The Issue The issue is whether petitioners' request to terminate, without penalty, their participation in the state group health insurance plan should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioners, Terri K. Cassano (Cassano) and Edward M. McDonald (McDonald), are employees of the Office of State Attorney, Tenth Judicial Circuit, in Bartow, Florida. As such, they are eligible to participate in the State Group Health Insurance Program (program) administered by respondent, Department of Administration, Division of State Employees' Insurance (Division). At issue in this case is approximately $1,500 paid by petitioners and their employer for health insurance coverage under the program during the period October through December 1989. Effective July 1, 1989 the State of Florida implemented the first phase of a two-phase Flexible Benefits Plan (plan) which allowed, among other things, for employees who participate in the program to make their required monthly insurance premium contribution through a salary reduction agreement which has the effect of reducing the employee's taxable income by the amount of such contribution. Although not made clear in the record, it may be inferred that the plan is embodied in Chapters 22FB-1, 2 and 3, Florida Administrative Code (1987), which rules became effective on August 3, 1989. In federal bureaucratic parlance, the plan is known as a ``cafeteria'' plan /1 and was implemented after approval was obtained from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). All state employees were automatically enrolled in the plan unless they signed a waiver form. Cassano and McDonald chose to participate in the plan, and they acknowledge that they received a Division brochure describing the plan prior to their enrollment. Under the rules of the plan, a participant was required to remain in the plan for the entire plan year, which in this case ended on November 30, 1989, unless a so-called "qualifying status change" occurred. Rule 22BF-1.008(13) cites a number of events as constituting a "qualifying status change". However, the event defined in subparagraph (13)(b) as a "change in a participant's health insurance coverage resulting in cessation of coverage" is the event upon which petitioners rely. The manner in which that rule should be interpreted is the source of controversy in this proceeding. In July 1989 petitioners were utilizing as their health insurer Health Alliance Plan (HAP), a health maintenance organization (HMO) serving Polk County. HAP was designated as a qualifying HMO under the program. In late July petitioners learned that HAP would cease doing business in Polk County effective September 30, 1989. Because of this, it was necessary that they consider other insurance alternatives to replace their existing coverage. After considering enrollment in Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS), which was the only other health alternative offered by the Division,/2 Cassano decided to enroll as a dependent in her husband's health insurance program because of the lower monthly premiums and she would not have to meet a new deductible as she would with BCBS. As for McDonald, who is also a military retiree, he considered BCBS but opted instead for Medicare because he was being treated for an existing ailment and his physicians were not listed as primary providers with BCBS. Consequently, it would cost him approximately $200 per visit with those doctors if he elected to use BCBS. Under these circumstances, petitioners' health coverage under the program ended since their HMO was no longer in business and their only other option, BCBS, would result in petitioners paying significantly higher costs. Cassano was able to immediately obtain coverage with her husband's health plan effective on July 28, 1989 while McDonald's coverage with Medicare became effective on October 1, 1989, the day after his HAP coverage ended. When the Division learned that HAP was ceasing doing business in Polk County, it mailed to petitioners a "health care provider selection form" which offered them a special enrollment period from August 15 through 31, 1989. The form offered the choice of enrolling in HOPC, BCBS or to cancel their health insurance coverage. However, respondent contends that even though the form offered petitioners the option of cancelling their insurance, it did not apply and that petitioners' only choice was to transfer coverage to one of the two remaining state insurers. The form also noted that if petitioners had any questions they should contact their personnel office or the Division by telephone. Although their personnel office later informed them that respondent might not agree they could do so, Cassano and McDonald executed the form on August 23 and 28, 1989, respectively, and elected to cancel their coverage. They also executed a "qualifying status change form" so that they could cease participation in the plan even though the plan year did not end until November 30, 1989. In so doing, they noted on the form that the qualifying status change event was "cessation of coverage by Health Alliance Plan" and relied in part upon a Division document sent to them which outlined the plan and listed a qualifying status change event as being a "change in participant's health coverage: resulting in cessation of coverage". That same document noted that in order to prove that such an event had occurred, the employee had to furnish a "letter from carrier stating that coverage has ceased due to change in insurance plan". In addition, explanatory literature concerning the plan previously disseminated: by the Division reflected that "a cafeteria plan may also allow for revocation of health plan elections of all affected participants in the event coverage is significantly curtailed or completely terminated in connection with a health plan, if the coverage is provided by an independent third party." Thus, petitioners reasonably assumed that a qualifying status change had occurred by virtue of the cessation of coverage by HAP. After informal efforts to resolve the matter were unsuccessful, on September 28, 1989 Cassano and McDonald formally requested by letter the right to discontinue their participation, without penalty, in the state program. Their requests were essentially denied by letters dated October 5, 1989 from the Division director. In the proposed agency action, the Division stated that it would be happy to comply with their requests but "since the premiums you pay for such coverage have been pretaxed for the five month period ending December 1, 1989, we will continue to deduct these premiums through October 1989 payroll pursuant to rule 22FB-2.005 F.A.C." /3 As a consequence, petitioners were involuntarily required to pay for coverage in BCBS during the months of October through December 1989 even though they were enrolled in other health insurance plans, and their employer (the office of state attorney) was forced to make its required contribution. Through testimony of the state benefits administrator, William R. Seaton, it was established that the Division interprets the term "cessation of (insurance) coverage" as the cessation of all health insurance coverage by the state, including BCBS, an event unlikely to ever occur. Indeed, the administrator acknowledged that such an event would not occur unless the state no longer functioned as a viable entity. Because the state offered petitioners the option of enrolling in BCBS, Seaton contended there was no cessation of insurance coverage, even if petitioners' former HMO in Polk County went out of business. Seaton also opined that petitioners' request was prohibited by IRS regulations and, if approved, would subject the Division to a possible fine if audited by IRS. However, he could not identify a regulation that prohibited approval of their request. Further, there is no evidence that the Division has received specific advice from the IRS on the subject or made inquiry as to whether or not petitioners' request is permissible under federal regulations. Petitioners construe the termination of coverage by their HMO to be a qualifying status change since they no longer could be covered by that HMO. Relying on the plain language in the rule and Division explanatory literature, they did not telephone the Division to ascertain whether they could discontinue state coverage since they had no reason to do so. Through a proffer of agency counsel at hearing, it was pointed out that the federal regulation that allegedly prohibits petitioners from obtaining relief is found on page 14,847-6 of the Standard Federal Tax Reports published by Commerce Clearing House and received in evidence as a part of respondent's composite exhibit 1. 4/ It reads as follows: (2) Coverage changes. If the coverage under a health plan provided by an independent, third-party provider is significantly curtailed or ceases during a period of coverage, a cafeteria plan may permit all affected participants to revoke their election of the health plan and, in lieu thereof, to receive on a prospective basis coverage under another health plan with similar coverage.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the requests of Terri K. Cassano and Edward M. McDonald to discontinue participation in the state health program be granted and that appropriate refunds be given to petitioners and their employer. DONE and ORDERED this 9 day of February, 1990 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9 day of February, 1990.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive a refund of insurance premiums paid to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Division administers health plans, including COBRA, for the benefit of employees of the State of Florida. Petitioner was an employee of the State of Florida from 1991 until February 11, 2000, which was his last day on the payroll of the Office of the Attorney General. On May 27, 1998, Petitioner was placed on the Temporary Disability Retired List by the U. S. Air Force. He was presented an identification card reflecting his rank as colonel. His identification card reflects that he was eligible for medical insurance. As a retired military person Petitioner was eligible for treatment at a military medical facility or through TRICARE. TRICARE is a comprehensive health insurance program for military personnel. TRICARE may be a primary provider or a secondary provider of health benefits. During his active employment with the state, however, the TRICARE coverage was secondary. This means that the state paid any claims to the extent of its policy limits and the remaining amount of any claim would be processed and paid in accordance with TRICARE coverage. Petitioner was aware that placement on the Temporary Disability Retired List was, as the name implied, a temporary situation. It was his expectation that subsequent to being placed on the list, the U. S. Air Force would determine either that he was disabled to the extent that he would receive disability retirement, and thus continue to be eligible for TRICARE, or that he would be denied disability retirement and would have to arrange for other medical insurance, or do without. During Petitioner's employment with the Florida Department of Legal Affairs, he was covered by the State Group Health Self Insurance Plan. On February 11, 2000, when Petitioner terminated his employment with the Florida Department of Legal Affairs, he was seeking to have the State of Florida declare him disabled. Pursuant to law, Petitioner's entitlement to the benefits of the State Group Health Self Insurance Plan continued until March 31, 2001. Without taking action to secure health insurance, Petitioner would have only TRICARE as an insurer. However, if the state determined him to have become disabled while employed by the state, he would be covered by the State Group Health Self Insurance Plan, retroactively. On May 11, 2000, the Florida Division of Retirement denied Petitioner's application for in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. The effect of this determination was to terminate the possibility of coverage under the State Group Health Self Insurance Plan with the reduced premiums available to a person on disability retirement. The Florida Department of Legal Affairs failed to immediately notify the Division that Petitioner had terminated his employment. As a result, the Division did not send Petitioner a Notice of Continuation Coverage Eligibility until immediately after to May 11, 2000. The notice informed Petitioner of his right to have family continuation coverage in return for a premium of $517.96. It further informed him that he had until July 11, 2000, to elect coverage which would be retroactive to April 1, 2000. A second Notice of Continuation Coverage Eligibility, dated May 22, 2000, was sent to Petitioner. This notice similarly informed Petitioner of his right to have family continuation coverage in return for a premium of $517.96 but informed him that he had until July 22, 2000, to elect coverage which would be retroactive to April 1, 2000. The second page of the Notice of Continuation Coverage Eligibility informed Petitioner, inter alia, that coverage would be available for 18 months for voluntary or involuntary termination, 29 months for certain disabled qualified beneficiaries, and 36 months for all other qualifying events. The second page also informed Petitioner that coverage might end on the occurrence of several events. The event asserted to be pertinent to this case is the date the insured becomes covered by another group health plan which does not contain any limitation or exclusion with respect to a pre- existing condition. Petitioner filed a "Continuation of Coverage Enrollment" form dated July 21, 2000. This form noted that the date of the event that precipitated eligibility for coverage was February 11, 2000. Petitioner wrote on the form in his own hand, "I am permanently and totally disabled; I and my dependents am covered under TRICARE at present." At the bottom of the "Continuation of Coverage Enrollment" form, the Division authorized coverage dating back to April 1, 2000. Petitioner sent the Division a check in the amount of $517.96 to cover the initial premium. The date on the check was July 21, 2000. Sometime prior to August 24, 2000, he sent the Division another premium payment in the amount of $517.96. At the time Petitioner filed the "Continuation of Coverage Enrollment" form and submitted the premiums, he was covered by the regular military medical system, because he was considered to be retired by the U.S. Air Force. However, since the question of his disability with the U.S. Air Force had not been decided, he was aware of the possibility that his military health coverage could end at any time. By maintaining a COBRA policy, he was insuring that he would not find himself in a posture where he had neither COBRA nor TRICARE. On August 16, 2000, the U.S. Air Force determined that Petitioner was disabled and was entitled to the medical care provided by law for retired service persons, which includes TRICARE, presumably, for life. It was at this point Petitioner demanded the return of the premium he paid. Petitioner's theory for the refund is that he was, under the law, ineligible for COBRA coverage during the two months that he paid a premium with respect to it. On September 29, 2000, in a letter signed by Ria Brown, Benefits Administrator, the Division reiterated its refusal to refund the premiums and noted that Petitioner was covered under COBRA for the period April 1, 2000, through May 31, 2000. The letter informed Petitioner that, "Based on the information in your letter, you are eligible and entitled for TRICARE Standard coverage, but you did not indicate that you are actually enrolled." Ms. Brown also advised the following: Coverage at time of COBRA event: Section 4980(f)(2)(B)(iv) provides that a qualified beneficiary's right to COBRA continuation coverage may be terminated when the qualified beneficiary "first becomes," after the date of the COBRA election, covered under another group health plan (subject to certain additional conditions) or entitled to Medicare benefits. The final regulations provide that an employer may cut off the right to COBRA continuation coverage based upon other group health plan coverage or entitlement to Medicare benefits only if the qualified beneficiary first becomes covered under the other group health plan coverage or entitled to the Medicare benefits after the date of the COBRA election. Petitioner asserted in a reply, also dated September 29, 2000, that contrary to Ms. Brown's assertion, he was actually enrolled in TRICARE Standard during the operative period. In a letter dated October 3, 2000, Merrill Moody, the Division Director, informed Petitioner that his claim for refund was being denied because he had a contractual relationship with the Division and that he got the product for which he paid-- health insurance coverage for April and May, 2000. Mr. Moody also pointed out that the Division was required under law to allow active employees and their covered dependents, to participate in COBRA, notwithstanding their participation in other programs.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of State Group Insurance enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for a refund of $1035.92. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia Forrester, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Morris Shelkofsky 3721 Crawfordville Road, No. 17 Tallahassee, Florida 32310-7074 Cynthia Henderson, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 15, 2000, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Insurance is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in Florida and with regulating their conduct. Section 624.307 and Chapter 626, Part I, Florida Statutes (1999). At the times material to this proceeding, Ingrid Machado was Florida-licensed insurance agent. In March 1999, Teresita Baldor was interested in purchasing health insurance. Ms. Baldor had previously owned a private school and had been insured through the school's group health insurance policy. After she sold the school and began teaching mathematics at Miami-Dade Community College and Saint Thomas University, she no longer had health insurance coverage. On or about March 10, 1999, Ms. Machado met with Ms. Baldor at Ms. Baldor's home. Ms. Baldor knew Ms. Machado only as an insurance agent and did not know whether Ms. Machado was affiliated with an insurance agency. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor during the March 10, 1999, visit that she would try to place Ms. Baldor in a group for health insurance purposes but that she did not know at that time the group Ms. Baldor would be placed in or the name of the insurance company that would provide the health insurance coverage. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor during the visit that she would let Ms. Baldor know the name of the company providing her coverage and that she would send Ms. Baldor the coverage information. During her March 10, 1999, visit to Ms. Baldor's home, Ms. Machado asked Ms. Baldor for general identification information, such as her name and social security number, and for other information, such as her weight. Ms. Baldor did not sign any document during this visit and cannot recall if Ms. Machado completed any form during their conversation. Ms. Machado asked Ms. Baldor to make out two checks, one in the amount of $175.00 and one in the amount of $100.00, but Ms. Baldor does not remember Ms. Machado's telling her the reason she needed two separate checks. Ms. Machado asked Ms. Baldor to leave the line for the name of the payee blank, again telling Ms. Baldor that she did not yet know which insurance company would ultimately provide health insurance coverage to Ms. Baldor. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor that the name of the company would be filled in on the checks at a later time. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor that she would have health insurance coverage effective March 15, 1999. On or about March 20, 1999, Ms. Baldor telephoned Ms. Machado because Ms. Baldor had not received any information regarding health insurance coverage. Ms. Machado told Ms. Baldor that she was having complications with her pregnancy and could no longer handle Ms. Baldor's insurance matters. Ms. Machado gave Ms. Baldor the telephone number of the "Durey Agency," told her that this agency would work with her to obtain health insurance coverage, and gave her Ray Gonzalez's name. Ms. Machado had no further contact with Ms. Baldor after the telephone conversation on or about March 20, 1999, during the times material to this proceeding. At some point, Ms. Baldor called the telephone number Ms. Machado had given her to find out why she had not received any information regarding her health insurance coverage. Ms. Baldor told the person who answered the phone, a woman named Maria, that she wanted her checks back if she could not give her any information "right then." Later the same day, Maria called Ms. Baldor and told her that she had been placed in a group for health insurance purposes. A Neighborhood Health Partnership Enrollment Form was submitted to the Neighborhood Health Partnership on behalf of Ms. Baldor. On the form, Ms. Baldor was identified as an employee of "International Marketing." A signature appeared on the bottom of the form purporting to be that of Ms. Baldor, and the date next to the signature was "5/10/99." Ms. Baldor never saw the Neighborhood Health Partnership Enrollment Form. A few weeks after Maria told Ms. Baldor that she had been placed in a group for health insurance purposes, Ms. Baldor received a package from the Neighborhood Health Partnership that contained an identification card indicating that she was enrolled in the "International Marketing Group" and indicating that her insurance coverage with the Neighborhood Health Partnership was effective as of June 15, 1999. During Ms. Baldor's conversations with Ms. Machado, Ms. Machado never mentioned the Neighborhood Health Partnership or International Marketing Group. The checks Ms. Baldor provided to Ms. Machado were made payable to the Durey Insurance Group and were processed by the bank on or about May 17, 1999. In addition, Ms. Baldor wrote checks to the Durey Insurance Group dated July 10, 1999, and August 9, 1999, as payment for her health insurance premiums. Ms. Baldor's insurance coverage with the Neighborhood Health Partnership was eventually cancelled. It was Ms. Baldor's understanding that it was cancelled because the Durey Insurance Group did not remit her premium to the Neighborhood Health Partnership and because the "International Marketing Group" in which she was placed by the Durey Insurance Group did not exist. Summary The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado's actions with respect to her dealings with Ms. Baldor demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness or demonstrated that Ms. Machado lacked reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transaction of insurance. The Department presented no evidence to establish any standards of skill, ability, knowledge, or competence by which Ms. Machado's acts or omissions can be judged to determine if she committed any of the violations with which Ms. Machado is charged. It is not possible to determine from the evidence presented if Ms. Machado's actions deviated from a standard of fitness or trustworthiness which a reasonably prudent insurance agent would be expected to exhibit under the circumstances or if Ms. Machado's conduct fell below a standard establishing the degree of knowledge and technical competence which a reasonably prudent insurance agent would be expected to exhibit under the circumstances. 2/ The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado engaged in any unfair method of competition or deceptive practices or knowingly made any misrepresentations to Ms. Baldor regarding health insurance coverage. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Ms. Machado took some minimal information from Ms. Baldor and told her she would place her in a group for health insurance coverage. The uncontroverted evidence further establishes that Ms. Machado did not represent to Ms. Baldor that she would place Ms. Baldor in any specific group, that she would place Ms. Baldor with any particular insurance company, 3/ or that Ms. Baldor would be provided with any specific coverage or benefits. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado knowingly collected from Ms. Baldor any sums in excess of premium because, at the time Ms. Machado collected the two checks from Ms. Baldor, Ms. Machado did not know which insurance company would write health insurance coverage for Ms. Baldor and, therefore, did not know what the premium would be. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado knowingly collected from Ms. Baldor any premium for insurance that was not, in due course, provided. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Ms. Machado initially agreed to procure health insurance coverage for Ms. Baldor; however, because of her pregnancy, Ms. Machado referred Ms. Baldor to the Durey Insurance Group approximately ten days after Ms. Machado's only meeting with Ms. Baldor and advised Ms. Baldor that the Durey Insurance Group would assist Ms. Baldor in obtaining health insurance. There is no persuasive evidence establishing that Ms. Machado knew or should have known that Durey Insurance Group would not, in due course, provide legitimate health insurance coverage to Ms. Baldor. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Ms. Machado had any involvement, directly or indirectly, in the transaction in which the Durey Insurance Group identified Ms. Baldor as an employee of "International Marketing" and obtained health insurance for Ms. Baldor with the Neighborhood Health Partnership as a member of the "International Marketing Group." 4/ Furthermore, the evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Machado's actions made her a source of injury to Ms. Baldor or anyone else. As noted above, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that, soon after Ms. Machado's visit with Ms. Baldor on March 10, 1999, Ms. Machado advised Ms. Baldor that she could not act as Ms. Baldor's agent in placing her with a health insurance company, that she had sent Ms. Baldor's information and checks to the Durey Insurance Group, and that Ms. Baldor should contact the Durey Insurance Group for further assistance. Ms. Baldor's contacts subsequent to the latter part of March 1999 with respect to her health insurance coverage were exclusively with personnel who purported to be affiliated with the Durey Insurance Group. A representative of the Durey Insurance Group notified Ms. Baldor that her health insurance would be provided by the Neighborhood Health Partnership, and Ms. Baldor's premium checks were made payable to the Durey Insurance Group. Finally, the Neighborhood Health Partnership Enrollment Form identifying Ms. Baldor as an employee of International Marketing is dated approximately two months after Ms. Machado's last contact with Ms. Baldor, and the Department failed to present any evidence tending to establish that Ms. Machado had any involvement in the preparation of this form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance issue a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against Ingrid Machado. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2000.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to add an above-the-age-limits child, who became handicapped after their initial enrollment in the state insurance program, as an eligible dependent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are Robin A.C. Fearn, SSN 269-36-8341, an employee at the Marion County Correctional Institution since May 23, 1986, and his wife, Mary Fearn, SSN 273-36-8629, an employee of the University of Florida since September 5, 1978. Effective June 1, 1986, Petitioners were enrolled in the Spouse Program under the State of Florida's Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan. Participants in the Spouse Program are entitled to family coverage for themselves and any eligible dependents. Petitioners are the parents of a son, Lee A. Fearn, SSN 264-39-0713 who was born on February 27, 1961. At the time of Petitioners' initial enrollment in the health plan on June 1, 1986, Lee was 25 years of age and had exceeded the maximum dependent age limit of 23 years of age provided under the plan. Lee has not, at any time, been covered as a dependent under the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Insurance Plan. Shortly after his 29th birthday, Lee Fearn was rendered disabled from injuries received in an automobile accident in March 1990. Since that accident, Lee has been dependent on Petitioners for support. The Federal Social Security Administration has accepted him as dependent on his parents, and Respondent does not dispute that Lee is "incapable of self-sustaining employment by reason of such mental or physical handicap and chiefly dependent upon the employee" as that term is used in Rules 60P-1.003(4)(c) and (d) F.A.C. [formerly Rule 22K- 1.103(4)(c) and (d) F.A.C.] Petitioners attempted to secure health insurance coverage for Lee during the open enrollment periods in 1991 and 1992 by listing Lee as an eligible dependent in the space provided for adding dependents on the bottom half of their annual open enrollment form. As a part of its insurance program, the Respondent permits State employees to enroll in the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan (Plan) within 31 days of employment or during an annual open enrollment period as described in its Rules 60P-2.002 and 60P-2.003 F.A.C. The annual open enrollment form is titled, "Annual Benefit Selection Form." All state employees are asked to complete and return this form during each annual open enrollment period. It provides, in pertinent parts, as follows: "You must make a decision on each benefit. . . . Add only those dependents not currently covered by your health insurance. Eligible dependents are those outlined in Rule 22K-1 F.A.C." (Emphasis supplied) Employees wishing to make changes in their current health insurance are permitted to do so during the open enrollment period by indicating those changes on the Annual Benefit Selection Form. No health examination or declarations, even of a preexisting condition, are required during this annual open enrollment period. Employees are given five options regarding their health insurance on the Annual Benefits Election Form: Make no changes; Cancel Enroll Change from HMO Plan to State Self-Insured Plan or vice versa; and Change from individual coverage to family coverage or vice versa. Petitioners separately completed their Annual Benefits Selection Forms during the 1992 open enrollment period by indicating they did not wish to make any changes in their health insurance coverage, that is, family PPC coverage. At the bottom of the Annual Benefits Selection Form, Petitioners added Lee as a dependent and authorized payroll deductions and stated "I understand my enrollment or coverage changes will be effective January 1, 1993 . . ." (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners claim they submitted a similar form in 1991 and never received notice from Respondent of the acceptance or denial of their 1991 open enrollment request to add Lee as their dependent. Petitioners did receive back a denial in the form of two memos via the University of Florida personnel department, which employs Mrs. Fearn, for their 1992 open enrollment request. Verla Lawson, Department of Management Services, [formerly Department of General Services] Division of State Employees Insurance, State Enrollment Administrator, testified as to how the open enrollment plan and applicable rules have been administered. She has been employed with the agency since 1986, but her involvement with the pertinent issues appears to have begun only with her assuming her present position in 1991. Ms. Lawson testified that to accomplish Petitioners' goal of adding Lee to their coverage as a dependent they "should have" checked the box for "I wish to change" at the top of the form, filled out the dependent information at the bottom of the form and then made out another form for PPC coverage. From this portion of Ms. Lawson's testimony, it is inferred that the annual open enrollment form a/k/a the Annual Benefits Selection Form also constitutes the "Health Care Option Selection Form" referenced in Rule 60P-2.002 F.A.C. Ms. Lawson also testified that even if Petitioners had made out both forms required, the agency would have denied coverage of Lee. According to Ms. Lawson, employee participation in the Plan is considered continuous unless an employee elects to discontinue participation or to change to an HMO. She stated that although employees are asked to return open enrollment Annual Benefit Selection Forms each year for administrative purposes, they are not required to re-enroll in the Plan during each open enrollment period. If an employee indicates no changes on an Annual Benefit Selection Form, that form is not transmitted by an employee's local personnel office to the Department of Management Services in Tallahassee. Ms. Lawson conjectured that is what happened to Petitioners' 1991 attempts to add Lee to their coverage. However, Ms. Lawson consistently referred to the Annual Benefit Selection Form as "the enrollment form" for the Plan, and Mr. Fearn testified credibly that he was advised by his supervisor that his coverage would be terminated if he did not turn in his form timely. The language on the form reflects the same compulsory instruction. (See FOF 7). It is accepted, pursuant to Mr. Fearn's testimony and within the parameters of Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S.. that Mrs. Fearn was told that submission of the annual open enrollment form was necessary to prevent termination of her coverage. Also, according to Ms. Lawson, the agency interprets its rules to permit employees to add additional eligible dependents within 31 days of the acquisition of that dependent or during the open enrollment period, and the Plan has been administered to permit above-the-age-limit handicapped children to be added only during the employee's or retiree's initial enrollment in the Plan. The agency interprets Rules 60P-2.001 and 60P-2.002 F.A.C. and Section 110.123(2)(b) F.S. to mean that only employees, retirees or spouses of deceased employees may apply for "enrollment" in the Plan, that eligible dependents merely "participate" in the Plan under an existing family coverage when added as dependents, and that consequently, dependents do not independently "enroll" in the Plan. The agency therefore decided that Petitioners' 1992 attempts to add Lee Fearn to his parents' existing family coverage as a dependent did not constitute an "enrollment" which by its own terms created the opportunity to enroll an above-the-age-limits handicapped child. Because under this interpretation Lee Fearn was not an eligible dependent, the agency felt he could not have been added to Petitioners' coverage. Ms. Lawson was not familiar with any case with facts similar to this one. According to Ms. Lawson, if Petitioners had been first employed in 1992 and enrolled in the Plan within 31 days of that first employment, their handicapped over-age son could have been covered, and if they had been employed in 1986 but waited until 1992 to enroll for the first time in the Plan, their handicapped over-age son could have been enrolled at that time. Ms. Lawson specifically stated she could not say how the agency would proceed if the Petitioners herein dropped their coverage for one year and then tried to enroll both parent employees and the over-age handicapped child during a new employee 31 day grace period or an annual open enrollment. Ms. Lawson was not clear on what the agency might do if one or both of Lee's parents accepted employment elsewhere and later returned to government service and applied for the Plan, except that state retirement rules possibly would govern the length of a permissible break in service. Ms. Lawson was not asked, and therefore the record is barren of any explanation of how, the agency would interpret its rules if one parent were employed without covering Lee and the other were later employed and wished to cover him as an over-age dependent handicapped child within the second parent's first 31 days of initial employment. However, the agency maintained that there is no provision in the Plan allowing an employee who is already enrolled in the Plan to add a handicapped over-age child and that its rules have never been interpreted to permit the adding of such a dependent at annual open enrollment. Rule 60P-1.003(4)(c) F.A.C., as interpreted by the agency, applies to a handicapped dependent child already in the Plan who then turns nineteen. Rule 60P-1.003(4)(d) F.A.C., as interpreted by the agency, applies only to a handicapped dependent child not in the Plan at the time of the parent- employee(s) initial enrollment. The word "enroll" as used in Rule 60P-1.003(13) F.A.C. is interpreted by the agency to mean "change or transfer plans" under the program, if an employee is already enrolled in any state insurance program at all (PPC Plan or HMO). The agency interprets the same word to mean "enroll" if the employee has never before been enrolled in any state insurance program. Under the provisions of Section 110.123(5), F.S. the Secretary of the Department of Management Services is given the responsibility for administering the state group insurance program. Inherent in that responsibility, but subject to prior legislative approval, is the authority to determine benefits and the contributions required therefor. Such determinations, whether for a contracted plan or a self-insurance plan, do not constitute "rules" within the meaning of Section 120.52(16) or "orders" within the meaning of Sections 120.52(11) F.S. The purpose of this exception to the Administrative Procedure Act is to afford the Department flexibility to make benefit changes or clarifications consistent with legislative approval. Respondent modified its January 1, 1993 edition of the Benefit Document to reinforce its interpretation that above-age-limits handicapped children could only be added during an initial enrollment, but this information was not provided to employee consumers until after the instant case was already in progress. There was no actuarial or expert insurance evidence to show that the legislature by its statutes or the agency by its rules had made a conscious and reasonable decision to treat the over-age handicapped children of longtime employees differently than the over-age handicapped children of brand-new employees or employees who have had a significant interruption in government service or that there is any reason or purpose for such a distinction.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered enrolling Lee Allen Fearn SSN 264-39-0713 as an eligible dependent of Robin A.C. Fearn and Mary E. Fearn in the State Health Plan effective January 1, 1993 and that all eligible claims for his medical expenses after January 1, 1993 be paid. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of April, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 93-5859 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioners' PFOF: Petitioners' proposed recommended order does not comply with the rules of the Division of Administrative Hearings as to designating proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law separately or numbering same. It appears to present only conclusions of law or a final recommendation. It is rejected as proposed findings of fact. As proposed conclusions of law and legal argument it has been covered but not necessarily adopted in the recommended order's conclusions of law. Respondent's PFOF: 1-2 Accepted. 3 Accepted in part and rejected in part as legal argument or mere recitation of one person's testimony. Covered in FOF 17. 4-5 Accepted. 6-10 Rejected as legal argument or mere recitation of testimony, covered in FOF 17-25. COPIES FURNISHED: Robin A.C. & Mary E. Fearn 3241 NW 41st Avenue Gainesville, FL 32605 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire DMS/Division of State Employees Insurance 2002 Old St. Augustine Road B-12 Tallahassee, FL 32301-4876 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Sylvan Strickland General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the State of Florida's group health insurance plan.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Judy Stahl began her employment with the State of Florida as a public assistance specialist with the Department of Children and Families on October 4, 1991. She began participating in the State's group health insurance program on December 1, 1991. Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment by the State on November 28, 2002, for personal reasons. In her letter of resignation she stated that it was her intention to again seek employment with the State after the personal situation which caused her to resign was concluded. Premiums for the State's group health insurance are paid one month in advance. Therefore, Petitioner's coverage under the State's group health insurance program continued through the end of December 2002. In January 2003, the State's Division of State Group Insurance notified Petitioner of her right to elect continuation coverage under the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) and the federal Public Health Services Act (PHSA). Petitioner so elected and continued her participation in the State's group health insurance under COBRA for the maximum period of 18 months that was available to her. Her continuation coverage expired June 30, 2004. In May 2004 the State's Division of State Group Insurance notified Petitioner that her continuation coverage would soon expire and further advised her of her right to convert her insurance coverage to a private, individual policy. Petitioner exercised her option to convert to a private policy, effective July 1, 2004. In March 2005 the Florida Division of Retirement sent Petitioner an Estimate of Retirement Benefits. The Estimate contained the comment that: "As a result of a review of accounts for terminated members, it was determined that you are eligible for retirement benefits." The Estimate form was accompanied by a pamphlet explaining the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan. It was also accompanied by information on the State Employees' Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) health plan. The retirement pamphlet included the information that health insurance was available to retirees; however, the health insurance information advised that health insurance was only available to certain retirees. Petitioner concluded that if she retired, she could obtain cheaper health insurance from the State than from her private provider. This was the first time that Petitioner considered the possibility of retirement. Petitioner thereafter made many telephone calls to the Department of Children and Families, to the Division of Retirement, to the Division of State Group Insurance, and to People First, inquiring about retirement and insurance. These telephone inquiries were the first time she mentioned to any State employee or representative that she was interested in retiring. At the end of March 2005 she made the decision to retire and submitted her application for retirement benefits. Her effective retirement date was April 1, 2005. At the time Petitioner filed her application for retirement, she was no longer participating in the State's group health insurance program. At the time she filed her application for retirement, she was no longer participating in continuation coverage pursuant to COBRA. She was insured under a private policy. At the time of her initial enrollment in the State group health insurance program, Petitioner signed a new enrollee form that, inter alia, advised her that eligibility and enrollment were governed by the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 22K-l. During her employment she also enrolled in supplemental dental insurance. That enrollment application form notified Petitioner that any changes in enrollment or coverage are governed by the federal Internal Revenue Code and the Florida Administrative Code. Throughout her employment and at the time that she terminated her employment, she completed Annual Benefits Open Enrollment forms, which also notified her that any changes in enrollment or coverage are governed by the Internal Revenue Code and the Florida Administrative Code. While employed by the Department of Children and Families, Petitioner was provided with copies of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefit Document. Those booklets describe eligibility for participation to include employees, certain retirees, and COBRA participants. They also describe termination of coverage due to termination of employment and describe continuation coverage and conversion coverage. At the time Petitioner retired, she was not a State employee; she was a former State employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner is not eligible to participate in the State's group health insurance program. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark J. Berkowitz, Esquire Mark J. Berkowitz, P.A. 524 South Andrews Avenue, Suite 200N Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Sonja P. Matthews, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Tom Lewis, Jr., Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether petitioner owes respondent premiums on account of insurance coverage (Family I) under the State Employees Group Health Insurance Program from March 1, 1979, to August 31, 1981? If so, whether petitioner is obligated to pay the underpayment as a condition of continued insurance coverage?
Findings Of Fact Until December 6, 1978, petitioner, who has worked as a forest ranger for Florida's Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services since 1967 or 1968, was married to Betty R. Brogdon, the mother of his two children. Betty Brogdon was employed by Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services at the time of the dissolution of her marriage to petitioner. A provision of the dissolution decree required petitioner to maintain health insurance in effect for the children. During the marriage, in April of 1978, petitioner applied for, and received Family I insurance in the Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan, Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, continuing the coverage under a predecessor policy. Petitioner paid a premium for the Family I coverage reduced by certain employer contributions, after formally bringing to his supervisor's attention the fact that Betty R. Brogdon was also a state employee, and signing forms to that effect. Before August 1, 1979, the employer contributed 75 percent of the amount of the premium for Individual I coverage for each employee. From August 1, 1979, until August 1, 1980, the employer contributed, in addition, 25 percent of the family premium. On and after August 1, 1980, the employer contribution for each employee increased to 75 percent of the amount of the premium for Individual I coverage plus 50 percent of the family premium. Since this amount exceeds the total premium for Family I, families with this coverage in which both spouses work for state government have paid no insurance premium for Family I coverage since April 1, 1980. After the marriage ended, Betty Brogdon applied, on February 6, 1979, for Individual I health insurance, by submitting a form through the personnel office at the Sunland Center in Marianna, where she was employed. Since she had been a beneficiary under the family policy that her husband kept in force while they were married, her application reflected no change in that policy. When it reached the Bureau of Insurance of the Department of Administration, it was indistinguishable from any other new application by an employee who had not signed up when beginning work. After medical approval on May 7, 1979, she received Individual I coverage for herself only. Petitioner works with four other forest rangers and a supervisor at a site seven miles west of Marianna. There is no "personnel technician" stationed there and none visits. He told his supervisor of the divorce and, on March 2, 1979, filled out a "personnel action request" form furnished by a district office of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services in Bonifay, Florida, indicating "[m]arital and dependent change," which reached the Director of the Division of Forestry on March 9, 1979. Like other forms of its kind, this form never reached the Bureau of Insurance of the Department of Administration. The Bureau of Insurance did receive, however, on August 13, 1981, a "change of information" form reporting the Brogdons' dissolution of marriage on December 6, 1978. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Effective the following month, on advice of the Bureau of Insurance, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services subtracted from petitioner's paychecks the same insurance premium other employees not married to state employees paid for Family I coverage. The Bureau of Insurance lacks authority to make such deductions itself. Between March of 1980 and December 31, 1982, the only claims submitted under the policy were for petitioner himself. But for the $100.00 deductible, these claims were paid. The difference between what a state employee married to another state employee paid for Family I insurance coverage between July 1, 1979, and August 31, 1981, and what a state employee not married to another state employee paid for the same coverage amounts to $864.42.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent direct petitioner to pay the sum of eight hundred sixty-four dollars and forty two cents ($864.42) within ninety (90) days of entry of final order. If petitioner fails to make timely payment, that respondent cancel his Family I State Employees Group Health Insurance Program policy. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben R. Patterson, Esquire 1215 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondents, by refusing to allow consumers to cancel their individual health insurance policies subsequent to the "free-look" period and thereby failing to refund premiums paid, engaged in conduct violative of Subsection 627.6043, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that the Petitioner has jurisdiction over Respondents, National States and Penn Treaty, during times material. On June 24, 1993, Petitioner filed a five count administrative complaint against National States alleging that 20 consumers had purchased various types of health insurance policies and that such policy holders requested cancellation of those policies before the expiration date of their policy. The policy holders prepaid the premiums on such policies. National States refused to honor those requests for cancellation and did not refund the unearned premiums remaining on those policies. National States, by its assistant vice president, William O'Connor, advised those policy holders that they were not entitled to cancellation after the "free-look" period and therefore refused to refund any unearned premiums. Policy holders who were denied premium refunds include the following: Alexandrine Austin, Henry M. and Mary Lou Butler, Madeline Goding, William O. and Rowena Haisten, Sebastian N. and Jane E. Imme, Teresa Karl, John F. Killinger, J. Robert Merriman, Nell I. Mooney, Ralph Motta, Kathryn Patterson, Alene R. Smith, and Bernadine Weiss. On June 17, 1993, Petitioner filed a three count administrative complaint against Penn Treaty alleging that certain consumers had purchased various health insurance policies, that the policy holders requested cancellation of those policies prior to the expiration and Penn Treaty refused to honor those requests for cancellation and to refund any unearned premium remaining. Penn Treaty advised those policy holders, by letter, that they could not cancel their policies after the "free-look" period. The policy holders who were denied cancellation and/or a refund by Penn Treaty were Adelbert Gronvold, George and Marie Hutnyak and George F. and Elizabeth M. MacVicar. Health insurance policies do not contain a provision granting the policy holder the right to cancel. Ms. Kitterman, a former employee of Petitioner who has reviewed health insurance policies for over sixteen (16) years, was familiar with such policy forms. She has not seen a provision in an individual health insurance policy which specifically granted an insured the right to cancel a policy midterm. Dr. Solomon, an expert with extensive knowledge concerning health insurance policy provisions or the absence thereof, opined that health insurance policies do not contain a provision dealing with the ability or the right of the insured to cancel or not to cancel their health insurance policy. Finally, Ms. Andrews, the assistant bureau chief of life and health forms for approximately eight (8) years, has also personally reviewed health insurance policy forms. Ms. Andrews supervised the insurance analysts who reviewed such forms and corroborate the testimony of Kitterman and Solomon that such policy forms do not contain a provision addressing the insured's right to cancel. Petitioner has never required an individual health policy form to contain a provision regarding an insured's right to cancel. Although Petitioner does not require such a provision, it does insist that companies refund unearned premiums once an insured files a request to cancel pursuant to Section 627.6043, Florida Statutes. A discussion of the "free-look" period is contained in Rule 4-154.003, Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Insured's Right to Return Policy; Notice". That rule states: It is the opinion of the insurance commissioner that it will be in the public interest and of benefit to all if the person to whom the policy is issued has the opportunity to return the policy if he is not satisfied with it, provided such return is made within a reasonable length of time after receipt of the policy; therefore, each and every company issuing for delivery a disability policy in this state is requested to have printed or stamped thereon, or attached thereto a notice in a prominent place stating in substance that the person to whom the policy or contract is issued shall be permitted to return the policy or contract within ten (10) days of its delivery to said purchaser and to have the premium paid refunded if, after examination of the policy or contract, the purchaser is not satisfied with it for any reason. The notice may provide that if the insured or purchaser pursuant to such notice returns the policy or contract to the insurer at its home office or branch office or to the agent through whom it was purchased, it shall be void from the beginning and the parties shall be in the same position as if no policy or contract had been issued. This rule shall not apply to either single premium non-renewal policies or contracts or travel accident policies or contracts. Notices in this Rule 4-154.003 and in Rule 4.154.001 may be combined. (emphasis added) Thus, if a policy is returned during the "free look" period, the company is required to return the entire premium paid. The "free-look" period allows the consumer an opportunity to review the contract for the designated period of time. It allows them to make sure that it was the type of contract they intended to purchase and to review the application that was submitted to the company to verify that the information on it is correct. "Guaranteed renewable" is defined in Rule 4-154.004, Florida Administrative Code, titled "Non-cancellable or non-cancellable and guaranteed renewable policy; Use of Terms." That rule states: The terms "non-cancellable" or "non-cancellable and guaranteed renewable" may be used only in a policy which the insured has the right to continue in force by the timely payment of premiums set forth in the policy until at least age 50, or in the case of a policy issued after age 44, for at least five years from its date of issue, during which period the insurer has no right to make unilaterally any change in any provision of the policy while the policy is in force. Except as provided above, the term "guaranteed renewable" may be used only in a policy in which the insured has the right to continue in force by the timely payment of premiums until at least age 50, or in the case of a policy issued after age 44, for at least five years from its date of issue, during which period the insurer has no right to make unilaterally any change in any provision of the policy while the policy is in force, except that the insurer may make changes in premium rates by classes. The foregoing limitation on use of the term "non-cancellable" shall also apply to any synonymous term such as "not cancellable" and the limitation on use of the term "guaranteed renewable" shall also apply to any synonymous term such as "guaranteed continuable". Nothing herein contained is intended to restrict the development of policies having other guarantees of renewability, or to prevent the accurate description of their terms of renewability or the classification of such policies as guaranteed renewable or non-cancellable for any period during which there may be actually be such, provided the terms used to describe them in policy contracts and advertising are not such as may readily be confused with the above terms. Thus, the term "guaranteed renewable" as defined by Petitioner's rule notably does not contain any prohibitions against an insured's ability to cancel. Both Dr. Solomon and National States expert, E. Paul Barnhart, agreed that the industry meaning of "guaranteed renewable" is that companies guarantee renewability of a health or accident policy but do not guarantee that the rate will remain constant. Guaranteed renewable policies may be cancelled by the company only for nonpayment of premium or for false statements made by the insured in the application. Guaranteed renewable policies can also be cancelled by the company at the terminal point which, for most of National States policy holders, is when the insured dies but, in a few cases, at age 65. Whether a policy is marketed by the company as "guaranteed renewable" is a business decision made by the insurer generally to meet competition. Thus, the insurer, in making the decision to market an insurance policy as guaranteed renewable, waives any right that might otherwise be available to the insurer to cancel or non-renew except those authorized by statute which are, as noted, nonpayment of premium and material misrepresentation. Nowhere in any of the expert's opinions or Petitioner's witnesses is the term guaranteed renewable construed to mean that an insured has also waived the right to cancel a health insurance policy. All health insurance policies are cancellable by the insurer unless the company has chosen to market the policy as non-cancellable or guaranteed renewable which, as noted, may be only cancelled for nonpayment of premium and material misrepresentation. Dr. Solomon's opinion is based on the equitable theory that an insurance company, when it writes a health policy, does not immediately earn all of the premium collected, and the insured is therefore entitled to the unearned premium if he cancels midterm. Mr. Barnhart confirmed that a premium is not totally earned the moment it is collected but that "it's earned over the period of time for which the premium has been paid . . . if someone pays an annual premium, say on July 1, 1993, that annual premium would become earned at a steady rate over the year that follows and become fully earned as of June 30, 1994." When a premium is received for health and accident policies, the company will establish an unearned premium reserve, which is a basic reserve set up as a result of the payment of premiums and represents, at any given point in time, that portion of the premium that remains unearned. Insurance companies are required by law to maintain unearned premium reserves because they have not earned the premium. Unearned premium reserve is typically a section in the balance sheet of a company that is reserved for that purpose of paying back premiums that are not earned, or holding premiums in that account, as a segregated item, until such time as they are earned. Refunds of premiums are made on the basis of either a short-rate or a pro-rata table. Short-rate refunds are for the purpose of returning a portion of the insured's premium in the event that the insured elects to cancel midterm. The insured is penalized for cancelling the policy midterm under the short-term rate table by absorbing some of the company's expenses of underwriting the policy and administrative costs. That is, if the insured cancels an annual policy within one month after which an annual premium has been paid, the insured will receive less than 11/12ths of the advance premium. Pro-rata refunds mean equal distribution which is the refund procedure used when the insurer makes the decision to cancel. Thus, if the insurer cancels an insured's policy that is so cancellable by the insurer in the annual policy example, the insurer would be liable to make a pro-rata refund of premium to the insured which will be 11/12ths of the premium paid. Thus, an insured is not penalized when it is the insurer who exercises its right to cancel any policies which are so cancellable by the insurer. Section 627.6043(2), Florida Statutes, states: In the event of a cancellation, the insurer will return promptly the unearned portion of any premium paid. If the insured cancels, the earned premium shall be computed by the use of the short- rate table last filed with the state official having supervision of insurance with the state where the insured resided when the policy was issued. If the insurer cancels, the earned premium shall be computed pro-rata. Cancellation shall be without prejudice to any claim originating prior to the effective date of cancellation. (emphasis added) Ellen Andrews, the Department's former assistant bureau chief for life and health insurance forms several years prior to 1989, and in 1989 when the statute at issue was initially rewritten by the Legislature and as it is currently written, was familiar with the development of Petitioner's position as the statute went through renumberings in 1990 and 1992. It was part of Ms. Andrews' duties and responsibilities to assist Petitioner in the interpretation of that statute. It was her ultimate responsibility to be in charge of implementation of that statute. Petitioner's initial interpretation has remained unchanged since the statute was initially reworded in 1989 and moved to its various sections of part 6 of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes. The Department's opinion and decision on the meaning of what is currently Section 627.6043(2), Florida Statutes, is that if the insured cancels a policy midterm, the insured would be entitled to a return of premium pursuant to the short-rate table if one was filed with the Department. The Department further interprets the statute to mean that the insurer has a right to cancel, unless the insurer has waived that right by selling a guaranteed renewable or non-cancellable policy and if an insurer exercises that right, the insurer must make a refund to the insured on a pro-rata basis. Petitioner's position is based on the statutory provision that the insured shall receive a return of premium if the insured cancels and that if the insured didn't have a right to cancel, then the insured wouldn't have a right to receive a refund of premium. In 1989, Petitioner took the initiative to obtain statutory authority for its position by submitting a proposed draft to the Legislature revising the statute in order to provide insureds, by statute, the right to receive a return of the unearned premium upon notifying the insurer of their decision to cancel the individual health insurance policies. Mr. Barnhart verified that there would be no claims incurred once a policy ceases to be in force; that National States refund a portion of the premium when a policy is rescinded or terminated and that National States refunds unearned premiums when an insured dies midterm of the policy period whether required by statute or not. Penn Treaty refunds unearned premiums upon death and has a provision in its individual health and accidental insurance policies which provides that the insured shall receive a refund of unearned premiums upon death. From an actuarial perspective, there is no difference between either death or cancellation in midterm of a policy period by an insured. Penn Treaty sells, in Florida, long term care, home health care and medicare supplement insurance policies. National States generally sells guaranteed renewable policies in Florida. National States' position is that health and accident policies are not cancellable by the insured in Florida and that only medicare supplement policies are cancellable by the insured because there is a provision in the policy that allows an insured to cancel and because there is statutory authority for the insured to cancel that policy. Its position is that Section 627.6043, Florida Statutes, does not provide for cancellation by the insured. However, National States allows that the statutes regarding cancellation under the medicare supplement law, Section 627.6741(4), Florida Statutes, mandates refunds to insureds who request cancellation of their medicare supplement policies. National States allow cancellations by insureds and refunds unearned premiums on health insurance policies in those other states which have statutes requiring such refunds. Likewise, Penn Treaty's position is that home health care and long term care policies are not cancellable by the insured because there is no provision in the contract to allow cancellation and because they are guaranteed renewable policies. Its position also is that the insured does not have the right to cancel, either contractually or statutorily. Respondents relied on legal opinions from their counsel (in Florida) and an opinion from Petitioner dated June 12, 1991 to deny refunds. Florida law addressing an insured's right to cancel a medicare supplement policy is at Section 627.6741(4), Florida Statutes. That section provides, in pertinent part, that: If a policy is cancelled, the insurer must return promptly the unearned portion of any premium paid. If the insured cancels the policy, the earned premium shall be computed by the use of the short-rate table last filed with the state official having supervision of insurance in the state where the insured resided when the policy was issued. If the insurer cancels, the earned premium shall be computed pro-rata. Cancellation shall be without prejudice to any claim originating prior to the effective date of the cancellation period. (emphasis added) The above statute is the only Florida law which addresses an insured's right to cancel his medicare supplement policy. Florida law requires that medicare supplement policies be guaranteed renewable. That law is found at Section 627.6741(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides: For both individual and group medicare supplement policies: an insurer shall neither cancel nor non-renew a medicare supplement policy or certificate for any reason other than non payment of premium or material misrepresentation. Respondents' position is that in Florida, insureds who purchase their policies are elderly and are easily led. If allowed to cancel, Respondents contend that they would lose out on a number of protections that they would be entitled to if they were required to keep their policies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a final order requiring Respondents to make refunds of premiums to all policy holders who request the cancellation of their health insurance policies after October 1, 1989, with 12 percent interest from the date cancellation was requested and further that Respondents' certificates of authority be placed on suspension for a period of twelve (12) months. It is further recommended that the suspension be suspended upon Respondents, payment of the unearned premiums to the above-referenced consumers. 1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1995.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is responsible to cover Petitioner's husband's medical claims as the primary payer from May 1, 2015, through July 1, 2016; and, if so, the amount Respondent would be required to cover.
Findings Of Fact In 1976, Petitioner became employed with the State of Florida. Since 1995, Petitioner and G.M. were insured under the State Employee's PPO Plan ("PPO Plan"). As a primary payer, the PPO Plan paid 100 percent of all claims incurred, subject to the payment schedule set forth in the PPO Plan. In 2007, G.M. became Medicare-eligible due to a disability. On October 1, 2007, he enrolled in Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B. On November 30, 2007, although he was eligible for Medicare Part B, Husband deferred enrollment in Medicare Part B and terminated Medicare Part B. On December 31, 2012, Petitioner retired from her employment with the State of Florida. During her employment and after retirement, Petitioner received the annual Group Health Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefits Document booklets detailing the PPO Plan. Petitioner did not review the eligibility requirements for Medicaid Part B until 2015. The PPO Plans that were mailed to Petitioner in 2007, 2012, and 2015 all contained identical language on page 13-2, which stated "If the disabled dependent is your spouse, your spouse's coverage under this Plan will continue to be primary, paying benefits first, as long as you are an active employee." The PPO Plan coordination of benefits provision designates DSGI as the primary payer, which pays 100 percent of the benefits for a retiree or her spouse until the retiree or spouse becomes eligible for Medicare Part B. Once the retiree or spouse becomes Medicare-eligible, DSGI becomes the secondary payer and pays 20 percent of benefits, as Medicare-eligible participants are entitled to have 80 percent of their expenses covered by Medicare Part B. The PPO Plan also provides that DSGI will be the secondary payer even if the retiree or spouse is not enrolled in Medicare Part B. Petitioner and G.M. looked at plans annually during open enrollment. They needed health insurance because of G.M.'s health problems. Petitioner would call People First annually to confirm continuance of the PPO Plan because the McVays did not want to be changed to an HMO. From January 1, 2013, to May 1, 2015, Petitioner paid full premiums, which Respondent accepted, and Respondent paid all claims in full as the primary payer. In reliance on this coverage and the representation of Respondent through its actions and inactions, G.M. continued to defer his coverage through Medicare Part B. DSGI contracts Florida Blue as a third-party administrator. Florida Blue conducted a routine audit and discovered the error that Medicare Part B should have been the primary payer for Husband not Respondent. Husband's disability status had slipped through the system when Petitioner retired. On April 13, 2015, Florida Blue notified DSGI by email that G.M. was eligible for Medicare Part B due to disability. On or about April 30, 2015, Florida Blue notified Petitioner by letter of DSGI's intent to assume secondary payer status. The letter provided the audit results and stated: During a recent audit it was discovered that your h[u]sband is enrolled in Medicare Parts A & B and have been for quite some time. Therefore, Medicare should pay your claims as primary and your retiree health coverage will be your secondary coverage. Your current insurance premium will be reduced by $407.16 per month effective May 1, 2015, as described below. You are also due a refund of premium however you can only receive a refund for two years of overpayments. DSGI switched to secondary payer status and changed G.M.'s benefit level to Medicare II tier, effective May 1, 2015. Upon Respondent's discovery that Husband was Medicare- eligible, Respondent prospectively applied the coordination of benefits provision of the PPO Plan. The adjustment reduced Petitioner's premium payment to correspond with Respondent's status as a secondary payer. Additionally, Respondent refunded all amounts that Petitioner overpaid as a result of previously scheduled automatic deductions. As a secondary payer, the PPO Plan pays only 20 percent of all claims incurred. Upon DSGI's switch from primary payer, Petitioner and G.M. attempted to obtain Medicare Part B for G.M. but were not able to do so until the open enrollment period. As a result, G.M. was exposed to paying 80 percent of all claims that would have otherwise been paid by Medicare had he been enrolled in Medicare Part B. Petitioner and G.M. would have made alternative arrangements for health insurance coverage had they been informed that G.M.'s status would change their primary payer and they would have a lapse in coverage. Petitioner and Husband went to the Social Security Office several times in an attempt to get special enrollment but were unable to obtain coverage. Respondent's decision to drop coverage is not considered a qualifying event by Medicare for special enrollment. Petitioner and Husband also sought private brokers for coverage, but were not able to obtain insurance. For 14 months, May 1, 2015, through July 1, 2016, G.M. did not have a primary payer, only the PPO Plan as a secondary payer. In January 2016, Husband was able to enroll in Medicare Part B during open enrollment with coverage beginning on July 1, 2016. During the time G.M. was uncovered, he had several medical incidents, which incurred medical expenses. On April 4, 2016, the EMT transported Husband to the hospital after his defibrillator went off. Husband also was hospitalized at Aventura Hospital and Medical Center from December 22 through 24, 2015, when blood was seeping into his bone fracture of his left ankle. Husband received health statements ("statements"), Petitioner's Exhibit 12, from Florida Blue summarizing his medical expenses. Each statement contains the language in all capital letters "THIS IS NOT A BILL." The statements to which the Medicare primary was denied also provided language "Resubmit with EOMB." The statements, which indicated a network provider was utilized, also stated, "Therefore no patient responsibility." For the December 2015 hospital stay, claim 8288, the billing statement designates $30,402.03 is owed. However, the statement provides Medicare had not processed the claim. It also states "THIS IS NOT A BILL." Each statement also designated out-of-pocket amounts of $0.00 or indicated that a network provider was used and eliminated member debt by stating "no patient responsibility." Petitioner appealed Respondent's decision to terminate Husband's coverage. She seeks reimbursement for medical expenses G.M. incurred during the 14-month period when the PPO Plan was the secondary payer and G.M. was not enrolled in Medicare Part B from May 1, 2015, through July 1, 2016. Both Petitioner's Level I and Level II appeals were denied because DSGI maintains the termination was proper based on the language of the PPO Plan. Petitioner initially sought relief through extension coverage until Husband would be covered by Medicare Part B. Once the case was transferred to DOAH, Petitioner sought damages in the amount of health-related expenses incurred by Petitioner from the date of DSGI's termination of G.M.'s primary coverage. At the final hearing, Jessica Bonin ("Bonin"), a 12-year employee of Florida Blue who handles appeals and processes PPO Plan payments, explained the provisions of the PPO Plan coordination of benefits. She testified that the PPO Plan pays benefits based on the allowed amount, which represents the rate negotiated between Florida Blue and a network provider. When calculating amounts that are covered under the terms of the PPO Plan, the deductible, coinsurance, and amount allowed for each claim have to be applied. Therefore, not all charges billed by a provider will count toward the deductible or coinsurance maximum or be reimbursed after the deductible or coinsurance maximum is reached when calculating medical expenses. Bonin calculated G.M.'s medical expenses in Respondent's Exhibit 18 and concluded that DSGI owed Petitioner $80.04 for a claim incurred on or about June 11, 2015. The reimbursement amount of $80.04 represents the amount the PPO Plan covers as secondary payer. At hearing, DSGI also stipulated to another reimbursement in the amount of $18.03. Husband testified he was seeking reimbursement for the entire amount of the combined statements regardless of whether charges were covered by Medicare or the PPO Plan's payment schedule. He totaled the statements from the health care providers at $47,056.56. G.M. also testified he did not know what monies were due on what bills. G.M. specifically requested the $30,401.03 for the inpatient hospitalization at Aventura in December 2015. He clarified that the bill that he received from Aventura was $3,455.72. Medicare Part A, in which G.M. was enrolled at all times relevant to this matter, covers inpatient hospital expenses. To date, G.M. has paid $4,415.19 out-of-pocket for medical expenses. Petitioner failed to provide competent evidence to demonstrate a reimbursable amount for G.M.'s medical expenses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, enter a final order denying the Petition and finding that Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for Husband's medical expenses in the amount of $98.07. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2017.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Department of Management Services properly denied medical insurance reimbursement to Marianne Fahle for EDTA chelation therapy services provided to her husband, John Fahle.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Marianne Fahle is a retired employee of the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this case, Marianne Fahle was a participant in the State of Florida group health insurance plan. Her husband, John Fahle, is a covered dependent. The state group insurance program is a self-insured health insurance plan administered for the State of Florida for its employees by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida ("BCBSF"). In August 2000, John Fahle was hospitalized after he collapsed at his home. Medical tests revealed that Mr. Fahle suffered from arteriosclerosis with an estimated 60-80% stenosis, or blockage, of his carotid artery. Rather than undergo surgery to relieve the blockage, Mr. Fahle chose a course of treatment commonly called EDTA chelation therapy. Chelation therapy involves the intravenous injection of ethylene-diamine-tetra acetic acid (edetic acid or EDTA) accompanied by nutritional supplements. After undergoing chelation therapy, Mr. Fahle's diagnostic tests were repeated, with reported results indicating some reduction of the blockage in his coronary artery and a reduction of the carotid artery blockage to 40-60 percent. The actual tests, as opposed to the physicians' reports of their results, were not offered as evidence. The weight of the evidence established that the reported improvement in Mr. Fahle's carotid artery blockage, from a 60-80 percent blockage to a 40-60 percent blockage, could be attributed to the subjectivity involved in reading the results of the diagnostic tests. In any event, the reported improvement was of little medical significance. Chelation therapy is generally accepted in the medical community as a safe and efficacious treatment for heavy metal toxicity, e.g., lead poisoning. The United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved EDTA as a lawfully marketed drug in 1953. The FDA cannot limit the manner in which a licensed physician may prescribe an approved drug, though it can place limits on the marketing representations that may be made as to the efficaciousness of a drug for certain uses. The FDA has approved the marketing of EDTA as a treatment for heavy metal poisoning. The FDA prohibits any person from representing that chelation therapy is a safe and efficacious treatment for arteriosclerosis, though a physician may lawfully treat arteriosclerosis with chelation therapy. Petitioner submitted several articles attesting to the value of chelation therapy in treating arteriosclerosis. A significant minority of physicians in the United States employs chelation therapy as an option in the treatment of arteriosclerosis. However, reliable, formal clinical trials have yet to establish the efficacy of chelation therapy as a standard treatment for arteriosclerosis. The strength of the anecdotal evidence and the persistent advocacy of physicians have led the National Institute of Health to begin clinical trials on the use of chelation therapy in the treatment of arteriosclerosis, but the results of these trials will not be available for five years. In any event, Mr. Fahle's coverage is determined by the terms of Ms. Fahle's insurance policy. The terms of coverage for the state group health insurance plan are set forth in a document titled, "State Employees' PPO Plan Group Health Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefit Document." The benefit document states, in pertinent part: Services Not Covered By The Plan The following services and supplies are excluded from coverage under this health insurance plan unless a specific exception is noted. Exceptions may be subject to certain coverage limitations. * * * 47. Services and procedures considered by BCBSF to be experimental or investigational, or services and procedures not in accordance with generally accepted professional medical standards, including complications resulting from these non-covered services. The benefit document defines "experimental or investigational services" as follows: ny evaluation, treatment, therapy or device that: cannot be lawfully marketed without approval of the US Food and Drug Administration or the Florida Department of Health if approval for marketing has not been given at the time the service has been provided to the covered person is the subject of ongoing Phase I or II clinical investigation, or the experimental or research arm of Phase III clinical investigation-- or is under study to determine the maximum dosage, toxicity, safety or efficacy, or to determine the efficacy compared to standard treatment for the condition is generally regarded by experts as requiring more study to determine maximum dosage, toxicity, safety or efficacy, or to determine the efficacy compared to standard treatment for the condition has not been proven safe and effective for treatment of the condition based on the most recently published medical literature of the US, Canada or Great Britain using generally accepted scientific, medical or public health methodologies or statistical practices is not accepted in consensus by practicing doctors as safe and effective for the condition is not regularly used by practicing doctors to treat patients with the same or similar condition BCBSF and [the Department] determine whether a service or supply is experimental or investigational. The benefit document is not explicit as to whether the elements of the quoted definition are to be considered in the disjunctive, but the plain sense of the document leads to the reading that if any one of the definitional elements applies, then the service or supply must be considered experimental or investigational. Dr. William Wood, BCBSF's medical director, confirmed that if any single element of the definition applies to a service or supply, then it is considered experimental or investigational. Chelation therapy would fall under every element of the definition except, arguably, the last element dealing with regular use by practicing physicians. The FDA does not allow chelation therapy to be marketed as a treatment for arteriosclerosis, chelation therapy is currently the subject of clinical trials, and it is not accepted "in consensus" by practicing physicians as a treatment for arteriosclerosis.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services enter a Final Order dismissing the petition of Marianne Fahle. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Marianne Fahle 12205 North Marjory Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 Julia Forrester, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 John Matthews, Director Division of State Group Insurance Department of Management Services 4040 Esplanade Way, Suite 135 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Simone Marstiller, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Respondent has violated sections 627.6675, 626.9541(1)(a)1., 626.9541(1)(a)6., or 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as pled in the Amended Notice and Order to Show Cause, and if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Office of Insurance Regulation of the Financial Services Commission (the Office) is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code with respect to licensees of the Office. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company (GTL) is a foreign insurer, domiciled in Illinois, which holds a certificate of authority to transact business as a life and health insurer in Florida. GTL offers insurance products nationwide, except for New York, including Medicare long-term care, supplemental, cancer, college student, accident, and sickness policies. GTL is subject to the jurisdiction of the Office under the Florida Insurance Code, is subject to fines and disciplinary actions, and is substantially affected by the administrative complaint filed against it. On or about April 3, 2000, GTL entered into an agreement with Celtic Life Insurance Company. Celtic agreed to make medical expense conversion insurance available to eligible participants whose coverage under GTL group medical expense insurance was terminated. However, the agreement with Celtic specifically excluded coverage if GTL discontinued the group medical expense insurance plan in its entirety, or in a particular state. This exclusion was consistent with Celtic’s normal rules and both parties to the agreement knew of the exclusion. Any suggestion on the part of GTL that it was confused about Celtic’s obligations under this provision of the contract is not credible. A conversion policy is a form of replacement insurance coverage for which certificate holders in a group policy may be eligible when their coverage under a group policy is terminated. On or about June 21, 2006, GTL submitted filing number 06-08141, an out-of-state group major medical policy (Policy), to the Office. The letter transmitting the Policy to the Office noted that the Policy included a conversion provision and stated that GTL had a conversion policy available through Celtic Insurance Company. The letter did not state that the conversion policies to be provided by Celtic would not be available if coverage by GTL was terminated as part of its withdrawal from an individual market or state. The Policy provisions regarding conversion provided in relevant part: Health Insurance Conversion. A covered person may convert his or her health insurance coverage under the policy to another form of insurance issued by us if such insurance or any portion of it ends, provided the covered person is entitled to convert and within 63 days after such coverage ends the covered person: applies in writing to us at our home office; and, pays the first premium. We will provide the covered person the required notice within 14 days of the person informing us of their interest in making application for a conversion policy. No evidence of insurability will be required if the covered person converts under this provision. The effective date of the converted policy shall be the day following the termination of insurance under the policy. The Policy went on to define covered persons entitled to convert as those who had been covered continuously for at least 3 months prior to termination of the policy. The Policy set forth some exceptions. The Policy made no mention that GTL could contract with another insurer to issue the individual converted policy. A group health insurance product is issued to an association or employer. Individual certificates of health insurance are then issued to the members of the group. Under the Policy, forms were issued to Consumer Benefits Association of America. Certificates of health insurance coverage were then issued to at least 216 Florida residents who were members of the Consumer Benefits Association of America (Members) as evidence of their insurance under the Policy. These certificates advised Members of their conversion privilege in the event that coverage shown by the certificate was terminated, in language substantially identical to that in the Policy. The certificates met the statutory requirement for notification of the conversion privilege. The certificates of health insurance coverage made no mention that GTL could contract with another insurer to issue the individual converted policy. The Policy was never profitable for GTL. GTL instituted significant increases in the premium, but losses were still too high, and GTL made decisions to terminate the Group Plan and exit the Florida market entirely. On April 26, 2010, GTL notified the Office that it would be terminating all medical expense health insurance coverage in the individual market in Florida. The notice stated that the Uniform Termination of Coverage would affect 286 insureds in Florida. GTL was not required to file a copy of the letter (Termination Letter) that it planned to mail to Florida residents whose coverage would be terminated, but it did submit a copy to the Office. The Termination Letter was reviewed by Mr. Gary Edenfield, who at the time was a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor in the Division of Life and Health, Office of Forms and Rates. Mr. Edenfield requested that GTL make two changes to the Termination Letter: first, he asked that the reference to a 90-day notice be changed to say 180-day notice; and second, he asked GTL to include a reference to a website listing companies that could be contacted to provide individual replacement coverage on a guaranteed-issue basis. GTL made the requested changes to the Termination Letter and provided a revised copy to Mr. Edenfield, who then advised GTL that it had listed an incorrect website. Mr. Edenfield’s advice on each occasion was based upon his understanding that the policies involved were all individual major medical policies, because that was the way GTL had entered the filing in “I-File,” the Office’s electronic filing system. He was unaware at this time that the Termination Letter would be going to Members under the group Policy as well. On or about May 5, 2010, GTL sent the Termination Letter1/ to at least 216 Florida residents covered under the out-of-state group major medical Policy, as well as to about 70 Florida residents who held individual policies offered by GTL. The Termination Letter stated, in relevant part: 2. WILL GTL BE OFFERING A REPLACEMENT PLAN? At this time GTL will no longer be offering major medical type coverage. However, if you have 18 months of creditable coverage, you may be eligible for an individual major medical plan on a guaranteed issue basis. The Florida Department of Financial Website http://www.floir.com/CompanySearch/ provides a listing of companies that you may wish to contact to obtain replacement coverage. If you have any questions about the termination, you may contact Policy Owner Service at 1-800-338-7452. You may also contact the Florida Department of Financial Services, Division of Consumer Services at 1- 877-693-5236. A guaranteed-issue policy is a replacement insurance policy that insurers who are authorized to write individual medical coverage in Florida are required by statute to write for an individual whose group coverage has been terminated. A person who is entitled to a conversion policy is not eligible for a guaranteed-issue policy. There was no mention in the Termination Letter of any right to a conversion policy as a form of replacement coverage for the Policy being terminated. At the time it sent the Termination Letter, GTL knew that three-fourths of the recipients of the Termination Letter were holders of certificates of insurance coverage under the Policy. GTL knew that the Policy and these certificates granted a conversion privilege. GTL did not intend to offer a conversion policy to Members whose coverage under the Policy was being terminated. GTL knew it did not have coverage with Celtic to provide converted policies and could not offer the coverage itself. GTL knew the Termination Letter was misleading. On May 11, 2010, the Division of Consumer Services of the Department of Financial Services began receiving consumer complaints related to GTL’s non-renewal of health insurance and the Termination Letter. Mr. Edenfield received a call from the Division of Consumer Services stating that they did not believe GTL’s action was a termination of individual major medical policies. Mr. Edenfield called Mr. Allan Heindl, Vice President of Product Approval and Compliance at GTL. Mr. Heindl told him that the filing involved an out-of-state group major medical policy. Mr. Edenfield then advised Mr. Heindl that GTL was required to provide a conversion policy, and that GTL would need to send a new notice out informing Members that they were not entitled to a guaranteed-issue individual policy, but were entitled to a conversion policy. Mr. Heindl stated that he would have to “talk to his people” about that. In a follow-up letter sent by e-mail from the Office and received by GTL on May 20, 2010, the Office again advised GTL that it was required to provide conversion policies. The Office again advised GTL that it would be necessary for GTL to send the Members receiving the first letter a second one that explained that they were entitled to a conversion policy and not a guaranteed-issue policy from another company that issues individual policies. The Office did not set forth any period of time within which GTL needed to send the second letter. Mr. Heindl testified that at the time he received the May 20, 2010 letter, GTL disagreed with the Office about whether GTL was required to provide a conversion benefit. GTL and the Office sent a few e-mails back and forth in early June 2010, discussing whether GTL was required to offer conversion policies under Florida law. GTL continued to say it saw no such requirement in Florida Statutes; the Office continued to maintain that the statutes required it. Mr. Heindl noted that there would not be any conversion plan to offer because the statute required GTL to terminate and non-renew all individual health plans, since they were exiting the market. On or about September 21, 2010, Capital City Consulting, L.L.C., sent a letter to the Office indicating that GTL had reviewed the statutes cited by the Office and had concluded that GTL was not required to offer conversion policies. On September 22, 2010, the Office sent another e-mail advising GTL that it must comply with the conversion statute. On or about September 29, 2010, GTL sent a letter to the Office stating that after reviewing the September 22, 2010, e-mail from the Office and after their telephone call with Deputy Commissioner Mary Beth Senkewicz, they were unable to agree with the Office’s interpretation of the statutes and still believed their actions did not violate the Florida Insurance Code. GTL never sent a follow-up letter to Members as requested by the Office. GTL began terminating coverage under the Policy and certificates in November 2010, as renewal dates occurred after the 180-day notice provided in the Termination Letter sent in May. On January 12, 2011, the Office served GTL with a Notice and Order to Show Cause alleging that GTL had violated the Florida Insurance Code by continuing to non-renew policies and failing to offer converted policies. On January 28, 2011, GTL filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with the Office. It amended that Petition on February 1, 2011, still maintaining that it was not required to offer conversion policies. In February or March, 2011, GTL began negotiations for an agreement with Celtic to provide the conversion benefit described in the Policy and certificates arising from GTL’s exit from the Florida market. On April 5, 2011, in response to a March 17, 2011, inquiry from Celtic as to the number of covered lives remaining, Mr. Heindl advised in part, “The size of the group in FL at the time of termination was 286 and today we have 28 left. I’m not sure if FL would make us go back and offer coverage to all previously insured insured’s. If FL does, I can’t imagine many would come back to GTL.” Discussions between GTL and Celtic continued in April and May. GTL reached an “understanding” with Celtic in May that Celtic would provide conversion coverage. The understanding was that if GTL sent notification to all terminated insureds informing them of the conversion available from Celtic, then GTL would pay an initial transaction fee of $125,000 to Celtic, due when the agreement was entered into, along with the sum of $30,000 per policy for each conversion policy subsequently issued by Celtic. If Celtic did not send out a notice to the terminated insureds, then the initial transaction fee would be reduced to $100,000. At the time the understanding was reached, only 28 or fewer Members were left; there was no understanding in place when the coverage of at least 188 Members was terminated. No written contract incorporating this understanding was ever entered into with Celtic. GTL did not send out a notice to the terminated Members. The initial transaction fee was never paid. Mr. Heindl testified at hearing that if a Member had come forward and actually applied for conversion, GTL would then have moved forward and paid the agreed-upon fees. No Member requested information about a conversion policy. GTL chose not to send any notice to terminated Members in an effort to eliminate or minimize the possibility that Members might request conversion policies, and so avoid the costs of contracting with Celtic to provide the conversion coverage. GTL was hoping that the Members were unaware of their conversion rights, and would not become aware of them. At no time from the inception of the Policy and the certificates based thereon, through the time the Termination Letters were sent, until the time of the Final Hearing in this case, did GTL have in effect any written contract with Celtic or any other insurer to issue converted policies to Members upon GTL’s termination of the Policy group coverage in its entirety, or in the State of Florida. On August 26, 2011, Mr. Heindl, party representative for GTL, conceded under oath in deposition that the Policy was an out- of-state group policy and that sections 627.6515 and 627.6675, Florida Statutes (2010),2/ did apply to the Policy. On September 2, 2011, an Order was issued granting the Office’s Unopposed Motion to Amend Notice and Order to Show Cause. Counts I and II of the earlier complaint were amended. The earlier complaint had charged in these counts that “Guarantee Trust violated the Florida Insurance Code by failing to offer converted policies as required by Section 627.6675, Florida Statutes.” As amended, Counts I and II alleged that “Guarantee Trust violated the Florida Insurance Code by issuing the Termination Letter without offering converted policies required by the Florida Insurance Code and Section 627.6675, Florida Statutes.” The word “offer” or “offering” is not defined in the Florida Insurance Code. These terms are used in dozens of places throughout the Code, however, in phrases such as “insurers to offer coverage,” “offers policies or certificates,” “licensees offering policies,” and “offering insurance,” all in the context of describing insurance lines and products being made available in the market by an insurer. GTL itself used these words in similar contexts. In its September 21, 2010, letter to the Office, GTL stated “GTL is not required to offer conversion policies.” In later e-mails to Celtic, GTL referred to “offering a conversion option” and “make us go back and offer coverage.” In the Termination Letter itself, GTL wrote, “GTL will no longer be offering major medical type coverage.” GTL could not reasonably have interpreted the phrase “without offering converted policies” in Counts I and II as referring only to notification to Members. GTL was well aware that Counts I and II were alleging that GTL’s issuance of the Termination Letter constituted a revocation of GTL’s contractual and statutory responsibility to make conversion insurance available to Members at a point in time at which GTL did not have a written contract in place with any carrier to provide such conversion policies. GTL was not hindered in its ability to prepare a defense to Counts I and II. The Office showed by clear and convincing evidence that at the time GTL issued the Termination Letter, GTL did not have a contract with another insurer to provide conversion policies upon GTL’s exit from the Florida market, and would be unable to do so itself. The Amended Notice and Order to Show Cause of September 2, 2011, also added three new counts, alleging that the Termination Letter sent out to covered persons constituted an unfair insurance trade practice under the Florida Insurance Code because it was misrepresentative, deceptive, and misleading. The statement in the Termination Letter that GTL would no longer be offering major medical coverage was not a false statement. GTL was withdrawing entirely from the Florida market and would not itself be offering any coverage, including individual conversion policies. Although technically true, the statement was nevertheless likely to mislead a reasonable Member, because it made no mention that GTL was legally required to arrange for another provider to offer the conversion policy on GTL’s behalf. The statement that GTL would no longer be offering major medical type coverage, omitting any further information, would leave the incorrect impression with a reasonable Member that the right to a conversion policy upon termination, as set forth in the certificate of health insurance, no longer existed. GTL knew that this statement was misleading as to a reasonable Member. Similarly, the statement in the Termination Letter that “you may be eligible” for an individual major medical plan on a guaranteed issue basis was not a false statement. The statement did not say that any reader “was” entitled to such a policy, only that they “may” be. Again, while not technically false, this statement was likely to mislead a reasonable Member, for none of these individuals was in fact eligible for a guaranteed-issue policy. GTL could easily have distinguished between Members and its individual policy holders in the letter, or better yet, sent two different letters, but it failed to do so. GTL instead chose to say only that readers “may be eligible” for a guaranteed issue policy and to include the reference to the Department’s website list of other companies, without any mention of the converted policy available to a majority of recipients of the letter. This omission was likely to leave a reasonable Member eligible for a conversion policy with the incorrect impression that this right no longer existed. GTL knew that this statement was misleading. Even the second question asked in the Termination Letter was misleading. The question posed by GTL, “WILL GTL BE OFFERING A REPLACEMENT PLAN?” was followed by true statements, but it was not the right question. Certificate holders would be interested in knowing what coverage might be available to them from any source to replace the terminated coverage, not simply coverage from GTL itself. Again, reasonable Members would likely be left with the impression that a conversion policy was no longer available to them because GTL was exiting the Florida market. GTL knew that posing the question in this fashion was misleading. On November 15, 2011, GTL filed a Petition to Challenge Unadopted Rule. The Petition was served on the Office more than 30 days before it was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings, as stipulated at hearing. The Financial Services Commission has not adopted the statement that it is a violation of provisions of the Florida Insurance Code to “issue a termination letter without offering converted policies as required by Section 627.6675,” or any similar statement, by rulemaking procedures. The Office proved by clear and convincing evidence that Celtic was never required to provide conversion policies if the termination of the Policy was a result of a decision to discontinue major medical coverage in Florida. It similarly proved that no other contract providing conversion policies under these circumstances was ever entered into with Celtic or any other insurer, and that GTL could not itself provide conversion coverage. The Office proved by clear and convincing evidence that GTL knowingly made, issued, published, disseminated, circulated, and placed before the public the Termination Letter. The Office failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any statement in the Termination Letter was false. The Office proved by clear and convincing evidence that statements in the Termination Letter were made for the purpose of inducing, and tended to induce, the forfeiture of the conversion policy to which the Members were entitled under the Policy. The Office proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Termination Letter contained an assertion, representation and statement with respect to the business of insurance that was willfully deceptive and misleading. GTL knew, or should have known, that this was an unfair or deceptive act or practice under the Florida Insurance Code.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Office of Insurance Regulation enter a Final Order finding that Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company committed 216 knowing and willful violations of subsection 626.9521(1), Florida Statutes, for engaging in an unfair method of competition and unfair or deceptive act or practice as defined in subsection 626.9541(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $1,000 for each such violation, for a total fine not to exceed an aggregate amount of $200,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2012.
