Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to findings of fact set forth in paragraphs 1-5, below. Zurich is an insurer domiciled in the State of New York. Zurich is authorized to do insurance business in the State of Florida. Zurich pays insurance premium taxes to the State of Florida. As a foreign insurer doing business in Florida, Zurich is subject to the provisions of Florida's retaliatory tax, Section 624.5091, Florida Statutes. Respondent Department of Revenue (Revenue) is the state agency charged with the duty to implement and enforce Section 624.5091, Florida Statutes. Zurich's interests are substantially affected by Revenue's Rule 12B- 8.016(3)(a)(4), Florida Administrative Code, by virtue of the tax assessment made against Zurich pursuant to the rule. OTHER FACTS Prior to 1989, the Department of Insurance administered insurance taxation. Now, Revenue has that responsibility. Section 213.05, Florida Statutes, directs Revenue to administer provisions of Sections 624.509 through 624.514, Florida Statutes. Section 213.06(1), Florida Statutes, authorizes Revenue to promulgate rules to implement those responsibilities. Rule 12B-8.016 was first promulgated by Revenue in December of 1989 to implement statutory authority of Section 624.429 (currently renumbered as 624.5091). This statute authorized retaliatory taxation against non-domiciled insurers in the amount by which their state of domicile would tax Florida insurers in excess of Florida's comparable tax. The statute provides in pertinent part: When by or pursuant to the laws of any other state or foreign country any taxes, licenses, and other fees, in the aggregate, and any fines, penalties, deposit requirements, or other material obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions are or would be imposed upon Florida insurers or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, which are in excess of such taxes, licenses, and other fees, in the aggregate, or other obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions directly imposed upon similar insurers, or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, of such other state or country under the statutes of this state, so long as such laws of such other state or country continue in force or are so applied, the same taxes, licenses, and other fees, in the aggregate, or fines, penalties, deposit requirements, or other material obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions of whatever kind shall be imposed by the department upon the insurers, or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, of such other state or country doing business or seeking to do business in this state. As it existed in 1989 and currently, the statute contains an exclusionary provision expressly excluding from the retaliatory tax any special purpose assessments in connection with insurance other than property insurance. This exclusionary provision is part of Subsection 3 of the current statute, 624.5091, and reads as follows: (3)This section does not apply as to personal income taxes, nor as to sales or use taxes, nor as to ad valorem taxes on real or personal property, nor as to reimbursement premiums paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, nor as to emergency assessments paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, nor as to special purpose obligations or assessments imposed in connection with particular kinds of insurance other than property insurance, except that deductions, from premium taxes or other taxes otherwise payable, allowed on account of real estate or personal property taxes paid shall be taken into consideration by the department in determining the propriety and extent of retaliatory action under this section. The parties concede that Revenue's Rule 12B-8.016 accurately tracts the first part of the retaliatory taxation statute. But a subpart of the Rule, 12B- 8.016(3)(a)(4), is challenged by Zurich in this proceeding because that subpart provides for inclusion of the assessment for administration of workers compensation in Florida and comparable assessments in other states. The rule subpart states: (3)(a) Other items which shall be included in the retaliatory calculations are: * * * 4. The workers compensation administrative assessment imposed by s. 440.51, F.S., as well as comparable assessments in other states. The State of Florida imposes assessment on workers compensation carriers such as Zurich in accordance with authority contained in Section 440.51, Florida Statutes, which is entitled "Expenses of Administration." Section 440.51 provides for the pro-rata assessment of all insurers and self- insurers of workers compensation to cover expenses of administering the workers compensation program. The assessment is a "special fund" that does not involve appropriated funds or general state revenues. Zurich's home state of New York imposes a comparable assessment. In accordance with Rule 12B-8.016(3)(a)(4), Florida Administrative Code, Revenue includes calculations for the Worker's Compensation Board Administrative Fund in the state of New York in Zurich's retaliatory tax calculation. In drafting the rule in 1989, Revenue relied upon Attorney General Opinion 057-173, which advised that Florida's Worker's Compensation Administrative Assessment should be considered a "tax" for purposes of retaliatory tax calculation. On this basis, Revenue's rule requires that such assessments be considered as "taxes" and included in the retaliatory tax calculation. However, following the issuance of Attorney General Opinion 057-173, the Florida legislature in 1959 enacted the present Subsection 624.5091(3), Florida Statutes, specifically excluding the consideration of "special purpose obligations or assessments imposed in connection with particular kinds of insurance other than property insurance" in retaliatory tax calculations. Following the 1959 enactment of the exclusionary language contained in Subsection 624.5091(3), Florida Statutes, the Department of Insurance did not include comparable worker compensation assessments of other states. The Department of Insurance administered insurance taxation until 1989. Department of Insurance forms introduced into evidence for 1986 showed that the Florida assessment, pursuant to Section 440.51 Florida Statutes, was treated as a deduction against Florida's premium tax and added back in on the Florida side of the retaliatory tax calculation. But the assessment was not included in a manner to inflate the calculation of the domiciliary state's comparative tax base. When Revenue assumed administration of insurance taxation in 1989, a proposed rule and an emergency rule were promulgated. Neither provided for inclusion of foreign states' special purpose administrative assessments in retaliatory tax calculation. In the course of the promulgation process, the determination to treat the worker compensation administrative assessment as a tax became a part of the rule. The purpose of Florida's retaliatory statute is to influence other states' legislative discretion to lower the tax burden on Florida insurers doing business in those other states. The items to be compared for retaliatory purposes are determined by the legislature and not by Revenue, Revenue auditors, or other states.
The Issue Whether surcharge taxes and excise taxes, plus penalties and interest, attributable to the sale of alcoholic beverages should be assessed against the Respondent, Trans World Airlines, Inc., d/b/a Trans World Airlines? Whether the Respondent's Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco license/permit number 78-14 should be subjected to a civil penalty or should be suspended or revoked for failure to timely file surcharge and excise tax reports and surcharge and excise taxes to the Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The Respondent is Trans World Airlines, Inc., d/b/a Trans World Airlines. The Respondent has be granted an alcoholic beverage license by the Petitioner. That license is identified as license number 78-14, series X (hereinafter referred to as the "License"). At all times relevant to this proceeding the Respondent held the License. From January 1, 1988, through January 15, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the "Tax Period"), the Respondent operated as an air carrier in the State of Florida. During the Tax Period the Respondent sold alcoholic beverages to passengers on aircraft flights over the State of Florida. As a result of the sales of alcoholic beverages over Florida airspace, the Respondent has incurred surcharge and excise tax liability to the Petitioner for the Tax Period. The Respondent has not remitted any amount of its surcharge or excise tax liability to the Petitioner for the Tax Period. The Respondent has failed to file monthly surcharge or excise tax reports during the Tax Period. In February, 1991, the Petitioner performed an audit of the Respondent for the Tax Period. During the Petitioner's audit of the Respondent, the employee of the Respondent responsible for remitting alcoholic beverage reports and taxes to various states, including Florida, admitted to the Petitioner that the Respondent remitted its alcoholic beverage taxes to other states and did not understand why the Respondent did not remit its alcoholic beverage surcharge and excise taxes to Florida. The Petitioner, as a result of its audit of the Respondent, computed the Respondent's liability for surcharge and excise taxes for the Tax Period. The Petitioner used a standard airline industry apportionment formula to compute the Respondent's tax liability. The apportionment formula utilized by the Petitioner to compute the Respondent's tax liability to Florida for the Tax Period consisted of the following computation (hereinafter referred to as the "Apportionment Formula"): (a) a ratio is computed by dividing total revenue air miles (based upon revenue plane miles) flown by the Respondent by the total revenue miles flown by the Respondent in Florida; (b) the ratio is multiplied by the total gallons of alcohol sold by the Respondent to determine the estimated amount of alcohol sold in Florida; and (c) the estimated amount of alcohol sold in Florida is multiplied by the Florida tax rate(s) to determine the total alcohol tax payable. In applying the Apportionment Formula, the Petitioner used revenue plane miles in calculating the first ratio of the Apportionment Formula. Line 22, page 18, line 9, page 28, lines 13-20, page 37, Transcript of August 21, 1991. The Petitioner did not use revenue passenger miles as argued by the Respondent. Revenue plane miles looks at the total miles flown by an aircraft without regard to the number of passengers on a flight. Revenue passenger miles takes into account the number of passengers on each flight by including the number of miles a plane flies times the number of passengers on board that flight. Revenue passenger miles takes into account the difference in the size of each plane involved in a flight. Revenue passenger miles more accurately reflects the amount of alcohol which may be consumed. The information utilized by the Petitioner in applying the Apportionment Formula to the Respondent for the Tax Period was information provided by the Respondent. The Respondent provided the Petitioner with revenue plane miles and not revenue passenger miles. Therefore, the Petitioner reasonably relied upon and used the best information available to it to compute the Respondent's liability for surcharge and excise taxes. It is reasonable for the Petitioner to use revenue plane miles to compute surcharge and excise taxes attributable to the sale of alcohol in Florida absent a taxpayer providing revenue passenger miles. The Apportionment Formula utilized by the Petitioner is a fair method of computing the tax liability of the Respondent to the State of Florida for the Tax Period. Using the data provided by the Respondent was reasonable. If the Respondent had provided revenue passenger miles, the Petitioner should have used that information in applying the Apportionment Formula. Based upon an application of the Apportionment Formula and using the data provided by the Respondent to the Petitioner, the Respondent owes the following amounts for the Tax Period: Surcharge: Surcharge $ 9,580.38 Penalty 1,699.87 Interest 356.01 Total $11,636.26 Excise: Excise $40,285.49 Interest 7,279.60 Total $47,565.09 The total liability of the Respondent for the Tax Period is $59,201.34. After the Petitioner's audit of the Respondent, the Respondent provided the Petitioner with revenue passenger miles and revenue ton miles. Revenue ton miles have no substantive affect on the taxable event at issue in this proceeding; the sale of alcohol in Florida. It is not clear whether the revenue passenger miles provided by the Respondent can be used by the Petitioner in applying the Apportionment Formula. If so, that information should be used to calculate the Respondent's liability for taxes, penalties and interest in this case. If the information is not sufficient, the parties agreed that the record would remain open to give the Respondent an opportunity to provide any information needed to calculate the Respondent's liability. The Respondent presented evidence concerning the percentage of flights by the Respondent during which alcoholic beverages were served over Florida and the percentage of flights by the Respondent during which alcoholic beverages were not served over Florida. This evidence is rejected because it did not specifically apply to the Tax Period and is not otherwise credible to prove the facts the Respondent was attempting to prove. So called "complimentary" alcoholic beverages are provided by the Respondent to some passengers. These beverages, however, are received as part of the consideration a passenger receives for purchasing a ticket from the Respondent. Such beverages are, therefore, sold by the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a final order be issued requiring the Respondent, Trans World Airlines, Inc., d/b/a Trans World Airlines, to pay surcharge and excise taxes, plus penalties and interest thereon, based upon application of the Apportionment Formula in the amounts set out in finding of fact 19. The amount of surcharge and excise taxes, plus penalties and interest thereon, may be recalculated by the Petitioner based upon an application of the Apportionment Formula utilizing revenue passenger miles for the Tax Period if revenue passenger miles have been, or are subsequently, provided to the Petitioner by the Respondent. It is further recommended that the Respondent be assessed a civil penalty of $1,000.00 for its failure to remit surcharge taxes and a civil penalty of $1,000.00 for its failure to remit excise taxes. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of November, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-2441 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 2. 2 3. 3 5. 4 6. 5-6 Hereby accepted. 7 10/ 8 7. 9-11 11. 12 12. 13 13. 14 16. 15 18. But see 15-17. 16 17. See 12 and 18. Conclusion of law. Not relevant. See 12. 21-22 Although true, the burden of proof in this case was on the Petitioner. 23 8-9. 24 Not relevant. 25-26 19. 27 20. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2-3. 3 5. 4 6. 5 12-13. 6 See 14-15. 7 See 21. 8-10 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Robin L. Suarez Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Thomas P. Lombardi Director - Tax Administration 100 S. Bedford Road Mt. Kisco, New York 10549 Donald D. Conn, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Richard W. Scully, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable for corporate income and excise taxes that have been assessed by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a subsidiary of PBS Building Systems America, Inc. (PBS- A). PBS-A and Petitioner filed consolidated Florida income and excise tax returns during the time in question. During the years in question, PBS-A had no tax nexus with Florida, but incurred losses that were available to offset gross income. During the years in question, Petitioner had nexus with Florida and incurred taxable income. The filing of the consolidated return reduced the taxable income of Petitioner by the losses of PBS-A. On December 19, 1990, Respondent issued two notices of proposed assessment for years ending December 31, 1985, through March 31, 1989. One notice identifies $8273 of unpaid corporate excise tax, plus $2798 of interest through September 15, 1990. The notice states that interest would continue to accrue at the daily rate of $2.27. The second notice of proposed assessment identifies $55,480 of unpaid corporate income tax, plus $20,254 of interest through September 15, 1990. The notice states that interest continues to accrue at the daily rate of $15.20. Petitioner filed a notice of protest dated February 15, 1991. By notice of decision dated October 17, 1991, Respondent rejected the protest and sustained the proposed deficiencies. The claimed deficiency for unpaid corporate income tax, however, was revised to $75,039. A notice of reconsideration dated July 21, 1992, restates the conclusions of the notice of decision. By petition for formal hearing dated September 16, 1992, Petitioner requested a formal hearing concerning the tax liabilities in question and specifically the conclusion that PBS- A was ineligible to file a consolidated return in Florida due to the absence of tax nexus with Florida. The September 16 letter recites facts to establish tax nexus with Florida through the establishment of financing relationships. However, it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of these factual assertions because they represent mere allegations. Petitioner failed to produce any evidence in the case and, when noticed for a corporate deposition, failed to appear. Additionally, Petitioner's failure to respond to requests for admission results in admissions that, during the relevant period, PBS-A was not a bank, brokerage house, or finance corporation and did not lend money to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the above-described assessments against Petitioner. ENTERED on February 12, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Attorney Lisa Raleigh Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Kathryn M. Jaques Arthur Andersen & Co. Suite 1600 701 B Street San Diego, CA 92101-8195
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner collected and remitted to Respondent the correct amount of sales and use taxes during the audit period from October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2007, and, if not, what additional amount of tax plus penalty and interest is due.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner True Blue Pools (Petitioner, taxpayer, or TBP) is a domestic corporation headquartered in Miami-Dade County, Florida. TBP services, repairs, and renovates swimming pools and constructed some pools during the audit period. Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue (Respondent or DOR), is the agency of state government authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida, pursuant to section 213.05, Florida Statutes.2 DOR is authorized to prescribe the records to be kept by all persons subject to taxes under chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Such persons have a duty to keep and preserve their records, and the records shall be open to examination by DOR or its authorized agents at all reasonable hours pursuant to section 212.12(6), Florida Statutes. DOR is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers and to request information to ascertain their tax liability, if any, pursuant to section 213.34, Florida Statutes. On November 2, 2007, DOR initiated an audit of TBP to determine whether it was properly collecting and remitting sales and use taxes to DOR. The audit period was from October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2007. On December 15, 2008, DOR sent TBP its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (NOI), with schedules, showing that TBP owed to DOR additional sales and use taxes in the amount of $113,632.17, penalty in the amount of $28,406.05, and interest through December 16, 2008, in the amount of $34,546.59, making a total assessment in the amount of $176,586.81. On October 26, 2009, DOR issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment. TBP timely challenged the Notice of Proposed Assessment, filing its petition with DOR and requesting an administrative hearing. Subsequent to the petition being filed, additional documentation was provided by TBP resulting in a revision to the tax, interest, and penalty amount due. DOR's revised work papers, dated May 27, 2010, claim Petitioner owes $64,430.83 in tax, $16,107.71 in penalty, and interest through May 27, 2010, in the amount of $27,071.99, with an assessment of $107,610.53. The assessed penalty, $16,107.71, was calculated after 25% of the penalty was waived, pursuant to subsection 213.21(3)(a), Florida Statutes, based on DOR's determination that there is no evidence of willful negligence, willful neglect, or fraud. The audit was conducted to determine liability in four categories: improper sales tax exemptions, unpaid sales taxes for taxable expenses, unpaid use taxes on fixed assets, and unpaid use taxes on taxable materials used to fulfill contracts to improve real property. Sales Tax Exemptions Due to the large volume of invoices and other records, the auditor conducted a random sampling of invoices for three months during the audit period, October 2004, January 2005, and September 2007.3 If no sales tax was collected and the Petitioner claimed that the transaction was exempt from the requirement to pay taxes, the auditor looked for proof that either the TBP customer was an exempt organization, for example, a school or a church, or that TBP had provided its suppliers with a DOR Form DR-13 to exempt from taxes products acquired for resale. In the absence proof of either type of exemption, DOR assumed taxes should have been paid. Using the difference between taxes collected and taxes due for the three months, the auditor determined that the percentage of error was .016521. When .016521 was applied to total sales of $1,485,890.79 for the 36-month audit period, the results showed that an additional $24,548.41 in sales taxes should have been collected from customers, and is due from TBP. Although a business is required to pay taxes for the materials it purchases to use in its business, it is not required to collect taxes from its customers when it enters into lump sum contracts to perform a service for customers. At least one invoice for $9,500.00 that the auditor treated as an improper exemption was, in fact, a partial payment on a lump-sum contract. The invoice referenced a "shotcrete draw," which represented the collection of funds after the concrete part of pool construction was completed. TBP is not required to collect taxes when it uses lump-sum contracts. Other invoices for pool repair and services were also mischaracterized as exempt by the TBP, but it is not clear that all were payments related to lump-sum contracts. DOR's auditor, nevertheless, testified as follows: With the knowledge that I have for True Blue Pools, being a lump-sum contractor, True Blue Pools should not charge their customer any sales tax. Transcript at pages 67-68. DOR concedes that some of TBP's transactions are also exempt from taxes as improvements to real property. In its Proposed Recommended Order, DOR asserted that TBP's use of the term "improvements to real property" is overbroad, but it did not specify how or why this is the case. During cross- examination of the owner of TBP, only one invoice for $500.00 for leak detection on the Delgado property was shown to have been for a service rather than for swimming pool construction. Taxable Expenses DOR audited TBP's purchases of tangible personal property used in the daily operation of its business. The products included chlorine and other chemicals, office supplies, and vehicle parts, expenses, and repairs. The ledger for a 12- month period, calendar year 2006, showed an average monthly additional tax due of $111.18, or a total of $4,002.48 in additional taxes for the 36-month audit period. As noted in Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order, "[t]he representative of TBP did not dispute DOR's allegation that no tax may have been paid on the purchase of all of these items " Fixed Assets TBP's list of fixed assets was taken from the depreciation schedule on Internal Revenue Service Form 4562. The items listed are computer- and software-related. TBP provided no proof that it had paid a use tax. The additional tax due equals $419.94. Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order includes the statement that "[a]gain, the representative of TBP did not dispute DOR's allegation that no tax may have been paid on the purchase of these items " Taxable Materials Taxable materials, those purchased to fulfill a contract to improve real property, included items used to build, renovate, and repair pools. The items included concrete, meters, drains, and valves. For the 12-month sample period, calendar year 2006, TBP failed to pay taxes on material purchases in the total amount of $168,310.05, or an average of $14,078.96 a month. For the 36-month audit period, the total of the purchases was $506,842.56. With a 6 percent tax due for the state and 1 percent for the county, the total additional tax due on materials is $35,460.00. TBP conceded that it improperly used a resale exemption to purchase taxable materials from suppliers without paying taxes. The materials were used to provide services and were not resold. Acknowledging again that TBP uses lump-sum contracts, this time to support the collection of additional taxes, the auditor testified as follows: And the law states that the taxpayer's [sic] an ultimate consumer of all materials purchased to fulfill a lump-sum contract, and that's what they told me they operate under, a lump-sum contract. Transcript at page 58. At the hearing, TBP used its actual profit and loss statement to show that the cost of goods it sold (general purchases and taxable materials) in the amounts of $18,360.77 in October 2004, $8,519.22 in January 2005, and $4,818.65 in September 2007. Corresponding taxes for each of those months should have been $1,285.25, $596.35, and $337.31, or an average of $739.63 a month, or a total of $26,626.68 for 36 months. The goods that it sold were not at issue in the audit of taxable materials, rather it was TBP's purchases from vendors that should have been taxed that resulted in DOR's audit results. Total Additional Sales and Use Taxes Due The three categories of additional taxes due, $4,002.48 for taxable expenses, $419.94 for fixed assets, and $35,460.00 for taxable materials, equal $39,882.42 in additional taxes due during the audit period. Taxes Paid TBP filed DOR Forms DR-15, monthly sales and use tax reporting forms, and paid sales and use taxes during the audit period. For the sample months used by DOR to examine sales tax exemptions, TBP paid $1,839.10 in taxes in October 2004, $1,672.73 in January 2005, and $1,418.13 in September 2007. Using the three months to calculate an average, extended to 36 months, it is likely that TBP paid $59,712 in taxes. TBP asserted that DOR was required to, but did not, offset the deficiency of $39,882.42, by what appears to be an overpayment of $59,712.00 in sales and use taxes. Other than pointing out that the amount reported on the DR-15s differed, being sometimes more and sometimes less than the amount shown on the profit and loss statements, DOR did not dispute TBP's claim that it had paid sales and use taxes. TBP's representative explained that end-of-the-year adjustments for additional collections or for bad debt could cause the amounts on the DR-15s and profit and loss statements to differ. With regard to the taxes paid, DOR took the following position in its Proposed Recommended Order: Petitioner's DR-15's [sic] for the collection periods October 2004, and January 2005, [and September 2007] (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1) do reflect sales tax being collected and remitted to DOR. DOR does not allege that Petitioner never paid tax on its purchases, or made bona fide exempt sales for which no tax was collected. DOR's audit findings identify just those which occurred within the sample period, scheduled in the auditor's workpapers, and applied over the entire audit period. The DR-15s are taken from the sample months selected by DOR within the audit period, and DOR does not address TBP's claim that a set off for taxes paid was mandatory, pursuant to subsection 213.34(4), Florida Statutes. Using the audit schedules, DOR showed credit for taxes paid in the amounts of $20.63 for taxable expenses, $0 for fixed assets, and $24.31 in state taxes and $1.03 for county taxes on taxable materials. The amounts are far less that the $59,712.00 in sales/use taxes TBP showed that it paid during the audit period.
Recommendation Based upon the forgoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue issue a final order dismissing the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated December 15, 2010. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2011.
Findings Of Fact The parties agreed at the hearing that there were no issues of fact which remained to be determined. The parties stipulated that the relevant facts are as set out in paragraph 5 of the Petition for Administrative Hearing. The following findings are quoted directly from paragraph 5 of the Petition. Petitioner is a federally chartered savings and loan association. Petitioner initially employed the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting for Federal Income Tax purposes. In a desire to more clearly reflect income, Petitioner applied for and received permission from the Internal Revenue Service allowing Petitioner to change its method of tax accounting from the cash to the accrual method, pursuant to Revenue Procedure 70-27. This change was to commence with the calendar year 1971. Consistent with this accounting method change, all net accrued income as of January 1, 1971, was recorded in its entirety in Petitioner's financial statements as of December 31, 1970. The total net adjustment required to convert to the accrual method was $758,911.00. Pursuant to an agreement entered into with the Internal Revenue Service, an annual adjustment of $75,891.00 was required. The annual adjustment spread the effect of the accounting change over a 10-year period, despite the fact that all the income was realized prior to January 1, 1971. On January 1, 1972, the Florida Income Tax Code became effective. Petitioner timely filed its 1970 and 1971 Florida Intangible Personal Property Tax Returns. Upon subsequent review of Petitioner's records, it became apparent that the intangible tax had been overpaid and a refund claim was submitted. The refund was issued to Petitioner by the State of Florida during the calendar year 1973 and reported in Petitioner's 1973 Federal Corporate Income Tax Return. On December 16, 1975, Respondent notified Petitioner that Petitioner was deficient in its payment of Florida Corporate Income Tax in the amount of $25,386.84. The total deficiency consisted of $3,267.00 for the year ended December 31, 1972; $19,202.00 for the year ended December 31, 1973; and $2,916.84 for the year ended December 31, 1974. Included in the alleged total deficiency of $25,386.84 is a tax in the amount of $14,696.70 for the year 1973. This tax is attributable to Petitioner's apportionment of a part of its 1973 income to sources outside of the State of Florida. Petitioner is no longer protesting this deficiency. On February 9, 1976, Petitioner filed its protest against Respondent's determination that a deficiency in tax existed. By letter dated March 9, 1976, Respondent denied Petitioner's protest filed on February 9, 1976.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, a corporation headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina, is in the business of operating movie theatres both within and without the State of Florida. At these theatres Petitioner Operates concession stands which sell both candy items and drinks in various sizes at different prices to persons who frequent the theatres. For the period of time from September, 1985 through May, 1985, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue sales tax on the total taxable value of all taxable items sold at its concession stands in all of its Florida theatres, in accordance with the presumptive effective rate of tax of 5.63 percent contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code. As a result of an audit for a previous period dated October 1, 1982, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue the amount of $10,637.00 for sales tax on taxable items sold at its concession stands during this audit period in accordance with the presumptive effective tax rate of 4.5 percent as contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code during the audit period. On August 15, 1985, Petitioner filed with the Department of Revenue, as agent for Respondent, two (2) applications for sales tax refund in the amount of $16,876.52 and $10,637.00. The applications were dated August 13, 1985, and were timely filed. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner: (a) posted and charged flat prices for the various items offered for sale, which prices included sales tax (b) kept records of daily and weekly sales of taxable items at each of its Florida theatres (c) kept records of daily attendance at each movie shown by each Florida theatre and (d) kept records of weekly calculations, through inventory analysis, of sales of drinks and candy items, including the number, size and price of each item sold at each of its Florida theatre. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner did not maintain cash registers at its concession stands in its Florida theatres and did not maintain records made contemporaneously with the sale of taxable items from the concession stands which separately itemized the amounts of sales tax collected on each sale transaction occurring at the theatres' concession stands. Rather, Petitioner chose, for its own convenience, to operate a "cash box" operation at each of its concession stands in its Florida theatres and willingly remitted sales tax to the Department of Revenue pursuant to the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code for the relevant periods. In April, 1985, Petitioner placed computerized cash registers in each of its Florida theatre concession stands. These cash registers provided tapes of each individual transaction each day, specifically recording each taxable and nontaxable sale and the amount of sales tax due on each taxable sale with a daily summation on each tape at each theatre. Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code, requires concessionaires such as Petitioner to remit sales tax at a rate of 5.63 percent of taxable sales under the present 5 percent statutory sales tax schedule and at 4.5 percent of taxable sales under the previous statutory sales tax schedule unless a concessionaire, through its records, shows another effective rate by "proof to the contrary". Petitioner produced an effective tax rate of 5.13 percent for the month of April 1985, for all its Florida theatres by dividing the total sales tax collected during April, 1985 by the total taxable sales during April, 1985, as evidenced by the cash register tapes from all of Petitioner's concession stands in Florida. Petitioner then used that tax rate as a base to retroactively reconstruct an effective tax rate for the refund periods by assuming that the product sales mix (product mix of products sold) and the transactional sales mix (the number of items purchased together in a single transaction by a customer) experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the month of April, 1985. There was no competent evidence that the product sales mix or the transactional sales mix experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the nonth of April, 1985. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support Petitioner's reconstructed effective tax rates that were used to calculate the refunds. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show "proof to the contrary" that its reconstructed effective tax rates are correct or that the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code were incorrect for the refund periods at issue in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Comptroller enter his final order DENYING Petitioner's refund applications. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1986.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, as the managing member of PNC, LLC (PNC), is personally liable for a penalty equal to twice the total amount of the sales and use tax owed by PNC to the State of Florida.1/
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes. PNC is a now-dissolved Florida limited liability company that did business under the name "CHEAP" at 309 South Howard Avenue, Tampa, Florida. PNC was registered as a business and filed its Articles of Organization with the Secretary of State on June 16, 2010. Until the company was dissolved by the Secretary of State in 2018 for failure to pay the 2017 annual filing fees, Mr. Scott served as its managing member and had administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes. Verna Bartlett was PNC's controller. PNC was registered with the Department as a dealer pursuant to section 212.18, Florida Statutes, and was issued Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration 39-8015401140-8. A certificate of registration requires the taxpayer to file sales and use tax returns and pay to the Department all taxes owed as they are received. After making numerous attempts to collect delinquent sales tax owed by PNC for tax reporting periods in 2013 and 2014, the Department filed this action seeking to impose a personal penalty assessment against Mr. Scott, the managing member of the company. Section 213.29, Florida Statutes, provides that any person who has administrative control over the collection and payment of taxes and who willfully fails to pay the tax or evades the payment of the tax shall be liable to a penalty equal to twice the amount of tax not paid. The penalty is based only on the taxes owed, and not the interest and fees that have accrued. The statute provides that if the business liability is fully paid, the personal liability assessment will be considered satisfied. On January 18, 2018, the Department issued a NAPL against Mr. Scott after PNC failed to pay the sales and use taxes owed the State for the reporting periods from February 2013 through October 2014. The outstanding taxes, exclusive of interest or penalties, total $79,325.75. The NAPL imposes a total penalty of $158,647.50, or twice the amount of sales tax owed by PNC. No payments have been made on the account since the issuance of the NAPL, and, PNC, now closed, currently has a total liability in excess of $200,000.00. During the relevant time period, Mr. Scott was personally responsible for collecting PNC's sales tax and remitting it to the Department; he had the authority to sign checks on behalf of PNC; he made financial decisions as to which creditors should be paid; he made the decision to use the sales tax collected for the business and for stipulation payments; and he made the decision not to remit the sales tax that was collected. This was confirmed by PNC's controller, Ms. Bartlett, who responded to the Department's Requests for Admissions. Mr. Scott also confirmed to a Department tax specialist that the admissions provided by Ms. Bartlett were accurate. Mr. Scott either never remitted payment or did not remit payment timely on behalf of PNC for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January through October 2014. Tax warrants were issued and judgment liens were recorded for the following reporting periods: February, April, and December 2013, and January, February, and April through October 2014. Resp. Ex. 5 and 6. All warrants and liens relate to reporting periods that fall within the personal liability assessment period. A Notice of Jeopardy Finding and Notice of Final Assessment (Notice of Jeopardy) dated June 18, 2014, was issued to PNC pertaining to the April 2014 reporting period. Resp. Ex. This notice was issued after Mr. Scott ceased making regular tax payments, the estimated deficiency was substantial, and the Department determined that collection of the tax would be jeopardized by further delay. A Notice of Jeopardy and Notice of Final Assessment dated August 7, 2014, also was issued to PNC pertaining to the April, May, and June 2014 reporting periods. Resp. Ex. 12. Because PNC reported more than $20,000.00 in sales tax each year, unless a waiver was obtained, Mr. Scott was required to file and pay PNC's sales tax electronically for all reporting periods within the personal liability period. See § 213.755(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 12-24.003. Despite having obtained no waiver, Mr. Scott never filed returns or paid PNC's sales tax electronically. And even though he never remitted a payment electronically, Mr. Scott indicated on at least six sales tax returns during the relevant time period that sales tax for the reporting period was remitted electronically. The only conclusion to draw from this action is that Mr. Scott filed or directed the filing of these returns knowing them to be false. The record shows that, dating back to 2011, Mr. Scott has a long-standing history of failing to abide by the tax laws of the state as it relates to PNC. For example, on September 15, 2011, Mr. Scott was referred for criminal investigation by the state attorney for his failure to pay taxes. Also, numerous returns were filed without a payment. This is prima facie evidence of conversion of the money due. § 212.14(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent's Exhibit 1 summarizes numerous contacts by the Department's Tampa District Office with Mr. Scott regarding collection notices, telephone calls, emails, assessment letters, warrant letters, and the like in an effort to secure compliance with tax laws. It is fair to find that Mr. Scott willfully attempted to evade or avoid paying sales and reemployment taxes during the relevant period. To prevent its Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration from being revoked, PNC entered into a compliance agreement on July 10, 2013, to pay past due sales tax and reemployment tax totaling $65,789.25. The agreement required PNC to: (a) accurately complete all past due tax returns and reports no later than July 10, 2013; (b) remit all past due payments in accordance with the attached schedule, which required 11 monthly payments of $4,000.00 beginning on August 10, 2013, and a final balloon payment on July 10, 2014; (c) accurately complete and file all required tax returns and reports for the next 12 months; and (d) timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months. A $15,000.00 down payment also was required to be paid on or before July 10, 2013. An addendum to the agreement (added by Mr. Scott) provided that "[a]ll payments, including the $15,000.00 down payment, shall first be applied to Sales and Use Tax." Although the down payment was made timely, the agreement was breached the first month (August) because Mr. Scott did not make the payment electronically. However, the agreement was not voided by the Department until October 12, 2013. Therefore, any payments made on or after October 12, 2013, were not considered compliance payments and are not subject to the addendum in the agreement. A somewhat confusing aspect of this dispute concerns Mr. Scott's contention, by way of cross-examination, that contrary to the addendum, the Department incorrectly applied his $15,000.00 down payment and subsequent compliance payments to the reemployment tax account, rather than the sales tax account, and that his sales tax liability should be reduced by that amount. As noted above, the addendum governs only the payments that predate October 12, 2013, which are the down payment ($15,000.00) and the August and September payments -- $4,000.00 each month. This issue was not raised by Mr. Scott until the Department issued a NAPL on April 13, 2017. The NAPL issued on April 13, 2017, indicated that the outstanding tax owed by PNC through October 31, 2014, was $90,808.17, and the personal assessment was twice that amount. In response to Mr. Scott's request, the Department acknowledged that it incorrectly applied the down payment to the reemployment account. Also, it took a second look at the two payments made in August and September, which predate the voiding of the agreement. The August installment payment consisted of two separate checks: $3,390.00 for sales tax and $610.00 for reemployment tax, and these amounts were applied in that manner. The September payment, $4,000.00, submitted in one check, was applied in the same manner as the August payment, with $610.00 going to the reemployment tax and the remainder to sales tax. Therefore, only $1,220.00 was incorrectly applied to the reemployment tax during those two months. On July 3, 2017, the Department reapplied a total of $16,551.00 from the reemployment tax account to the sales tax account for the relevant reporting periods. Mr. Scott contends the reapplication of the $16,551.00 to sales tax should reduce the amount of sales tax due by that amount. However, section 213.75(2) dictates that if a lien or warrant has been filed against the taxpayer, as is true here, the payment shall be applied in a priority order spelled out in the statute. Thus, the Department applied that amount in the following order: against the costs to record the liens against PNC; against the administration collection processing fee, if any; against any accrued interest; against any accrued penalty; and against any tax due. Under this priority order, the penalty/interest/fees categories totaled $5,066.58, while the tax liability category totaled $11,484.42. A detailed breakdown of this allocation is found in Respondent's Exhibit 29. Therefore, the total tax liability on the 2017 NAPL ($90,808.17) is reduced by $11,484.42, resulting in a total tax liability of $79,323.75, as shown on the updated 2018 NAPL. In the same vein, in his PRO, Mr. Scott argues that he was not given credit for payments of $9,110.24, $2,688.53, $178.28, and $1,321.80, which reduce his sales tax liability to $66,024.90 and the personal assessment to $132,049.80. See Pet'r Ex. 10. However, all of these payments (some of which are bank levies) were made after the compliance agreement was voided and do not apply to the reporting periods in this case. By way of cross-examination, Mr. Scott also contends that he was never given an accounting of what PNC owes despite "multiple requests" for the same. The record shows otherwise. On April 13, 2017, the 2017 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09, a computer-generated form which lists, in detail, a taxpayer's outstanding taxes owed by reporting period. A second copy of a ZT09 was faxed to him the following day. In his May 3, 2017, letter protesting the 2017 NAPL, Mr. Scott alleges that payments were not applied properly. In response, the Department sent a fax to Mr. Scott on May 10, 2017, listing checks that were not honored by the bank and requesting information concerning which payments PNC contends were not applied properly. In his response on May 12, 2017, Mr. Scott did not provide the requested information. On January 17, 2018, the 2018 NAPL was mailed to Mr. Scott, along with a ZT09. Finally, on April 12, 2018, per Ms. Bartlett's request, the Department mailed a ZT09 with the outstanding amounts due. Finally, in its PRO, the Department points out that after the hearing ended, it discovered that it made an error, in Mr. Scott's favor, in calculating his sales tax liability for the relevant reporting periods. Had it correctly calculated the amount of payments made by PNC, the sales tax liability for the relevant period would be increased from $79,323.75 to $84,444.35, which in turn would increase the personal assessment. However, the Department consents to the lower tax and assessed penalty amount, as reflected on the 2018 NAPL.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Christopher B. Scott, is liable to the Department for a penalty of $158,647.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2019.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Nick Farah, Sr., is liable for the taxes assessed under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, for the March 1, 1989 - February 28, 1994 audit period, and to what degree, if any, the audit debt may be compromised as uncollectible.
Findings Of Fact This case involves an assessment of sales taxes and charter transit system surtaxes associated with audit number 9501539, and covering the audit period of March 1, 1989, to February 28, 1994 (audit period), for Farah's Gazebo Restaurant (the restaurant) located at 3541 University Boulevard, North, Jacksonville, Florida. Sales of food and alcoholic beverages were made at the restaurant during the audit period. Sales tax was collected and remitted to the Department on the sales of alcoholic beverages during the audit period, but not on the sales of prepared food. The assessment relates to the sale of food during the audit period. The restaurant was first opened as a sandwich shop in 1974 by both Petitioners, Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah, who at all times material have been husband and wife. Mrs. Farah's middle initial is "N." Mr. Farah is now 74 years old. Mrs. Farah is 63. When the restaurant was opened in 1974, Nick Farah, Sr., opened a utility account with the City of Jacksonville in his name alone. At all times material, that same account in Nick Farah, Sr.'s name has been used by the restaurant. At all times material, Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah had a checking account (number 467835202-01), in the name "Nick Farah d/b/a Farah's Gazebo Cafe, Restaurant & Lounge" with American National Bank of Florida (American National checking account). During the audit period, this account was used by Petitioners as both the restaurant's checking account and their personal checking account. During the audit period, all proceeds from sales at the restaurant were deposited into the American National checking account. All of the Petitioners' personal living expenses were paid from monies deposited into the American National checking account. During the audit period, Nick Farah, Sr., ran banking and shopping errands for the restaurant at his wife's direction, and considered it appropriate to write checks on behalf of the restaurant in his wife's absence. When their restaurant was first opened, Petitioners obtained a sales tax registration certificate from the Department of Revenue. This certificate was issued in the names of both Petitioners. In 1986, Petitioners refurbished and expanded their sandwich shop to a full restaurant serving dinner along with alcoholic beverages. During the several months in which the restaurant was being expanded, the restaurant was closed for business. Petitioners have a son, Nick Farah, Jr., who has a restaurant and lounge in Gainesville, Florida. Nick Farah, Jr., helped his parents expand their restaurant and donated certain restaurant equipment for the expansion. In 1986, Nick Farah, Jr., obtained alcoholic beverage license 26-02438SRX solely in his name for the restaurant. In 1988, Petitioners' other son, John Farah, became actively involved with the operation of the restaurant, in order to allow his father, Nick Farah, Sr., to retire. John Farah's involvement with the restaurant lasted approximately six or seven months, after which he was no longer involved. In 1988, due to numerous medical problems, including high blood pressure, prostate cancer, diabetes, and weak eyes, Nick Farah, Sr., "retired." He advised the social security office in 1988 of his retirement and filed all necessary papers in order to begin to receive his social security benefits. His social security income was "direct deposited" to a Barnett Bank account set up solely for that purpose. Nick Farah, Sr., listed himself as "retired" on the couple's joint 1989-1994 federal income tax returns. These returns include Schedule C, "Profit or Loss from Business," and listed the restaurant as solely owned by Sue Farah, as proprietor. On these returns, Sue Farah stated that she was sole owner of the business known as Farah's Gazebo Restaurant. When Nick Farah, Sr., retired, Sue Farah began paying bills and making all executive decisions concerning employees, doing the ordering, deciding on the menu, and pricing. However, since 1988, the restaurant also has had a manager who has dealt with the employees and food ordering as well. Although he considers himself retired, Nick Farah, Sr., consistently has gone to the restaurant to eat, talk with friends, and play rummy. He has also performed errands and written checks for the restaurant. (See Finding of Fact 8) In testimony, he referred to the American National account as "our Gazebo account." (TR-111) Sales Tax Registration Certificate No. 26-08-093045- 08/1 was issued in the name of Nick Farah, Sr., Sue N. Farah, and Nick Farah, Jr., until June 1, 1992. On June 1, 1992, Sales Tax Registration Certificate No. 26-08-126824-08/1 was issued in the names of Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue N. Farah. This was done to separate the restaurant from Nick Farah, Jr.'s, Gainesville restaurant. The type of business organization listed on the certificate is "partnership." On each of the sales tax registration certificates, Nick Farah, Sr.'s social security number was used as the federal identification number. In 1993, the Alcoholic Beverage License was renewed in the names of Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah. Petitioners' personal residence is held jointly in their names. During the audit period, Petitioners refinanced their personal residence and obtained a home equity loan through American National Bank. The proceeds from this loan were used to pay expenses related to the restaurant. (See Finding of Fact 52). On March 24, 1994, the Department issued its DR-840 Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records to "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." Notices of Intent are usually issued in the name(s) on the current Sales Tax Registration Certificate. On April 14, 1994, the Farahs both executed a Power of Attorney appointing their attorney to represent them in matters relating to the audit. Subsequent to the audit, the Department issued its "Notice of Intent to Make Sales & Use Tax Audit Changes," under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, on November 4, 1994, in the names of "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." Taxes for the audit period March 1, 1989 - February 28, 1994, were assessed in the amount of $65,093.44. Penalties were assessed up to that point in time in the amount of $20,679.43. Interest was assessed up to that point in time in the amount of $22,678.86. The total was $108,451.73. Interest would continue to run. Also on November 4, 1994, the Department issued its "Notice of Intent to Make Charter County Transit System Surtax Changes" in the names of "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." Taxes were assessed in the amount of $5,424.46; penalties were assessed in the amount of $1,723.27; and interest was assessed in the amount of $1,889.92 for a total of $9,037.65. The Department revised its audit on January 17, 1995. Two revised Notices of Intent were issued, each in the names of "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant," with assessment in the following amounts: $62,974.40 (sales and use taxes), $19,839.95 (penalties), and $28,373.14 (interest); and $5,247.86 (charter county surtaxes), $1,653.29 (penalties), and $2,367.18 (interest). These revised notices were issued to reflect the deduction of certain non-revenue items from the gross deposits reflected on the Petitioners' bank statement. They also show accruing interest. By their attorney's letter dated February 6, 1995, Petitioners raised the issue of Nick Farah, Sr.'s liability for the assessment, arguing that his involvement with the restaurant during the audit period was insufficient to render him a "taxpayer" as contemplated by the applicable statutes and rules, and insufficient to create such a tax liability for him. The letter from Petitioners' counsel stated that Petitioner Sue Farah "considered the restaurant to be hers, and has filed her federal income tax returns accordingly. She is willing to sign the Notice of Intent and enter into a payment arrangement." Donald Ritchie, the Department's Jacksonville tax auditor who had initiated the audit, subsequently issued a "Memo to File," dated February 7, 1995, stating, Auditor contacted atty. Jeff Dollinger in response to his letter of 2-6-95 in which he states TP's claim that Sue Farah is sole proprietor of restaurant and Nick is not a "dealer" in connection with the restaurant operation. He stated in a telephone conversation that Sue Farah wished to sign NOI indicating agreement with the proposed audit changes "with the exception of penalty" and obtain a stipulated payment schedule but only if registration and audit were changed to eliminate Nick's name. On February 7 and 8, 1995, Peggy Bowen, a Departmental superior of Mr. Ritchie, directed two memoranda by electronic mail (e-mail) to another Departmental employee, Allen Adams, located in Tallahassee. These memoranda requested guidance on how to proceed with the questions raised by Petitioners' counsel. In response to these requests, a series of e-mail memoranda were exchanged within the Tallahassee office of the Department. The first, on February 8, 1995, from George Stinson, stated, in part: What advantage would we have if we assessed "Nick's Partnership"? . . . from what Peggy said, "Nick's Partnership" doesn't even exist, but "Sue's Sole Proprietorship" does. It seems to me that it would be absurd to assess an entity ("Nick's Partnership") that, by the taxpayer's own admission, doesn't exist. Just because the registration social data on the database is erroneous doesn't mean we should issue an erroneous assessment. The second February 8, 1995, electronic mail memorandum from Allen Adams to Peggy Bowen, stated, "OK, I take this as an approval to change our NOI and get an agreed case." The final electronic mail memorandum dated February 9, 1995, from George Stinson to Allen Adams provides: Allen...While mulling this all over in my brain, it occurred to me it would not be unwise for Peggy to prepare (but hold on to for the time being) an NOI under "Nick's Partnership" in case the other one somehow goes awry. If "Sue's Sole Proprietership" [sic] tries to pull a "fast one" and reneg on their agreement and stip because they claim they weren't the "registered" or "840'd" entity, we can file off the other one to make sure all bases are covered. If the TP seems to be dragging their feet and we're getting into a jeopardy situation, we could even have both NOI's (and assessments) in existence concurrently to keep us protected. Donald Ritchie testified that he did not know of the existence of a "Nick's Partnership" or where such a term came from. However, see Findings of Fact 21, 25, and 46. A memo to file was subsequently produced by Peggy Bowen, dated February 10, 1995, which stated in part: I spoke to Allen Adams on the telephone regarding the memo from George Stinson dated 2/9/95. We agreed that our procedure would be to revise the existing NOI which is in the name Nick and Sue Farah to Sue Farah, and correct the SSN, under the existing audit number. We issued the existing NOI as a sole proprietorship, as Nick & Sue Farah, and we are only clarifying the name of the sole proprietorship to Sue Farah. There were not any partnership federal tax returns filed only joint 1040. Neither Petitioner was privy to the internal e-mail memoranda of the Department. The parties have stipulated that the Department agreed to remove Nick Farah, Sr.'s name from the Notices of Intent in exchange for Sue Farah's agreement to sign the notices as "agreed" liabilities. Accordingly, the Department's Second Revised Notices of Intent were issued on February 13, 1995. The Second Revised Notices of Intent were issued in the name "Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." These were issued by Donald Ritchie.1 The Second Revised Notice of Intent to make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes (also referred to as "the second NOI") states in paragraph #1, "The Department of Revenue presents you with a Notice of Intent to make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes for the period of time which you have been found to be liable on various transactions subject to the tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, during the period 03/01/89 Through 02/28/94." It further states on the bottom of the first page, "NOTE: The execution and filing of this waiver will expedite adjustment of the tax liability as indicated above. . . . If you now agree with the tax audit changes, please sign this form and return it to the audit office indicated above." Petitioner Sue Farah signed the Second Revised Notices of Intent on March 10, 1995. Also on March 10, 1995, Petitioner Sue Farah submitted a request for compromise of taxes, penalties, and interest. The Department's representative in Jacksonville agreed to waive the penalties on the assessment. Subsequently, the Department's auditor forwarded the audit file to Tallahassee for further consideration of the Request for Compromise of Taxes and Interest. Donald Ritchie testified that during the course of the audit, it was apparent to him that it was an operation that was owned and operated by a husband and wife, Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah, but that a Notice of Intent is issued in the name of the taxpayer as it is listed on the sales tax registration. It is noted, however, that the audit period covered a period in which there were two sales tax registration numbers for the restaurant in the name(s) first of Nick, Sr., Sue and Nick, Jr., until June 1, 1992, and thereafter as Nick Farah, Sr. and Sue Farah, a partnership. (See Findings of Fact 20-21.) After the audit was conducted, the audit file was forwarded to Tallahassee for review. Included within the audit file was the Standard Audit Program & Report for Sales and Use Tax form. Donald Ritchie testified that he filled out the Standard Audit Program & Report for Sales and Use Tax form listing the taxpayers as "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah's Gazebo Restaurant," and indicating that the entity was a "sole proprietorship" because he understood that a business entity run by a husband and wife did not constitute a partnership but rather a sole proprietorship in the absence of the formal procedures of organizing a partnership. Donald Ritchie further testified that he forwarded the file to Tallahassee as an "unagreed audit," because after signing the second NOI the Petitioners had asked for "additional conditions," including a request by Sue Farah for compromise of the taxes, penalties, and interest, that had not been specified at the time Sue Farah signed. However, he conceded that anyone signing an NOI could request such compromise. It is also clear that Sue Farah had always retained the right to compromise the penalties. (See Findings of Fact 30, 32 and 44-45) The Department subsequently issued its Notices of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) on September 6, 1995, in the names of both husband and wife, as "Nick & Sue Farah/Farah Gazebo Restaurant." By letter dated November 3, 1995, Petitioner Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant protested the entire proposed assessments, on the ground of "doubt as to collectability." By letter dated January 15, 1996, Petitioner Sue Farah submitted her financial information in support of her protest. Petitioners had borrowed additional monies in order to pay off general debts and debt associated with the restaurant involved in this proceeding. They then borrowed again in order to open a second restaurant on "Mandarin" in Jacksonville. This new venture was to be run by a newly created corporation, of which Sue Farah is sole stockholder. Petitioners are agreed that if the restaurant which is at issue in this cause were sold, Sue Farah would get all the proceeds. By letter dated March 15, 1996, Kathleen Marsh, CPA and Tax Law Specialist for the Department, requested certain financial information from both Petitioners in order to consider the issues raised in the letter of protest, including but not limited to, audit papers, bank statements for the years 1995 and 1996, and various information relating to the operation and financial position of the second restaurant. By letter dated April 8, 1996, Kathleen Marsh notified Petitioners that she had not yet received the information she had requested, and was going to issue the Notice of Decision. By letter dated April 17, 1996, Petitioners' CPA responded in part to the Department's request for additional financial information, but it does not amount to a certification or audit of the Farahs' financial statements. Also on April 17, 1996, the Department issued its Notice of Decision, sustaining the assessment in its entirety, determining that doubt as to collectability had not been established by the Petitioners. The Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Department's determination, raising the additional argument that Nick Farah, Sr., was not sufficiently involved in the operation of the restaurant during the audit period so as to be liable for the tax assessment. The following information had been requested by the Department but was never received from the Petitioners: a copy of an IRS audit, bank statements for all accounts for the years 1995 and 1996, information relating to ownership of stock in the new restaurant corporation, and information relating to sales tax registration for the new restaurant. The Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration on November 5, 1996, again sustaining the assessment in its entirety and determining that doubt as to collectability still had not been established. It further determined that Nick Farah, Sr., was a registered dealer under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and was otherwise sufficiently involved in the operation of the restaurant so as to be liable for the assessment. Petitioners timely filed their Petition for this administrative hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Petitioners agreed that the amount of the tax assessed by the Department is correct. Since the offer of compromise, several properties owned either jointly by husband and wife or owned solely by Nick Farah, Sr., have been foreclosed. Otherwise, the sworn financial statements in the audit file have been adopted by the Petitioners' testimony as still accurate. None of these financial statements bear a certification by a certified public accountant. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Farah's financial situation has remained static in the ensuing two years. Sue Farah still desires to compromise the total tax bill with small monthly payments, but she could not articulate an amount she can currently pay and relied on her earlier offer.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue that: Assesses the entire liability for the March 1, 1989 - February 28, 1994, audit period against Sue Farah for the taxes, penalties, and accruing interest; Absolves Nick Farah, Sr., of any liability for the same audit period; and Denies all compromise of the amount(s) assessed. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1998.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be issued a sales tax exemption certificate either as a "church" or as a "religious organization."
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, In His Service, is a not-for-profit organization formed to give structure to a Bible study and prayer group Shirley B. Cole leads. Cole is the Petitioner's "pastor," but she is not ordained, does not officiate at weddings or funerals, and has no formal religious training other than participation in similar study groups in the past. The Petitioner is affiliated with an organization called the Federation of Independent Churches, which has an office on East Bird Street in Tampa, Florida. (In a post-hearing submission, Cole asserted that the Petitioner's "outreach is from Greater Ministries International, basically functioning as a satellite church, but there was no evidence regarding Greater Ministries International.) Portions of the Petitioner's by-laws were admitted in evidence at the final hearing. The by-laws make reference to three officers--president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer--but Cole testified that she was the secretary and that someone else was the treasurer, and she did not seem to know anything about a president or vice-president. In addition, while the by-laws refer to a board of directors and meetings of the board of directors, Cole does not know anything about either. The Petitioner is small (not more than 15 members). It consists primarily of Cole and her friends and neighbors and some others who hear about the meetings. The group has met in various locations, including Cole's home at 5155 20th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida, and the homes of other members of the group. In addition to Bible study and prayer, the group discusses health issues and other topics of interest and shares reading materials and tapes on topics of interest. From time to time, the group collects items of donated personal property for the use of members of the group and others in need who could use the items. In late June 1998, the Petitioner applied for a sales tax exemption certificate as a church. In response to a question from a representative of the Respondent DOR Cole stated that the Petitioner held services in her home every Thursday from 7:30 to 9:30 or 10 p.m. A DOR representative attempted to confirm Cole's representation by attending a meeting in Cole's home on Thursday, October 8, 1998, but no services were being held there, and no one was home. If there was a meeting on that day, it was held somewhere else. On or about December 28, 1998, DOR issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the Petitioner's application because the Petitioner did not have "an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services and activities are regularly conducted and carried on." In January 1999, Cole requested an administrative proceeding on the Petitioner's application, representing that she was holding the Petitioner's meetings at her home every Monday from 7:30 p.m. On Monday, April 5, 1999, a DOR representative visited Cole's home at 7:30 or 7:35 p.m., but no one was home. At final hearing, Cole testified that she went to pick someone up to attend the meeting and was late returning. Cole had an April 1999 newsletter admitted in evidence. It indicates that she holds weekly Bible study meetings on Mondays at her home. It also indicates: "The week of April 19th will be our maintenance [health] meeting." It also indicates that the Monday, April 26, 1999, meeting would be a "covered dish dinner with prayer and praise fellowship afterward." Cole also had a book/tape loan check-out list admitted in evidence. The list indicates that two items were checked out on January 21, one on February 8, two on February 14, one on February 15, one on March 8, one on March 21, two on March 22, one on April 4, one on April 5, and four on April 12, 1999. (Two entries dated April 13 precede two on April 12, so it is assumed that all were on April 12, 1999). Cole owns her home, pays the taxes, and pays the utility bills. Cole also claims a homestead exemption. There are no signs, no physical attributes, or anything else that would identify Cole's house as a church. No part of the home is set aside for the Petitioner's exclusive use. The Petitioner pays no rent to Cole and does not reimburse Cole for any of her expenses (such as taxes and utility bills) of home ownership. Under local City of St. Petersburg zoning ordinances, Cole would have to obtain a special exception from the Environmental Development Commission to use her home as a church. Cole has not attempted to do so. Had she tried, the special exception would be denied because her home does not meet the ordinance's minimum lot and yard size criteria for such a special exception. (It is not clear whether Cole's home would meet the ordinance's parking, maximum floor area ratio, and maximum surface ratio criteria for a special exception for a church.) In light of past discrepancies between the Petitioner's representations and the facts, it was not clear from the evidence presented in this case that meetings have taken place, are taking place, or will take place in Cole's home on a regular basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the DOR enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for a tax exemption certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Cole, Pastor In His Service 5155 20th Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 Kevin ODonnell, Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Having considered the pleadings and the record as reconstructed by the parties, as well as oral argument on the issues, the following pertinent facts are found: For the years previous to 1973 and for the years subsequent to 1973, petitioner has been granted a partial charitable exemption from ad valorem taxation, pursuant to F.S. 196.012(6). Petitioner's secretary, who was the only full-time salaried employee and officer of petitioner's organization, had the responsibility of reviewing and answering all correspondence addressed to petitioner. Due to the secretary's illness and subsequent demise, an application for ad valorem tax exemption for 1973 was not timely filed, and the property appraiser thus denied the exemption. For the tax year 1973, a charitable exemption would have been granted petitioner had it timely filed its application and return by April 1, 1973. Upon appeal by petitioner to the Broward County BTA on the stated grounds of "change of officers," the BTA granted the exemption upon the recommendation of the tax assessor. The BTA notified the respondent of the change in the assessor's action. The staff recommendation of the respondent was to invalidate said change on the ground that petitioner failed to demonstrate that it came within an exception to the waiver rule of Section 196.011 and therefore the change by the BTA lacked legal sufficiency and/or the evidence presented was insufficient to overcome the assessor's presumption of correctness. Petitioner requested a hearing to review the staff recommendation, the Executive Director of the respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing, and the undersigned was assigned as the Hearing Officer.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the action of the Broward County Board of Tax Adjustment granting the exemption be invalidated. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of February, 1976. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Carlton Building, Room 530 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 NOTE: Text within the *-* is unreadable on the document on file with the Division. Therefore, the complete text is not available in this ACCESS document. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32304 Mr. Thomas M. Coker, Jr. 328 Bayview Building 1040 Bayview Drive Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33304 Mr. Stephen E. Mitchell Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32304 Mr. Gaylord A. Wood 603 Courthouse Square Building 200 SE 6th Street Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
