Findings Of Fact The Board of Pilot Commissioners, Respondent, is charged with the responsibility of regulating licensed state pilots and certified deputy pilots in the State of Florida. Respondent is also charged with the responsibility and given the authority to license state pilots in various ports in Florida including the Port of Tampa. Section 310.061, Florida Statutes, provides, inter alia, that there shall not be more than 22 licensed state pilots for Tampa Bay. The number of deputy pilots which may be certified by Respondent is not specified by statute. Respondent may certify as many as necessary to meet the demand for pilot services. Currently, there are 20 licensed state pilots for Tampa Bay and four certified deputy pilots. No applications for pilot or deputy pilot for Tampa Bay have been accepted by Respondent for at least the past two years. Captain Gary Murphy applied to take the state pilot examination in 1980 and was qualified to do so. He is still on Respondent's mailing list to be notified when applications for Tampa will next be accepted. Captain Murphy is a member of TRICO. Respondent does not accept applications for state pilot positions in any port, including Tampa Bay, nor is an examination administered until Respondent has first declared an opening or openings for state pilots for the particular port. TRICO was founded by Captain David Rabren to provide piloting and shipping services on Tampa Bay. The other Petitioners signed membership agreements with TRICO. TRICO began operations January 1, 1984, and is an association of pilots who contract with the ship owners to provide certain piloting services in Tampa Bay. These include docking and undocking vessels and other piloting services on vessels these pilots are legally entitled to pilot. Only Captain Rabren of TRICO is a licensed state pilot for Tampa Bay and authorized to pilot foreign ships into and out of the port. Captains Murphy, Cropper, and Farrell all hold first-class pilots licenses issued by the U. S. Coast Guard for Tampa Bay and they all meet the statutory criteria for experience needed to sit for the Tampa Bay state pilot examination. If the proposed rule becomes effective, none of these Petitioners will be qualified to sit for the state pilot licensing examination. By Chapter 84-185, Laws of Florida, Section 310.071 was amended by extensive modification of Subsection (1)(b) and renumbering Subsection (2) to Subsection (3). Section 310.071, Florida Statutes, establishes the qualifications of applicants for licensure as state pilots and certification for deputy pilots. Following the effective date of Chapter 84-185 of October 1, 1984, Respondent issued proposed Rule 21SS-5.125, Florida Administrative Code.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Rusty Santangelo, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Ace Staffing, based on his disability (handicap) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Ace Staffing is a temporary employment agency. Ace Staffing works mostly with day laborers in the construction industry. Petitioner is a former temporary worker with Ace Staffing. Petitioner worked for Ace Staffing from 2007 through 2015. Generally, when an Ace Staffing customer requests temporary employees, the customer completes a Purchase Order (“PO”) indicating the date(s) for which employees are needed, the number of employees requested, and a description of the work to be performed. Ace Staffing then contacts its list of available employees and offers them job assignments. If an employee accepts the assignment, Ace Staffing provides that employee with a “ticket” for the customer to complete. The customer is to record the hours the employee worked, as well as the rate of pay on the ticket. After the employee performs the job, the employee returns the completed ticket to Ace Staffing along with the PO which the customer signs. Ace Staffing then collects information from the ticket to generate a paycheck for the employee. Ace Staffing typically pays employees on the day they worked. Thereafter, Ace Staffing bills the customer. Occasionally, Ace Staffing places a temporary employee in a long-term job assignment. In these circumstances, Ace Staffing considers the employee to be working a “steady” or “open” ticket. The customer still prepares a PO for Ace Staffing to record how many workers the customer employed for each work day. When working on a “steady” or “open” ticket, Ace Staffing requires the employee to provide his or her work hours to the customer at the worksite. The customer then reports the time to Ace Staffing (on a ticket or by e-mail). Ace Staffing, in turn, issues the paycheck to the employee. All Ace Staffing temporary employees are hired for specific jobs as requested by customers. Employees are never guaranteed constant work or a permanent assignment. Either Ace Staffing, the employee, or the customer may terminate the job at any time. Petitioner began working for Ace Staffing in September 2007. In 2011, Ace Staffing sent Petitioner to fill a temporary job assignment with Owens, Renz & Lee Company, Inc. (“Owens”). Owens provided janitorial and maintenance services for the Amway Arena (the “Arena”) in Orlando, Florida. Ace Staffing did not have a formal contract with Owens for its staffing services. Either Ace Staffing or Owens could end their business relationship at any time. Petitioner generally worked for Owens at the Arena performing custodial services. Petitioner worked in a part-time capacity and typically only when the Arena hosted events, such as music concerts and sporting events. Soon, Petitioner’s assignment with Owens became a “steady” or “open” ticket. When Owens needed an employee for the Arena, Ace Staffing allowed Owens to contact Petitioner directly to schedule the job. Ace Staffing instructed Petitioner to simply show up at the Arena when Owens offered him work. Regarding payment for his work for Owens, Ace Staffing instructed Petitioner that he was responsible for ensuring Owens completed the PO and the ticket for his work hours. Therefore, when Owens hired him, Petitioner was required to report his time to Owens. Specifically, Petitioner was to record the time he reported in, and when he left, the Arena. Typically, Petitioner would “punch in” with a time card when he checked in at the Arena. Owens would provide Petitioner’s recorded work hours to Ace Staffing on Petitioner’s ticket or via e-mail. Petitioner would drop off his ticket at the Ace Staffing office once a week. Ace Staffing would then provide Petitioner a ticket for Owens to complete the following week. This process enabled Ace Staffing to accurately prepare Petitioner’s paycheck. Ace Staffing paid Petitioner based on the work hours Owens reported on the ticket (or by e-mail). Ace Staffing issued Petitioner’s paycheck on a weekly basis. Petitioner very much enjoyed his job at the Arena. Similarly, the evidence indicates that Owens considered Petitioner a good and reliable worker. Petitioner worked steadily at the Arena averaging ten to 20 events a month. Petitioner began to envision that he could work for Owens as long as he wanted. Periodically, however, Petitioner complained to Ace Staffing that he was not being paid for all the hours he worked at the Arena. Petitioner’s pay issues came to a head in October 2015. On October 2, 2015, Petitioner appeared at the Ace Staffing office to discuss his pay shortage. Petitioner met with Prity Patel, the Owner of Ace Staffing. Petitioner told Ms. Patel that he had not been paid for approximately 45 hours that he had worked the previous fall in September and October 2014. Ms. Patel testified at the final hearing that the October 2, 2015, incident was not the first time Petitioner had complained about not being paid for all the hours he worked for Owens. She relayed that in April 2014, Petitioner told her that he had not been paid for several events he worked during December 2013. Both Ace Staffing and Owens investigated Petitioner’s claim. Owens subsequently confirmed that Petitioner had worked more hours than were recorded on his ticket. Thereafter, Ace Staffing paid Petitioner for the missing time and billed Owens accordingly. Subsequently, in May 2014, Petitioner again reported to Ace Staffing that he had worked several jobs for Owens for which he had not received compensation. This time, Petitioner identified one day in January 2014, and 12 days in March 2014. Once again, both Ace Staffing and Owens reviewed their respective records, and Owens was able to confirm that Petitioner worked the additional hours for which he claimed he was not paid. Ace Staffing paid Petitioner for all of the missing time. After Petitioner’s second complaint in May 2014, Ms. Patel instructed Petitioner to regularly check his paystub to ensure that he was properly paid for all the hours he worked. Ms. Patel specifically cautioned Petitioner not to wait weeks (or longer) to advise Ace Staffing of any error in his paycheck. However, despite Ms. Patel’s instructions for Petitioner to conscientiously record his work hours with Owens, on October 8, 2014, and again on November 8, 2014, Petitioner sent two e-mails to Owens declaring that he was missing pay for hours worked in September and October 2014. Then, almost a year later on September 11, 2015 (evidently because Owens never satisfactorily responded to his initial requests), Petitioner sent another e-mail to Owens about his missing time. At that point, on September 24, 2015, Owens sent an e-mail to Ray Patel (Ace Staffing’s office manager) informing him that Petitioner was complaining that he had not been paid for work in September and October 2014. Based on Petitioner’s history of pay issues, when Ms. Patel learned on October 2, 2015, that Petitioner was again complaining about missing pay, she became upset. She was frustrated that Petitioner had failed to follow her instructions to ensure that Owens accurately recorded his work hours. Ms. Patel was further irritated that Petitioner was bemoaning pay discrepancies that were over a year old. She was also distressed that, upon receiving each paycheck over the last year, Petitioner had assured her that the amount of his paycheck was accurate. Ms. Patel explained that reconstructing Petitioner’s work hours was intensive and time-consuming for both Ace Staffing and Owens. Petitioner was asking to be paid for hours that Owens had not submitted to Ace Staffing. Therefore, tracking down Petitioner’s work days and hours required checking with each of Petitioner’s supervisors at Owens on the specific event to verify whether Petitioner did, indeed, work on the date he claimed. This process was complicated by the fact that Owens employed hundreds of workers. Consequently, reviewing the jobs Petitioner worked was burdensome on both Ace Staffing and Owens. Therefore, upon hearing Petitioner’s latest complaint, Ms. Patel instructed Petitioner not to return to Owens until she could straighten out his back pay. Ms. Patel expressed to Petitioner that she would investigate the issue, and he could return to the Arena after the matter was resolved. Ms. Patel testified that she spent a considerable amount of time in October and early November 2015 accounting for and reconciling the time Petitioner insisted that he worked for Owens in September and October 2014. Ms. Patel voiced that she was ultimately unable to independently confirm the hours Petitioner claimed. Instead, she had to rely on Petitioner’s personal calendar, which he used to track the days and events he worked at the Arena. Ace Staffing paid Petitioner for all the missing hours (44.25 hours) he claimed he worked. On November 30, 2015, Petitioner received a call from Ms. Patel informing him that the final amount of all his missing back pay from 2014 would be deposited in his bank account. Ace Staffing did not bill Owens for Petitioner’s missing time. As a direct consequence of the complications Petitioner’s pay issues caused, Ms. Patel decided to end Ace Staffing’s business relationship with Owens. Petitioner was the only Ace Staffing employee working for Owens, and the account had simply become too troublesome to administer. As a result, after October 2, 2015, Ace Staffing no longer placed any temporary employees with Owens or the Arena. On November 30, 2015, Ray Patel formally notified Owens that Petitioner would no longer be working for them. On the other hand, Petitioner, after he met with Ms. Patel, was quite anxious to return to work at the Arena. He was fully prepared to report back to Owens as soon as Ace Staffing resolved his pay discrepancy. Petitioner believed that Ace Staffing and Owens were not communicating with each other, and the clerical error that led to his pay issue could be resolved with minimal coordination between the two companies. Petitioner had been prepared to work at the Arena on Friday, October 3, 2015, for the start of basketball season. Petitioner represented that Owens had also scheduled him for additional events over the next two weeks. Further, Owens indicated that it was willing to continue employing Petitioner despite the pay dispute. After October 2, 2015, Ace Staffing continued to offer Petitioner temporary job assignments. Prior to and during the years Petitioner worked for Owens, Ace Staffing regularly sent Petitioner on day labor jobs. These jobs included work as a flagman, a sign holder, and distributing flyers. Ms. Patel, Rich Patel (an Ace Staffing manager and secretary), and Janice Mullendore (Ace Staffing’s office assistant) all persuasively testified that during October and November 2015, they contacted Petitioner and presented him with similar work. Ms. Patel explained that she only intended not to send Petitioner (or anyone) back to Owens. But, Ace Staffing always had jobs to provide to her temporary employees, including Petitioner. Petitioner, however, turned down every assignment Ace Staffing offered. He expressed to Ace Staffing that he already had a job he liked-–working for Owens at the Arena. Ace Staffing advised Petitioner that the assignments at the Arena were no longer an option. Petitioner pronounced that he did not want any other jobs but to work for Owens at the Arena. Ms. Mullendore testified that after Petitioner rejected several temporary assignments, she removed him from her list of available employees. She did not want to spend time calling someone who was not interested in working on the jobs she offered. Ms. Patel echoed Ms. Mullendore’s statement saying that after Petitioner turned down three to four job offers, Ace Staffing simply stopped calling him about available temporary work. Ace Staffing did not offer Petitioner another temporary job after November 2015. As a result of the fallout from his meeting with Ms. Patel on October 2, 2015, Petitioner asserts that Ace Staffing unjustly “terminated” him based on his disability. Petitioner felt that Ace Staffing punished him for complaining about his missing pay and for being “slow.” Petitioner asserts that he tried his best to keep up with the hours he worked for Owens. He may have been “slow,” but he was determined. Ms. Patel denied that Ace Staffing terminated Petitioner’s employment. She emphasized that the reason Ace Staffing halted Petitioner’s assignment with Owens was due to his multiple failures to accurately and timely report his work hours to Owens (and Ace Staffing). Ms. Patel stressed that Petitioner’s failure to dutifully record his hours at the time he worked at the Arena placed an extreme and unnecessary administrative burden on Ace Staffing. Reconciling Petitioner’s pay discrepancies required hours of extra work for both Ace Staffing and Owens. Further, Petitioner’s actions placed Ace Staffing in the uncomfortable position of having to request its customer (Owens) review its own work records to verify Petitioner’s work hours. Ms. Patel felt that the situation resulted solely from Petitioner’s inattentiveness. The October 2015 complaint was Petitioner’s third incident involving unpaid work hours, which Ms. Patel determined was unacceptable. Ray Patel also testified that Ace Staffing did not terminate Petitioner. Ace Staffing simply stopped offering Petitioner temporary assignments after November 2015. Mr. Patel further testified that Ace Staffing’s decision to remove Petitioner from its list of available workers was not related to any disability from which he suffered. Ace Staffing’s decision was based on Petitioner’s unwillingness to take any job assignment other than with Owens. Petitioner vehemently challenged Ace Staffing’s representation that it presented him additional work after October 1, 2015. Petitioner recounted that, according to his phone records, Ace Staffing called him seven times between October 5, 2015, and November 30, 2015. Of these seven calls, Petitioner believed that only one call concerned additional temporary work. This call came from Rich Patel who offered him an assignment passing out flyers. At the final hearing, Petitioner described a number of mental and physical ailments he experienced during his time working for Ace Staffing.4/ In 2000, Petitioner was diagnosed with human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), which caused Petitioner several lingering side effects including chronic muscle pain and fatigue. Since March 2011, Petitioner has received regular treatment for bipolar disorder. Petitioner was Baker Acted in June 2011 due to depression and an attempted suicide. In 2011 and 2012, Petitioner experienced several anxiety attacks while working at the Arena. In 2011 and 2014, Petitioner underwent surgery related to an umbilical hernia from which he still endures complications. Petitioner continues to be treated for depression with psychotic features. In addition, Petitioner suffers from asthma, sleep apnea, and plantar fasciitis in both feet. Ace Staffing does not dispute that Petitioner suffered from disabilities during the time he worked for them.5/ (Petitioner concedes that Ace Staffing had no knowledge of his HIV or foot issues.) Ace Staffing was aware that Petitioner was limited in the types of work he was able to perform. Ace Staffing tried to accommodate Petitioner’s limitations by offering him job assignments Petitioner indicated he could execute. Despite all his medical conditions, Ace Staffing readily placed Petitioner with Owens at the Arena. Based on the competent substantial evidence in the record, the preponderance of the evidence does not establish that Ace Staffing discriminated against Petitioner based on his disability (handicap). Accordingly, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that Ace Staffing discriminated against him in violation of the FCRA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no unlawful employment practice and dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 2017.
The Issue Under the standards established by Section 330.30, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14-60.05, Florida Administrative Code, the issues presented for resolution are: Whether the site is adequate for the proposed private seaplane base. Whether the proposed seaplane base will conform to minimum standards of safety. Whether safe air traffic patterns can be worked out for the proposed airport and for all existing airports and approved sites in the vicinity.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, the testimony of the witnesses, and the exhibits admitted in evidence at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. On August 24, 1983, Mr. Ruzakowski of 159 San Remo Drive, Venetian Shores Subdivision, Islamorada, Florida, filed an application with attachments with the Department for a private seaplane base license. The application of the proposed private seaplane base to be known as Plantation Key seaplane base proposes that landing and taking off would be in the open water area known as Florida Bay or Cotton Key Basin and that the seaplane would be parked on a ramp at the applicant's home. In order to reach the applicant's waterfront home, the application proposes a taxi route along Snake Creek which connects Florida Bay to the applicant's home. The application had attached to it a letter of zoning approval from the Building and Zoning Department of Monroe County signed by Mr. Joseph E. Bizjak, Assistant Building Official, which letter stated that the ramp on the applicant's property ". . . has never been and is not now in violation of any Monroe County zoning codes." The Department of Transportation has never been notified by the Monroe County Zoning and Building Department of any withdrawal of this zoning approval. Also attached to the application was a letter from Robert Billingsley supervisor of the program development section of the Federal Aviation Administration which stated that the FAA airspace approval for applicant's seaplane was still current and in effect. Mr. Ruzakowski's 1976 application for a seaplane base proposed using Snake Creek as a take-off and landing area. The instant application only proposes to use Snake Creek as a taxi area to and from Mr. Ruzakowski's residence (where he proposes to park the airplane) and the take-off and landing area in Florida Bay. The distance from Mr. Ruzakowski's residence to the take- off and landing area is approximately one mile. Upon receipt by DOT of Mr. Ruzakowski's 1983 application, an on-site feasibility inspection of the site was made by Mr. Steve Gordon of the DOT's Sixth District in Miami, Florida. Mr. Gordon, a District Aviation Engineer, has extensive experience as an airplane pilot and as an airport site inspector. Mr. Gordon conducted an adequate on-site inspection and concluded that the proposed seaplane base appeared to be in compliance with the applicable statutory and rule provisions. Specifically, Mr. Gordon concluded that the take-off and landing operations would be away from the area of the homes in the development, that the ramp on Mr. Ruzakowski's property was adequate for safe approach upon his lot, that his lot was a safe place to park his seaplane, that Snake Creek was wide enough for taxiing the airplane, that the take-off and landing area contained no obstructions or hazards, and that there was no hazard to other airports in the area. Following the inspection, Mr. Gordon wrote to Mr. Ruzakowski and to the DOT officials and advised them that the proposed site was feasible for a private seaplane base under the applicable licensing requirements. Thereafter, the DOT sent notice to approximately 200 addressees advising them of the proposed private seaplane base application, the inspection results, the DOT's intent to issue site approval and advising of a public meeting on the matter. The notice was also published in The Florida Keys Keynoter newspaper on October 13, 1983. Among the addressees notified by mail were adjacent property owners, the Monroe County Building and Zoning Department, the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners, and the FAA. The Marine Patrol and the Coast Guard were also notified of the public hearing. Neither the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners nor the Monroe County Building and Zoning Department sent a representative to attend the public hearing. Following the public hearing and consideration of all of the objections stated at the public hearing, Mr. Gordon recommended that site approval be granted for the proposed seaplane base. There are other licensed seaplane bases in Florida in which the take- off and landing areas are in open water such as bays and in which seaplanes using the base taxi to and from the parking area in channels used by boats. The airplane owned by Mr. Ruzakowski which he proposes to use at the subject seaplane base is a modified Republic Seabee. The modifications include modifications which make the airplane more maneuverable, quieter, and dependable. When taxiing on the water the pilot of the Seabee has excellent visibility of everything from very close to the airplane to infinity. The airplane is very maneuverable on the water, due in part to the fact that it has both water and air rudders. The airplane can be stopped very quickly on the water because the direction of the propeller thrust can be reversed. The propeller reversal also makes it possible for the airplane to back up while on the water. The airplane can taxi on the water as slowly as 5 miles per hour. Once it reaches the take-off area, the actual take-off run lasts only about 18 or 20 seconds. The airplane is approximately 40 feet wide from wingtip to wingtip. The tip of the airplane propeller is at least four feet above the water. As a result of the excellent visibility from the airplane and the high degree of maneuverability of the airplane, it is easy for the pilot of the airplane to observe and avoid any boats or other objects in the vicinity of the airplane. While operating on the water the airplane is subject to the same navigation rules which apply to boats and ships. The applicant, Mr. Ruzakowski is a 73 year old retired airline pilot. He has between 20,000 and 22,000 hours of flying experience, approximately 75 percent of which was as pilot in command. He has flown a large number of different types of airplanes, including land based airplanes, seaplanes, and amphibians. He has had extensive experience in both single- engine and multi- engine aircraft. In 54 years of flying he has never had an accident. Safety is the main factor in all of his flying. Mr. Ruzakowski is an FAA consultant engineer and does all of the maintenance and repairs on his own airplane. He has invented an improved control system for the Republic Seabee aircraft and has received FAA approval for his invention to he installed on other Republic Seabees. Mr. Ruzakowski appears to be in excellent physical and mental condition; at the hearing he appeared to be strong, agile, and alert. These appearances are confirmed by the fact that he currently holds a valid FAA pilot's license and medical certificate. He has never been denied an FAA medical certificate. His vision is excellent and is perhaps getting better because several years ago his FAA medical certificate required him to keep reading glasses in the aircraft, but his current medical certificate contains no such restriction. Snake Creek is used by a variety of large and small commercial and pleasure boats. The volume of boat traffic varies from day to day and also by time of day. At times there are also swimmers and divers in Snake Creek and in the designated take-off and landing area. However, none of the boat traffic is incompatible with the operation of the applicant's airplane because the visibility from the airplane and the maneuverability of the airplane are such that the pilot of the airplane has as much or more ability to avoid or prevent a collision as does the operator of any of the boats and ships using the waterway.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing it is recommended that the Department of Transportation issue a Final Order approving the issuance of Site Approval Order No. 83-34. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of May, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Miklas Esquire Post Office Box 366 Islamorada, Florida 33036 James Baccus, Esquire Post Office Box 38-1086 Little River Station Miami, Florida 33138 Judy Rice, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Honorable Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Raymond T. Grady, Jr., held registered specialty contractor license number RX DO32138 issued by petitioner, Department of Profession Regulation, Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. 1/ According to the official records of petitioner, Grady was first licensed in 1977. He later qualified F & L Contracting, Inc., a contracting company doing business in Palm Bay, Florida, in February, 1982. The 1983 annual report filed by F & L Contracting, Inc., with the Department of State reflected that Grady was secretary-treasurer and resident agent of the corporation while a Fred James Henderson served as president. Grady continued to qualify F & L Contracting, Inc. until February 27, 1984, when he notified petitioner that he was no longer its qualifying agent. Presently, his license is on an inactive status. Fred James Henderson did business under the name of F & L Contracting, Inc., F & L Contractors, Inc. and F & L Construction, Inc. All had the same street address and telephone number and were the same for all practical purposes. Only F & L Contracting, Inc. was qualified by Grady with the State. On or about August 25, 1983, Lyman and Dawn Crowshaw of 356 Holiday Park, Palm Bay Florida, entered into a contract with F & L Contractors, Inc., to have a utility room added to their residence for a price of $5,835. The contract was negotiated by Henderson. When the contract was signed, Henderson gave the Crowshaws his business card which reflected the name "F & L Contracting, Inc.," and had the same telephone number and address as F & L Contractors, Inc. Under the agreement, Lyman Crowshaw gave F & L Contractors, Inc. a check in the amount of $1,945 as the first of three payments for the work. The check was deposited into the bank account of F & L Contracting, Inc., the company which Grady had qualified. Because Henderson held no license from the State, he could not pull job permits in the City of Palm Bay. Therefore, it was necessary for Grady to sign all applications and pick up the permits on behalf of Henderson. In this regard, the city building officials perceived Grady to be the individual who qualified Henderson to do business as a contractor. For this reason, the official notified Grady that no permit could be pulled on the Crowshaw job because of a setback restriction on Crowshaw's property. When Crowshaw learned of this, he immediately requested a refund of his money, but Henderson did not oblige. After the Crowshaws sent a letter to F & L Contracting, Inc. on November 18, 1983 demanding payment, and their attorney did the same on January 4, 1984, Henderson and his wife finally executed a promissory note on January 11, 1984 promising to pay the Crowshaws $500 per month plus 18 percent interest until the $1,945 was repaid. Henderson signed the note individually and as president of F & L Contractors, Inc. Mr. Crowshaw received one $500 payment on January 21, 1984 from Henderson. After he received no other payments, Crowshaw filed a complaint against Grady in an effort to recover his money. That prompted the instant proceeding. The Crowshaws and Grady had never seen each other prior to the final hearing. The Crowshaws did have two telephone conversations with someone who represented himself to be Grady in late 1983 and early 1984, and in those conversations, Grady assured them that he would get Henderson to repay the money owed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and that his license be suspended for one year, unless Grady obtains a signed release from the Crowshaws indicating restitution has been made. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DOANLD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, filed an Administrative Complaint in prosecution of a probable cause finding by the Board of Pilot Commissioners, an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating entry into the profession of harbor piloting and enforcing the practice standards for that profession for those already licensed. The Respondent at all times material hereto, was admitted as a licensed pilot in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0000033. The Respondent resides in Jacksonville, Florida and practices his profession by piloting vessels in and out of the port of Jacksonville. On February 26, 1987, the motor vessel, Fernpasset, was approaching the port of Jacksonville for the purpose of discharging a load of Volkswagon automobiles. The Fernpasset is a Liberian registered car carrier having a gross tonnage of 9841 tons, a length of 536 feet, with an 89.5 foot beam. The vessel is somewhat unique in that it has a very large "sail area" or wind-affected profile as a necessary part of its structure, which extends approximately ninety percent of the vessel's total length and at a height of approximately sixty feet above the water line. This represents a much larger wind-affected profile for this vessel, as compared to more conventional cargo ships. The Jacksonville Harbor is reached by navigation of the St. Johns River channel inland from the Atlantic Ocean. At the point where the river and river channel reaches the Atlantic Ocean are two jetties, composed of granite rocks, serving as a breakwater at the entrance to the harbor. The harbor entrance has a north jetty and a south jetty. The north jetty projects waterward from the land for approximately 2,400 yards. The south jetty projects out into the water approximately 1,400 yards. Buoy number seven in the St. Johns River channel is located nine hundred yards inside the jetties. At approximately 1800 hours on February 26, 1987, the Fernpasset commenced preparation for entering the port of Jacksonville. The chief mate made VHF radio contact with the Jacksonville pilot station at about this time and gave the dispatcher at the pilot station, at his request, his estimated time of arrival at the sea buoy, his deep draft, approximately twenty-two to twenty- four feet, and what the weather conditions were at sea. During the initial radio contact between the Fernpasset and the pilot dispatcher, Errol M. Hatton, at approximately 1815 hours, the dispatcher asked First Officer (Chief Mate) Oleson whether he wanted to pick the pilot up inside the jetties or at the sea buoy. He replied that it would pick up the pilot inside the jetties. The vessel's master, Ole Brakstaad, agreed to that procedure. After this initial contact, and after the arrangement with the Fernpasset was made that it would pick the pilot up inside the jetties, the dispatcher called the Respondent, Captain Register and informed him of the job and the boarding arrangement. Prior to the Fernpasset arriving in the port area, the Jacksonville area had experienced moderate to severe weather from the northeast with "northeasters" blowing for approximately a week, with choppy and rough seas. Indeed, the official log of the M/V Fernpasset reveals that wind conditions on February 26, 1987, while at sea, varied from wind force four through wind force six and seas varied from sea scale four through sea scale five. Just two hours before the initial radio contact with the pilot station, at approximately 1600 hours, the Fernpasset was experiencing winds from the Northeast at force five, gusting at six. The sea had a heavy swell running at that time. Wind force six is approximately twenty-two to twenty-seven nautical miles per hour. Sea scale five consists of waves running eight to twelve feet high. See Respondent's exhibit two, (Brakstaad's Deposition). After Captain Register arrived at the pilot's station, the dispatcher, Mr. Hatton, spoke with the vessel approximately two more times, checking on its estimated time of arrival and having the vessel confirm that it would pick up the pilot inside the jetties. This arrangement had already been made before Captain Register had been called at his home by the dispatcher and told to report for duty to pilot the Fernpasset into the harbor. Captain Register did not participate in the conversation that set up this arrangement because he was at home and not on duty at the time. The evidence does not reflect that this choice was anything but freely made by the master of the Fernpasset and it does not indicate that Captain Register had any reason to believe that the master of the vessel had not freely chosen to pick up the pilot inside the breakwater, especially in view of the fact that inclement weather conditions were prevailing, with the attendant danger involved in boarding a pilot in heavy seas. In any event, the master of the vessel, Captain Ole Brakstaad, commenced conning his vessel into the entrance to the St. Johns River. He used his radar and the navigational markers to line up the vessel to transit between the north and south jetties. The vessel's master had assumed control of the vessel's movement from the Chief Mate at approximately 1900 hours. At approximately 1943 hours, the vessel passed the sea buoy preparing to enter the entrance channel to the river. At 1944 hours, several rudder commands were given to the helmsman and the vessel "steadied up" on course 278 degrees, lined up to enter the channel. At about this time, the winds had shifted to north- northeast at approximately 16 knots. As the vessel entered the channel, the master and the chief mate were unable to see the range lights. At 1946 hours, the master ordered a slow ahead "bell" to reduce the ship's speed to 10 knots for transiting the channel. The range lights were still not visible to the master or chief mate. As the vessel passed buoys three and four, it was centered in the channel. The wind speed increased to approximately eighteen knots from the northeast. In order to counteract the effect of the wind and strong current, which was in a southerly direction, the master ordered the helmsman to come to starboard to course 283 degrees, in order to remain centered in the channel. The master determined that the vessel was being "set" to the south by the combined forces of the northeast wind and the southerly current and therefore had to steer further north to compensate for the set. He ordered courses of 285 degrees, 290 degrees and finally 295 degrees. At 1953 hours, he increased the vessel's speed from slow ahead to half speed ahead to provide for greater maneuverability. At approximately 1954 hours, he ordered full speed ahead, with an emergency bell, to the engineer after realizing that his ship was sideways in the channel and still being set to the south. At 1955 hours, however, the Fernpasset grounded on her port side on the St. Johns River entrance channel south jetty. Before he could contact the pilot, however, he received a call from the pilot boat stating that the Captain should proceed into the channel at a speed of 10 knots. The master informed the pilot that his vessel had run aground and that he needed tug assistance. At approximately 2015 hours, Captain Register boarded the grounded vessel. Captain Register was only able to board the vessel after great difficulty because of the rough weather. After he got aboard, he assisted in towing the vessel off the breakwater and out to sea and in assessing damages. The practice of boarding a pilot requires the vessel being boarded to slow down and make a "lee" or sheltered area on one side of the vessel, sheltered from winds and waves, to help the pilot boat approach and place the pilot aboard the ship. The pilot boat is a fifty-two foot boat, specially designed, with a platform over the deckhouse or cabin upon which the pilot stands in order to catch a rope ladder thrown over the side of the ship to be boarded. The ladder must be caught on the up-roll of the pilot boat so as to avoid the pilot's being crushed between the pilot boat and the side of the ship while he is on the rope ladder. Boarding a pilot is dangerous under any circumstances, and especially so during heavy, severe weather. Weather conditions off the mouth of the St. Johns River are usually much worse as to the wind and rough waves than inside the jetties. Captain Elija Guillory is a shipmaster who has an unlimited Master's License for any type of vessel. He has been a master mariner for twenty-five years. He is currently the master of the tanker, Neches. He has entered and exited the port of Jacksonville many times. In fact, he enters the Jacksonville port approximately one and one-half times per month on trips between Houston and Corpus Christi, Texas and Jacksonville. He is also a licensed pilot for the port of Houston, Texas. Captain Guillory was accepted as an expert in shipmaster's duties and practices. Captain Guillory's testimony establishes that the master of a vessel always makes the final decision about when and where to pick up a pilot. He is the person best able to, and responsible for, determining the safety of a given situation, both as to his vessel and the pilot's safety. Captain Guillory testified that, if it be assumed that a northeast wind of Beaufort force five or six, with a heavy swell, was operating that it would be a "borderline situation" as to the safety of picking up a pilot outside the jetties under those conditions. He testified that it would depend on the characteristics of the vessel and circumstances aboard the vessel. On his own ship, which has about thirty-five feet of free-board, (less area exposed to the northeast wind), he felt he would be able to have boarded the pilot outside. A car carrier, however, has a large "sail area" of approximately sixty feet above the water line extending approximately ninety percent of the length of the vessel. This might have made it risky to slow or stop a ship with that much sail area, with a strong wind blowing, in order to pick up a pilot outside the jetties in view of the southerly set caused by both the wind and current. Captain Guillory established that it is regular practice for him and other shipmasters to tell the pilot where he will pick the pilot up during episodes of rough weather. In nice weather, he gives the pilots a choice about where they are to be picked up. He established that that is the standard practice between shipmasters and pilots for East coast United States ports. Finally, Captain Guillory opined that the Captain of the vessel should not have decided to enter the port without a pilot. In any event, it is the practice of master mariners to make the decision at sea, before entering the port, as to the safety of the vessel, the crew and the boarding pilots. It is customary and common for the master to make a decision that, due to bad weather conditions, he will pick the pilot up inside the jetties at the port of Jacksonville. This is decided after the master has made an independent evaluation of all the safety factors to consider. Although the United States Coast Pilot, volume four, states that the pilot boarding area for Jacksonville is between the sea buoy and the outermost entrance channel buoy, this is merely a guide for optimum conditions. Pilots are normally and customarily boarded where ever the master feels it is safe to do so under then-prevailing conditions. In this instance, the master of the vessel made the final decision as to where to board the pilot. That decision was made before the pilot had been informed that the vessel to which he was assigned was approaching the sea buoy and that it was time for him to go on duty and prepare to board the vessel. He did not participate in the decision about picking up the pilot inside the jetties.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, Captain Clifton A. Register, should be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1988. APPENDIX PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Reject as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted in part, but not as dispositive of any material issue presented. Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not in and of itself dispositive of any material issues presented. Accepted, but not in and of itself dispositive of any material issues presented. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by the evidence of record, with the exception of the similarity consisting of the sea buoy being one and one-half miles from the entrance to the port between two rock jetties or breakwaters, which is not in and of itself dispositive of any material issues presented. Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Even if Port Everglades was a port of essentially the same configuration as the Port of Jacksonville, which the record does not establish, the weather and sea conditions and condition and configuration of the vessel involved at the particular day and time in question has a great deal to do with consideration of what safe piloting practices are for such conditions. Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as having little or no weight in finding facts and concluding the law applicable to this case, because of the subjective circumstances involved in deciding whether safe piloting practices have been observed, as delineated above. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 (904) 488-0062 Gary A. Bubb, Esquire Toole, Bubb, & Beale, P.A. 25th Floor Southern Bell Tower Post Office Box 1500 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Louella Cook, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Documentary evidence was received that Hangar Two, Inc. was chartered on April 4, 1980, and had "Hangar Two, Inc." and its unique logo registered as a service mark on June 18, 1980. See Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 6. Documentary evidence was received that Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was incorporated on November 25, 1980. See Exhibits 4 and 5. Wallace I. Garrick testified on behalf of Hangar Two, Inc. Garrick has been the attorney for Carl Knight for a number of years and handled the incorporation of Hangar Two, Inc. for Knight. For several years, Knight has been engaged in the business of repairing, rebuilding and maintaining aircraft. Garrick has been to Knight's place of business many times. The business was located at North Perry Airport for a number of years and did business as Hangar Knight was forced to move his business and incorporated his business as Hangar Two, Inc. The business of the corporation is the repair and maintenance of aircraft. Knight moved his business to a building on the southeast corner of the same airport, which he caused to be identified and marked with his service mark "Hangar 2." See Exhibit 6. Located in this building when Knight moved there was an aircraft repair and maintenance business operated by George Ritch. Thereafter, Ritch retained a one-room office and leased a small portion of the floor space for his business use. Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was incorporated by Milton Margulies, a local attorney. Its primary Director and agent for service of process is Jean S. Morse, an employee of Margulies. Garrick was advised by Margulies that he had incorporated Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. for George Ritch, and that he had no further relationship with the corporation or with Ritch. Incorporation of Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was sought after the date that Knight's business moved into the same building occupied by Ritch and after the date Knight's business was incorporated in the name Hangar Two, Inc. Incorporation of Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was not in good faith. Both corporations are engaged in the same business, aircraft repair and maintenance, and their principal places of business are located in the same building at the same airport. Garrick has seen bills and other mail intended for Ritch's business delivered to Knight's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of State revoke the reservation for the corporate name Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Wallace I. Garrick, Esquire Concord Building, Suite 1000 66 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Jean S. Morse, Registered Agent Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. 2020 NE 163rd Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Stephen Nall, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions This cause came on to be heard before the Pilotage Rate Review Board (Board) at regularly scheduled meetings held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on April 29, 1998 and in Boca Grande, Florida on May 19, 1998, pursuant to a Recommended Order entered by ALJ Linda M. Rigot on February 94, 1998. Exceptions to the Recommended Order were filed by the Port Everglades Pilots' Association (PEPA). Responses to the Exceptions were filed by the South Florida Cargo Carriers Association, Inc. (SFCCA). Both PEPA and SFCCA appeared at the Fort Lauderdale meeting through counsel and extensive argument was heard on the Exceptions. The Board's rulings on the Exceptions, made after a review of the complete record (including the prehearing stipulation, the transcript, exhibits and the submissions of the parties), are set forth below. Preliminary Statement-The Standards to be Applied in Reviewing the Findings of Fact Contained in a Recommended Order It is a settled rule of administrative law in this state that the findings of fact of an administrative law judge may not be rejected or modified, "unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based on competent substantial evidence." Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes. Accord Belleau v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 695 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Martuccio v. Dept. Of Professional Regulation, 622 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Freeze v. Dept. Of Business Regulation, 510 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Florida case law holds that an agency reviewing a recommended order is not authorized to reevaluate the quantity and quality of the evidence presented as at DOAH final hearing beyond a determination of whether the evidence is competent and substantial. Brogan v. Carter, 671 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 19963. A reviewing agency may not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of witnesses, as those are evidentiary matters within the province of the ALJ as the finder of the facts. Martuccio, supra, at 609; Heifetz v. Dept. Of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Consequently, if the record of the DOAH Proceedings discloses any competent substantial evidence to support the findings of fact made by the ALJ in the Recommended Order, the Board is bound by such factual findings. Bradley. supra, at 1123. There is, however, a fundamental difference, first elucidated in McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So. 2d 569, 578-579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), between evidentiary findings of fact, which involve resolving conflicts of perception, judging credibility of witnesses and drawing permissible inferences therefrom and those ultimate factual findings which are usually couched in terms of statutory or rule language and which resolve the legal issues between the parties.2 As the court in Mcdonald, supra, stated at 346 So. 2d at 579 an ALJ's findings as to credibility, weight and other matters which are susceptible of "ordinary methods of proof "should be accorded-great deference. However, the court went on to hold that an AlJ's findings regarding matters of opinion and issues which must be resolved by reference to agency expertise, because they are "infused by policy considerations," are entitled to agency deference but with "correspondingly less weight."3 The agency must be circumspect, however, in exercising its authority to reject an ALJ's findings even if they could be labeled as "ultimate findings of fact." If factual disputes underlying an ultimate issue of fact can be resolved by "ordinary methods of proof " then an agency may not reject or modify an ALJ's ultimate factual findings without finding that they also were not supported by competent substantial evidence and complying with the requirements of Section 120.57(1); see Harac v. Dept. of Prof. Reg. Board of Architecture, 484 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1986); Dunham v. Highlands County School Board, 652 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1995). If, in an appropriate instance, the question as to what legal standards should be applied to ultimately resolve the issues involves policy considerations (at least to the extent an agency has discretion to interpret its statutes and rules), it follows that an ALJ's findings as to such mixed questions of law and fact should be entitled to weight only to the extent they correctly apply the agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate, not simply the interpretation of that mandate by the witnesses at the hearing or even by the ALJ herself.4 The policy reason for not allowing an ALJ's ultimate findings of fact to always obtain practicable immutability and thus usurp an agency's ability to explicate its positions and interpretations of law in its own jurisprudence, is clear. Agencies, such as the Board, are appointed to oversee and implement the police power of the state and have obtained expertise in doing so. The agency is well aware of its own history and policy, as well as the legal positions set forth therein. ALJ's are likely not to have this intimate familiarity with the policy issues that comes with enforcing a regulatory scheme on a regular basis. Bearing the aforementioned principles in mind the Board hereby renders its rulings on the Exceptions. B Rulings on Exceptions Rejection of PEPA's Exceptions The Board hereby rejects PEPA's Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 5, 9 10, 12, and 13 insofar as the ALJ's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. Exception 7 was withdrawn Exceptions 16-20 and 22-23 are addressed to the ALJ's Conclusions of Law, were treated as legal argument, and thus require no rulings by the Board. Exception 21 to the ALJ's proposed Conclusion of Law 89 was addressed by the Board as an exception to a proposed finding of fact insofar as COL 89 is actually a factual finding. After properly recasting COL 89 as a finding of fact, the Board determines that the finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and the Exception is rejected. The Board's rejection of Exception 5 is based upon its reading of the ALJ's findings to mean that the amount of time spent by pilots on clerical and administrative tasks, while "extensive" was not suffciently documented as to place a numerical amount (hourly, daily or monthly) upon the time spent. The reason for this separate discussion is that the Board finds that the ALJ's finding, while correct, could be somewhat misleading. The Board also sets forth its reasoning below on several of the legal issues raised by PEPA as part of those Exceptions which were rejected by the Board. PEPA asserted, as the basis for several of its Exceptions, that the Board had made certain legal conclusions in earlier rate cases that may have been contradicted by the analysis of the ALJ in the Recommended Order. PEPA argued that certain of the ALJ's findings are thus erroneous because they contradict other, earlier, conclusions of the Board. While it is true that stare decisis and a respect for precedent are recognized in administrative law (albeit to a lesser degree than in traditional judicial fore), there must be an order of the Board that has precedential value before these principles may be invoked. Here PEPA points to various "orders" of the Board which were entered in previous rate application review proceedings in support of its position. Where PEPA's argument misses the point is that none of these previous "orders" ripened to Board precedent due to the fact that no Section 120.569 and 120.57 proceedings-ever occurred in those previous rate proceedings. Thus the findings of the Board in those previous proceedings were based only upon the untested-in an evidentiary sense-material submitted to the Board by the applicants and their opposition at a Board meeting- see Section 310.151(3), Florida Statutes. Until the Board has the benefit of a record which has gone through the crucible of a evidentiary proceeding under Chapter 190 and a judicially reviewable final order is entered, the holdings of the Board in unchallenged rate orders are only persuasive and not precedential in nature. The Board further agrees with PEPA (Exception I ) that the determination as to what constitutes a "reasonable operating expense" as that term is used in Section 310.15 l (5)(b)3, Florida Statutes, is a legal conclusion which requires the Board to interpret the statute and apply it to the pilot lobbying and political expenses found by the ALJ; Schnmsher v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 694 So. 2d 856, 860-862 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1997), Macpherson v. School Board of Monroe County, 505 So. 2d 682, 683-684 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987). To the extent that the ALJ placed the determination of what is a "reasonable operating expense" in her findings of fact her Recommended Order is erroneous. Here, however, although the ALJ erroneously found that lobbying expenses and political contributions by pilots are not "reasonable operating expenses" as a finding of fact, the Board finds that they should be so treated as a matter of law. Thus the ALJ's findings, while erroneously labeled, reached the correct result. Therefore the Exception was properly rejected. As has been long held by the Public Service Commission, lobbying expenses as well as political and charitable contributions are not to be considered as reasonable operating expenses for purposes of determining the rate base for rate setting purposes, PSC Docket # 950495-WS, Order # PSC-96-1320- FOF-WS at 150-153; PSC Docket # 960234-WS, Order # 97-0847-FOF- WS at 66-71. The rationale for such a decision is based upon the fact that, while for tax and accounting purposes such expenses are appropriately classified as ordinary business expenses and/or may be deductible from taxable income, to place the burden of paying for such discretionary expenditures upon the user of the regulated service is inappropriate. The Board accepts this reasoning. The Board's ruling when rejecting PEPA's Exception 2 is based upon an identical analysis. Once again, the Board determines for rate setting purposes, as a matter of law, that the present value of the unfunded portion of PEPA's pilot retirement program must be considered as a "book" component of pilot income if, as was found by the ALJ, its value can be reasonably quantified-see Sections 3] 0.151 (5)(b) 2 and 9, Florida Statutes. A similar position has been taken by the PSC- see Rule 25-14.012, F. A. C. Acceptance of PEPA's Exceptions The Board accepts in part PEPA's Exception 3. The Exception addresses Proposed Findings of Fact 25 and 49-52. The Board finds that the ALJ's finding in the first sentence of Finding of Fact 25 is not supported by competent substantial evidence and, to the extent that the final sentence of Finding of Fact 25 and Findings of Fact 49-52 are based upon that specific finding, they are not accepted by the Board.5 Nevertheless PEPA does not dispute that the ALJ's a projected range of increase in annual revenue growth from 5.9% and 7.3% at the port is reasonable and is supported by the facts. As a result, the Board, based upon the remaining testimony and data, accepts the ALJ's projected range for the growth of revenue at the port. The Board accepts PEPA's Exception 6 to Finding of Fact 33 to the extent that it objects to the ALJ's findings that the examination and licensing process of a deep-sea deck officer is comparable to that of a Florida licensed pilot. While the findings of the ALJ in the other areas of "comparability" are accepted by the Board, there was no evidence from any source as to the examination and licensing procedures of pilots and deep- sea officers from which the ALJ could have drawn her conclusion. The Board accepts PEPA's Exception 8 to Finding of Fact 39 to the extent that it objects to the "explicit" recognition of the similarity of "deep-sea masters and harbor pilots'' (E.S.) in 33 CFR Part 407. While the Board would agree that the provision of the CFR compares "deep-sea masters and Great Lakes pilots"(E. S.) it does not, on its face, generally address "harbor pilots." The remainder of the Finding of Fact appears to be simply a discussion of the CFR provision which7 as a provision of law, speaks for itself. The Board accepts in part PEPA's Exception 11 to Findings of Fact 56-58. The ALJ's conclusory statement in the first sentence of FOF 56 that "the job of piloting does not present any serious physical risks" is simply not supported by the record. While the Board accepts the ALJ's other findings, it is clear (and not disputed by any of the experts in navigation and seamanship) that there are serious risks in piloting in periods of heavy weather and/or at night. The remainder of the Finding is accepted by the Board. Similarly, the second sentence in FOF 57 regarding embarkation and disembarkation is flawed because of its categorical finding that such actions are not particularly dangerous. Once again, had the ALJ qualified her finding with a reference to "under normal circumstances" or "in fair weather" the statement would be unexceptional and would be supported by the record. The rest of the Finding is accepted by the Board. The Board also finds that the ALJ's conclusion in the last sentence of FOF 58 that the Board members were not engaged in a strenuous act when they boarded a vessel at Port Everglades during the initial rate hearing is not supported by any evidence adduced at the hearing. The remainder of FOF 58 is accepted by the Board. The Board accepts PEPA's Exception 14 to Findings of Fact 72-74. There was competent substantial evidence in the record to sustain the ALJ's findings. The findings are, however, struck because the ALJ has failed to give effect to a stipulation (Pre- Hearing Stipulation at p. 9 ¶20) contained in the Pre-Hearing Stipulation entered into between the parties.6 In the Pre-Hearing Stipulation the parties agreed that to certain facts contained in various tables in the Investigative Report did not require proof at the hearing. Notwithstanding this fact, the ALJ found a revised "handle" time in her Recommended Order which was different (1 hour per vessel as opposed to 1.5 hours) than that contained in the stipulation. The Board finds that, as asserted by PEPA, this was error, Schrimsher, supra at 694 So. 2d 856, 863; Coq v. Fuchs Baking Company, 507 So. 2d 138, 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).7 The Board accepts in part PEPA's Exception 15. The evidentiary findings in FOF 75-76 are supported by the evidence in this proceedings and are unexceptional. Nevertheless, the provisions of Section 310.151(5)(c), Florida Statutes, specifically grant to the Board the discretion to apply the CPI or other economic indicators to a rate change request. Thus the ALJ's statement that "the CPI and employment cost index (sic) are not suitable bases of comparison for measuring pilotage rates" does appear to "read out" this discretionary statutory factor from consideration in all rate cases. The Board can not agree with this position as a matter of law The Board does find, however, that while not the sole factor in determining the rates in these proceedings that the CPI is of material value in the consideration of the rates to be established at Port Everglades. C Conclusion With the foregoing amendments, the Board accepts the Findings of Fact of the ALJ and the same hereby become the Findings of Fact of the Board. II
The Issue Whether the subject assessment of taxes, interest and penalties should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact By "Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings" dated July 31, 1989, Respondent assessed Petitioner with taxes, interest, and penalties in the total amount, as of the date of the notice, of $161,724.75. This assessment was made pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes, following an incident on February 4, 1988. The parties stipulated that this assessment was properly issued, that notice thereof was properly given to Gary Wayne Chitty, and that the mathematical calculations contained therein are accurate and correct. The following findings are made as to Petitioner, Gary Wayne Chitty, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. His full name is Gary Wayne Chitty. His social security number is 261-17-0682. His date of birth is April 27, 1953. His present residence is 6840 S.W. 12th Street, Miami, Florida. He has never declared himself a citizen of any country other than the United States. On, or before, February 1988, he knew Rafael Silvio Pena. On February 4, 1988, he held a valid multi-engine pilot's license which was issued to him by the Federal Aviation Authority. On, or about February 4, 1988, he and Rafael Silvio Pena boarded and flew an aircraft designated N6726L. He and Mr. Pena planned to fly a multi-engine aircraft (N6726L) from a point outside of the United States and to enter the airspace of the United States near Cedar Key, Florida and travel within the airspace of Florida to Marathon, Florida. He filed, or caused to be filed, a flight plan for said trip with Mr. Pena in advance of the trip. He loaded or caused to be loaded marijuana on the aircraft (N6726L) prior to its departure. On, or about, February 4, 1988, he and Mr. Pena flew said airplane (N6726L) from a point in the vicinity of Cedar Key, Florida, to Marathon, Florida. During said flight, the aircraft made no other landings. During the entire flight on February 4, 1988, he and Mr. Pena were the sole occupants of said aircraft. During said flight he was the pilot of N6726L. He flew this aircraft on February 4, 1988 with the full knowledge and/or consent of the airplane's owners and/or official lessees. When he took off from the aircraft's departure point on February 4, 1988, it was loaded with a large quantity of marijuana. When he took control of said aircraft and took off, he knew it was loaded with said marijuana. He discussed his plans to transport the marijuana with Mr. Pena. When he took control of the aircraft, the aircraft (N6726L) contained nineteen (19) bales of marijuana which weighted six hundred ninety-nine (699) pounds. He and Mr. Pena flew this airplane along a course towards Marathon, Florida in a manner which took it over or near Lake Okeechobee, Florida. At a point along his route, he and/or Mr. Pena caused the bales of marijuana to be jettisoned from the aircraft. The marijuana was jettisoned as part of a conscious plan or design. The marijuana that was jettisoned from N6726L during its flight on February 4, 1988, weighed a total of 699 pounds. He did not know that during this flight of February 4, 1988, his aircraft was being observed by law enforcement officers. As part of his original plan, he piloted this aircraft to Marathon, Florida, where he landed. AA. During this entire flight the aircraft performed adequately and experienced no mech- anical difficulties. BB. Upon his landing at Marathon, he and Mr. Pena were arrested. CC. He knew the estimated retail value of the marijuana on board his aircraft (N6726L) was $600 per pound.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which upholds the subject Jeopardy Findings and Assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28th day of January, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: James McAuley, Esquire Mark Aliff, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Department of Revenue Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mel Black, Esquire 2937 S.W. 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33133 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahasseee, Florida 32399-0100 William D. Moore General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G14-22.012 is an invalid exercise of legislatively delegated authority in violation of section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2014).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner BBP is an association of harbor pilots that performs the pilotage services at PortMiami. BBP consists of pilots licensed by the State of Florida in accordance with chapter 310, Florida Statutes. Petitioner PEPA is an association of harbor pilots that performs the pilotage services at Port Everglades. PEPA consists of pilots licensed by the State of Florida in accordance with chapter 310. FHPA is a statewide organization representing the interests of Florida’s approximately 100 state-licensed harbor pilots, the membership of which is comprised of the eleven local pilot associations that serve each of Florida’s 14 deep-water ports. BBP and PEPA are members of FHPA. Chapter 310 governs pilots, piloting, and pilotage in the waters, harbors, and ports of Florida. Section 310.141, Florida Statutes, requires that, except in certain narrow circumstances, all vessels shall have a licensed state pilot or deputy pilot on board to direct the movements of the vessel when entering or leaving ports of the state or when underway on the navigable waters of the state’s bays, rivers, harbors, and ports. Section 310.011 creates the 10-member Board of Pilot Commissioners (“BOPC” or “Board”); each member is appointed by the Governor “to perform such duties and possess and exercise such powers relative to the protection of the waters, harbors, and ports of this state as are prescribed and conferred on it in this chapter.” In addition to other responsibilities, the Board determines the number of pilots in each port (section 310.061) and disciplines licensed pilots when appropriate (section 310.101). Although the BOPC has numerous statutory responsibilities, setting the rates of pilotage in each port is not one of them. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G14-22.012 (“challenged rule” or “rule”) is entitled “Determination of Disputed Issues of Material Fact; Formal or Informal Hearings.” 5. Rule 61G14-22.012 cites section 310.151(1)(c) as specific authority. The challenged rule lists as “Law Implemented” sections 310.151 and 120.57. The former Pilotage Rate Review Board originally adopted the rule in 1995. When the Legislature amended chapter 310 in 2010, the former Pilotage Rate Review Board’s name was changed to the Pilotage Rate Review Committee (“PRRC” or “Committee”). The Committee consists of seven members, all of whom are also members of the BOPC. The PRRC is responsible for setting rates of pilotage in each port. On November 5, 2014, the BOPC/PRRC published a notice in the Florida Administrative Register announcing a telephone conference call meeting for consideration of “Rate Review Committee Rules.” PRRC members voted at that meeting to repeal rule 61G14-22.012, but determined they did not have enough information to know if a Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs was required. On December 11, 2014, the BOPC/PRRC published a second notice in the Florida Administrative Register announcing a telephone conference call meeting for consideration of “Rate Review Committee Rules.” At that meeting, the PRRC voted to reconsider its original vote to repeal rule 61G14-22.012, but because the issue of potential reconsideration had not been properly noticed, no official vote on reconsideration was taken. On January 7, 2015, the BOPC/PRRC published a notice in the Florida Administrative Register announcing a meeting on January 22, 2015, and January 23, 2015. Among the subjects noticed for consideration was “Reconsideration of Repeal of Rule 61G14-22.012, F.A.C.” This matter was considered by the PRRC on January 23, 2015. By a 5-2 vote, the Committee voted against repealing rule 61G14-22.012. FCCA is a trade association representing cruise lines that are subject to pilotage fees pursuant to chapter 310, Florida Statutes. FCCA has filed petitions to reduce the rates of pilotage in both PortMiami and in Port Everglades.
