The Issue Whether the Petitioner owes sale and/or use tax for the purchase/lease of magnetic tapes containing mailing lists used by the Petitioner in its mail order business, as set forth in the Notice of Decision dated December 10, 2003, and, if so, the amount owed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, including the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. See § 213.05, Florida Statutes (2004). At the times material to this proceeding, Spectramin was a Florida "S" corporation whose home office and principal place of business was located at 5401 Northwest 102 Avenue, Suite 119, Sunrise, Florida. Spectramin was a Florida- registered sales tax dealer. On October 19, 2001, the Department issued to Spectramin a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records for audit number A0127016590, which was a sales and use tax audit covering the Audit Period. On January 15, 2002, the Department and Spectramin signed an audit agreement that delineated the procedures and sampling method to be used by the Department for the audit. Because Spectramin's books and records were voluminous, the Department and Spectramin agreed to employ certain specified sampling procedures. For the audit, the Department examined Spectramin's purchase invoices, general ledgers, and income statements for the 2000 calendar year. At the times material to this proceeding, Spectramin was a mail-order company that sold nutritional supplements throughout the United States. It engaged in direct marketing of its products and employed two methods of direct marketing: Self-mailers were sent to prospective customers, and catalogs were sent to persons who had purchased its products, as a means of educating these buyers and converting them into repeat customers.1 In order to send self-mailers to prospective customers, Spectramin leased mailing lists consisting of names and addresses, and, in some instances, bar codes, compiled by various vendors who sold mailing lists. The contents of the mailing lists were based on demographic criteria specified by Spectramin. Under the terms of the lease, Spectramin was allowed to use the mailing list for only one mailing. Pertinent to this proceeding, Spectramin received some of the mailing lists in the form of data digitally encoded on magnetic tapes. The cost of leasing a mailing list was based on the number of names on the list, and the invoice for a list included a separately-stated, standard charge of $25.00 to cover the cost of the magnetic tape containing the data. The magnetic tapes themselves had no value to Spectramin; the only value of the tapes to Spectramin lay in the data encoded on the tapes, and the greatest part of the cost of the one-time lease was the cost of the data encoded on the magnetic tapes; for example, Spectramin paid $75.00 per 1,000 names for one of the mailing lists it leased, plus the $25.00 charge for the magnetic tape. Spectramin did not pay sales tax in Florida on the cost of the data encoded on the magnetic tapes at the time it leased the mailing lists. Spectramin did not have the computer equipment necessary to read the data on magnetic tapes, so it contracted with third-party letter shops and printers to process the magnetic tapes. The letter shops with which Spectramin has done business since 1991 are all located outside the state of Florida. Once a letter shop received magnetic tapes from Spectramin, the data on the tapes were downloaded to a computer, and cleaned, and sorted into usable names and addresses; the letter shop then sent the cleaned and sorted data to a print shop, which printed the names and addresses onto self-mailers provided by Spectramin. The letter shop sorted the self-mailers by zip code and mailed them. All of these operations took place outside Florida. At one time, Spectramin's practice was to have the mailing-list vendors ship the magnetic tapes encoded with the data directly to a letter shop specified by Spectramin. The letter shop held the Spectramin magnetic tapes until it had accumulated several tapes, and then it would process the data from the tapes, have the names and addresses printed on the self-mailers, and mail the self-mailers. Spectramin found that the letter shops with which it did business sometimes lost track of the tapes received for Spectramin's mailings, and it cost Spectramin additional time and money to track down the tapes or to purchase mailing lists. Because of the additional time and money Spectramin spent to track down the lists, it stopped having the magnetic tapes sent directly to the letter shop. At the times material to this proceeding, the magnetic tapes containing the digitally-encoded mailing lists were shipped directly to Spectramin by the mailing-list vendors, and Spectramin took delivery of the tapes at its principal place of business in Florida. The vendors sent the mailing lists to Spectramin's Florida office by overnight delivery through either Federal Express or United Parcel Service. It was Spectramin's usual business practice for an employee to take delivery of the magnetic tapes containing the mailing lists and to place them on a shelf in the front of the office. The boxes containing the magnetic tapes were not opened. When Spectramin had accumulated several boxes of magnetic tapes, an employee put the boxes into a larger box and sent the tapes by overnight delivery to one of the out-of-state letter shops with which Spectramin did business. Spectramin did not keep the tapes in its Florida office more than one or two days because the mailing lists it had leased lost their value with time.2 The only value of the magnetic tapes was in the names and addressed encoded on the tapes, and the only use to which Spectramin put the data was to cause the names and addresses it had leased to be printed on self-mailers and mailed to the prospective customers. Because the letter shops that printed the names and addresses and mailed the self-mailers were located outside of Florida, Spectramin did not "use" the data or the magnetic tapes in Florida. The only contact the magnetic tapes had with Florida was during the short period of time the tapes sat on the shelf at Spectramin's office before being shipped out of the state for processing. Spectramin did not pay use tax in Florida on the cost of the data encoded on the magnetic tapes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order withdrawing the sales and use tax assessment against Spectramin, Inc., for the audit period extending from September 1, 1996, through August 31, 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2005.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business and domicile in Texas, has an obligation to collect and remit Florida sales taxes on sales it made to a Massachusetts-domiciled corporation, in view of the facts found below.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a Delaware Corporation whose principal place of business is in Austin, Texas. The Petitioner designs, develops, and markets portable computer equipment, chiefly portable "tablet" personal computers with related "peripherals," which it sells and delivers in multiple states, including Florida. It sells these products to "re-sellers" and distributors, as well as to "end users." The Petitioner, by the Department's admission in Exhibit "A" (audit) does not maintain a physical presence in the State of Florida. It does employ one sales person for business in Florida, but maintains no warehouse or other facilities, vehicles nor other indicia of physical locations or operation in the state of Florida. The Petitioner is registered as a "dealer" with the State of Florida, Department of Revenue under the Florida Sales and Use Tax Law. The Petitioner does engage in some sales to Florida "end customers" or to re-sale purchasers in Florida. These transactions, however, are not at issue in this case. The dispute solely relates to transactions between the Petitioner and Advantec Computer System, Inc., of Marlboro, Massachusetts. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the regulation, control, administration, and enforcement of the sales and use tax laws of the State of Florida embodied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Chapter 12A-1. The Respondent conducted an audit of the books and records of the Petitioner, resulting in this proceeding, for the audit period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2006. That audit was conducted by Xena Francis, and revealed, according to the Department's position, a purported sales tax payment deficiency on the part of the Petitioner in the above-referenced amounts. The Department, upon completion of the audit, issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, thus advising the Petitioner of the amount of the tax penalty and interest it was assessing as a result of the audit. The transactions which the Department maintained were questionable, in terms of taxes not being paid with regard thereto, were those where the Petitioner sold computer products to entities who did not produce to the Petitioner a certificate of exemption from collection of sales tax by Florida on that transaction, and where the product was shipped by the Petitioner into Florida by common carrier. The Department essentially takes the position that, since the Petitioner has a state sales and use tax "dealer certificate," that it is responsible to prove any transactions as being exempt from the relevant taxing provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and the above rule chapter. The Department apparently presumes as a part of this position that the fact that the product in question was shipped to ultimate users in Florida by common carrier from the Petitioner's place of business outside the state that such were Florida sales tax transactions. It thus contends that the burden is on the Petitioner to prove that they are exempt from such tax and collection. After it was advised of the audit findings and the basis for the assessment, the Petitioner provided to the Department certain exemption certificates for a number of the entities and transactions for which shipment had not been made into Florida. The Department accepted these and the assessment was adjusted downward to reflect the exempt status of those transactions, pursuant to the further information provided the Department by the Petitioner. The other disputed transactions for which no exemption certificate was provided by the Petitioner, were deemed by the auditor to be taxable. In essence, the auditor took the position, as does the Department, that every person making sales into the State of Florida is subject to sales and use tax unless specifically exempt and that it is incumbent upon the selling dealer (which it maintains is the Petitioner) to establish the exempt status of the transaction, at the time of sale, with a supporting re-sale certificate or some documentation to support the transactions, exempt status.1/ The sales which are the subject of this dispute are exclusively those between the Petitioner and Advantec Computer Systems, Inc. Advantec is a Massachusetts Incorporated and domiciled corporation. It apparently does not possess a Florida "re-sale certificate" or "dealer certificate." The Petitioner sold various computers and related products, as shown by the invoices in evidence, to Advantec. The invoices and the testimony adduced by the Petitioner established that those sales were between the Petitioner and Advantec, the Massachusetts corporation. Advantec, in turn, sold the products or some of them to Florida customers. Those customers did not pay the Petitioner for the sales, but paid Advantec. Advantec directed that delivery from the Petitioner be made not to Advantec itself, but to its Florida-end customer via common carrier from the Petitioner's out-of-state location or from its overseas supplier. In any event, delivery was made from outside Florida to the Florida Advantec customers by common carrier. The Petitioner billed no Florida customer and had no relationship with any Florida customer of Advantec. Instead it invoiced and billed Advantec for the price of the products involved on a "net 30-day" basis. Advantec would then pay the Petitioner for the amount invoiced by the Petitioner to Advantec. As to the Advantec sales at issue, there was no nexus, substantial or otherwise, between the Petitioner and Advantec's customers in Florida, except that the product was "drop shipped" from the Petitioner's relevant location out of the State of Florida to the Florida customer by common carrier, not by any vehicle owned, leased, or operated by any person or entity affiliated with the Petitioner. In fact, the deliveries in question were made by Federal Express as a drop shipment. Advantec's principal business activity is the re-sale and distribution of computers and related products. It has no presence in Florida and is not a registered dealer in Florida. When the Petitioner made the sales to Advantec Computer Systems, as shown by the invoices and testimony in evidence, it billed Advantec for the sales and did not collect sales tax. While the Petitioner has in its possession Advantec's Massachusetts-issued tax-exempt certificate, the Petitioner does not have a Florida tax-exempt certificate on-file for Advantec, because Advantec is not registered in Florida, and the sale by the Petitioner to Advantec is a Massachusetts sale with no Florida nexus. The Petitioner offered three Technical Assistance Advisements (TAA) into evidence, which it obtained from the Department in support of the fact that the transactions in question are not taxable. (See Exhibits 2, 3, 4 in evidence.) These exhibits were admitted on a limited basis over the Department's objection as being possibly material to a determination as to the weight and credibility of the Department's evidence in this case, but not as being legally binding or constituting legal precedent, which last quality is precluded by Section 213.22(1), Florida Statutes (2006). Additionally, the Petitioner offered and had admitted Petitioner's Exhibit 7, which was an e-mail received from a representative of the Department, in response to an inquiry by the Petitioner. This was admitted over hearsay objection as a party statement offered by the opposing party.2/ In that exchange between the Petitioner and the Department, the Petitioner, as shown by testimony and the exhibit, related the facts involved in the sales to Advantec. The Department's response indicated that, if indeed, the buyer and seller were both located outside the State of Florida and the goods when purchased were outside the State of Florida, then the sale is not a Florida sale, between the out-of-state buyer and the out- of-state seller (the Petitioner). If the goods were then delivered by common carrier to the out-of-state buyer's ultimate customers in Florida, from the Petitioner's out-of-state location, then the transaction between the Petitioner and the out-of-state buyer is not subject to the Florida sales tax law and, in essence, is non-jurisdictional, not as a "Florida nexus sale." In summary, the Petitioner sold the goods in question to Advantec and invoiced Advantec at its Massachusetts domicile and address on "net 30-day" term. No Florida customer, person, or entity was billed for the sales in question, nor was any payment collected from any individual or business entity located in the State of Florida. Once the sale was consummated between the Petitioner and Advantec, the Petitioner merely "dropped shipped," by common carrier, the goods purchased by Advantec to Advantec's ultimate customer located in the State of Florida.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue, vacating and dismissing the assessment of the subject sales tax and interest to the Petitioner, Motion Computing, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 2007.
Findings Of Fact American Beryllium Company, Inc. is a subsidiary of Loral Corporation. On March 16, 1981, American Beryllium Company, Inc. filed a separate company form DR-601-C for Florida Intangible Tax Return reflecting a tax liability of 52,483.00 and paid this amount accordingly upon this date. The above form and check were processed by the Department of Revenue on April 9, 1981. On April 29, 1981, the Loral Corporation filed a separate company 1981 form DR-601-C reflecting a tax liability of $45.70 and paid this amount accordingly upon this date. The above form and check were processed by the Department of Revenue on May 4, 1981. On April 27, 1984, Loral Corporation and American Beryllium Company, Inc., filed a consolidated and amended 1981 form DR-601-C reflecting a tax liability of $35.07. Also, on April 27, 1984, Loral Corporation and American Beryllium Company, Inc., filed a 1981 form DR-26 refund claim exclusive of interest and penalties in the amount of $2,443.63, which is $85.07 less than the $2,528.70 total amount of taxes reported and paid in 1981. The above refund claim was received by the Department of Revenue on May 1, 1984. The Office of the Comptroller denied Petitioner's refund request in the amount of $2,443.63. The Office of the Comptroller authorized and paid a refund in the amount of $45.70 to the Loral Corporation which it paid as taxes owed on April 29, 1981. This leaves a remaining balance of $2,397.93 paid by American Beryllium Company, Inc. as tax it paid on March 16, 1981.
Findings Of Fact The parties have agreed that there are no issues of fact to be determined in this matter, and that the relevant facts are set out in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition which was received in evidence at the hearing as Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1. This matter involves a determination for Florida corporate income tax purposes of the net income derived by the Petitioner in connection with the purchase, development, and sale of certain property in Dade County, Florida. Petitioner purchased the property prior to January 1, 1972, the date upon which the Florida Income Tax Code became effective. Petitioner expended, through a subsidiary corporation, $369,058 in developing the property. These expenditures also occurred prior to January 1, 1972. For Federal income tax purposes the Petitioner had deducted these expenditures as business expenses during the years that they were incurred. Petitioner sold the property during 1972. Because the Petitioner had deducted the expenditures as business expenses, the expenditures could not properly have been included in the base price of the property for Federal income tax purposes, and the net income for Federal tax purposes was computed by subtracting the original purchase price from the sale price. Since the Florida Income Tax Code was not in effect at the time the expenditures were made, the Petitioner received no Florida tax benefit for the expenditures. In computing the net income for Florida tax purposes derived from the sale, the Petitioner included the expenditures in the base price of the property, and calculated its net income by subtracting the sum of the purchase price of the property and the expenditures from the sale price. The Department, contending that the $369,058 should not have been included in the base price of the property, issued a deficiency assessment which reflected the net income from the sale of property as the difference between the sale price and the purchase price. Petitioner originally contended that it was entitled to add the amount that the property appreciated prior to January 1, 1972 to the base price of the property. Petitioner is no longer contesting the deficiency assessment based upon a disallowance of that addition to the base price of the property. The Department was originally contending that it was entitled to interest at 12 percent per annum calculated retrospectively from the due date of the alleged deficiency. The Department has agreed to abandon its effort to impose that rate of interest. The issue raised in this case is whether the development expenses incurred by the Petitioner and deducted for Federal income tax purposes as business expenses prior to 1972 can be subtracted from Federal taxable income for the purpose of determining taxable income derived from the sale for Florida tax purposes.
The Issue The issue presented is whether HMY New Yacht Sales, Inc., is liable for the payment of use tax, together with penalty and interest, on a yacht which it purchased for resale and for use as a demonstrator.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner HMY New Yacht Sales, Inc., is a Florida cor-poration located in Dania, Florida. It is a franchise and an authorized dealer for several lines of new boats. Petitioner is registered as a dealer for Florida sales tax purposes and has a dealer decal. Petitioner became an authorized dealer for Davis Yachts, a manufacturer located in North Carolina, in 1985. In January 1990 Petitioner purchased a boat from Davis Yachts to be used for demonstration and promotional activities and for resale. The boat was a 47-foot fiberglass sports fisherman named "The Bandit." When the boat was delivered, Petitioner outfitted The Bandit with extensive electronics and fishing equipment, including a tuna tower, outriggers, a fighting chair, rocket launchers, and live wells. It took approximately two months (until the second week in March 1990) to outfit the boat to have it ready for its intended sports fishing purpose. The type of equipping done by Petitioner is typical of that done on every such boat when it is sold since such a boat cannot be used for its intended purpose without the electronics and other equipment. Petitioner, however, wanted the boat to be "ready to go," when Petitioner sold it rather than having the purchaser wait for the outfitting to be done before the purchaser could use the boat. Petitioner paid the factory approximately $520,000 for the boat. Petitioner's payments to local vendors for services and materials used in outfitting the boat brought Petitioner's cost to approximately $590,000. The Bandit was never documented or registered in the state of Florida. It was only operated under Petitioner's dealer registration and decal, as provided in Section 327.13, Florida Statutes. The boat was purchased with the intent to sell it, and it was always for sale from the first moment it was outfitted and ready to be shown. It was never Petitioner's intent to keep the boat. As soon as it was outfitted, the boat had on board, at all times, a file containing a complete inventory of the boat's equipment, including custom and standard options, and a color brochure with pictures of the boat to be given to potential customers. While Petitioner was attempting to sell the boat, it was also used by Petitioner as a sales promotional tool. Petitioner took the boat to various fishing tournaments and exhibited it at boat shows and open houses. Davis Yachts bore some of the expense of those activities since promoting the boat inured to the benefit of Davis as well as of Petitioner. When the boat was being used for promotional or sales activities, it would always have on board employees or salespersons of Petitioner or of Davis Yachts and customers. On occasion, family members accompanied Petitioner's salespersons on board the boat. The manner in which The Bandit was marketed--taking it to fishing tournaments and boat shows and having open house at various events--is typically the way new sport fisherman yachts are sold throughout the industry. The boat was shown to prospective customers at least once a month. Approximately 50 customers were taken on sea trials. The boat was never loaned or rented to anyone. It was used only under the direction of Petitioner or Davis Yachts. The only compensation received by Petitioner relating to the boat resulted from the occasions when Davis Yachts split some of the expenses for the promotional or sales activities. The boat did not sell as quickly as Petitioner hoped. In October 1990 Petitioner placed the boat on the Buck System, a multiple listing service which distributes information to other yacht brokers concerning boats which are for sale. Generally, boat dealers would not put new inventory in the multiple listing system. Petitioner did so in this instance, however, in order to quickly sell the boat because the government had announced a luxury tax proposal which Petitioner feared would result in a downturn in the boat market. Even with all the effort put into attempting to sell the boat, it did not sell until November 1991. In July 1992 the Department began a routine sales tax audit of Petitioner. The audit was completed in September 1992 and covered the period of time from March 1987 through February 1992. The Department auditor determined that Petitioner owed use tax on The Bandit because in November 1990, on the advice of its accountant, Petitioner took the boat out of its inventory account and placed it in its fixed assets account in order to take depreciation for federal income tax purposes. Based solely on Petitioner's treatment of the vessel on its corporate books, the auditor determined that Petitioner converted The Bandit to its own use and was, therefore, responsible for payment of the statutory use tax rate of 6 percent of the value of the boat as reflected on Petitioner's records. Based upon the audit, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment, assessing Petitioner $33,921.94 in tax, $8,480.50 in penalty, and $7,085.52 in interest through September 16, 1992. Interest continues to accrue at $11.15 per day.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered determining that Petitioner is not liable for payment of use tax, penalty, or interest on The Bandit, and withdrawing the assessment which is the subject of this proceeding. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-12, 15, and 19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 13, 14, and 18 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 16, 17, and 20 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 6, 8, and 9 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5, and 10 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 7 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Pennington & Haben, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Mark T. Aliff, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The parties agreed at the hearing that there were no issues of fact which remained to be determined. The parties stipulated that the relevant facts are as set out in paragraph 5 of the Petition for Administrative Hearing. The following findings are quoted directly from paragraph 5 of the Petition. Petitioner is a federally chartered savings and loan association. Petitioner initially employed the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting for Federal Income Tax purposes. In a desire to more clearly reflect income, Petitioner applied for and received permission from the Internal Revenue Service allowing Petitioner to change its method of tax accounting from the cash to the accrual method, pursuant to Revenue Procedure 70-27. This change was to commence with the calendar year 1971. Consistent with this accounting method change, all net accrued income as of January 1, 1971, was recorded in its entirety in Petitioner's financial statements as of December 31, 1970. The total net adjustment required to convert to the accrual method was $758,911.00. Pursuant to an agreement entered into with the Internal Revenue Service, an annual adjustment of $75,891.00 was required. The annual adjustment spread the effect of the accounting change over a 10-year period, despite the fact that all the income was realized prior to January 1, 1971. On January 1, 1972, the Florida Income Tax Code became effective. Petitioner timely filed its 1970 and 1971 Florida Intangible Personal Property Tax Returns. Upon subsequent review of Petitioner's records, it became apparent that the intangible tax had been overpaid and a refund claim was submitted. The refund was issued to Petitioner by the State of Florida during the calendar year 1973 and reported in Petitioner's 1973 Federal Corporate Income Tax Return. On December 16, 1975, Respondent notified Petitioner that Petitioner was deficient in its payment of Florida Corporate Income Tax in the amount of $25,386.84. The total deficiency consisted of $3,267.00 for the year ended December 31, 1972; $19,202.00 for the year ended December 31, 1973; and $2,916.84 for the year ended December 31, 1974. Included in the alleged total deficiency of $25,386.84 is a tax in the amount of $14,696.70 for the year 1973. This tax is attributable to Petitioner's apportionment of a part of its 1973 income to sources outside of the State of Florida. Petitioner is no longer protesting this deficiency. On February 9, 1976, Petitioner filed its protest against Respondent's determination that a deficiency in tax existed. By letter dated March 9, 1976, Respondent denied Petitioner's protest filed on February 9, 1976.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is liable for payment of sales and use taxes.
Findings Of Fact The Department conducted an audit of the business records of Petitioner, a Florida corporation operating a food catering business, covering the audit period of June 1, 1985 through May 31, 1990. As a result of that audit, the Department determined that Petitioner had failed to collect and remit sales taxes due to the Department and was liable for the payment of those unpaid sales taxes. The Department issued an assessment determining that Petitioner owed the amount of $213,683.87 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalty for the audit period. On October 9, 1992, the Department issued its second revised audit assessment based upon its redetermination of Petitioner's tax liability. On that date, the Department reduced Petitioner's liability to the amount of $147,924.45, which sum includes the unpaid tax, the penalty therefor, and interest through that date. Based on its revised calculations, the Department also determined that interest would accrue at the rate of $27.06 per day until the date of payment. Through the date of the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner has made no payments to satisfy or reduce the amount of assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner liable for the payment of sales tax, penalty, and interest through October 9, 1992, in the amount of $147,924.45 together with the amount of $27.06 interest per day until the date of payment. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 6-8 have been adopted in substance in this Recommended Order. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-5 and 9-16 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or recitation of the procedural context of this case. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Richard J. Hays, Esquire 7100 West Commercial Boulevard Suite 109 Lauderhill, Florida 33319 Mark D. Cohen, Esquire 121 Southeast First Street Suite 600 Miami, Florida 33131 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Burger King, a Florida corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Pillsbury Company, with headquarters located in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Burger King filed its intangible tax returns and made its original tax payments on or before their respective due dates of June 30, 1972, and June 30, 1973. On May 3, 1974, DOR sent a letter to Burger King indicating that Burger King's intangible tax account was being reviewed and that DOR's records did not reflect having received the 1972 or 1973 returns. The next piece of correspondence between the parties (according to the record) occurred over two years later on June 3, 1976. At that time DOR informed Burger King that it was auditing Burger King's intangible tax account for the tax year 1973. This letter constitutes the initiation of an investigation prior to the expiration of three years from the due date for filing the 1973 return. The parties make no further reference in their correspondence to the 1972 return or the tax year 1972. However, DOR does request a copy of Burger King's balance sheet dated December 31, 1972. This request is contained in DOR's letter of September 12, 1977, which letter in its opening paragraph limits the inquiry to tax years 1973 through 1977, inclusive. In addition to its letter of June 3, 1976, DOR filed its proposed assessment for tax year 1973, on the same date, June 3, 1976. Typed at the bottom of the proposed assessment was the following statement: This proposed assessment shall become final within sixty (60) days of receipt, unless you file a protest requesting a departmental conference, or petition for a hearing under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120, F.S. Upon receipt of these documents, Mr. Tom Howell, the property tax manager for Pillsbury Corporation asked for an extension of time to file the information requested in the June 3rd letter, which extension was granted by DOR. However, no protest or petition for hearing was filed within the sixty (60) days. Subsequently, Mr. Nicolas Joanos, a tax examiner with DOR recommended that Burger King file an amended tax return to take advantage of savings that would accrue if subsidiary corporations were consolidated on the return. While no such amended return was filed, a recomputation of tax liability based upon consolidation was made by DOR on January 6, 1977. On January 27, 1977, Burger King paid the additional tax for the years 1974, 1975, and 1976 but declined to pay the tax due for the 1973 tax year on the ground that the billing was dated past the expiration date for making a 1973 assessment. On February 23, 1977, DOR computed a new proposed assessment which included accrued interest from the prior proposed assessment. Burger King subsequently filed its request for a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The intangible properties sought to be taxed by DOR for 1973 include some $11,000,000 of inter-company accounts receivable due from Burger King's parent corporation, The Pillsbury Company. DOR does not contest that Burger King overpaid its intangible tax for the tax year 1972, but opposes a refund on the procedural ground more fully explained below. During the applicable periods of time herein, Burger King never made application for a refund for the 1972 tax paid. Rather, the issue was first raised by Burger King in its amended petition dated January 29, 1978.
Findings Of Fact Having considered the pleadings, evidence and legal arguments presented in this cause, the following facts are found: Petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey and qualified to do business is one State of Florida. Two of the subsidiaries of Petitioner are Island Properties, Inc., formerly known as Heftler International, Inc., and Island Land Corporation, formerly known as Heftler Construction Company of Puerto Rico, Inc. These corporations are organized under the laws of the State of Florida and the State of New Jersey respectively and maintain principal places of business in Puerto Rico. For the fiscal years ending July 31, 1972 and July 31, 1973, petitioners properly included losses from the operations of the Puerto Rico corporations in their consolidated income tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service. For the fiscal years ending July 31, 1972, and July 31, 1973, petitioners timely filed with the respondent consolidated income tax returns including therein the operations of the Puerto Rico corporations. After a timely audit, the respondent excluded, for the purposes of computing adjusted federal income as defined by 220.13, the losses sustained by the Puerto Rico corporations. The respondent also excluded from the computation of the apportionment factors defined in F.S. s. 214.71 and 220.15 the value of the property, payroll and sales utilized in the operations of the Puerto Rico corporations. The respondent cited F.S. ss. 220.13(1)(b)2.b, 220.15(3) and 214.71 as its authority. The adjustments made by the respondent results in a net proposed deficiency of $75,076.46 for the two fiscal years in question. After attempts by the parties to resolve the issues by informal means failed, the petitioner requested a formal hearing and the respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that there is no basis for affording petitioners any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $75,076.46 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lewis M. Kanner, Esquire WILLIAMS, SALOMON, KANNER DAMIAN 1003 du Pont Building Miami, Florida 33131 E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Mr. J. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact During the three year period from October 1, 1974 through September 30, 1977 Air Jamaica purchased prepared meals from Jerry's Caterers at Miami (Jerry's) in the total amount of $740,760.04 and Taca purchased prepared meals from Jerry's in the total amount of $161,379.72. Sales tax, penalty and interest through March 20, 1978 were assessed against Air Jamaica in the amount of $35,291.54 on the total paid for meals from Jerry's. Sales tax plus interest through November 20, 1977 were assessed against Taca in the amount of $9,359.86 on the total paid for meals from Jerry's. These figures are accepted as accurately representing 4 percent of the cost of meals purchased plus interest and penalties. The operations with respect to the meals were identical for both Air Jamaica and Taca. Prepared meals were delivered to the aircraft by Jerry's in trays holding 25 meals. These trays are supplied with heating elements and act as ovens in which the meals are heated. When placed aboard the aircraft by Jerry's' employees the trays holding meals intended to be served hot are plugged into electrical outlets on the plane. Prepared food delivered to the aircraft by Jerry's intended to be served cold obviously are not plugged into the electrical outlets. Air Jamaica departs from Miami and serves only Montego Bay and Jamaica. Taca departs from Miami and serves the cities of Belize, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama. Some 30 to 50 minutes after leaving Miami each company serves a meal for which no separate charge is made to the passenger. At the time these meals are served the aircraft is well outside the boundaries of Florida and either over Cuba or international waters. Although no separate charge is made for the meal served the cost of the meal, like every other operational and administrative cost, is considered in arriving at the air fare charged to the passenger for the transportation from Miami to destination. Jerry's bills the airlines for the number of meals delivered at a wholesale price of $3.48 per meal for meals served to first class passengers and $2.19 for meals served to economy passengers. Each airline provided Jerry's with tax resale certificates which relieved Jerry's from the collection of sales tax on meals delivered to the aircraft.
