The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent abused its discretion in failing to settle or compromise the outstanding tax assessment against Petitioner, based on Petitioner's inability to pay, pursuant to Section 213.21, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation, engaged in the business of painting and repairing damaged automobiles and other vehicles. Petitioner's principal place of business and home office is located at 100 Northwest 9th Terrace, Hallandale, Florida. Respondent is the agency charged with administering the tax laws of the State of Florida, pursuant to, among other provisions, Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. Respondent is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers. It is further authorized to request information to ascertain the tax liability of taxpayers, if any, pursuant to Section 213.34, Florida Statutes. It is undisputed that Petitioner is a taxpayer. From September 2, 1997 through March 12, 1999, Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner to determine whether Petitioner had been properly collecting and remitting sales and use tax and whether any additional sales and use tax amounts were due. On September 2, 1997, Respondent forwarded its form DR-840, Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, to Petitioner. The period of time being audited was from August 1, 1992 through July 31, 1997. For part of the audit period, Petitioner's records were inadequate. Petitioner's record keeping was poor. For the remainder of the audit period, Petitioner's records were voluminous. A higher amount of gross sales were reported on Petitioner's federal tax return than on Florida's tax return. Petitioner could not document 95 percent of its exempt sales reported to the State of Florida. Petitioner reported a ratio of 35 percent for exempt sales on its filed Florida sales and use tax returns. Because of the two factors of inadequate and voluminous records, sampling was required by Respondent. On January 12, 1998, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a written audit sampling agreement. On June 5, 1998, Respondent provided its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes to Petitioner. On July 21, 1998, Respondent issued its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (revised), which was the first revision, to Petitioner. On January 12, 1999, Respondent issued its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (revised), which was the second revision, to Petitioner. On March 12, 1999, Respondent issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner. This notice indicated that Petitioner owed additional sales and use tax in the amount of $166,306.93, penalty in the amount of $81,443.38, and interest through March 12, 1999, in the amount of $77,468.37. Consequently, the notice further indicated that the total amount of the assessment against Petitioner was $325,218.68. A compromise of the assessed tax, interest, or penalty can be performed at Respondent's field level after an audit is completed and the case is still in Respondent's field office. However, the field office's authority is limited in that affected taxpayer must agree to the amount of the tax assessed. In the present case, Petitioner did not agree to the amount of the tax assessed and, therefore, Respondent's field office could not compromise the assessed tax, interest, or penalty against Petitioner. On September 17, 1999, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision. Respondent notified Petitioner that the assessment would not be changed. Petitioner requested a reconsideration as to whether Respondent should compromise the tax, interest, and penalty, based on grounds of doubt of collectibility. By Notice of Reconsideration issued January 7, 2000, Respondent notified Petitioner of Petitioner's failure to establish an inability to pay the assessment in full. Petitioner timely challenged Respondent's determination of Petitioner's inability to pay the assessment and requested a hearing. It is undisputed that Respondent has the discretion to compromise an assessment. Respondent may compromise tax or interest based on doubt of collectibility of the tax or interest. The taxpayer bears the burden of providing documentation to support the taxpayer's position that it cannot pay the tax or interest. Respondent examines whether a compromise is in the best interests of the State of Florida in determining whether to compromise an assessment. Respondent considers a compromise to be in the best interests of the State and may compromise the assessment under the following circumstances: (1) on the basis of the taxpayer providing documentation of the taxpayer's inability to pay the assessment in full but having the cash flow to make payments in installments; or (2) when a taxpayer's business or the taxpayer-corporation is insolvent and the taxpayer's or corporation's assets were used to satisfy legitimate liabilities and not used to enrich any person closely related to the taxpayer or corporation; or (3) when a taxpayer is gravely ill and the cash flow of the taxpayer's business is poor. When it considers compromising any tax, interest, or penalty, Respondent reviews several factors, including the audit file, financial information, and any other factors or circumstances which may affect collectibility. The financial information considered includes positive and negative sales trends, cost of goods sold, profitability, and net worth. Additionally, any changes in assets, in particular fixed assets, and liabilities are taken into account. Other factors or circumstances considered include the fair market value of a taxpayer's assets, the future prospects of a taxpayer's business, and the solvency or insolvency of a taxpayer's business. Respondent does not consider the liquidation value of a taxpayer's business. Petitioner was, and is, not familiar with the State of Florida's sales and use tax law, as the law relates to Petitioner's business. Petitioner's president has no prior experience in maintaining the books and records of a company or in completing financial statements of a company. Petitioner's president never attended a seminar, presented or sponsored by Respondent, on Florida's sales and use tax, or read any of Respondent's pamphlets on sales and use tax. Petitioner has a New York accountant, who never provided Petitioner's president or treasurer with any instructions regarding Florida's sales and use tax. During the audit period, Petitioner never requested written advice from Respondent regarding the application of Florida's sales and use tax to its business. For the last three years, Petitioner's sales have been a little less than $1,000,000. For the years 1996 and 1997, Petitioner's federal tax returns showed cash balances at the beginning of each year even though the cash balance for 1997, $51,431, was less than for 1996, $93,497. Petitioner's federal tax returns for 1996 through 1998 indicate a loss for each year during that time period. However, a comparison between Petitioner's sales income in its federal tax returns and its state tax returns shows that Petitioner's sales income was grossly underreported. Respondent's analysis worksheet, referred to as Doubt as to Collectibility Analysis Worksheet, indicated a negative dollar figure as to cash available by Petitioner to pay Respondent. Inconsistencies existed between the information reported in Petitioner's tax returns and information provided by Petitioner during the protest period. Petitioner's sales figure as of August 31, 1999, an eight-month sales period for 1999, stated in its Petition for Reconsideration, dated October 6, 1999, was substantially less than the sales figure reported on Petitioner's sales and use tax returns filed during the same time period. Additionally, Petitioner overstated the cost of goods sold in one of its federal tax returns, which resulted in an overstated net loss. The fair market value of Petitioner's assets indicated in its Petition for Reconsideration, $30,000, was more than 100 percent of the value reflected on Petitioner's county tangible personal property return, $13,000. Also, further areas of inconsistencies existed between the information provided by Petitioner and the information reported on Petitioner's tax returns. Petitioner indicated that its former treasurer received a deferred compensation payment of $60,000, but neither Petitioner's tax returns nor financial statements reflected a payment for the expense. Petitioner showed a loss on its 1996 federal tax return, which, according to Petitioner, was a result of moving expenses and expenses in the construction business; however, no expense unique to moving or the construction business was reflected on Petitioner's tax return or financial statement. Petitioner's financial data, including federal tax returns and state wage reports, showed trends and deficiencies. A trend of an increase in gross sales for Petitioner was shown for the years 1997 through 1999, in Petitioner's federal tax returns for the same years and in Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration, regarding its gross sales as of August 31, 1999. Additionally, the same federal tax returns showed a trend of an increase in net income for the same years in that deductions in relation to sales were less than the previous years. For the years 1994 through 1997, as reported on Petitioner's federal tax returns, Petitioner's depreciable assets increased each year. Respondent's analysis worksheet also showed a negative dollar figure as to Petitioner's adjusted net worth. As of August 31, 1999, the first eight months of 1999, Petitioner's total assets were $40,814 and its total loans, payable to banks, were $90,000. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner failed to provide Respondent with adequate and complete documentation and information in order for Respondent to make a determination of collectibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the assessment of tax, penalty, and interest against Copo Paint and Body Shop, Inc., and sustaining the refusal to compromise the tax, penalty, or interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph C. Moffa, Esquire Moffa & Moffa, P.A. One Financial Plaza, Suite 2202 100 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Nicholas Bykowsky, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner's application for a certificate of qualification, pursuant to Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-22, Florida Administrative Code, for failure to timely file the application.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a family-owned construction firm located in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. It primarily acts as a contractor on pile driving projects. Petitioner is also involved in property management, oil, pre-stressed concrete, and general construction. Respondent selects its highway and bridge contractors from those who qualify under Section 337.14(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-22.002(2), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner has been a qualified bidder and construction contractor in Florida for Respondent continuously since the early 1940s. Contractors desiring to bid on state highway construction contracts in excess of $250,000 must apply annually to Respondent for a certificate of qualification. The application must be accompanied by the applicant's most recent annual financial statement, showing its financial condition no more than four months before Respondent receives the application. The application directs applicants to "mail" the completed forms to Respondent's Contracts Administration Office. Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Expiration of Qualification on or about February 3, 1999. The notice advised Petitioner of the following: Your qualification with this Department will expire on 04/30/99. Pursuant to Florida Statutes, your pre-qualification application must be 'filed' with the Department within four (4) months of the ending date of your financial statement. Filing is defined as receipt of the application by the Contracts Administration Office. Enclosed are two copies of the application form. Please return an original and one (1) copy of the application and all attachments. Please be advised all information must be filed in duplicate. In preparing your new application, please carefully follow the instructions on the application form and those enclosed with this notice. Additional reference material and a copy of Rule 14-22, F.A.C., are also enclosed for your convenience. Petitioner mailed its 1999 application for qualification, together with its most recent audit report dated December 31, 1998, to Respondent's Contracts Administration Office on April 27, 1999. Petitioner's fiscal year ends on December 31. An independent accounting firm begins preparing Petitioner's audit report shortly thereafter. The accounting firm's field work for Petitioner's 1998 audit was not complete until March 10, 1999, the date of the audit certification. This certification means there were no material changes in Petitioner's financial condition up to that date. There was no material change in Petitioner's financial condition over the holiday weekend from Thursday, December 31, 1998 to Monday, January 4, 1999. Changes in the amount of interest earned by Petitioner or charged against it during this brief interval would not make a difference in anyone's decision process. Any significant change up to March 10, 1999, would have been disclosed by the accounting firm in the December 31, 1998, audited financial statement. The same accounting firm has been auditing Petitioner's books for at least 15 years. Petitioner is in very sound financial condition. The Board of Governors of the United States Postal Service has set no more than three days as the standard for delivery of first class mail between Hattiesburg, Mississippi, and Tallahassee, Florida. This standard is not a guarantee. However, 90-94 percent of the time, the postal service delivers first class mail within two or three days throughout the country, as measured by an internal service measurement standard. The postal service also contracts with Price- Waterhouse to perform an independent external service measurement system called EXFC. Under that system, the postal service scored 100 percent on test mailings, delivered to Tallahassee from Mississippi within three days, over the past three years. The post office in Tallahassee, Florida, provides dedicated carrier service for the delivery of first class mail to state agencies five days a week. The postal service also delivers mail on Saturdays for the agencies that request weekend delivery. The postal service delivers Respondent's mail to its mailroom between 7:30 and 9:00 a.m. on weekdays. Respondent also receives mail on the weekends. Respondent's security guard pushes the weekend mail cart into the building on the weekends. Respondent's mailroom staff sorts incoming mail and places it in various bins for each mail station by 11:00 a.m. each week day. The mail stations send individuals down to the mailroom to pick up the mail from their assigned bin. If a station has not picked up its mail by 2:30 p.m., mailroom personnel deliver it to that station. Occasionally, first class mail is placed in the wrong bin and delivered to the wrong mail station. That mail is retrieved by the mailroom staff sometime after 2:30 p.m. and delivered to the correct office. At the end of the business day, no first class mail remains in the mailroom for delivery within the building. There is no evidence that first class mail intended for the Contracts Administration Office has ever been misdelivered. Bessie White, Administrative Assistant in the Contracts Administration Office, picks up the mail for her office from bin number 55. After she opens the mail, she stamps qualification applications and financial statements using an electric date and time clock. Ms. White saves envelope postal markings by cutting them out and attaching them to the applications. She then distributes the mail to various personnel in her office. The date and time clock that Ms. White uses to stamp incoming mail has to be reset manually when a calendar month ends in less than 31 days. April 30, 1999, was a Friday. Ms. White did not reset the date and time clock at the end of the business day. She did not work on the weekend of May 1-2, 1999. On Monday, May 3, 1999, Ms. White dated and time stamped Petitioner's application and financial statement before she reset the clock on the stamp machine. Consequently, the date and time stamp erroneously reflected that Petitioner's application and financial statement were received on Sunday, May 2, 1999, at 11:42 a.m. Ms. White distributed Petitioner's application and financial statement to the appropriate staff member in her office. Later that day, she reset the date and time clock to reflect the correct date of May 3, 1999. She did not go back to correct the erroneous stamps on mail, including Petitioner's documents, which she had already distributed. Ms. White discovered the error on Petitioner's application and financial statement seven months later, after Petitioner filed its protest in this matter. At that time, she made a handwritten notation on the documents, indicating their receipt on May 3, 1999. Petitioner mailed its 1999 application for qualification and its audited financial statements with a reasonable expectation that Respondent would receive them within three days, on or before April 30, 1999. Petitioner relied upon the postal service standard, and its own experience, in anticipating delivery of the documents within that time frame. Petitioner has an affiliate company located in Monticello, Florida. The Florida affiliate normally receives mail from Petitioner within three days. The record here contains no explanation for the delay by one business day in the receipt of Petitioner's application by Respondent's Contracts Administration Office. Petitioner mailed similar applications to Georgia, Arkansas, Missouri and Louisiana on April 27, 1999. All of these applications were approved. Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny Application for Qualification by certified mail on May 24, 1999. Respondent made this decision because the financial statements accompanying the application were dated more than four calendar months prior to the date the application was filed. Respondent counts calendar months in making its decision whether a qualification application is timely. In this case, Respondent took the position that the four-month time period ended on April 30, 1999, 120 days after December 31, 1999. 1./ If Petitioner's fiscal year had ended on June 30, 1999, Respondent would have required Petitioner to file its application within 123 days, on or before October 31, 1999. In determining whether a qualification application is timely, Respondent does not allow the five-day grace period for service by mail as set forth in Rule 28-106.403, Florida Administrative Code, and adopted by Respondent in Rule 14- 22.0011, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent approves over 400 qualification applications a year. It denies an average of 20 applications because they are late. When an application is denied as untimely, the applicant has an opportunity to furnish Respondent with an audited interim financial statement. An interim audit requires the same work and preparation as a regular annual audit. An interim audit would cost Petitioner between $25,000 and $30,000. Performing and filing an interim audit would also cause a three-month delay in the processing of Petitioner's application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order approving Petitioner's application for a certificate of qualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1999.
The Issue Whether the proposed decision of the Department of Children and Family Services to award the contract for Florida Assertive Community Treatment (FACT) Programs for District 11, as set forth in RFP No. 01H02FP5, to Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc., was contrary to the Agency's governing statutes, the Agency's rules or policies, or the specifications of the RFP?
Findings Of Fact On or about February 18, 2002, DCF issued RFP No. 01H02FP5 for the implementation of Florida Assertive Community Treatment (FACT) Programs for persons with severe and persistent mental illnesses in DCF Districts 4, 7, and 11. The review in this case is limited to DCF's proposal to award a FACT contract in District 11. Three vendors submitted proposals for District 11, including Petitioner and Intervenor. Section 5.2 of the RFP requires that each proposal include a title page as page two of the proposal and include the RFP number; title of proposal; prospective offeror's name; organization to which the proposal is submitted; name, title, phone number and address of person who can respond to inquiries regarding the proposal; and name of project director, if known. The proposal submitted by Intervenor contained a title page identifying the offeror as Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc., (PSFI) with a mailing address in Chesterfield, Maryland. Further, every page of Intervenor's proposal had the name Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc. printed on the bottom left corner of every page. Section 6.1 of the RFP describes two phases of DCF's review of the proposals. The first is an initial screening of all proposals for what the RFP describes as "Fatal Criteria." The second is the qualitative review by an evaluation team of each proposal using criteria set out in the RFP. Fatal Criteria Section 5.4 of the RFP reads as follows: 5.4 RESPONSE TO INITIAL SCREENING REQUIREMENTS The initial screening requirements are described as FATAL CRITERIA on the RFP Rating Sheet (see section 6.1). Failure to comply with all initial screening requirements will render a proposal non-responsive and ineligible for further evaluations. The fatal criteria are: Was the proposal received by the date, time and location as specified in the Request for Proposal (section 2.4)? Was one (1) original and eight (8) copies of the proposal submitted and sealed separately? (section 5.12)? Did the provider include a Proposal Guarantee payable to the department in the amount of $1,000.00 (section 2.11)? Did the application include the signed State of Florida Request for Proposal Contractual Services Acknowledgement Form, PUR 7033 for each proposal submitted? Did the provider submit the Notice of Intent to Submit form contained in Appendix 2 by the required due date? Did the provider register and attend the offeror's conference? Did the proposal include the signed Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, Ineligibility and Voluntary Exclusion Contracts/Subcontracts (Appendix 6)? Did the proposal include the signed Statement of No Involvement(Appendix 7)? Did the proposal include the signed Acceptance of Contract Terms and Conditions indicating that the offeror agrees to all department requirements, terms and conditions in the Request for Proposal and in the Department's Standard Contract (Appendix 8)? Did the proposal include a signed lobbying form (Appendix 9)? Did the proposal include an audited financial statement for fiscal years 1999- 2000 and 2000-2001? Did the proposal include a certification of the offeror's good standing (Appendix 1)? Did the proposal contain evidence the minimum staffing levels in section 3.11 will be hired and employed? Did the proposal contain a signed Certification of a Drug-Free Workplace program (Appendix 10)? Did the proposal contain a certification regarding electronic mailing capability as referenced in section 3.20 (Appendix 5)? (emphasis in original) Section 6.1 of the RFP includes a Fatal Criteria rating sheet requiring "yes" or "no" responses by the reviewer, which included, among other provisions, the following: 4. Did the proposal include a signed Form PUR 7033? * * * 11. Did the proposal include independent audited financial statement from a CPA firm for fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001? Form PUR 7033 Section 5.1 of the RFP, entitled, STATE OF FLORIDA REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL CONTRACTUAL SERVICES ACKNOWLEDGMENT FORM, PUR 7033, requires proposers to manually sign an original Form 7033 on the appropriate signature line. The signed form 7033 must appear as the first page of the proposal. Form PUR 7033 is not a form generated by DCF but is generated by the Department of Management Services. The RFP did not set forth any fatal criteria in connection with this form other than it be signed. The proposal of Intervenor, PSFI, contained form PUR 7033 with the signature of PSFI's Chief Executive Officer, D. Cherry Jones, within the signature block designated as "authorized signature." The name Psychotherapeutice [sic] Services appears on Intervenor's form 7033 in the block entitled "vendor name." The address which appears in the block designated as "vendor's mailing address" on Intervenor's form PUR 7033 is the same mailing address in Chesterfield, Maryland, that appears on the title page of Intervenor's proposal. In completing the RFP forms designated as Appendix 1, Offeror Certification of Good Standing; Appendix 5, Certification of Electronic Mail Capability; Appendix 7, Statement of No Involvement; Appendix 8, Acceptance of Contract Terms and Conditions; and Appendix 10, Certification of a Drug-Free Workplace Program, Psychotherapeutic Services appears in the blank designated for the name of the vendor or offeror. These appendices were all signed by D. Cherry Jones. No required appendix was omitted or unsigned in Intervenor's proposal. Petitioner contends that the use by Intervenor of Psychotherapeutic Services or a shortened version of its full name instead of Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc., on Form PUR 7033 and the required appendices renders Intervenor's proposal non-responsive to fatal criteria and caused confusion within DCF as to the corporate status of the actual offeror. In Appendix 8 to Intervenor's proposal, the corporate documents from the Florida Department of State were for Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc. Timothy Griffith is Deputy Executive Director of Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc. According to Mr. Griffith, the use of the term Psychotherapeutic Services refers to a group of companies that make up the Psychotherapeutic Services Group. The parent company of all Psychotherapeutic Services affiliates, including Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc., is Associated Service Specialists, Inc. The relationship between Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc., and Associated Service Specialists, Inc., was set forth in sufficient detail in Intervenor's proposal. There is no evidence that anyone in DCF or its evaluators were confused as to what entity was identified in the proposal submitted by Intervenor. Stephen Poole is a Senior Management Analyst II with DCF, and is the procurement manager for the RFP. There was never any confusion in his mind as to what entity was making the offer to DCF. He understood Psychotherapeutic Services to refer to Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc., and had a "common sense" understanding of who the offeror was. Consistent with his testimony, Mr. Poole's reference to Psychotherapeutic Services, Inc., on the bid tabulation sheet was simply shorthand for Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc. Similarly, the bid tabulation sheet references Petitioner as Bayview Center for Mental Health even though its full name is Bayview Center for Mental Health, Inc. Likewise, his reference to "PSI" on the fatal criteria evaluation sheet "stood for and stands for, in our language, Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc." Petitioner's assertion that Intervenor's proposal was non-responsive as a result to the use of an abbreviated form of Intervenor's name is not supported by the above findings. Financial Statements Petitioner asserts that Intervenor failed to meet the requirement set forth in Section 5.4k of the RFP and referenced in paragraph 11 of the fatal criteria RFP rating sheet, that proposers include independent audited financial statements for fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. The RFP did not provide any definition, standard, guideline, or mandatory requirement for the format or content of financial statements, audits, or audited statements. The RFP simply required that they be included. Intervenor's proposal contained audited financial statements for fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. Intervenor's 2000-2001 audited financial statements consisted of an independent auditor's report from Nardone, Pridgeon & Company, P.A., Certified Public Accountants, dated August 10, 2001; balance sheets; statements of cash flow; statements of operations and retained earnings (deficit); and personnel and operating expenses. However, four pages, consisting of the Notes to Financial Statements, were omitted. There is no dispute regarding the contents of the audited financial statements for 1999-2000 submitted by Intervenor. The independent auditor's report stated in pertinent part: We have audited the accompanying balance sheets of Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc. as of June 30, 2001 and 2000, and their related statements of operations and retained earnings (deficit) and cash flows for the years then ended. . . . In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc. as of June 30, 2001 and 2000 We conducted our audits to form an opinion on the 2001 and 2000 basic financial statements taken as a whole. Luther Cox is a certified public accountant and has expertise in accounting and financial statements. It is Mr. Cox's opinion that the notes to financial statements are a required element of an audited financial statement. Mr. Cox's opinion was based in part on the Florida Board of Accountancy Rules in defining the term, "financial statement." Mr. Cox acknowledged, however, that based upon the representation that the auditors provided in the first paragraph of their letter, the auditors reviewed all of the financial statements. Additionally, Mr. Cox acknowledged that based upon his review of the notes to the financial statements, there was no negative information which should have been disclosed in the subject auditor's opinion letter and that the letter was a "clean opinion", meaning that no adverse financial information was known to the auditors which otherwise would have been required to be reported. Martin Kurtz is also a certified public accountant. He acknowledged that that the omission of the notes is not consistent with the standards of the practice of accountancy in Florida. However, he was of the opinion that, based upon the way the independent auditor's opinion letter is written, the letter relates to a full set of financial statements. "They may not have all been presented in the proposal. But there was a full set of audited financial statements." Thus, the auditor's clean opinion letter included a review of the notes. According to Mr. Kurtz, the text of Intervenor's proposal contains more information about the relationship between the parent company and Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc., than the notes to the financial statements. With the above competing opinions by certified public accountants, it is appropriate to examine the agency's use of the audited financial statements in their review of the proposals. According to Mr. Poole, the requirement to have the proposals contain independently audited financial statements was to assure DCF that the offeror possessed sufficient financial sophistication and organizational capacity to perform a FACT contract. In reviewing compliance with the requirement for an audited financial statement, DCF reviewed the submission to determine whether or not it had a letterhead from an independent auditor and whether there were financial statements. The submitted financial statements were not reviewed by a certified public accountant of DCF. According to Mr. Poole, DCF was looking generally for the "strength, administratively of the offeror. If it had the level of management expertise to be able to perform a contract in that amount of money of a million dollars." The independent auditor's letter represents that Intervenor's financial statements for fiscal years 2000-2001 were in fact audited. Petitioner's assertion that Intervenor's proposal is non-responsive because of the omission of the notes to the financial statements is not supported by the above findings. In further support for its assertion that Intervenor's omission of the notes to the financial statements renders Intervenor's proposal non-responsive for failure to meet fatal criteria, Petitioner asserts that the requirement for the inclusion of audited financial statements was not only considered within the fatal criteria of the RFP, but also was a "key consideration" for scoring criterion 36 of the RFP. Organizational capacity is set forth in section 5.5(4) of the RFP and states in pertinent part: To assist in the determination of the offeror's organizational capacity, please provide, as part of this section, the following: 4. A copy of the financial statements or audits for state fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. 6. Evidence that the offeror has met its financial obligations in a timely and consistent manner without the need to incur loans or a line of credit to routinely meet its expenses. (emphasis in original) Section 6.3.6 of the RFP contains certain criteria for the evaluators to score with regard to organizational capacity of the proposers. Criterion 36 reads as follows: 36. What evidence did the proposal provide that the offeror has not had to obtain loans or a line of credit to routinely meet its financial obligations and expenses in a timely and consistent manner as referenced in section 5.5(4)? Key considerations for scoring: Its independently audited financial statements for fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 support response. Offeror's independently audited financial statements for the last two years give evidence of ability to start a new program without benefit of start-up funds. Each of the evaluation criteria contained references to key considerations for scoring. The key considerations were to assist the evaluators in assessing the merits of the proposals. In evaluating criterion 36 pertaining to lines of credit, it was the role of the individual evaluators to interpret the degree of routine reliance and assign, accordingly, a particular score from zero to three. Intervenor directly addressed loans and lines of credit in the text of its proposal in response to criterion 36. As with the other criteria, evaluators could score this criterion from zero to three. The Department deferred to the evaluators regarding how they interpreted offerors' responses to the requirements of 5.5(4). Thus, the omission of the auditor's notes in regard to criterion 36 goes to the weight of the information in the proposal, not as to whether or not fatal criteria were met. Evaluation Committee Process Members of the Evaluation Committee were given instructions by Mr. Poole prior to commencing the qualitative review of each proposal. Each Evaluation Committee member signed a conflict of interest statement indicating they had no conflicts. The members were specifically instructed that the proposals were to be reviewed independently from one another and from each other; that any problem an evaluator may have with a proposer was not to be considered as part of their score; that the universe began and ended within the confines of the proposal; and that they were to use a scoring protocol to affix their score and to report back the following week to give that score, but not to share their results with anyone until the briefing meetings that followed the qualitative review. The Evaluation Committee consisted of employees of DCF, except for Barbara Johanningsmeier, who is a National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) representative. Mr. Poole spoke to the executive director of NAMI explaining that the NAMI evaluator should be a person who is knowledgeable either through life experience or work of Florida's community mental health system; who has an understanding of the system of care that is publicly funded; and who has an interest and some knowledge and expertise in the area of programs either through employment or through other factors. NAMI provided Ms. Johanningsmeier as the evaluator requested by DCF. Mr. Poole explained DCF's unquestioned acceptance of Ms. Johanningsmeier as an evaluator: We accepted Mrs. Johanningsmeier as the representative of NAMI because of our relationship with NAMI and our shared vision and mission of a community mental health system of Florida that is responsive to the individual needs with persons with severe and persistent illness and that our goals in some ways are the same, that we want a responsive system to people with a very serious disability . . . . [T]here would be no reason to question the validity or expertise of a representative of NAMI because NAMI has an interest in Florida's publically funded community mental health system. According to Celeste Putman, DCF's Director of Mental Health, the evaluation team included a NAMI representative to make sure that the team had a strong representative who really understood the needs of people with very severe, persistent mental illness, and who has worked closely with that population. Ms. Putnam explained that DCF has always felt that it is important to have a family member, someone who is close, from a personal standpoint, to the service delivery involved. Ms. Johanningsmeier had experience evaluating at least three other similar procurements. Further, Ms. Johanningsmeier was a member of the Board of Directors of NAMI, Florida, at the time she served on the Evaluation Committee and was a member of a local Board of Directors of NAMI. She was familiar with the NAMI PACT manual. Ms. Johanningsmeier gave an extensive description of her personal experiences with the public and private mental health systems in Florida, from her child's experience in those systems. Ms. Johanningsmeier's purpose on the evaluation team was to represent NAMI and not to promote the NAMI viewpoint in the evaluation. She denied scoring any of the criteria out of bias toward or against any of the participants using criteria outside of those that were given to her in the RFP, or attempting to skew the score in any way. Petitioner alleges that many of its responses to subjective questions were better than those of Intervenor and therefore should have been scored higher. Robert Ward, President and chief executive officer of Bayview, believed that Ms. Johanningsmeier scored Petitioner low, and as a result he felt there was either a bias of some kind or that the evaluator did not know what she was doing. Mr. Ward felt that something was wrong, but did know what it was. Petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Susan Kelly, is a senior research consultant with a private company. She works with data analysis and research and has expertise in statistics with a Ph.D. in sociology. She conducted a statistical test of the scoring by all evaluators for the purpose of determining the existence of patterns or any kind of irregularities or differences in scoring. The statistical significance test performed by Dr. Kelly showed variations between the scores of Ms. Johanningsmeier and two of the other reviewers. Dr. Kelly characterized Ms. Johanningsmeier's scores as an "outlier," but did not know the reason why there was a difference in scores between Ms. Johanningsmeier and the other evaluators. Dr. Kelly's analysis did not involve any review of the RFP, the proposals or information regarding Ms. Johanningsmeier's background or position to the Evaluation Committee. There was no substantial or material evidence presented by Petitioner to show that Ms. Johanningsmeier's scoring of the proposals was inconsistent with the scoring methodology in the RFP, clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary or capricious.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the bid protest filed by Bayview Center for Mental Health, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary J. Clark, Esquire Frank P. Rainer, Esquire Sternstein, Rainer & Clark, P.A. 101 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Two, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Thomas R. Tatum, Esquire Brinkley, McNerney, Morgan, Soloman & Tatum, LLP. Post Office Box 522 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302-0522 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Board of Accountancy was the state agency responsible for the certification and licensing of public accountants and the regulation of the public accounting profession in Florida. Respondent, Gerald E. Shaw, was licensed as a certified public accountant, (CPA), in Florida and operated a public accounting practice in Florida as Gerald E. Shaw, P.A. During the period between December 31, 1990 and April 20, 1991, Respondent was retained to audit the financial books and records of High Point of Fort Pierce Condominium Association Section I, Inc. His audit report and allied papers were submitted to the membership of the association by letter dated April 20, 1991. In his letter he indicated he had conducted his audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, (GAAS), and he opined therein that the financial statements he prepared, "present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the [Association] as of December 31, 1990 and the results of its operations for the year then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles." At some point thereafter, the Department/Board of Accountancy received the financial statements prepared by the Respondent which contained apparent deficiencies on the face, particularly the lack of adequate note disclosure. Thomas F. Reilly, C.P.A., an expert in public accounting and an individual who had, on previous occasions, conducted similar investigations for the Board of Accountancy, was retained to conduct an investigation to ascertain the facts related to the instant financial statements prepared by the Respondent. By letter dated October 4, 1991, the Department notified Respondent that the investigation would take place and the subject matter thereof. Mr. Reilly thereafter met with the Respondent and discussed the financial statements and work papers in issue with him. Though Respondent was initially reluctant to participate in the investigative process unless he was provided, ahead of time, with a list of the reported deficiencies, he later agreed to a review of his work product. When he had completed his investigation, Mr. Reilly prepared a report in which he stated his opinions regarding the sufficiency of the financial statement prepared by Respondent which he determined to be inadequate. His opinion was based on his findings that there were a significant number of departures from the accounting standards called for in Statement of Accounting Standards, (SAS), 58 developed and promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, (AICPA). Mr. Reilly also found there were no references in the Financial Statement prepared by Respondent to footnotes as required by Accounting Principles Board, (APB), Statement 4. There also was no summary of significant accounting policies as required by APB Statement 22. All of this was determined from the hierarchy of accepted auditing principles as found in SAS 5. APB Statement 22 is at the top of the hierarchy and indicates that a failure to follow generally accepted accounting principles is a significant deviation. Among the deviations Mr. Reilly found were included: Cash in reserve funds was incorrectly referred to as a current asset. Reserve funds should not be considered current assets. (See APB Statement 43). Leases should be disclosed and here these were significant. (See FASB 13, Section L-10). Related party disclosures are not mentioned in the notes as they should be. Here there were 3 separate condominium associations and this financial statement related to only one of them. Since the 3 associations were related, however, the statement should have referred to the others within the complex shared by them all. Because of their interrelationship, disclosure was important. There was no allocation of expenses among the three different associations. There were some invoices paid which may have been allocated among the 3 associations and this was not discussed. It could be significant. Rule 7D-23, F.A.C., requires disclosure of common property and the costs of repair thereof. This requires reserves be maintained for future repair, and the method of allocation, or the waiver thereof, should be explained. This can be very significant, and it was not done by Respondent here. Among the work papers submitted some things which should have been shown were not in evidence. These included: A written audit program should have outlined as required by SAS 22 and SAS 41. This is very significant. A client representation letter should have been obtained as called for in SAS 19. Without it, a limitation on the audit is imposed. This is very significant. A review of related party transactions was not shown to have been done as required by SAS 45. Because of the related organi- zations, this was a material deviation. There appeared to be no review of the internal control structure, (policies, pro- ceedings, etc. relating to the accounting practices of the organization). The auditor should look at this and understand it so he can plan his audit, as required by SAS 55. Here, the audit report did not show it was done and this is significant. A preliminary judgement of materiality levels, as required by SAS 47 was not done. There was no showing that planning had been done as required by SAS 22 and 47, or analytical procedures used in planning the nature, timing and extent of other audit procedures, as required by SAS 56. Each of these alone might not be significant, but taken together, they all are significant. There appeared to be no consideration given to applicable assertions in develop- ing audit objectives as required by SAS 31. An attorney's letter was not in the file as required since the books showed an attorney had been used during the year. This is called for by SAS 12 and is used to check on the status of the legal work and any potential liability of the client. No check was made to see if any test- ing had been done to insure the association was in compliance with Rule 7D-23, FAC. No inquiry was made to see if the client was in compliance with the laws and regulations of the state in general, as called for by SAS 63. The work papers contained a lot of unnecessary bills and statements not norm- ally included. These should not have been there in that form without a showing they were used in the audit. (See SAS 41) There was no showing that any tests were done to insure a correct expense all- ocation among the 3 entities. There was no reporting disclosure checklist. While not required, such a list is common practice to insure all required disclosures pertinent to condo associations were made. The failure to do this is, in Reilly's opinion, practice below commonly accepted standards. The checklists are available from many sources readily access- ible to accountants. There is nothing secret or exclusive about them. Accounting competency standards are found in Rule 21A-22.001 - 21A- 22.003, F.A.C. In Mr. Reilly's opinion, based on, among other discrepancies, the matters outlined above, Respondent deviated from these standards to a point below the standard for a reasonably prudent certified public accountant. He defines "generally accepted accounting practices", (GAAP), as a source of knowledge that exists as defined within the parameters of SAS 5. Certified public accountants keep current in literature pertinent to their professional practice by attendance at continuing education courses, conferences, by performing quality and peer reviews, by doing investigations for the Board of Accountancy, and by networking with other CPA's. These are, of course, not the sole methods of maintaining currency but the ones used mostly by active practitioners, to the best of Mr. Reilly's knowledge. In his report of investigation, Mr. Reilly notes that Respondent is not a member of either the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants or the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and does not participate in the peer review or quality review programs of either organization. His continuing professional education, as reported by him, consisted mainly of self study programs published by Accounting Publications, Inc., and though his practice is related, to a substantial degree to condominium associations, he has not attended any recognized continuing professional education course in that area. Mr. Felsing, also a CPA, heard Mr. Reilly's testimony at the hearing and reviewed his report of investigation. He agrees with Mr. Reilly concerning Respondent's report and he also considers Respondent's departure from generally accepted accounting standards to be significant. He notes that the Respondent here expressed a "clean" opinion regarding the status of the association which he should not have done because of the deficiencies in his work. Mr. Felsing did not review Respondent's work papers, but based on his understanding of Reilly's testimony, he identified what he considers to be significant departures from standard. These include: There should have been a work program developed as required by SAS 22. This is very significant. There should have been a client representation letter as required by SAS 19. This is significant because the failure to have it requires a qualification of the report. SAS 45 requires a review of all related parties and this was not done here even though related parties existed. Respondent's failure to document his thought processes on understanding on internal control standards is indicative of Respondent's attitude toward those standards. Felsing generally concurs with the opinions given by Mr. Reilly right down the line. He concludes that the Respondent's demonstrated lack of planning raises a question as to the effectiveness of the audit since one cannot determine if all required tasks were done. Generally accepted accounting standards require the use of analytical procedures as a valuable tool. Failure to use them would be a significant departure from accepted standards since they all relate to the planning of the engagement and without documentation, a reviewer of the audit report cannot tell if the required tasks were performed. The mere inclusion of client documents in the work papers is not acceptable proof that the work was done. The significance of the disclosure checklist lies in the fact that it is the only way to insure that all required items are included in the financial statement. After a review of all the evidence available to him, Mr. Felsing concluded that Respondent failed to use due diligence as a CPA in this audit. In the aggregate, the information available shows Respondent was either not aware of or chose to disregard the applicable professional standards pertinent here. In his defense against the charge of failing to conform to generally accepting accounting standards, Respondent refers to SAS 5 and AU 411.02 and 411.05. These authorities basically outline the standards against which accounting practice is measured. He notes that the term, "generally accepted accounting practices" includes not only pronouncements but also concept statements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and "broad conventions and rules" which are not pronouncements. Respondent urges that a practitioner has to follow generally accepted accounting practices when performing an audit. There are two subgroups of these practices which pertain to (1) profit and nonprofit organizations, and (2) governmental entities. According to the AICPA interpretation of Conduct Rule #3, there are reasons to depart from GAAP when appropriate. One is the evolution of a new form of business transaction and another is new legislation requiring a departure. In either case, a certified public accountant might legitimately deviate from GAAP. Since, he claims, GAAP is somewhat fluid in application, the auditor has the responsibility and the right not to act as a robot but to see that the audit properly serves the purpose of the entity being audited so as to promote decision making and to identify net income and net worth. Respondent asserts that GAAP are not an end in themselves but a tool in making business decisions. The usefulness of the financial information should be the primary quality to be sought. Usefulness deals with relevance and reliability. In the instant case, Respondent claims that the concept of condominium ownership of realty is so new and so different, and governed by such new legislation that GAAP which have been in use over the past 10 or 15 years and developed to deal with the condominium association are not pertinent. Here, he claims, he had to modify. His position, however, is not well taken. The audit report in issue was to be read by the condominium owners who are interested in the stewardship of the condominium board and the net worth of the association. Respondent contends they are not interested in profit or tradable net worth. A condominium association has a clear and stated purpose which is the management and maintenance of the condominium property. Therefore, an accountant who goes into an audit of a condominium association without having these concepts in his mind is, in his opinion, not doing a good job. Turning to the specifics of the allegations made by Petitioner's witnesses and in the report of investigation, while he accepts some of the comments as valid so far as they allege a particular action, he also claims, in those cases, that the alleged inadequacy has no significant effect on the financial statements. For example, on page C-1 of Mr. Reilly's report, under the heading, Financial Statements, he refers to audits (plural) when only one year is reported on. On the other hand, Respondent disagrees with Reilly's comments regarding an "unorthodox" practice of presenting separate operating statements for the general and reserve funds. Respondent claims there is no definition of "unorthodoxy" for a condominium association and, as evidenced by the 1990 budget of the association, there were more than one reserve account indicated on the financial statement. In his opinion, the accountant should honor that segregation of funds. Respondent agrees that his financial statements do not contain a general reference to the accompanying notes, but he cannot see where any damage was done to a reader of those statements because the footnotes were there without a separate reference. He disagrees that it is generally accepted to record changes in financial position as a basic part of the financial statement when dealing with condominium associations. They are "new animals" and as the accountant, he has the right, he claims, to decide if that information is necessary to the reader of the financial statement. Here, he concluded it was not and, in fact, could be a source of confusion. Respondent also disagrees the Reilly's comment regarding the information regarding reserve funds. He believes that if the financial reporter feels there is a need for segregation of funds, he has to present that segregation in detail. In this case, Respondent believes there is no orthodoxy for condominium reporting and it would be useful to the reader of the statement to see total assessments from all sources so as to determine the justification for his monthly assessment. He also disagrees with Reilly's conclusion that the financial statements do not contain a summary of significant accounting policies. There are, he claims, no alternatives to the way he presented them. Respondent has difficulty responding to Reilly's seventh assertion which is to the effect that cash in reserve funds was inappropriately reflected as a current asset since the reserves are long term. Mr. Shaw believes that if the cash is there, it is available to the board whether it is used or not. This appears to be a matter of semantics and not an issue particularly related to the accounting for condominium associations. While it is true the reserve asset is current and available, it is a dedicated asset and the better accepted accounting practice, as indicated by both experts, is to treat it more as a long term asset. It is so found. Respondent also disagrees with Reilly's conclusion that his terminology in Sections 2 and 3 of the balance sheet is unorthodox. He asserts that those sections do not have to be defined anywhere in the financial statements and are not related to Section 1. He contends that any reader of the audit report would know what is what and be able to understand it. With regard to the "missing" note disclosures, he disagrees with all allegations. He claims that disclosures under FASB #13 and #96 clearly do not apply to condominium associations but relate to investor owned leaseholds. Review of the pertinent bulletin does not necessarily support Respondent's position. He also claims that since there are no related parties none need be disclosed as regards the property management company or the other Sections. The same, he contends, relates to disclosure of potential allocation of expense between the three associations in the same complex. He also does not accept the need to disclose the allocation of interest income between funds utilized by the association. As to disclosures related to reserves and the funding for major repairs and replacements, he contends there is no GAAP that requires this disclosure. Only the state requires it. If a practice is called for in either a statute or rule governing a business activity, whether the profession agrees or not, that requirement must be met and one who fails to do so omits at his peril. In general, those things omitted from his audit, such as a cash flow statement, were not requested by the client, he claims. Had he been asked for them, he would have provided them. Respondent also seeks to rebut some of Mr. Reilly's comments regarding his work papers. He has no complaint with the first two which are not critical of his audit, and he admits he may be in violation of GAAP with regard to Reilly's finding that certain required documentation was not included therewith. However, if, as he alleged, the financial statement conforms to GAAP, there is no harm done when the supporting work papers are not exactly as they should be. He contends, as well, that several, such as SAS #22 which refers to assistants, do not apply. Admitting to a violation of SAS #19 which calls for a client representation letter, he claims to have cured that defect by subsequently getting one and thereafter saw no reason to change the financial statement. Again, as with his response to the complaints regarding the financial statement, he claims any alleged failure regarding related parties is invalid since, he asserts, there are none. With regard to the remaining alleged defects in the supporting documentation to the work papers, he claims there was a search for unrecorded liabilities but because there was no mention made of it, Reilly could not tell this from the documents. Admitting there was no documentation regarding understanding of the internal control structure, as required by SAS #55, Respondent claims he understood it. He alleges he did accomplish an assessment of control risk as required by SAS #55 but admits there is no record of it in the work papers. The preliminary judgement of materiality levels, planning, and analytical procedures in planning the nature, timing and extent of other audit procedures, as required by SAS #'s 22,47 and 56 were all accomplished, he claims, but admits they were not included in the work papers. He also admits he did not get an attorney's letter and that this is a violation. However, he claims he did test to determine if the association was in compliance with pertinent statutes and rules, but it was not written down in the work papers, and he claims that confirmation of accounts receivable was not necessary because there were none except from Sections 2 and 3, which he did verify. In this latter assertion, it appears he was correct. Mr. Shaw refers to allegations 4 - 6 regarding work papers as mere statements of fact with which he takes no issue. A closer look at the report, however, reveals that numerous omissions were noted here as well. He admits that a financial statement reporting checklist was not in evidence but relates he deemed it not necessary. Mr. Reilly disagreed and his opinion is more supportable. There is little to disagree with in Mr. Reilly's item 8 under work papers when he asserts that the omission of an overall index of the work papers made them difficult to review and void of audit methodology. Taken together, the evidence demonstrates that Respondent's audit did not sufficiently conform to GAAP and was less than required under the circumstances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered in this case placing Respondent, Gerald E. Shaw's, license as a certified public accountant in Florida on probation for a period of three years under such terms and conditions relating to practice and continuing education as are deemed appropriate by the Board of Accountancy. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-3420 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted and incorporated herein except as they relate to the treatment of reserve accounts as long term assets. FOR THE RESPONDENT: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Gerald E. Shaw 10780 South US 1 Port St. Lucie, Florida 34952 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Martha Willis Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation/Board of Accountancy Suite 16 4001 Northwest 43rd Street Gainesville, Florida 32606
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's certified public accountant's license should be disciplined for the alleged violations set forth in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Flanagan & Baker, P. A. (respondent or firm), was a certified public accounting firm having been issued license number AD 0006179 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy (Board). When the events herein occurred, the firm's offices were located at 2831 Ringling Boulevard, Suite E-118, Sarasota, Florida, and John R. Flanagan and Michael L. Baker, both certified public accountants (CPA), were partners in the firm. In addition, Thomas A. Menchinger, also a CPA, was a junior partner. The firm has since been dissolved, and Flanagan and Menchinger have now formed a new firm known as Flanagan & Menchinger, P. A., at the same address. It is noted that Flanagan, Baker and Menchinger are not named as individual respondents in this proceeding, and at hearing respondent's representative assumed that only the firm's license was at risk. Whether license number AD 0006179 is still active or valid is not of record. In 1987, respondent, through its partner, Flanagan, accepted an engagement to prepare the 1986 calendar year financial statements for Ballantroe Condominium Association, Inc. (BCA or association), an owners' association for a fifty unit condominium in Sarasota. Financial statements are a historical accounting of what transpired for an entity during a particular period of time as well as the status of its assets, liabilities and equity on a given date. They are prepared for a variety of persons who rely upon them to see what transpired during that time period. If the statements are not properly prepared, the possibility exists that harm or other problems may accrue to the users of the statements. After the statements were prepared and issued, a unit owner made inquiry with respondent in August 1987 concerning two items in the statements. When he did not receive the desired response, the owner wrote the Department in September 1987 and asked for assistance in obtaining an opinion regarding the two items. Eventually, the matter was turned over to a Board consultant, Marlyn D. Felsing, and he reviewed the statements in question. Although Felsing found no problems with the two items raised by the owner, he noted what he perceived to be other errors or irregularities in the statements. This led to the issuance of an administrative complaint on September 29, 1988 charging the firm of Flanagan & Baker, P. A., with negligence in the preparation of the statements and the violation of three Board rules. That precipitated the instant controversy. The engagement in question represented the first occasion that the firm had performed work for BCA. The association's annual financial statements from its inception in 1980 through calendar year 1983 had been prepared by Touche Ross & Company, a national accounting firm, and for the years 1984 and 1985 by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., a Sarasota accounting firm. Some of these statements have been received in evidence. As a part of the Board investigation which culminated in the issuance of a complaint, Felsing visited respondent's firm, interviewed its principals, and reviewed the work papers and financial statements. A formal report reflecting the results of his investigation was prepared in June 1988 and has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. In preparing his report, Felsing relied upon a number of authoritative pronouncements in the accounting profession which underlie the concept of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). These included various opinions issued by the Accounting Principles Board (APB), Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) issued by the Auditing Standards Board, and Accounting Research Bulletins (ARB) issued by the Committee on Accounting Procedure. The three organizations are a part of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). With regard to the concept of materiality, which requires an accountant to consider the relative importance of any event, accounting procedure or change in procedure that affects items on the statements, Felsing did not exclude any matters on the ground they were immaterial. Rather, he included all possible irregularities, regardless of their materiality, on the theory that the probable cause panel (for which the report was initially prepared) should consider all items in the aggregate. According to Felsing, a number of irregularities or errors were found in the financial statements prepared by respondent. These are discussed separately in the findings below. The first alleged deficiency noted by Felsing concerned a change by the association from accelerated to the straight-line method of depreciation. According to APB 20, such a change is considered to be significant, and "the cumulative effect of changing to a new accounting principle on the amount of retained earnings at the beginning of the period in which the change is made should be included in net income of the period of the change." In other words, APB 20 requires the cumulative effect of the change to be reported in the net income of the current year. However, respondent accounted for the change as a prior period adjustment on the statement of members' equity. Respondent justified its treatment of the item on the ground the prior year's statements prepared by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., did not show any accumulated depreciation. Thus, respondent asserted it was merely correcting an error because the other firm had not reported depreciation on the balance sheet. In addition, respondent noted that the effect on the balance sheet was only $721, deemed the item to be immaterial, and concluded its treatment of the item was appropriate. However, APB 20 requires the auditor to address the cumulative effect of the change ($2,072) rather than the effect of only the current year ($721), and therefore the cumulative effect should have been reported in current income. By failing to do so, respondent deviated from GAAP. The association had designated several cash accounts as being reserve accounts for deferred maintenance and replacements. Under ARB 43, such accounts must be segregated in the balance sheet from other cash accounts that are available for current operations. This would normally be done in a separate classification called "other assets" so that the user of the statements would be aware of the fact that the reserves were not available for current operations. However, the statements reflect that three such reserve accounts were placed under the classification of current assets. It is noted that these accounts totaled $25,514, $18,550 and $30,927, respectively. While respondent recognized the difference between cash available for current operations and reserves for future use, and the requirements of ARB 43, it noted that the association's minute book reflected the association regularly withdrew funds from the accounts throughout the year to cover current operations. Also, the prior year's statements prepared by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., had classified the item in the same fashion. Even so, if respondent was justified in classifying the accounts as current assets, it erred by identifying those accounts as "reserves" under the current assets portion of the balance sheet. Therefore, a deviation from GAAP occurred. One of the most important items in a condominium association's financial statements is how it accounts for the accumulation and expenditure of reserves, an item that is typically significant in terms of amount. The accounting profession does not recommend any one methodology but permits an association to choose from a number of alternative methods. In this regard, APB 22 requires that an entity disclose all significant accounting policies, including the choice made for this item. This disclosure is normally made in the footnotes to the financial statements. In this case, no such disclosure was made. Respondent conceded that it failed to include a footnote but pointed out that when the statements were prepared by Touche Ross & Company, one of the world's largest accounting firms, that firm had made no disclosure on the basis of immateriality. However, reliance on a prior year's statements is not justification for a deviation from GAAP. It is accordingly found that APB 22 is controlling, and footnote disclosure should have been made. The financial statements contain a schedule of sources and uses of cash for the current fiscal year. According to APB 19, all transactions in this schedule should be reported at gross amounts irrespective of whether they utilize cash. However, respondent reported all transactions in the schedule at their net amount. In justifying its action, respondent again relied upon the prior years' statements of Touche Ross & Company and Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., who reported the transactions in the same manner. It also contended the item was immaterial and that a detailed explanation of the item is found in the statement of members' equity. Despite these mitigating factors, it is found that the schedule was inconsistent with APB 19, and a deviation from GAAP occurred. Felsing's next concern involved the language used by respondent in footnote 6 to the statements. That footnote pertained to the unfunded reserve and read as follows: NOTE VI - UNFUNDED RESERVE As of December 31, 1986, the Association reserves amounted to $103,953 consisting of $18,931 as a reserve for depreciation and statutory reserves of $85,022. The amount funded was $95,422 leaving an unfunded balance of $8,531 due to the reserves from the operating funds. Felsing characterized the footnote as "confusing" because it referred to depreciation as a part of a future reserve for replacements. Felsing maintained the footnote contained inappropriate wording since depreciation relates to assets already placed in service and not to their replacements. Respondent agreed that the footnote, taken by itself, might be confusing. However, it contended that if the user read the preceding footnote, which he should, there would be no possible confusion. That footnote read as follows: NOTE V - RESERVE FOR DEPRECIATION The Association funds the reserves for depreciation through its operating budget. These funds are to be used for the replacement of property and equipment as the need arises. As previously noted, the Association changed its method of computing depreciation to conform with generally accepted accounting principles. As of December 31, 1986, the reserve for depreciation totaled $18,931. According to respondent, the above footnote made clear to the user that the firm was not referring to depreciation as a reserve but rather was setting aside funds equal to depreciation in an effort to have sufficient cash to purchase assets in the future. While the deficiency here is highly technical and minute in nature, it is found that the footnote is not sufficiently clear and that the user might be confused. Felsing next observed that the footnotes did not disclose how the association accounted for lawn equipment or other capital assets. According to APB 22, such a choice is considered a significant accounting policy and, whatever policy is utilized, the same must be disclosed in the footnotes to the statements. In response, Flanagan pointed to a footnote in Note I of the statements which read in part as follows: Property and Equipment and Depreciation Property and equipment capitalized by the Association is stated at cost. During 1986, the Association changed its method of depreciation from the accelerated cost recovery method to a straight line method in which property and equipment is depreciated over its estimated useful life in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. According to respondent, this footnote was adequate in terms of explaining the method of depreciation. Also, a number of other statements were introduced into evidence to show that other entities routinely used a corresponding footnote. Flanagan's testimony is accepted as being the most credible and persuasive evidence on this issue, and the footnote is accordingly deemed to be adequate disclosure on this policy. In the statement of members' equity, there is an item in the amount of $1,730 described as "capitalization of lawn equipment expensed in previous year." Although Felsing did not question the amount shown, he faulted respondent for not properly describing whether the item was a change in accounting principle or an error correction. According to APB 20, the disclosure of an error correction is required in the period in which the error was discovered and corrected. Although respondent considered the footnote described in finding of fact 11 to constitute adequate disclosure, it is found that such disclosure falls short of the requirements of APB 20. Work papers are records and documentary evidence kept by the accountant of the procedures applied, tests performed, information obtained and pertinent conclusions reached in the engagement. They serve the purpose of documenting the work performed and provide verification for the accountant. In addition, another important, required tool is the audit program, a written plan for how the auditor intends to perform the audit. The plan serves the purpose of documenting the accountant's mental process of deciding what procedures are necessary to perform the audit and to communicate those procedures to the persons actually conducting the audit. The audit plan should include in reasonable detail all of the audit procedures necessary for the accountant to perform the audit and express an opinion on the financial statements. Although a variety of checklists have been prepared by the AICPA and other organizations, each audit program must be tailored to fit the needs of a particular client. Felsing noted what he believed to be a number of deficiencies with respect to respondent's work papers, audit program, and engagement planning. In reaching that conclusion, Felsing relied upon various SAS pronouncements which govern that phase of an auditor's work. Those pronouncements have been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibits 7-14. Although the work papers themselves were not introduced into evidence, Felsing stated that his review of them reflected they were "deficient" in several respects. For example, he did not find a planning memorandum, time budget, checklist or other evidence that planning procedures were performed as required by SAS 22. In this regard, Flanagan corroborated the fact that no formal planning memorandum to the file was prepared. Although respondent's audit program was written for a condominium association, Felsing found it "extremely brief" and was not tailored to this particular client. He opined that such a program should have included reasonable detail of all audit procedures necessary to accomplish the audit and to express an opinion on the financial statements. In particular, it was noted that some required procedures were not on the list while some procedures actually used by respondent were not included. Through conversations with respondent's members, Felsing learned that much of the audit work was performed by Menchinger, the junior partner in the firm. In addition, "a few" other work papers were prepared by an unknown assistant. Although Menchinger reviewed all work performed by the assistant, Felsing found no evidence that the papers were reviewed by the supervising partner, Flanagan. Such review, which is a required step in the audit process, is generally evidenced by the supervising partner placing check marks or initials on the individual work papers. Felsing noted further that the decision to rely on the testing of internal controls was not documented in the work papers by respondent. He added that the amount of time budgeted by respondent for this engagement (around thirty hours) was inadequate given the fact that it was the first year the firm had prepared this client's statements. Finally, Felsing concluded that the violations were not peculiar to a condominium association but were applicable to all enterprises. Respondent pointed out that the association was a small client with less than five hundred line items, and the audit program and engagement planning were planned within that context. Respondent introduced into evidence its audit program which contained the steps taken by the firm in planning for the engagement. Testimony that all steps contained therein were followed was not contradicted. Similarly, Flanagan testified without contradiction that he reviewed all work performed by Menchinger but did not evidence his review with tick marks on each page. According to Flanagan, on a small audit such as this, he considered the signing of the tax return and opinion letter evidence that he had reviewed the work papers. However, Flanagan acknowledged that someone examining the papers would not know they had been reviewed by the supervising partner. Based upon the above findings, and after reconciling the conflicting testimony, it is found that respondent violated GAAP by failing to have a planning memorandum, time budget, and evidence of testing of internal controls within its work papers. All other alleged violations are found to without merit. Respondent has continued to represent the association since the Board issued its complaint. Indeed, Flanagan noted that the association is pleased with the firm's work, and this was corroborated by a letter from the association's board of directors attesting to its satisfaction with the firm. There was no evidence that the association or any other third party user of the statements was injured or misled by relying on the statements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of the violations discussed in the conclusions of law portion of this Recommended Order, and that license number AD 0006179 be given a reprimand. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October 1989.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, a licensed Limited Surety Agent, failed to transmit the statistical reporting requirements information to the Petitioner within thirty days after the end of 1988.
Findings Of Fact Beverly Elaine Bryson's licensure as a Limited Surety Agent (bail bondsman) was placed with Bankers Insurance Company on December 1, 1988. The Department required all limited surety agents to complete a Statistical Reporting Requirements form for the period from July 1 through December 31, 1988. The report was to be transmitted to the Department within 30 days after the end of the period. Respondent Bryson opened her business on December 7, 1988, and executed twenty bonds within the reporting period. Respondent Bryson completed the form within the first part of January 1989. She mailed one copy of the form to the Department and another copy to her general agent, Amando Roche, at Roche's Surety, Inc. Linda Roche, who is employed at Roche's Surety, Inc., recalls receiving a copy of the report from Respondent Bryson. To assure that the Department received the report form, Linda Roche sent a copy of the report, along with the reports of other agents to the Department by Federal Express Mail. The purpose of the transmittal by express mail was to obtain a signed receipt from the Department. The one-page report form that was transmitted to the Department incorrectly listed the bondman's name as "Brysons, Beverly" as opposed to "Beverly Elaine Bryson." In addition, the form was completed in such an ambiguous fashion that an ordinary reading of the form reveals that the report was completed for the reporting period from January 1 through June 30, 1988, as well as the period from July 1 through December 1988. The address on the form, 1960 Velasco Street, was different than the address on file with the Department. The address at the Department was 1900 Velasco Street. Based upon the high percentage of errors, misinformation, ambiguities, and general differences in the report from information already on file, it is unknown what happened to the two copies of the report transmitted to the Department. The problems with the contents of the report were created by the Respondent. In an attempt to acquire the report after the reporting deadline, the Department sent the Respondent a letter stating that the Department had not received the report. An additional time period in which to file the report was given to the Respondent. The letter was sent by certified mail, and reached the 1960 Velasco Street address by March 15, 1989. When the certified letter was received at Respondent's business, Beverly Elaine Bryson was out of the state on vacation. Carol Graham, an insurance agent within the business, signed for the letter. The Respondent was never notified by Carol Graham or any other employee within the business that the Department had not received the first report and was requesting that the information be provided. In March 1989, Linda Roche received a telephone call from Carol Graham regarding the Statistical Reporting Requirements form for the Respondent. Mrs. Roche incorrectly recalls that the call was made by the Respondent. Mrs. Roche reported to the caller that she had sent a copy of the report by Federal Express Mail to the Department. Mrs. Roche's recollection of the telephone call reconciles the question of why Carol Graham did not inform the Respondent of the Department's request. A reasonable inference exists that Ms. Graham believed that Mrs. Roche's mailing was a recent one, and that the matter did not require any more attention. As of the date of hearing on October 17, 1989, the Department records did not reveal that a Statistical Reporting Requirements form for July through December 31, 1988, had been filed on behalf of Beverly Elaine Bryson. The inaccuracy of the report completed and mailed by the Respondent was unintentional.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the violations charged against the Respondent Bryson as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, Case No. 89- 4411, be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA D. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-4411 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #1. Rejected. See HO #4. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. See HO #4. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #5. Accept the first sentence. See HO #5. The rest is rejected. Improper conclusion. See HO #7 and #14. Rejected. See HO #10 through #13. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Rejected. See Preliminary Statement Accepted. See HO #2 and #4. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Christopher Anderson III, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dennis J. Rehak, Esquire Post Office Drawer 660 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Basic is a general contractor specializing in asphalt resurfacing and related construction activities. Its principal offices are in Orlando, Florida. Basic is not currently qualified to bid on construction projects to be let by DOT. Its certificate of qualification expired on June 30, 1984. Until the expiration, Basic had been continuously qualified by DOT to bid on such jobs since 1975. During the time it was qualified, Basic successfully performed approximately fifty state jobs. In early September, 1984, Basic received its annual audited financial statement from its accountants, Fox and Company (Fox), which reflected Basic's financial condition for the year ending on March 31, 1984. On or about September 14, 1984, Basic filed its application for renewal of its certificate of qualification. With the application, Basic filed the audited financial statement prepared by Fox and Company and an additional financial statement prepared by Basic's new accountants, Colley, Trumbower and Howell (Colley). This Colley financial statement was merely a compilation and covered the period April 1, 1984 through June 30, 1984. The audited statement of Fox contained the opinion of a certified public accountant; the compilation of Colley contained no opinion. The audited statement preceded the date of filing by approximately 170 days. DOT reviewed the application and denied it on the ground that the financial statements submitted were of a date more than 120 days prior to the application DOT did not perform a fiscal analysis or further review of the application after it determined that the application did not contain what it believed to be the necessary financial statements. In response to the denial, Basic had Colley prepare an additional financial statement which reflected its financial condition through September 30, 1984. This financial statement was a review and did not contain an opinion of a certified public accountant (See transcript p 47, lines 22 and 23). DOT declined to accept this review. An "audited" financial statement is a financial statement that has been subjected to full audit scrutiny and verification. A compiled financial statement is merely a compilation of financial information as supplied by the client. A reviewed financial statement consists of inquiries and compilation of financial data with application of analytical procedures and is less in scope than an audited financial statement. An "opinion" is a term of art in the field of accounting and refers to an opinion that the basic financial information taken as a whole is fairly stated in all material respects and is in accordance with generally accepted accounting principals. A qualified opinion is subject to the same definition and level of scrutiny, but is qualified as it relates to one or more items in the financial statement. DOT only accepts audited financial statements which express an opinion. The financial information in the reviewed financial statement, when read in conjunction with the audited financial statement reflects that Basic is in an adequate financial situation with positive current rates and a substantial adjusted net worth. Basic is making a profit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the application of Basic for a certificate of qualification. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1985.
