The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents Paul Crum, Sr., and Paul Crum, Jr. (the "Crums"), are entitled to the Noticed General Permit issued by the Department of Environmental Protection ("Department") for the construction of a single- family residential dock and associated structures.
Findings Of Fact Background The Crums are the owners of the riparian property located at 15696 Shark Road West, Jacksonville, Florida. The Crum property is adjacent to Pumpkin Hill Creek, which lies within the Nassau River-St. Johns River Marshes Aquatic Preserve. Extending from the Crum property into Pumpkin Hill Creek is an existing wood dock approximately 90 feet long and four feet wide, with a platform near the landward end of the dock. Petitioner Brooks owns the property immediately adjacent to and north of the Crum property. Petitioner Brooks has a dock and boat lift. Petitioner Cole owns the property immediately adjacent to and southeast of the Crum property. The Cole property is located on a salt marsh and has no dock. Petitioner Jones lives approximately 3,200 feet north of the Crum property, on a tributary to Pumpkin Hill Creek. Petitioner Jones has fished Pumpkin Hill Creek and the surrounding waters for over 25 years. Noticed General Permits are a type of environmental resource permit granted by rule for those activities which have been determined to have minimal impacts to water resources. Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427 grants by rule a general permit to construct a single family pier, along with boat lifts and terminal platforms, provided certain specific criteria are met. In August 2005, the Crums applied for a Noticed General Permit to extend their existing dock into deeper water. The Department issued a Notice of Determination of Qualification for Noticed General Permit, but later rescinded the authorization after Petitioner Brooks complained to the Department that the landward end of the existing dock is located only 21 feet from her property boundary and, therefore, did not comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.004(3)(d), which requires that a dock be set back a minimum of 25 feet "inside the applicant's riparian rights lines." In November 2005, the Crums re-applied for a Noticed General Permit. Their revised plans called for removal of the existing dock and construction of a new dock extending approximately 255 feet out into Pumpkin Hill Creek. The proposed dock would be located a minimum of 25 feet inside the Crums' riparian rights lines. On December 6, 2005, the Department issued a Notice of Determination of Qualification for a Noticed General Permit for the revised dock, stating that the project satisfied the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427, as well as the conditions for authorization to perform activities on state-owned submerged lands set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21 and for activities in an aquatic preserve under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20. In April 2006, Petitioners filed three petitions for hearing with the Department alleging that the proposed dock significantly impedes navigation by restricting access to a tidal creek and extends more waterward than necessary to access a water depth of (minus) -4 feet at mean low water, which is prohibited for docks in aquatic preserves under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.005(3)(b)3. Petitioners attached to their petitions a copy of a bathymetric survey showing the elevations of the submerged lands in the vicinity of the proposed project. In response to the information contained in the survey, the Crums revised their plans to shorten the dock to its currently proposed length of 186.56 feet. A new Notice of Determination of Qualification for a Notice General Permit was then issued by the Department on October 16, 2006. The final dock project consists of: (a) removal of the existing wood dock; (b) construction of a four-foot wide, 186.56-foot long, single family residential dock consisting of an access pier, a 12-foot by 12-foot terminal platform, and a 14-foot by 20-foot open boat lift with catwalk (the “proposed dock”). The proposed dock will terminate where the water will be four feet deep at mean low water. Navigating in and Near the Tidal Creek To the south of the Crum property is a wide expanse of salt marsh. Within the salt marsh are unnamed tidal creeks. The mouth of one tidal creek that flows to Pumpkin Hill Creek is located approximately 90 feet south of the existing Crum dock. The tidal creek is shallow and is not navigable at or near low tide. Petitioner Jones owns an 18-foot flatboat which he sometimes keeps at his residence and sometimes at Petitioner Brooks' property. The boat draws about one foot of water. Petitioner Jones uses this boat to fish in the tidal creek located near the Crum property about ten times every month. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner Brooks or Petitioner Cole ever navigate in or otherwise use this tidal creek. There are many other tidal creeks located in the marshes associated with Pumpkin Hill Creek. Petitioner Jones boats and fishes in most of them. Petitioner Jones said that, currently, he must wait two hours past low tide for the water depth to be sufficient for him to get into the tidal creek near the Crum property. His usual course to the creek lies just beyond the end of the existing Crum dock. He claims there is a channel there, but no channel is shown on the survey or in any of the parties' photographs. After the proposed dock is constructed, Petitioner Jones' usual course to the tidal will be obstructed. He contends that the new course he would have to take to the tidal creek will take him across shallower areas of Pumpkin Hill Creek so that he will have to wait two more hours (a total of four hours) after low tide to get into the creek. Therefore, Petitioner Jones' alleged injury is the reduction of the hours available to him to navigate in and out of the tidal creek for fishing. The existing Crum dock terminates on a broad mud flat which is exposed at mean low water. However, the bathymetric survey shows the mud flat is at a lower elevation near the end of the dock so water covers this area before it covers the rest of the mud flat. However, the bathymetric survey also shows the elevation of the bottom rising as one moves south from the existing dock. At the mouth of the tidal creek the elevation is 1.0 feet NGVD (National Geodetic Vertical Datum, an official, surveyed reference point). Because the tidal creek drains into the main body of Pumpkin Hill Creek, a reasonable inference can be made that the bottom elevations in the creek generally become higher (and the water depths decrease) as one moves up the creek toward dry land. Prop scars in the exposed bottom at the end of the existing dock indicate that boats have traveled over this area when the water was so shallow that the engine props were striking the bottom. Prop scarring can cause turbidity and damage to benthic organisms. The bathymetric survey indicates that mean high water in this area of Pumpkin Hill Creek is 3.03 feet NGVD, and the mean low water is -1.78 feet NGVD. The mean tidal fluctuation between mean low water and mean high water is thus 4.81 feet. Randall Armstrong, who was accepted as an expert in navigation and piloting, explained that in this area, where there are two daily tides, the water elevation will generally increase by 1/12 of the mean tidal fluctuation in the first hour after mean low water, another 2/12 of the fluctuation in the second, and 3/12 in the third hour. Applying this general rule to the tidal fluctuation here of 4.81 feet results in an estimated 1.2-foot increase in water elevation two hours after low tide and a 2.4-foot increase three hours after low tide. Based on the mean low water elevation of -1.78 feet NGVD, the water elevation would usually be about -0.6 foot NGVD two hours after low tide and 0.6 foot NGVD three hours after low tide. Therefore, the tidal creek (with a bottom elevation of 1.0 foot NGVD at the mouth) would usually be "dry" two hours after low tide and would usually have less than a foot of water three hours after low tide. That evidence contradicts Petitioner Jones' statement that he now navigates into the tidal creek two hours after low tide. That might occasionally be possible, but the bathymetric survey indicates the creek would usually be too shallow at that time. In fact, the evidence suggests that the tidal creek is only reliably navigable without causing prop scars to the bottom by using boats with very shallow draft and waiting until high tide (or shortly before or after) when the water depth at the mouth of the creek would be about two feet. It was Mr. Armstrong's opinion that the 1.0-foot NGVD elevation at the mouth of the tidal creek determines when and how long the tidal creek is navigable, and those times would not be affected by the proposed dock. He described the new course that a boater would use to navigate into the tidal creek after the proposed dock is built. He used the bathymetric survey to show that when the water is deep enough to navigate into the tidal creek, the water depth is also sufficient to navigate the new course. The proposed dock might, as Petitioner Jones alleges, cause boaters to traverse a longer section of the mudflat then they do currently. However, the more persuasive testimony supports the Crums' position that the navigability of the tidal creek is controlled by its shallowest point at the 1.0-foot NGVD elevation and that the proposed dock will not interfere with navigation of the tidal creek by requiring boaters to traverse shallower areas. Petitioner Jones testified that he regularly navigates his boat close to the existing Crum dock. The evidence does not indicate that the proposed dock would cause an unreasonable risk of collision for boaters using the new course to the tidal creek.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that grants Noticed General Permit No. 16-253057-002-EG to the Crums. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2006.
The Issue Whether the finger pier portion of Respondent Raab's dock creates a navigational hazard. The resolution of that issue will determine whether the dock qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact DEP has the authority to regulate the construction of docks in jurisdictional wetlands and other waters of the State of Florida and on state submerged lands under Chapters 253, 373, and 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 62-330 (which adopts Chapter 40E-4) and 18-21, Florida Administrative Code. The Association is a residential community located in Sewall's Point, Martin County, Florida. All lots within the community abut navigable channels which provide ingress and egress to the ICW. These channels converge so that there is only one channel that connects to the ICW. Most of the residents of the community have large vessels that routinely navigate the channels within the community. At the time of the formal hearing, many of the vessels owned by residents of the community had drafts of four feet and at least two had drafts of five feet. In 1997, Mr. Raab purchased a residence in the Association that is located very close to where the channel meets the ICW. Because of that location, practically all residents of the Association have to pass in front of Mr. Raab's property when going into or returning from the ICW. The property at issue is located at 22 Simara Street, Sewalls Point, Martin County, Florida. The dock at issue in this proceeding is subject to DEP's regulatory authority. When Mr. Raab purchased this property in 1997, there was an existing marginal dock parallel to the bulk-head. Mr. Raab subsequently sought and received approval from DEP to demolish the existing marginal dock and replace it with a virtually identical structure. The existence and configuration of the marginal dock is not at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Raab thereafter sought to modify his approved marginal dock by adding a finger pier which extended into the channel 36 feet so he could dock his vessel perpendicular to the bulkhead. Mr. Raab's plan also called for the construction of two pilings 12 feet from the end of the finger pier. Mr. Raab had, as of the time of the formal hearing, re-constructed the marginal dock and had constructed the finger pier. 3/ The two additional pilings had not been constructed at the time of the formal hearing. After reviewing the modified project, DEP determined that the project was exempt from the need for an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes. DEP also authorized Mr. Raab to use state-owned submerged lands if necessary. The Association thereafter timely challenged DEP's determination that the finger pier portion of the project (and the two additional pilings) did not require an environmental resource permit. There was a conflict in the evidence as to the functional width of the channel in front of Mr. Raab's property. 4/ Mr. Holly testified on behalf of the Association that the functional width of the channel was 83 feet. Mr. Lidberg, testifying on behalf of Mr. Raab, testified that the functional width was 101 feet. This conflict is resolved by finding that the functional width of the channel in front of the Raab property is 101 feet. 5/ The prevailing winds in the area in front of Mr. Raabb's dock blow into the dock. The depth of the water in the channels is influenced by tides. The principal reason Mr. Raab wants the finger pier is so that he can moor his boat with the bow to the prevailing winds in times of high winds. At the time of the formal hearing, Mr. Raab owned a vessel with an overall length of 44 feet. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Raab's finger pier and the two pilings that have been authorized, but not constructed, constitute a hazard to navigation. 6/ Based on the totality of the evidence, it is found that these structures do not create a navigational hazard. 7/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order dismissing the Association's challenge to the determination that Mr. Raab's project qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2000.
The Issue Whether Respondent Richardson’s application for a wetlands resource permit to construct a private road and bridge through wetlands should be denied for failing to provide mitigation to offset the impacts to existing wetlands. Whether Respondent Richardson had provided the Department with reasonable assurance that he or she owns or has sufficient authorization to use certain land in mitigation to offset the wetland impacts.
Findings Of Fact In January of 1990, John Richardson applied to the Department for a wetland resource (dredge and fill) permit under Section 403.918, Florida Statutes to construct a private road and bridge through wetlands. The proposed project would impact 0.032 acres of wetland. The proposed project is not located in an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW). The proposed project would adversely affect the following: the conservation of fish and wildlife; the fishing, recreational values, and marine productivity in the vicinity of the proposed project; and the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by the wetlands impacted by the project. The proposed project would be permanent in nature. The proposed project would not meet the criteria of Section 403.918(2)(a) Florida Statutes, without mitigation adequate to offset the impacts to wetlands. To provide adequate mitigation for the proposed project, Respondent John Richardson proposed to create and preserve 0.029 acres of new wetlands and preserve 4.35 acres of existing wetlands. The preservation would consist of granting to the Department a perpetual conservation easement over the mitigation wetlands. Respondent John Richardson represented to the Department that he was the record owner or had permission to use the land that he offered for mitigation. The Department reasonably relied on that representation. The mitigation proposed by Respondent John Richardson would be adequate to offset the impacts to wetlands resulting from the proposed project. On March 4, 1992, the Department issued to John Richardson a wetlands resource permit for the proposed project. The Department was not aware, before it issued this permit, that John Richardson might not own or have permission to use the mitigation land. The Department was substantially justified in issuing the permit to John Richardson on March 4, 1992. Specific conditions 28-31 of that permit required Respondent John Richardson to grant the Department a conservation easement over the mitigation land within thirty days after issuance of the permit. Respondent John Richardson failed to grant the Department the required conservation easement, and failed to publish notice of the Department’s action. On July 22, 1996, Petitioners filed a timely petition with the Department challenging the Department’s issuance of the March 4, 1992, permit to Respondent John Richardson. On September 11, 1996, Janet Richardson filed an application with the Department for transfer of the March 4, 1992, permit to her following the dissolution of marriage with John Richardson. By letter dated October 11, 1996, the Department requested Janet Richardson to provide additional documentation to show that she either owns the mitigation land or has permission to use that land. Janet Richardson was required to provide a legal survey drawing depicting the mitigation land, property records showing ownership of that land, and a notarized statement from the land owner authorizing her to use that land. The Department specifically advised Janet Richardson that it could not approve the proposed project if she failed to submit this requested documentation to the Department prior to the final hearing. Janet Richardson failed to provide the requested documentation by the date of the final hearing in this matter, or subsequently. As of November 6, 1996, no work had begun on the proposed project. At the hearing, the Department adequately explained its change in position from deciding to issue the permit (on March 4, 1992) and proposing denial of the permit (on November 6, 1996). The Department relies on an applicant’s representations regarding ownership of or right to use land unless a problem is brought to the Department’s attention. In this case, the Department was not aware that there was a problem with the applicant’s right to use the mitigation land until the petition was filed with the Department on July 22, 1996. Janet Richardson failed to provide proof that she either owns or is authorized to use the land to mitigate the impacts to wetlands from the proposed project. Without such proof, Janet Richardson failed to prove that she could mitigate those same impacts from the proposed project.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order denying Respondent Richardson’s request for a wetlands resource permit for the proposed project.ONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Stauffer Post Office Box 97 Aripeka, Florida 34679-097 Cy Plata Post Office Box 64 Aripeka, Florida 34679 Steven McCallum Post Office Box 484 Aripeka, Florida 34679 Leslie Neumann Post Office Box 738 Aripeka, Florida 34679 John Richardson 700 West Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34607 Janet Richardson 1603 Osowaw Boulevard Springhill, Florida 34607 Thomas I. Mayton, Jr., Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virgina B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Daniel A. Reynolds, should take corrective action and pay investigative costs for allegedly controlling, eradicating, removing, or otherwise altering aquatic vegetation on eighty-seven feet of shoreline adjacent to his property on Lake June-in-Winter (Lake June) in Highlands County, Florida, without an aquatic plant management permit.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent is the riparian owner of the property located at 260 Lake June Road, Lake Placid, Highlands County (County), Florida. He has owned the property since 2001 and resides there with his wife and two young children. The parcel is identified as Parcel ID Number C-25-36-29-A00-0171-0000. The southern boundary of his property, which extends around eighty-seven feet, abuts Lake June. Respondent has constructed a partially covered dock extending into the waters of Lake June, on which jet skis, a canoe, and other recreational equipment are stored. The Department is the administrative agency charged with protecting the State's water resources and administering and enforcing the provisions of Part I, Chapter 369, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated under Title 62 of the Florida Administrative Code. The parties have stipulated that Lake June is not wholly-owned by one person; that it was not artificially created to be used exclusively for agricultural purposes; that it is not an electrical power plant cooling pond, reservoir, or canal; and that it has a surface area greater than ten acres. As such, the parties agree that Lake June constitutes "waters" or "waters of the state" within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62C-20.0015(23), and is not exempt from the Department's aquatic plant management permitting program under Florida Administrative Code Rule 62C-20.0035. Unless expressly exempted, a riparian owner who wishes to control, eradicate, remove, or otherwise alter any aquatic plants in waters of the state must obtain an aquatic plant management permit from the Department. See § 369.20(7), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 62C-20.002(1). An aquatic plant is defined as "any plant, including a floating plant, emersed, submersed, or ditchbank species, growing in, or closely associated with, an aquatic environment, and includes any part or seed of such plant." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62C-20.0015(1). These plants are found not only in the water, but also along the shoreline when the water recedes below the high water mark. They provide important habitat for fish, insects, birds, frogs, and other animals. Torpedo Grass and Maidencane are two common species of aquatic plants or weeds. Applications for a permit are filed with one of the Department's regional offices. After a site inspection is made, a permit is issued as a matter of right without charge or the need for a hearing, and it is effective for a period of three years. A Department witness indicated that there are approximately 1,300 active permits at the present time, including an undisclosed number of permits for property owners on Lake June.3 It is undisputed that Respondent has never obtained a permit. A statutory exemption provides that "a riparian owner may physically or mechanically remove herbaceous aquatic plants . . . within an area delimited by up to 50 percent of the property owner's frontage or 50 feet, whichever is less, and by a sufficient length waterward from, and perpendicular to, the riparian owner's shoreline to create a corridor to allow access for a boat or swimmer to reach open water." § 369.20(8), Fla. Stat. The exemption was established so that riparian owners could create a vegetation-free access corridor to the waterbody adjacent to their upland property. The statute makes clear that "physical or mechanical removal does not include the use of any chemicals . . . ." Id. If chemicals are used, the exemption does not apply. Under the foregoing exemption, Respondent could remove up to 43.5 feet of aquatic vegetation in front of his property on Lake June, or one-half of his eighty-seven foot shoreline. By way of background, since purchasing his property in 2001, Respondent has had a long and acrimonious relationship with his two next door neighbors, Mr. Slevins (to the west) and Mr. Krips (to the east).4 Neither neighbor uses Lake June for recreational purposes. After purchasing the property, Respondent says that Mr. Slevin began to verbally harass and threaten his family, particularly his wife. When Respondent observed the two neighbors repeatedly trespassing on his property, including the placing of an irrigation system and a garden over the boundary lines, Respondent built a fence around his lot, which engendered a circuit court action by the neighbors over the correct boundary line of the adjoining properties. Respondent says the action was resolved in his favor. According to Respondent, Mr. Slevins and Mr. Krips have filed "probably 100 to 200 different complaints on everything from barking dogs, to weeding the yard to calling DEP." Respondent also indicated that Mr. Slevins is a personal friend of the Highlands County Lakes Manager, Mr. Ford. As his title implies, Mr. Ford has the responsibility of inspecting the lakes in the County. If he believes that aquatic vegetation has been unlawfully removed or altered, he notifies the Department's South Central Field Office (Field Office) in Bartow since the County has no enforcement authority. Mr. Reynolds says that a personal and social relationship exists between Mr. Slevins and Mr. Ford, and through that relationship, Mr. Slevins encouraged Mr. Ford to file at least two complaints with the Field Office alleging that Respondent removed aquatic vegetation in Lake June without a permit. In 2002, the Department received a complaint about "aquatic plant management activity" on Respondent's property. There is no indication in the record of who filed the complaint, although Respondent suspects it was generated by Mr. Slevins. In any event, after an inspection of the property was made by the then Regional Biologist, and improper removal of vegetation noted, Respondent was sent a "standard warning letter" that asked him "to let it regrow" naturally. According to the Department's Chief of the Bureau of Invasive Plant Management, Mr. William Caton, Respondent "did not" follow this advice. In 2004, another complaint was filed, this time by the Highlands County Lakes Manager. After an inspection was made, another letter was sent to Respondent asking him to "let it regrow," to implement a revegetation plan, and to contact the Department's Regional Biologist. After receiving the letter, Respondent's wife telephoned Mr. Caton, whose office is in Tallahassee, and advised him that the complaint was the result of "a neighbor feud." Among other things, Mr. Caton advised her that the Department would not "get in the middle" of a neighbor squabble. At hearing, he disputed Mrs. Reynolds' claim that he told her to disregard the warning letter. He added that Respondent did not "follow through with" the corrective actions. As a result of another complaint being filed by the Highlands County Lakes Manager in 2006, a field inspection was conducted on July 12, 2006, by a Department Regional Biologist, Erica C. Van Horn. When she arrived, she noticed that the property was fenced and locked with a "Beware of Dog" sign. Ms. Van Horn then went to the home of Mr. Slevins, who lives next door, and was granted permission to access his property to get to the shoreline. The first thing Ms. Van Horn noticed was that the "lake abutting 260 Lake June Road was completely devoid of vegetation." She further noted that "on either side of that property [there was] lush green Torpedo Grass." Ms. Van Horn found it "very unusual" for the vegetation to stop right at the riparian line. Although she observed that there was "a small percentage of Maidencane" on the site, approximately ninety to ninety-five percent of the frontage "was free of aquatic vegetation." Finally, she noted that the dead Torpedo Grass on the east and west sides of the property was in an "[arc] shape pattern," which is very typical when someone uses a herbicide sprayer. During the course of her inspection, Ms. Van Horn took four photographs to memorialize her observations. The pictures were taken from the east and west sides of Respondent's property while standing on the Slevins and Krips' properties and have been received in evidence as Department's Exhibits 1-4. They reflect a sandy white beach with virtually no vegetation on Respondent's shoreline or in the lake, brown or dead vegetation around the property lines on each side, and thick green vegetation beginning on both the Slevins and Krips' properties. The dead grass to the east had been chopped into small pieces. During her inspection, Ms. Van Horn did not take any samples or perform field testing to determine if herbicides had been actually used since such testing is not a part of the Department's inspection protocol. This is because herbicides have a "very short half life," and they would have broken down by the time the vegetation turns brown leaving no trace of the chemicals in the water. Ms. Van Horn left her business card at the gate when she departed and assumed that Respondent would contact her. On a later undisclosed date, Respondent telephoned Ms. Van Horn, who advised him that he was out of compliance with regulations and explained a number of ways in which he could "come into compliance with these rules," such as revegetation. She says he was not interested. After her inspection was completed, Ms. Van Horn filed a report and sent the photographs to Mr. Caton for his review. Mr. Caton has twenty-seven years of experience in this area and has reviewed thousands of sites during his tenure with the Department. Based on the coloration of the vegetation right next to the green healthy vegetation on the adjoining properties, Mr. Caton concluded that the vegetation on Respondent's property had "classic herbicide impact symptoms." He further concluded that the vegetation had been chemically sprayed up to the boundary lines on each side of Respondent's property before it was cut with a device such as a weedeater. Based on the history of the property involving two earlier complaints, Respondent's failure to take corrective action, and the results of the most recent inspection, Mr. Caton recommended that an enforcement action be initiated. On August 11, 2006, Ms. Van Horn sent Respondent a letter advising him that a violation of Department rules may have occurred based upon the findings of her inspection. The letter described the unlawful activities as being "removal of aquatic vegetation from the span of the total adjacent shore line and significant over spray on to aquatic vegetation of neighboring properties on either side of [his] property." Respondent was advised to contact Ms. Van Horn "to discuss this matter." On May 15, 2007, the Department filed its Notice alleging that Respondent had "chemically controlled" the aquatic vegetation on eighty-seven feet of his shoreline in violation of Section 369.20(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 62C-20.002(1). The Notice sought the imposition of an administrative penalty in the amount of $3,000.00, recovery of reasonable investigative costs and expenses, and prescribed certain corrective action. On April 28, 2008, the Department filed an Amended Notice alleging that, rather than chemically removing the vegetation, Respondent had controlled, eradicated, removed, or otherwise altered the aquatic vegetation on his shoreline. The Amended Notice deleted the provision requesting the imposition of an administrative penalty, expressly sought the recovery of investigative costs and expenses of not less than $179.00, and modified the corrective action. After her initial inspection, Ms. Van Horn rode by the property in a Department boat on several occasions while conducting other inspections on Lake June and observed that the property "was still mostly devoid of vegetation." At the direction of a supervisor, on June 15, 2007, she returned to Respondent's property for the purpose of assessing whether any changes had occurred since her inspection eleven months earlier. This inspection was performed lakeside from a Department boat without actually going on the property, although she spoke with Respondent's wife who was standing on the dock. Ms. Van Horn observed that the area was still "devoid of vegetation but there was some Torpedo Grass growing back on the [eastern] side." She estimated that "much more" than fifty percent of the shoreline was free of vegetation. Photographs depicting the area on that date have been received in evidence as Department's Exhibits 5-7. Both Respondent and his wife have denied that they use any chemicals on their property, especially since their children regularly swim in the lake in front of their home. Respondent attributes the loss of vegetation mainly to constant use of the back yard, dock area, and shoreline for water-related activities, such as swimming, using jet skis, fishing, and launching and paddling a canoe. In addition, the Reynolds frequently host parties for their children and their friends, who are constantly tramping down the vegetation on the shoreline and in the water. He further pointed out that beginning with the house just beyond Mr. Krip's home, the next five houses have "no vegetation" because there are some areas on the lake that "naturally do not have any vegetation across them." Finally, he noted that Lake Juno suffered the impacts of three hurricanes in 2004, which caused a devastating effect on its vegetation. Respondent presented the testimony of Brian Proctor, a former Department aquatic preserve manager, who now performs environmental restoration as a consultant. Mr. Proctor visited the site in June 2007 and observed "full and thick" Torpedo Grass "growing in the east and west of the property lines." Based on that inspection, Mr. Proctor said he was "comfortable stating that at the time [he] did the site visit in June of '07 there was nothing that appeared to be chemical treatment on Mr. Reynold's property." He agreed, however, that the "shoreline vegetation was poor," and he acknowledged that it was unusual that Lake Juno was lush with aquatic vegetation in front of the neighboring properties to the east and west but stopped at Respondent's riparian lines. When shown the June 2006 photographs taken by Ms. Van Horn, he acknowledged that it "appeared" the property had been chemically treated. He was able to make this determination even though a soil test had not been performed. Photographs introduced into evidence as Respondent's Exhibits 1-4 reflect that on June 27, 2007, there was thick green vegetation on both sides of his property, although one photograph (Respondent's Exhibit 1) shows only limited vegetation along the shoreline and in the lake in the middle part of the property. The photographs are corroborated by a DVD recorded by Respondent on the day that Ms. Van Horn returned for a follow-up inspection. While these photographs and DVD may impact the amount of corrective action now required to restore the property to its original state, they do not contradict the findings made by Ms. Van Horn during her inspection on July 12, 2006. Finally, photographs taken in 2003 to depict what appears to be chemical spraying of vegetation and the construction of a bulkhead without a permit by Mr. Slevins have no probative value in proving or disproving the allegations at issue here. The greater weight of evidence supports a finding that it is very unlikely that heavy usage of the shoreline and adjacent waters in the lake by Respondent's family and their guests alone would cause ninety-five percent of the shoreline and lake waters to be devoid of vegetation when the inspection was made in July 2006. Assuming arguendo that this is true, Respondent was still required to get a permit since the amount of vegetation altered or removed through these activities exceeded more than fifty percent of the vegetation on the shoreline. More than likely, the vegetation was removed by a combination of factors, including recreational usage, mechanical or physical means, and the application of chemical herbicides on each riparian boundary line, as alleged in the Amended Notice. The fact that the Department did not perform any testing of the water or soil for chemicals does not invalidate its findings. Finally, the acrimonious relationship that exists between Respondent and his neighbors has no bearing on the legitimacy of the charges. Therefore, the allegations in the Amended Notice have been sustained. The parties have stipulated that if the charges are sustained, Respondent is entitled to recover reasonable costs and expenses associated with this investigation in the amount of $179.00. As corrective action, the Amended Notice requires that Respondent obtain a permit to remove Torpedo Grass from his property and to replant "126 well-rooted, nursery grown Pontederia cordata ("pickerelweed") at the locations depicted on the map" attached to the Amended Notice. Because the evidence suggests that some of the area in which vegetation was removed in 2006 had regrown by July 2007, the proposed corrective action may be subject to modification, depending on the current state of the property.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether the Respondent, Roy Palmer, is entitled to a Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit, under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-341, and a Consent of Use under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 18-21.
Findings Of Fact Procedural History On or about February 13, 1995, the Respondent, Roy Palmer (Palmer), applied for a wetland resource permit to construct a 395-foot boat dock for use at his single-family residence at property he owned on Sarasota Bay, an Outstanding Florida Water. As proposed, this dock was to originate from the northern part of Palmer's property and have a terminal platform with two boat moorings and two boat lifts. On September 1, 1995, the Department of Environmental Protection (the Department or DEP) gave notice of intent to issue a permit for a shorter (370-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging the intended action. DEP referred the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 95-5311. On or about December 11, 1995, Palmer applied for a noticed general environmental resource permit (ERP) permit for his dock under new DEP rules went into effect on October 3, 1995. This proposal was for the 370-foot dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. On or about January 10, 1996, DEP acknowledged receipt of the noticed general ERP (No. 582819483) and informed Palmer that it appeared to meet the requirements of the new rule. DEP also gave notice of intent to grant Palmer's application for consent of use of sovereign submerged lands necessary to construct the dock. (The record is not clear when the application for consent of use was filed.) The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging agency action regarding both the noticed general ERP and the consent of use. DEP also referred this petition to DOAH, where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 96-0736. Palmer withdrew the original permit application and moved to dismiss DOAH Case No. 95-5311. In July, 1996, Palmer applied for a noticed general ERP to build a still shorter (232-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property (Permit No. 292583). Apparently, no notice of the application was published or required to be published. It is not clear whether the Petitioners "filed a written request for notification of any pending applications affecting the particular area in which the proposed activity is to occur." Palmer's second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) was amended on or about August 19, 1996, to eliminate one boat mooring and one boat lift. DEP took no action on Palmer's second application for a noticed general ERP No. 292583. On September 23, 1996, Palmer filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Administrative Proceeding in DOAH Case No. 96-0736 because he had withdrawn the previous application for a noticed general ERP for a 370-foot dock (No. 582819483) and was proceeding only on the second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) for the 232foot dock. Palmer's intent was to dismiss only the portion of his prior application regarding the noticed general permit, but not the consent of use. On October 28, 1996, the Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging noticed general ERP No. 292583 for the 232-foot dock. This petition alleged that the Petitioners filed a written objection to noticed general ERP No. on September 16, 1996, which requested a written response, and that no response of any kind was received until the Petitioners inquired and were told that DEP did not intend to respond to either the noticed general ERP (No. 292583) or the Petitioners' objection. Proposed Dock at Issue The proposal at issue is for a 227-foot access pier and 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform with only one boat mooring and one boat lift. The length, location, and design of Palmer's proposed dock was changed in an attempt to satisfy the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP or the Department) and Palmer's neighbors. Palmer's task in this regard was difficult in part because a longer dock with a terminus in deeper water could have less impact on seagrasses (the major environmental concern) but would have a greater impact on the neighbors' views of Sarasota Bay (the major infringement of riparian rights concern.) In the final version, Palmer tried to balance these conflicting concerns. As proposed, neither the terminal platform, boat lift, nor mooring location occurs over submerged grassbeds, coral communities or wetlands. Starting at the mean high water line, the first 75 feet of the access pier for the proposed dock will traverse essentially no sea grasses. In the next 75 feet to 150 feet of the access pier, there will be approximately 80% vegetative cover consisting primarily of the seagrass halodule wrightii. Between 150 feet and 200 feet, there will be approximately 20% vegetative cover consisting of the seagrasses halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. Between 200 feet and 232 feet, seagrasses consisted primarily of thalassia testudinum, except that the terminal platform is located in an area of essentially bare sand. Starting at 80 feet from the mean high water line, the access pier for the proposed dock will ramp up to 5 feet above mean high water for the next 20 linear feet and continue at that elevation for the next 112 feet to reduce shading of the seagrasses. Then it will descend stairs for the next 5 linear feet, until it is 3.5 feet above mean high water, and will continue at that elevation for 10 more feet to where it joins the 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform. In this way, wherever it traverses seagrasses, the access walkway portion of the pier will be elevated 5 feet above mean high water. The access walkway will be only 4 feet wide and will have half-inch wide gaps between its deck boards to allow sunlight through and further reduce shading of the seagrasses. The access walkway also will have handrails that are maintained in such a manner as to prevent use of the access walkways for boat mooring or access. As proposed, the terminal platform and boat lift occurs in a location with minimum depth of 2.2 feet below the mean low water level. There is some water 1.7 feet deep in the vicinity of the terminal platform, but the structure can be used without traversing the shallow water. The structure is designed so that boat mooring and navigational access will be in water at least 2 feet deep. Including access pier and terminal platform, the total area of Palmer's proposed dock over sovereign, submerged land would be 1,008 square feet. There will be no wet bars or living quarters over wetlands or surface waters or on the pier, and there will be no structures enclosed by walls or doors. There will be no fish cleaning facilities, boat repair facilities or equipment, or fueling facilities on the proposed dock. No overboard discharges of trash, human, or animal waste, or fuel will occur from the dock. The only dredging or filling associated with construction of Palmer's proposed dock will be the minimum dredge and fill required for installation of the actual pilings for the pier, terminal platform, and boat lift. Altogether, less than 30 square feet of bay bottom will be disturbed during construction and displaced to accommodate the pilings. Palmer's noticed general ERP is subject to the general conditions set out in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 341.427. Among those conditions is the requirement that Palmer implement best management practices for erosion, turbidity, and other pollution control to prevent violation of state water quality standards. The pilings will be jetted, not driven, into place to minimize disturbance of the bay bottom and temporary increases in turbidity. Turbidity barriers will be installed and maintained in a functional condition at each piling until construction is completed and soils are stabilized and vegetation has been established. Used properly, turbidity barriers have proved effective in containing temporary turbidity from dock construction. Based on the expert testimony, it is found that the construction of Palmer's proposed dock will not significantly impact seagrasses. The Petitioners presented expert testimony on seagrasses, but their expert testified only generally based on studies showing that shading negatively impacts seagrasses. He had no prior knowledge of the Palmer dock design, seagrass coverage, or the depth of the water. When apprised of some information concerning Palmer's proposed dock, he admitted that the studies involved far more severe shading conditions than would be caused by the proposed dock. He could not testify that the Palmer dock design would harm seagrasses, with the exception of those actually removed by the installation of the pilings. Accidental boat propeller dredging in using a dock can be a secondary impact on seagrasses from dock construction. But while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of damage to seagrasses from accidental prop dredging. Petitioners Dr. Franklin Pfeiffenberger, James Castoro, and Winifred Castoro jointly own a dock to the south of the Palmer property. This dock, which was built in the 1930's, projects 190 feet into Sarasota Bay and traverses seagrasses. Unlike the proposed Palmer dock, the Pfeiffenberger dock is not elevated, and it terminates in seagrasses. The seagrasses under the Pfeiffenberger dock are the same types as those located in the Palmer dock alignment--a combination of halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. The dock has been rebuilt a number of times over the years. Upon physical inspection, apparently healthy and growing seagrasses were found underneath the Pfeiffenberger dock. The proposed dock will not harm wildlife, including manatees (the only endangered species in the area, animal or plant). Manatees use Sarasota Bay in general, but the east side of the bay, where the Palmer property is located, is not a high use area. It is shallow and would not be considered "select" habitat for manatees. The proposed dock would not have any detrimental effect on manatee travel patterns; they could easily swim around the dock. Manatees eat seagrasses and other aquatic vegetation, but the proposed dock will not have significant adverse impact on those resources. Finally, while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of injury to manatees in the area from boat collisions and prop scarring. Except for temporary turbidity during construction, no other water quality parameters will be violated as a result of the construction of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock and its use will not significantly impede navigability in Sarasota Bay. The bay is approximately 18,000 feet wide at that point, and it is approximately 4,800 feet from Palmer's property to the Intracoastal Waterway. Since the water is shallow near shore in the vicinity of the Palmer property, relatively few boats frequent the area. Those that do are generally smaller boats. These boats easily could navigate so as to avoid the dock; very small boats, such as canoes and kayaks, might even be able to carefully pass under the elevated portion of the dock. Palmer's proposed dock also would not be a serious impediment to other recreational uses of Sarasota Bay in the area. The water is too shallow for swimming. Fishing could improve because the dock could attract baitfish. People could continue to wade-fish by walking around or even under the proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock is aesthetically consistent with the area in which it is located. All the Petitioners have some sort of man-made structure projecting out into Sarasota Bay from their property. As already mentioned, Dr. Pfeiffenberger and the Castoros have a 190-foot dock projecting straight out into Sarasota Bay. Within the past five years, Dr. Pfeiffenberger has installed a bench to sit on at the end of the dock. To the north of the Palmer property, property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Cabaniss has a yacht basin formed by a sea wall that projects roughly perpendicular to the shoreline out into the bay. Immediately north of the Cabaniss property, there is a boat house on the Goldman property where it abuts the yacht basin. The Goldmans' boat house is approximately 20 feet in length and 10 feet in height from ground level. Immediately south of the Palmer property, Ms. Stenhouse has a small dock (which appears to be located over seagrasses.) As a result, the viewsheds of Palmer and the Petitioners already contain many docks and man- made structures. In addition, the Ringling Causeway and bridge can be seen from all of these properties. Palmer's proposed dock will appear in some views from the Petitioners' properties. Generally, the closer the neighbor, the more will be seen of Palmer's proposed dock. Some of the Petitioners will only be able to see the proposed dock if they go out to the westerly edge of their properties on the bay. While the proposed dock will appear in and alter these views, it will not eliminate any Petitioner's view of Sarasota Bay. Even the closest neighbors will have some unobstructed views around the proposed dock. It also will be possible to see over and under the proposed dock, similar to the way in which many of the Petitioners now enjoy their views. There are tall pine and palm trees on the Cabaniss property between their house and their view of the bay. Most of the other properties in the vicinity appear to have similar viewsheds. Ms. Stenhouse has a large stand of mangroves of the western edge of her property; they cover approximately 60 percent of the panorama from her house, but they are trimmed up so she can see through them. While some people would prefer not to have the Palmer dock there, other people might view the availability of single- family residential docks to be an asset to the properties in the neighborhood. Based on expert testimony, it cannot be found that property values in the area would go down as a result of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock does little if anything to further the idealistic goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan to restore and expand seagrasses in Sarasota Bay in that the proposed dock will eliminate some seagrasses. However, only approximately 30 square feet of seagrasses will be lost. Otherwise, the proposed dock is consistent with other goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan in that the dock has been aligned and planned so as to minimize impacts on seagrasses while balancing the neighbors' desire to minimize the impact on their views of Sarasota Bay. Palmer's Riparian Rights Palmer and his wife received a Warranty Deed, dated August 27, 1993, from James Kirk, II, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Marie Ferguson. The deed describes Lots 27 and 28 of the Indian Beach subdivision in Sarasota, Florida, with a western boundary "along the shores of Sarasota Bay." Palmer attached this deed to his applications. Since at least November 1992, the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay has been west of a seawall on the Palmer property. The evidence was clear that the seawall has been there since at least 1944 and that Palmer has not filled the area to the west of the seawall or built any structure that influences its existence. The evidence was not clear as to the creation and history of upland to the west of the seawall. From aerial photographs, it appears that at least some upland has existed to the west of the seawall at least from time to time for at least the last 30 years. For reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers also received a Warranty Deed from Kirk, dated September 3, 1993, purporting to convey title only up to the seawall on the Palmer property. Likewise for reasons no witness could explain, a land surveyor named Lawrence R. Weber prepared a boundary survey based on the description in the September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed. Also for reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers received a Quit Claim Deed from Kirk, dated October 20, 1993. This instrument quitclaimed to the Palmers "all of the Grantor's property to the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay, including riparian rights." Except for the mysterious September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed from Kirk, all deeds in the chain of title back to at least 1944 reflect an intention to convey riparian rights. A deed given by Helen and Frederick Delaute to Cecilia and Harold Wilkins, dated April 19, 1944, described the westerly boundary of the property as running northerly along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced riparian rights. (This deed attached a survey showing the still-existing seawall.) The next deed in the chain of title was from the widowed Cecilia S. Wilkins to Edward and Laura Williams dated December 27, 1954. The metes and bounds description again referenced the westerly boundary as running along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Edward and Laura Williams to Aidan and Wilma E. Dewey dated June 30, 1958. This deed again defined the westerly boundaries of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Aidan and Wilma Dewey to Edward and Marie Ferguson dated August 23, 1967. This deed again defined the westerly boundary of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order issuing Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit (No. 292583) and Consent of Use (No. 582819483) to Roy Palmer. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Filson, Esquire Filson and Penge, P.A. 2727 South Tamiami Trail, Suite 2 Sarasota, Florida 34239 Thomas I. Mayton, Esquire T. Andrew Zodrow, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David M. Levin, Esquire Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg Post Office Box 4195 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Alexandra St. Paul, Esquire The Riverview Center 1111 3rd Avenue, West Suite 350 Bradenton, Florida 34205 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact On or about July 9, 1987 an application for conditional use approval to allow off-premises sale of beer and wine (2APS) was filed on behalf of Petitioner for property located at 2030 Gulf to Bay Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida. The property is zoned general commercial (CG). A public hearing before the Planning and Zoning Board was held on August 4, 1987. At that hearing, the Petitioner's representative was not allowed to give rebuttal testimony, although the Board's by-laws do allow the applicant to rebut testimony in opposition to the application, and rebuttal is, in fact, usually allowed. The Petitioner's representative did not specifically request an opportunity to rebut the opponent's testimony, but assumed he would be given an opportunity to speak before the Board voted. The Planning and Zoning Board voted 3-2 to deny conditional use approval for this application. A timely appeal was taken by Petitioner on August 18, 1987. With this application, Petitioner seeks approval to sell beer and wine at a 7-11 convenience store. By subsequent application and approval of the Planning and Zoning Board on September 1, 1987 Petitioner has been granted a conditional use for 1APS, package sale of beer only. However, this 1APS application and approval is not at issue in this case. The parties stipulated that the property in question is within five hundred feet of a church and several residences.
Findings Of Fact By application (Exhibit 1) dated September 15, 1978, WCMI requested a permit to dredge approximately 740 cubic yards of sovereign bottom lands in Snook Bay adjacent to upland property owned by applicant. At the same time applicant requested a lease of some 0.98 acres of submerged sovereign land, containing the area to be dredged, for the purpose of constructing a marina with docking facilities over the leased property. Following receipt of all requested information from applicant, plus objections from adjacent land owners, DNR, as the state agency acting on behalf of the Trustees Internal Improvement Trust Fund (TIITF), held a public hearing in Naples, Florida on April 25, 1979. The Hearing Officer submitted a report following this hearing in which he recommended the lease be granted (Exhibit 4). After review DNR staff recommended granting the lease and before the Trustees took action, Petitioner requested this hearing. In the interim DER reviewed the application for a dredge and fill permit and, following a preliminary investigation, advised WCMI of its intent to deny the permit (Exhibit 8). At informal conferences with DER, WCMI revised its application to commence the dredging 25 feet from the existing seawall, reduce the amount of material to be dredged to 349 cubic yards and to move the floating dock sections further from the seawall. This revised application (Exhibit 10) was submitted to DER and, after review, DER on November 13, 1979 (Exhibit 11) issued its notice of intent to grant the requested permit. Petitioner then requested this hearing to contest the granting of this permit. The Isles of Capri was developed into a waterfront homesite project by bulkheading, dredging and filling a pristine mangrove area to provide the homesites now occupied by members of Petitioner. This project destroyed the ecosystem as it existed before the development. The area which is here proposed for lease and for a permit to dredge some 349 cubic yards therefrom is located in the originally disturbed area. Most of the homes on the Isles of Capri are built on waterfront lots and most homeowners have docks and boats. Fishing is generally considered good off the docks and in surrounding waters. The proposed marina is located in Snook Bay, a relatively small cul-de-sac-like area. On the dead end of Snook Bay, which is adjacent to the proposed marina, mangroves have been planted and the area designated as a park. Since these mangroves are rat infested, the park concept has not received general acceptance. However, the proposed marina will not adversely affect this park. Apart from the ecological problems that will allegedly be created by the leasing of the property and the dredging thereon, Petitioner alleges the project will interfere with other "rights" of the homeowners of the Isles of Capri. Although this Hearing Officer has considerable doubts as to the validity of these alleged rights, the facts presented relating thereto will be first considered. WCMI owns the uplands adjacent to this submerged land and this land is zoned General Retail Commercial, which includes use as a proposed marina. Use as a marina would create less additional vehicular traffic than would any of the other 12 uses considered most likely for this land. (Testimony of Barr) The proposed marina will provide wet dock space for 32 boats and dry storage for 116 boats in sheds with the boats stacked three-high. No ramps will be provided and boats will be launched and picked up by use of a forklift at the concrete seawall. Parking space for 54 vehicles will be provided. This parking space complies with local requirements, as does WCMI's proposed construction. Collier County and the area of Collier County in the vicinity of Isles of Capri is an area of rapidly increasing population. A need for some six additional marinas has been recognized by Collier County authorities. Numerous witnesses opposed the use of WCMI property as a marina because: They do not think the site is suitable for a marina, and a much smaller marina would be preferred. Installation of a marina would increase boat traffic, thereby increasing the risk of boat collisions, increase wake action which might damage seawalls, disrupt the peace and quiet now enjoyed by these residents, and increase the possibility of boats striking manatees. Property values in the vicinity of the proposed marina and elsewhere in the Isles of Capri might decline. Operation of a marina would increase the noise level, thereby disturbing occupants of residences closest to the proposed marina. Vehicular traffic would be greatly increased on the Isles of Capri once the marina commences operation. Most of these objections are beyond the jurisdiction of this tribunal. This property has been zoned for the use proposed and if this use is inappropriate, the proper recourse is with the local zoning authorities. The credible evidence submitted is that the operation of the marina would increase boat traffic in and out of Snook Bay some 20 round-trips per day and this increase will create and insignificant additional risk of collision with other boats or with the occasional manatee that is sighted. While most of this traffic will use the deeper channel that follows the seawalls and boat docks of residents, an alternate channel is available for use by boaters with local knowledge of its characteristics. Even if all traffic used the deeper channel, no serious hazard to navigation would thereby result. No credible evidence was presented that the increased boat traffic caused by the marina would increase the damage to a properly constructed seawall. Navigation of these waters is a right to be jealously guarded. If wave damage results, local authorities have jurisdiction to establish speed or wake restrictions. Furthermore, the more credible evidence presented was that at the Isles of Capri more subsidence of soil behind the seawalls is caused by tidal action than by wake action. No credible evidence was presented that the operation of the proposed marina would decrease property values. Even if this could be shown, such a use would be consistent with the usage for which this property is zoned. There are two marinas across the street from WCMI's proposed marina and no evidence was presented that the operation of these smaller marinas affected property values. The uncontradicted evidence that was submitted was that property values on the Isles of Capri have increased at a rate as great as, if not greater than, land values elsewhere in Collier County. The roads on Isles of Capri are presently operating far below capacity and the additional traffic expected to be generated by the proposed marina will have no significant impact on these roads, nor will the construction of the marina create any vehicular safety problems. Petitioner's contention that the construction and operation of the marina will create additional pollution because of septic tank, oils and greases, and water runoff from impervious surfaces is not well-placed. It is not well-placed in the first instance because this is not the proper forum in which to air these complaints. Local health and safety ordinances regulate the installation of septic tanks, installation of fueling facilities and retention of water falling on the property. Secondly, the evidence presented here is that WCMI will comply with all regulations regarding septic tanks, no live-aboard boats will be moored at the marina other than temporarily for fuel or supplies, fuel tanks will be underground on the upland area, provided with proper protection and insulation, and the fuel will be dispensed by hose from the fueling dock by experienced personnel. WCMI will provide containment booms and retrieving material to take care of the accidental spill that might occur. Collier County Ordinance requires the first 1-inch of rainfall be retained on the property and WCMI will comply with this requirement. From the testimony of the numerous residents who testified, the primary concern of most of those who object to the proposed installation is that "their" waters will become more available to people living elsewhere and this will somehow detract from the use and enjoyment of these waters by these residents. If access to the Isles of Capri is facilitated for people living elsewhere by the installation of this marina, these waters will become more crowded, resulting in less fish per resident, and this aquatic preserve will become less private and more available to the general public. These residents purchased their homesites because of the waterfront characteristics and the quietness and solitude of the area. Facilitating access by non-residents will necessitate sharing these waters with these non-residents, thereby detracting from the enjoyment residents hoped to retain undiminished forever. The allegations of Petitioner that merit the most serious consideration in both of these applications of WCMI involves those relating to the ecosystem. Petitioner contends that the proposed dredging will adversely affect the ecosystem and this requires denial of the dredge-and-fill permit. Without the permit the lease would be useless. Petitioner also contends the granting of the lease would be contrary to the public interest. WCMI's original application was to dredge from the seawall seaward some 60 feet until the desired depth contour was reached. Also, floating concrete docks would be adjacent to the seawall for berthing sites. When an inspection of the area disclosed the bottom grasses were heaviest from the seawall out to about 30 feet, the applicant was issued the Notice of Intent to Deny by DER because of these bottom grasses and the shading that would be caused by the floating docks. WCMI then proposed to do no dredging for the first 25 feet from the seawall, except for two areas 30 feet and 36 feet wide needed to launch boats, and also to move the floating docks 25 feet from the seawall so as not to shade the grassy areas. As noted above, the site under consideration was severely disturbed by the initial dredging which destroyed the original grassbeds at this site. Some of these grasses have now returned but the coverage is sparse and patchy. From the seawall out to about 30 feet the grass is Cuban shoalweed and manatee grass. Respondent's investigations and studies revealed only these two grasses. Petitioner's biologist who performed studies similar to those done by Respondent found halophila in the deeper waters (up to five feet) extending out as far as 60 feet from the seawall. Halophila is a more ephemeral grass that grows in deeper depths than Cuban shoalweed and manatee grass and is often found in previously dredged areas. The area proposed for dredging comprises some 1200 square meters, and seagrasses cover about one-fourth of the dredge area. Sample cores taken by Petitioner's expert in October while the more luxuriant summer growth predominated showed some 1600 blades of grass per square meter, while the winter sample taken by WCMI expert showed 467 blades per meter. In the 320 square meters of seagrasses in the area a total biomass of invertebrates was found to be 17 pounds. Using generally accepted conversion rates and invertebrate reproduction cycles to convert this biomass to fish, this weight of invertebrate biomass could be converted into between 2 and 10 pounds of fish annually. Removal of the seagrasses will remove feeding grounds and hiding areas for some types of aquatic animals and also take away the type of fish that inhabit such areas. On the other hand, the piling and other docking structures that will be installed will attract sessile organisms such as oysters, barnacles, etc. which currently attach themselves to rocks and mangrove roots in the vicinity. The biomass or weight of these organisms is likely to equal or exceed those to be lost by dredging away the seagrasses. While different types of fish will be attracted to the area where the shellfish and other attaching animals congregate than will be attracted to grassy bottoms, the change is not significant from a quality or quantity of fish point of view. The area to be dredged is an area that has partially recovered from its earlier destruction and there is no reason to believe a similar recovery will not recur after the dredging here proposed is completed. No evidence was presented that a collision between a boat and a manatee has ever occurred in the waters in the vicinity of the Isles of Capri. Any conclusion that such an incident is likely to occur because of increased boat traffic when the proposed marina is in operation would be sheer speculation. Furthermore, Collier County does not contain any of those designated waters wherein special manatee protection rules are to be set up. Nor is Snook Bay one of those areas where a concentration of manatees is likely to occur.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing Chapter 253, Florida Statutes on behalf of the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). The Board holds title to submerged sovereign lands pursuant to Sections 253.03 and 253.12, Florida Statutes, and Article X, Section 11, Florida Constitution. Fraraccio, together with his wife, owns a parcel of real property located in section 13, township 38 south, range 41 east which is commonly known as 26 High Point Road and which is located in Martin County, Florida. The southern boundary of the Fraraccio's property (subject property) borders the St. Lucie and Indian Rivers. In June, 1987, Fraraccio filed an application for permission to alter mangroves which grow along the shoreline of the subject property. It was Fraraccio's intention to cut the tops of the trees in order to promote horizontal growth. This application was filed with and processed by the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER). On September 1, 1987, DER issued a permit for the mangrove alteration. Pertinent to this proceeding is the following specific condition of the Fraraccio permit: 4. "No person shall commence mangrove alteration or other activity involving the use of sovereign or other lands of the state, title to which is vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund or the Department of Natural Resources under Chapter 253, until such person has received from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund the required lease, license, easement, or other form of consent authorizing the proposed use. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 16Q-14, if such work is done without consent, or if a person otherwise damages state land or products of state land, the Board of Trustees may levy administrative fines of up to $10,000 per offense. In October, 1987, the Department's Bureau of Survey and Mapping was asked to survey the west line of the Jensen Beach to Jupiter Inlet Aquatic Preserve (Preserve) at the confluence of the St. Lucie River. Terry Wilkinson, chief surveyor for the bureau, conducted the field survey on October 14-16, 1987. Mr. Wilkinson placed a metal rebar with a cap designating "D.N.R." at a point on the mean high water (MHW) line at the Fraraccio's property. Mr. Wilkinson also staked three points with lathe markers on a line northerly along the MHW line from the rebar monument. It was Mr. Wilkinson's opinion that the Preserve abutted the Fraraccio property from the point marked by the rebar monument northward along the coast. That portion of the Fraraccio property which was south and west of the rebar did not abut the Preserve. Fraraccio disputed the findings regarding the Preserve boundary reached by Wilkinson and did not concede that his property abuts the Preserve. On December 15, 1987, the issue of the Preserve boundary was taken before the Governor and Cabinet sitting as the Board at the request of the Department, Division of State Lands. Fraraccio was represented before the Board by counsel who argued against the staff recommendation. Mr. Wilkinson's interpretation of the boundary line for the Preserve was approved. That area waterward of the MHW line from the rebar monument northerly along the Fraraccio shoreline was, therefore, deemed to be part of the Preserve and sovereign submerged land. Prior to cutting any mangrove trees, Fraraccio telephoned Casey Fitzgerald, chief of the Department's Bureau of State Lands Management, to inquire as to whether Department permission was required to trim mangroves located above the MHW line. Fitzgerald's letter advised Fraraccio "that trimming mangroves located above the MHW line would not be within the purview of this department." Fitzgerald further recommended that Fraraccio "employ the services of a registered land surveyor to specifically identify the individual trees which are so located." Fraraccio did not obtain an independent survey. Instead, he relied upon the rebar monument and the lathe markers placed by Wilkinson, and contracted to have the mangroves landward of that line trimmed. One of difficulties encountered in determining the location of a mangrove in relation to the MHW line is the fact that one tree may have several trunks and prop roots which emanate from the center of the tree. Consequently, there is some uncertainty regarding how to locate the tree. One method used locates the centermost trunk and considers that point the tree location. Another method calculates the greatest percentage of tree mass and considers that point the center of the tree. This calculated center is then matched against the MHW line. Either method results in a judgment based upon visual inspection. This judgment may differ among reasonable men. In January, 1988, Fraraccio supervised the cutting of mangroves based upon the MHW line as established by the Wilkinson survey. Fraraccio did not intend to cut trees waterward of the MHW line. No trees were cut waterward of the Wilkinson line. A number of trees were trimmed landward of the Wilkinson line. There is no evidence that either the rebar monument or the lathe markers placed by Wilkinson were moved either prior to or after the mangrove alteration. Fraraccio was responsible for the direct supervision of the workmen who completed the mangrove trim. No work was done without Fraraccio's authorization. On March 22, 1988, Kalani Cairns, inspected the Fraraccio property. Cairns took field notes of the inspection. One of comments made at that time was that it was "difficult to determine if MHWL stakes have been moved." Based upon his review of the area, Cairns determined approximately 20 mangrove trees below the MHW line had been topped. Subsequently, the Department issued the Notice of Violation and Order for corrective action. Since Fraraccio did not believe he had cut waterward of the MHW line, no corrective measures were taken. Subsequent to the Notice, additional mangroves were not cut. Fraraccio timely sought review of the notice. In preparation for the formal hearing in this cause, the Department contracted with Greg Fleming to prepare a survey of a portion of the Fraraccio property. The purpose of this second survey was to locate the MHW line along the Fraraccio shoreline and to plot mangrove trees which had been trimmed and which were waterward of the line. Approximately 24 trimmed mangrove trees were located waterward of the MHW line as determined by the Fleming survey. The Fleming survey resulted in a MHW line which was upland of the line established by the Wilkinson survey. The trimmed trees in dispute are located between the two lines, as marked on the ground, by the lathes placed by the two surveyors. Mr. Wilkinson did not testify and no credible explanation was given for why the lines, as marked in the field, differ. At the time of the cutting, however Fraraccio believed the Wilkinson lathes marked the MHW line. This belief was based upon the representations that the Department had made regarding the rebar monument marked "D.N.R." and the fact that the placement of the lathe stakes had coincided with placement of the rebar.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund enter a final order dismissing the Notice of Violation against Charles A. Fraraccio. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4309 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 6, it is accepted Wilkinson put down three lathes and that there is no evidence that those lathes were moved. Otherwise, the paragraph is rejected. Mr. Wilkinson did not testify and, therefore, no evidence was presented on the issue of the lathes. It is clear Fraraccio believed the lathes to be the MHW line. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The MHW line was correctly depicted on the ground and on paper by the Fleming survey which was done after-the-fact. Pertinent to this case is the fact that Fraraccio and DNR treated the Wilkinson survey on the ground (as shown by-the rebar and the three lathes) as the MHW line prior to the cutting. Paragraph 9 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 10, the record shows Fleming was contacted to perform the second survey in December, 1988, and that it was dated February, 1989. With that modification and clarification, paragraph 10, in substance, is accepted. Paragraph 11 is accepted to the extent that the two surveys differed on the ground (as opposed to on paper). Paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 accepted but are irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 15, it is accepted that the workmen were instructed not to cut waterward of the MHW line. The remainder is irrelevant to this proceeding. Paragraphs 16 through 18 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 10, it is accepted Fraraccio cut or trimmed the trees based upon the Wilkinson survey as depicted by the rebar and 3 lathe markers. Otherwise, paragraph 19, is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20 is accepted. Paragraph 21 is rejected as irrelevant to this proceeding. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Department. Paragraphs 1 through 16 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 17 is accepted since both surveys coincided at the point of the rebar marked "D.N.R.;" otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence since the surveys differed as plotted on the ground. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are accepted. Paragraph 20 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 21 is accepted. Paragraph 22 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 23 is rejected as irrelevant. The number of trees cut waterward of the MHW line as established by the Fleming survey was approximately The size of the trees is irrelevant. Paragraph 24 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 25 and 26 are accepted. Paragraph 27 is rejected as irrelevant to this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: William L. Contole McManus, Wiitala & Contole, P.A. O. Box 14125 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408 Ross S. Burnaman Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Gardner, Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners and an adjoining land owner have been involved in a dispute respecting the boundary between their property. The adjoining land owner developed a residential community known as the Bayside Estates subdivision. A canal system was dredged creating waterfront lots in the subdivision, and the canal system was connected to a waterway which flows to the Gulf of Mexico. The portion of the canal system which connects it to the waterway leading to the Gulf of Mexico was constructed on property owned by the Petitioners. Litigation respecting the rights of the Petitioners and adjoining land owners has been conducted in the Circuit Court of the 20th Judicial Circuit, Lee County, Florida, and in the Florida Second District Court of Appeal. Petitioners are seeking to construct a cable across the joining portion of the canal system, which they contend lies totally within their property. The canal system is a navigable waterway. The stated purpose of the Petitioners' proposed project is to prevent persons who live above the Petitioners' property from using the waterway for boating access to the Gulf of Mexico. The project would serve as a clear obstruction to navigation within the canal system. The Bayside Estates subdivision is located on the canal system above the point where the Petitioners would construct their proposed cable. There are approximately 300 property owners in the subdivision and as many as 150 of them are boat owners. These persons presently utilize the portion of the canal system which the Petitioners propose to block for water access to the Gulf of Mexico. These persons purchased property in the subdivision with the understanding and the belief that they would have water access to the Gulf of Mexico. Other than the fact that it would serve as an obstruction to navigation, the Petitioners, proposed cable would have no environmental impact, except perhaps an aesthetic one. The cable would not obstruct the flow of water, and would not be a source of pollution.
Findings Of Fact The Intervenors filed an Application for Dredge and Fill Permit with the Department of Environmental Regulation. The Department entered a notice of its intent to issue a permit. Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing. The Department forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, where it was given Case No. 82-3155. A Recommended Order which includes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law has been entered in Case No. 82-3155. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set out in the Recommended Order are hereby incorporated into this Final Order and constitute a part of this Final Order. The Petitioner is an association of home owners within a residential development known as "Caloosa." Intervenors are seeking to develop an industrial park on land adjacent to the Caloosa development. Surface and ground waters from the proposed industrial park would drain toward Caloosa. Prior to the Department's entry of the notice of intent to issue a permit to Intervenors, the Department's personnel evaluated the application in free-form proceedings. An environmental specialist who works with the Department as a permit processor proposed to deny the application on account of the fact that Intervenors proposed to fill approximately 70 acres of wetlands, 24 of which were within the Department's permitting authority under Rule 17-4.28, Florida Administrative Code. The administrator of the Department's Dredge and Fill Permitting Section came to the conclusion that denial of the application could not be justified. He felt that the wetlands to be filled served only marginally to preserve water quality in the area. The Intervenors had proposed to artificially create wetland areas in order to compensate for the loss of filled wetland areas. The program administrator suggested to the permit processor that they negotiate to get the Intervenors to create additional artificial wetlands in order to mitigate against any possible adverse effect from the loss of natural wetland areas. These negotiations occurred, and the Intervenors agreed to increase artificially created wetland areas. The Department of Environmental Regulation does not have a rule which provides that its personnel can engage in negotiations respecting a permit application. Negotiations are, however, an inherent part of a permitting process. The Department does not have any written or unwritten policy whereby it accepts such mitigating factors as artificially created wetlands as justifying the filling of natural wetlands. It does not appear that the Department has any rule or nonrule policy concerning mitigation or trade-offs, and it does not appear that the Department has ever had such a rule or policy. The Department does not have a policy of accepting concessions, trade-offs, or mitigating factors so as to allow an applicant to violate the Department's water quality standards. Since there has been a permitting process, such factors as artificially created wetlands have been considered by the Department in determining whether an application meets the Department's criteria for issuance of a permit. The Department's policy is to consider whether an applicant has provided reasonable assurance that the short-term and long-term effects of proposed activities will not result in violations of water quality standards, as required under Rule 17- 4.28(3), Florida Administrative Code. If an applicant has proposed to construct artificial wetlands, the Department would logically consider it in making determinations about granting the permit. There is no evidence in the record of this proceeding from which it could be concluded that the Department has any unpromulgated "mitigation" policy which has the effect of a rule.
