The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Great Southern Café is a restaurant located in Seaside, Florida. The restaurant is owned by James Shirley. As owner, Mr. Shirley did not generally involve himself in personnel decisions at the Café. Such decisions and the day-to- day management of the restaurant were the responsibility of the general manager, who at the time period relevant to this case was William “Billy” McConnell. Petitioner Janet D. Mayes is female. Petitioner has ADD, ADHD, OCD, and general anxiety disorder. She has been diagnosed with these conditions for 20 years and they are all controlled through medication. More importantly, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner’s disorders interfered with her ability to work or significantly impacted any other major life activity. Indeed, Petitioner has worked in the restaurant business for about 30 years and has held a variety of different positions during that time, often working long hours. Since her disorders did not interfere with any of Petitioner’s major life activities, the evidence did not demonstrate that such disorders were disabilities or handicaps for purposes of employment discrimination. Sometime around March 2012, Petitioner interviewed for employment with Respondent. She was initially hired as a hostess for the restaurant by the then general manager, Jim Ruby. Shortly thereafter, Mr. McConnell, who was then assistant manager, replaced Mr. Ruby as general manager. At the time, Mr. McConnell had 35-40 years of experience as a restaurant manager in Alabama and Florida and had managed the predecessor restaurant to Great Southern Café known as “Shades.” Mr. McConnell’s management philosophy was to be patient with employees, to train them in the right way, and to ask employees to do their best. He would give employees the benefit of the doubt, and when disciplinary action was necessary, would sit down and talk with the employee to build confidence in them. Mr. McConnell’s disciplinary style was informal and it was not his general practice to issue formal written discipline to employees. Mr. McConnell liked Petitioner’s work ethic and thought she did a good job as hostess. Under Mr. McConnell’s management, Petitioner was promoted by Mr. McConnell to relief manager in May of 2012. In August 2012, she was again promoted by Mr. McConnell to full manager. Mr. McConnell did not know about, nor was he provided with any documentation regarding, Petitioner’s disorders. Indeed, the evidence showed that Petitioner’s disorders were not so obvious that anyone who encountered her necessarily would have known about those disorders. There was no evidence that Petitioner ever sought any kind of accommodation from Respondent for her disorders. Since Mr. McConnell worked only the day shift and Petitioner usually worked nights, their paths did not often cross at work. However, the evidence demonstrated that Mr. McConnell occasionally used the term “bitch” to refer to Petitioner. The evidence also demonstrated that he did so not in a malicious or discriminatory way, but in a joking manner because of Petitioner’s actions that he witnessed or that were described to him. Petitioner conceded that it was “like it was a joke” when Mr. McConnell referred to her as a “bitch.” There was no testimony that Mr. McConnell used this term on repeated occasions so that its use rose to the level of harassment or that he used it to belittle or demean Petitioner. Sometime in April 2013, the Café catered a very large event known as “JazzFest.” Petitioner assisted Mr. McConnell in the planning and execution of this event for the Café. Her husband, William, who had been unemployed, was hired to help in food preparation at the event. In general, JazzFest was stressful for all those who worked the event. Both Mr. McConnell and Petitioner worked many extra hours at the festival. During the course of JazzFest, Mr. McConnell, as manager, permitted the employees to get food from the banquet line since they had been working all day without breaks for nutrition. Petitioner and her husband loudly and inappropriately berated Mr. McConnell in public and in front of other employees about allowing employees to get food from the banquet line. Mr. Shirley witnessed the confrontation and considered the display to be an inappropriate method by Petitioner to communicate her disagreement regarding Mr. McConnell’s management decision. Mr. McConnell also observed that during JazzFest, Petitioner was “too pushy” and “too bossy” with the staff without having any good reason for such treatment of employees. Additionally, Mr. McConnell observed that Petitioner was “not herself” and “wound up a little too tight” during JazzFest. Further, Mr. McConnell was aware that Petitioner had some recent personal stressors, such as her husband having issues with unemployment and one of her sons being arrested and incarcerated. He believed Petitioner’s behavior was due to the pressures in her family life combined with the pressure from working Jazzfest. Therefore, Mr. McConnell decided to give Petitioner a week off, with pay, for rest and relaxation. He hoped that Petitioner would come back refreshed and ready for the busy beach season after her break. Mr. Shirley knew of and supported the time off for Petitioner and hoped that Petitioner’s time away from work would ease some of the undercurrent of negative feelings that had built up between Petitioner and some of the employees. After Petitioner returned from her week off, Mr. McConnell received reports from some of his employees that Petitioner was being unreasonable, raising her voice and losing her temper “numerous” times. He also received reports that Petitioner was “hard to work for,” and “a bully.” In addition, owner James Shirley received some complaints from employees that Petitioner was “going off on people.” Indeed, her treatment of the employees had gotten to the point that several employees no longer wished to work with her. These employees were considered good employees and were part of the restaurant team. The evidence showed that it is very important for restaurant staff to function as a team and that maintaining good working relationships among team members is one important component of a good functioning restaurant. Mr. McConnell spoke to Petitioner about the subject of the complaints and asked why she was pushing the staff so hard and creating a bad environment. Petitioner said she would try to do better. During this conversation, Mr. McConnell did not remember asking Petitioner whether her meds were “out of whack,” but he has stated this to other people as a figure of speech in the manner of “get your act together.” The evidence did not show that Mr. McConnell’s use of the phrase was discriminatory, harassing or demonstrative of any knowledge of Petitioner’s alleged disability or perception of the same. After his talk with Petitioner, things improved for a couple of days. However, Mr. McConnell received more and similar complaints about Petitioner from the same employees who previously complained about her, with some indicating they would quit if Petitioner continued to work at the restaurant. Mr. McConnell feared that if something was not done about Petitioner some of his good team employees would leave and he would not be able to run the restaurant. The better evidence demonstrated that Mr. McConnell met with Petitioner and offered her two weeks’ severance pay. He spoke with her about her inability to get along with the employees and function as a team member at the restaurant. The meeting lasted about 20-30 minutes. Ultimately, Petitioner refused the severance pay, handed over her keys, and left. There was no credible or substantial evidence that Petitioner’s termination was based on disability, perceived or otherwise. Similarly, there was no credible or substantial evidence that Petitioner’s termination was based on her sex. Although Petitioner asserted harassment from Mr. McConnell, no evidence to support this claim was adduced at the hearing. Respondent hired and promoted Petitioner to a manager position, allowed Petitioner to hire her husband and son (and at least one of her son’s friends), and gave her a paid week off after JazzFest to refresh and relax from a stressful event. The evidence showed that Mr. McConnell gave Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, as he did with all his employees, and only decided to terminate her after talking with Petitioner and determining that giving her time off did nothing to eliminate the negative energy Petitioner was bringing to the job. Based on these facts, Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against her based on sex or disability when it terminated her from employment. As such, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Thirston, II, Esquire Thirston Law Firm Post Office Box 19617 Panama City Beach, Florida 32417 (eServed) Timothy Nathan Tack, Esquire Kunkel Miller and Hament 3550 Buschwood Park Drive, Suite 135 Tampa, Florida 33618 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the facts stipulated to by the parties, the following relevant facts are found: Prior to her employment with the respondent, petitioner had work experience in waitressing, bookkeeping, operating a wine and beer bar and operating a grocery store. At all times relevant to this proceeding, petitioner was married and had three children. Respondent Jax Liquors, Inc. (Jax) owns and operates a retail liquor business which is' divided into package store operations and lounge operations. Though its lounges are generally located adjacent to a package store, each is a separate entity having its' own management structure. There are 35 package stores employing 198 males and 199 females, and 11 lounges with 135 employees, 87 percent of which are female. While sales figures for the package stores range from $1.5 to $4 million per year, the lounges' sales figures are approximately $50,000 per year. Because of the greater volume of inventory, customers, employees and paper work, promotion of employees to the management level in the package stores takes a longer period of time. Employees in the lounges can move up from the position of cocktail waitress to assistant manager or manager in a short period of time because of the less demanding nature of the work. The employee turnover rate in the lounges is eight times higher than that of the package stores. Lounge employees tend to be younger and less settled and career-oriented than package store employees. On or about February 22, 1982, petitioner was hired by Jax as a cocktail waitress at the Jax Lounge on the Apalachee Parkway in Tallahassee. She was trained as a cocktail waitress for approximately two weeks, and when the assistant manager was promoted to manager, petitioner began training as an assistant manager. During her months at the Apalachee Parkway lounge, petitioner was a good worker with no complaints or problems. On or about March 24, 1982, petitioner was transferred to the Jax lounge on Thomasville Road in Tallahassee to serve as an assistant manager. On July 9, 1982, she was promoted to the position of manager at that lounge. One coworker, a cocktail waitress, described petitioner as a strict, but good manager with no scheduling, customer or staff complaints. Another coworker, who became the assistant manager when petitioner was promoted to manager, described petitioner as a hard worker but overbearing and bossy, with some scheduling problems and frequent tardiness. A similar description of petitioner was provided by the former manager of the Thomasville Road lounge. A frequent customer at the lounge described petitioner as competent and congenial with customers, and an energetic worker. Petitioner replenished the lounge supplies from the adjoining package store. The manager of the package store felt that she did not have a good understanding of the inventory and supplies she needed at the lounge. On or about July 20, 1982, approximately two weeks after petitioner was promoted to the position of lounge manager, John Chern was promoted to the position of Tallahassee District Supervisor thereby becoming petitioner's direct supervisor. At about that same period of time, the Tallahassee lounges were not operating at a high enough profit and the District Manager instructed Chern to make certain changes in operation. Among the changes were the addition of personnel bartenders and cocktail waitresses, so as to provide better service to the lounge patrons. Mr. Chern told his supervisor, the District Manager, that he had run into problems with petitioner and had experienced difficulty in obtaining cooperation from her in implementing the new schedule. Mr. Chern had also heard complaints about petitioner from other employees of both the lounge and the adjoining package store regarding scheduling and her treatment of her employees'. He felt that her general overall performance as a lounge manager was "weak." Petitioner admits that she felt and told Mr. Chern that she knew it would be difficult to work with him and that she knew if he became her supervisor, she would be fired. Petitioner felt that Mr. Chern was overly strict, and resented the fact that he would call her at home during her off- hours to discuss lounge business. John Chern has been employed with Jax Liquors since 1971, having started as a stock clerk. On August 9, 1982, Mr. Chern discharged petitioner from her employment with Jax Liquors. In explaining the reason for her discharge, Mr. Chern made reference to "outside obligations, your husband and family..." or "family and other obligations." On the following day, Mr. Chern filled out a form explaining the reason for petitioner's discharge as "not right person to run lounge, poor attitude with customers, did not take supervision or work with employees." There were no written reprimands in petitioner's personnel file. While it is the policy of respondent to issue written reprimands for nonmanagerial employees, more is expected from an employee at the managerial level and written reprimands are not required. After petitioner's termination, the assistant manager, a married female, was promoted to the position of lounge manager. Petitioner presented raw data or "head counts" derived from the personnel files of respondent in an attempt to demonstrate that sex and/or marital status had an effect upon the likelihood of involuntary discharge. However, the chosen categories of persons (i.e., males -- without disclosure of their marital status, women with children -- without disclosure of their marital status) were not well-defined and were overlapping. In addition, no statistical analysis was applied and there is thus no statistical significance to these head counts or raw data. No inference can be raised from this data that either gender or marital status was a causative factor in any involuntary termination. Applicants for employment at Jax Liquors are required to list their marital status, number of children, ages of children and who will care for the children. The purpose of these questions is to put the applicant on notice that the hours of employment are often unusual and are subject to sudden change. Lounge employees are also required to sign a form stating their agreement to be reassigned to any lounge and to work any position assigned at the rate of pay for that position. Respondent occasionally requires lounge employees to work at different lounges in different positions when the volume of business anticipated requires additional staffing. Lounge employees are generally able to make more money with a greater volume of customers.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed by Angela Portera against Jax Liquors, Inc. be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 12th day of July, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia Daire 118 N. Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Douglas W. Abruzzo, with Donald L. Tucker, P.A. Suite 804 Lewis State Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Suzanne Oltman Clerk of the Commission Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his position as a delivery person with the Respondent on or about September 28, 1991, on the basis of his race (Black), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Portion-Trol Foods, Inc., d/b/a Mother Butler Pies, is in the business of manufacturing and delivering pies to Denny's Restaurants, and is an employer under the Florida Human Relations Act of 1977, as amended. Petitioner, a black male, was hired by Respondent on June 26, 1990. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a delivery person, whose primary duty was delivering Respondent's pies to restaurants throughout the Central Florida area, which he did in 1990 and 1991. Petitioner's direct supervisor was Percival Gordon, a black male. Petitioner, like all other employees working under direct supervision, had been informed on several occasions regarding how to properly work and interact with restaurant personnel when delivering pies to the restaurants. Petitioner displayed no patience while interacting with restaurant personnel when he delivered pies. Beginning in early 1991, Petitioner began to act rudely and abrasively toward restaurant personnel with which he interacted when delivering pies to their restaurants. This improper conduct by Petitioner included being very loud and verbal in front of restaurant customers. He offended a restaurant hostess, a restaurant unit aide, and restaurant managers with his objectionable agressive behavior. He spoke rudely to everybody, and used profanity toward restaurant managers while in the restaurants. On one occasion he removed pies from a restaurant cursing, and destroyed customer pies by placing the pies on top of another in the hands of a restaurant cook. Petitioner's supervisor gave him verbal reprimands regarding his conduct in April and May, 1991. As supervisor of delivery persons, it was a job duty to routinely visit the restaurants to which the delivery persons he supervised delivered pies. During these visits Petitioner's supervisor would talk to the restaurant manager and other restaurant personnel in an effort to obtain feedback regarding the job performance of the delivery persons over which he had supervision. On June 5, 1991, Petitioner's supervisor visited two restaurants as part of his job duties. During these visits, management personnel of the restaurants approached Petitioner's supervisor, and voiced a complaint regarding Petitioner and a specific incident where Petitioner had delivered the wrong pies to each of the restaurants, and Petitioner's response to them. Petitioner's response was abusive and inappropriate in both instances. Both management persons told Petitioner's supervisor that due to Petitioner's inappropriate conduct, they did not want to see him back in their restaurant anymore. After being informed of these two most recent acts of improper conduct by Petitioner toward those individuals to whom he delivered pies, Petitioner was issued a written counseling review on June 8, 1991, which summarized the facts regarding these incidents of improper conduct. In this written counseling review, it was explained to Petitioner that he had already been issued several verbal warnings regarding his negative attitude and use of abusive, profane language toward restaurant personnel with which he interacted. Petitioner was warned that if such an incident occurred again, further disciplinary action would be taken against Petitioner. Respondent's Bakery Plant Manager reviewed the counseling review form issued to Petitioner, and prepared a memorandum which he gave to Petitioner. In this memorandum, it was reiterated to Petitioner that if there were "any further occurrences [sic] of the type of poor behavior described that it will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. You need to understand that this is very serious, and up to you to correct immediately." Despite the above-mentioned warnings from his supervisor, Petitioner continued to conduct himself inappropriately when interacting with restaurant personnel to whom he delivered pies. In September 1991, Petitioner engaged in another act of improper conduct. On this occasion Petitioner was delivering pies to a restaurant in Apopka, Florida. On this occasion, Petitioner first spoke with a cook on duty at the time. Petitioner told the cook that he had permission from Respondent's main office "to destroy or get rid of pies out of the case that don't [sic] supposed to be there." Petitioner did not at any time during his employment with Respondent have permission from Respondent's main office to remove customer's pies from restaurants and throw them away. Petitioner began to remove the customer's pies from the restaurant and stack them one on top of the other, into the hands of the cook. Petitioner then took the pies out of the cook's hands and put them in a tub used for bussing the tables of the restaurant. After verifying the incident, the General Manager spoke with Petitioner via telephone about the incident. During the conversation Petitioner got angry with the manager, and slammed down the phone. After receiving a report regarding this most recent incident, Petitioner's supervisor went to the restaurant in Apopka, and conducted a complete investigation into what took place. The supervisor and the Baker Plant Manager evaluated this most recent incident of improper conduct by the Petitioner, in light of his prior employment history with Respondent, and decided to terminate Petitioner based upon his continued improper conduct. Their decision was based upon the fact that Petitioner had received numerous warnings regarding his inappropriate conduct, and had failed to respond in a positive manner to any of these warnings. Petitioner offered only three unsubstantiated allegations as to why he believed he was terminated based upon his race. First, Petitioner alleged that when white delivery drivers employed by Respondent delivered pies to various restaurants, restaurant personnel would not make them wait as long as they would make him wait. However, Petitioner admitted that the restaurant managers and personnel, who he claimed kept him waiting longer than other white drivers, were not the managers of Respondent, Mother Butler Pies, but rather of Denny's Restaurants. Second, Petitioner alleged that he believed that he was terminated by Respondent based upon his race, because he was issued shirts with different people's names on it, which his wife had to stitch his name onto for identification purposes. Third, Petitioner claimed that he believed he was terminated based on his race due to an alleged incident in which a restaurant manager started a fight with Petitioner and subsequently Respondent did not want Petitioner "to go into the store to make a delivery because he [the restaurant manager] was having a problem with the employee. He [the restaurant manager] took it out on me". Petitioner admitted that the restaurant management personnel with whom he had problems were not the managers of Respondent, Mother Butler Pies. Petitioner offered testimony concerning his damages.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-0320 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner: Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 8(in part), 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19(in part), 21, 22, 24, 25 Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or a comment on the evidence: paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8(in part), 9, 10, 13, 17, 19(in part), 20, 23 COPIES FURNISHED: Veerasammy Mangali (pro se) 5642 Pendleton Drive Orlando, Florida 32839 William Curphey, Esquire 205 Brush Street Tampa, Florida 33601 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Donna Cernan worked at Talk of the Town Meetin' & Eatin' Place and its predecessor "Freckles" as a cocktail waitress from September, 1980, until she was discharged May 11, 1983. During this period Petitioner also qualified and worked as a bartender part of the time, but preferred the position of cocktail waitress as she made more money in that job than as a bartender. All cocktail servers, except bartenders, at Respondent are females. Cocktail waitresses and female bartenders wear a form-fitting Danskin uniform, while male bartenders wear dark trousers and light colored shirts. In January, 1983, Petitioner voluntarily quit her job and remained away for approximately three months to resolve family problems. At the time she left, Petitioner was head cocktail waitress responsible for supervising the lounge and training new cocktail waitresses. When she asked for her job back in April, 1983, she was rehired as a cocktail waitress. In April, .1983, it was announced at a staff meeting that some of those overweight should reduce. Petitioner was told she should lose ten pounds. Four other cocktail waitresses were told they were overweight. No evidence was presented that any of these employees were terminated or that they lost weight. When Petitioner inquired what weight had to do with being a good waitress, she was told by one of Respondent's managers that in addition to cocktails Respondent sold sex appeal. Petitioner took diet pills to help her reduce but testified they only made her sick. Three co-workers of Petitioner testified that when Petitioner returned to work in April, 1983, her attitude was poor; she would "fly off the handle" with co-workers and customers; and she continued to have problems at home and brought those problems with her to work. As a result, her attitude towards her job was poor and Petitioner acknowledged poor attitude to her co-workers. This poor attitude is also confirmed by Petitioner's testimony that, although she had worked as a cocktail waitress for ten years, she liked her uniform until she was told Respondent sold cocktails and sex appeal; and from that moment on she hated the Danskin. Although Petitioner denied she ever drank on the job in violation of Respondent's policy, one witness who worked as a bartender at the time testified she gave Petitioner peppermint schnapps when Petitioner requested it. When asked why she did that knowing it was contrary to Respondent's rules, she stated she was the "new kid on the block" and wasn't going to dispute a request from an oldtimer like Petitioner. This latter testimony is deemed more credible than Petitioner's testimony in this regard and is accepted. In April, 1983, as part of Respondent's training program, all of the waitresses were given an exam on procedures to follow and on the prices of various drinks. They had been provided the answers prior to the test and were required to obtain a passing grade of 90 percent accurate. If they failed, they were allowed to retake the exam until they passed it. A copy of the first examination turned in by Petitioner was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 4. Petitioner answered Question 40, "What do you think about having to take this test?", with one word, "Shit." Petitioner, in her complaint of discrimination, alleged that the male bartenders were not required to lose weight and cited as an example Jeff Whitten as being overweight. Three photographs of Whitten were admitted as Exhibit 3. These photographs were taken in November, 1983, and all of Respondent's witnesses shown these photographs identified the subject and stated he looked in the photographs the same as he did in April, 1983. Petitioner testified Jeff looked thinner in the photographs than he did in May, 1983. Exhibit 3 shows a man who was described as 6 feet 2 inches tall, weighing about 190 pounds, and the photographs do not indicate obesity. On May 11, 1983, Petitioner was called into the office of Doug Gordon, one of Respondent's managers and Petitioner's "boss," and told he was sorry but he had to terminate her because of her attitude on the job. At the same time, he gave her a letter of recommendation (Exhibit 1)
The Issue Did the Respondent commit an act of discrimination in refusing the Petitioner public accommodations at its motel?
Findings Of Fact The Red Carpet Inn is a motel located at 5331 University Boulevard in Jacksonville, Florida. Located adjacent to and in front of the property is a topless bar, which is unaffiliated with the motel. The proximity of this bar to the hotel created significant problems for the motel's management because many of the dancers and others working at the bar rented rooms at the hotel. Because of the coming and goings of dancers late into the night and early morning; entertainment of non- guests by dancers; and suspect drug use and sales on and about the premises, the hotel employed an active security detail. The Petitioner, a black female, resided at the hotel in Room 509 for several weeks immediately prior to May 6, 2004. She paid for her room on a nightly basis. Her room rent was frequently paid by persons other than herself. She was observed going from the bar to her room at late hours, and was thought to possibly be working at the bar as a dancer by motel security staff. She was observed visiting with other residents of the hotel at various times including late at night. The staff and manager received complaints from other residents about a person who was identified as the Petitioner. These complaints included, but were not limited to, noise, frequent visitors, and visiting with other guests late at night. As a result of these reports and his concerns about activities in the motel that disturbed other guests and were possibly illegal, the manager decided to refuse the Petitioner further accommodations at the hotel. Clarence Jones, a minister and friend of the Petitioner's family, testified about his visits to the premises. He visited the Petitioner, whom he had known since she was born, to bring her food and money because she was not working. He observed persons who he described as pimps and prostitutes in the vicinity of the motel and bar, together with persons he described as drug pushers. He paid for the Petitioner's room on occasion. Jones and members of the Petitioner's family visited her at the motel, but with the exception of Jones, these visits were during the day. Their testimony indicated that the Petitioner was a good person. The Petitioner testified. She was counseled by Kay Cannon, a black room clerk, to watch the number of calls she made and be careful of her activities because of management's concerns. According to the Petitioner, another desk clerk, Ursula Brooks, used a racial epithet when talking with the Petitioner. Brooks testified, and denied using any racial epithets to anyone, including the Petitioner. The manager and others testified about other residents of the motel who were described as Hispanic and African- American.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order dismissing the Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Dione Riley 3875 South San Pablo Avenue, No. 1208 Jacksonville, Florida 32224 Subhash Gandhi Red Carpet Inn 5331 University Boulevard, West Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. In May of 1990, Petitioner, a black male, began working as a delivery driver for the former owner of the Domino's Pizza franchise in Tallahassee, Florida. Respondent bought the franchise in March of 1992 and retained Petitioner as a driver to deliver pizza at store number 5131. On March 30, 1992, Petitioner signed a statement that he had read and understood the Respondent's Employee Orientation Manual setting forth, among other things, standards for personal conduct. This manual specifically advises that an employee may be disciplined or discharged for: (1) negligent handling of company funds; (2) insubordination and refusal to do assigned work; (3) disturbing the work force and/or creating a disturbance; and (4) harassment of team members. At all times material hereto, Scott Nelson was the store manager at Respondent's store number 5131. Mr. Nelson had authority to hire and fire employees at that location. Though it was against store policy, Mr. Nelson and other employees frequently used profanity and told vulgar off- color jokes while working. Sometimes the jokes involved inappropriate racial overtones. At times Mr. Nelson would call black customers "stupid niggers" after they left the store. Petitioner would also use the term "nigger" in conversations but in a context he believed to be acceptable. Mr. Nelson encouraged employees to discuss any problem they had with management in the privacy of the office at the rear of the store. Mr. Nelson told the employees that they could speak freely during these discussions and nothing they said would be taken personally. The purpose of holding the discussions in the office was to prevent customers from overhearing the conversations. Occasionally, Mr. Nelson and an employee would have a heated argument and curse at each other as long as no customers were in the store. Other employees heard these arguments but there is no evidence that the arguments took place outside the confines of the office. During some of these arguments, Mr. Nelson would threaten to fire employees but not follow through with his threats or report the incidents to his superiors. At all times material to this proceeding, Niki Supplee, a white female, worked as a delivery driver at Respondent's store number 5131. She and Mr. Nelson had heated arguments in which they cursed each other. She was never written up or disciplined after these outbursts. The record does not reveal the location or the subject matter of the arguments between Ms. Supplee and Mr. Nelson. At all times material to this proceeding, Ms. Supplee had a black boyfriend. Upon learning that her boyfriend was black, Mr. Nelson offended Ms. Supplee by asking why she was attracted to a black man. He wanted to know what was wrong with her and why she could not find a white guy. Once or twice when Ms. Supplee heard Mr. Nelson use a racial epithet, she informed him that she did not appreciate that kind of language. Subsequently, Mr. Nelson would use a racial slur then apologize to Ms. Supplee. Petitioner and Mr. Nelson occasionally had a beer together after work. On one of these occasions, Mr. Nelson admitted that he had been raised in an environment where there were very few black people. Mr. Nelson admitted that he had to learn how to get over certain feelings about being around black people when he first began working at Domino's Pizza. At the hearing Mr. Nelson admitted that on occasion he may have made racial slurs in front of his employees about customers after they left the store. However, prior to the incident which is the subject of this proceeding, no employee ever complained to Mr. Nelson's supervisor, Ron LeStourgeon, about Mr. Nelson's use of racial epithets or perceived racial prejudices. There is no evidence that Mr. Nelson ever used a racial slur directed towards his employees or in relation to an employment decision. During the period of Petitioner's employment, he was given verbal warnings about failing to be at work on time, making personal stops on company time without permission, and refusing to perform certain tasks on the premises. Mr. Nelson would occasionally instruct Petitioner to do an assigned task at the store when other white employees were standing around talking. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Nelson's instructions to Petitioner were anything more than a reminder to do a previously assigned routine job for the day. Mr. Nelson required Petitioner to sign a statement on September 7, 1993, as a result of his refusal to follow directions without complaint. Mr. Nelson prepared the statement in which Petitioner agreed to follow the direction of management staff promptly and without complaint or risk disciplinary action including termination. The statement advises Petitioner that he should go directly to Mr. LeStourgeon if Petitioner had a complaint he could not resolve with Mr. Nelson. There is no competent persuasive evidence that Mr. Nelson created written or verbal policies designed to adversely impact Petitioner and not other employees. Mr. LeStourgeon was in the store 275 to 300 times during 1993. Petitioner did not attempt to contact Mr. LeStourgeon regarding any perceived racial discrimination at work. Petitioner's testimony to the contrary is not persuasive. On October 21, 1993, Petitioner filed a claim with the United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division of the Employment Standards Administration. This complaint alleged that Respondent did not pay Petitioner for all of the hours he worked. Mr. Nelson subsequently resolved this dispute by taking Petitioner's word that he was due the money and including that amount in the next pay check. There is no competent persuasive evidence that Respondent's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment was related to the filing of this claim. On October 21, 1993, Petitioner also went to the Florida Commission on Human Relations and spoke to an in-take counselor. He did not file a claim but wanted advice because he believed the problems he and other blacks were experiencing at work were due to racial discrimination. On November 16, 1993, Petitioner made a certain pizza delivery and inadvertently failed to turn in $8.55 when he checked out that night. Milton Finkelstein, the assistant manager on duty, realized after Petitioner left for a two-day vacation that the store was short by that amount. Mr. Nelson was not on duty that evening. Mr. Nelson returned to work on November 17, 1993, but Mr. Finkelstein had the day off. Mr. Nelson did not determine which driver was responsible for the missing money until Mr. Finkelstein returned to work on November 18, 1993. Petitioner lived very close to the store but had no telephone. On occasion, a driver was sent to Petitioner's house to ask him to report to work. However, Petitioner let the managers know that he did not want to be bothered at home when he was off. Petitioner did not return to work until November 19, 1993. Mr. Finkelstein showed the ticket for the missing money to Petitioner who confronted Mr. Nelson in the office. Because Petitioner denied that he made the delivery, Mr. Nelson called the customer who thought a black man delivered the pizza three days before. Petitioner was the only black driver on duty at store number 5131 on November 16, 1993. Petitioner's testimony that he worked at another Domino's Pizza store for most of that evening is not persuasive. After the telephone call, Mr. Nelson insisted that Petitioner would have to reimburse the store for the missing $8.55. Mr. Nelson also told Petitioner that he would have to pay future missing receipts even if management did not identify Petitioner as the responsible driver for three days. Petitioner began to argue loudly and yell at Mr. Nelson. As Petitioner stormed out of the office, he screamed back, "Fuck you, Scott," repeating it several times. Three employees in the front of the store heard Petitioner make these statements. Mr. Nelson then told Petitioner to, "Go get your money. Go get your mileage." Mr. Nelson was upset at the time of this incident because it was the most threatening scene that had ever occurred in the store. Petitioner and Mr. Nelson had argued in the past but Petitioner had never been so openly defiant. Mr. Nelson intended to take some disciplinary action but did not make an immediate decision to fire Petitioner. Petitioner's testimony that Mr. Nelson fired him before he yelled profanities is not persuasive. When Petitioner left the store on November 19, 1993, he had cash from that day's deliveries that belonged to the store. Mr. Nelson sent Mr. Finkelstein and another employee to Petitioner's home to retrieve the cash. Upon their arrival, Petitioner was uncooperative and verbally abusive. They returned to the store without the cash. Mr. Nelson called Mr. LeStourgeon, to advise him of the situation and ask him what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken. Mr. LeStourgeon directed Mr. Nelson to do what was necessary to retrieve the day's receipts and fire Petitioner for insubordination. Mr. Nelson called the Tallahassee Police Department. Two police officers interviewed Mr. Nelson then went to Petitioner's house. The officers returned to the store without the cash receipts. There is no evidence that Mr. Nelson ever signed a complaint. About 1:30 a.m. on November 20, 1993, Petitioner voluntarily returned to the store and gave the cash receipts from November 19, 1993, to Mr. Nelson. He did not pay the $8.55 which he owed the store. Petitioner inquired whether he was fired. Mr. Nelson informed Petitioner that he was fired for insubordination. Petitioner did not hire black people to work in the store then cut back their hours or fire them in order to replace them with more recently hired white people. Testimony to the contrary is not persuasive. Mr. Nelson was more than just insensitive at times to other people's feelings. He often failed to conduct himself in a professional manner. He had difficulty supervising and working with white and black employees. He no longer works for Petitioner as a store manager. Regardless of Mr. Nelson's inappropriate behavior and lack of management skills, his decision to report Petitioner's insubordinate conduct to Mr. LeStourgeon was not motivated by intentional racial discrimination. Rather, Mr. Nelson sought the advice of his superior because of Petitioner's gross insubordination: (1) he cursed the store manager in front of other employees; (2) he refused to pay $8.55 for the pizza delivered on November 16, 1993; (3) he refused to promptly turn in the cash receipts from November 19, 1993 upon request; and (4) he verbally abused the assistant manager and the other employee who attempted to retrieve cash receipts. Competent persuasive evidence indicates that Mr. LeStourgeon made the decision to fire Petitioner based on his conduct alone with no knowledge of Mr. Nelson's policies regarding profanity or vulgarity. Mr. Nelson's racial prejudices, if any, were unknown to Mr. LeStourgeon and not a consideration in the employment decision. Moreover, Mr. LeStourgeon would have fired Petitioner because of his blatant insubordination and threatening attitude even if he had been aware that Mr. Nelson had tolerated similar conduct in the past. The same decision would have been reached absent the presence of Mr. Nelson's alleged discriminatory motive. There is no evidence that Petitioner replaced Petitioner with another driver, white or black. Mr. Nelson hired Mr. Finkelstein's daughter, a white person, while Petitioner was still working for Respondent. She backed into a customer's car in the parking lot. Respondent gave the customer twenty-five free pizzas for damage to his car because Mr. Finkelstein agreed to pay Respondent for the pizzas. Mr. Finkelstein subsequently reimbursed Respondent. This incident does not show favoritism for white employees. During 1993, Respondent had approximately twenty-three (23) employees at store number 5131. Of those employees, sixteen (16) were white, five (5) were black, and two (2) were Hispanic. Petitioner was the only employee fired from Respondent's store number 5131 in 1993.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor or the witnesses, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Respondent did not discharge or otherwise discriminate against Petitioner on account of his race and dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes specific rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Respondent did not file Proposed Findings of Fact. Rejected. Testimony of management concerning this point is more persuasive. Rejected. See paragraph 20. Accepted as modified in paragraphs 5-7. Accepted as modified in paragraph 8. Rejected. See paragraphs 16-17. Rejected. Not supported by competent persuasive evidence. Rejected. See paragraph 30. Accepted as modified in paragraphs 5, 10, and 12. Reject the last sentence entirely as argumentative. Rejected. See paragraph 30. Rejected. See paragraph 16. Rejected. See paragraph 16. Rejected. See paragraph 25. Rejected. See paragraph 22. Rejected as not supported by competent persuasive evidence. Rejected. No evidence that Petitioner applied for promotion. COPIES FURNISHED: Lenny Fulwood, II 790 El Dorado Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Thomas Bean President of Seminole Pizza, Inc. 6005 Benjamin Road, Suite 100 Tampa, Florida 33643 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570
The Issue At issue in this case is the question of whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner by discharging the Petitioner because of his race and/or a handicap?
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, General Parcel Service of Florida, Inc., is in the business of shipping, receiving and delivering goods, primarily small packages. The Respondent's headquarters are located in Jacksonville, Florida, and it has a branch operation in Tallahassee, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert L. Johnson, was hired by the Respondent as a driver in late February or early March, 1989. Mr. Johnson worked out of the Tallahassee branch operation. Mr. Johnson was employed by the Respondent until October 24, 1989. Mr. Johnson is a black male. Between February, 1989, and June, 1989, Mr. Johnson's work was satisfactory. In July, 1989, Mr. Johnson injured his back. As a result of this back injury, Mr. Johnson was absent from work until approximately July 10, 1989. Mr. Johnson worked for approximately three weeks after returning to work in July, 1989, but was absent because of his back injury from the end of July, 1989, until approximately September 7, 1989. When Mr. Johnson returned to work in July and in September, 1989, his physician had ordered that he not lift anything which weighed more than 25 pounds. The weight limitation was the only limitation placed by Mr. Johnson's physician on the duties Mr. Johnson could perform. There was no medical restriction placed on Mr. Johnson's duty to report to work or to report on time. Beginning in June, 1989, the Tallahassee terminal manager, and Mr. Johnson's supervisor, was Harry LaNoue. The first day after Mr. Johnson returned to work in July, 1989, Mr. LaNoue had Mr. Johnson answering the telephone and doing paperwork. The second day Mr. LaNoue had Mr. Johnson washing trucks, cleaning around the premises and picking up trucks. On the third day after returning to work, in addition to the duties Mr. Johnson began performing on the second day, Mr. Johnson also began delivering packages. After Mr. Johnson's back injury, Mr. LaNoue personally selected the packages Mr. Johnson delivered. Mr. LaNoue attempted to insure that no package was given to Mr. Johnson which weighed more than 25 pounds. Mr. LaNoue also instructed Mr. Johnson that he was not to attempt to lift any package which weighed more than 25 pounds and that he should bring any packages which weighed more than 25 pounds back to the terminal. Mr. LaNoue also told Mr. Johnson that he was to keep all appointments with his physician and to return any packages which he could not deliver before any such appointment. Although Mr. Johnson testified that Mr. LaNoue tried to pressure him into performing duties which he believed he should not be performing because of his back injury, the weight of the evidence failed to support this testimony. Mr. Johnson gave no examples of such pressure which were contrary to his physician's instructions and he contradicted his testimony by admitting that Mr. LaNoue took the actions reflected in finding of fact 10. After Mr. Johnson injured his back, a couple of incidents involving Mr. Johnson's attendance occurred. Those incidents are described in Finding of Facts 13, 14 and 15. At some time after Mr. Johnson returned to work Mr. Johnson's wife telephoned and told Mr. LaNoue that Mr. Johnson would miss work because his back was sore. Mr. LaNoue asked to speak to Mr. Johnson but was told that Mr. Johnson was not available. Mr. LaNoue asked Ms. Johnson to have Mr. Johnson telephone him within an hour. Mr. Johnson did not call Mr. LaNoue. About an hour later Mr. LaNoue telephoned and spoke with Mr. Johnson. Mr. LaNoue told Mr. Johnson to go to see his physician. Mr. Johnson refused. Mr. LaNoue then told Mr. Johnson to report to work. Mr. Johnson refused. Mr. LaNoue told Mr. Johnson that it was important that he be dependable and report to work. On approximately September 14, 1989, Mr. LaNoue selected five or six packages he intended for Mr. Johnson to deliver. The packages weighed less than 25 pounds. When Mr. Johnson reported to work he told Mr. LaNoue that his back was sore. Mr. LaNoue instructed Mr. Johnson to go to see his physician. Mr. Johnson said no and walked out of the building. Mr. LaNoue telephoned the Respondent's personnel director, Ann Beeman, and reported the incident. Following this telephone call, Ms. Beeman received a telephone call from Mr. Johnson complaining about his back. She instructed Mr. Johnson to go to see his physician. Ms. Beeman informed Mr. LaNoue of her instructions to Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson went to see his physician, telephoned Mr. LaNoue and told him that he had been told to return to work. No additional restrictions on Mr. Johnson's work were imposed by the physician. After seeing his physician, Mr. Johnson returned to work. The packages that had been selected for him to deliver had already been delivered. Therefore Mr. Johnson performed other duties. In October, 1989, Mr. Johnson proposed to Mr. LaNoue and Scott Douglas Paul, driver supervisor/assistant terminal manager, that he be allowed to drive a route to Valdosta, Georgia. The route involved picking up packages from a drug company located in Valdosta. The company was an important client of the Respondent. Mr. LaNoue indicated that he would give the route to Mr. Johnson. Mr. LaNoue explained to Mr. Johnson how important the client was to the Respondent and told Mr. Johnson that he must be on time and be dependable. Mr. Johnson was also reminded that it was very important that Mr. Johnson comply with the Respondent's policy that drivers call at least one hour before their assigned departure time if they would not be able to report to work on time. The departure time for the Valdosta run assigned to Mr. Johnson was 5:00 p.m. On October 24, 1989, the second day after the Valdosta run had been assigned to Mr. Johnson, Mr. Johnson called the Respondent's offices between approximately 4:30 p.m. and 4:45 p.m. Mr. Johnson spoke to Mr. Paul. Mr. Johnson told Mr. Paul that he had "family problems" but refused to tell Mr. Paul specifically what the problem was. Mr. LaNoue was in the same room with Mr. Paul during his telephone conversation with Mr. Johnson. Based upon hand signals between Mr. LaNoue and Mr. Paul, Mr. Paul told Mr. Johnson that, if he did not report to work that day, he need not bother coming to work again. Between June, 1989, when Mr. LaNoue became the Tallahassee terminal manager, and November 1, 1989, eight individuals, including Mr. Johnson, were fired by Mr. LaNoue. Four of those individuals were black (including Mr. Johnson) and four were white. The individuals fired between June, 1989, and November 1, 1989, their race and the race of the individuals, if any, who were hired to replace them are as follows: Terminated Employee Race Race of Replacement William Rodriquez White No Replacement Tom Arnold White White Randy Wansley White Black Larry Hargrove Black White Elmer McCoy Black Black John Constant White Black Robert Johnson Black Black Lester Kelly Black White Mr. Johnson is a member of two classes protected under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes: race (black) and handicapped (back injury). Mr. Johnson was replaced by a member of one of the protected classes: race. The weight of the evidence failed to prove whether Mr. Johnson's replacement was a member of the other protected class Mr. Johnson is a member of: handicapped. The Respondent had a nondiscriminatory, rational and business-related basis for discharging Mr. Johnson: Mr. Johnson was not dependable. Mr. Johnson failed to prove that the Respondent's reason for discharging him was a pretext.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order finding that there is no cause to conclude that the Respondent discriminated against Robert L. Johnson and dismissing Mr. Johnson's Petition. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Respondent has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner did not file any proposed findings of fact. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2. 3 5. 4 7. 5 6-7. 6 9. 7 9-10. 8 7 and 10. 9 12-13. 10 14. Not relevant to this proceeding. 14. The last sentence is hearsay and no finding of fact based on this hearsay has been made. 13 14. 14 14-15. 15 16. 16 16-17. 17 16. 18 18. 19 11. 20 Hereby accepted. 21-22 19-20 and hereby accepted. 23 Hereby accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Johnson 3250 West Tennessee Street Lot 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Charles F. Henley, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 40593 Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0593 Margaret A. Jones, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent, Momma G’s, Inc. (“Momma G’s”), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01 through and 509.092, Florida Statutes(2015),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner (“Scarlett Evans” or “Ms. Evans”) or by retaliating against her for participating in a protected activity.
Findings Of Fact Momma G’s is a sandwich-shop franchise consisting of franchisees and company-owned stores. Ms. Evans is a female who began working at a Momma G’s franchise located in Panama City, Florida (“the restaurant”), in October of 2013. Ms. Evans started as a cashier, and her good performance led to her being promoted to shift leader in May of 2014. A few months later, the franchise owners asked Ms. Evans to become the restaurant’s general manager because the current general manager was doing a poor job. While employed as the restaurant’s general manager, Ms. Evans typically worked Monday through Friday for 35 to 40 hours a week. Ms. Evans occasionally worked weekends in order to account for inventory, and she asserts that she had no problem with working weekends. In approximately December of 2014, the restaurant’s three owners notified Momma G’s corporate headquarters that the restaurant was struggling. The restaurant was six months behind on its rent, and the landlord was threatening eviction. In addition, the owners had accumulated over $300,000 in bank debt. Because closings damage a restaurant chain’s image, Momma G’s corporate headquarters negotiated a deal in which the franchisor acquired the restaurant and would operate it as a company-owned store. Accordingly, Momma G’s assumed control of the restaurant on May 1, 2015. Momma G’s did not fire any of the restaurant’s employees, but it did require all of them to re- apply for positions at the restaurant. Mike Davis is the vice president of Operations for Momma G’s. At the times relevant to the instant case, he oversaw 30 restaurants. Once Momma G’s corporate headquarters completed the negotiations to acquire the restaurant, Mr. Davis immediately drove to Panama City in order to oversee the transition. Mr. Davis contacted another Momma G’s employee (Sam Ferminella) and asked him to assist with the transition. Mr. Ferminella was a general manager who had proven to be proficient in turning around troubled stores. After the May 1, 2015, acquisition, Mr. Davis remained in Panama City for approximately three days to oversee the transition. Mr. Ferminella was more involved with improving the restaurant’s day-to-day operations, and he spent approximately to 11 days in Panama City during the first three weeks after the acquisition. At some point during the 10 to 11 days following the acquisition, Ms. Evans talked to Mr. Davis and/or Mr. Ferminella about continuing as the restaurant’s general manager. It is unclear what Ms. Evans was told, but there is no dispute that she was essentially in charge of the restaurant after Mr. Ferminella left Panama City following his initial 10-to- day visit. Rather than being a salaried employee, Ms. Evans was paid by the hour before and after the acquisition. On May 11, 2015, Ms. Evans learned that the restaurant’s general manager position was being advertised on- line. She texted Mr. Ferminella to inquire about the situation, and he promptly called her. Ms. Evans alleges that Mr. Ferminella told her during that conversation that Momma G’s cannot have a single mother working as a general manager because the restaurant needs someone who can work long hours, be available any day of the week, and respond on a moment’s notice if there is a problem at the restaurant. That conversation prompted Ms. Evans to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“the EEOC”) on May 20, 2015. Momma G’s learned of Ms. Evans’ complaint on approximately May 25, 2015. On May 26, 2015, Sandy Gnad (who was responsible for Human Resources at Momma G’s) contacted Ms. Evans via telephone and e-mail. Ms. Gnad wanted to know if there was something she could do to help. Mr. Davis learned of the complaint at some point in June of 2015. After Momma G’s learned of her complaint, Sam Moore began working as the restaurant’s general manager, and Ms. Evans claims that her work hours were reduced. According to Ms. Evans, she typically worked 35 to 40 hours a week. However, her hours were allegedly reduced to 20 to 30 a week in late May. In addition, there were occasions when she would be released after two to two and one-half hours of work when she had been scheduled to work six hours. Ms. Evans was the restaurant’s highest paid hourly worker. Ms. Evans alleges that the restaurant was having trouble keeping up with demand at some point that summer. According to Ms. Evans, Mr. Davis dealt with the problem by increasing Ms. Evans’ hours and splitting the general manager duties between Ms. Evans and Mr. Moore. At that point, Ms. Evans asserts that the only difference between her and Mr. Moore was that he was a salaried employee, while Ms. Evans was still paid by the hour. Mr. Moore resigned from the restaurant at the end of June, and Ms. Evans had been acting as a de facto general manager. Ms. Evans filed a complaint of discrimination with the FCHR on July 8, 2015, alleging that she was not hired for the restaurant’s general manager position because she is a single mother. On August 7, 2015, Ms. Evans and a co-worker named Sierra Kennedy were at the restaurant prior to 10:00 a.m. and were preparing to open the store at 10:30 a.m. Mr. Davis had made an appointment to interview Stefanie Flaugher at the restaurant for the vacant general manager position, and Ms. Flaugher arrived at approximately 9:45 a.m. on August 7, 2015, for her 10:00 a.m. interview. However, Mr. Davis had not arrived, and Ms. Flaugher was standing outside the restaurant waiting for him. Ms. Evans had to make a bank deposit, and she encountered Ms. Flaugher on her way out of the restaurant. Ms. Flaugher told Ms. Evans that she was there to interview with Mr. Davis for the general manager position. Ms. Evans expressed frustration and told Ms. Flaugher that the general manager position was her job, and proceeded to the bank. When Ms. Evans returned to the restaurant, Mr. Davis was interviewing Ms. Flaugher in a booth. At some point during the interview or soon thereafter, Mr. Davis approached Ms. Kennedy and said something to the effect that, “So Scarlett quit.” When Ms. Kennedy reported that Ms. Evans had not resigned, Mr. Davis turned back to the booth where Ms. Flaugher was still sitting and stated, “No, she did not quit.” According to Ms. Kennedy, Mr. Davis appeared to be excited when he thought that Ms. Evans had resigned. However, his excitement reportedly turned to disappointment after Ms. Kennedy corrected him. Mr. Davis remained at the restaurant for approximately two hours after the interview concluded. During that time, he worked on his laptop, walked around the store, and did paperwork. He never seemed excited or upset. Mr. Davis said nothing of any significance to Ms. Evans. On August 11, 2015, Ms. Evans received a message that Ms. Gnad wanted to speak with her. After she and Ms. Kennedy finished serving the restaurant’s lunchtime customers, Ms. Evans returned Ms. Gnad’s call. Upon reaching Ms. Gnad, Ms. Evans learned that the call was being recorded and that Mr. Davis was joining the call. Upon joining the call, Mr. Davis stated that Ms. Flaugher had reported to him that Ms. Evans had used the “f- word” when they conversed outside the restaurant on August 7, 2015. Mr. Davis had hired Ms. Flaugher to be the restaurant’s general manager, and he wanted Ms. Evans to sign a letter stating that she would respect Ms. Flaugher’s authority. In addition, the letter noted that Ms. Evans had “rudely spoke[n] to a manager candidate who was waiting outside for an interview, addressing her disrespectfully and using the ‘f’ word multiple times.” Mr. Davis told Ms. Evans that she could either sign the letter or resign. Ms. Evans vehemently denied using any profanity during her conversation with Ms. Flaugher. Prior to this phone conversation, Ms. Evans had not been given a copy of the letter Mr. Davis wanted her to sign. When Ms. Evans refused to sign the letter after hearing a description of its contents, Mr. Davis fired her. Ms. Kennedy resigned that day. Testimony Adduced at the Final Hearing Ms. Evans testified that Mr. Ferminella told her in May of 2015 that Momma G’s could not have a single mother as a general manager because the position essentially requires one to be available at all times. Mr. Ferminella testified that Momma G’s has hired single mothers to fill general manager positions, and he denied ever telling Ms. Evans that she was ineligible for the general manager position. He testified that Ms. Evans had been hired as a “supervisor” in May of 2015 and that he never told anyone to reduce Ms. Evans’ hours. Mr. Ferminella testified that the highest paid hourly worker in a restaurant is typically released early on days when business is slow. Mr. Davis testified that he had agreed to hire Ms. Evans as an hourly supervisor. Her responsibilities included management of the restaurant’s daily operations, managing other employees, and purchasing. Mr. Davis denied telling anyone to reduce Ms. Evans’ hours. He also testified that the restaurant industry has a practice of releasing the highest paid hourly worker early when business is slow on a particular day. That helps keep costs down. Mr. Davis testified that Momma G’s has hired single mothers to fill general manager positions in the past. Mr. Davis testified that Ms. Flaugher told him during her interview about her conversation with Ms. Evans. According to Mr. Davis, Ms. Flaugher told him that Ms. Evans had used the “f-word” during that conversation. Mr. Davis testified that use of the “f-word” by a Momma G’s employee results in immediate termination. Nevertheless, Mr. Davis did not take immediate action. Instead, he testified that he had to “listen and investigate and take time, and then report to my direct report2/ the conversation. And, you know, that’s the way things work. Things were very – move very slowly in this business, making decisions.” Mr. Davis also testified that he hired Ms. Flaugher to be the general manager of the restaurant in Panama City. According to Mr. Davis, Ms. Flaugher accepted the offer and reported for training at a Momma G’s restaurant in Auburn, Alabama. Momma G’s even reserved a hotel room for her while she was training in Auburn. However, Ms. Flaugher supposedly left the week-long training after a few days without giving notice of any kind to Mr. Davis or anyone else associated with Momma G’s. During the final hearing, Mr. Davis attributed Ms. Flaugher’s sudden and unexplained disappearance to her being “traumatized” by her conversation with Ms. Evans on August 7, 2015. As noted above, Ms. Gnad performed human relations work for Momma G’s, and she testified that Mr. Davis “has complete authority to hire or fire whoever he wants” at a Momma G’s owned store without needing anyone else’s approval. However, her statement only applied to certain Momma G’s stores, and it is unclear whether Mr. Davis had such authority at the Panama City restaurant. Ultimate Findings of Fact Ms. Evans failed to establish that Momma G’s discriminated against her when she was not hired for the general manager’s position. Ms. Evans also failed to prove that Momma G’s retaliated against her by reducing her hours during the summer of 2015. However, Ms. Evans did prove that Momma G’s effort to discipline her, and ultimately terminate her, based on the conversation with Ms. Flaugher, was retaliation for filing complaints with the EEOC and the FCHR. The testimony of Ms. Evans and Ms. Kennedy was far more credible than Mr. Davis’s. In particular, the undersigned credits Ms. Kennedy’s testimony that Mr. Davis approached her and excitedly said something to the effect that, “So Scarlett quit.” After Ms. Kennedy corrected him, Mr. Davis appeared to be disappointed, turned back to the booth where Ms. Flaugher was still sitting, and stated, “No, she did not quit.” That testimony indicates Mr. Davis was hoping that Ms. Evans’ employment at the restaurant would come to an end. During his testimony, Mr. Davis was adamant that a Momma G’s employee would be immediately terminated for using profanity. However, when he supposedly learned from Ms. Flaugher on August 7, 2015, that Ms. Evans had used the “f-word,” he took no action whatsoever despite being at the restaurant with Ms. Evans and Ms. Kennedy for approximately two hours after the interview had concluded. His lack of prompt action belies Mr. Davis’s assertion that he needed to conduct an investigation. Any such investigation would have included a prompt discussion with the accused (i.e., Ms. Evans). In addition, Mr. Davis simply accepted a statement made by a complete stranger without conferring with an employee who was regularly in charge of the restaurant. In short, there was no true investigation and no intent to conduct one. The undersigned also has a difficult time reconciling Mr. Davis’s assertion that Ms. Flaugher was “traumatized” by her encounter with Ms. Evans when Ms. Flaugher: (a) agreed to be the general manager at the restaurant; (b) traveled to Auburn, Alabama, for one week of training; and (c) attended a few days of that training prior to leaving with no explanation. If Ms. Flaugher was so traumatized, it seems very unlikely that she would have accepted Mr. Davis’s job offer. It is even more unlikely that one so traumatized would travel from her home for a week-long training session and suddenly realize after a few days of training that she could not accept the general manager position. By attributing Ms. Flaugher’s unexplained disappearance to being traumatized by her conversation with Ms. Evans, Mr. Davis demonstrates a pretextual basis for his desire to have Ms. Evans’ employment at the restaurant end. Finally, Mr. Davis’s credibility was also undermined by his demeanor on the witness stand. He appeared to be very nervous or uncomfortable when cross-examined by Ms. Evans’ attorney, and he appeared even more nervous or uncomfortable when the undersigned questioned him about certain aspects of his testimony. In sum, Mr. Davis’s failure to obtain Ms. Evans’ version of what happened outside the restaurant on August 7, 2015, demonstrates that the effort to discipline her on August 11, 2015, was a pretext for retaliating against her for filing complaints with the EEOC and the FCHR. In other words, Mr. Davis had no interest in conducting an actual investigation and giving Ms. Evans an opportunity to rebut Ms. Flaugher’s assertion. Rather than being motivated by a desire to ascertain what actually happened outside the restaurant on August 7, 2015, Mr. Davis was motivated by a desire to take some sort of adverse action against Ms. Evans. There is no other reasonable conclusion because all of the evidence indicates that Ms. Evans was a good employee. Mr. Ferminella testified that Ms. Evans would have been considered for the general manager position if she had been willing to work the required hours and be a salaried employee. Also, even after Momma G’s acquired the restaurant, Ms. Evans continued in a leadership role, even though she was never officially designated as the restaurant’s general manager. The evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing demonstrates that there was a causal connection between the filing of Ms. Evans’ complaints and the adverse employment action at issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order awarding Scarlett Evans back pay, a reasonable attorney’s fee, and any other relief she is entitled to under section 760.11, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2016.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed with the Respondent from August 3, 1985 until May 10, 1986, as a waitress in the dining room of the Kings Inn Restaurant in Pensacola, Florida. In March, 1987, the Petitioner became pregnant. She then informed her employer, Mr. Judge of her pregnancy. He told her initially that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to. Shortly thereafter, he told her that she could not work after five months of pregnancy. On another occasion, his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, told her that she could not work after she "started showing." Once the Respondent, Mr. Judge, learned of the Petitioner's pregnancy, he began a regime of harassing treatment. For instance, Mr. Judge made her do the "side work," filling up all the salt and pepper shakers and sugar bowls for all of the waitresses and waitress stations. It had always been uniform policy that each waitress had the responsibility to do her own side work for her own station and tables. Mr. Judge also began yelling and cursing at her in front of her workers and customers, causing her great humiliation and embarrassment. He criticized her publicly about her posture and the way she serviced customers, although she had always had an excellent record as a competent waitress and had no complaints from customers or former employers, before announcing that she was pregnant. Mr. Judge also began a practice of constantly questioning other employees about the Petitioner's job performance, although he apparently learned of no substandard performance in both her duties and her attitude toward her customers. He also took her to task about her "charge tips" being less than other employees, apparently the measure he used to determine if a waitress was serving her customers appropriately and adequately. This situation, however, was caused by his discriminatory conduct toward her in giving her fewer tables to serve and thus, reducing her tip income. Mr. Judge additionally assigned her to clean up a portion of the kitchen area, particularly the "bread shelves" when normal policy had been for kitchen personnel to perform all kitchen clean-up duties, with any clean up of the bread shelf area being rotated amongst the dining room personnel. The Petitioner, however, was singled out for this duty exclusively after it became known that she was pregnant. The Petitioner was also required to stay late and perform certain closing duties at the end of business late at night, much more often than other waitresses. In addition to performing restaurant closing duties, she was frequently required to wait on cocktail tables as late as 2:00 in the morning on many of the "late duty" occasions, even though she was hired as, and until she became pregnant worked exclusively as, food waitress. Petitioner's testimony and Petitioner's exhibit 2, in evidence, establishes that, although Petitioner was only scheduled to stay late three times in March, three times in April and once in May that, in fact, she worked late, that is, after all other employees or waitresses had been released for the evening seven out of nine days that she worked in March; nine out of twelve days she worked in April; and six out of the seven days she worked in May. Indeed, on May 10, 1986, the last day she worked for the Respondent, Mr. Judge required her to stay late and to "bus" all the tables, that is clean all the tables, in the dining room, allowing the waitress who was scheduled to stay late that night to leave early. The Petitioner became quite upset at this turn of events and resigned her position, due to the repeated pattern of harassment as described herein. Although Mr. Judge initially told the Petitioner that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to during her pregnancy, in fact, on April 11, 1986, Mr. Judge hired the Petitioner's replacement. He hired Pamela Modes and had the Petitioner train her in her waitress duties. He stated to Ms. Modes privately when hiring her "that he needed a food waitress" because "he's got a girl that's pregnant." Additionally, he told the Petitioner that he objected to her working because of her pregnancy and claimed his insurance would not allow him to employ her after she was five months pregnant. These statements, coupled with the statement by his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, to the effect that she would not be employed there "once she started showing" reveal an intent by the employer to terminate the employee, the Petitioner, because of her pregnancy. Instead of terminating her outright, the Respondent chose to put sufficient pressure on the Petitioner through extra, unscheduled work duties and the other above-mentioned forms of harassment, so as to coerce her into leaving the Respondent's employ. The Petitioner thus made a prima facia showing that she was forced to terminate employment due to her sex and her pregnancy, and no countervailing evidence was adduced by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida Human Relations Commission finding that an unlawful employment practice has occurred through the Respondent's discrimination against the Petitioner because of her sex (pregnancy) and that she be accorded all relief allowed under the above- cited section, including backpay and related benefits in accordance with the requirements of Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 21st of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra A. Larson, Pro Se 9742 Aileron Avenue, Apt. 606 Pensacola, Florida 32506 Dracut Corporation d/b/a Kings Inn Restaurant Lawrence F. Judge, Jr. Owner/General Manager 1309 Maldonado Pensacola Beach, Florida 32561-2323 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
