitioner work on light duty until he could have surgery. Respondent accommodated Petitioner's needs by allowing him to work on light duty pending the proposed surgery. Respondent has a substance abuse policy to maintain a work place that is free from the use of illegal drugs and the use of alcohol. The policy provides for assistance for employees who develop an addiction to drugs or alcohol and who voluntarily seek assistance before the company has knowledge of the problem. If an employee tests positive for illegal drugs or alcohol use while on the job, the employee is subject to immediate termination. Respondent's substance abuse policy provides for drug and alcohol screening under the following circumstances: after any injury that requires outside medical attention; after any incident that results in damage to other associates, company property, or a pattern of personal injuries; upon observance of abnormal or erratic behavior while at work or a significant deterioration in work performance; upon reasonable suspicion due to observable phenomena, direct observation of use, or a report of use by a reliable and credible source; and (e) pursuant to random drug screening. Petitioner never tested positive for illegal drugs or alcohol use while he was working for Respondent. He never even went to work under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol. However, on August 22, 2000, Petitioner voluntarily advised Respondent that that he had a substance abuse problem and that he desired to participate in the assistance referral program. On August 23, 2000, Petitioner met with Respondent's human resource manager and occupational nurse. The nurse reviewed the company's substance abuse policy and assistance referral program with Petitioner. Additionally. the nurse advised Petitioner as follows: (a) he would have to enroll in a treatment program; (b) he would have to provide Respondent with weekly letters from the treatment program, furnishing information about Petitioner's progress in the program; and (c) he would be subject to random drug screens for two years. The human resource manager advised Petitioner that he would be discharged if he failed to comply with and successfully complete the treatment program. Petitioner indicated that he understood Respondent's requirements for participation in the assistance referral program. Petitioner elected to enroll in an outpatient substance abuse treatment program sponsored by Marion Citrus Mental Health. Petitioner missed his first appointment at the treatment center because he lacked transportation. Petitioner eventually began attending the treatment program three nights a week. He continued to work light duty at Respondent's plant during the day. Petitioner did not furnish Respondent with documentation showing that he had enrolled in the substance abuse treatment program. Instead, Petitioner advised Respondent's occupational nurse that he had signed a release at Marion Citrus Mental Health so that she could call his mental health counselor to verify his attendance in the program. Meanwhile, Respondent continued to reorganize and downsize its operations. When there were more employees restricted to light duty than light duty positions available, Respondent assisted the employees in filing workers' compensation claims and allowed them to stay at home on medical leave for up to 12 weeks. In time, Respondent could no longer accommodate Petitioner's physical injury with a light duty position. Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim and began staying at home on medical leave on September 11, 2000. On September 11, 2000, Respondent's occupational nurse called Petitioner's mental health counselor at Marion Citrus Mental Health. The nurse learned that Petitioner had kept an appointment at the mental health facility on September 7, 2000. The nurse also learned that Petitioner had not signed a release of information form that would allow the counselor to share any other information about Petitioner's treatment program. On September 12, 2000, Respondent's occupational nurse sent Petitioner a letter. The purpose of the letter was to remind Petitioner that he was required to furnish Respondent with a written statement from the substance abuse treatment facility each week. According to the letter, the written statement was supposed to include Petitioner's treatment plan schedule. The letter advised Petitioner that to remain employed, he would have to keep Respondent fully informed about his progress in and completion of the treatment program. On September 14, 2000, Petitioner called Respondent's occupational nurse to advise her that he could not keep his appointment at Marion Citrus Mental Health that week. Petitioner advised the nurse that he was taking medication that made him dizzy and that he had transportation problems, which made it difficult for him to attend the treatment program. On September 15, Petitioner went to Respondent's plant to see the occupational nurse. Because he claimed that he had not received the letter dated September 12, 2000, the nurse read the letter to him and gave him a copy of it. Once again the nurse explained Respondent's assistance referral program to Petitioner, advising him that Respondent would not tolerate future missed appointments at Marion Citrus Mental Health. The nurse also gave Petitioner a rapid drug screen, the result of which was negative. On November 15, 2000, Respondent sent Petitioner another letter regarding his failure to furnish Respondent with evidence of his attendance at and completion of a treatment program. The letter advised Petitioner that he had to furnish the information on or before November 27, 2000, or risk having his employment terminated. Petitioner received Respondent's November 15, 2000, letter but did not furnish Respondent with the requested information. Petitioner did not call Respondent to explain his failure to do so. In a letter dated November 27, 2000, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was discharged. Petitioner furnished Respondent with a letter dated December 4, 2000, from Marion Citrus Mental Health. The letter states that Petitioner had been enrolled in substance abuse outpatient counseling beginning August 31, 2000, and that he was progressing well. There is no evidence that Respondent applied its substance abuse policy to non-minority employees differently than it did to Petitioner or other minority employees. Additionally, there is no evidence that Respondent treated non-minority employees who had workers' compensation claims differently than it treated Petitioner or other minority employees who were home on medical leave due to a workers' compensation injury. In fact, Petitioner admitted during the hearing that he had no proof that Respondent discriminated against him based on his race. During the relevant time period, Respondent had approximately 52 employees (half black and half white) that suffered a workers' compensation injury. Employees with workers' compensation injuries were allowed to remain on family medical leave for 12 weeks. Employees who returned to work within the 12-week period were guaranteed a job. Subsequent to the 12-week period, employees with workers' compensation injuries were not officially terminated unless they were unable to return to work after 12 months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ray Mayo 708 Southwest Second Street Ocala, Florida 34471 Kade Spencer Dayco Products, Inc. 3100 Southeast Maricamp Road Ocala, Florida 34471 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Harbour Shores Hospital is a 60-bed short-term psychiatric facility, with 36 adult beds and 24 adolescent beds. The facility opened in October 1985, and had an occupancy of 62 percent at the time of the final hearing in March 1986. T. 14, 20. The hospital is an integral part of Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc., located in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and Lawnwood is owned by Hospital Corporation of America. T. 13-14. Hospital Corporation of America now operates 5,000 psychiatric beds in the United States. T. 18. Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. (Lawnwood), submitted an application for certificate of need number 3363 on June 14, 1984, for the conversion of 12 short-term psychiatric beds to 12 short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds. T. 15. No construction is needed to convert these 12 beds. T. 16. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) initially denied the application. T. 106. All references in this order to Harbour Shores Hospital shall include the Petitioner, Lawnwood, unless specifically stated otherwise. The parties stipulated that the only issue in this case is need and any ancillary issue which is based upon need. T. 4-5. HRS has a rule governing short and long-term hospital inpatient hospital substance abuse beds, which is rule 10-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Subparagraph (f)1 of the rule contains what HRS calls bed allocations" and calculates need for a health service district as a whole. Harbour Shores Hospital is located in St. Lucie County in Health District IX. District IX is composed of St. Lucie, Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, and Palm Beach Counties. HRS Ex. 2, p.7. The District IX Local Health Council has identified two subdistricts for purposes of allocating short term psychiatric and substance abuse beds. Subdistrict 1 is St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties, and subdistrict 2 is Palm Beach County. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 7; T. 110. HRS proposes to determine need as of January 1989 using the date of the application as the starting point for the five year period specified in rule 10- 5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 107-6. The basis of this decision is a new policy by HRS to implement the Gulf Court decision. There is a need for only 1 additional short-term substance abuse bed in District IX by January 1989 based upon Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 109. HRS Exhibit 1. HRS proposes also to refer to such need for short term substance abuse beds as indicated by local health council plans, relying upon rule 10- 5.11(27)(h)3, Florida Administrative Code. T. 110. The local health plan for District IX allocates needed beds based upon the subdistricts described above. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 6. Further, the local health plan has adopted the method of HRS found in rule 10-5.11(27), supra, for calculating need, and calculates such need using the HRS rule factor of .06 substance 3. All references in this order to Harbour Shores Hospital shall include the Petitioner, Lawnwood, unless specifically stated otherwise. The parties stipulated that the only issue in this case is need and any ancillary issue which is based upon need. T. 4-5. HRS has a rule governing short and long term hospital inpatient hospital-substance abuse beds, which is Rule 10-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Subparagraph (f)1 of the rule contains what HRS calls bed "allocations" and calculates need for a health service district as a whole. Harbour Shores Hospital is located in St. Lucie County in Health District IX. District IX is composed of St. Lucie, Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, and Palm Beach Counties. HRS Ex. 2, p.7. The District IX Local Health Council has identified two subdistricts for purposes of allocating short-term psychiatric and substance abuse beds. Subdistrict 1 is St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties, and subdistrict 2 is Palm Beach County. HRS Exhibit 2, p.7; T. 110. HRS proposes to determine need as of January 1989 using the date of the application as the starting point for the five-year period specified in Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 107-8. The basis of this decision is a new policy by HRS to implement the Gulf Court decision. There is a need for only 1 additional short-term substance abuse bed in District IX by January 1989 based upon Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 109. Exhibit 1. HRS proposes also to refer to such need for short term substance abuse beds as indicated by local health council plans, relying upon rule 10- 5.11(27)(h)3, Florida Administrative Code. T. 110. The local health plan for District IX allocates needed beds based upon the subdistricts described above. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 6. Further, the local health plan has adopted the method of HRS found in rule 10-5.11(27), supra, for calculating need, and calculates such need using the HRS rule factor of .06 substance abuse beds per 1,000 population in each of the two subdistricts. HRS Exhibit 2, pp. 5 and 8, paragraph II. Using current estimates of the populations of each subdistrict in January 1909, HRS projects that subdistrict 1 will have a surplus of 15 substance abuse beds in 1989, and all net need (16 beds) will be in subdistrict 2, which is Palm Beach County. T. 111; HRS Exhibit 1. HRS has not adopted these subdistricts by rule. T. 128-29. There was no evidence to substantiate the reasonableness of the subdistricts adopted in the local health plan. T. 131. The following is a summary of the existing and approved short-term substance abuse beds in District IX, showing county of location, and occupancy rates for 1985: Humana Hospital 16 Licensed Indian River 8509 Sebastian Lake Hospital 16 Licensed Palm Beach 3558 Palm Beaches Fair Oaks 17 Licensed Palm Beach 3807 Savannas 20 Approved St. Lucie Hospital Beds Status County Patient Days Occupancy 145.7% 60.7% 60.7% The number of patient days at Fair Oaks, however, is for four months, August, October, November, and December 1985. Thus, the actual number of patient days, 1269, has been multiplied by 3 to obtain an estimate for an entire year. T. 23- 24, 61-62. The occupancy rate is the number of patient days divided by the product of the number of days in the year (365) and the number of licensed beds. Using the statistics in paragraph 10, the average occupancy rate for the three existing facilities in District IX was 88.8 percent. If one assumes, as did Petitioner's expert, that the utilization rates for short-term substance abuse beds will at least remain the same as in 1935, with the addition of the 20 new beds at Savannas Hospital, District IX may have an occupancy rate of 63.8 percent and subdistrict 1 may have an occupancy rate of 64.8 percent . The 20 new beds at the Savannas Hospital are those granted to Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc., and are projected to open in November 1986. T. 83. As discussed above, Harbour Shores Hospital had been in operation about five months by the time of the March 1986 hearing, and its 60 short term psychiatric beds were averaging 62 percent occupancy, which is about 15 percent above the occupancy projected in its certificate of need application. T. 38. Harbour Shores serves patients from the four counties of subdistrict 1, St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee, and serves a significant number of patients from Palm Beach County as well; three to four percent of its patients also come from Brevard and Broward Counties. T. 19. About 80 percent of the patients at Harbour Shores in the first five months of its operation had a substance abuse problem secondary to the primary diagnosis of mental illness. T. 30, 50, 63. This is consistent with experience throughout Florida. T. 63. Most of these "dually diagnosed" patients have been through a detoxification program before entering Harbour Shores Hospital. T. 30. In its beginning months of operation, Harbour Shores has had patients referred from the courts, law enforcement agencies, community and social agencies, physicians, and from HRS. T. 21-22, 59. Harbour Shores can expect to obtain substance abuse referrals from these agencies. Staff at Harbour Shores works with the DWI Board, Students Against Drunk Driving, and school administrative personnel. T. 39-40. In October and November 1985, Harbour Shores received 38 requests from physicians, the courts, law enforcement agencies, and social agencies, for admission of patients for substance abuse treatment. T. 22, 49. There is no evidence that Harbour Shores had any such requests in December 1985 or January 1986. In February 1986, it had 14 such requests, and in March to the date of the hearing, it had 5 requests. T. 48. There is no evidence as to whether these requests were for short or long-term substance abuse services, or whether these were requests from different patients or multiple requests from the same patient. There is also no evidence that the persons requesting substance abuse treatment were not adequately treated at existing facilities. Thus, the data from these few months is not an adequate basis for determining future need for short term substance abuse beds. Ms. Peggy Cioffi is the coordinator for the Martin County Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program. Deposition, Ms. Peggy Cioffi, p. 2. Ms. Cioffi testified as to the need for substance abuse services in her area. She did not testify as an expert witness. Her program is primarily designed to assist the County Court in referrals of misdemeanants and others within the Court's jurisdiction who need substance abuse services. Id. Ms. Cioffi has difficulty placing persons needing inpatient or residential treatment. Id. at p. 3. She related an example of a county prisoner who asked to be detained in jail three months for lack of an alcohol program. Id. at p. 4. Ms. Cioffi did not state whether this person needed residential or inpatient hospital care. She also had recently reviewed a 14 page county court docket and determined that 67 percent of those charged represented alcohol or drug related offenses. Id. Ms. Cioffi did not clearly show how she was able to infer this fact. Further, Ms. Cioffi was unable to tell from this statistic how many of these defendants needed short term inpatient hospital substance abuse treatment. Id. at p. 6. She stated that a very high percentage of these could benefit from some kind of services, but did not separate the kinds of services, Id. at p.7. Ms. Cioffi stated that she often had to wait to find a place for a person in the following facilities: Dunklin, CARP, and Alcohope. Id. at p. 5. Ms. Cioffi stated that these were "residential" facilities, but she did not state whether these facilities were the equivalent of short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse facilities. These facilities are located in District IX, Id. at p. 7, but are not short-term in patient hospital substance abuse beds licensed as such. See paragraph 10 above. See also T. 96-99. In summary, although Ms. Cioffi identified a generalized need for residential or hospital substance abuse treatment, she did not draw any distinction between the two services. If there was a similarity, she did not provide evidence of the similarity. Lacking evidence in the record that need for residential treatment programs can be used to show need for inpatient hospital beds, Ms. Cioffi's testimony is insufficient to show need for the services sought by the Petitioner. The Honorable Marc Cianca is a County Judge in St. Lucie County. Deposition, Judge Marc Cianca, p. 2. Judge Cianca was of the opinion that his area attracted semi-young people with substance abuse problems in greater numbers than the retirement population. Id. at 17-18. He frequently was frustrated in his efforts to find substance abuse services for defendants in his Court. Id. at 3-5. Judge Cianca felt that most of the people he saw needed long-term therapy, beginning with inpatient services, followed by long-term follow-up programs. Id. at 12-14. Like the testimony of Ms. Cioffi (which concerned the same group of persons before the County Court), Judge Cianca did not clearly distinguish need for short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse services from need for all other forms of substance abuse treatment, and the record on this point is silent as well. For this reason, Judge Cianca's opinion that 100 short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds are needed must be rejected. The testimony of Ms. Cioffi and Judge Cianca is insufficient as a predicate for determining need for the inpatient hospital beds sought by the Petitioner for another reason, and that is the lack of evidence that the persons identified as needing substance abuse services will have the ability to pay for such services at Petitioner's facility, or that third party payment will be available for them. The people in need in Ms. Cioffi's testimony normally do not have funds to pay for treatment. Cioffi, p. 8. Similarly, a substantial number of the people in need seen by Judge Cianca do not have insurance coverage and would not be able to use Harbour Shores unless they qualified for Medicaid and unless Harbour Shores took all of those qualified for Medicaid. Id. at 7, 15-16. A substantial number of the persons needing substance abuse treatment do not have jobs or insurance and must rely upon "welfare" for services. Id. at 15, 17. These persons cannot afford certain programs, and must rely upon state aid through programs such as those provided by Indian River Community Mental Health Center, and for these programs there is always a waiting list. Id. at There is no evidence that any of these persons are eligible for Medicaid. Ms. Sharon Heinlen, Director of Planning and Development for Harbour Shores Hospital, who testified for the Petitioner as an expert in health planning and hospital administration, had not studied the Medicaid population in the area to determine need. T. 76. Although Harbour Shores had about 15 percent of its psychiatric patient days devoted to Medicaid patients, T. 33, the validity of this percentage for substance abuse patients, or for the reasonably near future, was not established by other evidence. Petitioner's formal application for this certificate of need projects 5 percent of its gross revenues from Medicaid and another 5 percent devoted to bad debt, indigents, and Baker Act cases. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 5. But the application does not state whether this percentage will be evenly distributed among psychiatric and substance abuse patients. In any event, the percentages of indigent care and Medicaid care are too small to satisfy the need identified by Judge Cianca and Ms. Cioffi. Stated another way, the need identified by those two witnesses is not relevant to Petitioner's application except with respect to a small percentage. Harbour Shores plans to have after care for substance abuse patients. T. 40. The Savannas Hospital is the name of the hospital to be completed in November 1986 to provide, among other services, 20 short term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds under the certificate of need granted to Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc. T. 82-83. The primary service area of the Savannas Hospital will be the same four counties as now served by Harbour Shores Hospital, as well as Palm Beach County. T. 84. The Savannas Hospital intends to be licensed. T. 84. The Savannas Hospital is located in Port St. Lucie, in St. Lucie County. T. 95-96. The service proposed is a comprehensive substance abuse service. T. 87. Five of the twenty substance abuse beds will be devoted to detoxification. T. 92. The Savannas Hospital will be operated by the Mediplex Group in partnership with Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc. T. 82. The land will be owned by Mediplex. T. 95. The Savannas Hospital will be a private, for profit, hospital, while the Mental Health Center will be a not-for- profit facility. T. 86. The Savannas Hospital publicly states that it will take five percent indigent patients, which does not include Medicare. T. 87. There is no commitment to provide more indigent care. T. 89. All other patients acre expected to be fully paying. T. 93. The actual figure for free or nonpaying patients has not yet been calculated. T. 94. The Savannas Hospital will not serve Medicaid substance abuse patients because it is a freestanding facility. T. 36, 86. Humana Hospital Sebastian is the closest facility to Harbour Shores currently in operation providing inpatient short-term hospital substance abuse services, and Humana Sebastian can accept Medicaid patients. T. 59. Ms. Elizabeth Dudek testified for HRS as an expert in health planning and certificate of need review in Florida. Ms. Dudek has reviewed all of the applications made in District IX for substance abuse beds since November 1983, and as a supervisor, has reviewed all of the applications in the state for substance abuse beds. T. 104. She has been in contact with the District Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Program Office and has attended public hearings, as well as administrative hearings, concerning substance abuse beds in District IX. T. 104-05. She also listened to all of the evidence presented at the final hearing. It was Ms. Dudek's opinion that there was no need for the substance abuse beds sought by the Petitioner. T. 127-28. Ms. Sharon Heinlen was also qualified as an expert in health planning, as well as hospital administration. T. 13. Ms. Heinlen has only recently moved to Florida, T. 11, 66, and stated that she did not know Florida well enough to know what might be the best thing to advocate in Florida with respect to whether all hospitals should provide all services. T. 65-66. She had conducted studies of District IX, however. T. 66. The average occupancy rates for District IX testified to by Ms. Heinlen were mathematically incorrect, and the correct lower rates do not support her opinion that additional short term substance abuse beds are needed. See FF 11. The fact that about 80 percent of the psychiatric patients now are at Harbour Shores Hospital also have a substance abuse problem does not necessarily support Ms. Heinlen's opinion as to need. See FF 12. This statistic is consistent with experience in all of Florida, and therefore should be accommodated by the HRS numeric need methodology. Moreover, it must be inferred that hospitalization of these patients as psychiatric patients was proper, rather than as substance abuse patients, and that even if additional substance abuse beds were available, these patients still would need to be in a psychiatric bed for treatment of the primary diagnosis. As discussed in FF 14, the data concerning recent requests for substance abuse services at Harbour Shores Hospital is not sufficient to conclude that a need exists for additional beds. As discussed in FF 17, Ms. Heinlen did not have an adequate basis for any opinion as to the need for short-term substance abuse beds for Medicaid patients in District IX. Finally, Ms. Heinlen testified that there was a waiting list for patients to be admitted to licensed short-term substance abuse beds at Fair Oaks and Lake Hospital, but the testimony was hearsay. T. 28. Since this evidence conflicts with the relatively low occupancy rates at these same facilities, and has not otherwise been corroborated by non-hearsay evidence, it must be rejected as a basis for a finding of fact. Further, due to the conflict with the low occupancy rates, it is rejected as a basis for Ms. Heinlen's expert opinion. In summary, Ms. Heinlen's expert opinion that there is a need for short-term, inpatient hospital substance abuse beds in District IX must be rejected. It is the position of HRS that even if the rule showed a need, the occupancy factor would be a factor in showing no need. T. 134. Conversely, if the rule showed no need, the occupancy factor would be one factor among others which night show need. Id.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to an exemption from disqualification, to have direct contact with unmarried minor clients or clients who are developmentally disabled, having been disqualified from direct contact with those persons by virtue of an offense related to drug abuse prevention and control, Chapter 893, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact In State of Florida v. Victor Days, in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida, Case No. 93-33378, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of cocaine possession. This case was in relation to a criminal law offense prohibited by Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Adjudication was withheld. Petitioner received a one year probation based upon the order of the court entered October 22, 1993. Following the entry of his plea to the offense of possession of cocaine, Petitioner went through a drug screening to be evaluated concerning response to his use of drugs. The result of that screening was a recommendation that Petitioner receive out-patient treatment for his use of cocaine. Petitioner did not participate in an out-patient program. Eventually he enrolled in an in-patient program to address his drug abuse. Although Petitioner offered his plea to the offense of possession of cocaine and accepted the disposition, at the hearing in the present case Petitioner contended that he had not committed the offense for which he stood accused and entered his plea. But the plea entered contemplates a lack of agreement with the truth of the charges. Petitioner also complained in the administrative hearing that he had not received adequate advice from his attorney in the criminal law case. Petitioner does concede that he had a problem with the abuse of crack cocaine that existed before and beyond his arrest for the charge of possession of cocaine. Additionally, Petitioner admits that during this time he abused alcohol. Petitioner describes that he did not "drop" the cocaine that he was arrested for, and that charging him for that offense was an "injustice." Petitioner describes the circumstances of his arrest as a "wake-up call," concerning the fact that he was involved with crack cocaine, if not on the occasion of his arrest, at other times. Petitioner describes his use of crack cocaine as being associated with binges in which he would have $100 and spend it on the crack cocaine. He can recall at least eight occasions in which he would "binge" on crack cocaine. In his testimony at the administrative hearing, Petitioner describes his use of crack cocaine in that period of time as constituting an addiction. Petitioner acknowledges that in the period 1993 through 1994, he suffered from addiction, to the extent that he had a co- dependency for crack cocaine and alcohol. In the years 1992 through 1994, Petitioner had worked for Jackson Memorial Hospital in Dade County, Florida, in the Environmental Services Department. This employment did not include direct contact with patients. Following the disposition of Circuit Court Case No. 93- 33378, roughly a year later, on November 15, 1994, Petitioner entered a residential program for drug abusers, referred to as Faith Farm Ministries in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Specifically, it was a program to benefit adults with drug abuse problems. The program was administered by Fort Lauderdale Rescue Tabernacle, Inc., Alpha Ministry. The program was designed to help the participants deal with their drug dependency and to reorder their lives for the better. Petitioner successfully completed the program as evidenced by a certificate issued to the Petitioner on May 1, 1995. For approximately eight months beyond his graduation from the drug abuse program, Petitioner served as a peer counselor for other adults enrolled in the program. During his probation, Petitioner's probation officer referred Petitioner to the court for having violated probation. Petitioner was not found in violation of his probation. When Petitioner was not found in violation of his probation, Petitioner had already attended the residential drug treatment program. 1l. Following the completion of his drug abuse program, Petitioner worked at a K-Mart in Miramar, Florida, for approximately six months in 1995, as a salesperson. Later Petitioner took a position with Chemical Addictions Recovery Effort, Inc. (Chemical Additions Recovery), in Panama City, Florida, as a Human Service worker, with direct contact with minors who are 13 to 17 years old. More specifically, those youngsters are part of a program referred to as Starting Over Straight (S.O.S.), within the umbrella of Chemical Addictions Recovery. In this position, Petitioner assisted the juveniles who had drug-related problems. This position was held for approximately three months. Petitioner then took a position with a program within the Chemical Addictions Recovery, referred to as Detox. That program, in which he had direct contact with the clients, was in association with adults and children suffering with problems related to alcohol and drugs. Petitioner held that position for approximately three months. During Petitioner's affiliation with Chemical Addictions Recovery, Petitioner was required to undergo a background check, based upon his holding a position of trust and responsibility, as an employee with direct contact with minor clients. When the screening was completed, it revealed Petitioner's criminal law case associated with the possession of cocaine. This disqualified the Petitioner from continuing to have direct contact with unmarried minor clients or clients who are developmentally disabled. Petitioner has an interest in continuing employment involving direct contact with unmarried minors, such as the children who were participants in the S.O.S. For this reason Petitioner has pursued his request for exemption from disqualification. At the time of the hearing Petitioner was employed as a floor-care worker with Bay Genesis Eldercare in Panama City, Florida. He had held that position for approximately three months. On the date of hearing Petitioner was 36 years old. Petitioner believes that his life has changed following participation in the residential drug treatment program. Petitioner in his day-to day life works to tell people that drugs and alcohol are a waste of time. That was the motivation Petitioner had for working as a Human Service worker at Chemical Addictions Recovery. Petitioner does not sense any difficulty in dealing with children. He believes that children look up to him. At present Petitioner does not use alcohol or drugs. Petitioner attends church. Mary Cruel, Petitioner's great-aunt, is a supervisor at S.O.S. She describes that program as a residential program for children who have a problem with substance abuse. Ms. Cruel is familiar with the Detox program associated with Chemical Addictions Recovery. That program, as Ms. Cruel describes it, is a crisis intervention program for adult women and some children. Ms. Cruel recalls that Petitioner had a problem with drugs and alcohol, as part of overall life problems. In response, Ms. Cruel helped to place the Petitioner in the Faith Farm Ministries program. As Ms. Cruel describes it, Petitioner's participation in the Faith Farm Ministries program was voluntary. Participation in that program was felt to be the better choice, in that it had a spiritual emphasis. Ms. Cruel communicated with the Petitioner while he was participating in the drug rehabilitation program. She observed that the Petitioner was passionate about getting well, and that he quit blaming others for his difficulties. Now Ms. Cruel sees the Petitioner about three times a week. Ms. Cruel observes that her husband is close to the Petitioner. Ms. Cruel's husband does not abuse drugs. Ms. Cruel has observed the Petitioner trying to encourage other persons, who have problems with drugs to get into treatment and in conversation with others, Petitioner refers to his life experience. Ms. Cruel notes that Petitioner wants to work in a substance abuse program. Ms. Cruel is aware that Petitioner earns more money at his present employment than he did in the position that he was dismissed from with Chemical Addictions Recovery. Finally, Ms. Cruel observes that Petitioner lives a more regular life than he did before dealing with his addictions, and that Petitioner stays clean and sober one day at a time without being seen to have regressed. Rosemary G. Balkcom, R.N., C.D., a nursing services supervisor at Chemical Addictions Recovery, in correspondence, notes that Petitioner in working in the Detox program related well with clientele and that his overall attitude toward the persons participating in the program was one of genuine concern and empathy. Further, Ms. Balkcom notes in her remarks that Petitioner enjoys being able to assist and provide guidance for the clientele in the program. Finally, Ms. Balkcom notes that if Petitioner were allowed to continue to work in the program, and gained required education and training, Petitioner would present a positive role model for others. Amy Shackleford, Petitioner's co-worker, notes in correspondence that Petitioner has a genuine care for juvenile residents, and that Petitioner is active, motivated, honest, and dependable. Ms. Shackleford notes that young residents with low self-esteem have become actively involved with Petitioner. Ms. Shackleford notes that Petitioner is a perfect role model, and a positive influence in helping young people grow into productive citizens.
Recommendation Upon consideration the of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered exempting Petitioner from disqualification to work in a position of special trust or responsibility that would allow direct contact with unmarried minor clients or clients who are developmentally disabled. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 100A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Victor Renaldo Days 1003 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact 14. The third sentence is not relevant. 20. Irrelevant. The second sentence concerns admissions to general hospitals, and thus is only of marginal relevance. Absent further evidence concerning medical ethical standards, and given the gravity of ethical issues, a finding as to ethical propriety cannot he made. 32-33. Evidence does exist that the programs will still be able adequately to function in the smaller space proposed for a single building, although inevitably some of the more desirable features of having more space will be lost with a single building. 36. The testimony cited compares staffing of a psychiatric hospital, with 45 attending psychiatrists, to the staffing of a substance abuse facility, where patients presumably do not have acute medical problems. It is illogical to conclude from such a comparison that one medical director is not enough for the few medical problems that substance abuse patients may have. 40. The testimony cited was not from a representative of Glenbeigh. 45. A matter of law. The second sentence must be rejected because it appears that HRS does consider the statewide average of .076 long term beds per 1,000 persons to be an appropriate ratio. (HRS failed to substantiate the basis of the policy on this record.) Rejected because although the witness testified that less than a majority of such patients could he treated in a speciality hospital, he also testified that he could not tell what percentage could he treated in a residential treatment facility, and limited his testimony to "some." T. 666. There is no testimony at the record cited. Not supported by the record cited. Rejected. The testimony of Ms. Ramage was accepted on this point. Rejected as worded. The witness was referring only to epidemiological analysis, which was only one of several methods he identified to determine need. T. 1330-33. 58-60. Bed inventory in District V is irrelevant as discussed in the findings of fact, and the evidence is inextricably commingled. 78-86. Rejected in the findings of fact concerning short term financial feasibility. If there were need, Glenbeigh has the capacity to finance all of the projects. 87. It is not clear from the testimony that the witness understood the question cited as the basis for the second sentence for this proposed finding of fact. Previous testimony had made it clear that the planned length of stay was to be longer than 28 days for adults. The answer "right" to the question that preceded it, T. 403, is inexplicably inconsistent, evidencing a misunderstanding by the witness. The witness's inability to testify as to the exact amount of expected insurance coverage for adults, however, has been made a part of the findings of fact concerning length of stay. 89. With the exception of site preparation, which is already a part of the findings of fact, this proposed finding is not relevant. The witness testified that Tampa would get a water retention pond if needed. T. 455. Absent evidence that sewage or other utilities would he needed in Tampa (which is unlikely, given the urban nature of Tampa), the remainder of the proposed finding is not relevant. Irrelevant, given the testimony as to total project cost and square footage. Marginally relevant. See discussion above with respect to the proposed finding of Charter Hospital. COPIES FURNISHED: Ivan Wood, Esquire The Park in Houston Center Suite 1400 1221 Lamar Street Houston, TX 77010 Douglas L. Mannheimer, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kenneth F. Hoffman, Esquire W. David Watkins, Esquire Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Hoffman, Jr., Esquire Ross Silverman, Esquire King and Spalding 2500 Trust Company Tower 25 Park Place Atlanta, GA 30303 Chris Bentley, Esquire 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, HRS Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32388-0700 =================================================================
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter its final order denying certificate of need number 3215 to Management Advisory & Research enter, Inc. d/b/a Glenbeigh Hospital. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9 day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1987. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 84-2918 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have been rejected. The numbers correspond to the. paragraph numbers used by the parties. Glenbeigh's proposed findings of fact have no numbers, and thus have been numbered by page number, by paragraph number on the page (beginning with the first full paragraph on that page, and assigning the last paragraph on a page to that page, even though it continues to the following page), and by sentence number within the paragraph. FINDINGS OF FACT PROPOSED BY GLENBEIGH: 1.2. Law, not fact. 1.4. Law Law Law 2.3.1-6. Law 3.2-5. Law 4.1. Law 4.4.2-3. Law 6.2. Irrelevant 7.1. Unpersuasive. There is not enough evidence of advertisement of the character intended by Ms. Ramage, and Ms. Ramage's testimony as to advertisement is unpersuasive as well. 9.1.2. Irrelevant. 9.3-4. through 11.1. This legal point has not been addressed since standing has been conferred by the "affected person" rule as interpreted by the First District Court of Appeal. 11.2-13.3. This section is a mixture of facts relevant to the argument that St. Francis has not proven standing and to the argument that the Glenbeigh project is needed. To the extent that the facts are relevant to the first argument, that argument has not been addressed due to the fact that standing is conferred h5 the "affected person" rule. With respect to the second reason for the proposed facts, portions have been rejected for the reasons which follow. 11.2 Some of this has been adopted. It is all true, but cumulative. 11.3.1-4. Only marginally relevant, since the application was for short term substance abuse beds. 11.3.5-8. Rejected as not persuasive. The record in this case demonstrates that residential treatment beds and psychiatric beds do, in part, serve as alternatives to short and long term substance abuse beds. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. The short term substance abuse bed rule demands that approach. It explicitly states what should he subtracted from gross need to obtain a net bed need figure. This would have been relevant had Glenbeigh's four methods for projecting need proven to have been reliable. But since those methods failed, this supportive evidence is now irrelevant. Without a context, this statement is suspect. Further, it is insufficient to tie in with other evidence to show a quantitative need. Irrelevant 12.5 Irrelevant, since short term beds are at issue. 13.1. It is probably true that Mr. McMurray believes that short term substance abuse beds are needed for St. Anthony's Hospital, and at the same time, believes that the St. Francis Careunit is needed and partially serves the need for both short and long terms substance abuse care. It is also undoubtedly true that St. Anthony's group of associated health care corporations is in direct competition with Glenbeigh, and seeks to open services in all phases of the potential market. To this extent, Mr. McMurray's testimony has been considered in the context of the competitive forces at work. Nonetheless, the totality of the evidence present indicates that residential treatment facilities do partially serve the needs of all types of substance abuse patients. The remainder of the needs of such patients appears to he served by short term substance abuse beds, psychiatric hospital beds, and general hospital beds. Thus, ultimately the credibility of Mr. McMurray is not of great importance. 14.1. Law. 14.2.5. 94 percent occupancy is the mathematical result. 14.1 through 16.1. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant since Charter Hospital proved that it was an "affected person" pursuant to HRS's rule. Moreover, testimony that assignment of primary diagnosis was accepted. Thus, the distinctions drawn in the proposed findings of fact on page 15 have no application to what in fact occurs. Charter Hospital has sufficiently proven that it treats some patients that have both a psychiatric and substance abuse problem, patients who also could be treated by Glenbeigh in its proposed facility, with psychiatric care provided by outside contract and referral. 17.6.2. Absent credible evidence as to the numbers of adolescents that need long term substance abuse services, a finding cannot be made that "the adolescent program would create an average for the hospital far in excess of 28 days." If need for adolescent services had been credibly identified, then it is true that the average length of stay of such patients would drive the total average length of stay for the Glenbeigh facility upward. 19.2. The average length of stay at Glenbeigh's Ohio hospital (at 28-32 days) does not help much to determine whether District VI has a substantial number of persons needing to stay longer than 28 days. Dr. Wheeler's testimony is too general to be applied in this case. The record does not contain adequate evidence of the specifics of the program to he offered at Glenbeigh from which one might conclude that the kind of education alluded to by Dr. Wheeler might either he offered, or be warranted or really needed. There is no evidence of a proposal to serve geriatric substance abusers in significant numbers, and thus this irrelevant. 20.4. Mr. Jaffe did not testify that editorial comments did not carry any weight, but only that such comments were of much less importance ("does not carry nearly as much weight"). The testimony cited is not sufficiently clear to allow a finding as stated. Moreover, the issue is primarily one of law. Irrelevant. Applications for certificates of need must show need of patients, not need to simply put beds where none exist. Ultimately, this reasoning has been rejected in this Recommended Order because it appears that short term substance abuse facilities-can (and probably do) treat a certain number of patients who stay for longer than 28 days, and can nonetheless maintain an average length of stay for all patients of 28 days or less. 21.1.1-2. Irrelevant. It is not illegal for a short term substance abuse hospital to admit a patient who will stay for more than 28 days. It is only illegal if the pattern of such admissions causes the facility to no longer fit the definition of short term substance abuse, that is "short-term services not exceeding an average length of stay of 28 days." Rule 10- 5.011(1)(q)2., Fla. Admin. Code. That is what Mr. Jaffe said. The record contains no evidence that any such pattern exists in District VI, and in fact, the average length of stay is only 23.6 days, well below the 28 day limit. 21.1.3. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. There is no evidence that single diagnosis substance abuse patients are being admitted to psychiatric hospitals. Accessibility to residents in District V is not relevant absent evidence of need in District V. The testimony as to access across Tampa Bay is so cursory as to he only marginally relevant, even if District V need had been shown. 22.3.2. Irrelevant. 22.4 Not persuasive. 23.1-2. No evidence presented to support an incipient policy that District VI should have the same ratio of long term substance abuse beds to population as the ratio in the state at large, and that ratio has not been adopted as a rule. 23.3. Rejected for the same reason as in 21.3 above. 25.1. Rejected because the evidence showed that short term substance abuse hospitals, short term psychiatric hospitals, and residential treatment facilities provide similar services to the patients that Glenbeigh would have available to it to serve. 27.3. Rejected due to lack of need. 27.5.2. Rejected due to lack of need. 30.6. Rejected as discussed elsewhere because alternatives are available. 30.6.3. Rejected because these patients can be served in short term substance abuse hospital beds, which are not at 100 percent capacity. 31.1. Rejected for reasons discussed above. Alternatives exist. Rejected for lack of evidence that any patients will experience serious problems in obtaining inpatient care of the type proposed, since short term substance abuse beds exist. Law, not fact. 31.6.2 The testimony cited (T.690, 909) is not sufficiently credible or detailed to conclude that the proposal is consistent with the local health plan. The local health plan is not in evidence. 32.1.5. Rejected for lack of need. True, but not an issue in the case at this point. A question of law. 34.1 and 2. Rejected as explained with respect to proposed findings of fact 23.1-2. 34.3. Rejected as explained with respect to proposed finding of fact 21.3 34.4.2. The result of the Marden method in this case indicate that the method is not reliable. 34.6. While this proposed finding is true, it is not needed since no contrary finding has been made. 35.2. Some of the assumptions were correct, as found in the findings of fact. Rejected because contrary to the record cited. True, but of marginal importance in determining quantitative need because no other evidence exists to tie this fact into a reliable projection of bed need. 35.6. This proposed finding of fact is true, but not necessary since contrary findings of fact have not been adopted. 36.1.2-3. Rejected in findings of fact discussing the Marden methodology. 36.2. Rejected in findings of fact discussing the Marden methodology.
The Issue The issues presented for resolution in the two consolidated cases are whether Rule 10E-16.004 (27), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and whether Petitioner violated that rule on a specified occasion and is subject to fine or other penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Associated Counselling and Education, Inc., doing business as Substance Abuse Family Education (SAFE), is a Florida corporation doing business in Orange County, Florida. SAFE provides substance abuse treatment to adolescents, mostly within the ages of twelve (12) to eighteen (18) years, with a few young adults who have turned nineteen while in treatment. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency with statutory authority to license and regulate certain treatment programs, including SAFE. At all times material to this proceeding HRS has licensed SAFE to provide substance abuse treatment services in a category titled "non-residential day and night treatment with a host home component." SAFE is not licensed as a secure facility or an addictions receiving facility. SAFE uses a program similar to the Alcoholic Anonymous twelve-step program as a tool for rehabilitating drug abusing juveniles. The program includes five phases through which the clients progress at varying rates. The "first phase" describes clients who are new to the program. As clients progress they enter into stages of increasing responsibility and freedom, until they are able to graduate and return to the everyday world. The program requires that the youths' parents or legal guardians admit them into treatment, even when children are referred by a court, by HRS or another source. The program requires rigorous participation by the parents and any siblings of the client. SAFE's contract for treatment includes a voluntary withdrawal provision which requires that the client request withdrawal through a "chain of command." The purpose of the deliberate, several-step process is to avoid withdrawal on an impulsive or transitory whim of the client. SAFE's rules, including the withdrawal provision, are explained to the client at the beginning of treatment and are reviewed daily with the clients. Clients who are just starting in the program, "first phasers," spend their days at the program and are placed at night with host parents, generally parents with experience in the program through their own children's participation. Staff and host parents are trained in crisis intervention and aggression control techniques through an HRS sanctioned training program. The techniques are progressive; they range from verbal intervention, to putting an arm around a client's shoulder, to physically forcing a client to the floor when the client has threatened to injure himself or others. SAFE contends that when a client attempts to leave treatment without going through the withdrawal process and without involving the parents or guardians in the process, the client is in serious danger of injuring himself or others immediately following departure from the program. SAFE uses physical intervention as a last resort to prevent clients from leaving the program without going through the "chain of command." At night, however, such intervention is used by host parents only to restrain dangerously aggressive behavior. SAFE instructs its host parents to not physically stop a child from leaving the host home. S. B. was a "first phaser" in SAFE's program in August 1993. During dinner one evening he had been staring or glaring at other clients and acting in a provoking and disruptive manner. After dinner, during an organized "rap" session, several clients were called on to confront S. B.'s behavior. He reacted by throwing a chair, across several rows of clients, at the client who was confronting him. Then he bolted, or attempted to bolt, from the room through the exit door. He was restrained by staff, was calmed, and he returned to his seat. Very shortly after he returned to his seat S. B. began staring or glaring at a client by the exit door. He jumped up and ran for the door. Again, he was physically restrained as he kicked, fought and yelled with anger. Staff person Pamela Mardis was one of the persons who participated in the restraint of S. B. on August 27, 1993. She considered the client to be in harm's way if he were permitted to leave the program without the assurance of proper safeguard for his well-being and safety. The January 12, 1994 amended notice of violation provided by HRS to Loretta Parrish, SAFE's owner and executive director, states, in pertinent part: As an amended complaint, the following incidents have been found to be in violation of 10E-16, F.A.C., requirements and are therefore subject to administrative fines: * * * August 27, 1993, 5:20 p.m., (report written August 27, 1993, 6:45 p.m.) in which a client was restrained in an effort to keep the client from leaving treatment, your agency will be fined $100 for non-compliance with 10E-16.004 (27)(a), F.A.C., requirements. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 6) HRS interprets its rule to prohibit restraint when the perceived danger to the client is in leaving and getting back on drugs. SAFE contends that to let one client leave voluntarily without going through the withdrawal procedures would mean that all of the clients, adolescents with poor decision-making skills, would walk out. There is a program in Palm Beach County, Florida, purportedly similar to SAFE, called Growing Together, Inc. On January 22, 1994, HRS and Growing Together, Inc., entered into a stipulated Final Declaratory Judgement in case no. CL93-9599-AO, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, which provided, in pertinent part: In the absence of a Court Order restricting the rights of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may act upon the request of a parent or legal guardian in accepting a minor client for substance abuse treatment regardless of the minor's objections. In the absence of a Court Order limiting the authority of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may reasonably restrict minor clients from terminating their participation in treatment contrary to the express direction of a parent or legal guardian. So long as the minor's rights to challenge the reasonableness of restrictions imposed at the express direction of a parent or legal guardian are protected -- that is, so long as the minor is informed of his or her rights and is provided a practical means by which to exercise those rights -- Growing Together, Inc., may continue to act in loco parent) in declining to release a minor from treatment where such release is against the will of a parent or legal guardian and no court order has been issued to direct otherwise. The State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is hereby prohibited from taking any action contrary to the legal principles enunciated herein and is expressly prohibited from enforcing any interpretation of F.S. Section 397.601 which interpretation is contrary to the findings of this Judgement. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 7)
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Melvin Robinson, through sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 801.111, Florida Statutes (1975).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 4, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department had requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The final hearing in this cause was conducted on January 5 1982, following a continuance of the previously scheduled hearing of December 16, 1981, which was designed to allow the Petitioner to gain the assistance of counsel. The Petitioner was unable to make those arrangements and the hearing was held with the Petitioner appearing pro se. In the course of the final hearing, the Petitioner testified and offered as witnesses, Alice Butler, Section Aide in the mentally disordered sex offender program, Florida State Hospital; Sterling George, Psychiatric Aide in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital; and Alfred Gerardo, a participant in the sex offender program at Florida State Hospital. The Respondent offered as witnesses, Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital; Charles Shaffer, Clinical psychologist in the aforementioned program; Allison Dowling, Clinical social Worker in that program; and Lois Stevens, Clinal social Worker at Florida State Hospital. The Respondent presented two exhibits which were admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding Petitioner has been in the custody of Respondent, in keeping with orders of court. During that time, the Petitioner has resided at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in the program for the benefit of sex offenders, to include those persons committed under Chapter 801, Florida Statutes (1975), entitled "Child Molester Act." Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities his progress in the recognition of and the ability to deal with the underlying conditions which caused his placement in the program are at end. In the face of these circumstances, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. These opinions were made known to the Petitioner and when confronted with this information, the Petitioner requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. Robinson was admitted to the forensic service at Florida State Hospital on October 9, 1990, to begin his participation in the mentally disordered sex offender program. He had previously been enrolled in the program from March, 1979, through February, 1979, a commitment under the terms of Chapter 801, Florida Statutes. Following his initial release from the program, Robinson was accused of violating the terms and conditions of probation and was adjudicated guilty of the offense for which probation was granted. Imposition of a sentence in that case was withheld and the Petitioner was returned to the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, in keeping with the rationale expressed in his original commitment to the program at Chattahoochee, which original commitment had occurred by Order of Court on February 20, 1976. In the matter of the most recent offense which had caused the revocation of Robinson's probation, Robinson received a sentence of ten years in the Florida State Prison; however, service of that sentence was stayed pending release and discharge from the custody of the Respondent on this most immediate commitment for care and treatment in the mentally disordered sex offender program. Beginning with the October 9, 1980, hospital stay, the goals of the program have been to deal with the patient's problems concerning sexual deviation, pedophilia; alcoholism; inadequate and passive aggressive personality styles and cultural deprivation. Notwithstanding the efforts of the patient and those of the staff to deal with the underlying disorders, this success has not been complete. The treatment has been exhausted in this program and other similar programs in the system in the State of Florida, and the Petitioner still presents a danger based upon his sexual deviation and propensity to commit sexual acts involving children, in particular minor females. These determinations are reached in the face of the facts that follow. The program at Florida State Hospital has as its main focus the utilization of group therapy with adjunctive programs in recreational and occupational therapy, and this treatment regime relies heavily on a patient's self-motivation. The Respondent's Exhibit 2 is a series of clinical summaries related to the patient's performance during the course of his treatment. The most recent evaluation points out, in general terms, the Petitioner's pattern of acting-out behavior and disregard for ward policy and, more importantly his lack of motivation and progress in the therapies which are essential to success in the program. In addition, testimony was given in the course of the hearing on the part of the Petitioner's therapist and other persons affiliated with the treatment team. Lois Stevens had been the Petitioner's primary therapist from October, 1980, to January, 1981. She observed in the Petitioner indications of low self- esteem; the fact that the Petitioner was easily disappointed; that he was easily influenced by others; that he had an inability to deal with abstract feedback and a problem of allowing himself to be abused. These were matters of concern which needed to be addressed as a prerequisite to dealing with the Petitioner's sexual deviation. In effect, this was a process of identifying the problems which underlie his sexual deviation. In this connection, Stevens found that the Petitioner had the desire to do better but evidenced poor judgment and impulse control. These circumstances were aggravated by the fact that the Petitioner had and has limited intellectual ability. During this phase no intense effort was made to discuss the sex offense, molestation of a young girl. While in this treatment situation, Robinson accepted staff criticism in an appropriate way and he did improve in personal hygiene, which had been a problem initially. After a period of time it was determined that the Petitioner should be placed with a separate therapist to go forward with his treatment. From January, 1981, to July, 1981, the Petitioner had Allison Dowling as his primary therapist. In the beginning Robinson performed reasonably well and had been given some freedom of movement within the facility and was granted a position as a patient volunteer on the ward. He was beginning to cope better in the institutional environment; however, he remained reluctant to examine, in therapy sessions, the problem of his sexual deviation. Specifically, that difficulty related to his ability to deal with insight oriented therapy. He would enter into a discussion of the offense in the therapy sessions, but tended to minimize the seriousness of his offense, demonstrating marginal understanding of the etiology and maintaining factors in his deviant sexual behavior. Moreover, between sessions with the group he tended to forget what had been dealt with on the prior occasion. He had to be prompted to participate, with one exception. As established by Dowling in this sequence of the treatment, the Petitioner began to act in an inappropriate way while on the ward and was tardy for group therapy sessions. In the connection with his misbehavior on the ward, it was necessary to force the Petitioner to engage in a discussion of those matters and the act of taking away his privileges of freedom of movement and position did not promote a change in the Petitioner. He attempted to manipulate staff members about the misbehavior and to have group members in the therapy sessions accept his side of the dispute as opposed to directly addressing problems. The items of misbehavior included homosexual activity with another participant of the program and sleeping in the nude, which were contrary to hospital policy. On another occasion the Petitioner attempted to get a staff aide to take him to an unauthorized activity, in violation of ward policy. Dowling has observed little progress in the Petitioner's attempts to control his sexual misbehavior and she correctly indicates that his sexual deviance still exists and no further progress can be made in dealing with this condition. Charles Shaffer, a clinical psychologist was the primary therapist for the Petitioner from November, 1981, to January, 1982. His observations concerning the progress of the Petitioner are in accord with those of Allison Dowling. He did note that the Petitioner has shown himself to be willing to help others with their daily problems but is unwilling to participate himself, and by way of explanation Robinson states that the other patients don't understand or can't understand his problem related to the sexual deviance. Shaffer's observations establish that the Petitioner is comfortable with his life style, and hasn't indicated any desire to change that pattern. Robert Alcorn, the director of the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital, through his testimony indicated agreement to the effect that the treatment had been exhausted in that program without success, which is an accurate depiction. Alcorn also established that conferences related to Robinson's potential placement in affiliated sex offender programs led to the conclusion that those programs could not assist the Petitioner, ergo, treatment has been exhausted in those other facilities. The Petitioner, through his testimony, acknowledged that he had participated in homosexual activities at the hospital and had been punished by the suspension of his grounds privileges and job opportunity. Following those episodes the Petitioner indicated that he lost interest in participating in the program but did in fact participate. He acknowledged that he attended occupational therapy, as well as the primary therapy, and was tardy at times. Robinson admits that he has difficulty explaining himself and has problems with impulse control. He says he can't find himself, is tired of being a nothing. Robinson believes he does not always think before acting. Finally, he has a fear of returning to court and facing the disposition of his case. Alice Butler, a witness for the Petitioner who was a co-therapist at the time that Stevens was assigned to Robinson's case, established that earlier in the treatment Petitioner was more motivated in his participation than he has been recently. And, in fact, the Petitioner has broken the rules as recently as two weeks prior to the hearing by sleeping nude. She also observed that the Petitioner has been in the so-called "observation section" for a long time and is satisfied with his placement. (This particular section is a more restricted area than some of the other advanced wards.) Sterling George, a psychiatric aide and witness for the Petitioner from his observation finds that as a general proposition the Petitioner takes part in activities with other patients and is not a problem on the ward. Finally, Alfred Gerardo, another participant in the mentally disordered sex offender program, gave testimony. He has known the Petitioner for approximately fifteen months. He has also participated in the same group with Robinson from October, 1980, through May, 1981. His initial impressions of Robinson were not favorable, but in the last few months he has gained a better appreciation of the Petitioner. In particular, he has observed Robinson to have made improvement in terms of his willingness to he concerned about matters of education and acting-out, and in the realm of the Petitioner's appearance. From this witness's understanding the Petitioner's participation in group activity is limited and particularly so in the area of the underlying sexual problem. In summary the Respondent has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner's sexual deviance, but that treatment has not been totally successful and the patient continues to be a sexual menace, and there is a likelihood that the Petitioner would commit other sexual crimes.
Findings Of Fact GENERAL In November 1983, Pasco filed an application with DHRS to build and operate a freestanding psychiatric and substance abuse facility in Pasco County. Pasco is a Florida corporation and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Florida Health Facilities, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of United Medical Corporation (UMC). DHRS' initial notice of intent to deny Pasco's application was issued on April 13, 1984. On May 3, 1984, Pasco timely filed its petition for formal administrative hearing. (DOAH Case No. 84-1933). Thereafter, DHRS reconsidered its initial decision, and on November 20, 1984, DHRS and Pasco entered into a Stipulation, and DHRS issued CON No. 3053 to Pasco in February 1985. (DOAH Case No. 84-1933 was subsequently, dismissed as the result of this reconsideration.) Following publication of DHRS' decision to issue the CON, petitions for formal hearing were filed by Horizon and Hernando, UPC, CHNPR, and Harborside Hospital, Inc., and petitions to intervene were filed by Community Care, Morton Plant and PIA Medfield, Inc., d/b/a Medfield Center. The petitions were consolidated and resulted in the cases at bar--DOAH Consolidated Case Nos. 85-0780, 85-1513 and 85-2346. Harborside Hospital, Inc., Petitioner in Case No. 85-2392, and PIA Medfield, Inc., d/b/a Medfield Center, Intervenor in Case No. 85-0780, subsequently voluntarily dismissed their petitions and are not parties to this proceeding. Horizon is a freestanding psychiatric facility located at 11300 U.S. 19 South, Clearwater, in Pinellas County, in District V. Hernando is an approved, as of September 1984, but as yet unopened 50-bed freestanding psychiatric facility to be located at the intersection of S.R. 50 and Clay Street in Brooksville, Hernando County. Hernando County is in District III. Hernando's bed complement will consist of 35 short-term psychiatric beds, 15 short-term substance abuse beds and a 10-bed crisis stabilization unit. UPC is an approved but yet unopened 114-bed psychiatric teaching facility to be located on the campus of the University of South Florida in Hillsborough County, in District VI. Its bed complement does not include licensed substance abuse beds. CHNPR is a 414-bed acute care hospital located in Pasco County, Florida, in District V. As part of its bed complement, the hospital operates a 46-bed psychiatric unit. Its complement does not include licensed substance abuse beds. Morton Plant is a 745-bed acute care hospital located in Pinellas County, District V. As part of its bed complement, the hospital operates a 42-bed psychiatric unit. Its bed complement does not include licensed substance abuse beds. Community Care is an approved but as yet unopened 88-bed psychiatric facility to be located in Citrus County in District Its bed complement includes 51 short-term psychiatric beds and 37 long-term substance abuse beds. Its bed complement does not include licensed short-term substance abuse beds. Pasco originally proposed to construct and develop an 80-bed short-term psychiatric and substance abuse facility, composed of 60 general adult beds, 10 adolescent beds and 10 substance abuse beds (Exhibit 4). As a result of negotiations with DHRS, Pasco revised its proposal to a 72-bed facility composed of 35 general adult beds, 20 adolescent beds and 17 substance abuse beds (Exhibit 4, paragraph 1; Exhibit 11). As a condition to DHRS' agreement to grant the Certificate of Need, Pasco has agreed to provide at least 10 percent of its patient days to residents of Pasco County eligible under the provisions of the Baker Act or who are indigent, and to locate its facility no less than five miles east of the intersection of U.S. Highway 19 and County Road 587 (Exhibit 4, paragraphs 3, 4). The revised project cost, excluding working capital, totals $6,328,981.00 (Exhibit 6). BED NEEDS Applications for certificates of need must be consistent with criteria contained in Section 381.494(6)(c) as well as applicable rules of the agency. Subsection 1 of Section 381.494(6)(c) requires DHRS determine the proposal is consistent with: The need for the health care facilities and services and hospices being proposed in relation to the applicable district plan and State Health Plan adopted pursuant to Title XV of the Public Health Service Act except in emergency circumstances which pose a threat to the public health. The State Health Plan adopted addresses need through the year 1987, which is not the target year applicable to this case. The Plan indicates the need for short-term psychiatric and substance abuse beds should be determined based on the need methodologies found in Chapter 10-5.11(25) and 10-5.11(27) (Exhibit 27, page 6). DHRS' rules establish specific criteria to be used in evaluating and acting on CON applications for psychiatric and substance abuse services and facilities. Chapter 10-5.11(25) and 3-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Psychiatric Bed Need In District V Rule 5-11.25, Florida Administrative Code, allocates .35 beds per 1,000 population in each district for psychiatric beds. Of those, not less than .15 per 1,000 population may be allocated within acute care general hospital settings and no more than .20 per 1,000 population may be located in freestanding psychiatric facilities. The differentiations recognize Medicaid reimburses facilities for psychiatric services provided in the acute hospital setting, but not in the freestanding setting, assuring at least some financial access to services for Medicaid patients and allows the agency, from a policy standpoint, to weigh the cost and benefits of building new facilities on one hand against adding additional beds at existing facilities (Exhibit 26, page 3). The Office of Comprehensive Health Planning, under the signature of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health Planning and Development, has published the agency's Short-Term Psychiatric Bed Counts and Projected Bed Needs for 1990. On a district wide basis, the agency's document indicates a total gross need for 401 beds. There exist 372 licensed beds and no CON approved but unlicensed beds in District V. Morton Plant received preliminary approval for 22 beds but its application was subsequently denied by Final Order. See, Morton F. Plant Hospital Assn., Inc. v. DHRS, DOAH Case No. 83-1275, Final Order Oct. 8, 1985. Therefore, there currently exists a net projected need for 29 short-term psychiatric beds in District V for 1990. Final approval of the application here would result in a district surplus of 26 beds, an increase in beds of less than 7 percent over the projected 1990 numerical need. This 26-bed surplus would replace the 29-bed need after the 55 beds granted to Pasco are considered (Exhibit 27, pages 15-16). The projected numerical surplus for psychiatric beds in District V is due to an excess of 114 beds located in South Pinellas County. However, access problems to Pasco residents may, in fact, be one of the reasons for this excess (Exhibit 10, page 3). Rule 10-5.11(25) projects the need at the district level, leaving the specific allocation to the agency and to the Local Health Council by identifying particular areas within the district that may need additional beds through use of the Local Health Plan (Exhibit 26, page 3). The Local Health Council's 1985 plan projects needed beds to the target year 1990 and projects need by subdividing District V on a geographic basis of East and West Pasco and North and South Pinellas Counties (Exhibit 8, page 110, Tables 8 and 11; Exhibit 10, page 2). The Plan establishes subdistricts identical to those subdistricts which have been designated for acute care beds (Exhibit 8, page 110, Tables 8 and 11; Exhibit 10, page 2; Exhibit 27, page 8). The subdistrict concept evidences a rational division of the District's population and healthcare communities (Exhibit 10, page 2; Exhibit 27, page 8). In view of the poor transportation situation in Pasco County as well as traffic congestion along U.S. Highway 19, especially during the tourist period, an access problem exists for patients and their families seeking psychiatric and substance abuse inpatient services (Exhibit 10, page 2). In 1990, Pasco County's population will reach 286,488. This total is broken down into East and West Pasco County, with population projected to be 88,811 and 197,677, respectively. Application of the numerical need methodology to the Pasco population indicates a projected need for 101 psychiatric beds in Pasco County, allocating 70 beds to West Pasco and 31 beds to East Pasco, to insure adequate services are provided to all residents of the County (Exhibit 26, page 3). Recognizing the existence of 46 psychiatric beds at Community in West Pasco, there remains a projected need for 24 psychiatric beds in West Pasco County. With no existing psychiatric beds being located in East Pasco County, between the two areas there is an estimated need for 55 psychiatric beds in the County as a whole, the precise number of short-term psychiatric inpatient beds sought for approval by Pasco (Exhibit 26, page 3). Applying the allocation portion of the rule for freestanding facilities to Pasco County residents, there is indicated a net need for beds in freestanding settings of 58 beds by the year 1990. The grant of 55 beds to the applicant in this case is, therefore, consistent with the provision of the rule (Exhibit 26, pages 3, 4). Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)7 recognizes that an applicant proposing to build a new but separate short-term psychiatric facility should have a minimum of 50 beds. There is no practical manner within which to approve a facility in East Pasco County at the present time, based solely on the East Pasco population, since the numerical need is only 31 (Exhibit 26, page 3). From a health planning standpoint, it is practical to build a facility in the middle of the County, as proposed here. The impact upon existing providers is lessened by its location while at the same time the facility has the ability to obtain patients from all portions of the County. A facility located farther east would not be financially feasible as a result of the low base population (Exhibit 26, page 3). According to Rule 10-5.11(25)(e)7, "short term inpatient hospital psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90% of the service area's population." Conversely stated, not more than 10% of the Pasco service area population should be outside this time/travel standard. The Pasco proposed project meets the objectives of this criterion and improves geographic access to psychiatric care for Pasco County residents (Exhibit 28, page 3). Unlike a psychiatric unit in a general acute care medical hospital, it is not possible for the psychiatric beds proposed here to be used for acute medical purposes. The concept of a focused, single-purpose facility is also in keeping with the goal of the District Mental Health Board Plan which indicates the need to develop centralized inpatient services in Pasco County. Rule 10-5.11(25) (e)1 (Exhibit 28, page 5). The Local Health Plan notes that it would be cost effective to apply a 75 percent average occupancy threshold for psychiatric and substance abuse services within the service area when considering additional inpatient facilities or services of this type. It also indicates that facts such as patient origin and accessibility should be considered within the need for beds. The plan notes that individuals from Pasco County have had to seek Baker Act services outside of the County and even the District. Thus, access to inpatient care for the indigent psychiatric patient is recognized to be a problem in Pasco County (Exhibit 8; Exhibit 27, pages 11-12; TR-84, lines 16-25; TR-85, lines 16-25; TR-93, lines 23-25; TR-94, line 1). According to the-plan, Baker Act and indigent residents of Pasco County must travel to facilities in District VI to obtain these services. Additionally, with respect to the need for beds, the Local Health Plan indicates that if the subdistrict analysis is accepted, then the need for psychiatric and substance abuse beds is greatest in Pasco County. The plan also notes that while past utilization of the psychiatric unit which exists in West Pasco County would seem to suggest low demand in the County, the low utilization stems in part from the restriction of access to private pay and involuntary patients (Exhibit 27, page 12). According to the plan, services are only being provided to private pay, voluntary patients; consequently, indigent patients are not being served. Baker Act patients who are involuntarily admitted have not been served (Exhibit 27, pages 12-13; TR-374, lines 2-25; TR-376, lines 21-25; TR-377, lines 1- 11). The applicant is proposing to allocate a combined total of at least 10 percent of its patient days to Baker Act and indigent patients, clearly assisting in meeting this need (Exhibit 27, pages 17-18). The Local Health Plan represents local statements and input addressing the needs within the community. The application meets and is consistent with the standards noted in the existing and approved Local Health Plan for District V (Exhibit 10, page 3), a specific requirement of Rule 10-5. 11(25 (e) 1. The applicant initially projected an occupancy rate of 71 percent of the second year and approximately 83 percent of the third year of operation satisfying the criterion contained in Rule 10-5.11.(25)(d), Florida Administrative Code. Subsection (d)(5) recommends that a project would normally not be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing short- term inpatient psychiatric beds in the district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12-month period. DHRS has interpreted this to be the average annual occupancy rate for all facilities for the short-term psychiatric beds within the service district, because the rule refers to the annual occupancy rate for existing beds in the service district, rather than to facilities (Exhibit 27, page 16). During the 12-month period July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1985 the existing short-term psychiatric facilities in District V reported an average of 75 percent occupancy level (Exhibit 27, page 17). Rule 10-5.11(25), Florida Administrative Code, indicates that a favorable determination may be made even when criteria other than those specified in the numeric need methodology, as provided further in Subsection (e) of Chapter 10- 5.11(25), are not met. This would also be true when applying the other criteria utilized in Section 381.494(6)(c) (Exhibit 27, page 13). Considering all these factors and the benefits that the proposed project would bring, there is a projected need for the 55 proposed short-term psychiatric beds shown under Rule 10- 5.11(25) (Exhibit 27, pages 22-23). Substance Abuse Bed Need In District V Rule 10-5.11(27) establishes a bed-to-population ratio of .06 beds per 1,000 population for the projected year in question (Exhibit 26, page 4). The need methodology, as applied to District V for 1990, shows a total need for 69 short-term substance abuse beds in District V. There are presently 74 licensed short-term substance abuse beds in District V and no additional CON approval. This results in a surplus of five beds in the district, without including the 17 beds approved for Pasco Psychiatric Center. (Exhibit 10, page 3, Exhibit 27, pages 23- 24). The Local Health Council has projected a need through 1990 for 17 substance abuse beds, using the State's formula contained in Rule 10-5.11(25) and 10.5.11(27) and applying the formula on a subdistrict basis (Exhibit A, page 118, table 11; Exhibit 10, page 2). Subsection (h)(l) contains a suggested standard of 80 percent occupancy rate in the District for the past 12 months. During the period from July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1985 reporting substance abuse bed facilities reported an average occupancy level of 88 percent. DHRS has determined there exist 22 short-term substance abuse beds at Horizon Hospital. However, Horizon does not report its utilization of those beds separately, but includes them within its reported short-term psychiatric beds (Exhibit 27, page 25). Much in the same manner as the short-term psychiatric rule, Rule 10-5.11(27)(h)3 refers to the Local Health Plan and consistency with local need determinations. According to the plan, there is a projected need in the two Pasco subdistricts for 17 short-term substance abuse beds by application of the numerical methodology .06 beds per 1,000 population to Pasco County. There are no short-term substance abuse beds available or approved in the Pasco County subdistricts (Exhibit 27, pages 11, 25-26). Rule 10-5.11(27)(h)4 establishes a minimum unit size of 10 designated beds. Additional calculation reveals that the numerical need for 17 beds is broken down into 12 beds in the . West Pasco area and five in East Pasco. Because of the minimum size requirement, there is no reasonable way for a unit to be built solely based on the East county portion of the numerical need. Consequently, a proper health planning alternative is to approve the 17-bed unit, which will be centrally located to serve both portions of the County (Exhibit 26, page 4). A Certificate of Need may be approved where need is determined through criteria other than the numeric need methodology. For example, criteria in Section 381.494(6)(c) and in subparagraph (f) of Rule (27) may indicate that need is demonstrated for the project beyond the numerical formula (Exhibit 27, page 23). Upon analysis of all the factors contained within the rule, the applicant meets the need for the Pasco subdistricts. AREAS OF CONSIDERATION IN ADDITION TO BED NEEDS A. Availability, Utilization, Geographic Accessibility And Economic Accessibility The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing health care services and hospices in the service district of the applicant. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 2 A number of hospital facilities serve District V's residents in need of psychiatric and substance abuse health care services (Exhibit 10, page 16 and 17, tables 9 and 10). Of these, Anclote Manor's patients have an average length of stay of more than two years. Anclote is licensed as a long-term care facility (Ibid., Exhibit 28, page 3) St. Anthony's Hospital, Mease Hospital and Suncoast Hospital have not contested the agency's initial decision to grant this application, leaving only Morton Plant and Horizon in Pinellas County and CHNPR in Pasco County as District V parties objecting to the application. CHNPR's patients are predominantly geriatric (Exhibit 28, page 3). During 1984 the utilization of psychiatric beds at Morton Plant was 137 percent. Hospitals in North Pinellas County show an average 100 percent utilization of their psychiatric beds for the period (Exhibit 35, pages 10 and 11). However, for the same period, utilization of CHNPR's psychiatric unit was 50 percent. Ibid. During the last available 12-month period of information (July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1985), the existing short-term psychiatric facilities in District V reported an average occupancy level of 75 percent (Exhibit 27, pages 16-17). Based upon utilization of less than 75 or 80 percent, there may exist underutilized beds for psychiatric services at Horizon Hospital (TR-798, lines 19-20). However, this conclusion is based upon the assumption that Horizon is licensed for 200 psychiatric beds (TR-798, lines 21-23). DHRS however, considers that Horizon is licensed (License 1809) for 178 psychiatric beds (TR-800, lines 10-15). Consequently, the number of licensed psychiatric beds affects the occupancy rates at Horizon. In order to determine access or demand within a community, factors besides utilization must be looked at (TR-887, lines 13-21). A number of other factors may and in this case do, in fact, affect occupancy rates (TR-887, lines 13-21). In addition to location, the existence of semi-private rooms, sex and age segregation policies adopted by various facilities, and corporate decisions artifically impede access and thus affect utilization and occupancy rates (TR-431, lines 9-13; TR-883, lines 12-24, 25; TR-884, lines 1-10). CHNPR's low occupancy rates are affected by the facility's location, lack of a commitment to indigents medically underserved patients, as well as its lack of segregation of psychiatric beds between adults and children (TR-392, lines 24- 25; TR-393, lines 1-9; TR-397, lines 13-19; TR-398, lines 4- 10).and 13; TR 883, lines 12-24, 25; TR-884, lines 4-10). Pasco residents have been forced to seek inpatient psychiatric and substance abuse services outside the County for years (Exhibit 21, page 1). The location of CHNPR in the western part of the county makes services inaccessible to residents of the eastern part of the county (TR-397, lines 1319; TR-398, lines 4-10). No facility exists in Pasco County that contains the proper housing for adolescents who need psychiatric services (Exhibit 21, page 2). Rainbow House, an adolescent residential care center in Dade City, can accommodate a very limited number of children and is not prepared to handle acutely ill children (TR-399, lines 5- 9). While CHNPR's psychiatric unit is designated for 46 beds, only 26 beds are available for psychiatric services. The dramatic changes in occupancy at Community Hospital of New Port Richey from 80 percent to 40 percent indicate the psychiatric beds are used for acute medical purposes (Exhibit 22, page 2). Without a public transportation system in Pasco County, travel time for Pasco residents and their families is a problem (TR-401, lines 14-25; TR-402, lines 1-23). A major portion of Pasco residents who have been provided inpatient services are provided those services by facilities located one hour away (Exhibit 22, page 2; Exhibit 23, pages 1-2; TR-397, lines 7-16). The access problem is more acute for the elderly, which comprise 32.7 percent of Pasco's population compared to 19.3 percent for all of Florida projected to 1990 (Exhibit 26, page 2). The distance to facilities serving Pasco County residents is sufficiently great as to make follow-up care very difficult, preventing family involvement, and making treatment inefficient (TR-325, lines 7-25; TR-408, lines 1-8; TR-436, lines 12-25). Based upon a July 1985 population of 240,204 approximately 13 percent of Pasco County residents are not within a 45-minute total travel time to a psychiatric facility in District V. This number is expected to increase to 19 percent of the County's population by 1990 (Exhibit 18, page 17, figures 10 and 11; page 14 and figure 13, page 15). United Medical Corporation (UMC), which owns Pasco, has a history of providing services to indigents and medically underserved (Exhibit 13, page 2) and in particular to residents of Pasco County. Ibid. This is based upon UMC's former ownership of Tampa Heights Hospital. At that time it was the facility that admitted Baker Act patients from Pasco County (Exhibit 10, page 3; Exhibit 13, page 2). CHNPR's recent corporate decision to take Baker Act patients is not persuasive as to the issue of access to indigents and medically under served (Exhibit 27, pages 19-20). The timing of the agreement with the Pasco and Hernando Human Development Councils during the pendency of these proceedings indicates, at a minimum, that the application here has already favorably affected access to these citizens. CHNPR's policy with respect to indigents, Medicaid and the medically underserved residents reduces the accessibility of these patients to its facility. See Turro v. DHRS and CHNPR v. DHRS, DOAH Case Nos. 83-005 and 83- 092, Recommended Order September 7, 1983, Final order October 25, 1983, 6 FALR 336, et seq. The proposed project will be accessible to residents in need of psychiatric and substance abuse services in District V. NEED FOR SPECIAL EQUIPMENT The need in the service district of the applicant for special equipment and services which are not reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 6. Although an issue in this proceeding, no evidence was presented as to the applicability of this criterion or the applicant's consistency or inability to meet this criterion. It is thus specifically found that this criterion is not applicable. NEED FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES The need for research and educational facilities including but not limited to institutional training programs and community training programs for health care practitioners and for doctors of osteopathy and medicine at the student internship and residency training level. Section 381.494(6)(c)7,. Although an issue in this proceeding, no evidence was presented as to the applicability of this criterion or the applicant's consistency or inability to meet this criterion. It is specifically found that this criterion is not applicable. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care. Section 381.494(6) (c)3. The availability of resources including health manpower, management personnel and funds for capital and operating expenditures for project accomplishment and operation; the effects the project will have on clinical needs of health professional training programs in the service district; the extent to which the services will be accessible to schools for health professions in the service district for training purposes if such services are available in the limited number of facilities; the availability of alternative uses of such resources for the provision of other health services; and the extent to which the proposed services will be accessible to all residents of the service district. Section 381.494 ( 6) (c) 8. Management and Quality of Care UMC, the parent corporation, has at its disposal management personnel and will be able to obtain health manpower to accomplish the project (Exhibit 12, page 2; Exhibit 13, pages 1-2). UMC presently owns and operates three psychiatric hospitals (Exhibit 11, page 1). The facility will have at its disposal UMC's services in the areas of management and recruitment. UMC has successfully recruited physicians and other health care providers in the past (Exhibit 13, page 1) lines 1-5; TR-332, lines 19-21). The applicant will be able to adequately staff and, manage the facility and provide quality care to its patients in the service area. Funds for Capitol and Operating Expenditure UMC has obtained a commitment from Freedom Savings & Loan Association to finance the project (Exhibit 14, page 2) and will therefore be able to obtain the financing necessary to build and operate the facility. No evidence was presented to show the project will have a detrimental effect on clinical needs of health professional training programs in the district for training. Financial Feasibility The facility will be financed through a construction loan with a 5-year permanent financing package at a rate of prime plus one and one-half percent floating and a two percent fee (Exhibit 14, page 1). The projections contained in Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5 as well as the underlying assumptions indicate the figures represent reasonable and accurate estimates of income and expenses that will be incurred in the event the Certificate of Need is issued (Exhibit 9, page 1; Exhibit 11, pages 2-3; Exhibit 12, pages 1-2; Exhibit 13, pages 1-2; Exhibit 15, page 2; Exhibit 17, pages 1-2; Exhibit 25, pages 6-9). Note: See also, Hoefle's testimony. CHNPR contends that the projected ALOS should be considered at CHNPR's level. However, the ALOS at CHNPR's psychiatric unit is directly affected by the influx of Baker Act patients and contractual limitations (TR-921, lines 19-25; TR- 922, lines 1-2; TR-452, lines 14-17; TR-453, lines 5-12). In the final analysis the financial feasibility of the proposal will depend to a large degree on whether physicians will admit patients to the facility. Doctors Vesley and Rudajev will support the facility when built and their projections as to the numbers of patients and ALOS are reasonable (TR-292, lines 17-18; TR-293, lines 4-7; TR-293, lines 12-15; TR-295, line 16; TR-317, lines 19-24; TR-324, lines 13-24; TR-325, lines 1-2; TR-336, lines 19-22; TR-332, lines 19-21). It is reasonable that other physicians in Pasco County will locate in the area surrounding the hospital and will support the facility once it is opened (TR- 413, lines 7-17; TR-792, lines 2-9). The needs and circumstances of those entities which provide a substantial portion of their services or resources or both to individuals not residing in the service district in which the entities are located or in adjacent service districts. Such entities may include medical and other health professions, schools, multi-disciplinary clinics and specialty services such as open-heart surgery, radiation therapy and renal transplantation. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 11. No evidence was presented indicating the applicability of this criterion or the applicant's ability or inability to meet this criterion. I find this criterion not applicable. AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH CARE ALTERNATIVES The availability and adequacy of other health care facilities and services and hospices in the service district of the applicant, such as outpatient care and ambulatory or home care services which may serve as alternatives for the health care facilities and services to be provided by the applicant. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 4. At the time of hearing, no alternatives to the application proposed were presented. Nor was other evidence presented to indicate alternatives to the proposed facility and services are, in fact, available at the time of this proceeding. Other than CHNPR no facilities located in Pasco County provides inpatient psychiatric services (TR-400, lines 21 25; TR- 4 01, lines 1-3). Probable economies and improvements in service that may be derived from operation of joint, cooperative or shared health care resources. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 5. The facility will share resources with other facilities owned or operated by UMC such as common training and joint purchasing (Exhibit 11, page 1); financial management (Exhibit 12); financing (Exhibit 14); and recruitment and marketing (Exhibit 13). These shared resources will provide economies and improve services presently available in District V. IMPACT UPON EXISTING FACILITIES AND COSTS AND COMPETITION The probable impact of the proposed project on the cost of providing health services proposed by the applicant upon consideration of factors including but not limited to the effects of competition on the supply of health services being proposed and the improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of health services which foster competition and service to promote quality assuance and cost effectiveness. Section 381.494 (6) (c) 12. Two hospitals in Pasco County in relatively close proximity to each other are owned by Hospital Corporation of America--Community Hospital of New Port Richey and Bayonet Point Medical Center--giving HCA 86 percent of all hospital beds in the West Pasco service area. The applicant's expert, Dr. Scott, compared statewide HCA hospital averages and daily pre-tax profits based on adjusted patient days with those at CHNPR and Bayonet Point, using 1982 actual hospital data reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board. The data indicates a much higher than HCA average operating margin, total margin, daily gross revenues and daily pre-tax profits. In Pasco County, HCA shows profitability roughly double that of its statewide averages (Exhibit 25, pages 3-4). HCA has now acquired the nearby freestanding psychiatric hospital at the University of South Florida (Exhibit 25, pages 3-4; TR-854, lines 14-18). Without competition, HCA will not be required to compete in Pasco County for price or quality of care. Approval of the application should significantly reduce HCA's share of the Pasco-Hillsborough market in terms of beds and would positively affect competition and the delivery of health care services (Exhibit 25, page 5; Exhibit 27, pages 29-30). In 1985 CHNPR psychiatric unit's occupancy rate was 41 percent (Exhibit 41, page 4). Following execution of its Baker Act agreements, occupancy rose to 49.7 percent (TR-921, pages 5- 18). CHNPR is a large institution which grossed more than $1 million in pre-tax income based on 50 percent utilization (TR-998, lines 21-25). CHNPR projects that in 1987, 1988 and 1989 only 1 percent of its revenues will be derived from Medicaid patients and .9 percent will be derived from indigents (TR-915, lines 18- 25; TR-916, lines 1-5). Left without competition, HCA will continue to dominate the health care delivery system in Pasco County, a situation which should not be continued. (TR-620, lines 24-25; TR-621; TR- 622). Morton Plant's witness agreed there exists a need for additional psychiatric and substance abuse beds in Pinellas and Pasco Counties in District V (TR-829, lines 15-25; TR-833, lines 3-6). In 1984, approximately 4 percent of Morton Plant's psychiatric patients resided in Pasco County (TR-837, lines 14- 17). Morton Plant's psychiatric unit's occupancy rates have consistently exceeded 100 percent (TR-838, lines 3-6) and there is a waiting list at Morton Plant's adolescent unit (TR-843, lines 2-4). Morton Plant presented no evidence that issuing this CON to Pasco would substantially affect its psychiatric unit (TR- 826, line 25; TR-827, lines 1-25; TR-828, lines 1-9). UPC, now owned by HCA, is located outside District V. UPC, as a university hospital, is different from any other in Florida (TR-860, lines 17-24). It was UPC's mission as a research and teaching facility, and its regional concept of .referrals extending over 17 counties, that led to the grant of its application by DHRS (TR-860, line 25; TR-861, lines 1-21). UPC projected 30 percent of its patients would be referred from outside the area including Pasco County (TR-856, lines 6-11). This limitation was not considered by Dr. Fernandez in concluding that UPC would be adversely affected by the grant of the CON to Pasco. The effect upon UPC is further lessened when one considers the general availability of UPC's facility to the Pasco/District V community. In order to admit patients to the UPC facility, physicians must be members of the UPC faculty (TR- 857, lines 5-11). Eight of UPC's beds will be subject to admissions restricted to only two physicians (TR-857, line 25; TR-858, lines 1-25; TR-859, lines 1-20). Horizon and Hernando are owned by PIA. Horizon receives approximately 5 percent of its patients from Pasco County (TR-787, lines 23-25; TR-788, lines 1- 2). Approval of the Pasco facility may cause Horizon to lose 80 to 90 percent of its total 137 admissions from Pasco--109 to 123 admissions; however, this loss may occur with or without approval of this application (TR-792, lines 17-25; TR-793, lines 1-9). Horizon's expert's testimony regarding utilization was based upon Horizon being licensed for 200 psychiatric beds (TR- 798, lines 1-24); however, DHRS considers Horizon licensed for 178 (TR-798, lines 25; TR-799, lines 1-25; TR-800, lines 1-25; TR-801, lines 1-4). Hernando, located in District III, relied upon a need argument based solely on District III, not District V, in pursuing its CON application (TR-770, lines 18-25; TR-771, line 1). Hernando has previously defined its primary service area as only including Citrus and Hernando Counties, both in District III, and did not include Pasco County within its secondary service area, or for purposes of projecting its admission rates or feasibility (TR-771, lines 14-22; TR-772 lines 10-15; TR-775, lines 20-25; TR-776, lines 1-2; TR-777, lines 5- 16). Community Care has not determined a site for its facility in Citrus County (Exhibit 29, page 6, lines 9-11). Community Care opposes the application because its main concern is the reduction in market share that may be available to its facility (Exhibit 29, page 27, lines 2-6). In its CON application in 1983, Community Care relied only upon District III as its population base (Exhibit 29, page 8, lines 18-21; page 9, lines 19-25). Community Care relief upon the Local Health Plan in District III in establishing need (Exhibit 29, page 10, lines 1- 10) and relied solely upon Citrus and District III population growth as its patient base (Exhibit 29, page 10, lines 10-15). Community Care will not provide short-term substance abuse services (Exhibit 29, page 20, lines 12-18; page 25, lines 11-25). Approval of the Pasco facility will not increase the cost of health services in District V and will favorably affect present services, promoting more efficiency in the health delivery system. The effect of the approval, with its related conditions, will assure access to underserved residents who otherwise will continue at the mercy of the HCA facilities. 110. Approval will not substantially adversely affect providers within or outside District V. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE PROPOSALS The costs and methods of proposed con- struction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction. Section 381.49 (6) (c)13. In cases of capital expenditure proposals for the provision of new health services to inpatients, the department shall also reference each of the following its findings of fact: That less costly, more efficient, or more appropriate alternatives to such inpatient services are not available and the development of such alternatives has been studied and found not practicable. That existing inpatient facilities providing inpatient services similar to those proposed are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner. In the case of new construction, for example, modernization or sharing arrangements, have been considered and have been implemented to the maximum extent practicable. That patients will experience serious problems in obtaining inpatient care of the type proposed, in the absence of the proposed new service. Section 381.494 ( 6) (d) 1-4. The evidence indicates the costs and methods of the proposed construction are reasonable. The normal percentage of architectural and engineering fees are in the range of 5 percent to 7 percent of construction costs; in this case the architectural and engineering fees are approximately 6 percent. The construction costs of approximately $78 to $80 per square foot are reasonable for this type facility (Exhibit 15, page 2; Exhibit 17, pages 1-2). See also footnotes to paragraphs 86 and 87. Less costly, more efficient or more appropriate alternatives to the services proposed here are not available. No existing facility or applicant has filed an application seeking to provide services similar to those sought to be provided by this applicant for the target population year 1990. Existing inpatient facilities providing services similar to those proposed are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner. Utilization rates at existing district facilities when considered in light of accessibility including artificial barriers, indicate the facilities are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner. As noted earlier, alternatives to the project here at issue are not present. The lack of access, geographical, financial and artificial, to residents of Pasco County in need of psychiatric and substance abuse services, as well as the numerical need evidenced by application of the state-mandated need methodologies indicate that, absent the proposed service, patients will experience serious problems in obtaining psychiatric and substance abuse inpatient care.
