The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent, Miracles House, Inc. (Respondent or Miracles), as licensee of Miracles House, Inc., a group home facility, violated provisions of section 393.0673, Florida Statutes (2017), and administrative rules,1/ as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what is the appropriate sanction.
Findings Of Fact APD is responsible for regulating the licensing and operation of group home facilities in the state of Florida. APD's clients include vulnerable individuals with developmental disabilities attributed to autism, cerebral palsy, intellectual disabilities, Phelan-McDermid syndrome, Prader-Willi syndrome, or spina bifida. APD's clients can choose to live in an institutional setting, group home, or independently. A client is assisted in this choice by a residential placement coordinator. A group home is a licensed facility providing a living arrangement similar to a family setting. It is the provider's responsibility to provide not only room and board but also safety, transportation, assistance with the activities of daily living, and to attempt to provide all residential habilitation services at the level needed by the client, as established by the client with a waiver support coordinator. A waiver support coordinator is an independent contractor for APD who acts as a case manager and is responsible for coordinating the services provided to a client. Support plans are prepared and submitted to APD by a client's waiver support coordinator. A support plan is a "snapshot" of a client's life. It includes a summary of events and activities that have occurred throughout the year, including hospitalizations, medications, and the client's goals. The resources and capabilities available to a client and his support givers are not always sufficient to meet all of the client's needs. The support plan is implemented to maximize the attainment of habilitative goals. The support plan is periodically reviewed to assess progress toward habilitative and medical objectives and revised annually after consultation with the client. Each client is assigned a level of care code that relates to payment made to the group home on the client's behalf. As its name suggests, there is some correlation between the level of care code that is assigned and the level of care to be given by the provider, but because additional services may be provided by other individuals and resources, the assigned level of care does not necessarily reflect all needs and services necessary for, or being provided to, the client. If a group home believes that it cannot provide the required residential habilitation services or meet its responsibilities with respect to a particular client, it can make this known to the waiver support coordinator. Adjustments are periodically made to the support plan, including the level of care code. If adjustments sufficient to address the provider's concerns are not made, a group home may request that a client be placed in another facility. APD issued license number 11-1088-GH to Miracles for the purpose of operating a group home located at 113211 Northwest 26th Court, Miami, Florida. Ms. Whipple is a corporate officer of Miracles and the on-site manager of its group home. There was no evidence introduced indicating that Miracles had previously received discipline based upon its group home license. Client R.H. At all times material to this case, Client R.H. was a resident of Miracles' group home, where he has lived for several years. Client R.H. has an intellectual disability. Mr. Lumumba was a contracted waiver support coordinator working with APD. He began work in this capacity in July of 2016 and was assigned to Client R.H. at that time. Mr. Lumumba prepared support plans and many incident reports for Client R.H. after that date. Incident reports prior to Mr. Lumumba's service were also admitted into evidence. Successive support plans repeat much of the narrative from prior plans, and because only selected plans were introduced into evidence, it is difficult to determine exactly when many of the additions or entries were made. Client R.H. is reported as having suicidal thoughts, and it is noted that when he is under the influence of drugs, he requires support and direction to be safe. He is described as needing reminders, instruction, redirection, and support to avoid danger and to remain healthy and safe. Notations in the support plans and numerous incident reports document a distinct pattern of behaviors by Client R.H. In an incident report dated January 26, 2015, it was reported that Client R.H. became agitated, left the group home alone, and walked to the Mental Health Center located at Northwest 27th Avenue and 151st Street. He was later transported by the Mental Health Center staff to Jackson Memorial Behavioral Health Unit and admitted. In an incident report dated February 11, 2015, it was reported that Client R.H. became agitated and left the group home to go to the store, refusing to be accompanied by staff. He later presented himself at North Shore Medical Center where he was admitted to the Crisis Stabilization Unit. In an incident report dated February 17, 2015, it was reported that Client R.H. visited his mother, got into an argument with her, left her home, and went to Memorial Regional Hollywood Emergency Room (ER). He was later discharged in the care of Miracles' group home staff. In an incident report dated March 30, 2015, it was reported that Client R.H. became argumentative and left the group home unaccompanied under the pretext of going to the nearby corner store. He traveled to the North Shore Medical Center ER and was admitted to the Behavioral Health Unit. He was discharged on March 25, 2015, and returned to Miracles by hospital staff. A July 19, 2015, update to the Client R.H.'s support plan indicates that Client R.H. reported that he was not abused at the Miracles' group home, and that he felt safe and wanted to stay there. In an incident report dated August 14, 2015, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home and went to the North Shore Medical Center ER, where he was admitted as a psychiatric patient. The group home was informed he would be kept for 72 hours and then discharged. In an incident report dated August 18, 2015, it was reported that Client R.H. "eloped" from the group home. He later made contact with his mother, began acting in bizarre ways, and said he needed drugs. He ran into the street shouting, began to undress, and lay down in front of cars. He was taken to Aventura Hospital and admitted as a psychiatric patient. A September 21, 2015, update to the support plan reflects that Client R.H. had moved out of the Miracles group home to stay with his sister. In September of 2015, Client R.H. was removed from Miracles at Dr. Whipple's request, made 30 days earlier, according to Mr. Lumumba. A December 14, 2015, entry in the support plan indicates that Client R.H. went to jail in October 2015 for trespassing and petty theft. When he was released on December 6, 2015, he asked to return to Miracles' group home. The support coordinator was unable to place Client R.H. in another group home, and Miracles' group home was requested to take him back, which it did. In an incident report dated February 12, 2016, it was reported that Client R.H. became agitated, argumentative, and uncontrollable. He walked to the street, pulled down his pants, screamed, and began to roll around in the street. Police were called, and he was arrested and transported to the North Shore Medical Center. In an incident report dated March 9, 2016, it was reported that Client R.H. was verbally and physically out of control. He went to the street in front of the house, fell to the ground, and began rolling around. He could not be physically restrained or verbally redirected. The police were called, and he was restrained and taken to North Shore Medical Center where he was admitted for psychiatric treatment. In an incident report dated March 17, 2016, it was reported that police arrived at the facility and arrested Client R.H. for a 2014 charge of stealing church equipment. During the annual support plan meeting on June 1, 2016, Client R.H. indicated that he still felt comfortable at the group home and said that "Ms. Felicia" (Whipple) was like a mother to him. Client R.H. indicated he had been going to church with her every Sunday since he returned to the group home in December. The July 1, 2016, support plan prepared by Mr. Lumumba suggested that the rate for client R.H. be changed from minimal to moderate and stated: [Client R.H.] requires 24 hours' supervision to ensure health and safety as he suffers from insomnia, seizures, psychosis and mood disorder, Bipolar, depression, and drug addictions. The approval of this services request will ensure that [Client R.H.] receives the support that he needs to achieve his goal and maintain a healthy life style. The July 1, 2016, support plan also noted: Consumer has had history of abuse in the past when he was living with his mother. He was abused by mother's boyfriend. However since he has been at Miracle House, there was an abuse allegation made by [Client R.H.'s] mother, however it was investigated and they have find that the mother was the one who initiated the allegation. There was no foundation on those allegations. No history of abuse or neglect that has been documented in his records. Mr. Lumumba testified that the notations in the support plans that Client R.H. required 24-hour supervision were "recommendations" as opposed to "requirements." In an incident report dated July 13, 2016, it was reported that Client R.H. went to his mother's housing complex unannounced, where security was unable to reach his mother, and he was denied access. He became agitated, verbally aggressive, and out of control. The police were called, and he was taken to Hialeah Hospital. In an incident report dated July 23, 2016, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home without stating where he was going. He failed to return to the group home overnight. His mother called the group home to inform staff that he had been arrested after police approached him and found crack cocaine in his possession. A support plan update dated December 1, 2016, indicates that Miracles requested a change from "minimal" to "moderate" behavioral focus to provide additional services to Client R.H. In an incident report dated December 5, 2016, it was reported that Client R.H. was verbally abusive, out of control and agitated, screaming and cursing staff, and running in the street. The report states that police were called, and he was transported to North Shore Medical Center's crisis unit. He was discharged from North Shore Medical Center and returned to the group home on December 7, 2016. In an incident report dated December 28, 2016, it was reported that Client R.H. went to his mother's housing complex unannounced, where security was unable to reach his mother, and he was denied access. He became agitated, verbally aggressive, and out of control. The police were called, and he was taken to Hialeah Hospital. In an incident report dated February 25, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. informed staff at about 10:00 p.m. that he was going to buy cigarettes from the corner store. He did not return and called the group home from the jail to report that he had been stopped by police, searched, and arrested for possession of crack cocaine. In an incident report dated March 27, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. told staff he was going to a store to buy cigarettes. He did not return and was assumed to be at his mother's house. His mother called late in the afternoon to report that he had gone to the North Shore Medical Center ER and been admitted to the crisis unit. Ms. Whipple testified that in March of 2017, Client R.H.'s level of care code was changed to Extensive 1. In an incident report dated April 6, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. became agitated, combative, and threatening. Staff was unable to de-escalate his behaviors. Police were called, and he was taken to North Shore Medical Center. In an incident report dated April 17, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. went to visit his mother on Easter morning. His mother called in late afternoon to report that he had gone to North Shore Medical Center ER and been admitted to the crisis unit. In an incident report dated April 26, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home in the afternoon for cigarettes. He did not return. His mother called at 10:30 p.m. to report that he had called her from Palmetto General Hospital where the police had taken him. In an incident report dated May 7, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home for cigarettes but walked to the Jackson Memorial Hospital mental health unit instead, where he was admitted. In an incident report dated May 17, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home saying he needed cigarettes from the store. He later called his mother to report that he had been picked up by the police for burglary. In an "annual summary" entry in the support plan, it was noted, in relevant part: [Client R.H.] has not make much progress this year. He has been in and out of Crisis and has been Backer Acted too many times and at the time that I'm writing this Support plan, [Client R.H.] is an crisis since May 17-2017. [Client R.H.] needs another supportive alternative program to rehabilitate him for his constant going to crisis. He need to be a program where he can be monitored and with a restricted rules and regulation and Medical intervention or his constant substance issues. In an incident report dated May 28, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home to go to his mother's home on May 27, 2017, and did not return as expected. He called the group home on May 28, 2017, and said he was at Jackson Memorial Hospital in the crisis unit. He was released on May 29, 2017. In an incident report dated June 5, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home to go to the store the previous day and failed to return. His mother called to report that he had been arrested for breaking and entering and stealing merchandise from someone's home. Following the 2017 support plan meeting, in which the number of incident reports and alternatives to address Client R.H.'s drug issues were discussed, the July 1, 2017, support plan stated that "[Client R.H.] has been unpredictable and it require a lot of man power to really keep [Client R.H.] living at Miracles House, the group home is asking the Behavior analyst to have [Client R.H.] level of care has been approved to change from Moderate to Extensive Behavior focus [] 1." Mr. Lumumba noted that no abuse or neglect had been reported since he began working with Client R.H. in 2015. In an incident report dated August 5, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. became verbally agitated and physically aggressive with medical staff while at an appointment at a mental health provider. The report states that police were called, and Client R.H. was "taken under Baker Act." In an incident report dated August 14, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home for cigarettes. He called later to say that he had checked himself in at Jackson Memorial Hospital ER. In an incident report dated November 29, 2017, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home to purchase cigarettes and did not return. His mother called to report that he had been arrested for property theft. In an incident report dated January 27, 2018, it was reported that Client R.H. became agitated and said he wanted to go to the crisis unit. He called the police, and when they arrived, he was outside running up and down in front of the home and saying he wanted to go to the hospital. He was taken to North Shore Medical Center Crisis Unit. In an incident report dated February 12, 2018, it was reported that Client R.H. began screaming uncontrollably. He became verbally aggressive, ran outside the facility, said he wanted to kill himself, and asked for the police to be called. After unsuccessful attempts to de-escalate the situation, police were called, and he was taken to North Shore Medical Center's crisis unit. In an incident report dated March 26, 2018, it was reported that Client R.H. left to get items from the corner store and did not return. North Shore Medical Center called to say he had arrived there. He was admitted. In an incident report dated May 30, 2018, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home to get items from the store. He called in the afternoon saying he had gone to Jackson Memorial Hospital ER and been admitted into the crisis unit. In an incident report dated June 2, 2018, it was reported that Client R.H. went to his mother's home for a visit, where he initiated an altercation with his mother. He was taken to the North Shore Medical Center Crisis Unit. In an incident report dated June 12, 2018, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home. His mother later advised that he had walked to Jackson North and checked himself into the Crisis Unit. In an incident report dated June 26, 2018, it was reported that Client R.H. left the group home to go to the store. He wandered in to North Shore Medical Center and stated he was not feeling well. He was admitted as a medical patient. Ms. Whipple testified that Client R.H. was a competent adult and that she was legally unable to restrain him. She testified that he always asked for permission to leave. But when they told him he could not go, she testified, he would get mad and storm out the door anyway. Ms. Whipple recognized that Client R.H. required a great deal of supervision, and she requested that his level of care code be increased, so that she would be compensated in part for her increased responsibilities, but she testified that she was never focused that much on the amount of money she was receiving. Ms. Whipple testified that she trained her staff to redirect Client R.H.'s behaviors to ensure that he would not run off. She stated that an Extensive 1 level meant that he should be closely watched, and that is what the staff at Miracles' group home was trained to do. Mr. Lumumba testified that he had tried to place Client R.H. in other group homes, but that Miracles' group home was the only place that he knew Client R.H. would survive. The notations in these incident reports and support plans strongly support Mr. Lumumba's sentiment that Client R.H. "needs another supportive alternative program to rehabilitate him for his constant going to crisis." APD did not clearly show that the support plan's statement that Client R.H. "requires 24 hours' supervision" created a legal obligation for Miracles to literally provide constant supervision. APD did clearly and convincingly show that Miracles failed to facilitate the implementation of Client R.H.'s support plan, because, taken as a whole, it obviously required a very high level of supervision that Miracles could not, or did not, provide. APD does not argue, and there was no evidence to show, that Client R.H.'s dignity was infringed, that his right to privacy was violated, or that he was subjected to inhumane care, harm, unnecessary physical, chemical or mechanical restraint, isolation, or excessive medication. There was no evidence that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) verified that Miracles was responsible for any abuse, neglect, or exploitation of Client R.H. The record contains evidence of a single DCF investigation into allegations of maltreatment and inadequate supervision, opened on November 30, 2017, and closed on January 22, 2018. That investigation concluded that the allegations were not substantiated, that no intervention services or placement outside the home was needed, and that Client R.H.'s needs were being met. There was no compelling evidence to show that Client R.H. was subjected to abuse or exploitation by Miracles while at the group home. Client J.B. Client J.B. has an intellectual disability and lived at Miracles' group home from May until December of 2017. In an incident report filed by Ms. Loriston dated December 14, 2017, it was reported, in relevant part, that: On 12/14/17 at 6:15 pm wsc received a phone call from Ms. Felicia Whipple stating that she threw the consumer's belonging in the front yard as she is no longer welcome to her group home. Ms. Whipple also stated that [Client J.B.] is on the way home from her part-time job, she contacted [Client J.B.] to let her know of her belongings bein in the front yard. [Client J.B.] contacted law enforcement because she feared for her safety, WSC immediately was able to find an emergency accommodation at Paradise Gaine Group Home. While she testified that her report was accurate, Ms. Loriston described the events a bit differently at hearing. She testified that Ms. Whipple called her to say that Client J.B. could no longer come back to the group home and that her belongings would be waiting for her in front of the door. She specifically testified that Ms. Whipple did not tell her that she threw Client J.B.'s belongings in the front yard, but rather told her that they were at the front door. Ms. Loriston testified that when she arrived at Miracles' group home, she did not see the belongings, that the incident was over, and the police were gone. In an incident report filed by Ms. Whipple, dated December 16, 2017, it was reported that: Consumer receives her Social Security Disability Check and she is currently employed at MACY's. From these funds she refused to pay Room and Board and refused to move from the facility. Following a confrontation requesting payment, she left the facility and returned later with 2 cars loaded with family and associates to the facility to threaten the owner and the facility. Police were called and APD, Residential Services Coordinator, Carey Dashif. He along with the WSC coordinated the transition of consumer to another group home in the interest of safety for Miracles House residents and staff. Ms. Loriston's account of events was less than clear and convincing due to the discrepancies between her statement in the incident report and her testimony at hearing. She did not actually see any of the events of that evening and did not remember distinctly the exact admissions of Ms. Whipple, the critical competent evidence in the case. She was consistent in her testimony that Ms. Whipple admitted she had moved Client J.B.'s belongings. Her remaining testimony was largely hearsay. While Ms. Whipple's account of events was less than credible, it was not her burden to prove what happened. Ms. Llaguno testified that the proper procedure to terminate services to Client J.B. would have been for Miracles to send a 30-day notice terminating the placement. Ms. Loriston similarly testified that this was also her understanding. Remarkably, no APD rule establishing this policy was recognized or identified at hearing, however. Neither were Miracles' written criteria or procedures for termination of residential services introduced. Though Ms. Loriston's testimony that she had to immediately find other housing for Client J.B. is credited, violation of APD rules was not clearly shown. APD did not show that Miracles failed to have written criteria and procedures for termination in place or that they were not consistent with Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65G-3. Medicaid Action As stipulated by the parties, in July of 2017, the Agency for Health Care Administration took action against Miracles by terminating its Medicaid provider number. As stipulated by the parties, Miracles lost its Medicaid provider authorization, and has lost the right to furnish Medicaid services and receive payment from Medicaid in Florida. No evidence as to the basis for, or purposes of, the Medicaid termination was introduced. There was no evidence that Miracles previously had its license to operate a residential facility revoked by APD, DCF, or the Agency for Health Care Administration.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order finding Miracles House, Inc., as licensee of Miracles House, Inc., Group Home, in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65G-2.009(1)(a)1. and section 393.0673(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes; suspending its license to operate a group home until its right to furnish Medicaid services and receive payment from Medicaid in Florida is restored; and imposing a fine in the amount of $100. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2018.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(d)3. is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact Background This is a challenge to the facial validity of the 48-hour rule. It is not a challenge to the 48-hour rule as applied.2 Nonetheless, the following background provides the context that produced the challenge. See also Findings of Fact 14-16. LifePath, Suncoast, and Palm Coast (or related entities), as well as the Agency, are parties in pending proceedings at the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) involving Palm Coast's (or related entities) challenges to the Agency's preliminary determinations to deny CON applications (hospice) filed by Palm Coast (or related entities). These cases have been abated pending the outcome of this proceeding. In each proceeding, Palm Coast (or related entities) contends that a "special circumstance" exists under the 48-hour rule to justify approval of each CON application. Moreover, in support of its position, Palm Coast (or related entities) relies, in part, on data compiled by LifePath and Suncoast. It is the use of this data, in light of the 48-hour rule and interpretation thereof, that caused LifePath and Suncoast to file the rule challenges, notwithstanding that the Agency has not definitively interpreted the 48-hour rule. Parties The Agency administers the CON program for the establishment of hospice services and is also is responsible for the promulgation of rules pertaining to uniform need methodologies, including hospice services. See generally §§ 408.034(3) and (6) and 408.043(2), Fla. Stat.; Ch. 400, Part IV, Fla. Stat. Suncoast is a not-for-profit corporation operating a community-based hospice program providing hospice and other related services in Pinellas County, Florida, Hospice Service Area 5B. Suncoast has provided a broad range of hospice services to residents of Pinellas County since 1977. Suncoast has implemented an electronic medical records system and has developed a proprietary information management software system known as Suncoast Solutions. LifePath is a not-for-profit corporation operating a community-based hospice program providing hospice services in Hillsborough, Polk, Highlands, and Hardee Counties, Hospice Service Areas 6A and 6B. LifePath has provided a broad range of hospice services for the past 25 years. Palm Coast is a not-for-profit corporation currently operating licensed hospice programs in Daytona Beach, Florida, Hospice Service Area 4B and in Dade/Monroe Counties, Hospice Service Area 11. Palm Coast, as well as other related entities such as Odyssey Healthcare of Pinellas County, Inc., e.g., CON application No. 9984 filed in 2007, for Hospice Service Area 5B, has filed several CON applications to provide hospice services. It is also a party in pending proceedings before DOAH, challenging the Agency's preliminary decisions to deny the respective applications. Palm Coast's sole member is Odyssey Healthcare Holding Company, Inc., which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Odyssey Healthcare, Inc. (Odyssey). (Palm Coast and Odyssey shall be referred to as Palm Coast unless otherwise stated.) Standing Petitioners provide hospice services in Florida and have not applied for a CON to provide hospice services outside their current service areas. In the absence of a numeric need,3 an applicant for a hospice CON is afforded the opportunity to demonstrate a need for a new hospice program by proving "special circumstances." These include circumstances described in the 48-hour rule. The applicant must document that "there are persons referred to hospice programs who are not being admitted within 48 hours (excluding cases where a later admission date has been requested)."4 The parties have cited no law that requires an existing hospice provider to maintain records documenting when a person is referred to a hospice program. Public documents are not available that may otherwise provide information regarding when a person is referred to a hospice program.5 Existing providers do not uniformly maintain data that reflects the length of time between when a person is referred to and later admitted to a hospice program. By rule, existing licensed hospice providers in Florida are required to report admissions data every six months to the Agency. The Agency uses the information to calculate numeric need under the rule methodology. Petitioners keep records indicating, for their record keeping purposes, e.g., when a person contacts the hospice program and when the person is admitted. Petitioners use software to assimilate this type of information. Petitioners also maintain patient records that contain this type of information. However, this information is not specifically gathered and maintained for the purpose of determining when a person is actually "referred" to a hospice program and later "admitted" and whether "persons" are admitted within 48 hours from being referred. During discovery in pending CON proceedings following preliminary agency action, Petitioners produced information, related to this record, to Palm Coast or related entities. Palm Coast or related entities have used this information in their CON applications to justify a "special circumstance" under the 48-hour rule. See generally Pet 6, 17, 17A and PC 75-78. See also T 987-995. It is a fair inference that Palm Coast or related entities have and will use this information in CON application cases pending at DOAH. See generally Palm Coast's February 14, 2008, Request for Judicial Notice, items 1-18. It is the use of the information by Palm Coast or related entities, coupled with Palm Coast's or related entities interpretation of the 48-hour rule that caused Petitioners to file the rule challenges in this proceeding. LifePath and Suncoast are regulated by and subject to the provisions of Rule 59C-1.0355. See generally Pet 30 at 2, item 2. The 48-hour rule is a CON application criterion, a planning standard, that is not implicated unless and until an applicant relies on this provision in its hospice CON application and uses data provided by, e.g., existing providers such as Petitioners. Subject to balancing applicable statutory and rule CON criteria, application of the 48-hour rule may provide an applicant with a ground for approval of its CON application by indicating a need for a new hospice program. This may occur either leading up to the Agency's issuance of its SAAR, see Section 408.039(4)(b), Florida Statutes, stating the Agency's preliminary action to approve a CON application, or ultimately with the entry of a final order following a proceeding conducted pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. This information may also be considered during a public hearing if the Agency affords one. § 408.039(3)(b), Fla. Stat. Existing hospice providers, such as LifePath and Suncoast, may be substantially affected by the Agency's consideration of this information, especially if the Agency preliminarily concludes (in the SAAR) that a CON application should be approved based in part on application of the 48-hour rule. At that point, existing hospice providers have the right to initiate an administrative hearing upon a showing that its established program will be substantially affected by the issuance of the CON. See § 408.039(5)(c), Fla. Stat. Existing providers may also intervene in ongoing proceedings initiated by a denied applicant. Id. Petitioners have proven that they are substantially affected by the application of the 48-hour rule. Rule 59C-1.035(4) Prior to the Agency's adoption of Rule 59C-1.0355 in 1995, the Agency adopted Rule 59C-1.035, which included, in material part, a numeric need formula. In a prior rule challenge proceeding, it was alleged that Rule 59C-1.035(4) and in particular the numeric need formula was invalid. Paragraph (4)(e) provided: (e) Approval Under Special Circumstances. In the absence of need identified in paragraph (4)(a), the applicant must provide evidence that residents of the proposed service area are being denied access to hospice services. Such evidence must demonstrate that existing hospices are not serving the persons the applicant proposes to serve and are not implementing plans to serve those persons. This evidence shall include at least one of the following: Waiting lists for licensed hospice programs whose service areas include the proposed service area. Evidence that a specifically terminally ill population is not being served. Evidence that a county or counties within the service area of a licensed hospice program are not being served. Rule 59C-1.035(4), including paragraphs (4)(e)1.-3., was determined to be invalid. Catholic Hospice of Broward, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Administration, Case No. 94-4453RX, 1994 Fla. Div. Admin. Hear. LEXIS 5943 (DOAH Oct. 14, 1994), appeal dismissed, No. 1D94-3742 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan. 26, 1995). However, other than quoting from paragraph (4)(e) because it was included as part of the rule, there was no specific finding or conclusion regarding the validity of paragraphs (4)(e)1.-3. The successor rule, Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(d)1.-3., changed the preface language and substantially retained paragraphs (4)(e)2. and 3., now paragraphs (4)(d)1.-2., but omitted paragraph(4)(e)1. (waiting lists) and added paragraph(4)(d)3. (the 48-hour rule). Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(d)1.-3. Elfie Stamm has been employed by the Agency in different capacities. Material here, Ms. Stamm was the health services and facilities consultant supervisor for CON and budget review from July 1985 through June 1997. Since 1981, Ms. Stamm has had responsibility within the Agency for rule development. In and around 1994 and prior to the former hospice rule being invalidated, a work group was created for the purpose of developing a new hospice rule. Input was requested from the work group. Various hospice providers throughout the state participated in the rule development process. It appears that there was an attempt to replace the waiting list standard in the prior rule with the 48-hour standard. (There had been general objections made to the waiting list standard in this and other Agency rules.) The language for the 48-hour rule apparently came from the work group, rather than from Agency staff, although there is no evidence indicating which person or persons suggested the language. The Agency kept minutes of a meeting conducted on June 30, 1994, to discuss the proposed hospice rule, including the 48-hour rule. The minutes were kept to record any criticisms or comments regarding the proposed hospice rule. The minutes of a rule workshop "only addresses issues where people have concerns and varying opinions." The record does not reveal that any adverse comments were made regarding the 48-hour rule. In 1995, the Agency, adopted Rule 59C-1.0355, including Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(d)1.-3. that provides: (d) Approval Under Special Circumstances. In the absence of numeric need identified in paragraph (4)(a), the applicant must demonstrate that circumstances exist to justify the approval of a new hospice. Evidence submitted by the applicant must document one or more of the following: That a specific terminally ill population is not being served. That a county or counties within the service area of a licensed hospice program are not being served. That there are persons referred to hospice programs who are not being admitted within 48 hours (excluding cases where a later admission date has been requested). The applicant shall indicate the number of such persons.6 The 48-hour rule, in its present iteration at issue in this proceeding, has been a final rule since 1995.7 The Agency's hospice need methodology is set forth in Rule 59C-1.0355(4), which is entitled "Criteria for Determination of Need for a New Hospice Program." Rule 59C-1.0355(4) is comprised of four paragraphs, (4)(a) through (4)(e). Paragraph (4)(a) sets forth the process for the Agency's calculations of a numeric fixed need pool for a new hospice program. Paragraph (4)(b) provides that the calculation of a numeric need under paragraph (4)(a) will not normally result in approval of a new hospice program unless each hospice program in the service area in question has been licensed and operational for at least two years as of three weeks prior to publication of the fixed need pool. Paragraph (4)(c) similarly states that the calculation of a numeric need under paragraph (4)(a) will "not normally" result in approval of a new hospice program for any service area that has an approved but not yet licensed hospice program. Paragraph (4)(d) of the need methodology sets forth the three "special circumstances" quoted above. Paragraph (4)(e) sets forth preferences that may be applicable to a CON application for a new hospice program. The purpose of the 48-hour rule is to establish a standard by which the Agency may determine whether there is a timeliness of access issue that would justify approval of a new hospice program despite a zero fixed need pool calculation. Under the hospice need methodology, "special circumstances" are distinguishable from "not normal" circumstances, in part, because the three "special circumstances" are comprised of three delineated criteria rather than generally referencing what has been characterized as "free form" need arguments. Also, "not normal" circumstances may be presented when the Agency's numeric fixed need pool calculations produces a positive numeric need. Once an applicant demonstrates at least one "special circumstance" in accordance with Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(d)1.-3., the applicant may then raise additional arguments in support of need, which may be generally classified as "not normal" or as additional circumstances. Although the 48-hour rule has existed since 1995, it has rarely been invoked as a basis for demonstrating need by a CON applicant seeking approval of a new hospice program. In this light, the Agency has rarely been called upon to interpret and apply the 48-hour rule. The Agency recently approved a CON application filed in 2003 by Hernando-Pasco Hospice to establish a new hospice program in Citrus County (CON application No. 9678). The application was based, in part, on the 48-hour rule. In its SAAR, the Agency mentions that the applicant presented two letters of support, stating that some admissions to hospice were occurring more than 48 hours after referral. The number of patients was not quantified. There was no challenge to the Agency's preliminary decision. The Agency's decision does not provide any useful guidance with respect to the Agency's interpretation of the 48-hour rule. The Challenges Petitioners allege that the 48-hour rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the terms "referred" and "persons" are impermissibly vague and vest unbridled discretion with the Agency. For example, Petitioners point out that the term "referred" is not defined by statute or rule and contend it is not a term of art within the hospice industry. As a result, Petitioners assert the starting point for the 48-hour period cannot be determined from the face of the rule. Petitioners also contend that the 48-hour rule is arbitrary and capricious because the language, "excluding cases where a later admission date has been requested" (the parenthetical), is the only exception that may be considered when determining whether there has been compliance with the subsection, when, in fact, there are "other facts and circumstances beyond the control of the hospice provider that may result in delay in admission of a hospice patient." Petitioners also contend that the use of a 48-hour time period for assessing the need for a new hospice provider in a service area notwithstanding the Agency calculation of a zero numeric need is arbitrary and capricious. Finally, Petitioners allege that the 48-hour rule contravenes the specific provisions of Section 408.043(2), Florida Statutes, which is one of the laws it implements. Specifically, Petitioners further allege that "[b]ecause of its vagueness, its lack of adequate standards, its vesting of unbridled discretion with the Agency, and its arbitrary and capricious nature [the 48-hour rule] fails to establish any meaningful measure of the 'need for and availability of hospices in the community,' as required by [S]ection 408.043(2), Florida Statutes, and in violation of Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2007)." Joint Prehearing Stipulation at 2-4. The Agency's and Palm Coast's Positions The Agency and Palm Coast contend that Petitioners do not have standing to challenge the 48-hour rule, but otherwise assert that the 48-hour rule is not invalid. In part, Palm Coast and the Agency contend that there is a common and ordinary meaning of the term "referred," which is "that point in time when a specific patient or family member on behalf of a patient or provider contacts a hospice provider seeking to access hospice services. Once a patient, patient family member on behalf of [a] patient, or provider contact [sic] a hospice provider seeking to access services, the 48 hour 'clock' should begin to run." See Joint Prehearing Stipulation at 6; AHCA/Palm Coast PFO at paragraph 79. With respect to the term "persons," Palm Coast and the Agency suggest that whether there are a sufficient number of "persons" that fit within the special circumstance "is a fact-based inquiry, which should be evaluated based on a totality of the circumstances." The Agency and Palm Coast contend that circumstances other than as stated in the parenthetical may be considered. Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(d)3. and Specific Terms Referred The term "referred" is not defined either by AHCA rule, in Chapter 400, Part IV, Florida Statutes, entitled "Hospices," or in Chapter 408, Part I, Florida Statutes, entitled "Health Facility and Services Planning." The terms "referred" or "referral" are not defined in any Agency final order or written policy. No definition of "referred" appears in at least three dictionaries, Webster's New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 2005) at 1203, Webster's II New College Dictionary (1999) at 931, and Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) at 989, although "refer" is defined, id. For example, "refer" means, in part "[t]o direct to a source for help or information." Webster's II New College Dictionary (1999) at 931. The term "referral," as a noun, means: "1 a referring or being referred, as for professional service, etc. 2 a person who is referred or directed to another person, an agency, etc." Webster's New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 2005) at 1204. Referral also means: "The practice of sending a patient to another practitioner or specialty program for consultation or service. Such a practice involves a delegation of responsibility for patient care, which should be followed up to ensure satisfactory care." Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary at 1843 (19th ed.). Pet 18A. Pursuant to the Patient Self-Referral Act of 1992, "'[r]eferral' means any referral of a patient by a health care provider for health care services, including, without limitation: 1. The forwarding of a patient by a health care provider to another health care provider or to an entity which provides or supplies designated health services or any other health care item or service; or 2. The request or establishment of a plan of care by a health care provider, which includes the provision of designated health services or other health care item or service." § 456.053(3)(o)1.-2., Fla. Stat. Essentially, this Act seeks to avoid potential conflicts of interest with respect to referral of patients for health care services. In the absence of any authoritative definition of "referred," it is appropriate to determine whether the word has a definite meaning to the class of persons within the 48-hour rule. It is also appropriate to consider the Agency's interpretation of the 48-hour rule. As noted, hospice services are required to be available to all terminally ill patients and their families. Under the 48-hour rule, a CON applicant has the opportunity to prove that persons are being denied timely access to hospice services after 48 hours elapses from when they have been referred and they have not been admitted, absent some a reasonable justification. The issue is what elements are necessary for a person to be deemed "referred" and are those elements commonly understood well enough to enable the 48-hour rule to withstand a challenge for vagueness. If a person calls a hospice organization and inquires about the availability of hospice services, does this call start the 48-hour period? If the same person calls a hospice organization and states that he or she is the caregiver/surrogate for an elderly parent in need of hospice services, does this call start the 48-hour period? If the same person calls a hospice organization and states that he or she is the caregiver/surrogate of an elderly parent in need of hospice services, that the elderly parent is terminally ill, and further requests hospice services, does this call start the 48-hour period? If the same person calls a hospice organization and states that he or she is the caregiver/surrogate of an elderly parent in need of hospice services, that the elderly parent is terminally ill based on a prognosis by a licensed physician under Chapters 458 or 459, Florida Statutes, and further requests hospice services, does this call start the 48-hour period? Does eligibility for hospice services have a bearing on when a person is referred? If so, what factor(s) constitute eligibility? Petitioners contend the term "referred," as used in the 48-hour rule, can not be defined with any precision; hence the term is vague.8 Petitioners describe "referred" and "referral," for operational purposes, but not with respect to how the term "referred" is used in the 48-hour rule. Agency experts define the term differently, although none suggest the term is vague. Palm Coast offers a definition of "referred" or "referral" as part of its standard of admitting patients within three hours after referral. But, Palm Coast has a more generic and broader definition for the terms when used in the 48-hour rule. It is determined that "referred" can be defined with some precision and is not vague. But, the various positions and thought processes of the parties are described below and help in framing the controversy for resolution. LifePath and Suncoast Over the years, LifePath developed an administrative/operational manual pertaining to policies and procedures. One such policy is the "referral/intake procedure" that is the subject of a two page written policy, PC 55, revised March 2006. LifePath does not have a written definition of the terms inquiry or referral. LifePath does not believe it is reasonable to define referral as the point in time when a patient, a patient family member, or a physician requests hospice services on behalf of a patient. It is too general. In and around March 2006, LifePath considered a referral to occur when a first contact to LifePath was made by a person requesting hospice services. LifePath used the term referred "to anybody requesting services as a referral source." The admissions staff was directed to gather from the referral source, physician, and/or family any information needed to complete the patient record in the Patient Information System, and contact the patient/family on the same day of referral if available to discuss Lifepath hospice services. Sometime after December 2006, and the final hearing that was held in the Marion County hospice case, LifePath began revising its referral and intake procedure. According to LifePath, its process did not change, only its manner of characterizing certain terms, such as referral. At this time, LifePath wanted to track more precisely different occurrences within LifePath's process, including providing a more accurate label for referral as a request for assessment (RFA) rather than a referral. For LifePath, a referral and a RFA are not synonymous. A RFA is the first contact with the hospice program, which enables staff to follow- up with the prospective patient. A referral is a written physician's order for admission. At the same time, it had come to LifePath's attention that hospice providers (Palm Coast) defined referral differently. It became clear to LifePath that "Palm Coast had a very different definition of referral than [LifePath] did at that particular time. [LifePath] wanted to be able to clearly track each event during that time process so that [LifePath] would be able to compare with [Palm Coast's] definition of referral at that time." Stated somewhat differently, LifePath wanted to create a process that would capture several events (e.g., dates and times) consistently and measurable in the intake process rather than comb through paper charts to verify what they were doing. In April 2007, LifePath made several changes and updates to its written policy/procedure manual and software system, including using the term RFA instead of referral. According to the revised April 2007 policy, "Intake means: the initial demographic and patient condition information that is necessary to initiate the process for 'request for assessment.'" PC 56-57. In summary, for LifePath, a RFA for services is different from and precedes a referral. A RFA occurs when a person makes an initial contact with LifePath inquiring about access to hospice services. At this point LifePath has a name and an action to follow up with, and the information is entered into LifePath's system. The intake process begins. A RFA could be made by a physician in the community who orally or in writing requests LifePath to assess a patient for hospice care and/or issues an assess and admit order if appropriate. A call from a physician requesting LifePath to determine whether a person is appropriate for hospice services begins LifePath's RFA process. An RFA could arise when a person calls LifePath and says that their neighbor is really sick and gives LifePath the neighbors name and telephone number. RFA used in the April 2007 policy revision (PC 56) means the same as the term referral as used in the March 2006 policy revision (PC 55), i.e., the same point in time when LifePath received the patient's name and began the intake process and ability to follow up. Again, LifePath's intake process did not change; Lifepath's policies became more specific describing the events that occur during the entire intake process. According to LifePath, LifePath's revised policy of April 2007 is not reflective of LifePath's interpretation of the 48-hour rule. LifePath's revised policy "outlines the process in the organization in which [Lifepath] begin the intake process and how [LifePath follows] up and then certain moments in time within that process that [LifePath tracks] and monitor[s] as an organization." The April 2007 revision was followed by a May 2007 revision. LifePath characterized Palm Coast exhibits 55 through 57 as an "interim pilot process" that has been made permanent without any apparent significant changes. LifePath also perceived Palm Coast as defining referral to mean when a physician issues an admission order. As a result, LifePath began capturing data reflecting that moment in time so that the Agency could compare LifePath's data -- an apples-to-apples approach -- with another provider's data based on a definition that equated referral with a physician's order, but not for the purpose of defining what referred means to LifePath under the 48-hour rule. LifePath now considers a referral to occur when a physician issues an order to admit for the purpose of gathering data that is to be used to compare other providers, not for the purpose of applying the 48-hour rule. An assess and admit order in LifePath's view is not a referral until LifePath assesses the patient, obtains consent of care, determines that the patient is appropriate for hospice services, receives certification, and receives an order to admit the patient at that time. The RFA process is completed when either the patient is admitted to the program or it is determined that the patient cannot be admitted to the program. LifePath will admit a patient in lieu of having an admitting order when LifePath receives a verbal order to admit the patient from a physician. The verbal order for admission is a referral. LifePath admits at least 75 percent of its patients within 48 hours of the RFA. However, LifePath gave several reasons outside of a hospice program's control that would delay admission greater than 48 hours from the RFA. LifePath believes that the Agency's rule is a good rule, but that the language has been taken out of context and used inappropriately. Like LifePath, Suncoast's interest in the 48-hour rule was stimulated when Palm Coast filed two CON applications requesting approval to provide hospice services in Pinellas County and both applications claim a need for an additional hospice program based, in part, on the 48-hour rule. Suncoast was concerned with the manner in which referral was being used by Palm Coast in light of data provided by Suncoast and further believes that the 48-hour rule is being manipulated by Palm Coast. Suncoast uses an elaborate software product that uses terms such as referral. Suncoast does not have a formal policy definition of referral. Suncoast believes that there are differing definitions of referral among hospice programs. Suncoast filed its rule challenge because according to Suncoast the 48-hour rule is nonspecific; because there is no commonly understood definition of referral in the hospice rule or in the Agency that Suncoast and other hospice providers can depend on. Given the lack of a specific definition, Suncoast and others are unable to determine when the 48-hour clock begins. As used in its business and not for the purpose of defining the term in the 48-hour rule, Suncoast defines referral to mean "that first contact with [Suncoast's] program where [Suncoast gets] a name and [Suncoast gets] other information about the client so that [Suncoast] can go see them." This definition is not limited Medicare reimbursed hospice services. Inquiry and referral are the starting points. But, Suncoast states that there is no consistent definition of referral across the hospice industry. Suncoast also views a referral and an admission as "processes," "not really events." Sometimes the process takes a period of weeks to evolve with many variants, e.g., eligibility, consent, etc. Palm Coast In this proceeding, Interrogatories were answered on behalf of Hospice of the Palm Coast - Daytona and by Hospice of the Palm Coast - Waterford at Blue Lagoon with respect to the referral, intake, and admission of patients for hospice services to such facilities. Several terms are defined. "Referral" is an industry term, referring to contact by an individual or entity including but not limited to a patient, family member on behalf of a patient, HCS, POA, guardian, ALF, nursing home, or hospital seeking to access hospice services. "Referred" is an industry term, having a plain and ordinary meaning within the hospice field which generally describes when a patient, patient family member or personal representative, or provider contacts a hospice program seeking to access hospice services. "Intake" [] a general term of art describing the process from referral to admission. Admission is a general term of art describing that point in time when a patient meets all eligibility requirements including clinical requirements for hospice services and is admitted to a hospice program. [Assessment is t]he process by which patients are evaluated regarding clinical appropriateness for hospice services including eligibility requirements as set forth by state regulation, Medicare, Medicaid or other third party payors. [First Contact and initial contact, a]s it relates to referral, intake, and admission of patients, are defined above as referral and referred. For Palm Coast's purposes, a referral occurs when someone, e.g., a physician, discharge planner, family or a friend, contacts the hospice agency seeking hospice services. If the first contact comes from a physician, Palm Coast seeks that physician's approval to admit the patient if the patient is eligible or qualifies for hospice. For Palm Coast, it is typical to obtain a physician's written order for evaluation and admission before the patient is evaluated by the hospice provider. If a physician calls with a referral of a patient, the call goes to the admission coordinator. Calls from patients or family of a hospice patient would be routed into the clinical division. A referral does not include contacting a hospice requesting information where a chemotherapy wig or a hospital bed could be purchased. For Palm Coast, the admissions coordinator determines when an inquiry is an inquiry only or is a referral. The phone call may turn into a referral when the caller is asking for hospice services to be provided or a family member or to a patient who is at their end of life as opposed to a general request for information about hospice services. But, Palm Coast does not have written criteria for use by the admissions coordinator in determining whether a phone call is an inquiry or referral, or when an inquiry becomes a referral. Odyssey also does not have a written definition of referral, although it is a term used in policies and procedures. A referral results when they have a patient's name and a physician's name and someone is calling for hospice services. Ms. Ventre states that order and referral are not interchangeable. A physician's order is not a referral. For the purpose of describing Palm Coast's hospice operations and referring to page four of the "referral process" page within Palm Coast's Admission and Patient/Family Rights Policies, a referral begins when a written physician's order is received by the hospice program. Receipt of a physician's written order and referral are synonymous regarding the three- hour standard. Receipt of a telephone call from a potential patient does not qualify as a referral. It is classified as an inquiry. It is unusual for a patient or a patient's family would make a referral themselves. (Ms. Ventre characterized an inquiry as someone calling for an explanation of hospice services. A phone call could be classified as an inquiry or referral depending on the depth of the call. It may be an inquiry where there is no follow-up.) Palm Coast uses Odysseys service standard providing that all patients are admitted within three hours from a written physician's order to admit -- 24 hours a day, seven days a week. (This three hour standard is one of 14 standards adopted by Palm Coast/Odyssey.) A clinical assessment is performed within this three hour period. For Palm Coast, if it has a written physician's order to admit and if the family is available, Palm Coast believes it can meet the three-hour standard. Palm Coast (and Odyssey) does not track the time between receipt of a physician's order to evaluate and the admission of the patient nor does Odyssey track the time between the receipt of a physician's order to admit and the time the admission of the patient. Palm Coast (and Odyssey) maintains internal mechanisms that are reviewed on a daily basis to evaluate the referral process and if patients are being admitted in a timely fashion. Sometimes the three-hour standard is not met. The most frequent reason is that the patient and/or the family are not available to meet. Another is the time it may take to gather documentation from the referring physician. The Agency Agency experts defined "referred" differently. During the final hearing, Ms. Stamm stated that in order for a person to receive hospice services, the person must be qualified or eligible. Eligibility occurs when a physician certifies that the person has a six months or less (for Medicare) or (pursuant to Florida law) one year or less life expectancy. Ms. Stamm clarified her deposition testimony during the final hearing and stated that a person is referred to a hospice program when a request for hospice services is made to the hospice program by or on behalf of the person, coupled with the physician's written certification. A referral would not occur when, e.g., the person or someone on their behalf simply asks for hospice services without the physician's certification. Ms. Stamm was not aware whether this interpretation reflected the Agency's interpretation. She never thought there was a problem with defining "referred" or that it was an issue, so it was not discussed. Also, Ms. Stamm was not aware of how the Agency has interpreted the 48-hour rule. Mr. Gregg confirmed that there is no written definition of referred, but that it is commonly used in healthcare, i.e., "referral is a mechanism by which a patient is channeled into some specific new or different provider." Having considered his prior deposition testimony, see endnote 9, and in preparation for the final hearing in this proceeding, for Mr. Gregg, the 48 hours starts "[a]t the point of initial contact," "the point when some person representing a potential patient calls a hospice or contacts a hospice and says I believe we have a person who is appropriate for your service." The first contact could be made by a hospital discharge planner or nursing home social worker. Mr. Gregg does not believe that a physician's certification is required to start the 48-hour period or is part of the initial contact.9 Rather, the physician's certification would come at the end of the process, although the "physician is going to be a part of a successful referral." In other words, in order to start the 48-hour period, it would not be necessary for the hospice program to be advised that a patient was terminally ill. The latter determination is required to assess whether "the patient is appropriate and eligible." Generally, Mr. Baehr agrees with Mr. Gregg's view. For Mr. Baehr, there is a transfer of responsibility that occurs when the first contact is made at a point in time when either the patient or a family member or some institution, whether it be an assisted living facility, nursing home, hospital, or a physician, makes a contact with a hospice, and in a sense initiates a process that requires the hospice program to respond and do something so that this process can get underway. Mr. Baehr opines that referral has a common understanding; it is similar to when a patient is provided with a different medical service, whether it be hospice or some other form of healthcare service, from the one they are currently receiving. Mr. Baehr differentiates this scenario from one that occurs when a person merely seeks information about hospice versus someone who is seeking eventual admission to a hospice program. Admitted There is no rule or statute that requires a hospice provider to admit a patient within a certain time period. In Big Bend Hospice, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Administration, Case No. 01-4415CON, 2002 Fla. Div. Hear. LEXIS 1584 (DOAH Nov. 7, 2002; AHCA April 8, 2003), aff'd, 904 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), a proceeding involving a challenge to a numerical need (under the fixed need pool) for an additional hospice program, it was expressly found: "40. An admission consists of several components: (a) a physician's diagnosis and prognosis of a terminal illness; (b) a patient's expressed request for hospice care; (c) the informed consent of the patient; (d) the provision of information regarding advance directive to the patient; and (e) performance of an initial professional assessment of the patient. At that point, the patient is considered admitted. A patient does not have to sign an election of Medicare benefits form for hospice care prior to being admitted." 2002 Fla. Div. Admin. Hear. LEXIS at *26- 27(emphasis added). See also § 400.6095(2)-(4), Fla. Stat. This finding of fact was adopted by AHCA in its Final Order. A patient cannot be admitted for Medicare reimbursement without a physician's order. In order to be eligible to elect hospice care under Medicare, an individual must be entitled to Part A of Medicare and be certified by their attending physician, if the individual has an attending physician, and the hospice medical director as being terminally ill, i.e., that the individual has a medical prognosis that his or her life expectancy is six months or less if the illness runs its normal course, and consent. 42 C.F.R. §§ 418.3, 418.20(a)- (b), and 418.22(a),(b),(c)(i)-(ii). AHCA has defined the term "admitted" by and through its Final Order in Big Bend Hospice and there is no persuasive evidence in this case to depart from that definition, although the definition of the term was discussed during the hearing. The Agency's definition of "admitted" establishes the outer time limit when the 48-hour period ends for the purpose of the 48-hour rule. Persons The 48-hour rule requires the applicant to indicate the number of persons who are referred but not admitted to hospice within 48 hours of the referral (excluding cases where a later admission is requested). The term "persons" is not defined by AHCA statute or rule. However, the term is generically defined by statute. "The word 'person' includes individuals, children, firms, associations, joint adventures, partnerships, estates, trusts, business trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries, corporations, and all other groups or combinations." § 1.01(3), Fla. Stat. "The singular includes the plural and vice versa." § 1.01(1), Fla. Stat. The term "persons" used in the 48-hour rule is not vague, ambiguous, or capricious. In context, it refers to individuals who are eligible for hospice services within the meaning of the 48-hour rule as discussed herein and who request hospice services. The Agency has not established by rule or otherwise a specific number of persons that can trigger a special circumstance under the 48-hour rule or the specific duration for counting such persons. The numeric need formula does not encompass every health planning consideration. The need formula is based on general assumptions such as population, projected deaths, projected death rates applying statewide averages, and admissions. The special circumstances set forth in Rule 59C- 1.0355(4)(d) compliment other portions of the rule and the statutory review criteria and allows an applicant to identify factors that may be unique to a particular service area, such as a particular provider not providing timely access to persons needing hospice services or a service area that is rural or urban that affects access. One size may not appropriately fit all. Rather, the term is capable of being applied on a case-by-case basis when (hospice) CON applications are reviewed by the Agency prior to the issuance of the SAAR and thereafter, if necessary, in a de novo proceeding, through and including the issuance of a final order. The Agency's exercise of discretion is not unbridled. Excluding cases where a later admission date has been requested10 The 48-hour rule provides in part: "3. That there are persons referred to hospice programs who are not being admitted within 48 hours (excluding cases where a later admission date has been requested). The applicant shall indicate the number of such persons." There is some testimony that the parenthetical may be interpreted broadly by the Agency, although Mr. Gregg suggested that the parenthetical was literally limited to when a specific request is made for a later admission date. There are numerous circumstances beyond the control of a hospice that delay an admission other than when a later admission date is requested under the rule. These circumstances do not necessarily indicate an access problem.11 Petitioners provided examples of situations (other than when a later admission date is requested) that may arise when a person would not be admitted with 48 hours after being referred such as when a patient or family is unresponsive to a contact made by the hospice provider; a patient was out of a hospice program's service area when the initial request for hospice services was made and no immediate plans to transfer to the service area; the patient/family/caregiver chose to stay with another benefit, e.g. skilled nursing facility, versus electing their hospice Medicare benefit; a patient residing in a non-contract hospital, e.g., VA Hospital, when the initial request is made and patient admitted to hospice service when the patient is transferred out of that facility into a contract facility, hospice inpatient setting or home; patient meeting the admission criteria at a later date; a delay in obtaining a physician order for assessment; or when a patient is incompetent at the time the initial request to consent for care or other delays in obtaining consent. There are also factors where a referral does not end in an admission. Persons falling in this category would not be counted under the 48-hour rule. The Agency and Palm Coast suggest that the Agency may consider these non-enumerated factors, whereas LifePath and Suncoast suggest the Agency's discretion is limited. Compare Agency/Palm Coast PFO at paragraphs 90-95, and 141 with LifePath/Suncoast PFO at paragraphs 61-67. The persuasive evidence indicates that the Agency should consider these factors. Nevertheless, the plain language of the parenthetical excludes from consideration legitimate circumstances that would reasonably explain a delay in admission other than the affirmative request for a later admission date and, as a result, is unreasonably restrictive. 48 hours Licensed hospice programs are required to provide hospice services to terminally ill patients, 24 hours a day and seven days a week. It is important that terminally ill persons who request hospice services (or if requested on their behalf), receive access to hospice services in a timely fashion. There is evidence that approximately 30 percent of patients that are admitted to hospice die within seven days or less after admission, i.e., an average length of stay of seven days or less. While the opinions of experts conflict, the 48-hour period is a quantifiable standard assuming that there is a precise and reasonable definition of referred and admission. Ultimate Findings of Fact Having considered the entire record in this proceeding, it is determined that the term "referred" is not impermissibly vague or arbitrary or capricious. A person is "referred" to a hospice program when a terminally ill person and/or their legal guardian or other person acting in a representative capacity, e.g., licensed physician or discharge planner, on their behalf, requests hospice services from a licensed hospice program in Florida. This definition presumes that prior to or contemporaneous with the request for hospice services a determination has been made by a physician licensed pursuant to Chapter 458 or Chapter 459, Florida Statutes, that the person is terminally ill, i.e., "that the patient has a medical prognosis that his or her life expectancy is 1 year or less if the illness runs its course." §§ 400.601(10) and 400.6095(2), Fla. Stat. This determination may be made by, e.g., the hospice's medical director, who presumably would be licensed pursuant to one of these statutes. The Agency and Palm Coast implicitly suggest that a referral (pursuant to the 48-hour rule) does not include a determination by a physician that the person is terminally ill. When it comes to "referral" in the generic, non- emergency physician/patient setting, the patient is examined by a physician; the physician determines that the patient needs a further evaluation by a specialist; and the physician refers the patient to the specialist.12 This is usually followed with a written order. The patient, or his or her authorized representative on the patient's behalf, must consent to and request any further examination for the ensuing service to be provided. The point is that the physician makes the referral. In order to apply the plain and commonly understood meaning of the term "referred" in the context of the 48-hour rule, the physician's determination is a critical component of the referral process, coupled with the patient's request and ultimate consent for services. Access to hospice services and the time it takes to deliver the service is of the essence for the prospective hospice patient. Having a written and dated physician certification of terminal illness would likely make recordkeeping easier and more predictable to assist in determining when the 48-hour period starts, in conjunction with the request for services. However, the potential delay in obtaining a written certification from a physician who has determined the patient is terminally ill should not be required to begin the 48-hour period and the referral in light of the purpose of the 48-hour rule. Thus, while a determination of terminal illness is necessary to start the running of the 48 hours under the 48-hour rule, reduction of that determination to writing is not. This definition, coupled with the 48 hour admission requirement and consideration of other factors affecting an admission, provides a sufficient standard for determining whether a person is receiving hospice services in a timely fashion.13 Whether access has been denied to a sufficient number of "persons" under the rule for the purpose of determining whether a special circumstance may justify approval of a hospice CON application in the absence of numeric need can be determined on a case-by-case basis by the Agency in the SAAR or later, if subject to challenge in a Section 150.57(1), Florida Statutes, proceeding in light of the facts presented. See generally Humhosco, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 476 So. 2d 258, 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The use of the word "persons" in the rule is not vague or arbitrary or capricious. The time period of "48 hours" is not vague or arbitrary or capricious. Given the plight of terminally ill persons needing hospice services, it is not unreasonable for the Agency to have chosen this time period, in conjunction with "referred" and "admitted" as the beginning and stopping points for determining whether access is being afforded on a timely basis. The parenthetical language "(excluding cases where a later admission date has been requested)" is arbitrary and capricious because it precludes consideration of other factors that reasonably demand consideration given the rule's purpose. There is persuasive evidence that persons may not access hospice services (be admitted within 48 hours after being referred) within the 48-hour period based on circumstances that are outside the control of the hospice provider and arguably outside the parenthetical language. To the extent the parenthetical language is construed to limit consideration to one circumstance, the failure to consider other circumstances could unreasonably skew upward or overstate the number of persons that may fit outside the 48-hour period and indicates a lack of timely access when the contrary may be true, having considered the circumstances. The 48-hour rule can remain intact notwithstanding severance of the parenthetical language. The remaining portions of the rule provide an applicant with a viable avenue to demonstrate a lack of timely access based on a special circumstance. Finally, even if the 48-hour rule was not in existence, under applicable statutory and rule criteria, see, e.g., Subsections 408.035(2), Florida Statutes, an applicant may provide evidence that persons are being denied timely access to hospice services in a service area. However, such evidence would not necessarily be classified as a special circumstance unless the evidence fit within Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(d)1. and 2.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Petitioner’s employment position was properly reclassified from career service to the selected exempt service pursuant to Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001). All citations are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed with the Department beginning in 1998 as a Grant Specialist. In April 2000, she applied for and was promoted into a newly created position of Operations Management Consultant (OMC) Manager in the Serving Health Insurance Needs of Elders (SHINE) program. The SHINE program is primarily a statewide health insurance counseling program designed to serve Florida’s elders. At the time of her promotion, Petitioner’s new position was classified under the Career Service System. The position was reclassified from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service effective July 1, 2001. Petitioner’s position description describes the duties and responsibilities of the position as follows: The Operations and Management Consultant Manager assists with supervision and coordination of day-to-day volunteer management and program management functions for the SHINE (Serving Health Insurance Needs of Elders) Program. Works [sic] is performed under the supervision of the program coordinator (Senior Management Analyst Supervisor) and in support of the department’s mission, vision and values. The position description also provides percentages of time regarding activities engaged in pertaining to these duties and responsibilities: 30% Manages volunteer support activities for the SHINE Program. Provides orientation, training and ongoing technical assistance to program partners and volunteer leadership; develops resource guides and other tools to assist with programmatic and operational issues; conducts meetings, workshops and seminars to build leadership skills; maintains regular communication with program liaisons and volunteer leadership; disseminates correspondence on key programmatic issues; helps resolve operational challenges; and works to ensure outcomes measures are achieved. 20% Supervises volunteer service functions for the program. Develops protocols and tracking systems for service and support provided to volunteers and staff. Coordinates collection of information for the volunteer database and maintenance of volunteer files. Assists with surveys and evaluations. Supervises activities of program staff. 10% Assists with development, preparation, monitoring and oversight of contracts of agreement with providers and program partners. 10% Performs other duties as assigned by SHINE Program Coordinator. 10% Ensures the aspects of SHINE Program of Information& Referral (I & R), education and outreach are coordinated with the overall agency responsibility in those areas. Supervises staff activities as they relate to these functions. 5% Takes the lead for the preparation for the SHINE grant reapplication and other related new grant applications and opportunities. 5% Assists with budget development. 5% Ensures that required grant reports and narratives are submitted to funder on time and complete. 5% Represents Department of Elder Affairs and SHINE at community education events for the public and the aging network. May make presentations at workshops, community forums and seminars as assigned. Serves as an advocate for elders. Further, the position description lists six positions which are described as “subordinate positions.” This is consistent with the organizational chart of the Division of Self Care and Community Volunteer Initiatives which also reflects six positions directly under her position. However, during the time Petitioner held the position of OMC Manager, there were some reorganizations that resulted in two of the positions being shifted, sometimes being under the authority of Petitioner and sometimes being under the authority of others. In any event, at all times material hereto Petitioner was the supervisor of five to seven persons. Petitioner does not dispute that she performed some supervisory duties. At hearing, she acknowledged that she had supervisory duties, but asserts that she only spent a minimal amount of time in the performance of supervisory activities. Each morning, Petitioner would hold a staff briefing which lasted 15 to 30 minutes with the individuals she supervised. Petitioner described these group staff meetings as an update session to discuss “what’s hot, what are you working on, do you need help, do you need information . . . and more targeted towards continuing to instill a teamwork type of effort in the attitude of the staff.” In addition to her duties regarding staff, Petitioner was also responsible for the oversight of contracts with program providers and with volunteers. These providers and volunteers were not employees of the Department. Petitioner estimates that she spent between 50 and 75 percent of each day on contract management issues. However, in terms of her responsibility to develop, prepare, monitor, and oversee those contracts, she would utilize her staff in order to carry out many of those duties. Tom Reimers has worked for the Department since 1995. He is currently the Director of the Division of Volunteer and Community Services. Prior to that, he served as Director of the SHINE Program. During part of that time, Mr. Reimers was Petitioner’s direct supervisor. According to Mr. Reimers, Petitioner was responsible for the work product of the employees she supervised, in reviewing their work product, in informing those employees when their work product was inadequate, and in evaluating employees including signing their “Review and Performance Planning” forms. Her signature on those employee reviews appears in the line designated for “supervisor’s signature.” Mr. Reimers considered Petitioner to be a full-time supervisor in that Petitioner had the authority to sign time sheets, approve and consider requests for travel, provide information to her employees about their job and about the Department’s mission, ensure that they were carrying out the mission, and provide guidance to her subordinate employees. When Mr. Reimers received communications from the persons under Petitioner’s supervision or needed to communicate something to them, he would generally funnel that communication through Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Reimers was frequently out of the office due to his job responsibilities. When he was out of the office, Petitioner described herself as a “second-in-command type of individual monitoring the program at home.” Mr. Reimers conducted Petitioner’s employee evaluations. His review of her work included her ability to communicate with employees, whether she was properly assigning and overseeing work of her subordinates, and whether she was motivating her staff. Petitioner received positive evaluations from Mr. Reimers. Petitioner interviewed applicants for at least two employment positions and made recommendations regarding their employment. In both instances, those persons recommended by Petitioner were hired. Petitioner was employed by the Department until March 31, 2002, when her position was eliminated because of loss of grant monies which funded her position. The weight of the evidence supports a conclusion that Petitioner spent a majority of her time supervising employees as contemplated by Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Department of Elder Affairs should enter a final order finding that the position held by Petitioner Candace C. McMahon on July 1, 2001, was properly classified into the selected exempt service. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2004.
The Issue Whether the Certificate of Need (CON) applications filed by Odyssey Healthcare of Collier County, Inc., d/b/a Odyssey Healthcare of Northwest Florida, Inc. (Odyssey), and HPH South, Inc. (HPH), for a new hospice program in the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or the Agency) Service Area 5B, satisfy, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule review criteria to warrant approval; and whether such applications establish a need for a new hospice based on special circumstances, and, if so, which of the two applications best meets the applicable criteria for approval. Holding: Neither applicant proved the existence of special circumstances warranting approval of an additional hospice program in Service Area 5B. Although neither application is recommended for approval in this Recommended Order, both applicants, on balance, satisfy the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Of the two, HPH best satisfies the criteria.
Findings Of Fact The Parties AHCA The Agency for Health Care Administration is the state agency authorized to evaluate and render final determinations on CON applications pursuant to Subsection 408.034(1), Florida Statutes. HPH HPH is a newly created not-for-profit corporation formed to initiate hospice services in Pinellas County. HPH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hernando-Pasco Hospice, Inc., d/b/a HPH Hospice and is one of the oldest, not-for-profit community hospices in Florida. HPH Hospice was incorporated in 1982 to serve terminally ill persons within Hernando and Pasco Counties. HPH was approved to expand its services north to Citrus County in 2004. HPH is a high-quality provider of hospice services in the service areas where it currently operates. It provides pain control and symptom management, spiritual care, bereavement, volunteer, social work, and other programs. HPH employs a physician-driven model of hospice care, with significant involvement of hospice and palliative care physicians who are physically present treating patients in their homes. The number of physician home visits provided to hospice patients by HPH physicians is larger than many hospices in Florida and throughout the United States. In 2009, HPH provided over 35,000 visits by physicians, advanced registered nurse practitioners, and licensed physician assistants to its hospice patients. The majority of these visits occurred in the patients' homes. HPH operates multiple facilities that allow for provision of services to patients in various settings and hospice levels of care. Among its facilities, HPH operates four buildings it calls Care Centers, at which patients can receive general in-patient care. Additionally, HPH operates four units which it calls Hospice Houses. Those units provide for residential care in a home-like environment for patients who do not have caregivers at home or who otherwise are in need of a home. HPH receives no reimbursement for room and board for the care provided at its Hospice Houses and expends over $1.4 million annually in charity care to operate these Hospice Houses for the benefit of its patients. HPH has an established record of providing all levels of hospice care and does not use its Care Centers as a substitute for providing continuous care in the patient's home when such care is needed. Annually, HPH provides approximately percent of its patient days for continuous care patients. HPH has well-developed staff education and training programs, including specialized protocols for care and treatment of patients by terminal disease type such as Alzheimer's, COPD, cancer, failure to thrive, and pulmonary diseases. Odyssey Odyssey is the entity applying for a new hospice program in Service Area 5B. The sole shareholder of Odyssey is Odyssey HealthCare Operating B, LP, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Odyssey HealthCare, Inc. (OHC), Odyssey's parent and management affiliate. Odyssey was formed for the purpose of filing for CON applications in Florida and, thereafter, for owning and operating hospice programs in Florida. OHC is a publicly-traded company founded in 1996 and focuses on caring for patients at the end of life's journey. OHC's sole line of business is hospice services. OHC's patient population consists of approximately 70 percent non-cancer and 30 percent cancer patients. OHC is one of the largest providers of hospice care in the United States. OHC has approximately 92 Medicare-certified programs in 29 states, including established programs in Miami-Dade (Service Area 11) and Volusia (Service Area 4B) Counties and a start-up program in Marion County (Service Area 3B), which was licensed in January 2010. Over four years ago, OHC was the subject of an investigation by the United States Department of Justice that ultimately resulted in a settlement and payment of $13 million to the federal government in July 2006. The settlement did not involve the admission of liability or acknowledgement of any wrongdoing by OHC. As part of the settlement, OHC entered into a corporate integrity agreement (CIA) with a term of five years. Odyssey is now in the final year of the CIA. The settlement and CIA allow OHC to self-audit to ensure compliance with the Medicare conditions of participation, which is the first and only time the OIG has allowed a provider to self audit. Suncoast Suncoast is a large and well-developed comprehensive hospice program serving Pinellas County, Service Area 5B. Suncoast is the sole provider of hospice services in Service Area 5B. According to data reported to the Department of Elder Affairs, Suncoast had 7,375 admissions and provided 795,102 patient days of care in 2009, more than any other Florida hospice. In that same year, Suncoast provided 115,247 patient days of care in assisted living facilities, the third highest total in Florida. Suncoast considers itself a model for hospice across the United States and the world. Suncoast has a large depth and breadth of programs, including community programs offered by its affiliate organizations, such as the AIDS Service Association of Pinellas County, the Suncoast Institute, and Project Grace. Suncoast is active in the national organization for hospices and interacts with programs that use it as a model and resource. Unlike the applicants, Suncoast does not use the Medicare conditions or definitions to limit or define the scope of services it provides. Under the Florida definition, hospice is provided to patients with a life expectancy of 12 months or less. HPH, by way of contrast, uses the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services definition for hospice, i.e., a prognosis of six months or less. Overview of Hospice Services In Florida, hospice programs are required to provide a continuum of palliative and supportive care for terminally ill patients and their families. Under Florida law, a terminally ill patient has a prognosis that his/her life expectancy is one year or less if the illness runs its normal course. Under Medicare, a terminally ill patient is eligible for the Medicare Hospice benefits if their life expectancy is six months or less. Hospice services must be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and must include certain core services, including nursing, social work, pastoral care or counseling, dietary counseling, and bereavement counseling. Physician services may be provided by the hospice directly or through contract. Hospices are required to provide four levels of hospice care: routine, continuous, in-patient, and respite. Hospice services are furnished to a patient and family either directly by a hospice or by others under contractual arrangements with a hospice. Services may be provided in a patient's temporary or permanent residence. If the patient needs short-term institutionalization, the services are furnished in cooperation with those contracted institutions or in a hospice in-patient facility. Routine home care comprises the vast majority of hospice patient days. Florida law states that hospice care and services provided in a private home shall be the primary form of care. Hospice care and services, to the extent practicable and compatible with the needs and preferences of the patient, may be provided by the hospice care team to a patient living in an assisted living facility (ALF), adult family-care home, nursing home, hospice residential unit or facility, or other non-domestic place of permanent or temporary residence. A resident or patient living in an ALF, nursing home, or other facility, who has been admitted to a hospice program, is considered a hospice patient, and the hospice program is responsible for coordinating and ensuring the delivery of hospice care and services to such person pursuant to the statutory and rule requirements. The in-patient level of care provides an intensive level of care within a hospital setting, a skilled nursing unit or in a freestanding hospice in-patient facility. The in- patient component of care is a short-term adjunct to hospice home care and home residential care and should only be used for pain control, symptom management, or respite care in a limited manner. In Florida, the total number of in-patient days for all hospice patients in any 12-month period may not exceed 20 percent of the total number of hospice days for all the hospice patients of the licensed hospice. Continuous care, similar to in-patient care, is basically emergency room or crisis care that can be provided in a home care setting or in any setting where the patient resides. Continuous care, like in-patient care, was designed to be provided for short amounts of time, usually when symptoms become severe and skilled and individual interventions are needed for pain and symptom management. Respite care is generally designed for caregiver relief. It allows patients to stay in hospice facilities for brief periods to provide breaks for the caregivers. Respite care is typically a very minor percentage of overall patient days and is generally designed for caregiver relief. Medicare reimburses the different levels of care at different rates. The highest level of reimbursement is for continuous care. Approximately 85 to 90 percent of hospice care is covered by Medicare. The goal of hospice is to provide physical, emotional, psychological, and spiritual comfort and support to a terminally ill patient and their family. Hospice care provides palliative care as opposed to curative care, with the focus of treatment centering on palliative care and comfort measures. There is no "bright line test" as to what constitutes palliative care and what constitutes curative care. The determination is made on a case-by-case basis depending upon the facts and circumstances of each such case. However, palliative care generally refers to services or interventions which are not curative, but are provided for the reduction or abatement of pain and suffering. Hospice care is provided pursuant to a plan of care that is developed by an interdisciplinary group consisting of physicians, nurses, social workers, and various counselors, including chaplains. There are certain services required by individual hospice patients that are not necessarily covered by Medicare and/or private or commercial insurance. These services may include music therapy, pet therapy, art therapy, massage therapy, and aromatherapy. There are also more complicated and expensive non-covered services, such as palliative chemotherapy and radiation that may be indicated for severe pain control and symptom control. Suncoast provides, and both Odyssey and HPH propose, to provide hospice patients with all of the core services and many of the other services mentioned above. Fixed Need Pool The Agency has a numeric need formula within its rule for determining the need for an additional hospice program in a service area. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.0355(4)(a). When applying the formula in the present case, AHCA ultimately determined that the fixed need was zero for the second batching cycle of 2009. In the absence of numeric need, an applicant must document the existence of one of three delineated special circumstances set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(d), i.e., (1) That a specific terminally ill population is not being served; (2) That a county or counties within the service area of a licensed hospice program are not being served; or (3) That there are persons referred to hospice programs who are not being admitted within 48 hours. Absent numeric need or one of the delineated special circumstances, there cannot be approval of a new hospice program. In forecasting need under the hospice rule's methodology, AHCA uses an average three-year historical death rate. It applies this average against the forecasted population for a two-year planning horizon. AHCA also uses a statewide penetration rate, which is the number of hospice admissions divided by hospice deaths. The statewide average penetration rate is subdivided into four categories: cancer over age 65, cancer under age 65, non-cancer over age 65, and non-cancer under age 65. The projected hospice admissions (based on death rate and projected population growth) in each category are then compared to the most recent published actual admissions to determine the number of projected un-met admissions in each category. If the total un-met admissions in all categories exceed 350, a new hospice is warranted, unless there is a recently approved hospice in the service area or a new hospice provider has not been operational for two years. In the instant case, AHCA's final projections showed the net un-met need for hospice's admissions in Service Area 5B was 318, i.e., below the threshold amount of 350 necessary to establish need for an additional hospice program. The fixed need pool for the purpose of this administrative hearing is zero. HPH is primarily basing its determination of need for a new hospice on its contention that there are three specific terminally ill population groups in Pinellas County that are not being served. Odyssey is primarily basing its determination of need for a new hospice on its contention that there are persons being referred to the existing hospice program in Pinellas County who are not being admitted within 48 hours. The Proposals HPH's Proposal HPH proposes to establish its new hospice program in Pinellas County, Service Area 5B. HPH is currently licensed to provide hospice care in three contiguous sub-districts north of Service Area 5B, i.e., in Hernando, Pasco, and Citrus counties. HPH's corporate headquarters is located in Pasco County, ten to 15 minutes from the Pinellas County border. HPH currently operates a home health agency in Pinellas County. HPH's CON application identifies special circumstances justifying approval of its proposal, including four sub-populations of terminally ill persons who are currently underserved in Service Area 5B: (1) patients living in ALFs; (2) patients requiring continuous care; (3) medically complex patients; and (4) patients not being admitted within 48-hours. Another circumstance identified by HPH to support approval of its application is the fact that Pinellas County is one of the most populous and most elderly service areas in the State, and yet, it only has a single hospice provider. HPH argues that the fact Suncoast is a sole hospice provider for the service area exacerbates and contributes to the problems of gaps in available hospice services to the specific terminally ill sub-populations identified in its CON application. HPH proposes a de-centralized model of hospice service delivery similar to its model in the three contiguous counties where HPH presently provides hospice services. HPH proposes contracting with existing nursing homes and hospitals for in-patient beds ("scatter beds") throughout Service Area 5B. HPH then projects that it could offer in-patient services in the local neighborhoods of patients and families where they live, as opposed to transferring patients to a single in-patient facility for the provider's convenience. As census increases, HPH commits to establish, by month seven of operation, a dedicated in-patient unit to provide in-patient level of care and Hospice House residential care to patients in a home-like environment. Like its hospice operations in Hernando, Pasco and Citrus Counties, HPH proposes to implement its "physician- driven" model of hospice care in Service Area 5B, allowing for greater involvement of physicians in the care and treatment of hospice patients, including physician home visits. Odyssey's Proposal Odyssey proposes to address lack of competition2 in Service Area 5B and the special circumstance of patients not being admitted within 48 hours of referral. Under AHCA's hospice rule, an applicant may demonstrate the need for a new hospice provider if there are persons referred to a hospice program who are not being admitted within 48 hours. However, the applicant must indicate the number of such persons. Odyssey relies upon referral of admission statistical information previously provided by Suncoast to a sister Odyssey entity in a 2005 hospice CON matter. Suncoast at that time provided three years of data that demonstrated between 1,700 (31 percent of admissions) and 2,300 (38 percent of admissions) of patients admitted to Suncoast were admitted 72 hours or more after referral. The definition of referral by Suncoast, however, differs from the definition of referral relied upon by Odyssey. (See Paragraph 56, herein.) Odyssey also provided letters of support from the community to further evidence the existence of the 48-hour special circumstance. However, the letters of support originally appeared in an application filed by Odyssey in 2007 and were not given any weight in the instant proceeding based on their staleness. Odyssey also contends that the existence of a sole provider in Service Area 5B has created a monopolistic situation in the service area. It further contends that the lack of competition has led to the existence of a 48-hour special circumstance in Service Area 5B. Approval of Odyssey's application will, it says, eliminate the monopoly currently existing in Service Area 5B and will address the lack of competition currently occurring in Service Area 5B. Subsection 408.045(2), Florida Statutes, speaks of a "regional monopoly," but there is no credible evidence in the record to suggest that Suncoast's position as a sole provider in Pinellas County constitutes a "regional monopoly." Facts Concerning Special Circumstances Arguments Service Area Demographics Hospice Service Area 5B, Pinellas County, is a single-county hospice service area with a population of approximately one million residents. Pinellas County is currently ranked as the fourth largest county in the State in total numbers of elderly persons over 65 years of age, as well as elderly persons over 75 years of age, behind only Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties. Pinellas County also experienced the fourth highest number of total deaths in the State in 2008--11,268. Pinellas County's mortality rate in recent years has slowed. However, even considering a slower growth rate in the number of deaths, Pinellas County likely will remain the fourth largest county in the State in both elderly population and number of deaths through 2015. Although it is the fourth largest service area in terms of likely hospice patients, Suncoast is the sole hospice provider in Service Area 5B. By contrast, the other three largest service areas all have multiple hospice programs to serve their large elderly populations with eight providers in Service Area 11 (Miami-Dade), five providers in Service Area 10 (Broward), and three providers in Service Area 9C (Palm Beach). In assessing the extent of utilization of hospice services in Service Area 5B, HPH through its health planner, Patricia Greenberg, noted that Suncoast appears to have over-stated its utilization rate in its semi-annual reports to AHCA. Ms. Greenberg testified that Suncoast's AHCA data includes patients who are not truly hospice patients and are, instead, patients who are participating in non-hospice programs operated by Suncoast, including palliative care programs known as "Suncoast Supportive Care" and "Hospital Support." The number of such patients was not quantified by Ms. Greenberg.3 Suncoast counters that it does not let the conditions of participation define the scope and breadth of hospice services it offers. Suncoast tries not to be defined by the Medicare conditions of participation and has programs that are not covered by the benefit, including but not limited to its residential care at Woodside and its caregiver services. Specific Terminally Ill Populations HPH identified as under-served in Service Area 5B medically complex patients with complex medical needs, including multiple IVs, wound vacs, ventilator, complex medications, or acutely uncontrolled symptoms in multiple domains. These are the same kinds of patients who would require continuous care within their homes. Hospice patients have become more highly acute in recent years. More patients are being discharged from hospitals with highly complex medical conditions, often directly from hospital intensive care units. Patients discharged directly from hospitals tend to have higher acuity levels. Ms. Greenberg reviewed Suncoast's data on hospital discharges and found Suncoast statistically lags behind HPH in caring for medically complex patients discharged from hospitals. Looking at a three-year average, HPH had 3.7 percent of its hospice discharges directly admitted from hospitals, compared to percent for Suncoast. This is more than a 50-percent deviation between hospital discharges to hospice for HPH versus Suncoast. However, a comparison of Suncoast to HPH does not establish that there is a specific underserved population in Service Area 5B which is not receiving services. One case manager testified to sometimes not being able to timely find hospice placements for medically complex patients. Such patients would then have to be transferred from the hospital to a nursing home or rehabilitation facility. However, she did not testify that this specific terminally ill population was not being served, only that they were being served somewhere other than in an in-patient hospice bed. Medically complex patients, including those needing continuous care, were another specific terminally ill population identified by HPH. At page 54 of her deposition, Deborah Casler, a case manager at Helen Ellis Hospital, addressed those populations, saying, "[w]hat I am going to say is if anybody needed continuous care through Suncoast, it would happen, but it wasn't always a quick and easy process." HPH compared its percentage of continuous care patient days with Suncoast, showing that HPH had more. That does not equate to an absence of service for any specific terminally ill population. HPH attempts to create a presumption that services are not being provided by conditioning its application on a certain percentage (3 percent) of days for continuous care patients. That is merely a projection of intent; it is not evidence that a certain population is not currently being served. Assisted Living Facility Residents HPH provided anecdotal evidence that some ALFs in Pinellas County were not pleased with the services being provided by Suncoast. One ALF administrator was dissatisfied that Suncoast took a long time to admit her resident (but the resident was ultimately admitted). Another was disappointed with Suncoast because it took a long time to get medications for her resident. Another felt like Suncoast's quality of care was inferior. HPH provides a greater percentage of hospice services to ALF residents in Pasco (12.7 percent), Hernando (26.5 percent), and Citrus (23.5) counties than Suncoast provides to ALF residents in Pinellas County. There are approximately 215 ALFs in Pinellas County of varying sizes, i.e., from three beds to almost 500 beds. Suncoast did not provide services to all of them. There was no showing, however, that any resident of an ALF who needed or requested hospice services was denied such care. None of the evidence presented by HPH establishes the existence of a group of ALF residents who were not being served in the service area; nor does the evidence prove that any specific ALF residents are, in fact, terminally ill. The 48-Hour Admission Provision Neither Suncoast, nor Odyssey presented any hard data on timeliness of admissions. In fact, none of the parties could agree as to what action constitutes an admission. Suncoast says an admission must include a physician order and a consent by the patient and family. Odyssey identifies a referral as a telephone call from a family member, even if the call is simply an inquiry as to what services might be available. Odyssey says that the majority of its patients are admitted within three hours of referral and at least 80 percent are admitted within 24 hours. During that three-hour time frame, Odyssey will contact the family, contact the physician in order to evaluate and admit, if appropriate, screen the patient to ensure he or she meets the eligibility guidelines, go out and meet with the family, and provide support while necessary information is being gathered. HPH candidly admits that the issue of admissions within 48 hours does not, in and of itself, justify the approval of a new hospice program in Service Area 5B. However, HPH argues, it is an element of hospice services that HPH would do better than the other parties. There is no credible evidence in the record that an identified number of persons in Pinellas County had not been admitted to hospice within 48 hours of referral. Statutory and Rule Review Criteria Rule Preferences The Agency is required to give preference to an applicant meeting one or more of the criteria specified in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(e)1 through 5: Commitment to serve populations with unmet need.-- There is no numeric need in this matter. Neither applicant proved the existence of a population with unmet need. Commitment to provide in-patient care through contract with existing health care facilities.-- Both HPH and Odyssey intend to use scatter beds and to contract with existing health care providers. Commitment to serve homeless and AIDS patients, as well as patients without caregivers.--Both applicants have shown a history of serving such groups and commit to do so in Pinellas County. Not Applicable. Commitment to provide services not covered by insurance, Medicare or Medicaid--Both applicants have a good history of providing indigent care and commit to do so in Pinellas County. Consistency with Plans; Letters of Support Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.0355(5) requires consideration of the applications in light of the local and state health plans. The local health council plans are no longer a factor in this proceeding. The state health plan addresses the concept of letters of support. Again, as neither applicant proved special circumstances warranting approval of a new hospice program, this comparison is unnecessary. However, there was considerable testimony and argument at final hearing concerning letters of support and the issue deserves some discussion. Each applicant provided letters of support. In fact, HPH's application contained over 250 letters of support from a wide range of writers, including physicians, nurses, ALF and nursing home administrators, and others. AHCA even complimented HPH's letters of support in both quantity and quality. Such letters are, of course, hearsay and cannot be relied upon to make findings as to the statements made herein. However, the fact that HPH generated so many letters of support is a fact that lends additional credence to their application. Odyssey's letters of support, by comparison, were much fewer in number. The letters were also dated, having come from a CON application filed some three years prior to the application currently at issue. The content of those letters would also be hearsay. And in the present action, the age of the letters would reduce their significance as support for the Odyssey CON application at issue. Statutory Review Criteria The Agency reviews each CON application in context with the criteria set forth in Subsection 408.035(1)(a) through (j), Florida Statutes: Subsection 408.035(1)(a), Florida Statutes--The need for the health care facilities and health services being provided There was no need projected by AHCA under its need methodology. Neither party established the existence of special circumstances warranting approval of a new hospice program in Service Area 5B. Subsection 408.035(1)(b), Florida Statutes-- availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization Suncoast is the sole provider of hospice services in Service Area 5B. This service area is one of the largest in the State. There are other service areas which have a single hospice provider, but Service Area 5B is the largest service area to be served by a single hospice provider. Service Area 5B experienced the fourth largest number of deaths in the State in 2008, an important factor in the provision of hospice care. Suncoast has 15 interdisciplinary care teams, each of which, lead by a patient-family care coordinator, includes RNs, home health aides, counselors, volunteers, and a chaplain. Suncoast has a north community service center in Palm Harbor that houses four patient care teams. On the back of that property is Brookside, Suncoast's newly built 30-bed in-patient facility. In central Pinellas County, Suncoast has its main service center with six patient care teams along with administrative and support offices. Suncoast has a pharmacy, as well as durable medical equipment and infusion departments, located in Largo. In central Pinellas County is Suncoast's ten-acre, 72-bed Woodside facility. Thirty-six of the beds are in-patient and 36 are residential. On the back of the property are 18 efficiency apartments called "Villas" with separate living, sleeping and kitchen areas. When patients become too ill to remain at home, their spouse may move into a villa until the patient dies. In the southern portion of the county is Suncoast's south community service area which houses five patient care teams, as well as "ASAP." ASAP is Suncoast's AIDS Service Association of Pinellas County which serves and provides support to patients with HIV and AIDS. Suncoast also has in-patient contracts with every hospital in Pinellas County and a number of contracts with nursing homes for in-patient care. Patients may receive continuous care in the home whether that is a residence, an ALF, or a nursing home or may receive care in the Suncoast in-patient unit. There is disagreement over whether Suncoast accurately reports its admissions and whether all reported admissions are actually hospice patients. Further, HPH points out that its penetration rate in counties where it operates is much higher than Suncoast's penetration rate in Pinellas County. However, the most credible evidence is that Suncoast is effectively serving the needs of hospice-eligible residents of Service Area 5B. Subsection 408.035(1)(c), Florida Statutes--ability to provide quality of care and record of providing quality of care Both applicants satisfy this criterion. Both applicants can provide a broad range of quality hospice services to all its patients. HPH touts its physician model, including physician home visits, as evidence of its commitment to quality care. Physician visits have been proven to help patients get pain under control more quickly, an important factor considering ten percent of hospice patients die within 48 hours of admission. Odyssey is a large company and has extensive operational policies and procedures concerning provision of quality care to its patients. Odyssey has a program called Care Beyond which it believes will enhance quality care in Service Area 5B. Odyssey has had some regulatory violations while HPH has not. However, Odyssey has resolved those violations favorably. Subsection 408.035(1)(d), Florida Statutes-- availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulate that both applicants meet this criterion. Subsection 408.035(1)(e), Florida Statutes--extent to which proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district Both applicants satisfy this criterion. HPH is the existing provider of hospice services in the adjacent service area to Service Area 5B. HPH can use its existing contacts in Service Area 5B to extend its service to residents of that area. HPH has already established relationships with Airamed Corporation and its 11 nursing homes and ALF in Service Area 5B. HPH also commits to being more directly involved with smaller ALFs in Pinellas County. Odyssey is a large hospice with significant resources which can be utilized to enhance access for residents of Service Area 5B. It commits to bring quality personnel to Service Area 5B as part of its successful start-up procedures. Subsection 408.035(1)(f), Florida Statutes--immediate and long-term financial feasibility The parties stipulate that both applicants meet this criterion. Subsection 408.035(1)(g), Florida Statutes--extent to which proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness Both applicants are established providers of hospice services. The absence of any other hospice provider in Pinellas County means there is no effective competition. If either of the applicants was granted a CON for a new hospice in Service Area 5B, it would likely foster competition and promote quality and cost-effectiveness. Subsection 408.035(1)(h), Florida Statutes--costs and methods of construction, etc. This criterion is not applicable to the instant case. Subsection 408.035(1)(i), Florida Statutes--the applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Both applicants meet this criterion. HPH offers extensive services that go beyond the Medicare requirements of participation. It also operates "Hospice Houses" which provide room and board to homeless hospice patients. Odyssey's record of indigent care is evidenced by the fact that approximately 55 percent of its non-Medicare net revenue is from Medicaid, and 9.5 percent of its non-Medicare services are provided to indigent patients. Subsection 408.035(1)(j)--designation as a Gold Seal Program This criterion is not applicable to the instant case. Ultimate Findings of Fact The Agency determined that there is no need for an additional hospice in the service area based upon the fixed need pool formula. Neither applicant was able to establish the existence of special circumstances warranting approval of a new hospice in the service area. There is no specific terminally ill population which is not receiving hospice services that has been identified by the applicants. There is no persuasive evidence that there is an identifiable number of individuals who were referred to hospice, but were not admitted within 48 hours.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Agency for Health Care Administration denying the CON applications of HPH South, Inc. (No. 10066), and Odyssey Healthcare of Collier County d/b/a Odyssey Healthcare of Central Florida (No. 10068). DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2010.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to recover certain Medicaid funds paid to Respondent pursuant to section 409.923(1), Florida Statutes, for hospice services Respondent provided through three program locations (Melbourne, Boynton Beach, and Dade) during the audit period between September 1, 2009, and December 31, 2012; and the amount of sanctions, if any, that should be imposed pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e).
Findings Of Fact Parties AHCA is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. § 409.902, Fla. Stat. (2018). Medicaid is a joint federal and state partnership to provide health care and related services to certain qualified individuals. Vitas is a provider of hospice and end-of-life services in Florida. During the relevant periods, Vitas maintained hospice programs headquartered in Melbourne, Dade, and Boynton Beach, each enrolled as a Medicaid provider with a valid Medicaid provider agreement with AHCA. Hospice Services Hospice is a form of palliative care. However, hospice care is focused upon patients at the end-of-life-stage, while palliative care is for any patient with an advanced illness. Both hospice and palliative care patients are generally among the sickest patients. Hospice is focused upon serving the patient and family to provide symptom management, supportive care, and emotional and spiritual support during this difficult period when the patients are approaching their end-of-life. Hospice care, as with Vitas, uses an interdisciplinary team ("IDT") to provide comfort, symptom management, and support to allow patients and their families to come to terms with the patient's terminal condition, i.e., that the patient is expected to die. Each patient is reviewed in a meeting of the IDT no less than every two weeks. For hospice, a terminally ill patient must choose to elect hospice and to give up seeking curative care and aggressive treatments. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Vitas was authorized to provide hospice services to Medicaid recipients. As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Vitas was subject to federal and state statutes, regulations, rules, policy guidelines, and Medicaid handbooks incorporated by reference into rule, which were in effect during the audit period. Medicaid Hospice Benefit Medicaid recipients are eligible to have their hospice services covered by Medicaid if a physician, using his/her clinical judgment, determines and certifies that the patient is terminally ill with a life expectancy of six months or less if the disease runs its normal course. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 418.3 and 418.22. The Florida Medicaid Hospice Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, the January 2007 edition ("Handbook"), governs whether a service is medically necessary and meets certification criteria for hospice services. Pages 2 through 4 of the Handbook identify six areas of documentation (often referred to throughout this proceeding as "the six bullet points") for a physician to consider when making a determination regarding a patient's initial certification for hospice eligibility. These include: Terminal diagnosis with life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness progresses at its normal course; Serial physician assessments, laboratory, radiological, or other studies; Clinical progression of the terminal disease; Recent impaired nutritional status related to the terminal process; Recent decline in functional status; and Specific documentation that indicates that the recipient has entered an endstage of a chronic disease. The Medicaid hospice provider must provide written certification of eligibility for hospice services for each patient. The Handbook also provides certification of terminal illness requirements as follows: For each period of hospice coverage, the hospice must obtain written certification from a physician indicating that the recipient is terminally ill and has a life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness progresses at its normal course. The initial certification must be signed by the medical director of the hospice or a physician member of the hospice team and the recipient's attending physician (if the recipient has an attending physician). For the second and subsequent election periods, the certification is required to be signed by either the hospice medical director or the physician member of the hospice team. Certification is required for each election period. A patient may elect to receive hospice services for one or more of the election periods. The election periods include: an initial 90-day period; a subsequent 90-day period; and subsequent 60-day time periods. The Handbook provides guidance regarding the election periods as follows: The first 90 days of hospice care is considered the initial hospice election period. For the initial period, the hospice must obtain written certification statements from a hospice physician and the recipient's attending physician, if the recipient has an attending physician, no later than two calendar days after the period begins. An exception is if the hospice is unable to obtain written certification, the hospice must obtain verbal certification within two days following initiation of hospice care, with a written certification obtained before billing for hospice care. If these requirements are not met, Medicaid will not reimburse for the days prior to the certification. Instead, reimbursement will begin with the date verbal certification is obtained . . . . For the subsequent election periods, written certification from the hospice medical director or physician member of the interdisciplinary group is required. If written certification is not obtained before the new election period begins, the hospice must obtain a verbal certification statement no later than two calendar days after the first day of each period from the hospice medical director or physician member of the hospice's interdisciplinary group. A written certification must be on file in the recipient's record prior to billing hospice services. Supporting medical documentation must be maintained by the hospice in the recipient's medical record. AHCA's Audit Florida law obligates AHCA to oversee the activities of Florida Medicaid recipients and providers in order to ensure that fraudulent and abusive behavior occur to the minimum extent possible and, when appropriate, to recover overpayments and impose sanctions on providers. § 409.913, Fla. Stat. Among other duties, AHCA is required to conduct (or cause to be conducted) audits to determine possible fraud, abuse, and overpayments in the Medicaid program. § 409.913(2), Fla. Stat. The statutes define "overpayment" as "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake." § 409.913(1)(e), Fla. Stat. When an overpayment is identified, AHCA is required to recover the overpayment and impose sanctions as appropriate. § 409.913, Fla. Stat. When making a determination that an overpayment has occurred, the agency shall prepare and issue an audit report to the provider showing the calculation of overpayments. § 409.913(21), Fla. Stat. The Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), contracted with HI to perform an audit of Vitas on AHCA's behalf. HI, in turn, retained a PRO, Advanced Medical Reviews ("AMR") to provide physician reviews of claims during the audit process in order to determine whether an audited claim was eligible for payment. HI is an approved Medicaid Integrity Contractor that is assigned by CMS to Florida and was instructed to perform audits of Florida hospice providers who had been paid with Medicaid funds for the audit period. HI received the Medicaid billing information from AHCA and developed an audit plan in conjunction with AHCA MPI staff. Per Vitas' Medicaid Provider Agreements, Vitas agreed "to comply with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules, regulations and statements of policy applicable to the Medicaid program, including Medicaid Provider Handbooks issued by AHCA." To that end, Vitas also agreed to maintain its records for at least five years to satisfy all necessary inquiries by AHCA. The stated objective of the audit, as reflected in the FARs, was "to determine whether the recipients met eligibility for hospice services and payments were in accordance with applicable Federal and State Medicaid laws, regulations, and policies." For the purpose of the audit, the recipient files to be reviewed were selected using the following criteria: The recipient was not dually eligible (eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare); and The hospice coverage was greater than or equal to 182 days based on the recipient's first and last date of service within the audit period. In addition, HI excluded recipients who had at least one malignancy (cancer) primary diagnosis and had a date of death less than one year from the first date of service with this provider. HI, in its capacity as an authorized contractor of CMS, contacted Vitas and requested medical files for those 250 recipients who met HI's selection criteria for the audit. HI then forwarded the 250 recipients' medical files to HI nurse claims analysts for initial detailed review. If, after review of Vitas' medical records, the HI claims analyst determined that a recipient was eligible for Medicaid hospice services, the analyst would clear the file and remove it from further consideration. As a result, 63 files were determined to have sufficient documentation to support approval of the claim. If, however, based upon the initial review, the analyst had any questions or concerns about a particular file, he or she would set it aside for later peer review by an independent physician who would make the ultimate determination with regard to hospice eligibility. In this case, 187 recipients' medical records were peer-reviewed by a physician who made a determination concerning whether the medical records supported the recipient's eligibility for Medicaid hospice. Of the 187 files, 118 were determined to be ineligible in whole or part for Medicaid hospice. HI contracts with PROs, which provide physicians to perform the peer review. Initially, HI contracted with AMR to provide peer review services. Section 409.9131(2)(c), provides that a "peer" is "a Florida physician who is, to the maximum extent possible, of the same specialty or sub-specialty, licensed under the same chapter, and in active practice." Often recipients in hospice care see multiple physicians. HI staff, therefore, reviewed the recipients' medical records to determine the names of Respondent's physicians treating the recipients whose medical records were being audited. Thereafter, HI staff obtained the specialty or subspecialty of Respondent's physicians from the Florida Department of Health, Board of Medicine, website. The most common specialties were Internal Medicine and Family Medicine. HI instructed AMR to appoint peers who are: (1) licensed in Florida, (2) in active practice, and (3) to the maximum extent possible have a specialty in Internal Medicine or Family Medicine. In this case, HI, through AMR, initially employed the services of five Florida physicians who reviewed the 187 recipient files at issue. The findings of the peer reviewers were presented in the Draft Audit Reports ("DARs"). Physicians Tania Velez, M.D. (specializing in family medicine), Terese Taylor, M.D. (specializing in family medicine), and Anita Arnold, D.O. (specializing in cardiovascular disease, interventional cardiology, and internal medicine), discontinued providing services as peers following the publication of their opinions in the DARs. These physicians were initially responsible for reviewing 25 recipient files. Todd Eisner, M.D. (specializing in internal medicine and gastroenterology), reviewed and rendered his opinion as to the hospice eligibility of five recipients in the DARs. Ankush Bansal, M.D. (specializing in internal medicine), reviewed the hospice eligibility of 88 recipients. Subsequent to the petitions being filed in this matter, Dr. Bansal opted to no longer participate in this matter. AHCA, therefore, requested HI to have all of Dr. Bansal's cases re- reviewed by another peer physician. AMR could not provide peer physicians who could complete the re-reviews in the desired time frame, so HI sent the re-reviews to another PRO, Network Medical Review ("NMR"). HI gave NMR the same instructions it gave to AMR with respect to how to select peers. HI, through NMR, selected Dr. Kelly Komatz (specializing in pediatrics, and hospice and palliative Care) and Dr. Charles Talakkottur (specializing in internal medicine) to perform the re-reviews of Dr. Bansal's claims. Dr. Komatz reviewed one patient file in dispute. Dr. Talakkottur reviewed 76 recipient files in dispute. Audit Methodology There is no statutory definition of "terminal illness" and no guidelines for the term are provided by rule or in the Handbook. In performing their respective peer reviews, the peer physicians were instructed to use their clinical experience, generally accepted medical standards, and the Handbook. Two peer reviewers with similar experience could review the same record and come to different conclusions as to a terminal diagnosis. The same goes for a determination as to a life expectancy of six months or less. Both are subjective by nature. Similarly, there are no AHCA guidelines to determine when the criteria of serial physician assessments, laboratory, radiological or other studies, have been met. The same is true for what constitutes sufficient documentation of clinical progression of the terminal disease, recent impaired nutritional status, recent decline in functional status, and specific documentation that a recipient has entered the end-stage of a chronic disease. Local Coverage Determinations ("LCDs") are Medicare guidelines that are disease specific and nationally recognized tools used to assist physicians in determining hospice eligibility. Florida does not use LCDs with respect to Medicaid. However, HI developed a document, titled the "Summary Lead Sheet—Medical Review Methodology Documentation/LCD's," which was approved by CMS. This documentation was then provided to AHCA and sent to the claims analysts and initial peer reviewers to perform their review of Medicaid reviews in this audit. To evaluate the likely terminality of a recipient's condition for benefit eligibility, LCDs direct physician reviewers to use certain clinical indicators including: Palliative Performance Scale ("PPS") scores; Functional Assessment Staging ("FAST") scores; Activities of Daily Living ("ADL") scores, which measure the patient's abilities in bathing, dressing, feeding, transferring, continence, and ambulation; Body Mass Index ("BMI"); and New York Heart Association ("NYHA") classifications. The Handbook makes no reference to LCDs or these clinical indicators. Nor does it prohibit their use. In fact, these clinical indicators are part of the "generally accepted standard of medical practice" to be considered in the context of "medical necessity" as defined by sections 409.913 and 409.9131. LCDs are not all-inclusive of all the different conditions for which a person may be eligible for hospice. Resultantly, LCDs are an appropriate tool to use in prognosticating whether a patient has a terminal illness with a life expectancy of six months or less. However, a patient's failure to meet the LCD for a specific disease does not per se disqualify the patient from Medicaid hospice eligibility. The peer reviewers were instructed, "Please do not break up a certification period with partial approved and partial denied dates." Pursuant to this instruction, if a patient meets hospice eligibility for any portion of a certification period, they should be approved for the entire period. None of the doctors involved in this case, from either side, actually examined the patients. All of the doctors conducted essentially a desk audit review of the medical records. Issuance of the DARs and FARs Based upon the peer reviews, DARs were prepared by HI, which identified overpayment of Medicaid claims totaling $6,943,664.74, relating to 118 recipients. The DARs were transmitted to Vitas. Vitas, through its medical directors, provided a response to the DARs. Vitas contested every alleged overpayment and maintained that all recipients in question were eligible for the Medicaid hospice benefit at all times. After receiving Respondent's responses, HI forwarded the responses to AMR so that the AMR peer review physicians could evaluate the responses and amend any of their conclusions, as appropriate. While the peer review physicians agreed with Vitas' responses in certain limited instances, the peer review physicians mostly disagreed, and, as a result, HI prepared the FARs. The FARs were then submitted to, and approved by, CMS. CMS provided the FARs to AHCA with instructions that Florida was responsible for furnishing the FARs to Vitas and initiating any state recovery process needed to collect the overpayment. The FARs prepared by HI contain the determinations of the peer review physicians concerning whether each of the recipients at issue had a terminal diagnosis with a life expectancy of six months or less if their disease progressed at its normal course. The FARs concluded that 92 recipients were ineligible for at least a portion of their stay with a cumulative overpayment of $5,401,615.18. Vitas timely filed three petitions, one for each location, with AHCA's agency clerk. On or about February 6, 2017, AHCA referred the three cases to DOAH. On February 14, 2017, the undersigned entered an Order of Consolidation, and the three cases are now proceeding under DOAH Case number 17-0792MPI. During the course of the underlying proceeding, the parties first stipulated that 67 of the original 92 recipients identified in the FARs were at issue. Throughout the course of these proceedings, however, the parties have moved closer and disputed less ineligibility determinations. As a result, of the original 250 recipients' medical files reviewed, only 61 remain in dispute. AHCA now seeks the revised overpayment of $3,847,755.95, with a corresponding reduction in the fines of $906,715.29 for a grand total of $4,754,471.24. The Experts Due to the nature of the review and "re-review" process, the vast majority of the final hearing was comprised of the testimony of each parties' experts regarding whether particular recipients met the criteria of Medicaid hospice benefit eligibility. For each recipient, an AHCA and a Vitas expert reviewed the medical records and provided an opinion as to whether the six bullet points of the Handbook were satisfied to determine whether the recipient was "terminally ill with a life expectancy of six months or less if the disease runs its normal course." The following physician experts were tendered and accepted for AHCA: Dr. Talakkottur, Dr. Eisner, and Dr. Komatz.1/ The following physician experts were tendered and accepted for Vitas: Dr. Shega and Dr. Vermette. Because the determinations of whether a recipient met the applicable criteria are highly subjective, it is important to distinguish between the relative qualifications of the experts. AHCA's Experts Dr. Talakkottur Dr. Charles Talakkottur was presented by AHCA as an expert in internal medicine. He has maintained an active practice in Florida for over nine years and reviewed and issued his opinion as to the hospice eligibility of 76 recipient files in dispute. Of those 76 recipient files, Dr. Talakkottur initially determined that 59 recipients were ineligible for at least a portion of the period that Vitas billed for hospice Medicaid services. In subsequent reviews, Dr. Talakkottur overturned two more files, leaving 57 recipients ineligible for at least a portion of the Medicaid services billed by Respondent. As discussed above, negotiations continued between the parties during the course of the final hearing. This resulted in Dr. Talakkottur testifying about 48 of the remaining disputed recipients' Medicaid hospice eligibility. Dr. Talakkottur admits patients to hospice from his practice, which requires him to make the type of prognosis determination, such as those at issue in this proceeding. However, Dr. Talakkottur is not now nor ever has been board- certified in hospice and palliative medicine. He has never been a Certified Hospice Medical Director. He has never signed a certification for hospice eligibility nor worked for a hospice. Dr. Talakkottur's practice is named TLC Medical, Aesthetics & Pain Management. The website for his practice shows that he provides Botox, IPL Photofacial, Juvederm/Dermal Fillers, Laser Hair Removal, Medical Marijuana, Medical Services, Medical Weight Loss, Medicare Doctor in Tampa, and Pain Management. Although advertised on his website, Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged he is not certified to provide medical marijuana treatment. Neither Dr. Talakkottur's practice website nor his practice YouTube page advertise hospice or end-of-life care services. Dr. Talakkottur never discussed the Handbook with anyone at AHCA. He did not receive any training from AHCA, CMS, HI, or NMR on how to perform the audit. Dr. Talakkottur was provided certain instructions from NMR on how to perform his reviews. The instructions state, "Please do not break up a certification period with partially approved/partially denied dates (i.e. if certification period is 01/01/2015 through 02/01/2015, and any dates within that period are deemed medically necessary, please approve the entire certification period)." Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged, however, that he did not follow this instruction. Dr. Talakkottur's testimony regarding the many patients he reviewed clarifies that he applied the six bullet points from the Handbook to his reviews of both certification and recertification decisions. However, the six bullet points are prefaced with a paragraph beginning: "Documentation to support the terminal prognosis must accompany the initial certification of terminal illness." In other words, the six bullet points are not applicable to recertification decisions. A patient must still have a prognosis of less than six months to be recertified, but the six bullet points no longer represent the appropriate factors. In fact, the Handbook clarifies that "[f]or subsequent election periods, written certification from the hospice medical director or physician member of the interdisciplinary group is required." In light of this clear distinction, deference to the clinical judgment of the hospice physicians becomes more significant for recertification periods. Dr. Talakkottur did not lend any credence to the "real-time" decisions of the hospice physicians. Instead, Dr. Talakkottur sought out ways to deny coverage and frequently based his decisions on bullet points that the patient was not required to satisfy to support eligibility. Dr. Talakkottur opined that he would not want to consider a patient's severity of comorbidities when prognosticating six months life expectancy or less. He often reviewed patients myopically, considering only the primary diagnosis. By way of explanation, he opined that in his professional opinion taking into account comorbidities was wrong because a condition such as an "ant bite" or a scratch is a comorbidity. In contrast, the other experts in this proceeding convincingly testified that the patient's whole condition should be evaluated in determining the prognosis of life expectancy of six months or less, including the presence and severity of comorbidities. Although Dr. Talakkottur was properly selected as a peer reviewer and qualified as an expert in internal medicine, his testimony was deemed less credible than that of the Vitas medical experts, Dr. Shega and Dr. Vermette. Dr. Eisner Dr. Eisner performed the peer review for 13 recipients, 12 of whom remain in dispute. Dr. Eisner's background is in internal medicine and gastroenterology. He held a board certification in internal medicine between 1993 and 2003. In 1995, Dr. Eisner was board-certified in gastroenterology, a board certification that he continues to maintain. At some point around 2003, the certification standards changed such that Dr. Eisner was no longer required to maintain his board certification in internal medicine in order to remain board- certified in gastroenterology. Since 1995, 100 percent of Dr. Eisner's practice has been focused on gastroenterology. Dr. Eisner routinely makes life expectancy prognostications for his patients. Further, Dr. Eisner also refers patients to hospice on a regular basis. In so doing, Dr. Eisner is called upon to make the type of prognosis determination similar to those at issue in this proceeding. Dr. Eisner does not treat patients for the following specific diseases: diabetes, hypertension, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease ("COPD"), HIV/AIDS, cerebral degeneration, cerebral vascular disease, cardiovascular disease, malignant neoplasm of the brain, heart disease, dementia, Alzheimer's, adult failure to thrive, or debility. He was only familiar with those diseases as comorbidities to a principal diagnosis related to a gastroenterological disease and does not treat those primary diseases. While cardiology, critical care, geriatric, infectious disease, medical oncology, and pulmonary disease are also subspecialties of internal medicine, Dr. Eisner has not done a fellowship in any subspecialty other than gastroenterology and does not hold himself out as an expert in any internal medicine subspecialty other than gastroenterology. Dr. Eisner did not recall receiving any instructions other than the Handbook but acknowledged he did not read the entire Handbook to perform his review. Dr. Eisner was not aware of what documentation must accompany the initial certification for a terminal disease for Medicaid hospice purposes or what documentation must accompany a subsequent certification for Medicaid hospice purposes. Contrary to the testimony of Dr. Talakkottur, Dr. Eisner acknowledged that the presence and severity of comorbidities should be considered when making a clinical determination of life expectancy of six months or more. Although Dr. Eisner was qualified both as a peer reviewer and an expert in this proceeding, his lack of any recent experience in a practice area other than gastroenterology diminished the weight given to his testimony concerning non- gastroenterology related illnesses and conditions. Dr. Komatz Dr. Komatz re-reviewed the records of one recipient that remains in dispute. Dr. Komatz holds an active Florida medical license and is board-certified in pediatrics and hospice and palliative medicine. She has been board-certified in hospice and palliative medicine since 2010. As part of her practice, Dr. Komatz currently cares for hospice patients, refers patients to hospice, and certifies patients for hospice care. According to Dr. Komatz, when determining the eligibility of a patient for hospice, a practitioner must look at the patient's overall level of function, medications, and needs regarding such things as the use of oxygen and equipment to assist with daily living. The determination is then made taking into account these and other factors regarding the patient's current state. In her professional opinion, it is not uncommon to see a patient who has a prognosis of six months or less actually live for longer than six months. Significantly, Dr. Komatz opined as an expert for AHCA that it is important for a physician to be board-certified in hospice and palliative care in order to be competent to review a hospice record because the hospice training teaches the practitioner more about disease trajectory, the interdisciplinary team and how that works in conjunction with the patient. It also provides experience as to how hospice operates in general. In addition, she noted that the person best able to determine hospice eligibility is someone who has been trained in hospice care and/or practices in that field on a regular basis. Dr. Komatz acknowledged that it is possible that two physicians could review the same medical records and reach different conclusions about the hospice eligibility of a patient. When reviewing the initial certification requirements, Dr. Komatz stated that most hospice beneficiaries forego further laboratory or radiologic studies. She also opined that the condition of hospice patients can plateau or improve due to the hospice care being received. Likewise, it would not be fair to look for a progression of functional decline in a patient if the patient was already at the lowest functional level. She stated that "specific documentation that indicates the recipient has entered an end-stage of a chronic disease" is vague and is merely a summary of the other specific initial certification requirements. Consequently, most of the six bullet points are rarely applicable. Dr. Komatz stated that to be eligible for hospice services, a patient need not meet all the initial certification six bullet points, but instead it is a "totality of circumstances" standard based on the medical record of the patient. Dr. Komatz worked as a subcontractor for NMR. She only communicated with NMR personnel regarding the audit. She had no contact with HI or AHCA. Dr. Komatz was provided the NMR instruction sheet, which instructs reviewers not to break up certification periods to perform her review. Dr. Komatz was qualified both as a peer reviewer and an expert in this case. Due to her regular and direct experience in hospice and palliative care, her testimony, particularly as to prognostication of life expectancy and the practice of hospice and palliative care generally, was given great weight. Vitas' Experts Dr. Shega Dr. Shega was accepted as an expert in hospice and palliative care and geriatric medicine. He is the National Medical Director for Vitas. In that role, he oversees the four regional directors, as well as the medical directors that report to them, and also oversees physician services. Dr. Shega testified regarding the disputed recipients in the Melbourne and Boynton Beach programs. Dr. Shega attended Northwestern University Medical School, performed his residency and internship at the University of Pittsburgh, and performed a two-year academic fellowship in geriatric medicine at the University of Chicago. He is board- certified in geriatrics and hospice and palliative medicine. He is licensed to practice medicine in Florida and Illinois and actively treats hospice patients roughly six to eight weeks per year. Dr. Shega is currently an associate professor of medicine at the University of Central Florida. Prior to that, he has held positions as an associate professor of medicine at the University of Chicago, an assistant professor of medicine at Northwestern, an assistant professor of medicine at the University of Chicago, and an instructor of medicine at the University of Chicago. While at Northwestern, he was the director of its hospice program for several years and also worked in a hospice as a team physician for the University of Chicago. Dr. Shega was part of the University of Chicago leadership committee in geriatrics and palliative medicine where he helped to oversee its clinical operations. He has also served on numerous geriatric and hospice-related committees. Dr. Shega is a member of the American Geriatric Society and the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine, and through being an associate editor for the "Pain and Aging" section of Pain Medicine, has a membership to the American Pain Society. He currently performs one to two teaching presentations a week across the country and has published over 40 peer-reviewed articles on topics related to hospice and palliative care. Dr. Shega was recently the co-managing editor of a nine-book series that discusses the background of hospice and palliative care, pain management, non-pain symptoms, psychological and social symptoms, pediatric care, and chronic illnesses and end- of-life illnesses, congenital hyperinsulinism ("CHI"), COPD, dementia, renal disease, and neurologic disorders. Dr. Shega was qualified as an expert in this case. Due to his regular and direct experience in hospice and palliative care, his testimony, particularly as to prognostication of life expectancy, and the practice of hospice and palliative care generally, was given great weight. However, the credibility given to Dr. Shega's testimony was tempered by the fact that he is directly employed by Vitas and was involved in overseeing or facilitating Vitas' response to the DARs, wherein Vitas contested every finding and sought reimbursement for every alleged overpayment. Dr. Vermette Dr. Vermette was accepted as an expert in hospice and palliative care, and family medicine. During the final hearing, he testified regarding the disputed recipients in the Dade program. Dr. Vermette is the Vitas Medical Director for the Claims Review Group. In that capacity, his duties are to review charts and perform support and training of other medical directors and physicians throughout the country in how to review charts and documentation. Dr. Vermette attended medical school at the University of Texas, Southwestern Medical School in Dallas. He then attended a three-year residency program in family medicine at the University of Texas Health Science Center in Houston followed by service in the military as a medical doctor, achieving the rank of Major. Dr. Vermette is licensed to practice medicine in a number of states, including Florida. He is board-certified in family medicine and hospice and palliative medicine. He is also certified as a Hospice Medical Director, which is designed to recognize expertise in hospice and palliative medicine. Dr. Vermette is certified as a registered medical auditor. Dr. Vermette has held faculty positions as a clinical instructor at the University of Texas Health Science Center, an associate professor of medicine at the University of Nebraska, a clinical preceptor for Texas A&M University and the University of North Texas, and currently serves as a volunteer faculty member at the Drexel School of Medicine and a voluntary clinical instructor at the Mercy Health System in Philadelphia. Dr. Vermette currently has staff privileges to provide hospice and palliative care medicine at Mercy Fitzgerald Hospital, Mercy Hospital, and Methodist Hospital in Philadelphia. In 1998, Dr. Vermette began referring patients to hospice and following them as their attending physician. In 2009, Dr. Vermette began working part-time for Vitas and routinely followed patients in the inpatient units ("IPUs") in Fort Worth. He would spend two out of every four weeks rounding and seeing hospice patients in the IPU. He then began doing some of the call activities, some home team visits, and participating in interdisciplinary care team meetings. He moved to Philadelphia in 2012 and continued treating Vitas hospice patients. At that time, he also began performing chart reviews for Vitas. Dr. Vermette sought licensure to practice in Florida shortly after Vitas became aware of this audit and that his pursuit of licensure in Florida was intended to facilitate his provision of expert witness services in this case. Dr. Vermette admitted that, even though he is licensed in Florida, he has never treated nor evaluated a single patient in Florida. In fact, the first time that Dr. Vermette read the Handbook was as part of his preparation to testify in this case. Dr. Vermette was qualified as an expert in this case. However, like the testimony of Dr. Shega, the credibility given to Dr. Vermette's testimony was tempered by the fact that he is directly employed by Vitas and was involved in overseeing or facilitating Vitas' response to the DARs, wherein Vitas contested every finding and sought reimbursement for every alleged overpayment. SPECIFIC CLAIMS FOR RECIPIENTS AT ISSUE Patient 2, D.A.2/ Melbourne Recipients Patient D.A. was a 48-year-old female, admitted to hospice on 07/15/09, with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage HIV/AIDS. The claim periods at issue are 09/01/09 to 09/12/09 and 02/15/10 to 05/31/10. D.A. was evaluated face-to-face by Dr. Peterson, the Associate Medical Director for Vitas, on 07/14/09, the day before her admission. Based on his clinical assessment, he determined the patient was hospice appropriate because she had HIV/AIDS, debility, and failure to thrive, with significant recent weight loss, and dysphagia, secondary to esophageal candidiasis.3/ D.A. was admitted to hospice with two active infections, profound weight loss over the previous two- to three-month period (per her self-reporting), peripheral neuropathy, lethargy, and fatigue; she spent most of her time in bed. She had discontinued her antiretroviral HIV-targeted treatment. She was noted to have a BMI of 18 at the time, which is considered severe malnutrition and which negatively impacted her prognosis. On admission, D.A. reported 10 of 10 pain in both legs from her HIV-related peripheral neuropathy. She was described as thin, cachectic (physical wasting with loss of weight and muscle mass due to disease), and had difficulty ambulating. D.A. was also noted to have a medical history of syncope (fainting), urinary tract infections ("UTIs"), and fractures. D.A. was started on medications for the infections, Mycelex for thrush, and Bactrim double-strength for her lung infection. D.A.'s blood work was done on 07/16/09, which showed the patient had a CD4 count of 89. Dr. Shega testified that while her CD4 count was above 25, given D.A.'s clinical status, hospice care was appropriate because the patient was more than likely at end-stage HIV/AIDS. After her July admission, D.A. started gaining weight with the support of the Vitas interdisciplinary team. She had no recurrent refractory infection and the status of her fractures improved as well. D.A.'s clinical status improved such that at the end of the first 90-day period, she no longer could be evaluated with a prognosis of six months or less, and was discharged on 09/12/09. D.A. was readmitted to hospice on 02/15/10 with a diagnosis of end-stage HIV/ADIS. At that time, D.A. was lethargic, weak, had a flat affect and responded with one-word answers. She required assistance with bathing and ambulating, and had a PPS score of 50 percent.4/ On 02/26/10, D.A. was noted to have some secretions and dyspnea (shortness of breath) with exertion. She was believed to have a recurrence of thrush and was started on Mycelex troches. On a 03/02/10 physician visit, the patient was noted to have difficulty swallowing, decreased ability to ambulate, was slightly confused, and displayed white patches on her oral pharynx, suggestive of candidiasis. A subsequent physician evaluation on 03/19/10 noted D.A. was suffering from a severe sore throat, weighed 96 pounds, and had a poor appetite, low blood pressure, and ongoing significant loss of muscle mass. On 05/17/10, D.A. was noted to have a temperature of 99.7, shortness of breath, thrush, and was placed on medication to help with her discomfort. On 05/31/10, a nurse saw D.A. and noted her weight had dropped to 94 pounds, her PPS declined to 40 percent. A hospital bed was ordered because the patient was spending 90 percent of the time in bed, due to fatigue and weakness. Dr. Eisner testified that this patient was not Medicaid hospice eligible because her candidal esophagitis is a treatable condition, it was treated, and her PPS score improved and she gained weight. Further, Dr. Eisner pointed out some likely inaccuracies in the recorded weights of D.A. However, Dr. Eisner provided an opinion regarding this patient outside his expertise as shown by his inability to provide any specific indicators with regard to prognosticating if an HIV/AIDS patient had six months or less to live. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that D.A. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 3, D.G. Patient D.G. was a 48-year-old female who was admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of debility unspecified. Debility is a condition similar to "failure to thrive," which usually denotes a patient with poor conditioning due to multiple medical problems. The dates at issue are 09/30/09 to 10/20/09 and 11/12/09 to 12/25/09. D.G. was hospitalized on three occasions within several months of her initial hospice admission. At the second hospital admission on 09/15/09, she experienced respiratory failure requiring intubation and a tracheostomy and was placed on a ventilator, secondary to influenza and pneumonia. She experienced a myocardial infarction (heart attack or "MI"), acute renal failure requiring dialysis, and had multiple infections. She required a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy ("PEG") tube for feeding and a dialysis catheter. D.G. was placed in a skilled nursing facility upon the second hospital discharge, but soon signed out against medical advice and refused further dialysis. On 09/23/09, she was readmitted to the hospital with bacteremia, secondary to her dialysis catheter being infected. In addition, she had a UTI and a skin infection on her abdomen. While hospitalized, D.G. displayed an extremely high potassium level, which could trigger ventricular arrhythmia (irregular heartbeat). Her hospital physician deemed her to be hospice appropriate and referred her to hospice. Upon initial evaluation, the admitting nurse was unsure how to most appropriately list D.G.'s terminal diagnosis, as her multiple comorbidities included a left leg amputation above the knee due to severe peripheral vascular disease; ongoing dry gangrene on her right leg and foot; coronary artery disease resulting in a recent heart attack; renal failure requiring dialysis; COPD with recent respiratory failure from pneumonia; and Crohn's disease, requiring multiple surgeries. The terminal diagnosis of debility unspecified was deemed the most appropriate. When admitted to hospice on 09/30/09, Patient D.G. was very ill and in substantial pain, requiring increased pain medication. Shortly after admission, D.G. developed a change in level of consciousness. Patient D.G. suffered a seizure on 10/20/09. Her family revoked hospice care, and D.G. was transferred back to the hospital for more aggressive treatment. On 11/10/09, D.G. again presented to the hospital emergency room ("ER"), this time with abdominal pain and right lower extremity pain, confusion, and a low albumin of 3.0. D.G. was supposed to follow up with hospice, but did not do so. She was found to have a PPS of 40 percent, was disoriented, and was at risk of aspiration. She also had an ongoing ulcer on her right leg from the peripheral vascular disease with gangrene. D.G. returned to the ER the following day, 11/11/09, and at that time, was admitted to the hospital. Upon hospital admission, D.G. had a PPS of 30 percent and a BMI of 23. She was disoriented, lethargic, had shortness of breath at rest or minimal exertion, and had lower extremity edema on the right side with a foot ulcer. She was now on oxygen, two to three liters. On 11/12/09, D.G. was transferred from the hospital to the Vitas IPU for symptom management of uncontrolled pain, agitation, anxiety, and wound care. D.G. was diagnosed with debility and failure to thrive due to the multitude of medical conditions noted above. During the months prior to this second hospice admission, she had undergone serial physician assessments and laboratory and radiologic studies. She had also had multiple admissions to the hospital and ER. Over the course of the second hospice period, D.G. had a PPS of 40 percent, then a PPS score of less than 40 percent, and finally, a PPS score of 30 percent. Dr. Shega testified that a patient's PPS score of 30 or 40 percent is supportive of a prognosis of six months or less, if the illness runs its normal course. After a brief stay in the Vitas IPU, D.G. returned home for care. On 12/04/09, she was dependent in 5 of 6 ADLs. On 12/11/09, her dry gangrene converted to wet gangrene and additional medication was started. She became lethargic and was given antibiotics, but her condition worsened, and she was transferred back to the IPU with a 10 of 10 pain, and low-grade fever. D.G. met specific indicators of "rapid decline and disease progression" from the LCD for debility. She exhibited dependence in more than 3 of 6 ADLs, a PPS below 70 percent, recurrent infections, worsening pressure wounds, increased pain, increased respiratory symptoms, and changes in lucidity. At final hearing, Dr. Eisner testified that D.G. "improved to the point that hospice was revoked on 12/25/09." Dr. Eisner was incorrect, however, because the record reflects D.G. was placed back in hospice IPU on 12/24/09, as she continued to deteriorate, refused evaluation by staff and threatened to call the police if wound care was attempted. The following day, D.G. revoked hospice a second time and went back to the hospital to seek aggressive treatment. Dr. Eisner concluded that D.G. did not meet the standard of six or less months to live; rather, D.G. suffered from a chronic condition, Crohn's Disease. However, this does not account for D.G.'s multitude of significant comorbidities. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that D.G. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 6, J.R. Patient J.R. was a 58-year-old male with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage heart failure. The claim period at issue is only one week, 01/24/11 to 01/31/11. During the period at issue, J.R. suffered NYHA Class IV heart failure. Class IV is the worst classification and supportive of hospice appropriateness. J.R. had a PPS of 50 percent and had active symptoms that supported a life expectancy of six months or less if the illness ran its normal course. Dr. Eisner credibly testified that by 01/24/11, J.R. had improved to a point that his life expectancy was greater than six months. J.R.'s disease was no longer progressing to the point of impairment, and his functional capacity had improved. However, AHCA approved benefits for Patient J.R. for the time frame 04/19/10 through 01/23/11. The one-week time frame at issue fell within the last 60-day benefit period approved by AHCA, which began on 12/15/10. According to the instruction provided to the reviewers, this week must be approved. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that J.R. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 7, R.A. Patient R.A. was a 59-year-old male with a terminal diagnosis of COPD who was admitted to Respondent's care on 03/21/11. The dates at issue are less than two months, from 03/21/11 to 05/01/11 and 05/04/11 to 05/16/11. R.A. had a medical history of non-small cell lung cancer, which had been treated with chemotherapy and radiation. He also had a history of hypertension, depression, peripheral vascular disease, arthritis, chronic back pain, gastroesophageal reflux, and seizures. The precipitating event leading to his hospice admission was a hospitalization for pneumonia. At the time of discharge from the hospital, the original plan was for R.A. to be discharged to a skilled nursing facility. The hospital had trouble finding a skilled nursing facility willing to take the recipient because of his social problems, so it appears the hospice placement was a placement of convenience as indicated in a physician's visit note dated 03/28/11, where it was noted, "Case manager is involved in the case to help him out and for possible placement. We will continue with the present medications at this point." In fact, R.A. told Vitas' staff that he would like to have an aid to help him with ADLs and his medications until he gets better, and Vitas' staff suggested R.A. should be referred for home care services. R.A. lived alone. Instead, R.A. entered hospice care. The initial certification documentation incorrectly indicated that R.A. had end-stage lung cancer; however, he had previously been diagnosed with lung cancer, which was in remission at the time of his hospice admission. R.A. revoked hospice care to return to the hospital for aggressive treatment of pneumonia. The certification documentation for R.A.'s second admission again incorrectly listed R.A. as having an end-stage diagnosis of lung cancer, despite the recipient telling Respondent that he was negative for cancer during his first admission. Respondent's certifying physician stated there was a new finding of mediastinal lymphadenopathy, a swelling of the lymph glands in the chest areas, which could be consistent with a reoccurrence of his primary process. Dr. Talakkottur, however, explained that R.A.'s lymph glands could have been enlarged for a number of reasons, such as if he had a cold, a blockage of lymph fluid, or pneumonia. Because R.A. had been suffering from bouts with pneumonia, enlarged lymph glands was not conclusive evidence of a reoccurrence of lung cancer. The initial nursing assessment prepared 05/04/11, notes that R.A. had been diagnosed during his last hospitalization with pneumonia and was complaining of cough and congestion. A nurse noted in her assessment that the recipient continued to express his desire to live alone, but she noted he may need a higher level of care. Dr. Talakkottur credibly testified that this recipient did not suffer from a terminal illness; rather, R.A. suffered from a chronic disease-—COPD. He had been diagnosed with COPD five years prior to his first hospice admission. R.A. was sick, but he was not likely to expire within the next six months. He just needed assistance with minor care, housekeeping, and occasionally with ADLs. He was not hospice appropriate and could have been served in a home health setting. The medical records contained in this recipient's file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this recipient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $20,467.42.5/ Patient 8, T.F.C. Patient T.F.C. was a 57-year-old female with a terminal diagnosis of malignant neoplasm of the corpus uteri. The dates at issue are 06/16/11 to 02/21/12. T.F.C. was diagnosed on 04/25/11 with high-grade serous adenocarcinoma by her treating oncologist. Her uterus and one of her fallopian tubes were removed due to cancer. After surgery, she was seen as an oncology outpatient during May 2011. On 06/12/11, T.F.C. presented to the ER with low back pain, which was not relieved with morphine. Her computed tomography ("CT") scan revealed severe left-side hydronephrosis, hydroureter, left pelvis and a spiculated soft tissue, whose density measured 3 x 2 centimeters. During the dates at issue, her PPS ranged from 40 to 60 percent, although she required increased pain medication and experienced three infections. She had a series of physician assessments and lab work, both while in the hospital and on outpatient visits. Dr. Shega testified that an oncologist from MD Anderson Cancer Center referred T.F.C. to hospice. There is, however, no file evidence to support this testimony, and it is difficult to understand how Dr. Shega knew this fact to be true. The only certification was that of the written certification prepared by Vitas' physician. Dr. Rebecca Moroose of MD Anderson Cancer Center of Orlando saw T.F.C. on 11/02/11. In her progress note, Dr. Moroose reflected upon the T.F.C's severe left hydronephrosis while hospitalized in June, which was believed to be associated with a mass "suspicious for recurrence." Dr. Moroose further reported that since being on hospice care, T.F.C. had excellent symptom control and that most of her pain was associated with her midline abdominal surgical scar and an associated mass found. Dr. Moroose planned to contact Vitas for clearance to obtain a CT imaging of the abdomen to reassess T.F.C.'s disease. On 11/07/11, a CT of her abdomen and pelvis with contrast, was performed and a comparison made to CT of June 2011. Two masses were discussed and compared to the earlier study. The seroma in the anterior abdominal wall of her vertical midline surgical incision was stable and felt not to represent a malignancy but rather a benign fluid collection. The second mass was much less conspicuous in the current study and represented a significant reduction in size compared to the previous study and was believed to possibly represent fibrotic tissue or residual disease. No clear evidence exists from the hospital records and/or MD Anderson Cancer Center that either mass is a definite recurrence of the disease. T.F.C.'s functional status remained static during her first admission. She was able to feed herself, her BMI was consistent with obesity, she could make her needs known, and when the nursing notes assessed her cognitive function, the recipient was consistently reported to be alert and oriented "times three." T.F.C. often reported her pain as zero, on a scale of zero to ten, and her PPS was between 40 and 60 percent. T.F.C. had no inpatient or continuous care stays while in hospice. T.F.C.'s need for increased pain medication appears to be related to issues she was having with her bladder, including kidney stones. She revoked hospice care on 02/21/12, to go to the hospital, to be treated for pain in her abdomen, which was related to kidney stones. Additionally, while in the hospital, she underwent a procedure to insert a stent to facilitate urination. Although T.F.C. had a history of bladder and UTIs, none of Vitas' recertifications or addenda to the recertifications report the recipient having either a bladder or UTI during the disputed period. Although T.F.C. suffered from a terminal illness, the medical records for this recipient do not support a diagnosis of six months or less if the disease runs its normal course. As Dr. Talakkottur testified, the medical records do not demonstrate a clinical progression of the terminal illness. During the period in dispute, T.F.C.'s condition overall remained static. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this patient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $36,221.03. Patient 9, A.J. Patient A.J. was a 74-year-old female with end-stage cerebral degeneration, with two recent hospitalizations prior to hospice admission. The dates at issue are 09/01/10 to 04/22/12. Upon admission to Vitas hospice, A.J. had a PPS of 30 percent and was dependent for 6 of 6 ADLs, with a FAST score of 7c. A.J. had an altered level of consciousness and was at high risk of aspiration. A.J. had a history of strokes and transient ischemic attacks ("TIA" or "mini-strokes"), with encephalomalacia in the left frontal and right thalamus, hypertension, coronary artery disease, increased lipids, dementia, psychosis with hallucinations, anemia, diabetes, chronic renal insufficiency, a history of gastrointestinal ("GI") bleed, and peripheral vascular disease. In terms of her functional state at initial certification, A.J. was bedbound, not fully capable of following commands, had sarcopenia (muscle wasting) in all four extremities, was very feeble, lethargic and oriented times zero, which meant she did not know who she was, where she was, or when it was. During the period at issue, A.J.'s PPS remained at 30 percent, she was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, her FAST score was always above 7, she was oriented to zero or one, and she was incontinent. A.J. had several infections during this time frame. A FAST score above 7 in a dementia patient is consistent with a terminal prognosis, according to the LCDs. Dr. Talakkottur testified that, in his opinion, A.J.'s condition was chronic, not end-stage. His opinion was based on his evaluation that A.J. did not decline during her stay in hospice. Dr. Shega, with ten years' experience as co-director of the Memory Disorders Clinic at the University of Chicago, strongly disagreed, opining that based on her medical history, including two recent hospitalizations, and the evaluation upon admission, A.J.'s dementia was end-stage. During her hospice stay, she continued to lose weight, had temporal wasting and muscle loss, began to experience contractures, and was sleeping more. Furthermore, citing the medical literature, Dr. Shega opined that A.J.'s health did decline in light of her three infections. Two weeks after her initial admission to hospice, A.J. was placed on continuous care due to nausea and vomiting, with no oral intake for two days. Later that same month, she was admitted to a hospital while remaining on hospice. A.J. met the disease specific criteria from the LCD for dementia and related disorders. As noted above, she had a FAST score of 7c, which indicates she was speaking six words or fewer, was 6 of 6 ADLs, and was incontinent. While A.J.'s time in hospice stay was certainly longer than anticipated, a review of her complete medical history presented a dementia patient with a prognosis of six months or less should the disease run its normal course, and she continued to decline. A.J. clearly met the criteria for admission to hospice for the dates at issue. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that A.J. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 10, M.A. Patient M.A. was a 56-year-old male with end-stage liver disease and end-stage COPD. The period in dispute is 10/10/10 to 04/30/11. M.A. had been hospitalized twice just prior to hospice admission, the first for 13 days beginning 08/03/10, with a second admission on 08/30/10. M.A. was hospitalized the second time with chest pain and dyspnea. M.A. remained in the hospital (almost six weeks) until referred to hospice by his hospital physician due to abdominal pain and ascites. Ascites, the accumulation of fluid in the peritoneal cavity, causing abdominal swelling, can occur as a result of liver failure. M.A.'s medical history included end-stage liver cirrhosis, chronic COPD, a history of GI bleed, esophageal varices, portal hypertension, alcohol abuse, diabetes, chronic renal insufficiency, anemia, coronary artery disease, and a left frontal cerebrovascular accident ("CVA" or stroke). In Dr. Talakkottur's opinion, Patient M.A. did not have end-stage liver disease because, in part, there was no report of blood in the stool or of vomiting blood. Although Dr. Talakkottur asserted ascites was not present in this patient, on cross-examination, he acknowledged ascites was noted in January 2011. In fact, M.A. was referred to hospice directly from an extended hospital stay for abdominal pain and ascites. Dr. Talakkottur also testified that M.A. had not been prescribed Lasix or Aldactone for ascites during his hospice stay. Dr. Shega, however, testified to the patient's substantial ascites, despite his being given a very high dose of diuretics, including Aldactone. Contrary to Dr. Talakkottur's testimony, the draft audit report acknowledges M.A. also had ascites on 12/29/10 and in March and April 2011. Dr. Shega opined that although M.A. did not specifically meet the LCDs for end-stage liver disease alone, the fact that he also had end- stage COPD, in combination with his substantial symptom burden, refractory ascites, and encephalopathy with forgetfulness, which worsened over the patient's stay, made the patient appropriate for hospice. M.A. exhibited shortness of breath at rest and with activity and was on 3.5L oxygen per nasal cannula. Over the course of the period at issue, M.A.'s dependency for ADLs generally trended higher, as did his level of pain, while his cognitive status worsened. The recertification signed on 03/24/11 reported cachexia and muscle wasting. While upon admission M.A. could walk a handful of steps by himself, by the end of the period, he was essentially bedbound. M.A.'s health clearly declined over the period at issue. Given his history of recent, lengthy hospitalizations, his numerous comorbidities with significant symptom burden, and his decline in functional status, M.A. clearly met the criteria for admission to hospice for the dates at issue. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that M.A. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 11, D.C. Patient D.C. was a 47-year-old female with a terminal diagnosis of adult failure to thrive. The three claim periods at issue are 12/21/10 to 02/10/11; 04/25/12 to 07/16/12; and 10/04/12 to 12/29/12. D.C. had a longstanding diagnosis of refractory Crohn's disease. At the time of her appropriateness evaluation in December 2010, she resided in a nursing home, which would have required a physician's order to agree that the patient was hospice appropriate. She had a PPS of 40 percent, was dependent in 2 of 6 ADLs, weighed 103 pounds, and suffered from alopecia (loss of hair). Her pain level was 7 of 10. Prior to admission to hospice, D.C. had been hospitalized twice in 2010, the first time in March for sepsis and endocarditis, and the second time on 07/30/10, for GI surgery, with complications of three fistulas, which placed her at high risk for infection. D.C.'s comorbidities included protein-calorie malnutrition, ongoing abdominal pain, anemia, reactive airway disease, neuropathy, peptic ulcer, a history of duodenal ulcer and GI bleed, ileostomy, depression, peripheral vascular disease, coronary artery disease, and cellulitis. The patient was very hesitant to eat, as food equaled pain. During the course of her first certification period, D.C.'s medical condition stabilized, and she was discharged on 02/10/11 due to an extended prognosis. Upon D.C.'s second hospice admission, her PPS was 40 percent, she was dependent on 5 of 6 ADLs, with a recent loss of weight and a BMI of 21.6. Her pain was recorded at 7 of 10 and she had developed a stage 2 sacral wound, in addition to two wounds on her abdomen. Her comorbidities remained the same as at the first admission, with the exception of a benign tumor above her heart, which was removed. During the course of her second certification period, Patient D.C.'s medical condition again stabilized and she was discharged on 07/16/12 due to an extended prognosis. Upon admission to hospice the third time, D.C.'s comorbidities remained the same. Her PPS score was 40 percent. In early December 2012, however, D.C. began to develop paranoia, was agitated and anxious, and required continuous care to have her antipsychotic medication titrated. On 12/15/12, D.C. fell and again was placed on continuous care for her paranoia and the fall. On 12/25/12, D.C. was involuntarily committed to the Halifax Hospital psychiatric unit. Her mother requested she be returned to the Halifax ER on 12/29/12 for a worsening altered mental state, at which time she was described as unresponsive. Her family revoked the hospice benefit, and D.C. was transferred to an inpatient hospice house in another program closer to the family's home. Dr. Talakkottur testified Crohn's Disease is a chronic disease and one could live for 20 to 30 years or more. Crohn's Disease is characterized by periods of dormancy or being well- controlled and periods of exacerbation. It should be noted, however, that at the time of the first admission, D.C. had already lived 39 years with the disease. Dr. Shega testified he believed that D.C. was hospice appropriate for each of the three periods in dispute due to her chronic condition, coupled with recent infections and weight loss. However, Dr. Shega admitted that it is common for a person suffering from Crohn's Disease to have weight fluctuations. Moreover, Dr. Shega admitted that many of the weight measurements in D.C.'s medical records were unreliable. D.C. met all applicable criteria for admission to hospice for the first period in dispute. However, as to the second and third periods in dispute, Dr. Talakkottur more credibly testified that D.C.'s medical records did not support an end-stage progression of any kind of disease; rather, she experienced exacerbations of her chronic illness, which she has had for the preceding 39 years prior to her hospice admission. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this recipient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services during the second and third periods in dispute and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment in an amount to be determined. Patient 12, C.W. Patient C.W. was a 42-year-old male with a history of stroke in 2003 and a terminal diagnosis of end-stage cerebrovascular disease. The dates at issue are 02/17/10 to 01/05/11 and 01/31/11 to 05/23/11. In 2003, seven years prior to his hospice admission, C.W. experienced a stroke. Additionally, since 2006, C.W. had cardiomyopathy, which is a disease of the heart reflective of an ejection fraction ("EF") of 35 percent or less. Dr. Shega opined that although the stroke was in 2003, it "could have left him extremely debilitated." Furthermore, C.W. also suffered from HIV, heart failure, and had been recently hospitalized for the removal of skin lesions in his groin area prior to his first admission. C.W. was discharged from his first admission for extended prognosis. For the second admission, Dr. Shega testified that C.W. had experienced a urinary tract infection ("UTI") precipitating his readmission to hospice. Ultimately, C.W. was discharged for extended prognosis, and Dr. Shega stated C.W. was appropriate for discharge because although C.W. had a couple of acute conditions during this stay, his weight and functional status stabilized, he did not have another infection, and he did not show any other decline. Dr. Talakkottur credibly opined that C.W. experienced issues related to his stroke and cardiomyopathy for quite some time prior to his admission to hospice. Therefore, C.W. had not experienced any change in health to warrant admission to hospice. While C.W. suffered from HIV, Dr. Talakkottur testified his HIV viral load was undetectable, meaning the viruses in his bloodstream were very low. Furthermore, Dr. Talakkottur opined that C.W.'s comorbidity of HIV was of no concern because the recipient also continued to receive his highly active antiretroviral therapy. Dr. Talakkottur further opined with respect to C.W.'s second admission that a UTI is not an indicator of end-stage cerebrovascular disease. C.W. had a Foley catheter, and it is common for recipients with a Foley catheter to develop UTIs. The medical records contained in this patient's file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that C.W. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services during either period in dispute and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $61,721.28. Patient 13, J.M. Patient J.M. was a 59-year-old male with a longstanding history of medical noncompliance with treatment plans and substance abuse, who was admitted with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage COPD after six ER visits or hospitalizations in just over six months. The dates at issue are 03/29/12 to 06/15/12 and 08/31/12 to 12/31/12. J.M.'s PPS upon admission was 50 percent, and he had shortness of breath at rest and exertion. His comorbidities included known fatty liver with history of ascites, CVA times two, UTIs, diabetes type 2, gastritis, hypertension, gastroesophageal reflux disease, heart failure with diastolic dysfunction in left ventricular with amyloidosis, myocardial infarction ("MI" or "heart attack") times two, pulmonary embolism, obesity, and bipolar disorder. J.M. suffered from COPD for many years preceding his hospice admission. He used oxygen on an as-needed basis, preceding and during his hospice stay. J.M. was also a polysubstance abuser. Dr. Talakkottur opined that J.M.'s issues were not the result of a progression of his terminal illness; rather, his decline was associated with his substance abuse. When J.M. was not abusing drugs and was compliant with his medication for his COPD, he had a good quality of life. Conversely, when he abused drugs and was noncompliant with his medication for COPD, he seemed to decline more. Dr. Shega testified that J.M.'s six ER visits/hospitalizations factored into his opinion that the recipient's COPD was end-stage. The nurse completing the Appropriateness Evaluation form noted under hospitalizations that the recipient visits a hospital at least monthly. The recipient tested positive for cocaine during those hospitalizations. The hospital attributed J.M.'s abdominal pain to cocaine use during the latter visit. Dr. Shega testified it was known that J.M. was a controlled substance abuser, particularly cocaine. Although J.M. suffered from a chronic illness, the medical records do not support a diagnosis of six months or less if the disease ran its normal course. Instead, as Dr. Talakkottur testified, the medical records demonstrate J.M. had an issue with medication compliance. For instance, nurses routinely had to remind J.M. to take his nebulizer treatment. However, when he took his medication, he appeared to have no respiratory distress and the intervention was effective. The medical records contained in J.M.'s file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that J.M. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $31,736.82. Patient 16, M.W. Patient M.W. was a 61-year-old female diagnosed with multiple sclerosis ("MS"). The claim periods at issue are 08/26/11 to 08/14/12 and 12/16/12 to 12/31/12. The patient's comorbidities included multiple basal cancer cell removals, arthritis, a history of gallstones, ileus, depression, osteoporosis, COPD, and glaucoma. MS is a condition that affects the neurological system. There are different kinds of MS, yet the most common type is called relapsing-remitting MS, which affects 80 percent of MS recipients. A patient with relapsing-remitting MS is similar to patients with other chronic illnesses in that a patient will have events or flare-ups that may occur roughly every 12 to 18 months or more. MS affects the quality of life more than it affects the quantity of life. M.W. suffered from MS since she was 34 years old, so she had dealt with the effects of MS for 27 years. Dr. Shega opined that this recipient was hospice eligible because of the recent decline in her functional status and nutritional decline. Dr. Shega stated his recollection was this patient could ambulate prior to her hospice admission. However, he later admitted M.W. was unable to walk for the past three to four years and had used a wheelchair for the past five to six years. Furthermore, on cross-examination, Dr. Shega admitted that the BMI for M.W. was miscalculated, and her BMI was in the normal range (22.8). In contrast, Dr. Talakkottur testified this patient was merely experiencing flare-ups of her chronic condition. Dr. Talakkottur opined that patients with terminal MS experience deteriorating respiratory function, which is evidence of the final decline. Dr. Talakkottur also noted that Respondent's month-to-month reports demonstrated unexplained discrepancies in M.W.'s reported scores for PPS, MMA, and ADLs. Furthermore, the medical records did not demonstrate M.W. had any deterioration in her respiratory function or any other terminal progression. If anything, as Dr. Talakkottur testified, the medical records show improvement for dependence with ADLs and her PPS score remained static. The medical records contained in this recipient's file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this recipient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $54,133.32. Patient 17, T.D. Patient T.D. was a 45-year-old female with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage heart disease. The claim period at issue is 04/14/11 to 12/23/11. The patient was diagnosed with NYHA Class IV heart failure as evidenced by shortness of breath at rest, worsening with exertion, and three and a half liters of oxygen via nasal cannula. Her PPS was 50 percent. She requested hospice and was referred to hospice by her primary physician because she required increased support and only wanted palliative treatments. Prior to her admission to hospice, T.D. had multiple encounters requiring physician management and an ER visit on 02/02/11 for a respiratory infection. She also suffered from ischemic cardiomyopathy, had a defibrillator placed in 2008, and suffered from diabetes requiring an insulin pump, peripheral neuropathy, COPD, sleep apnea, arthritis, spinal stenosis, gastroesophageal reflux disease, and history of TIAs. She was on 13 different medications. Dr. Shega opined that the NYHA classification is the predictor most tightly correlated with patient mortality. In this case, while T.D.'s EF changed, her symptom burden did not change. Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged that throughout the claim period at issue, the patient was a Class IV. Dr. Talakkottur testified that in his opinion hospice eligibility was not established, in part because the patient had no jugular venous distention ("JVD") on physical exam. Dr. Shega opined that in hospice care, forced expiratory volume in one second ("FEV1s") are done to characterize the patient's underlying pulmonary status. While outside hospice total volume tests are frequently done to establish a diagnosis, in this case diagnosis had been established and Vitas was prognosticating, not diagnosing. Between 04/29/11 and 11/08/11, T.D. had an abdominal infection requiring antibiotics; she had an episode of thrush; she had a titration of her pain medication due to discomfort; she had another episode of cellulitis in the abdomen; her PPS dropped to 40 percent and her ADLs were 4 of 6; she experienced a respiratory infection requiring antibiotics; she required antibiotics for a vaginal boil; she had an abdominal wound; methadone was prescribed for increased pain; methadone dosage was increased due to swelling; and methadone was again increased because of worsening pain. T.D. was discharged on 12/23/11 for extended prognosis. Dr. Shega testified that while he understood why that call was made, he offered the opinion that the patient still had a prognosis of six months or less. In addition to the reasons set forth above, during the course of the admission period, her PPS went from 50 to 40 percent, back up to 50 percent and, then declined again to 40 percent. She also experienced poor intake and chest pains during this time. T.D. was evaluated as a NYHA Class IV throughout her hospice admission. She had had multiple physician encounters in the months prior to her admission and was referred to hospice by her primary care physician. She continued to have multiple episodes of infection and wounds while in hospice care. For these reasons, this patient met the hospice admission guidelines for the claim period at issue. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that T.D. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 18, R.J. Patient R.J. was a 52-year-old male with terminal COPD. The claim dates at issue are 11/18/10 to 01/11/11. Immediately prior to admission to hospice, R.J. had been hospitalized for 12 days (from 11/06/10 to 11/18/10) for COPD exacerbation. He had hypercapnic, hypoxic respiratory failure and was unable to breathe on his own. He was on oxygen and placed on a BiPAP. Upon hospice admission, in addition to having disabling dyspnea at rest, R.J. was poorly responsive to bronchodilators and had an enlarged right atrium. His PPS was 40 percent, a BMI of 20, a very low weight of 114, and was dependent 4 of 6 ADLs. The patient was referred to hospice while in the hospital by his treating physician. His comorbidities included HIV, history of substance and alcohol abuse, arthritis, thrush, and bladder infections. Upon admission, R.J. was prescribed treatment of three liters of oxygen via cannula, continuous. A nebulizer treatment was used, using aerosolized medication to penetrate into the pulmonary system. On 12/03/10, the patient experienced a respiratory rate of 20, had an 8 of 10 abdominal pain, and was noted to be confused and agitated. On 12/09/10, R.J. had a pulmonary function test with an FEV1 of 0.42, which was 18 percent of predicted. An FEV1 less than 30 percent of predicted is associated with a severe airflow obstruction, supportive of a prognosis of six months or less. R.J. continued to have confusion and agitation through 12/14/10, when he was oriented times two. While it was true that R.J. did not suffer a COPD exacerbation or infection during the months at issue, Dr. Shega testified he had declined in respiratory status since admission, noting a second, severely reduced FEV1 to 10 percent. On 12/31/10, R.J. had elevated blood pressure, and continued to exhibit confusion, agitation and cognitive loss. He also continued to have dyspnea with low activity tolerance. R.J. exhibited specific indicators of "progression of end stage pulmonary disease" and "severe chronic lung disease" from the LCD for pulmonary disease. As noted above, he had hospitalizations due to his COPD immediately prior to admission to hospice and an FEV1 of less than 30 percent. His 12-day hospitalization, his poor nutritional status, his comorbidities and decline in respiratory status during the eight weeks at issue all support a finding that Patient R.J. was hospice appropriate during the claim period at issue. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that R.J. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 21, W.C. Patient W.C. was a 55-year-old female with congestive heart failure. She had ischemic cardiomyopathy, suggesting poor blood flow in her coronary arteries, impacting how well it pumps. The claim periods at issue are 10/06/11 to 10/25/11 and 11/30/11 to 11/27/12. W.C. was hospitalized for a cardiac catheterization on 08/29/11, and then hospitalized in September 2011 and again on 10/02/11 with heart failure exacerbation, the latter hospital stay being immediately prior to her first admission to hospice. She presented with chest pain and shortness of breath and had a low EF of 20 percent. W.C. also had an extremely low albumin of 2.2 indicating malnutrition, which was a factor in her refractory and recurrent edema. Both the hospitalist and cardiologist who treated W.C. on her most recent hospitalization referred her for hospice care. W.C. previously had cardiac bypass surgery, a history of chronic renal insufficiency, anemia, hypertension, bipolar disorder and was an insulin dependent diabetic. She had a defibrillator implanted twice, but it had to be removed each time due to infection. She also suffered from chronic lung disease. Likely due to her underlying mental health issues, W.C. had a longstanding history of noncompliance with her medication regimen. Despite W.C.'s multiple clinical issues, on 10/11/11 W.C.'s history and physical raised a question whether she was too functional for hospice services. Given her recent clinical history, W.C. was monitored for two weeks to evaluate and her case was forwarded to medical review to determine hospice appropriateness. On 10/16/11, W.C. complained of chest pain, her BMI had declined from 27.2 to 22.5, and she was experiencing edema. W.C. also experienced paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea, and required three pillows at night for comfort and dyspnea. On 10/25/11, W.C. revoked the hospice benefit to return to the hospital for aggressive treatment for shortness of breath. During that stay she experienced a MI (heart attack), and ongoing ischemic cardiomyopathy with a low EF of 20 percent. W.C. was readmitted to hospice on 11/30/11, following discharge after a five-day hospitalization. Dr. Shega admitted this recipient was a challenge to diagnose for disease progression because she had good days and bad days, and that one of Respondent's physicians, who treated her struggled with whether she was chronic or end-stage. Dr. Talakkottur opined this patient did not appear to be end-stage. W.C. had a normal volume status with sporadic periods of edema (swelling in the legs). W.C. had no heart arrhythmia, no tachycardia (fast heart rate), no hypotension (low blood pressure), and no hemodynamic instability (unstable blood pressure to support normal organ function). If anything, the problems experienced by W.C. were the result of her noncompliance with her medications and not that her disease had reached a terminal state. In fact, when Vitas discharged this patient, they noted that she was noncompliant with her medications. W.C. was independent for ADLs, lived alone, drove herself, and was still active in the community. The medical records contained in W.C.'s file support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met for the first period but not the second. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this recipient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services during the second period and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment in an amount to be determined. Patient 22, B.A. Patient B.A. was a 51-year-old female diagnosed with end-stage cerebrovascular disease. The claim periods at issue are 05/01/12 to 09/19/12 and 09/24/12 to 12/31/12. Prior to her admission to hospice, B.A. had two recent hospitalizations due to complications from a stroke suffered in December 2011. A PEG was placed during the second hospitalization on 04/21/12, for dehydration and fever. Over a period of five months, B.A.'s weight declined from 180 to 123 pounds, with a BMI of 20.5. Upon initial admission to hospice, B.A. was thin and frail, lethargic, short of breath with minimal exertion, incontinent, and had a stage one ulcer on her coccyx. B.A. was nonverbal, dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs and had a PPS score of 30. Her comorbidities were severe dementia, diabetes, carotid artery disease, and hypertension. Patient B.A. suffered a change in consciousness (likely seizures) and revoked hospice on 09/19/12 when she was admitted to a hospital. An MRI was conducted in the hospital, which showed diffused cerebral atrophic changes and evidence of decreased blood flow/oxygen to the brain. B.A. was discharged from the hospital and readmitted to hospice on 09/24/12, at which time she was unresponsive, with a PPS of 10, a documented weight of 110, and a FAST score of 7f. Just after her second hospice admission, she had a temperature of 100 on 09/25/12. On 10/10/12, she developed a stage two sacral ulcer. During this second admission period, B.A.'s weight continued to decline and she showed signs of muscle wasting. Dr. Talakkottur's re-review and deposition testimony was that Patient B.A.'s "records did not support progression of end-stage pulmonary disease, as evidenced by increasing visits to the emergency department for pulmonary infections or respiratory failure." As pointed out by Dr. Shega, however, Patient B.A. was never admitted for end-stage pulmonary or respiratory disease, but rather for cerebrovascular disease and cerebral degeneration. Dr. Talakkottur did not offer final hearing testimony regarding Patient B.A. Instead, AHCA offered his deposition testimony. In his deposition, he acknowledged he had not made note of B.A.'s significant weight loss. B.A. met the disease specific criteria from the LCD for dementia and related disorders. As noted above, she had a FAST score of 7c or less, which indicates she was speaking six words or fewer, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, and was incontinent. For the audit periods in question, it is undeniable that Patient B.A.'s prognosis of six months or less was correct, and she was Medicaid hospice eligible during all of the dates at issue. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that B.A. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for either period. Patient 23, E.G.D. Patient E.G.D. was a 70-year-old female diagnosed with adult failure to thrive. The patient was initially admitted to hospice on 01/06/10 and deemed eligible for hospice through 03/23/10. The dates at issue are 03/24/10 to 4/16/10 and 5/20/10 to 12/21/10. On 03/23/10, E.G.D. was noted to weigh 95 pounds, with a BMI of 19.9. She also experienced dysphagia and increased agitation. She had edema on the lower extremities, a PPS of 40 percent, and her ADLs were 11 of 12.6/ Patient E.G.D. had been hospitalized during the prior year with a MI in June 2009. Her comorbidities also included diabetes mellitus, hypertension, advanced Alzheimer's disease, coronary artery disease, ischemic cardiomyopathy, a pacemaker, and recurrent falls. On 04/02/10, while the patient's weight had increased to 95 pounds while on hospice care, her PPS was 40 percent and her FAST score remained at 7b. E.G.D. had impaired communication, was confused, had edema in her periphery, and had an acute UTI requiring antibiotics. Although the patient's weight had increased, her BMI was still under 20. E.G.D. was discharged on 04/16/10 for extended prognosis. She was readmitted to hospice on 05/20/10, after having been hospitalized for an acute heart attack, with hypoxic respiratory failure, resulting in low oxygen and respiratory distress. She had also been diagnosed with pneumonia during her hospital stay and had shortness of breath with minimal exertion making her a NYHA Class III. Due to her recent MI and an injection fraction of 20 percent, upon readmission to hospice, E.G.D. was diagnosed with end-stage heart disease. E.G.D.'s FAST score was 7f, she was 6 of 6 ADLs, had a PPS of 20 percent, and her weight had declined in the preceding month from 99 to 92 pounds. She was nonverbal and continued to be an aspiration risk. Her skin turgor was noted as poor and she was incontinent. Dr. Talakkottur opined that while E.G.D. had suffered a second heart attack, it was an acute event and not a terminal prognosis. He further argued that this patient's condition was chronic because there were no signs of angina, no shortness of breath, and no extended neck veins in a JVD test. In response, Dr. Shega noted that in the plan of care review, E.G.D. exhibited dyspnea at rest, had a FAST score of 7f, had a decreased level of consciousness and was lethargic. In Dr. Shega's opinion, JVD does not define end-stage heart failure. Rather, it just defines whether a patient is having an acute heart failure exacerbation at that time. Furthermore, research has shown that physicians, other than cardiologists, are not necessarily good at assessing JVD. According to Dr. Shega, Dr. Talakkottur also failed to take into account this patient's comorbidities, including end- stage dementia, which was likely a contributing factor to her sleeping 18 to 20 hours a day during her second admission and affecting her prognosis. 215. On 05/25/10, 06/08/10, and 06/22/10, E.G.D.'s cardiovascular condition was NYHA Class IV, with dyspnea at rest. During the benefit period beginning 09/17/10, this patient continued to be described as NYHA Class IV. And, while her weight increased to 110 pounds, she was still sleeping up to 20 hours a day, dependent in all ADLs, and had a PPS of 30 percent. During the last benefit period at issue, Patient E.G.D. continued to be NYHA Class IV, and had worsening edema. By 12/21/10, she was essentially unresponsive and the family revoked hospice to seek aggressive care in the hospital related to decreased appetite and decreased responsiveness. Dr. Talakkottur opined that there was nothing in the record to support a diagnosis of NYHA Class IV or significant symptoms of heart failure. In response, Dr. Shega pointed out those portions of the medical record that supported the fact E.G.D. had NYHA Class IV symptoms. As far as alleged lack of reports of frequent ER visits or hospitalizations, this patient was hospitalized for an acute MI less than a year prior to her initial hospice admission, was hospitalized again for a second heart attack immediately prior to her second hospice admission, and the family revoked hospice on 12/21/10 to readmit her to the hospital at the end of the last benefit period. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that E.G.D. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for either period. Patient 25, M.M. Patient M.M. was a 57-year-old male admitted to hospice with a primary diagnosis of systemic lupus erythematosus ("SLE"). The dates at issue are 02/01/12 to 12/31/12. M.M. was first diagnosed with lupus in 1974, and also had a history of vasculitis, which resulted in several fingers amputated secondary to necrosis. M.M. also suffered from glomerulonephritis, an autoimmune disease that attacks the kidney. Other comorbidities included multiple surgeries on his right knee, a left ankle surgery with ultimate fixation, neuropathy, hypertension, morbid obesity, umbilical hernia, Cushing syndrome, diabetes, and a history of gastric ulcers, hepatic steatosis, sleep apnea, peripheral vascular disease, coronary artery disease, and chronic renal insufficiency. In the six months prior to hospice admission, M.M. had been admitted to the hospital four times: to amputate several fingers; for ileus; for chest pain; and for shortness of breath. M.M.'s primary care physician referred him to Vitas for end-stage SLE. Patient M.M. was initially admitted to hospice on 02/01/12. At that time, his PPS was 30 percent and his pain registered 8 of 10. He also suffered multiple weeping wounds on his lower extremities from edema upon admission and throughout his stay in hospice. His long time primary care physician noted, "in the face of aggressive medical care, the patient's condition continues to deteriorate." Over the claim period at issue, M.M. required multiple increased levels of care for pain management and decline in his overall condition. M.M. required continuous care on 03/14/12 for increased pain; on 09/27/12 for pain and change in level of consciousness; and on 10/27/12 for confusion, agitation, delusion and falls. M.M. required hospice inpatient care on 08/23/12 for shortness of breath and fever; and on 10/01/12 for a fall, nausea, vomiting, and low blood pressure. After a fall, M.M. was taken to the ER in July 2012 for a laceration on his left foot. He required another trip to the ER in December 2012 for a fall. In November 2012, he became severely anemic, requiring three units of blood. On direct, Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged that anemia is one of the symptoms of SLE. In his re-review, Dr. Talakkottur opined that M.M.'s condition overall was static throughout the claim period and questioned whether the patient even had SLE. In response, Dr. Shega noted that M.M.'s primary treating physician's records documented he had SLE. In addition, he noted M.M.'s multiple infections requiring antibiotics, as well was requiring numerous IPU and continuous levels of care during the period at issue. Dr. Talakkottur's re-review acknowledged that Patient M.M.'s functional performance had declined during the hospice stay to a PPS of 30 percent on his last recertification, dated 11/21/12. Dr. Talakkottur also testified that M.M.'s recorded weight was inconsistent and that he was addicted to pain medication. While there are acknowledged weight inconsistencies in the record, it is clear the patient was obese and his weight was not a factor in his prognosis. As to whether M.M. was addicted to pain medication, Dr. Shega opined that this patient was in severe pain and needed multiple titrations of opioid treatment to manage the patient's pain and attempt to improve his quality of life at the end. While he was dependent on pain medication, there was no evidence M.M. was addicted. Patient M.M.'s terminal condition was documented by his primary care physician, as well as by four hospitalizations in the six months prior to hospice admission, the multiple times he was placed in the IPU or on continuous care during hospice care, his ongoing edema with infections, a hospital admission in July 2012, and a trip to the ER in December 2012. M.M.'s extensive, well-documented comorbidities supported a prognosis of six months or less. For the foregoing reasons, Patient M.M. was Medicaid hospice eligible during all of the dates at issue. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that M.M. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Boynton Beach Recipients Patient 2, H.P. Patient H.P. was a 51-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage HIV/AIDS. H.P. had two admissions to hospice: 01/03/11 to 05/16/11; and May 2011 to October 3, 2011. The period that is in dispute is the last eleven days of H.P's first admission: 05/05/11 to 05/16/11. H.P. was discharged for extended prognosis. At the time of admission on 01/03/11, H.P. exhibited pain, diarrhea, poor oral intake, a very low CD4 count, and was weak. She had a history of noncompliance with her plan of care, anemia, chronic pain which included neuropathy from her HIV/AIDS, and a history of blood clots to her leg and her lung. This patient also had a history of kidney stones, depression, seizures, insomnia, frequent UTIs, diabetes, and asthma. On 05/05/11, H.P. was transmitted to an IPU and was simultaneously evaluated for extended prognosis and determined that the patient, on that date, had a prognosis that more likely than not, she would live longer than six months. Vitas began working to discharge this patient on 05/05/11, but was unable to make appropriate accommodations for her until 05/16/11. The discharge of H.P. took longer because H.P. had very few financial resources, had HIV/AIDS, and was Haitian with an alien resident card, all of which complicated the placement process. None of H.P.'s family that was contacted by Vitas would accept H.P. in their home, including her daughter, niece, and sister. H.P. also refused to go to a nursing home. Vitas contacted multiple Assisted Living Facilities (ALFs) and made nine attempts to secure placement, but the ALFs were full or refused to accept H.P. Dr. Shega opined that during this time, the patient had a terminal illness with a life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness ran its normal course. Dr. Eisner did not know the specific indicators with regard to prognosticating whether an HIV/AIDS patient had six months or less to live despite being offered as an appropriate peer reviewer. The period at issue was during H.P.'s initial 90-day recertification period. According to the audit instructions provided to some peer reviewers, if any day during a certification period was approved by a peer reviewer, then the entire certification period was to be approved. Dr. Eisner claimed he was not provided this document to perform the audit. Drs. Talakkottur and Komatz, however, were provided such instructions. According to the audit instructions, the period at issue is required to be approved. H.P. was Medicaid hospice eligible during all of the dates at issue. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that H.P. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 3, G.L. Patient G.L. was a 54-year-old male, admitted to hospice initially with a terminal diagnosis of adult failure to thrive and later, prostate cancer. The claim period at issue is 02/01/2012 to 12/31/2012. Dr. Komatz testified that during the disputed period, G.L.'s medical records demonstrated the recipient was stable on consecutive visits and exams and was not showing progression of his hospice diagnosis. Dr. Komatz testified that G.L.'s PPS score remained consistently at 50 percent, which, to her, showed the patient was stable at that point in time and was not showing further decline. Dr. Komatz's opinion was also based upon the fact that G.L. was independent with respect to his ADLs. Dr. Shega opined that during this time, the patient had a terminal illness with a life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness ran its normal course. Although G.L.'s PPS was stagnant at 50 percent, when coupled with G.L.'s increasing pain and other symptoms, cancer literature indicates that G.L.'s life expectancy was six months or less. Dr. Shega testified that it was his belief that Dr. Komatz did not take into account G.L.'s disease progression as indicated by the ever- increasing pain and increasing dosage of oxycodone given to treat the increasing pain. AHCA demonstrated that the medical records regarding this patient's weight were inaccurate. However, the patient's weight appears to have increased or remained relatively stable. Furthermore, Dr. Shega testified that he could not find any documentation to support the proposition that G.L.'s cancer had metastasized or to support that his prostate cancer had metastasized to the pancreas. The medical records contained in G.L.'s file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met during the disputed period. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that G.L. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $51,686.51. Patient 5, G.R. Patient G.R. was a 41-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of debility unspecified. The claim periods at issue are 02/26/10 to 08/19/11 and 09/28/11 to 12/31/12. At 40 days old, G.R. contracted a measles infection, with a high fever, which had essentially left her disabled for her entire life. She had been nonambulatory and nonverbal for many years prior to her entering hospice care. G.R. was initially admitted to Vitas on 02/26/10. At the time of admission, G.R. had a PPS of 20 percent, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, and had a FAST score of 7f. She exhibited muscle wasting and was nonverbal, disoriented, and drowsy. She had shortness of breath at rest, a Stage I ulcer on her foot, and had a PEG tube due to her high risk for aspiration. Just prior to admission, she had a UTI and was hospitalized. However, those hospital records were not provided to support her initial admission. G.R. also had a history of recurrent pneumonia. She presented extremely contracted, stiff, and weak. Dr. Shega admitted that although a physician's note indicated G.R. had been in a steady decline as she had been previously ambulatory and interactive, G.R., in fact, had been nonambulatory for 15 years prior to her hospice admission. During the first disputed period, shortly after admission, G.R. developed cellulitis around the PEG tube site that required antibiotics. Also, during the first admission, she developed pneumonia, a lower respiratory tract infection, and required Levaquin for ten days. G.R. was discharged for extended prognosis on 08/19/11. She was then seen by Dr. Patrick Kavanaugh, a non- Vitas treating physician, who re-referred G.R. back to Vitas hospice because he believed the patient was hospice appropriate. G.R. was readmitted on 09/28/11 with a terminal diagnosis of cerebral degeneration. She had a PPS of 20 percent, was dependent in all ADLs, had a FAST of 7f, was in a fetal position, contracted and unresponsive, was a very high aspiration risk, had difficulty swallowing, and was noted to have increased congestion. She was on Xanax, Tylenol, Benadryl, and nebulizers. During the second admission period, G.R. had skin breakdown on her left and right heels, had problems with congestion and aspiration, had worsening shortness of breath, and became more unresponsive such that by the end of the second period, she could not track people with her eyes. Skin breakdowns are specific indicators of nutritional impairment. Her condition also worsened such that by the end of the second period, G.R.'s secretion treatment had gone from medication only to also requiring manual suction to prevent aspiration. Dr. Talakkottur stated, in his rationale for denying the dates at issue, that G.R.'s skin was intact, which is inaccurate. Dr. Talakkottur also indicated that the patient's aspiration and congestion was chronic, but failed to take into account that those symptoms worsened over G.R.'s second period of hospice care. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that G.R. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services during the second period in dispute, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for that period. The medical records contained in G.R.'s file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met for the first period in dispute. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this recipient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services for the first disputed period and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment in an amount to be determined. Patient 6, S.B. Patient S.B. was a 30-year-old male admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of cirrhosis of the liver. The claim period at issue is 10/06/11 to 01/03/12. S.B. was admitted directly to hospice from Broward Health Medical Center where he was hospitalized for liver failure and delirium tremens secondary to alcohol use. Liver failure was exhibited by an international normalized ratio ("INR") of 1.52 and an albumin of 2.2, a total bilirubin up to 28.5, ammonia of 86, and elevated liver function tests. S.B. had an altered level of consciousness and was disoriented. S.B. had a PPS initially of 30 percent that increased to 50 percent shortly thereafter with some ADL difficulty. S.B. had encephalopathy, decreased oral intake, and anemia. Both Dr. Talakkottur and Dr. Shega agree that this patient suffered from delirium tremens, which is basically a severe condition associated with alcohol withdrawal. Patients with liver disease often develop ascites. If the patient's condition is severe, a paracentesis procedure can be performed to remove the fluid. While the recipient was in the hospital, a paracentesis was attempted. S.B.'s paracentesis, however, was unsuccessful because there was no fluid to actually remove. Additionally, Dr. Shega admitted there was no evidence of ascites refractory to treatment in the medical records. Patients with liver disease often develop variceal bleeding, which are enlarged blood vessels in the gastrointestinal tract. If left untreated, the enlarged blood vessels can rupture and cause a patient to bleed to death. A patient with variceal bleeding has an increased risk of a poor prognosis and a more limited life expectancy. Dr. Shega admitted he could not recall evidence of variceal bleeding in the medical records for S.B. Dr. Talakkottur credibly testified that soon after S.B.'s acute episode of delirium tremens for alcohol withdrawal, he returned to being alert and oriented times three. In Dr. Talakkottur's opinion, S.B. could have been more appropriately served in an outpatient setting for his delirium tremens, which, in essence, was episodic. The medical records contained in this patient's file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met during the disputed period. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this recipient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $40,025.67. Patient 8, J.F. Patient J.F. was a 60-year-old male, admitted to hospice on 04/15/11, with a terminal diagnosis of cerebrovascular disease. The claim period at issue is 04/15/11 to 09/28/12. J.F. suffered a severe stroke and was hospitalized in March 2011, about a month prior to hospice admission. An MRI showed multiple infarcts that resulted in dysphagia, shortness of breath, confusion with disorientation, and poor oral intake. The patient was then readmitted to the hospital for a gallbladder- related acute infection and, at that point, the patient was referred by a hospitalist for evaluation of hospice services. On admission, J.F. had a PPS of 20 percent with comorbidities of diabetes, hypertension, depression, bipolar disorder, increased lipids, atrial fibrillation, and coronary artery disease. J.F. was extremely overweight. J.F.'s terminal diagnosis of cerebrovascular disease was evidenced by the severe stroke, poor functional status, significant dysphagia, and high risk for aspiration that is known to be associated with a poor prognosis, and two recent hospitalizations. A physician assessment indicated the patient was hospice appropriate and referred J.F. to Vitas indicating that the patient had a terminal disease. Upon admission, J.F. was extremely ill and required continuous care until 05/02/11, with recurrent fevers, shortness of breath, cough, and poor oral intake that ultimately resolved. In September 2011, he was noted to be incontinent, dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, with a FAST score of 7d. J.F. continued to have issues with the shortness of breath and coughing with meals. In October 2011, he had increased weakness and cough, and his family called 911; and J.F. went to the ER where he was found to have severe bradycardia with a pulse of 48. There was concern the patient might be having a heart attack. The ER physician indicated that the chest x-ray showed cardiomegaly, or an enlarged heart, and also noted that the patient had mild heart failure at the time of admission to the hospital. The patient also had low-grade fever and an albumin of 2.6, documenting very poor nutritional status. From November through December 2011, the patient transitioned from the hospital to home on continuous care to further manage his dyspnea and lethargy. During that time, J.F. continued to have difficulty swallowing and had episodes of apnea for 10 to 20 seconds. From January through April 2012, J.F. had severe depression, was emotionally labile and weak, and still had problems coughing. Dr. Shega testified that depression is a complication of stroke and associated with a higher mortality. J.F. was put on an antidepressant, which improved his agitation and aggression, and he became more compliant with the medication regimen, but continued to have dysphagia. J.F. had high blood pressure and, given the labile hypertension, Vitas was concerned that it would precipitate a stroke. J.F.'s prognosis remained six months or less, so his blood pressure medications were continually adjusted. By the end of August 2012, J.F. demonstrated significant improvement by going from dependent for care in 6 of 6 ADLs, which he was the whole stay, to having the ability to feed himself; he also had improvement in dysphagia at that time. Consequently, Patient J.F. was discharged from Vitas for extended prognosis. J.F. met all applicable criteria for admission to hospice for the disputed period. Dr. Talakkottur also acknowledged that J.F. was acutely ill at admission to Vitas, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs until he was discharged, was confined to bed and chair and transferred from bed to chair with a Hoyer lift throughout his hospice stay, was incontinent of bladder and bowel throughout his stay, and had a FAST score that did not improve to better than 7a throughout his stay. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that J.F. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 10, A.R. Patient A.R. was an 83-year-old female, admitted to hospice on 1/10/11, with a terminal diagnosis of adult failure to thrive. The claim period at issue is 01/10/11 to 07/02/12. Upon admission, Patient A.R. had a recent ER visit in December 2010 at Columbia Hospital for mental status changes and a UTI, she had a PPS of 30 percent, was bedbound, and required assistance with 6 of 6 ADLs. Also at admission, A.R. had two right foot wounds and was disoriented. She was a nursing home resident in Palm Beach. An order was obtained from the physician for a hospice evaluation and services. A.R.'s comorbidities were mixed dementia of Alzheimer's and vascular disease, with history of stroke, hypertension, hip fracture with repair, coronary artery disease, UTI, pneumonia, diabetes, and increased lipids. A.R.'s weight over the previous five to six months, obtained from the medical record, dropped from 117 to 103 pounds (about a 12 percent loss) with a BMI of 20.5, reduced oral intake along with dysphagia and risk for aspiration on a pureed diet. A.R. had unstageable wounds on her heels in April 2011. She continued to lose weight in May 2011 (as of 5/16/11, she had a weight of 97.5 pounds with poor oral intake) and by July 2011, she continued to have a poor appetite and was known to be pocketing her food. Dr. Shega testified this meant her dementia was so severe that she would forget to swallow, which not only impacted her food intake, but also increased her risk of aspiration. Patient A.R.'s weight continued to decline and then, after her weight got to about 95 pounds, multiple interventions were put in place at the end of September to improve her nutritional status, including increasing her resource supplements to three times a day, and increasing her dosage of Remeron, a known appetite stimulant, as well as an antidepressant. A.R.'s weight increased to 102 pounds in December with a fair appetite, but still noted dysphagia and pocketing food. By January 2012, A.R.'s weight increased slightly, then decreased to 100 pounds, before increasing back to 103 pounds. Her weight then decreased to 97 pounds in February 2012, documenting A.R.'s extremely unstable condition. In April 2012, A.R. continued to have dysphagia on a pureed diet and a poor appetite. By June and July 2012, A.R.'s weight stabilized around 100 pounds, and she did not appear to be declining; consequently, she was discharged from Vitas for extended prognosis. Dr. Shega testified that Patient A.R. also had progressive contractures due to her severely debilitated condition. Dr. Shega noted that at each recertification period, A.R.'s prognosis was six months or less if her illness ran its usual course. A.R.'s fluctuating weight, as much as three to five percent per month at times, created a poor prognosis and put her at high risk of death, and she met Medicaid hospice eligibility without having documented ongoing infections or fevers. Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged that, during her entire hospice stay, Patient A.R. was on a pureed diet and required crushed pills due to dysphagia; and as a precaution against aspiration, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, was confined to bed and chair, was incontinent of bladder and bowel, had a FAST level of no better than 7a, and had a PPS never higher than 40 percent. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that A.R. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 13, W.G. Patient W.G. was a 61-year-old male, admitted to hospice on 10/19/09, with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage cerebrovascular disease. The claim period at issue is 10/19/09 to 06/12/12. W.G. suffered a stroke in his 50s. Between 07/29/09, and 10/19/09, his nursing home requested he be evaluated for admission to hospice care. Vitas completed two Appropriateness Evaluation forms during this period for W.G. and, on both occasions, Vitas concluded that he was not eligible to receive the hospice benefit because his condition simply was not terminal. Ultimately, on 10/19/09, W.G. was admitted to hospice care with a reported terminal diagnosis of end-stage cerebrovascular disease. Respondent altered his terminal diagnosis to debility on 10/20/09. Dr. Shega opined that W.G. was eligible for hospice services because the patient had an ER visit prior to admission, became wheelchair bound, and had worsening dysphasia requiring an endoscopy. However, Dr. Shega admitted that the hospital visit and the endoscopy procedure both preceded the two Appropriateness Evaluations where Respondent failed to certify W.G. as eligible for hospice care. Moreover, the two Appropriateness Evaluation forms where Respondent declined to certify W.G. as eligible list his PPS score as 40 percent, yet the third Appropriateness Evaluation by which Vitas certified W.G. as eligible for hospice lists his PPS score as 30 percent. Notably, however, the next time W.G.'s PPS score is recorded in Vitas' records, it is back up to 40 percent. In this case, it is clear from W.G.'s medical records that he did not evidence deterioration in his nutritional status, pain control, breathing, or complication of his cardiovascular condition. Although W.G. received continuous care (a higher level of hospice medical attention) on occasion, W.G. returned back to his baseline status after each time of heightened care. Dr. Talakkottur credibly testified that patients who experience a stroke can have residual deficits, i.e., they may not be able to move an entire side of their body or walk, yet they live with the deficits for 20 or 30 years. In Dr. Talakkottur's opinion, W.G. was such a recipient who experienced deficits, yet he did not have a terminal diagnosis with a life expectancy of six months or less to live. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this recipient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $169,928.96. Patient 14, A.G. Patient A.G. was a 58-year-old male, admitted to hospice on 05/31/12, with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage liver disease. There are two claim periods at issue: 05/31/12 to 08/20/12 and 08/28/12 to 12/31/12. Patient A.G. was hospitalized at Broward Health on 05/18/12 with abdominal pain, imaging documenting cirrhosis with splenomegaly, no ascites, but significant liver dysfunction evidenced by a low platelet count, which supported portal hypertension associated with cirrhosis, elevated ammonia of 127, an INR of 1.4, albumin of 2.6, and a total bilirubin of 1.5. Chronic pancreatitis was also present and the patient had an elevated lipase of 392. A.G. had an altered level of consciousness with lethargy, and was at risk for aspiration. At admission A.G. was oriented times zero and only minimal arousal to painful stimuli. A.G. demonstrated a significant decline in liver function with encephalopathy, and the patient's primary care physician, who knew the patient very well, indicated that he thought A.G. had deteriorated and was hospice appropriate. Dr. Shega further testified that A.G. was Medicaid hospice appropriate at the time of admission to Vitas because the patient's laboratory values indicated severe liver dysfunction, including the INR and the albumin, along with elevated ammonia to corroborate the patient's confused mental status. A.G.'s clinical progression was documented by the primary care provider noting that the disease had taken a turn for the worse. Although the patient's weight was 188, he had an albumin of 2.5, which is very low, and demonstrated a decline in functional status with a PPS of 50 percent and some ADL impairment, which supported Dr. Shega's opinion that the patient had a prognosis of six months or less if the illness ran its normal course. During A.G.'s initial stay in hospice from 05/31/12 to 08/20/12, he had changes in mental status and lethargy indicative of hepatic encephalopathy. He also had dyspnea. Patient A.G. had two continuous care episodes: the first for lethargy and the second for pain and shortness of breath. He also required an IPU stay. Just prior to A.G. coming off service, he had an episode of thrush on 08/07/12 that required treatment with nystatin. Thereafter, A.G. went missing and was subsequently noted to be incarcerated. Being incarcerated does not disqualify a patient from Medicaid hospice eligibility. A.G. was readmitted to Vitas hospice on 08/28/12. Dr. Shega testified that A.G. was Medicaid hospice eligible at that time because he had lost weight from 188 to 180, continued to have abdominal pain rated 8 of 10, had shortness of breath with minimal exertion, had ascites, abdominal distension, and lower extremity edema. From 08/28/12 to 12/31/12, A.G. was dependent in 3 of 6 ADLs, his PPS score decreased to 40 percent, then to 30 percent, he had a poor appetite, and while his weight increased to 185 pounds, he continued to have lethargy, occasionally having shortness of breath with activity. By 12/31/12, his weight had decreased to 170 pounds. Dr. Shega testified that A.G. was eligible for Medicaid hospice services during the second admission period. On 11/17/12, the patient was receiving methadone at ten milligrams every eight hours for pain, which is a high dose, and he continued to need breakthrough medication for pain. A.G. continued to have shortness of breath with activity and continued to have weakness, nausea and vomiting, 3 of 6 ADL dependency, and a PPS of 40 percent. A.G.'s treating physician believed the patient was still hospice appropriate because of the ongoing pain requiring methadone for management, the shortness of breath with oxygen, and the nausea and vomiting which required an inpatient stay. Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged that while A.G. presented with an INR of 1.4 and an albumin of 2.6, a normal INR is 1.1 or below and a normal albumin is 3.5 or above. Consequently, A.G.'s INR and albumin levels were well outside of normal. Dr. Talakkottur also acknowledged A.G. had an altered mental status and lethargy, dysphagia, chronic pancreatitis, and comorbidities of congestive heart failure, COPD, diabetes, cirrhosis, hepatitis C, gallbladder disease, depression, schizophrenia, drug and alcohol abuse, a history of suicide attempts, and needed assistance with bathing and toileting. Dr. Talakkottur agreed that a patient is not disqualified from Medicaid hospice eligibility because of a past incarceration or for being a drug addict. Talakkottur acknowledged that A.G. also had ascites, edema, a PPS score that declined to 40 percent, and required oxygen. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that A.G. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 15, L.C. Patient L.C. was a 50-year-old female, admitted to hospice on 09/15/10, with a terminal diagnosis of stomach cancer (malignant neoplasm of the stomach). The four claim periods at issue are 09/15/10 to 10/26/10; 11/07/10 to 02/09/11; 03/11/11 to 03/24/11; and 03/23/12 to 04/05/12. Patient L.C. had a rare type of stomach cancer. Dr. Shega testified that in patients who have a more diffuse disease that is inoperable, the five-year survival rate is about 40 percent with treatment--if they pursue treatment--but the survival rate is unknown if the patient does not pursue treatment because most patients elect to pursue treatment. However, L.C.'s cancer was inoperable, which, by definition, means it was already diffuse. Patient L.C. had chemotherapy treatment on 09/06/10, prior to the first admission, and thereafter elected comfort care over more anti-tumor treatment. At the appropriateness evaluation, her PPS was 50 percent. Her previous weight four to five months prior to the first admission was 160 pounds and her weight at admission was 145 pounds, or a 9.4 percent weight loss. Patient L.C.'s BMI was 23.4. She reported 10 of 10 pain and had presented to the North Broward Medical Center ER with severe pain and was directly admitted to the Vitas IPU from the ER. In addition to pain, Patient L.C. reported poor oral intake and unintentional weight loss. L.C.'s primary care physician signed the oral certification of a prognosis of six months or less and was the attending physician for the patient. The Vitas medical director approved the admission, and given her underlying mental health, recommended a psychology consult and the use of methadone as the long-acting opioid to try to manage her pain. L.C. was seen by her primary oncologist, who referred the patient for hospice services and agreed with the admission. Patient L.C. had a history of Hepatitis C; hypothyroidism; schizoaffective disorder; bipolar disorder; a longstanding history of substance abuse; including crack cocaine; multiple suicide attempts; hypertension; tobacco use; and COPD. During the first period at issue, 09/15/10 to 10/26/10, Patient L.C. developed abdominal symptomatology, including pain, nausea, vomiting, cramping, and had underlying psychological/psychosocial challenges. L.C. was in the IPU for pain control for several days and then transitioned home, continued to have pain and titration of some of the medications, was switched from methadone to a Fentanyl patch due to some concerns in the home with possible diversion and abuse. L.C. then went to the IPU for an extremely high heart rate. Her PPS fluctuated, going as high as 80 percent. However, Dr. Shega testified that studies show that a high PPS score is still supportive of a terminal prognosis in cancer patients not receiving antitumor therapy. On 10/26/10, L.C. revoked services to pursue more aggressive treatment in the hospital, no longer wishing to follow the hospice plan of care. Patient L.C.'s second admission in Vitas hospice began on 11/07/10. Just prior to that, she was in the hospital and then readmitted to hospice service in her home. Her PPS was back down to 50 percent. Her previous weight had been 145 pounds and was now reported to be 130 pounds, with a BMI of 22, or a ten percent weight loss. L.C. reported 10 of 10 pain. While L.C. was in the hospital, she received one treatment with Gleevec, an antitumor treatment, and was then sent back for hospice services. Her case was discussed with her oncologist who agreed with the readmission to hospice. During the second period, 11/07/10 to 02/09/11, Patient L.C. was admitted to the IPU for pain, continued to have cachexia, her weight fluctuated, and she needed more Fentanyl to control her pain. She had substantial symptoms, including weight loss, muscle wasting, pain, shortness of breath with activity, agitation, depression, anxiety, early satiety, and nausea. Although L.C.'s PPS rose to 80 percent, she had a substantial symptom burden and was hospice appropriate. L.C. was discharged from Vitas hospice for not following the plan of care on 02/09/11. Patient L.C. began her third admission in Vitas hospice on 03/11/11, which lasted until 03/24/11. At the time of admission, L.C. was at home, had a PPS of 60 percent, her weight had decreased to 110 pounds, with a BMI of 18, reported 10 of 10 pain, and decreased oral intake. During the third admission, L.C. was admitted to the IPU. After the IPU admission, the patient was home for a very short period of time and came back to the IPU, but, ultimately, was discharged again for not being compliant with the plan of care. L.C. was readmitted to Vitas hospice for the fourth time on 03/23/12, until she was discharged again on 04/05/12, for not following the plan of care. Just prior to this fourth admission to Vitas, L.C. was on Heartland Hospice, and had been hospitalized at Holy Cross Hospital. At that time, when she ultimately revoked services from Heartland and transitioned to Vitas hospice, she had a PPS of 30 percent. Her weight was 110 pounds. A CT scan dated 03/21/12 noted that the patient had a large heterogeneous necrotic mass, which meant the mass was so big it outgrew its blood supply and the tumor cells died. It measured 20.5 by 20.5 by 20 centimeters (which is the size of two grapefruits) in the upper abdomen, compatible with malignancy or metastasis, origin uncertain. The mass encased portions of the stomach. Obstruction could not be excluded. L.C. had lost significant body weight, but her tumor's growth was leaving her weight the same. She also lost significant muscle mass. Dr. Shega testified that he had seen that occur several times in patients with this type of tumor. L.C.'s cancer was metastatic and the Vitas admission nurse noted on 03/22/12 that her treating physician in the hospital found that she had a days to a week prognosis that was very grim. During the brief fourth admission, L.C. had a large symptom burden and struggled while in the Vitas IPU trying to control her pain. Contrary to the opinion expressed by Dr. Talakkottur, the fact that L.C. may have been a drug addict had no bearing on whether she was terminally ill or her prognosis. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that L.C. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for the four periods in dispute. Patient 17, D.D. Patient D.D. was an 84-year-old female initially admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of adult failure to thrive. The three claim periods at issue are 09/27/10 to 03/21/11; 05/20/11 to 12/12/12; and 12/15/12 to 12/31/12. On 09/20/10, D.D. was admitted to the hospital for upper abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and was diagnosed with pancreatitis, complicated by a pseudocyst. Pseudocysts are associated as a complication of pancreatitis and associated with a significant mortality, particularly in older adults. Upon her initial admission to hospice, D.D. had a PPS of 30 percent, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, bilateral lower extremity contractures, a weight decrease of 190 to 170 pounds, and an albumin of 2.1, which was consistent with severe protein calorie malnutrition. She also exhibited muscle wasting with a Stage II ulcer on her coccyx/sacrum that was open and draining. She had symptoms of abdominal pain, shortness of breath with exertion, decreased appetite, and bilateral lower extremity edema. She was considered at risk for aspiration, had a history of pneumonia, and had a UTI within the six months preceding admission. Patient D.D. also had a history of dementia, cholelithiasis with increased liver function tests, diabetes, arthritis, osteoporosis, reflux, and hypertension. D.D. was incontinent and confused. D.D. left hospice care on 03/21/11. She was experiencing a life-defining condition of a small bowel obstruction and a UTI that, if not treated at an acute care hospital, would have caused her death. Instead, her family elected to revoke the hospice benefit and pursue aggressive treatment. D.D. returned to Vitas hospice care on 05/20/11. She had again been admitted to the hospital with the small bowel obstruction, secondary to recurrent pancreatitis, along with complications from a COPD exacerbation that required IV steroids, bacteremia that required IV antibiotics, and anemia requiring a blood transfusion. At the second admission date, she had a PPS of 30 percent, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, had contractures, and weighed 150 pounds. Her albumin was noted during her hospital stays at 1.9 to 2.1, again documenting severe protein calorie malnutrition. She had two right leg wounds, was a high risk for aspiration and had a very poor appetite with little oral intake. She had hypotension and was noted to have been in a steady decline for the past year. On 07/26/11, D.D. developed an acute infection that required antibiotics with Keflex. On 12/15/11, D.D. experienced shortness of breath requiring oxygen and pedal bilateral edema at two to three. On 04/09/12, three days after D.D. had a UTI, she experienced difficulty swallowing, profound muscle wasting, and was at grave risk of infection and skin breakdown. Her muscle wasting had progressed to bilateral temporal wasting. The Vitas physician noted that "[t]he patient is only alive today due to the excellent care given by her family as her debilitated state continues to put her at grave risk of infection and skin breakdown." On 07/11/12, D.D. was again seen by a Vitas physician. On this date, it was noted D.D. was becoming weaker with unexplained weight loss. On 08/22/2012, D.D. was seen by a Vitas physician who noted she continued to lose weight, was bedridden, and continued to decline. The patient was eating less, needed total care with ADLs, and had a history of UTIs. The Vitas physician stated: "[t]he patient is getting weaker. I saw the patient because the patient was weaker, and the patient, according to the daughter, is more lethargic all the time." In October 2012, D.D. had intermittent wounds including Stage II wounds on her back and right foot. During that month, the family also requested additional assistance taking care of D.D. at home, which is a service Vitas provides and is required to provide by statute. She then had another wound develop on 11/19/12. On 12/12/12, the family again revoked hospice. At that time D.D. developed a life-defining episode of diverticulitis. She had blood in her stool and was put on IV antibiotics in the hospital. She had an electrocardiogram ("EKG") which showed an atrial arrhythmia. Her hemoglobin was all the way down to 7.2--the normal range is 11 to 12. A hemoglobin of 7.2 is a severe level indicative of needing transfusions to prevent cardiac damage. Without an aggressive level of care, she most likely would have died. D.D. returned to hospice care on 12/15/12. At this time her terminal diagnosis was debility. She continued to be bedbound, contracted, dependent in all of her ADLs, with a PPS of 30 percent. Her albumin drawn from her latest hospitalization was still low at 2.7. She also had slightly worsening dysphagia. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that D.D. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for the periods in dispute. Patient 18, M.S.V. Patient M.S.V. was a 77-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of respiratory failure. The three claim periods at issue are 06/28/11 to 08/10/11; 03/22/12 to 05/03/12; and 05/11/12 to 07/03/12. On 05/21/11, M.S.V. was admitted to the hospital with respiratory failure secondary to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and interstitial lung disease, resulting in a very prolonged ICU stay. She had a tracheostomy and a PEG tube placed at that time. Her albumin was below normal at 2.7. She also had a pH of 7.11, which means her blood level was acidic instead of normal, which put her tissues at increased risk of death, such as heart arrhythmias. She also had a UTI and was on a ventilator. Her carbon dioxide level was 193--normal is 40--and her oxygen level was low at 64. Dr. Shega stated that studies show that when a carbon dioxide level ("PCO2") is over 75, the patient is admitted for acute exacerbations, sent to the ICU, and put on a ventilator, the six-month survival rate is 33 percent. In the months leading up to this hospitalization, M.S.V. had a GI issue that led to her having a colostomy. The colostomy was reversed during that hospital stay. The patient also had a history of tuberculosis, hypertension, and anemia. On 06/29/11, a non-Vitas physician certified M.S.V. had a life expectancy of six months or less. This was her primary care physician and attended the patient while in hospice. Her PPS was 30 percent at admission. A PPS below 70 percent is appropriate for hospice admission according to HI's instructions. During the first dates at issue, M.S.V. was admitted to the IPU and had challenges with secretions and choking and needed suctioning. She also had low-grade fevers during her IPU stay and episodes of tachypnea. She subsequently improved and was discharged for extended prognosis. M.S.V was readmitted to Vitas on 03/22/12. Prior to this, M.S.V. was admitted to the hospital with severe respiratory distress, was in the ICU again, was on a ventilator with a pseudomonas pneumonia that was complicated by a clostridium difficile colitis, a very severe infection of the large colon. On 03/31/12, M.S.V. needed five liters of oxygen on the trach collar, which is a substantial amount of oxygen, continued to have cough, secretions, congestion, and needed to be suctioned three times a day to remove green secretions. On 04/14/12, M.S.V. had confusion, was forgetful, and had dyspnea. She had rhonchi, cough, secretions, congestion with dyspnea, was still on five liters of oxygen, had abnormal lung findings and still required suctioning. She was on continuous care at that time. Continuous care is provided when a hospice patient has substantial skilled needs to manage their symptoms. Therefore, the hospice placed a nurse in the patient's home up to 24 hours a day to manage those symptoms. On 04/16/12, M.S.V. experienced shortness of breath and was very dyspneic with any type of exertion. She had weakness and required assistance with all ADLs. On 05/03/12, M.S.V. revoked hospice care. She had been in the IPU with a severe exacerbation of her respiratory symptoms requiring a seven-day course of Levaquin to help treat the increased secretions. She was also started on Prednisone for COPD exacerbation. She continued to struggle with secretions and near the end of the stay, she was having more lethargy, confusion and congestion. She revoked hospice care to seek aggressive care in the hospital. On 06/19/12, M.S.V. was seen at an acute care hospital and was diagnosed by a non-Vitas physician with end-stage pulmonary fibrosis. M.S.V.'s terminal diagnosis during the third period at issue was end-stage pulmonary fibrosis. On 06/20/12, M.S.V. had a heart rate of 124, which was markedly elevated with 100 being the upper limit of normal. She also had an elevated respiratory rate, was confused, agitated, somnolent, trying to take off her oxygen, and required Thorazine and Ativan to help control her symptoms. She had orthopnea, wheezing, cough, secretions, congestion, diminished breath sounds, required suctioning times four of thick yellow mucus, and was on continuous care and five liters of oxygen. M.S.V. developed respiratory infections during both the second and third claim periods in dispute. On 07/03/12, M.S.V. developed a temperature of 100.5, had agitation, anxiety, shortness of breath, increased congestion and increased lethargy. Her PPS was 30 percent at that time. She also was on Ativan and Thorazine and on eight liters of oxygen. She was congested with rhonchi, wheezes, rales, and dyspnea. She had shortness of breath at rest. She needed suctioning and was started on antibiotics. M.S.V.'s family then revoked hospice care for aggressive treatment. Dr. Talakkottur opined that because M.S.V. did not have increased ER visits, she was not showing evidence of decline. However, M.S.V. was hospitalized three times surrounding the dates at issue, had multiple instances of IPU and continuous care during hospice, and experienced multiple infections. Dr. Talakkottur also did not follow the standard of the Florida Handbook in that he denied a period due to no "significant" deterioration in the patient's condition. This is not a guideline for hospice eligibility--clinical progression of the terminal disease is a guideline. That progression is not required to be "significant" by any metric. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that M.S.V. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for the periods in dispute. Patient 29, R.S. Patient R.S. was a 62-year-old male initially admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of cerebral degeneration. The claim period at issue is 06/21/11 to 07/08/11. During the lead up to the dates at issue, R.S.'s status began to improve and Vitas was undertaking a review to determine if discharge was appropriate. On 06/21/11, R.S. suffered a fracture of the right clavicle while in an assisted living home. Fractures alone are associated with subsequent increased mortality in older adults (over age 60). In older adults, the fracture alters their homeostasis because they have homeostenosis. Any small change in the person's condition can lead to dramatic subsequent outcomes that increase the risk of mortality. The cause of death after the fall is variable, but it is often related to conditions, such as R.S.'s underlying condition. R.S. suffered from comorbidities of dementia, hypertension, paranoid schizophrenia, a history of seizures, benign prostatic hypertrophy of the prostate, a history of dysphagia, history of substance abuse, increased lipids, reflux, and a history of coronary heart disease. R.S. was also confused, nonverbal, and on oxygen. On 06/30/11, R.S. was a fall risk, was supervised at all times, and his mobility had substantially declined. R.S. was on Ativan to treat his anxiety and agitation, which also increased the fall risk and the risk of aspiration. Ativan was a new medication for R.S. prescribed to treat the anxiety and agitation and increased the risk of subsequent aspiration. Dr. Shega testified that agitation is a known manifestation of pain in persons with dementia. Particularly in a nonverbal patient who cannot say it hurts, he/she has to express himself/herself other ways. The American Academy of Neurology Guidelines for care of persons with dementia state that clinicians need to assess patients for pain and that includes agitation and dementia. R.S. was on morphine and Tylenol and then also on the Ativan to help control the agitation; however, all those medications can increase risk of aspiration. On 07/08/2011, R.S. was transferred to the ER for choking. He was in respiratory failure when he arrived and died shortly thereafter. Dr. Shega opined that the cause of death was related to his terminal diagnosis as fractures in patients with advanced dementia often change the trajectory of their illness and dramatically increases their likelihood of dying within six months. Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged that dementia patients can progress to the point that they can no longer swallow. It was undisputed that R.S. died of choking. Dr. Talakkottur inaccurately saw no correlation between R.S.'s fracture and his demise the following month. Dr. Shega's testimony was more credible than that of Dr. Tallakottur. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that R.S. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 21, A.D. Patient A.D. was a 63-year-old male admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of adult failure to thrive. The claim periods at issue are 10/21/09 to 03/24/10 and 05/13/10 to 02/28/11. Just prior to hospice admission, A.D. had been hospitalized for heart failure which required a BiPAP. At admission to hospice, A.D. had a PPS of 30 percent, weight that had decreased from 150 to 140 pounds, a BMI of 22.2, shortness of breath at rest and with minimal exertion, lower abdominal pain, weakness, and difficulty ambulating. A.D. had comorbidities of COPD; polysubstance abuse including cocaine; marijuana; alcohol; and tobacco; hypertension; atrial fibrillation; coronary artery disease with stents being placed; gastroesophageal reflux disease; medical noncompliance; increased lipids; and depression. A.D. was certified to have a prognosis for a life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness ran its normal course by the independent third-party physician who treated A.D. in the hospital. On 10/22/09, A.D. was noted to have an EF of 15 percent. EF alone is not a predictor of reduced life- expectancy. Dr. Shega noted that it is the relationship between the EF and the patient's symptom burden that predicts increased mortality and hospice appropriateness. Dr. Talakkottur testified that a normal EF is above 55 percent. On 10/23/09, A.D.'s respiratory rate was elevated at 24. He was hypotensive with a blood pressure of 90 over 60, required morphine for pain, was lethargic but arousable, had chest pain, was on oxygen, and was short of breath with exertion. On 12/08/09, A.D. was placed on continuous care. He experienced dizziness when he sat up, which Dr. Shega opined was probably related to the patient's low blood pressure of 80 over 50, consistent with a severe NYHA Class. On 03/24/10, A.D.'s terminal diagnosis was changed to end-stage heart disease. He had chest pains and an extremely low heart rate of 40. A.D. revoked hospice care and was admitted to the acute care hospital with a severe life-defining infection in the defibrillator pocket. An infection of a pacemaker is a rare occurrence. A.D. required a transesophageal echo on 14/15/10. A transesophageal echo is a probe down the patient's esophagus to determine how the heart is functioning. Usually, a transesophageal echo is done when there is concern about endocarditis or infection of the heart valves. On 05/13/10, A.D. was readmitted to Vitas. His EF was again 15 percent and his PPS was 30 percent. He was drowsy, was an aspiration risk, and was NYHA Class IV with chest pain and dyspnea at rest and exertion. Symptoms of heart disease are not just shortness of breath. They also include chest pain, fatigue, weakness, or palpitations. At the second admission, A.D. was again certified to have a prognosis for a life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness ran its normal course by the independent third-party hospital physician. He received morphine for shortness of breath and still had shortness of breath with exertion. During the second period at issue, A.D. had a trajectory very consistent with end-stage heart disease with intermittent periods of shortness of breath or chest pain at rest or with minimal exertion. At times, he would show minor improvement in cardiac status, then decline. He did gain weight during this period but continued to exhibit NYHA Class III and Class IV disease status. He became weaker and spent more time in bed. His nutritional status improved, but other parameters fluctuated or remained end-stage, particularly the NYHA Class. He also experienced hypotension. A.D. ultimately passed away in hospice during an approved period. A study done by Joan Lunny published in the Journal of the American Medical Association("JAMA") on heart failure and end-stage lung disease patients showed that the patients have exacerbations, get worse, then improve. They may plateau. They may improve a little, but will then get worse again. This is visually displayed in the HI presentation "The Role and Function of Hospice Reviewers, "which depicts via a line graph the saw- tooth nature of the progression of the diseases. (Vitas Ex. 4). A.D. disease trajectory followed this chart. Dr. Talakkottur stated that A.D. showed no signs of acute cardiac disease at either admission, which is contrary to the medical records showing he had NYHA Class III or IV symptoms at both admissions. Dr. Talakkottur also stated that a low EF was not concerning in this patient because it could rebound in six months. However, as indicated above, A.D.'s EF was at 15 percent on the date of each admission, 10/21/09 and 05/13/10. Dr. Talakkottur also stated that this patient was not terminal as evidenced by a lack of increased utilization of health care, such as ER visits and hospitalizations. However, the patient had been hospitalized just prior to each admission to hospice. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that A.D. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for the periods in dispute. Patient 23, S.V.D. Patient S.V.D. was a 44-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage liver disease with cirrhosis. The claim period at issue is 12/03/10 to 07/30/11. Just prior to hospice admission, S.V.D. had been hospitalized for vaginal bleeding, with a hemoglobin down to 2.5, which caused her to be admitted to the coronary care unit where she had a procedure in the hospital to help mitigate future bleeding, including an ablation and a dilation and curettage. She had an INR of 1.5 and an albumin of 2.1. She was jaundiced and had a bilirubin of 6. The upper range of normal for bilirubin is 1.1. She had a history of encephalopathy and multiple paracentesis. A paracentesis performed 11/29/10 removed five liters of fluid and a subsequent paracentesis on 12/03/10 removed four liters. Dr. Talakkottur opined that J.V.D. was not hospice appropriate because she failed to display signs of a terminal prognosis. Her PPS scores were between 30 and 50 percent, she was alert and oriented on the order of two to three, and she was able to ambulate throughout the period. Moreover, her albumin rose to 3.4, which was an improvement and marker of liver function. She had no recurrent or intractable infections, no respiratory problems, and her nutritional status remained good. However, upon admission, S.V.D. had an extremely elevated ammonia level, progressive malnutrition, and continued to use alcohol. She had a PPS of 40 percent, a BMI of 21.5, muscle wasting, weakness, shortness of breath, and a poor appetite. While the normal range for ammonia is 20 or less, S.V.D.'s ammonia level was 74. A BMI of 22 or less is considered significant nutritional impairment. On 12/03/10, a non-Vitas physician certified that S.V.D. had a life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness ran its normal course. On 12/08/10, S.V.D. had an INR of 1.53. This was drawn because S.V.D. needed another paracentesis, which occurred in the Vitas IPU on 12/09/10, and removed 1.5 liters of fluid. During the period at issue, S.V.D. exhibited impaired nutritional status with weight loss and muscle wasting, including bilateral temporal wasting. She also had jaundice, fatigue, periods of confusion, and encephalopathy. On 05/18/11, S.V.D.'s weight had decreased to 104 pounds with continued muscle wasting and bilateral temporal wasting with a poor appetite. She may have been abusing alcohol and was having worsening leg pain, probably from peripheral neuropathy related to alcohol. She had shortness of breath with minimal activity, was sometimes sleepy, alert and oriented, times two, with periods of confusion, which supported a diagnosis of encephalopathy. She required more assistance with ADLs and her PPS was 30 percent. S.V.D. had progression of her disease and was more easily fatigued, lost muscle mass, ascites, decreased appetite and weight loss, was sleeping sometimes for a whole day, and at times was too tired to eat. Dr. Talakkottur testified that S.V.D.'s nutritional status improved. Although her appetite did improve after the dates at issue, during the dates at issue, it was severely compromised. He also stated that he could not find any evidence of a compromised nutritional status. This statement was patently refuted by the record. Dr. Talakkottur argued as a reason for denying eligibility that the patient did not have further paracentesis. However, when the third paracentesis was drawn on 12/09/10, after admission to hospice, the fact that no future paracentesis would be drawn was not known. This is the type of revisionist review that is improper and cannot be used to deny eligibility after the fact. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that S.V.D. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 24, S.K. Patient S.K. was an 86-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage cerebral degeneration. The claim period at issue is just over seven months, from 05/10/12 to 12/31/12. Patient S.K. had two recent hospitalizations to Northwest Medical Center for lower extremity cellulitis on 02/20/12 and on 05/04/12, just prior to admission. The patient had functional decline. In the hospital, her PPS was noted to be 20 percent. She became bedbound within the previous nine months. Before that, she was ambulatory. She had upper and lower contractures. She was described as lethargic with a FAST at that time of 7d. She was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, with a weight of 78 pounds and a BMI of 14.2. She had muscle wasting, along with anorexia, incontinence, cachexia, and poor appetite. S.K. also had dysphagia, was on a pureed diet, and was at risk for aspiration. The patient had Stage II pressure wounds to the right hip, right toe, and knee. Patient S.K.'s past medical history included dementia, hypertension, DVT of the right lower extremity, and a pressure ulcer of the right hip. Dr. Shega testified that Patient S.K. met the criteria for Medicaid hospice because she had two recent hospitalizations for infections; progression of her disease; functional decline with wounds; impaired nutritional status; with BMI markedly low at 14.2; a PPS at admission of 20 percent likely related to lethargy; and documentation that nine months prior, the patient essentially became bedbound. All of that documentation together indicated that she went from a chronic illness to end-of-life. Patient S.K.'s non-Vitas attending physician signed the oral certification that concurred the patient had a terminal illness with a life expectancy of six months or less if the illness ran its normal course and authorized Vitas to evaluate and admit the patient to the program. After S.K. was admitted to Vitas hospice, she experienced lethargy and low-grade fevers consistent with likely aspiration that slightly improved, and then she developed thrush in the first benefit period, which impacted her ability to swallow and eat. The thrush was appropriately treated. Thrush only happens in usually severely immunocompromised patients. She would cough when she ate, indicating her high risk of aspiration. In July 2012, S.K. was dependent in all ADLs. Her PPS was 30 percent, her FAST level was 7f, she had a Stage III wound, was nonverbal, was eating 50 to 60 percent of small meals, and had visible weight loss. She was in pain when being moved. She developed a wound on the right foot that had bloody drainage, so she had a hip wound and a foot wound. Her caregiver reported she slept most of the day, stared at the ceiling, and continued to document end-stage cerebral degeneration. S.K.'s hip wound resolved in August 2012. In October 2012, the patient developed another episode of thrush, again documenting her poor status. S.K. had dysphagia and coughed when getting liquids, which meant that when the patient was drinking, she was coughing, which dramatically increased her risk of aspiration because she was having a hard time controlling the texture; and at any time, it could get into her lungs and cause pneumonia or asphyxiation. S.K. was recertified as Medicaid hospice eligible on 10/27/2012. S.K.'s MMA had decreased, she remained bedbound with cachexia and muscle wasting, she was eating about 50 percent, she continued to need to be fed, she was given Percocet for pain as needed, had shortness of breath with oxygen as needed, her wounds had resolved, and she was at very high risk for infection given her bedbound status, severe malnutrition, and inability to care for herself. S.K.'s PPS remained at 30 percent, and she was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs. Her home health aide visits had to be increased to seven times a week to help support the patient and family. Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged that Patient S.K. remained at a FAST level above 7, a PPS score of 30 percent or below, was incontinent of bladder and bowel, had dysphagia and was bedbound, and was 6 of 6 ADLs during the entirety of the dates at issue. S.K. met the disease specific criteria from the LCD for dementia and related disorders. As noted above, she had a FAST score above 7c, which indicates she was speaking six words or fewer, was 6 of 6 ADLs, and was incontinent. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that S.K. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 26, E.E. Patient E.E. was a 59-year-old male, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage liver disease. The claim period at issue is 09/01/09 to 04/30/10. E.E. had two hospitalizations for ascites and paracentesis prior to his stay in Vitas hospice. Upon admission, E.E. had a distended abdomen with 8 of 10 pain. E.E.'s skin was slightly jaundiced, he had a very poor appetite, and reportedly had not eaten in three days. The family and patient also reported issues with bloody noses and periodic bloody stool. At that time, the patient had a reported weight loss from 180 to 160 pounds or 11 percent of his body weight. E.E. was dependent in 5 of 6 ADLs, a PPS of 40 percent, dyspnea with rest and exertion, and confusion On 09/02/09, E.E. had two plus edema noted in his feet. As of 09/17/09, Patient E.E. had shortness of breath with activity and at rest. From a cognitive perspective, E.E. was confused at times and forgetful. He had bilateral edema in the extremities, was incontinent, under fall precautions, needed help setting up his food, and had very poor skin turgor with easy bruising indicating challenges with coagulation. Patient E.E. was extremely anxious, needed to be placed on an antibiotic for cellulitis, and was started on Aldactone for worsening edema. As of 11/30/09, while E.E.'s weight from admission in June increased from 160 to 180, his PPS remained at 40 percent, and he was having more pain in the abdomen related to ascites. The abdomen was described as distended. He continued to have confusion, forgetfulness, and agitation at times. E.E. also had lower extremity edema and now shortness of breath. E.E. was now on Lasix in addition to the Aldactone to try to control his edema. He continued to have a poor appetite. He was on lactulose to help manage his encephalopathy, which would not be expected in a 59-year-old without a dementia diagnosis, and he had confusion and forgetfulness; consequently, Dr. Shega concluded that was related to the end-stage liver disease. Dr. Shega testified that Patient E.E. was Medicaid hospice eligible at that time because he had ongoing manifestations of end-stage liver disease with worsening ascites, weight gain from the edema, a poor appetite, and required medication for encephalopathy. In February 2010, E.E.'s long-acting morphine was increased from 30 to 45 every 12 hours, he had pain, confusion and cognitive loss, was incontinent, had difficulty with ADLs, was eating about 25 percent of meals with anorexia, and had additional skin tears on his arms. E.E. had confusion, needed reorientation, and required a bed alarm on the bed because he might get up and fall. E.E. was prescribed an antipsychotic, Risperdal, at one milligram twice a day in March 2010 and had episodes of dyspnea requiring oxygen treatment. His PPS was 40 percent, pulse was 102, and had ongoing pain 8 of 10. He remained agitated with confusion and had aggression for which the antipsychotic was started. His Lasix dose was twice a day to try to manage the edema, and he continued to have intermittent dyspnea, ADL dependency, decreased appetite, easy bruising, and skin tears on both arms. In April 2010, E.E. continued to decline with increased confusion and weakness. He had new skin tears on both arms indicative of poor nutritional status. He had ascites along with his liver being able to be palpated. His weight was 165 pounds. He was lethargic, lying in bed with altered mental status; he remained on the lactulose and diuretics. His skin was jaundiced. Patient E.E. was Medicaid hospice eligible during all of the dates at issue. Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged that in March 2010, Patient E.E. became a fall risk, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, and had periods of aggression and was very confused, which was possibly caused by encephalopathy. Dr. Talakkottur further acknowledged in final hearing that in April 2010, Patient E.E. had severe low back and abdominal pain, was on two liters of oxygen, required assistance with 5 of 6 ADLs, had skin tears, signs of ascites, and jaundiced skin. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that E.E. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 28, D.M. Patient D.M. was a 59-year-old male, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of malignant neoplasm of the prostate. The claim period at issue is just over seven months, from 05/26/12 to 12/31/2012. D.M. was admitted to Vitas on 05/26/12 with a terminal diagnosis of malignant neoplasm of the prostate (cancer). He died on service on 5/07/13. The "Scope" of the audit, as included in the FARs, states, "In addition, HI excluded recipients who had at least one malignancy (cancer) primary diagnosis and had a date of death less than one year from the first date of service with this provider." The undisputed evidence shows that D.M. had a terminal diagnosis of cancer and died less than one year after first receiving hospice care from Vitas. AHCA has the burden to prove compliance with the audit scope. It has not in this case. According to the scope of the audit, this claim must be excluded. Even if the scope of the audit did not preclude disputing this patient's benefits, AHCA failed to show this patient was not eligible. Just prior to admission in May 2012, Patient D.M. sustained a fall for which he had imaging that demonstrated diffuse metastatic blastic lesions and an elevated PSA to 302 nanograms per milliliter. D.M. also had left hydronephrosis, an enlarged bladder secondary to the prostate cancer that required Foley catheter placement. A CT scan demonstrated widespread blastic bony metastasis diagnosed as prostate cancer. The patient had substantial physical disability with a noted PPS of 40 percent, a reported weight loss from 150 to 140 pounds, and a BMI of 20. The patient had 6 of 10 groin pain and bilateral lower extremity edema. D.M.'s non-Vitas physician, Dr. Richard Mastrole, signed the certification attesting that the patient had a prognosis of six months or less if the illness ran its normal course and authorized Vitas to evaluate the patient for hospice services and admit him to the Vitas hospice program (signed and dated on 06/07/2012). D.M. also had a hematology consultation by Dr. David Drew. Dr. Drew noted D.M. developed weight loss of more than 20 pounds, close to 15 percent of his body weight, in the previous four to five months. He also noted that D.M.'s pain was so severe it interfered with his sleeping and eating. Dr. Shega testified that D.M.'s imaging demonstrated the blastic disease (prostate cancer) growing and invading into the bone. Dr. Shega further testified that the patient's alkaline phosphatase was markedly elevated to 600, which demonstrated the cancer was eating into the bone. The blastic lesions suggested that the tumor was actively growing and metabolizing the bone, destroying the bone, which is what was contributing to the pain. Within the bone, there are nerve fibers, and those nerve fibers were being stimulated by the cancer, which was destroying the environment. Dr. Shega testified that patients who have bony metastatic disease are at marked increase risk of subsequent fracture. D.M. was Medicaid hospice eligible at the time of initial certification because he had a terminal diagnosis of metastatic prostate cancer with known bony metastatic lesions that were blastic in nature, and a prognosis of six months or less if the disease ran its normal course. There were serial physician assessments of a hospitalization with all the physicians, including the patient's primary care doctor, documenting the patient had a prognosis of six months or less. D.M. had impaired nutritional status as documented in the appropriateness evaluation and in the medical record in the hospital. He had functional decline demonstrated by a PPS of 40 percent, which is markedly impaired. On 05/25/12, the day prior to admission, Patient D.M. met with the Vitas admission nurse and discussed that he had Stage IV prostate cancer and the Vitas hospice philosophy. The patient stated that he would be seeking aggressive care and would be seeing an oncologist in one to two weeks for chemotherapy and that he might also have an orchiectomy in two to three weeks per the urologist. However, D.M. did not follow through with aggressive care. In June 2012, Patient D.M. suffered a fall. X-rays did not document a fracture, but the fall indicated his overall weakness. In July 2012, Patient D.M. had a Stage I ulcer on the left leg that subsequently healed, but demonstrated that his nutritional status had not improved despite the weight gain. As of 08/10/12, D.M. was distressed and not getting adequate pain relief. He had pain in his pelvis, hips, and back relating to bone metastasis. On exam, palpation of different areas of his body exacerbated the pain; he had edema; and his appetite was declining, although he did not appear to be losing weight (due to the steroid treatment). He was also lethargic. Patient D.M. continued to have worsening pain during his stay in Vitas hospice, requiring more aggressive pain management. He was started on methadone, which is one of the most potent opioid analgesics, which was increased as the patient was on Vitas service. The increased pain and titration of opioids supported that the cancer was progressing and worsening. D.M. met the disease specific criteria from the LCD for cancer. As noted above, he had both metastases and a PPS below 70 percent. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that D.M. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 29, R.S. Patient R.S. was a 59-year-old male, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of debility. The claim periods at issue are 04/20/11 to 05/23/11 and 06/03/11 to 10/16/12. Prior to admission, R.S. was hospitalized for almost three weeks beginning on 03/02/11 for joint pain. At that time, the patient had severe electrolyte abnormalities, hyponatremia, along with a hemoglobin of 7.7. He was a known alcohol abuser and had an EGD that found gastritis in the stomach, along with a duodenal ulcer. He also had a UTI during that hospital stay and pneumonia. The patient was not safe to live independently and was placed in an ALF. Patient R.S. had a recent significant decline in functional status and became totally dependent in ADLs resulting in a PPS of 30 percent. R.S. had a poor appetite and an extremely low albumin level of 2.1. The patient became more confused, forgetful and developed extremity edema. He had a wound on his right foot. R.S. had peripheral vascular disease contributing to his diagnosis of debility, with severe functional disability. His prognosis in part was related to severe functional disability. This patient's comorbidities included dementia, atrial fibrillation, alcohol abuse for over 30 years, and a history of delirium tremens ("DTs"), gout, high blood pressure, COPD, anemia, and depression. R.S.'s primary care, non-Vitas physician, certified the patient for hospice and that the patient's prognosis was six months or less. After admission, R.S. developed a lesion on the outer aspect of the right foot that became necrotic due to poor circulation. Ultimately, R.S. had to be transferred to the IPU for management. Patient R.S. decided that due to the pain, he wanted an amputation and revoked hospice services to receive that amputation. R.S. was readmitted to Vitas hospice on 06/03/11 after his above-the-knee amputation at Columbia Hospital and was quickly thereafter admitted to Vitas' IPU for pain control. At that time, the patient's PPS was 40 percent. R.S. had ongoing 9 of 10 stump pain, which is common after an amputation, but he developed necrosis of the left heel, and he was admitted to the IPU for pain management. R.S. was Medicaid hospice eligible at readmission because he had the same terminal diagnosis of debility with the same clinical manifestations, but now had a left heel ulcer; the patient had just come out of the hospital after a life-defining condition and was referred to hospice services from that hospitalization; and, functionally, the patient had a PPS of 30 percent. Those indicators together demonstrated that Patient R.S. continued to have a prognosis of six months or less if the illness ran its usual and normal course. As of 06/11/11, Patient R.S. continued to have pain and had a new necrotic area on the left heel, cachexia and muscle wasting, a poor appetite, and was increasingly confused at times with increasing dementia. As of 08/20/11, R.S. had ongoing cachexia, muscle wasting, continued pain, progressive dementia, and continued to have the wound on the left heel, which was necrotic, and was having regular wound care and needed to be debrided, which was a systemic manifestation of the peripheral vascular disease. In December 2011, R.S. was noted to have poor skin turgor, was at high risk of developing additional skin breakdown, and his skin temperature was cold due to the peripheral vascular disease. The patient had an open coccyx wound, along with a wound to the left outer knee. The ongoing wounds suggested that the patient's nutritional status had not improved and that he continued to be hospice appropriate. The wound tissue was dead and not healing very well and Santyl, a chemical debrider, was administered to remove the dead tissue, indicating a severe wound. R.S. was steadily declining as evidenced by increased weakness and skin breakdown. In May 2012, R.S. had urinary symptoms along with increased lethargy and forgetfulness. He was started on an antibiotic for UTI. His condition was steadily declining, requiring frequent repositioning in bed and had poor balance. R.S. had an active infection. In his debilitated stated, it was considered a life-defining infection making R.S. hospice appropriate with a prognosis of six months or less if the illness ran its usual and normal course. In July 2012, R.S. needed increased pain medication to help manage his symptoms and was transitioned from morphine to methadone for the neuropathic pain he was experiencing. He remained bedbound, incontinent, and dependent in all ADLs. He had persistent sleepiness throughout the morning and difficulty staying awake, a sign of end-stage disease. He had shortness of breath along with anorexia, anxiety and depression, and a PPS of 30 percent. R.S. continued to have poor blood flow to the leg with decreasing sensation and decreased pulses in the left leg, putting it at very high risk for subsequent skin breakdown and the risk of an additional ulcer was very high. He had decreased breath sounds and scattered rhonchi. R.S. was also complaining of urinary symptoms and was started on another antibiotic for a UTI. As of 08/27/12, R.S. continued to demonstrate severe physical disability, with a fair appetite, poor skin turgor, and a right shoulder wound that was open and draining, consistent with an infection. His right shoulder had a raised area with redness, hard, moderate drainage, and he was started on an antibiotic to treat the infection. Patient R.S. was discharged from Vitas hospice in October 2012. The patient was presented to the Vitas medical director review for a possible extended prognosis. The patient's pain was much better controlled with titration of medications. The patient's weight had increased and his appetite had improved. The patient currently did not have any wounds, and previous wounds had healed. The infection in August 2012 had resolved. Patient R.S. did not need a higher level of care. At that time, the medical director believed that the patient had a prognosis greater than six months if the illness ran its usual course. At final hearing, Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged that R.S., at initial certification, had a history of dementia, was incontinent, required full assistance with ADLs, had a necrotic toe, was bedbound and wheelchair-bound. He revoked hospice on 05/23/11, and shortly thereafter had his necrotic and gangrenous foot amputated above the knee. Dr. Talakkottur further acknowledged that during R.S.'s stay in hospice, he did not have a PPS score above 40 percent, his condition was slowly declining, evidenced by delayed wound healing and increased weakness. R.S. had muscle wasting, severe low back pain, became anorexic, continued to be incontinent of bowel and bladder, was too weak to get out of bed, developed a Stage III decubitus ulcer, and had a UTI and cellulitis. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that R.S. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for the two periods at issue. DADE RECIPIENTS Patient 1, A.B. Patient A.B. was a 34-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage AIDS. The claim periods at issue are 02/12/11 to 07/18/11 and 10/18/11 to 12/30/11. A.B. was hospitalized just prior to hospice admission on 02/04/11 for shortness of breath, cough, weakness, and pneumonia. On admission to hospice, A.B.'s weight had decreased from 189 pounds to 160 pounds in the previous five to six months. She also had a CD4 count of less than four. She was having difficulty chewing and was on a mechanically soft diet. A.B. had a history of several pneumocystis pneumonias, which Dr. Vermette stated is one of the sentinel opportunistic infections that define a patient as having AIDS, instead of HIV, and is a very serious type of pneumonia that is difficult to treat and eradicate. She had a PPS of 40 percent. A.B. had numerous admissions to Vitas continuous care and IPU. She was admitted to continuous care at the time of admission. On 02/17/11, she was admitted to the IPU. She was again placed on continuous care on 02/19/11. She was admitted back to the IPU on 03/23/11 for difficulty breathing and a respiratory infection. A.B. was re-admitted to the IPU on 04/11/11 for pain, and admitted again on 04/21/11 due to vomiting and pain. She was admitted to the IPU on 05/12/11 for abdominal pain and diarrhea. She was again admitted to the IPU for chest pain on 05/19/11. She was placed on continuous care for pain management on 06/10/11. A.B. was again transferred to the IPU on 07/04/11 for vomiting and abdominal cramping. On 05/10/11, A.B.'s weight had decreased to 157 pounds, she was cachectic, had shortness of breath managed with oxygen and bronchodilators, had a PPS of 40 percent, had increased episodes of confusion, agitation and forgetfulness, and was recently treated for oral candiasis. A.B. was discharged on 07/18/11 when arrested. On 10/18/11, A.B. was readmitted to Vitas hospice. Between the two hospice admissions, A.B. was again seen at the Magic Johnson Healthcare Center. In August 2011, her CD4 count was less than six. On 09/19/11, her weight was 151 pounds. She was taking her AIDS and heart medications without improvement and with periods of noncompliance, which are both indicators of worsening prognosis. At admission, A.B. had a PPS of 40 percent, a weight of 150 pounds, was having significant pain, shortness of breath at exertion and rest, ulcers and lesions on both legs, a history of recurrent infections, and had been discontinued for antiretroviral medications. On 10/19/11, A.B.'s attending physician certified her as having a life expectancy of six months or less if her terminal illness ran its normal course. On 11/12/11, A.B. was admitted to the IPU for pain management, at which point her PPS had decreased to 30 percent. On 11/20/11, A.B. was again admitted to the IPU for shortness of breath and chest pain. Her respiratory rate was extremely high at 28 and her pain medications had been changed from Percocet to morphine. On 12/01/11, A.B. had a CD4 count of 20, which was still in the terminal stage. She also had decreased appetite, increased weakness, and a PPS of 40 percent. On 12/30/11, A.B. revoked hospice care to seek surgery for recurrent diarrhea and gastrointestinal issues. Dr. Talakkottur stated as his rationale for denying eligibility that there was a lack of CD4 labs during the first admission, that her PPS remained at 40 percent, that she had no frequent hospitalizations, and that she had no recurrent infections. These statements are all contrary to the evidence. Dr. Talakkottur admitted A.B. had multiple hospitalizations leading up to hospice, serial assessments and lab work in the two years leading up to hospice, ten higher levels of care during her first admission, a CD4 count of less than 4 at admission, a PPS that dropped to 30 percent, and documented recurrent infections (pneumocystis pneumonia and thrush, which are opportunistic infections). At hearing, Dr. Talakkottur relied on the study "Mortality and Well Controlled HIV and the Continuous Antiretroviral Therapy Arms of the SMART and ESPRIT Trials Compared with the General Population" dated 03/27/13, by A.J. Rodger. The study, published after the end of the audit period, was not available to Vitas in 2011 when physicians were making real time prognoses regarding patient A.B. In addition, the patients examined in the study were only those with a CD4 count of greater than or equal to 350. With CD4 counts always at or below 20, A.B.'s condition would exclude her from the parameters of this study. Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged that the lower the CD4 count, the more susceptible a person is to infections and that these infections can increase the risk of morbidity and mortality. He also acknowledged that not taking AIDS medication increases the patient's chances of getting opportunistic infections. Patient A.B. was not compliant with medication. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that A.B. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for the two periods at issue. Patient 4, E.M. Patient E.M. was a 70-year-old male, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage COPD. The claim periods at issue are 12/21/11 to 05/13/12 and 05/15/12 to 12/31/12. Patient E.M. was hospitalized on 11/30/11 through to his initial admission to Vitas. He had shortness of breath and a pulse oxygen reading of 88. He responded poorly to treatment with bronchodilators and had a wound on his sacrum. He had a carbon dioxide pressure of 67, which was very high and implied the patient was not able to flush the carbon dioxide out of his lungs because of his disease. He had acidosis in his bloodstream of 7.32. Acidosis in the bloodstream can be extremely life- threatening it if drops below 7.25 or 7.2. An acidosis level of 7.32 shows that despite E.M.'s body's best effort to compensate for the retained carbon dioxide that his lung disease was causing, he was not able to maintain homeostasis. During the 11/30/11 hospital stay, Patient E.M. was placed on BiPAP, which at the time was the most aggressive nonintubation treatment available. He remained on BiPAP for about 22 days, despite efforts to ween him off before being referred to hospice. At the time of discharge from the hospital, E.M. was informed that he did not have many options to improve his condition. E.M. was certified hospice appropriate by his non- Vitas attending physician. He was admitted with evidence of extensive disease as identified above and a BMI of less than 19. At admission, E.M. was placed on continuous care while on eight medications to treat his respiratory symptoms. In January 2012, E.M. lost consciousness and was sent to the ER. On 03/09/12, E.M. had cough, congestion, and secretions, and had to be started on another antibiotic. On 03/15/12, E.M. had a PPS of 40 percent, was short of breath and on oxygen 24 hours a day. He could stand with assistance but could not walk freely. He had a poor appetite and slept day and night, which was evidence of progression as end-stage COPD patients require increased sleep and rest. E.M. had crackles in his lungs which were consistent with end-stage lung disease. He also had apnea during the first benefit period, which is more significant in COPD patients, because there is a chance they never start breathing again. Most COPD patients, who do not die of some other cause, die of acute respiratory arrest. Apnea in an end-stage COPD patient is a significant indicator of a poor prognosis. E.M. revoked hospice care on 05/13/12 and was treated at Baptist Hospital of Miami for intractable shortness of breath. He was discharged from the hospital on 05/15/12 and re-admitted to hospice that same day. At the second admission to hospice on 05/15/12, E.M. had shortness of breath, was coming off the recent hospitalization, had decreased weight from 121 pounds to 109.5 pounds, was chair-bound, had chronic kidney disease, bronchial asthma, and a PPS of 40 percent. He was placed on continuous care on admission. Upon readmission on 05/15/12, E.M. had muscle wasting, was unable to be weighed, had shortness of breath with continuous oxygen usage, and had decreased tolerance to activity and increased weakness. Dr. Talakkottur relied on the Global Initiative for Obstructive Lung Disease ("GOLD") Criteria for COPD for denying eligibility during the periods at issue. However, the GOLD criteria were developed to standardize what treatments are started when in a step-by-step organized fashion for COPD patients. GOLD is designed to treat patients to keep them out of the hospital. Dr. Vermette stated that the GOLD criterion has no relevance to a patient in E.M.'s condition who is already on eight medications, which is far beyond the GOLD criteria. Dr. Talakkottur's reliance on a spirometry test for prognosis is similarly misguided. A spirometry test is helpful to determine treatment and medication. Dr. Vermette stated that once a patient's COPD has progressed to the severity of E.M.'s, spirometry is inconsequential. The six-minute walk test is also irrelevant for a patient who has an illness as advanced as E.M. That test is to determine how many breathing treatments a patient needs and has no impact on prognosticating life expectancy. Dr. Talakkottur believed E.M. should have performed a six-minute walk test to determine the severity of his COPD, despite being unable to walk for six minutes (mainly bed and chair-bound). On 08/13/13, E.M. was forced to sit in a tripod position, trying to actually push air in and out of his lungs, not just with his diaphragm. He also exhibited global muscle atrophy, which meant all the muscles in his body were shriveling. This was evidence of both functional and nutritional impairment. COPD, by definition, is a chronic disease from the time of diagnosis. It does, however, enter an end-stage as evidenced by symptoms such as having shortness of breath at rest, being in and out of the hospital with intractable shortness of breath, being oxygen-dependent, and being on eight medications. E.M. exhibited specific indicators of "progression of end stage pulmonary disease" for the LCD for pulmonary disease. As noted above, he had hospitalizations due to his COPD both immediately prior to admission and during his stay in hospice. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that E.M. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment for the two periods at issue. Patient 6, G.O. Patient G.O. was a 90-year-old male admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage heart disease. The claim period at issue is under three months, from 05/21/12 to 08/18/12. Just prior to being admitted to hospice, G.O. had been hospitalized for multiple complex problems, including sepsis, left lower lobe pneumonia, severe anemia, and had a heart attack while in the hospital. He was referred to and certified for hospice by his attending physician. Dr. Vermette opined that G.O. was terminally ill with a prognosis of six months or less to live and his condition and symptoms were indicative of a NYHA Class IV because he suffered from shortness of breath at rest. NYHA Class III and Class IV patients will present with shortness of breath, chest pain, fatigue or palpations at rest; any of those symptoms occurring at rest would stage a person at Class IV and be considered an indicator of a poor prognosis. However, Vitas's file for G.O. seems to belie a finding that he met the standards for NYHA Class IV or Class III. The Plan of Care Review documents during the disputed timeframe fail to indicate that G.O. ever suffered from shortness of breath at rest--the hallmark for NYHA Class IV. One plan in the disputed timeframe remarks upon the recipient's respiratory system, but all other plans have no comment for the recipient's respiratory status. The plan dated 08/30/12, indicated the recipient had shortness of breath and received oxygen. Not all plans are indicative of the recipient having dyspnea. Those that are checked to indicate the recipient had dyspnea do not all suggest it was with exertion. Not one indicated dyspnea at rest. In the initial nursing note following G.O.'s hospice admission, a nurse assessed the recipient and checked that no problems were identified with the patient's neurosensory, cardiovascular, or respiratory systems. The patient was in no pain. G.O.'s vital signs in the cardiovascular section were reported within normal limits. Subsequent nursing notes reported G.O. having no shortness of breath, having no level of concern with his respiratory status, reporting oxygen was used "as needed" or "PRN" and that G.O. reported no level of concern with his respiratory system. In the cardiovascular system of the same notes, G.O. was reported to have no dyspnea at rest. Many notes were not checked for dyspnea and most reported the recipient had a "0" level of concern with his cardiovascular system. Further, the Appropriateness Evaluation form failed to support the patient being NYHA Class IV. The form notes that the recipient had shortness of breath with minimal exertion and not at rest. The respiratory system section of the evaluation is marked not applicable and the cardiovascular section does not indicate that the patient had dyspnea at rest, but instead noted only that the patient had dyspnea on exertion. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this patient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $38,253.17. Patient 9, L.B. Patient L.B. was a 70-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage vascular dementia. The claim period at issue is 11/12/10 to 03/05/12. L.B. had been hospitalized for a stroke just prior to hospice admission. Dr. Talakkottur acknowledged the stroke was severe. At admission, L.B. was on a PEG tube, had quadriparesis, breast cancer, hypertension, and contractures in her lower extremities caused by brain damage. She was total care, 6 of 6 ADLs, and incontinent, with a FAST of 7f. She had a PPS of 30 percent. L.B. also had renal insufficiency, dysphagia, malnutrition, and required oxygen supplementation. Patient L.B.'s FAST score of 7f demonstrated functional impairment, along with quadriparesis and constrictors, which indicated that her disease process was advanced. On 11/15/10, L.B.'s non-Vitas attending physician certified that the patient was appropriate for hospice and had a terminal diagnosis. Dr. Vermette testified that once a dementia patient reaches the equivalent debility of a FAST 7a, has functional decline, and has other significant comorbidities, then the patient is considered to have a terminally ill prognosis. L.B. had those conditions at admission. On 12/29/10, L.B. had an albumin on the lower end of normal at 3.6, had an abnormal lung exam with decreased breath sounds and rhonchi, and had dysphagia. Dr. Vermette testified that abnormal breath sounds and rhonchi in a patient with a PEG tube was a sign the tube feeding was not tolerated and placed the patient at a higher risk of aspiration. On 01/24/11, L.B. had a fever of 100 degrees. Her blood pressure medication was also increased. Dr. Vermette testified that stroke patients have an increased risk of stroke when their blood pressure is high. L.B. remained incontinent during the first certification period. On 02/10/11, L.B. had a PPS of 30 percent, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, had a FAST score between 7d and 7e, had contractures, weakness, high blood pressure, a lesion on her lower lip, and incontinence. Dr. Talakkottur opined that he saw no progression of the terminal illness. He opined the recipient's clinical state was static. Dr. Vermette explained that with these indicators, L.B. would not be able to decline significantly until her actual death, and so it would be expected for her PPS, ADLs, and FAST scores to remain static. Most patients in this condition die of an aspiration or respiratory event at some point in the course of their care. On 04/01/2011, L.B.'s PPS dropped to 20 percent before returning to 30 percent later that month. L.B. also developed a Stage II wound on her right buttock and sacrum, which persisted into May. On 05/09/11, L.B. had mild shortness of breath, had some congestion and excess secretions and was placed on atropine drops, an anticholinergic medicine used to dry up the oral/nasal secretions. Dr. Vermette testified that with dysphagia, the secretions would end up in the patient's lungs and she would have significant respiratory distress. On 06/24/11, L.B. was placed on Pro-Stat because her wounds were not healing with conventional treatment. Her PPS remained 30 percent, her FAST was 7d to 7e, and she still had decreased breath sounds and rhonchi. In August 2011, L.B. had wounds on her great toe and coccyx. On 09/08/11, L.B. was moaning and groaning at times and medicated with morphine for pain and still required ongoing wound care. On 09/24/11, L.B. still had a PPS of 30 percent, was 6 of 6 ADLs, had wounds, and increased secretions. The increased secretions increased L.B.'s risk of aspiration. On 10/27/11, L.B. had a FAST of 7f, was total care, and her PPS was 30 percent. L.B. had increased pain and increased secretions. She also had decreased tolerance to activity and decreased tolerance to being placed in a chair with a Hoyer lift. On 12/20/11, L.B.'s breast mass was increasing, her FAST was 7f and her PPS was 30 percent. She had contractures and chest congestion. Dr. Talakkottur stated a patient like L.B. could live for ten or 20 years. Dr. Vermette opined that L.B. was displaying the signs of the last six months of life if the disease progresses normally--advanced dementia with a FAST in the 7s, a PPS level in the 30s, recurrent problems with secretions, contractures, and wounds. In fact, L.B. did not live ten years but instead died on service at Vitas on 04/24/12. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that L.B. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 10, G.S. Patient G.S. was a 74-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage dementia. The claim period at issue is just under seven months, 09/01/09 to 03/26/10. Prior to admission to hospice, G.S. had aspiration pneumonia, a PEG tube, and ongoing dysphagia. In September 2009, G.S. had a PPS of 30 percent, a FAST of 7d, was incontinent, and weighed 107 pounds. She had gastroesophageal reflux disease as a comorbidity. G.S. was dependent in 12 of 12 ADLs, which is the same as 6 of 6, but on a different scale. She had episodes of congestion and cough related to dysphagia, which gave her a higher risk of aspiration, and she also had a recent UTI that required an antibiotic. Patients with dysphagia and gastroesophageal reflux disease who cannot swallow normally and are having liquid food pumped into their stomach have an increased risk for aspiration, making it a significant comorbidity. In October 2009, G.S. developed wounds on her left foot and left elbow. She was bedbound with contractures. Her wounds evidenced poor nutritional and functional status, as well as an increased risk of infection. In November 2009, G.S. remained total care, FAST 7d, and bedbound. She had impaired bed mobility--she could not reposition herself in bed by herself and her wounds had not healed. In January 2010, her left elbow wound was open, her FAST was 7d, she was total care, and she had an episode of vomiting. Dr. Vermette stated that G.S. was at an especially high risk of aspiration because when she vomited she could not lean over the bed or sit up to reposition herself but was forced to lie there and hope someone assisted her before she choked. G.S. began having shortness of breath at rest during January and February 2010. In March 2010, G.S. began tolerating placement in a chair better and her PPS increased to 40 percent. Vitas discharged her for extended prognosis on 03/25/10. Dr. Vermette stated that the patient's PPS and ADLs remained the same throughout the dates at issue, but she also had infections, wounds, and a risk of aspiration that evidenced a terminal prognosis of six months or less. He testified that G.S. was what a terminal dementia patient looks like. Dr. Talakkottur stated that G.S.'s wounds and UTI ultimately healed with appropriate treatment. He did not mention that it took nearly four months for the wounds to heal. Moreover, he could not have known in real time that those wounds would ultimately heal four months after they began. L.B. met the disease specific criteria from the LCD for dementia and related disorders. As noted above, she had a FAST score above 7c, which indicates she was speaking six words or fewer, was total care, and was incontinent. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that G.S. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 11, J.A. Patient J.A. was a 64-year-old male, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage heart disease. The claim period at issue is under three months, from 06/12/11 to 09/09/11. Prior to admission, J.A. had two significant hospitalizations. He was hospitalized from 05/10/11, to 06/02/11. During that hospitalization, he suffered a heart attack, respiratory failure, aspiration pneumonia, and encephalopathy. He had cardiomyopathy with an EF of ten percent and had congestive heart failure. He had several other comorbidities, including respiratory insufficiency, atrial fibrillation, diabetes, hypomagnesemia, which means low magnesium in the blood, and hypertension. J.A. was readmitted to the hospital on 06/04/11. He was in the hospital from 06/04/11 to 06/12/11, for altered mental status and was admitted directly to hospice from the hospital. At the time of his admission, J.A. was confused, had reduced ambulation, needed assistance with self-care, and had a PPS of 40 percent. He had a heart attack, which required intubation. He had an EF of 15 percent. He was jaundiced and was found to have cirrhosis with end-stage liver disease as a comorbidity. He had a JVD of three centimeters and diminished breath sounds. Dr. Vermette testified that J.A. had a prognosis of six months or less if the disease progressed at its expected rate because he had significant evidence of severe heart disease, multiple hospital admissions, and radiologic evidence of end- stage disease. He had a declining functional status, a PPS of 40 percent, and had just been intubated after a heart attack; consequently, it was very reasonable to assume that he had entered the terminal stage of the disease. Dr. Vermette testified that the prognosis is very limited for patients that have to be intubated and on a ventilator for five days after an acute heart attack, together with the other conditions affecting J.A., including the aspiration pneumonia. During June 2011, J.A. was admitted to the IPU. He continued to have significant symptoms of heart disease and more symptoms related to the liver disease, including encephalopathy. In July 2011, J.A.'s blood pressure became so low that he could not tolerate his medications; and, by August, his blood pressure medications had to be discontinued due his body's lack of tolerance. When Dr. Vermette was asked about plan of care reviews in the records for J.A. and whether those documents were inconsistent with a terminal prognosis of six months or less, Dr. Vermette testified that he focused his attention on the physician notes and nurse notes because those are notes that are being done, for the most part, at the bedside, in the presence of the patient, and the notes were a peer reviewers opinion of the patient at that point in time. In contrast, the plan of care reviews were produced as a result of discussing the case at an IDG meeting, with someone making notes of the comments that various people around the room were saying about the patient, and hoping to capture the discussion. Dr. Vermette pointed out that the plan of care reviews he was asked about contained a lot of information that corroborate J.A.'s terminal prognosis and condition, including shortness of breath on exertion, the extensive heart medications he was on, and dependent in 4 of 6 ADLs, which later worsened to 5 of 6 ADLs. Dr. Vermette testified that the plan of care reviews do not contradict the patient's eligibility for hospice. Dr. Eisner's testimony corroborated Dr. Vermette's that just prior to admission to hospice, J.A. suffered a cardiac event where his heart had stopped beating and he had an EF of 15 percent. Dr. Eisner further acknowledged that during J.A.'s stay in hospice, he lost 30 pounds of body weight, his dependency increased to 5 of 6 ADLs, his PPS score remained 40 percent, he had a decreased appetite and ambulation, had decreased tolerance to activity, had increased weakness, and was incontinent of bowel and bladder. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that J.A. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 12, N.D. Patient N.D. was an 87-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage cerebrovascular disease. The claim period at issue is 11/07/09 to 02/24/12. At the time of admission, N.D. had had a history of strokes and her attending non-Vitas physician referred and certified her as hospice appropriate. N.D. had a history of cerebral vascular disease and extensive dementia as a result. At admission, she had a PPS of 30 percent, was completely bedbound, had a FAST score of 7d, was total care, and incontinent. The Appropriateness Evaluation notes show that N.D. was referred to hospice for weight loss and severe agitation. However, a psychosocial/spiritual note reflects that N.D. had previously been on services and was discharged for extended prognosis, and she was reported to be more confused and depressed according to her family. The Appropriateness Evaluation reported N.D.'s weight as 150 pounds, with a BMI of 25 according to chart and family, and no pressure ulcers or skin lesions. It reported the patient having recurrent infections over the last six months but no further information regarding the infections was included in the space provided on the form. The Appropriateness Evaluation finally indicated that N.D. was hypertensive with no other cardiovascular symptoms and indicated that she had no issues with the following systems: respiratory, genitourinary, gastrointestinal, neurological, HIV disease, debility, or adult failure to thrive. Vitas reported N.D. as having a history of CVA, but failed to reflect the number or dates of such occurrences. Dr. Talakkottur noted that there was no indication as to when the CVA occurred in the Appropriateness Evaluation, and there was nothing marked under the neurological section to reflect how that system had been impaired or to what degree. Under the section entitled stroke/coma, Dr. Talakkottur also noted that none of the pertinent assessments were checked for certifying that diagnosis. A physician, in his addendum to the initial certification, stated N.D. suffered a CVA, was hypertensive, diabetic and had been left weak with a poor caloric intake. However, there is no indication of the severity of her condition or notice as to when the CVA occurred in the physician's addendum. If anything, the file records demonstrate that the condition could have been ongoing for some time. Four years prior to the hospice stay at issue, N.D. was noted to be nonambulatory and bed and wheelchair bound. Dr. Talakkottur shed light on this issue and testified that the N.D.'s CVA or diagnosis of a CVA was recorded back in 2006. These facts and findings are further evidence in support of Dr. Talakkottur's testimony that patients who have strokes oftentimes have a chronic condition and can live for years. This patient's condition essentially remained stagnant. The medical file reflects that N.D. lived three years following her CVA before being admitted to hospice care during the disputed period. In N.D.'s 59 Plan of Care Review documents, her level of impairment was listed as one and two--mild to moderate except for seven occurrences where her gastrointestinal system was reported as a three (severe concern) for constipation (typically not a life-threatening condition). Her level of care and medication were not reported to have changed. While N.D. was reported at times to have dyspnea, the Plan of Care Reviews never reported dyspnea at rest. N.D. did not suffer from non-healing wounds or recurrent infection. The file did not show any recurrent infections, any aspirations, or any instances where the recipient was oriented times zero. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this patient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $126,209.70. Patient 14, M.G. Patient M.G. was an 83-year-old male, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage cerebrovascular disease. The claim period at issue is 09/01/09 to 07/14/10. At the beginning of the dates at issue, M.G. had comorbidities of vascular dementia, hypertension, and a history of aspiration pneumonia. He had a FAST of 7c, was dependent in 5 of 6 ADLs and had a PPS of 40 percent. During the first few weeks, the patient had significant pain, was having some shortness of breath with activity, was using oxygen, continued to have a 40 percent PPS, was bed to chair-bound and totally dependent on ADLs. Just getting from the bed to the chair required assistance. Dr. Vermette testified that the differences between 30 percent and 40 percent PPS in the patient at this point was moot because both of those scores describe a patient who is in a terminal phase of the disease process. The patient had increased weakness and worsening dysphagia. In October and November 2009, Patient M.G. had an episode of respiratory symptoms, a low-grade fever, a high respiratory rate, shortness of breath, rales, and was on oxygen. The patient was having excess secretions, cough and congestion, and began an inpatient level stay to manage those symptoms. According to Dr. Vermette, in a patient with dysphagia, secretions, cough, fever and congestion make up an aspiration event. Anytime food or secretion goes down the trachea and into the lungs, it causes congestion, causes a cough, can cause fever, and can become full-blown pneumonia. It can lead to airway compromise and death; there is no way of predicting when that event is going to happen. Through January 2010, M.G. had a PPS of 40 percent, a low FAST, and required assistance with 6 of 6 ADLs. He had an episode of chest pain, went to the hospital and was evaluated. He was recommended to have a cardiac catheterization, which he/his family refused to do. He did not appear to have had a heart attack, but the hospital believed he was at risk of a heart attack. Although it would have been M.G.'s right to have the catheterization and get that done outside the hospice benefit, he/his family refused, which demonstrated that he/his family recognized that he was not in any condition for an invasive procedure and they just wanted to keep him comfortable rather than pursue aggressive treatment. Through March of 2010, patient M.G. was bedbound, had dysphagia, aphasia, hemiplegia, and was at high risk for aspiration pneumonia and sudden death due to an aspiration attack. He had a FAST of 7d, a PPS of 40 percent, increased weakness, and decreased tolerance to activities. M.G. was not improving. He was, at best, staying the same and, at worst, declining. In May of 2010, M.G. had a PPS of 30 to 40 percent, dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, incontinence, muscle wasting, and shortness of breath with minimal activity and at rest with chest pain off and on. M.G. qualified as a NYHA Class IV based upon the shortness of breath at rest and chest pain. M.G. had an albumin test in early June that came back in the normal range, at 4.5, which was high for the patient at that point. The patient was discharged in July 2010 for extended prognosis, before the patient was due for the next recertification. During the dates at issue, M.G.'s FAST level never improved to better than 7c, his PPS score never improved to greater than 40 percent and declined in March and June of 2010 to 30 percent, he was dependent for least 5 of 6 ADLs, and he had dysphagia. Dr. Talakkottur testified specifically that a patient with dysphagia is always at risk for aspiration. M.G. met the disease specific criteria from the LCD for dementia and related disorders. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that M.G. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 16, T.P. Patient T.P. was a 50-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of advanced AIDS. The claim period at issue is 10/17/11 to 06/12/12. Just prior to her admission to Vitas, T.P. was hospitalized with an admitting diagnosis of advanced AIDS, an altered mental status, noncompliance and polysubstance abuse, and she was cachectic. The non-Vitas attending physician referred and certified the patient to hospice for end-stage AIDS. At initial certification, T.P. was mainly bedbound, had reduced oral intake, was total care, and her PPS was 40 percent. She only weighed 88 pounds, she had a significant amount of pain, rated as 7 of 10 pain after receiving pain medicine. She had comorbidities of cocaine use, kidney infections, latent syphilis, muscle wasting, shortness of breath with minimal exertion, and a UTI in the last six months. Dr. Eisner testified that between the dates of 10/17/11, and 06/12/12, T.P. had a continuous PPS of 40 percent, she was gaining weight, she was performing some of her ADLs and, as such, she was not an appropriate candidate for hospice. The Appropriateness Evaluation simply reported her date of diagnosis in the HIV Disease section but failed to give any other clinical evidence, such as the CD4 count, persistent elevated viral load, opportunistic infections or organ damage that would be related to HIV. The date of diagnosis was reported to be 2010 and the terminal diagnosis was reported to be AIDS. Dr. Eisner opined that T.P.'s condition while hospitalized--bedbound, requiring 100 percent dependence with ADLs, a PPS of 40 percent, dyspnea, lethargic, oriented to one, and incontinence of bowel and bladder--were conditions not related to her underlying HIV disease but instead were related to her drug abuse. Dr. Eisner testified that had it been her underlying end-stage HIV disease, T.P.'s condition would not have gotten better during her hospitalization. Dr. Eisner noted that the hospital did not find infection or organ damage that one would associate with someone who had end-stage AIDS. Laboratory data from while T.P. was in the hospital came back "essentially normal." Upon discharge from the hospital, the recipient was taken to Gramercy Park nursing home. Multiple face-to-face encounters were made between Vitas' physician(s) and T.P. at Gramercy Park nursing home. During many of those visits, she was reported to be alert, oriented, in no acute distress, denying pain except for one occasion, yet she could not rate or describe the pain. T.P. was also reported to ambulate mostly with a wheelchair, to have an adequate appetite, and to require some assistance with ADLs. During face-to-face encounters with Vitas' physician on 03/14/12, and 05/03/12, signs of weakness were noted but otherwise her condition was essentially the same as prior visits. Dr. Vermette agreed that Vitas' file lacked any CD4 count or viral load for this patient. Dr. Vermette nonetheless believed T.P. to be end-stage based upon a very low albumin level of 1.8 taken 10/09/11. T.P.'s albumin, however, was measured again on 04/17/12, and was 3.3, which is within the normal range. Dr. Vermette's opinion that T.P. was end-stage AIDS was also based upon a reported shortness of breath. Plan of Care Reviews, however, failed to report T.P. having dyspnea during the time in dispute. Quite the contrary, the plans often reported she had oxygen available to her on an as needed basis without reporting respiratory distress or shortness of breath. The lack of terminality is also supported by Vitas' signed recertification charts, all of which failed to report a single instance of non-healing wounds, recurrent infections, titrations in pain medications, or dyspnea during the dispute period. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this recipient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $40,711.85. Patient 17, Z.H. Patient Z.H. was a 63-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage heart disease. The claim period at issue is just over one month, from 09/01/09 to 10/06/09. Dr. Talakkottur testified that in a Plan of Care Review dated 09/12/09, covering the period 08/26/09 to 09/02/09, Z.H.'s PPS was reported as 60 percent, her weight was 85 pounds, and the recipient required assistance with 5 of 6 ADLs. No shortness of breath was indicated. Nursing notes prepared in the months of September (September 3, 10, 15, 22, 25 and 29) all reveal that a nurse assessed and reported no issues or concerns with Z.H.'s bodily systems and observed little to no pain. Little to no issues were reported again for the recipient's neurosensory system. Z.H. was reported oriented times two or three following 09/03/09, and there was but one occurrence on 09/25/09, where the nurse indicated some confusion and agitation but noted the recipient was oriented times two. There was never any indication of a problem or issue with this patient's cardiovascular system. With regard to Z.H.'s need for assistance with ADLs, a nurse reported in all but one note that the recipient required assistance in 3 of 6 (grooming and bathing) ADLs. On 09/10/09, the recipient was reported to require assistance in all ADLs without providing comment or evidence of change in the recipient's organ systems or pain level. Throughout the month of September 2009, oxygen was reported to be available as needed and there was no higher level of care administered to the recipient. Throughout the month of October, nurses similarly reported Z.H.'s condition as they did in September. She was oriented times two, no concerns, issues, or comments regarding the recipient's bodily systems or pain, and required assistance in 3 of 6 ADLs. Dr. Talakkottur testified that the patient did not have a terminal condition. Further, while physicians reported Z.H. to have cardiovascular problems in the recertification documents, there is no chest pain, no edema, no JVD, no dyspnea, no palpations, no arrhythmia, and no syncope reported. As such, Dr. Talakkottur testified he could not classify this patient as having a terminal condition related to heart disease. In support of the patient's eligibility for hospice, Dr. Vermette relied upon Z.H. having a comorbidity of ovarian cancer. Vitas initially admitted Z.H. to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of ovarian cancer. However, shortly after admission, a physician consult reported there was no evidence of metastatic ovarian cancer. Vitas changed Z.H.'s terminal diagnosis to heart disease, but continued to reflect upon the patient having a comorbidity of ovarian cancer in support of her hospice eligibility. On cross, Dr. Vermette testified that he did not review the entire file to determine Z.H.'s clinical status and relied upon the recertification note during the period in dispute. The medical records contained in this file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met during the disputed period. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that Z.H. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $31,409.54. Patient 18, R.W. Patient R.W. was a 58-year-old male admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage liver disease caused by alcoholic cirrhosis. The claim period at issue is 11/26/11 to 12/09/12. In the two months preceding the disputed period, R.W. had multiple open wounds on his legs, had evidence of persistent ascites, and had symptoms of hepatic encephalopathy. He also required two episodes of continuous care, one for change in mental status and the other for shortness of breath and anasarca. He suffered a fall the day before recertification for the dates at issue. In November 2011, R.W. was very lethargic, had a poor appetite, a decrease in verbal skills, respiratory distress with a rate of 24, and rhonchi with labored breathing. His ADLs varied between 5 of 6 and 6 of 6 due to his fluctuating encephalopathy. R.W. had comorbidities of cardiac disease, encephalopathy, and COPD. In early December 2011, R.W. had recurrent episodes of shortness of breath at rest and with exertion, which made him a NYHA Class IV. R.W. developed a respiratory infection with a moist productive cough and labored respirations. He was coughing up large amounts of yellow sputum and was placed on nebulizer treatments. He also began having tremors in his hands, known as asterixis, which Dr. Vermette stated was evidence of neurologic dysfunction caused by the ammonia and other toxins built up in the blood because of R.W.'s liver failure. R.W. also had episodes of apnea in December 2011. R.W. had anasarca, facial swelling, and tremors into January 2012, and he developed foul- smelling wounds on his legs. At the end of January 2012 and into February 2012, R.W. was on continuous care for a change in level of consciousness. He was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, PPS of 40 percent, and his abdomen was large. He had edema in all extremities and was weak and very lethargic. R.W. was placed on prednisone to help with breathing. In March 2012, R.W. had anasarca and significant lethargy. He spent most of his days slumped over in a wheelchair, and he was on oxygen most of the time. By May 2012, R.W. was on oxygen at three to four liters and exhibited shortness of breath. He developed edema with a swollen scrotal region, which Dr. Vermette stated occurs typically only in significant heart failure and liver failure patients. The time he spent in bed as opposed to a wheelchair had increased, as had his periods of lethargy and his ascites. He remained on lactulose for hepatic encephalopathy. He also had facial edema. In July 2012, R.W. was placed on methadone around the clock and Percocet as needed, especially before dressing changes. He also was no longer able to wheel himself in his wheelchair, which evidenced further functional decline. In September 2012, R.W. was having shortness of breath at rest and with activity, again demonstrating NYHA Class IV, which was evidence of end-stage liver disease according to Dr. Vermette. At the end of September and into early October 2012, R.W. was on continuous care for difficulty breathing, as well as a low-grade fever and change in level of consciousness. He developed respiratory distress, was having periods of apnea and was hypotensive. In the end of November 2012, R.W. was again on continuous care. He was lethargic and confused. His pain medications had increased again and he had diminished consciousness, hepatic encephalopathy, arrhythmia and respiratory distress with a high respiratory rate. He also had muscle wasting. R.W. was again on continuous care on 12/05/12. This was his third hospitalization-equivalent within the last 60 days. He was admitted for respiratory distress and he died on hospice service on 12/09/12. Dr. Talakkottur's rationale for his opinion that Patient R.W. was not Medicaid hospice was that lab work had not been done. However, lab work is rarely done in a hospice setting. Lab work is only done to adjust the patient's plan of care to better address his symptoms and keep him comfortable. Hospices do not take labs just to document a disease. Dr. Talakkottur used a visual aid that contained a list of symptoms that he believed should be present in an end-stage liver patient. Dr. Vermette opined that a patient with terminal cirrhosis of the liver would not have all of those symptoms. Dr. Vermette stated that the list appeared to simply be a list from a textbook of all symptoms that could possibly relate to liver disease of any sort. Most were not useful for prognostication whatsoever. Dr. Talakkottur reasoned that Patient R.W. was not hospice eligible because he did not have refractory ascites. Dr. Vermette stated this patient had ascites recurrently and frequently. Dr. Vermette also testified that in his experience working in and treating hospice patients, that the clear majority of end-stage liver patients on hospice do not receive repeated paracentesis because they do not tolerate them well. R.W. was on medication throughout his stay in hospice for his ascites. As part of Dr. Talakkottur's rationale for denying eligibility, he stated R.W. "did not show any signs of end-stage of his chronic disease." However, the LCD for liver disease specifically states that refractory ascites, alone, is evidence of the disease being end-stage. Dr. Talakkottur also reasoned that this patient was not hospice eligible because he did not have anasarca. Dr. Vermette noted that R.W. had severe edema, including edema of his face and scrotum, which was anasarca. Dr. Talakkottur also reasoned that R.W. was not hospice eligible because he did not have asterixis, which was directly refuted by the record. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that R.W. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 19, M.M. Patient M.M. was a 48-year-old male admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage AIDS. The claim period at issue is just under eight months, 03/30/10 to 11/24/10. M.M. was admitted to an acute care hospital on 03/26/10 just prior to entering hospice with a history of fever, shaking, chills, and sweats, and he had a bacterial infection in his bloodstream of Enterobacter cloacae. He also had an infection in the wounds on his left leg of methicillin-resistant staph aureus ("MRSA"). He was anemic and was positive for cocaine and benzodiazepine. His CD4 count from the prior year was 70. M.M. was admitted directly from the hospital to hospice. At admission to hospice, M.M. was weak, bedbound, had dysphagia, was malnourished, severely immunocompromised, had failed treatment with antiretrovirals, had a PPS of 30 percent, and weighed 145 pounds, which indicated a five-pound loss from prior to admission. He had an ulcer on his left leg. M.M. was homeless, which according to Dr. Vermette impacted the patient's prognosis because he was not receiving adequate meals, shelter, and prior medical care. Dr. Vermette testified that the fact that the patient was homeless did not preclude him from being eligible for Medicaid hospice services, but made delivery of the services more challenging. In April 2010, M.M. was unable to ambulate and fell out of his wheelchair, further damaging the skin on his legs. M.M. did have improvement in his ADLs over the course of his stay in hospice, but he had a respiratory infection in July 2010 which required antibiotics and, by August 2010, had declined and was placed in a nursing home. His ADLs returned to 6 of 6 while in the nursing home. In September 2010, M.M. only had to be in the wheelchair for short intervals; however, he had muscle wasting at that time. On 09/14/10, M.M. was having generalized pain and shortness of breath with activity that required oxygen and occasional bronchodilators. He also had a respiratory infection and was incontinent. In November 2010, M.M. had a CD4 count of 29 from a prior level of 70. Dr. Talakkottur agreed that this lower CD4 count put the patient at higher risk for opportunistic infections. During the dates at issue, M.M.'s PPS increased to 40 percent, but decreased back to 30 by the fall of 2010. Dr. Vermette testified that M.M. had terminal AIDS because he was noted to have advanced HIV illness with wasting by the physician taking care of him in the hospital just prior to hospice admission. M.M. was also seen by an infectious disease expert who stated M.M. had advanced AIDS. M.M. was discharged from the hospital and referred to hospice by his doctors who stated that he had a poor prognosis and was hospice appropriate. Those doctors were not affiliated with Vitas. Dr. Vermette noted that although MRSA is not an opportunistic infection, it is a seriously harmful bacterium that is hard to eradicate even in a healthy patient with a normal immune system. Dr. Talakkottur believed, in part, that M.M. was not hospice appropriate because he did not have opportunistic infections. Dr. Vermette stated that Dr. Talakkottur did not properly take into account that an AIDS patient is usually not going to die from an opportunistic infection, and that most AIDS patients who die from an infection die from a regular infection that is more likely to kill an AIDS patient. M.M had two respiratory infections, a staph infection, and an infection in his blood. Any of those could be life-threatening to a healthy person, much less a person with AIDS. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that M.M. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 22, E.D. Patient E.D. was a 64-year-old male admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of adult failure to thrive. The claim period at issue is eight months from 02/23/10 to 11/25/10. E.D. was hospitalized in February of 2010 prior to hospice admission with respiratory failure. He was intubated. He also had renal failure during the hospitalization and was diagnosed with a brain tumor. He was admitted directly from the hospital to Vitas. At admission to hospice, E.D. had a PPS of 20 percent, was 6 of 6 ADLs, had a BMI of 17.7, a Stage III ulcer on his hand, pulmonary edema, hypertension, a brain tumor, a PEG tube, and coronary artery disease. He was taking only minimal sips of fluid and had confusion. E.D.'s brain tumor was measured to be 4.9 by 4.9 centimeters, or about two inches in diameter. Shortly after admission to hospice, E.D. was placed in the IPU due to severe agitation. In March 2010, E.D. had an infection of his central line. He developed blood in his stool and had significant anemia and significant gastrointestinal bleeding with a hemoglobin of 9.6 and hematocrit of 29.6, which would have required a transfusion if E.D. was not in hospice. In May 2010, E.D. was transferred to the IPU unit because of aggressive behavior, including hitting caretakers. He continued to have wounds and significant functional and nutritional decline, as evidenced by a PPS that remained at 40 percent or less and a BMI that remained significantly below 20. In June 2010, E.D. had a low albumin of 2.93. He still had non-healing wounds and required another IPU stay for agitation and combativeness in late July 2010. All nonessential medications were stopped because of side effects, including agitation. He also had a UTI in the end of July. In August 2010, E.D. was having dark discoloration to his right foot, which was evidence of diabetic peripheral vascular disease. Dr. Vermette testified that this was a significant finding of progression of E.D.'s comorbidity of diabetes. In September 2010, E.D. had another UTI requiring antibiotics. In October 2010, E.D. had a respiratory infection with rhonchi, congestion, cough, and he was on respiratory nebulizer treatments. He still had a PEG tube for nutritional supplements. His ambulation was restricted from bed to wheelchair with assistance. He was on dexamethasone for intracranial swelling from the brain tumor and on seizure prophylaxes. In November 2010, E.D. developed respiratory distress with a respiratory rate of 38. He was placed on continuous care, became nonresponsive despite being on continuous care, and ultimately died on hospice care. Dr. Eisner opined that E.D. did not die because of his terminal illness; therefore, Dr. Eisner found E.D. ineligible for Medicaid hospice. Dr. Vermette testified that adult failure to thrive is a diagnosis that was, at the time of E.D.'s admission, one of the four most common diagnoses used in hospice nationwide. It was used for patients who had significant functional impairment, significant nutritional impairment, and was used for a patient who had multiple conditions that could result in his death. It is now called multiple morbidity. Dr. Vermette testified that typically a patient who has concurrent different illnesses is admitted for adult failure to thrive when they meet the criteria. All of E.D.'s comorbidities were part and parcel of the diagnosis of adult failure to thrive. The pneumonia or respiratory failure that he developed right before he died was extremely similar to the event that led to him being admitted to hospice. Dr. Eisner stated that E.D. did not have adult failure to thrive because he gained 12 pounds and, therefore, could not have nutritional impairment. Dr. Vermette testified that E.D.'s weight gain was not inconsistent with the terminal diagnosis and that factors, such as nutritional supplements, beginning to eat a soft diet, and use of the steroid dexamethasone, would cause a weight gain. Dr. Vermette noted that there was no indication that the weight gain coincided with increased muscle mass or strength. More importantly, the fact that the patient gained weight over the course of his stay in hospice could only be known at the end of the hospice stay and during a retrospective review. It could not be known when the initial certification was made on the date the patient was admitted with a BMI of 17. E.D. met the disease specific criteria from the LCD for failure to thrive. As noted above, he had a PPS of 40 percent or less, a BMI less than 22, and was not responding to nutritional support by way of his PEG tube at admission. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that M.M. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 23, J.L. Patient J.L. was a 59-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage COPD. The claim period at issue is just over four months, 03/14/11 to 07/27/11. J.L. was admitted to the hospital with an exacerbation of COPD on 03/09/11. She was found to have severe anemia during this stay and was treated by IV with hydration, antibiotics, and blood transfusions. At the time of admission to Vitas, J.L. had shortness of breath at exertion and at rest, was an aspiration risk, and had recurrent infections. Her PPS was 40 percent. She also had AIDS, acute renal failure, and a history of hepatitis. Her BMI was 19.9 and she had a glomerular filtration rate of 25 and an albumin of 2.5. She was immediately admitted to the IPU with shortness of breath, agitation, and altered mental status. In April 2011, J.L. was drinking heavily and was found vomiting after drinking, which put her at a risk of aspiration and affected her longevity. She had bitemporal wasting, which showed significant nutritional decline for a patient this young. Between admission and the end of June, J.L. had multiple hospitalizations for a viral illness, a UTI, and a psychiatric admission--she was hospitalized on 03/25/11, 05/16/11, and 06/17/11. In late June 2011, J.L. showed signs of improvement. She was dependent in 5 of 6 ADLs, but her PPS increased to 60 percent. She was still having shortness of breath, but it was intermittent as opposed to constant. She was still having agitation and gastrointestinal issues. Over the course of the next month, she stabilized enough to be discharged for extended prognosis. Dr. Vermette testified that J.L. followed the sawtooth pattern of decline. J.L. had a serious decline at admission and subsequently improved, but at the time of admission there was no way to know whether that decline was going to be the one that resulted in death or she would have a rebound in condition. When she rebounded enough to no longer support a prognosis of less than six months, she was appropriately discharged. Dr. Eisner noted in his review that J.L. was not hospice eligible because "she improved during her hospice admission." However, her improvement from her severe status exhibited at admission could not be realized until she was appropriately discharged at the end of the dates in dispute. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that J.L. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 24, F.F. Patient F.F. was an 84-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage renal failure. The claim period at issue is just over four months, from 09/01/09 to 01/18/10. F.F. was referred to hospice for progressive decline in function. On her admission date, she was reported awake, alert, and oriented times two to three. In January 2009, a CT scan revealed that F.F. had a large renal cyst suggestive of Myeloma (a cancer of plasma cells in the bone marrow). Vitas admitted F.F. with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage chronic renal disease that had been diagnosed approximately four years earlier (2005). Evidence of F.F.'s renal disease was reported within the Appropriateness Evaluation's genitourinary section. One would therefore assume that Vitas would continue to track the status and/or progression of the disease under that system. Dr. Vermette, however, testified at the final hearing that end- stage renal disease did not produce genitourinary symptoms. End- stage renal disease caused symptoms systematically in other parts of the body because of the fact that the kidney's main function is to eliminate toxic metabolites from the body. When those toxins build up, they produce symptoms elsewhere in the body unrelated to genitourinary review of symptoms. A review of F.F.'s other systems reported in the Plan of Care Reviews suggest no terminal illness or progression of her renal disease. The Plan of Care Reviews reported no respiratory issues at all over the course of the disputed period. F.F. was reported to itch under the integumentary system. F.F. was neurologically sound. At best, she was reported to be forgetful at times, and her symptoms were reported mild from August through mid-October. Afterwards, Vitas failed to make further comment or score an impairment level for F.F.'s neurological system. The same was true for F.F's cardiovascular system except her impairment levels, when recorded between August and mid-October, fluctuated between mild and moderate. The plans reported no edema under cardiovascular. The plans reported F.F.'s musculoskeletal system to have a mild impairment level until 11/03/09, and thereafter, it went to moderate. As for her genitourinary system, there was no impairment level noted throughout the disputed period. Vitas also failed to report any concerns with F.F.'s genitourinary system in any nursing note, including the initial note prepared following admission (March 2009). Most nursing notes were checked that the genitourinary system had been "Assessed, no GU problems identified." The Plan of Care Reviews also fail to report F.F. enduring any pain above a mild impairment level. The only pain medication referred to in the plans is Tylenol 3 and it was used on an as needed basis. When marked in the Plan of Care Reviews, F.F.'s PPS was consistently 50 percent. F.F.'s weight was not always reported, despite the fact that she was ambulatory. However, when it was reported, the Plan of Care Reviews showed a steady increase. At admission she weighed 98 pounds, the first recorded weight in the Plan of Care Reviews was 100 and that was in October, and she was consistently reported to weigh 100 pounds until the latter part of December when her weight increased to 102 pounds and remained as such until the last Plan of Care Review in the disputed period. There were no labs to report F.F.'s albumin in the disputed period; however, labs were taken in October 2011, and it was reported at that time the recipient's albumin was 3.8 and 3.9 on 10/25/11 and 10/26/11. The medical records contained in this patient's file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met during the disputed period. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that F.F. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $20,545.60. Patient 25, S.C. Patient S.C. was a 43-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage SLE. The claim periods at issue are 02/02/12 to 02/24/12 and 05/14/12 to 12/31/12. SLE is an autoimmune disease where the body develops antibodies and attacks its own cells, damaging organ tissue all over the body. SLE can cause damage to the heart, to the lungs, to the liver, to the kidneys, and to the brain by damaging the blood vessels, leading to vasculitis. Most patients with SLE die from organ failure. In the time period leading up to the dates at issue, Patient S.C. was hospitalized with a stroke resulting from lupus. At the time of admission, she had a PPS of 30 percent, was drowsy, and required total care. Her family reported she had recently lost nine percent of her body weight. S.C. had significant comorbidities, including tuberculosis meningitis, four previous strokes, atrial fibrillation, and cardiac disease. She was an aspiration risk due to dementia and dysphagia. Her family sought hospice services. Patient S.C. met the criteria in the Florida Handbook at the beginning of the dates at issue because of her recent hospitalization with a stroke; the progression of her disease with multiple organs affected, including the brain, the heart, and immune system; nutritional decline; and significant functional impairment. During the first admission, Patient S.C. was on continuous care for numerous symptoms, including pain and respiratory symptoms. She came off continuous care but then was started on it again on 02/23/12, for agitation. Shortly thereafter, 911 was called, the patient was taken to the hospital, and hospice was revoked for aggressive treatment. At the time of her next admission beginning on 05/14/12, Patient S.C. had just been hospitalized again for altered mental status and possibly another stroke. The physician certification noted the patient was lethargic, had extensive evidence of disease, was bedbound, had reduced intake, required total care, had lost all intelligible vocabulary, was unable to sit independently, unable to smile, and unable to even hold her head up. Dr. Vermette testified that tuberculosis meningitis is a very rare condition. S.C. was exposed to tuberculosis while doing earthquake relief in Haiti about six months prior to her initial admission to hospice, which meant that, based on her status at admission to hospice, she had rapidly declined during those previous six months. With tuberculosis meningitis, instead of lodging in the lungs, it makes its way to the brain and affects the meninges. It is extremely difficult to treat. As of the initial certification on 05/14/12, Patient S.C. had a PPS of 30 percent, had a FAST of 7f, and had shortness of breath with minimal exertion. S.C. had contractures locking her limbs in a flexed position, as well as agitation and dysphagia. Her weight was 105 pounds, an additional 15-pound weight loss from the previous hospice admission three months earlier. S.C. showed evidence of progression of the terminal illness with worsening of the various organs that had been involved with lupus, further nutritional decline, and significant functional impairment. Over the next few months, S.C. continued to decline. She became aggressive and screamed when someone tried to bathe her, she tried to attack and claw nurse's aides, she began to develop skin breakdown on her ankle, and was only eating 30 percent of her pureed diet that had to be fed to her. S.C. was Medicaid hospice appropriate as of the recertification in August 2012. She had a fair appetite, was cachectic, had signs of muscle atrophy, needed total care, and had a PPS of 30 percent. In late August going into September, S.C. had fever and cough, and she was at increased risk of developing aspiration pneumonia. At the next recertification on 10/06/12, S.C. had to be fed, had an increasing appetite, and was eating 50 to 70 percent of her meals, but despite this, she was still very thin and cachectic. S.C. had atrophy of her leg muscles, so she was not able to stand on a scale. She was no longer able to tolerate being in a chair, even with a lift, so she was completely bedbound all the time. S.C. was recertified a final time during the period in dispute on 11/26/12. At that point, S.C. demonstrated functional decline, anorexia and weight loss, dysphagia, cardiac involvement of lupus, and had oral thrush, which further indicated the decline of her immune system and susceptibility to an infection. Following that recertification, S.C. continued to show evidence of significant decline. She developed a lung infection that required bronchodilators in the form of nebulizer treatments and antibiotics and had a fever of 102, which continued until 12/20/12. Whether S.C.'s PPS score was less than 30 percent, or whether it was 20 or 40 percent, did not change her eligibility for Medicaid hospice. Any number of 50 percent or less would have shown functional impairment to meet the expected functional decline. A PPS of 50 percent is generally considered compatible with a prognosis of six months or less in non-cancer hospice diagnoses. Even when a nurse note did not calculate a PPS number, they indicated the patient required total care, was bedbound, or was able to get in a wheelchair only with a Hoyer lift. Consequently, the description of the patient in the notes described the criteria that a physician would use to infer a PPS of 30 or 40 percent at any given time. There was no description of S.C. in the medical records that would lead to a PPS of 50 percent or greater. Dr. Vermette testified that once S.C. began developing cachexia and had a level of terminality to her disease process, she reached a tipping point at which even with good nutrition, she could not gain weight because her body was no longer capable of reversing the process. Where the records showed S.C. did eat 100 percent of her meal, she did not feed it to herself. She needed assistance with eating at those times. She was total care at those points and she was bedbound. Dr. Talakkottur testified that at the second admission, 05/14/12, Patient S.C. had been hospitalized for agitation and nasal bleeding, she had a PPS score of less than 30 percent, she was bedbound and had a FAST level of 7f, and she continued to be dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs. Dr. Talakkottur further testified that patient S.C.'s PPS score never rose above 40 percent, her FAST level never improved to better than 7c, and she was nonambulatory and incontinent during her entire length of stay. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that S.C. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 26, D.A. Patient D.A. was a 61-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage cerebral degeneration. The claim period at issue is 10/17/11 to 12/31/12. At the time of admission, Patient D.A. had end-stage dementia. In addition, she had recurrent UTIs and had been hospitalized a little over a month prior to hospice admission with a serious UTI. D.A. also had hyperglycemia and had a malignant melanoma Stage IV on her leg. A Stage IV melanoma, by definition, means that it is in the bloodstream waiting to settle. D.A.'s secondary conditions due to her dementia included severe cognitive impairment, functional impairment, incontinent of bowel and bladder, FAST of 7d, PPS of 30 percent, bedbound, reduced intake, dysphagia, and dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs. Patient D.A. met the criteria for Medicaid hospice eligibility in the Florida Handbook at the beginning of the dates at issue because of her status at admission and terminal diagnosis, clear evidence that she had reached the terminal stage of her illness, a recent hospitalization, significant functional decline, and significant evidence of nutritional impairment. Dr. Vermette testified that the indicators of end-stage cerebral degeneration include a FAST of 7a or above and secondary or comorbid conditions which are significant and contribute to prognosis. D.A. portrayed these indicators by having a FAST of 7c or above throughout the dates at issue, a known malignancy that has a poor prognosis in general, significant dysphagia which puts the patient at high risk of aspiration--the most common cause of death in dementia patients. She continued to be severely declined, she remained bedbound during the entire period, and she had signs of decline throughout her course of her care. At the beginning of the dates at issue, D.A. had a pressure ulcer to her left foot that eventually resolved. However, she quickly developed another wound on her upper thigh. D.A. developed dyspnea on exertion, such as while trying to roll over in bed and trying to eat, even though she was bedbound. There were very few actions D.A. could perform at that point. Shortness of breath while rolling over or eating was significant and showed an aspect of respiratory involvement in her disease. In December 2011, D.A. developed tremors in her hands, which was a sign of further disease progression of D.A.'s end-stage cerebral degeneration. D.A. also had hydrocephalus, which means that the areas in her brain that are normally filled with fluid had expanded. This was evidence that she lost brain tissue. In May of 2012, D.A. required an IPU stay because of shortness of breath and vomiting, which was life-threatening because of D.A.'s dysphagia and aspiration risk. While she was in the IPU, she weighed 165 pounds, which was a five-pound weight loss. In July 2012, she was coughing more frequently while trying to eat, which was evidence of worsening dysphagia and increased risk of aspiration. In September 2012, she developed another wound on her elbow. In October of 2012, she had developed contractures, so her fingers were curling up on themselves and the pressure of one finger pushing against the skin of another finger caused wounds. This was a sign of further progression of her terminal disease of cerebral degeneration. At the end of the dates at issue, D.A. was in the IPU again for shortness of breath and fever, which could lead to an aspiration pneumonia. She was started on antibiotics during the last few days of December 2012. Dr. Vermette testified that the only improvement in D.A.'s condition during the dates at issue was that, except for the elbow wound that began in October 2012, her numerous wounds did eventually heal, albeit at a delayed pace. However, whether or when a wound resolves cannot be known at the time it occurs. In December 2012, D.A. developed decorticate posturing, which means that D.A.'s brain had declined to the point where her arms were stiffly held out at the sides with the palms up and were immobile. Decorticate posturing is incompatible with having tremors and is a worse decline than tremors. Patient D.A. had aspiration events when she was having shortness of breath, and coughing and choking while eating, even though such events did not end up leading to pneumonia. When asked whether a patient was hospice appropriate that had a PPS score of 30 percent, was bedbound, required assistance with 6 of 6 ADLs, was confused, had reduced intake, was unable to sit up on her own, was not ambulatory, was incontinent of bowel and bladder, and had a history of melanoma, hydrocephalus, diabetes, obesity and arterial hypertension, Dr. Talakkottur would not answer yes or no and was unpersuasive. D.A. met the disease specific criteria from the LCD for dementia and related disorders. As noted above, she had a FAST score of at least 7c, which indicates she was speaking six words or fewer, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, and was incontinent. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that D.A. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 28, N.M. Patient N.M. was a 57-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage heart disease. The claim period at issue is less than one year, from 05/25/11 to 04/06/12. N.M. had a long history of heart disease, as well as stroke. She was admitted to the hospital approximately six months prior to her hospice admission in November 2010 and was diagnosed with cardiogenic shock, as well as coronary artery disease and carotid stenosis. Cardiogenic shock means the heart has such an insult that it becomes stunned for a period of time and the blood pressure rapidly drops. The patient usually ends up on multiple medications in an attempt to keep the blood pressure high enough to stay alive. N.M. was hospitalized again on 05/20/11, approximately five days prior to her hospice admission, for an acute decompensation of congestive heart failure. N.M. was having orthopnea (shortness of breath lying down) and had progressive shortness of breath, but was not a candidate for bypass surgery or other modalities that would have corrected her issues because of her multiple comorbidities. N.M.'s comorbidities included a previous stroke, obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and carotid stenosis. During the 05/20/11, hospitalization, Patient N.M. was found to have an EF of 45 percent, which was between normal and abnormal. She also had a pulmonary artery pressure of 57 with moderate to severe mitral regurgitation. Normal is only 8 to 25, making this finding more significant to her prognosis than the EF. N.M. was referred to and admitted directly to hospice from the hospital. She was unable to do any work, she was mainly sitting and lying, she needed assistance with care, and her weight was 183 with a BMI of 36, which was in the obese range. She had shortness of breath, or dyspnea, at rest and with exertion, NYHA Class IV. She had residual issues from her prior stroke, including muscle weakness on the left side. She was immediately admitted to a higher level of hospice care. Patient N.M. met the criteria for Medicaid hospice eligibility at the beginning of the dates at issue because she had evidence of terminal diagnosis with a life expectancy of six months or less, she had multiple hospitalizations, and she had multiple physician assessments and radiologic assessments. N.M. further had progression of the disease, declining functional status with a PPS of 40 percent. She had gone from chronic heart disease to end-stage heart disease. In August 2011, N.M. had signs of muscle atrophy and wasting, she remained bedbound, and she had a skin abscess in her axilla, or armpit, in the previous month. She remained a NYHA Class IV, and she was on six medications to try to control her cardiac symptoms. N.M. was also on oxygen 24 hours a day and had nitroglycerin tablets for when she had chest pains. Between August and November of 2011, N.M. had another abscess under her arm and she continued to have shortness of breath at rest and was NYHA Class IV. In November 2011, N.M. continued to have an abscess, needed extensive care, and had a PPS of 40 percent. In January 2012, N.M. had yet another skin infection. She required multiple doses of sublingual nitroglycerin and she required oxygen continuously. Her PPS was down to 30 percent. She needed extensive assistance and she had another UTI in addition to the abscess. N.M. had shortness of breath at rest and she became incontinent and was wearing diapers. In February 2012, N.M. was having continuous episodes of chest pain and shortness of breath at rest. In March 2012, she had more episodes of abscesses in her sweat glands and axilla which had become a recurrent infection. She had increased episodes of pain, which required more doses of pain medication. She was having more psychosocial symptoms, anxiety and depression, because of her symptoms related to her end-stage heart disease and medication was started for those symptoms. She continued to be a NYHA Class IV and continued to need oxygen 24 hours a day. N.M. was appropriately recertified for Medicaid hospice at each point in time and had evidence of a prognosis of six months or less at each point in time. On 04/06/12, N.M. had a worsening of her symptoms, and her family called 911. She went to the hospital and revoked hospice and was admitted to the hospital with decompensating symptoms. N.M. did not have any significant improvement during the dates at issue. Even though the EF found on the echocardiogram at the time N.M. revoked hospice showed some improvement, other issues on the echocardiogram showed the patient remained Medicaid hospice eligible, such as pericardial effusion more related to her intrinsic heart disease than to heart failure per se. She also had evidence of valve disease and inoperable multivessel coronary artery disease. Although there were a few nursing notes in N.M.'s records where the orthopnea box was not checked, the nurses frequently noted the patient had dyspnea, and that the patient was bedbound or lying in bed, which is the definition of orthopnea. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that N.M. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 29, V.R. Patient V.R. was a 56-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage cirrhosis of the liver. The claim period at issue is just over seven months, from 04/05/12 to 11/20/12. Rather than being referred to hospice from a hospital admission, V.R. was referred to hospice by her primary care physician. Dr. Eisner testified that V.R.'s liver disease was related to her chronic Hepatitis C. V.R. had suffered from liver disease since 1998. During the disputed period, Dr. Eisner opined that V.R. had a life expectancy of greater than six months because the file did not contain evidence to show her cirrhosis was progressing and her functional status did not change. Although she suffered from ascites, it did not worsen to the point of requiring a paracentesis. Dr. Vermette noted V.R. had a "declining functional status, including a PPS of 40 percent." However, her PPS score was 40 percent on admission and remained static at 40 percent until 09/20/12, when it rose to 50 percent. Dr. Vermette admitted that the most common markers for liver functionality are albumin scores and INR scores, which are assessed through a blood test. Vitas' training document, created by Dr. Shega, states that a patient must have an INR of greater than 1.5 and an albumin score of less than 2.5 AND other evidence of end-stage liver disease, such as ascites or encephalopathy. Dr. Vermette admitted that no blood tests were performed for V.R. during the disputed period. Therefore, V.R. did not have lab values which would lead a physician to conclude she had a life expectancy of less than six months. The medical records contained in this patient's file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met during the disputed period. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that V.R. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $35,999.98. Patient 30, J.A. Patient J.A. was an 86-year-old male admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of debility unspecified. The claim period at issue is less than one year, from 10/29/09 to 09/29/10. Patient J.A. was transferred to Vitas from a different hospice at the beginning of the dates at issue. The medical director from the prior hospice believed J.A. was still hospice eligible at the time of transfer and noted that J.A. had an increase in healthcare utilization as well as a fall causing a head injury. At admission to Vitas, J.A. had underlying organ systems insufficiency with significant cognitive and nutritional impairment, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, and required maximum assistance in going from bed to chair. He had dysphagia with micro aspirations, end-stage dementia with a FAST greater than 7, lung disease which required nebulizers frequently, coronary artery disease, and his PPS was 40 percent. On 11/02/09, Patient J.A. was on a pureed diet and was using oxygen and bronchodilators for cough, congestion, and agitation. He had a recent respiratory infection requiring antibiotics. His FAST score was 7c, he was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, and he had a PPS of 40 percent. He required a Velcro support to keep him from falling out of his wheelchair. By December 2009, J.A. had lost a pound and a half more weight. He had another fall later that month, hit his head, and required a skull X-ray. In January 2010, J.A.'s PPS decreased to 30 percent while his FAST remained in the terminal stage. In April 2010, J.A.'s weight decreased to 123 pounds. He had chest congestion requiring nebulizer treatment, increased weakness, dysphagia, and needed to be fed. In June 2010, J.A. was incoherent in speech and his FAST score was 7c to 7d. His weight was between 122 and 123 pounds, he had decreased tolerance to activity and sitting in a wheelchair, he had increased weakness and confusion, and he remained on a pureed diet due to the risk of aspiration. In August 2010, J.A. had shortness of breath and chest congestion intermittently, increased weakness and agitation, and restlessness. He was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, had further decreased tolerance to sitting in a chair and increased mental confusion. On 09/27/10, Patient J.A. developed a sudden change in level of consciousness and respiratory distress. He was placed on continuous care and over the next two days, he had very rapid breathing and respiratory distress with a respiratory rate as high as 42. His skin became mottled as he was getting less oxygen to the tissues. He had apnea spells and ultimately died of respiratory distress on 09/29/10. Dr. Eisner testified that J.A. did not exhibit functional decline over the dates at issue. Dr. Vermette explained that this patient was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs at admission requiring maximum assistance so there was no way to decline in functional status, although he did exhibit decline in his inability to tolerate just sitting in a chair. Dr. Eisner also stated that J.A.'s weight had been stable at admission at 128 pounds. However, J.A.'s weight declined by ten pounds in the months leading up to admission. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that J.A. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 31, A.J.M. Patient A.J.M. was a 77-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage heart disease. The three claim periods at issue total about six months: 03/13/12 to 03/15/12; 03/20/12 to 03/24/12; and 03/30/12 to 09/28/12. A.J.M. had a history of heart disease which required a defibrillator be placed three years prior to admission at Vitas. She was hospitalized in the days leading up to the first claim period with significant heart failure, diastolic dysfunction, and an EF of only 10 percent. She also had severe global hypokinesis of the left ventricle, which means heart tissue had died so the heart beat in an abnormal pattern with less strength than normal. A.J.M. was admitted directly from the hospital to Vitas. On admission on 03/13/12, A.J.M. had a PPS of 30 percent, was bedbound, had reduced intake, was NYHA Class IV, and had leg edema. She also had comorbidities of recurrent pneumonias and dementia. She was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs. A.J.M. revoked hospice care less than three days after admission on 03/15/12. A.J.M. returned to the hospital on 03/16/12. She presented to the ER with a hypertensive emergency and pulmonary edema. Her EF was 10 percent. She was intubated during this hospitalization and her blood gas was monitored. A.J.M. was immediately readmitted to Vitas hospice from this hospitalization on 03/20/12. At this admission, she had a PPS of 30 percent, was total care, still had reduced intake, had edema in both legs, was short of breath at rest, and had a wound on her sacrum. More history was noted including that the patient had pneumonia and UTIs in the last six months. Given the hospitalization with respiratory failure requiring intubation between the first and second period, this patient's terminal prognosis had worsened since the initial admission to hospice. During the second admission, A.J.M. had chest pains which required nitroglycerin. Vitas was arranging to transfer A.J.M. to the IPU for pain management when her family instead elected to seek aggressive treatment in the hospital and revoked hospice care again on 03/24/12. Patient A.J.M. was again admitted to Vitas directly from a hospitalization on 03/30/12. On admission, A.J.M. had a PPS of 30 percent, shortness of breath, an EF of 10 percent, a FAST score of worse than 7, diabetes, anemia, and dysphagia. A.J.M.'s weight had decreased to 130 pounds and she was experiencing chest pains. In April 2012, A.J.M. required an IPU stay for shortness of breath and had chest pain which was treated with nitroglycerin. A.J.M. received four bursts of defibrillation because she had three episodes of ventricular tachycardia and one episode of ventricular fibrillation, requiring the automatic device to shock her. On 05/06/12, Patient A.J.M. required a stay in the IPU for chest pains. Her respiratory rate was high and she was tachycardic. A.J.M. was in significant distress at this time. On 05/21/12, A.J.M. again required care in the IPU, this time for a change in level of consciousness. She was hypotensive, and as a result, some of her blood pressure medications were withheld. On 06/22/12, A.J.M. again required IPU care due to pain and respiratory distress. Her weight decreased to 122 pounds. On 09/14/12, Patient A.J.M. had significant respiratory and cardiac symptoms, increased weakness, and muscle wasting. On 09/24/12, she again was transferred to the IPU for change in level consciousness and agitation. She was in respiratory distress with a respiratory rate of 26, was becoming more delirious, and experienced more shortness of breath. A.J.M. died on hospice care on 09/28/12. Dr. Vermette opined that each of the IPU stays would have resulted in another hospitalization if A.J.M. had not been on hospice at the time. Dr. Vermette also opined that this patient died of end-stage heart disease or end-stage congestive heart failure with respiratory arrest. Dr. Talakkottur stated A.J.M. was not hospice eligible because she did not have significant respiratory or cardiac symptoms, had no frequent hospitalizations, and had no recurrent infections. These statements are directly contrary to the evidence. A.J.M. was noted to have recurrent UTIs and pneumonia within the six months prior to hospice admission. She had three hospitalizations in March 2012 due to her cardiac and respiratory distress along with five other IPU stays. Dr. Talakkottur also stated that A.J.M.'s nutritional status was not compromised despite a decrease in weight from 175 pounds to 122 pounds from the time of initial admission until the patient's death. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that A.J.M. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 33, M.V. Patient M.V. was an 89-year-old female admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage cardiovascular disease and also exhibited symptoms of end-stage cerebral degeneration. The claim period at issue is 12/14/10 to 03/25/12. On recertification for the period beginning 12/14/10, M.V. had shortness of breath, a PPS of 30 percent, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, a comorbidity of end-stage dementia with a FAST of 7d, and had dysphagia which required a pureed diet, as well as the Thick-It compound added to her fluids. M.V. remained 6 of 6 ADLs during the dates in dispute with a PPS of 30 percent. In April 2011, M.V. suffered a respiratory infection requiring antibiotics. In June 2011, she had visible signs of cachexia and muscle wasting. On 08/12/11, M.V. had a significant infection. Similarly, on 08/25/11, M.V. had congestion, shortness of breath, cough, and secretions, which was consistent with an aspiration event in a patient such as this with severe dementia and dysphagia. On 08/31/11, M.V. required a suction machine to help with the secretions. In October 2011, Patient M.V. became hypotensive and had another upper respiratory infection. M.V. continued to experience brachycardia and hypotension in December 2011. Her FAST score also worsened to 7e. Dr. Talakkottur agreed that this progression of M.V.'s FAST score would be consistent with her comorbidity of Alzheimer's disease. On 03/23/12, Patient M.V. developed acute respiratory distress with a respiratory rate of 24. She had cyanosis and was placed on continuous care for respiratory distress. M.V. died on hospice services on 03/25/12. Dr. Vermette testified that each of M.V.'s episodes of infection where she developed respiratory distress and developed cough, congestion, and required antibiotics were likely aspiration events. As noted from the Mitchell study, an episode of pneumonia in the presence of advanced dementia results in a grave prognosis. Patient M.V. had three episodes of significant respiratory distress, the last one of which ended up killing her, and either of the other two could have done so. Dr. Talakkottur stated this patient was not hospice eligible because she did not have recurrent infections. However, the record shows that M.V. had three respiratory infections within a year. Dr. Talakkottur stated that this patient had a hip fracture but that such an injury would have no impact on her prognosis. This is directly refuted by the credible testimony of Dr. Shega in prior claims. Dr. Talakkottur admitted that the medical record on 03/25/12 immediately preceding M.V.'s death evidenced that M.V.'s life expectancy at that point was less than six months. According to the audit instructions, if any day during a certification period was approved by a peer reviewer, then the entire certification period was to be approved. Dr. Talakkottur agreed that M.V. was hospice appropriate on 03/25/12; accordingly, that entire period must be approved for reason of the instruction alone. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that M.V. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 34, L.S.L. Patient L.S.L. was an 85-year-old male admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage cerebral vascular disease. The claim period at issue is 12/03/10 to 09/28/11. In 2008, L.S.L. suffered a significant stroke. Over time, he became increasingly debilitated. He was hospitalized prior to admission to repair and replace his PEG tube, but was noted by his daughter to have declined since that hospitalization, including that he required a Foley catheter. At the time of admission, he required a PEG tube for his feedings, had developed vascular dementia and was nonverbal. He had problems swallowing and had dysphagia. He had a seizure disorder and was on seizure medications. The medical records indicate that this patient was admitted to hospice for "agitation." Dr. Vermette testified that he thought it was "very likely" that the agitation experienced by L.S.L. was associated with the PEG tube reinsertion and Foley catheter insertion. Dr. Eisner opined that although L.S.L. was sick on presentation, it was the result of his stroke in 2008. He showed no change in his cerebral vascular disease and no progressive decline in his functional or nutritional status. Besides one brief inpatient overnight stay in June of 2011 to service his PEG tube, L.S.L. lived at home with his daughter. His daughter was a nurse who described herself as having experience working around patients like her father. In July 2011, a social worker noted the daughter stated her father was doing well, and he seemed like a chronic patient and had not declined since admission. The medical records show that discharge planning was discussed with L.S.L.'s daughter as early as 06/29/11; however, he was not discharged until 09/28/11, for extended prognosis. The medical records contained in this patient's file do not support a finding that the Medicaid hospice eligibility standard was met during the disputed period. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that L.S.L. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $46,830.90. Patient 35, R.B. Patient R.B. was a 52-year-old male admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage AIDS. The claim period at issue is just two weeks, from 01/14/11 to 01/28/11. R.B. was admitted to the hospital with pneumonia just prior to his hospice admission. The chest x-ray from that admission was consistent with pneumocystis carinii pneumonia ("PCP"), which is one of the defining opportunistic infections in AIDS patients. Patient R.B. was admitted to hospice directly from that hospitalization. He had a combined CD3 CD4 count of 88. At admission, R.B. had a PPS of 30 percent, was drowsy, was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, had weight loss from 125 to 110 pounds in the prior three months, and had a BMI of 18. In addition to AIDS, R.B. had thrush, a history of AIDS wasting, systemic lymphoma, non-small cell lung cancer, and COPD. He was placed in IPU for shortness of breath upon admission to hospice. He was also agitated and restless during that time. R.B. was going to be placed in a nursing home because he was homeless, but when the transfer to the nursing home was scheduled to occur, he became angry and belligerent and revoked hospice care. On the date R.B. revoked, his ADLs had improved to needing assistance with 1 of 6. However, Dr. Vermette stated it is not uncommon for a patient to show improvement in the first weeks after admission to hospice from an acute hospitalization. Dr. Vermette also stated that a combined CD3 CD4 count is very similar to a CD4 count. He stated a combined CD3 CD4 count below 200 would be AIDS-defining. During the dates at issue, R.B. required antipsychotic medications. He was also treated with oxygen and nebulizer treatments every four hours. He required two different narcotics for pain. Dr. Eisner found no evidence of decline during the two weeks R.B. was in hospice. However, this again shows the problematic nature of the retrospective review and does not take into account that at admission, this patient was hospice eligible. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that R.B. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment. Patient 36, J.D. Patient J.D. was a 79-year-old male, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage heart disease. The claim period at issue is just under six months, from 10/21/10 to 04/18/11. Leading up to and at the beginning of the dates at issue, Patient J.D. had been hospitalized because of gangrene in one of his legs, requiring amputation. He was referred to hospice from that hospitalization. In addition to his obvious peripheral vascular disease and anemia, J.D. had a history of stroke and dementia and a comorbidity of hypertension. He had a PPS of 30 percent, was bedbound, disoriented at times and required total care, had shortness of breath at rest and required frequent oxygen. J.D. was also having episodes of chest pain and having episodes of edema in his lower extremity. J.D. had experienced a MI (heart attack) ten years prior to admission to hospice. At admission the recipient's EF was 45 percent. Notably, J.D. was not suffering from shortness of breath or requiring oxygen after admission to hospice care. Moreover, starting with the nursing assessment on 11/16/10, Dr. Talakkottur noted that the nurses' notes fail to evidence anything of significance for either the cardiovascular or respiratory systems of J.D. which would lead him to believe J.D. had a prognosis of six months or less to live. Dr. Vermette opined that J.D. was hospice eligible because of his recent hospitalization and the progression of his terminal illness, specifically that he was a NYHA Class IV. However, in addition to the nurses' notes discussed during Dr. Talakkottur's testimony, the Plan of Care Reviews failed to report this recipient suffered from dyspnea at any time from admission until 04/12/11. Moreover, Dr. Vermette admitted that Respondent conceded a portion of J.D.'s hospice stay based upon concerns that certain Plan of Care Reviews had been merely photocopied with dates changed. Based upon the greater weight of evidence in this case, it is determined that this recipient was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services and that AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $148,606.85. Patient 38, L.F.P. Patient L.F.P. was an 83-year-old female, admitted to hospice with a terminal diagnosis of end-stage Alzheimer's disease. The claim period at issue is just over four months, from 08/09/12 to 12/31/12. In July 2012, L.F.P. was a FAST of 7c to 7d, dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs, PPS of 30 percent, had muscle wasting, decreased oral intake, was having episodes of agitation, and had a recent UTI. Following that recertification, a week prior to the beginning of the denied period, L.F.P. was placed on continuous care because of a change of mental status with significant lethargy and she was also dehydrated and having shortness of breath. On the first day of the denied period, L.F.P. developed a tremor possibly due to medications. L.F.P. then had improvement since the continuous care began and was more awake and alert. Her altered mental status appeared to be improving. Patient L.F.P. displayed the indicators for end-stage Alzheimer's, such as high FAST score, functional impairment, nutritional impairment, and other comorbidities or secondary symptom burden. Dr. Vermette testified that L.F.P. was appropriate for Medicaid hospice at the beginning of the dates at issue because the factors that were present when the patient was appropriately recertified on 07/08/12 were still present one month later, and indeed the patient had shown a need for significantly more care during those two weeks just prior to the beginning of the denied period. Because the first month of the recertification period was approved, the second month, including the beginning of the denied period, must be approved in accordance with the audit instructions. In August 2012, L.F.P. developed blood in her urine and a UTI, requiring an antibiotic. In September 2012, L.F.P. developed a wound in the sacral region and it was a Stage II, over an inch in diameter in all directions. While a patient does not die specifically from a skin wound of this size, he/she can develop an infection which then can debilitate a patient such as this and lead to sepsis and ultimately death from the infection. More commonly, this type of a wound is a marker of nutritional impairment and a general functional decline. In October 2012, L.F.P. remained FAST 7d and remained bedbound, total care. The prior wound healed in October; however, later in the month and early November, she developed a new wound in that area. L.F.P. developed contractures, her muscles tightened up because of disuse and caused her joints to flex and be locked in that position. L.F.P. began receiving baclofen to help with her contractures. L.F.P. was also at risk for aspiration and was on aspiration precautions, requiring a pureed diet and thickened liquids. In December 2012, Patient L.F.P. had a FAST score of 7d, a PPS of 30 percent, dysphagia requiring a pureed diet with thickened liquids, still had contractures, and she had a sacral wound. Additionally, she had shortness of breath at rest, which was an additional symptom burden and additional organ system involvement in her symptom burden. L.F.P. displayed the indicators of end-stage Alzheimer's disease throughout the dates at issue. Dr. Talakkottur confirmed that throughout the dates at issue, L.F.P. was incontinent of bowel and bladder, her PPS score never ranged above 30 percent, her FAST level was never better than 7d, and she was dependent in 6 of 6 ADLs. AHCA has not met its burden by the greater weight of the evidence that L.F.P. was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services, and it is not entitled to recover an overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order directing VITAS Healthcare Corporation of Florida to repay an overpayment to AHCA the sum of $954,488.60, plus the overpayments to be recalculated for Melbourne Patients 11 and 21, and Boynton Beach Patient 5. The undersigned reserves jurisdiction to the extent AHCA provides the revised sanctions, fines, and costs it is entitled to recover against VITAS and that amount is determined in a later proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the application of Catholic Hospice, Inc., to establish a hospice program in District 10 meets the statutory and rule criteria for approval.
Findings Of Fact 1. Catholic Hospice, Inc. (Catholic Hospice) is the preliminarily approved applicant for Certificate of Need (CON) Number 9333, to expand hospice services, currently provided in Dade County, into adjacent Broward County, Florida. 2. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) is the department authorized to administer the Florida CON program for health care facilities and services. 3. Catholic Hospice applied for CON Number 9333 to initiate services in Eroward County, which is designated AHCA, District 10, for the July 2001, planning horizon. As the parties stipulated prior to the final hearing, AHCA published zero as the numeric need for an additional hospice program in Broward County. At the time the CON application was submitted, Catholic Hospice asserted that its proposal would meet an unmet need for hospice care for the Hispanic and Haitian populations, in particular, and the growing multi-ethnic population in Broward County, in general. Catholic Hospice also initially indicated that its program would increase access to hospice care by eliminating financial, language, religious, and cultural barriers. At the hearing, Catholic Hospice presented evidence to support its intention to improve access for the Hispanic population by overcoming language and cultural barriers, and its assertion that the existing hospice programs are not consistently and aggressively reaching Hispanics. 4. Catholic Hospice is a partnership established in 1988 by the Archdiocese of Miami, St. Francis Medical and Health Care Services, and Mercy Hospital. The governing body is a 15-member Board of Directors with five directors from each of the three member organizations. The Board is ethnically diverse and includes three directors who are native Spanish language speakers. Catholic Hospice serves people of various religions, having, within the last year and a half, established the L'Chaim Jewish Hospice Program. 5. Catholic Hospice has steadily increased the proportion of care it gives to Hispanics in Dade County. In 1989, approximately 30% of Catholic Hospice patients were Hispanic. By 1999, Catholic Hospice served 740 Hispanic patients out of a total of 1157. By 2000, the number and proportion of Hispanic patients increased to 841 out of a total of 1228. Currently, over 60% of Catholic Hospice's patients are Hispanics, while 55% of the total populaticn of Dade County is Hispanic. Existing Hospice Programs and Services 6. The existing hospice providers in Broward County are vitas Healthcare Corporation (Vitas), Hospice Care of Broward County, Inc. (Hospice Care of Broward), Hospice by the Sea, Inc. (HBTS), and Hospice of the Gold Coast. All of the existing hospices have elected to qualify for and to obtain accreditation from the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. 7. Vitas is the successor to the organization known as Hospice of Miami, established in 1978. Vitas is a for-profit organization, having been established prior to the enactment of the Florida law which currently requires hospices to be not-for- profit corporations. ‘Currently, Vitas operates twenty separately licensed programs in seven states with an average daily census of 5,400 patients. In 1999, Vitas admitted 5,921 patients in Broward County and 4,382 in Dade County. It is the largest provider of hospice care in the United States, and in Broward and Dade Counties. In Broward County, Vitas cared for 180 Hispanic patients in 1998, 238 in 1999, and 206 through November 15, 2000. Approximately 3.3 to 4% of its total number of Broward County patients are Hispanic. 8. Hospice Care of Broward operates in both Dade and Broward Counties, with offices in both Fort Lauderdale and Miami. The main business office is the one in Fort Lauderdale with close to 180 employees as compared to a staff of 50 in the Miami office. The Miami and Fort Lauderdale operations share the same board of directors, executive director, development director, finance director, and clinical director of operations. 9. Hospice Care of Broward cares for patients in their homes, in hospitals or nursing homes, and in its own 5-bed residence in Fort Lauderdale. Approximately half of their Dade County patients and 2% of their Broward County patients are Hispanic. In 1999, Hospice Care of Broward admitted a total of 999 patients in Broward County and 172 in Dade County. 10. HBTS, established in 1979, is a not-for-profit corporation, which serves both AHCA District 9, for Palm Beach County and AHCA District 10, for Broward County. It operates a 30-bed inpatient center in Palm Beach and, by contract, provides care at various hospitals, including Hollywood Medical Center, Holy Cross Hospital, Cleveland Clinic Hospital and North Ridge Hospital. 11. In Broward County, HBTS served five Hispanic patients out of a total of 287, in 1998; 7 out of 415 in 1999; and 15 out of 641 in 2000, or almost 2.4%. 12. Hospice of the Gold Coast is a relatively small operation, serving approximately 200 patients a year, primarily at the North Broward Hospital District facilities. Its office located in the northeastern area of the County, which has a relatively small Hispanic population. As a result, Hispanic utilization of Hospice of the Gold Coast was estimated at 2% by one expert. 13. In general, hospice care is provided to terminally ill patients who are certified by a medical doctor as having a prognosis of death within six months. The care is, therefore, palliative, that is, to provide comfort to the dying patient, not curative. The patient and family members are treated as a unit by an interdisciplinary team which includes doctors, nurses, home health aides, chaplains, social workers, and counselors. Hospice services are gaining in acceptance and utilization in the United States. It is considered cost effective and is, therefore, subject to reimbursement by Medicare, Medicaid and private insurances. Many hospice services to relatives and the community, however, including camps for bereaved children, are funded by charitable donations to the programs. 14. In its CON application, Catholic Hospice describe two cases in which hospice patients in Broward expressed a preference for its care. One doctor who testified by deposition for Catholic Hospice said he supports the application because there is no real advocate for Hispanics in Broward County. He complained of discriminatory practices in county hospital emergency rooms. He also expressed frustration that the existing hospices are not supporting his clinic, but admitted that he is not familiar with referrals to hospices. When his hospital patients need hospice, the social service departments handle referrals. He refers his other potential hospice patients to their churches. See Catholic Hospice Exhibit 20. Demographic Data 15. Approximately 80% of all hospice patients are over 65 years old. Hospice patients, obviously, are those whose deaths 10 are not unexpected, that is, not the victims of homicides, suicides or fatal motor vehicle accidents. Hospice services were traditionally provided largely to terminally-ill cancer patients, who still make-up the majority of patients statewide. 16. Catholic Hospice's expert noted that, particularly after some Dade County communities were destroyed by Hurricane Andrew, the trend of Hispanic migration into Broward County has been increasing. The projected increase in the Broward Hispanic population, from 2000 to 2005, is 45,900 for people under age 65 and 7,000 for people 65 and over. 17. The total Hispanic population of Broward County, is approximately 205,000 people out of a total of 1.5 million, or an estimated 12.6 to 13.4%. It is projected to increase to 15.6% by 2005. By comparison, Hispanics are approximately 55% of the population in Dade County. In Broward, Hispanics are more heavily concentrated in south central and southwestern areas of the County. One of Catholic Hospice’s offices is located in the northern Dade County area of Miami Lakes, conveniently near the southern areas of Broward County. Broward County residents are included in the staff and volunteers working in that office. The other office is in Kendall. Consistent with the concentration of the population, the largest number of Hispanics discharged from a Broward County hospital come from Memorial Hospital West. il 18. Catholic Hospice took the position that hospice care for Hispanics in Broward County should be provided within two or three percentage points of that which the group represents in the total population. The fact that the Broward providers serve from two to 4% Hispanic patients is, according to Catholic Hospice, indicative of underservice to the group. 19. Catholic Hospice's health planning expert conceded, however, that a better analysis than Hispanic population as a percentage of the total, would take into consideration more specific demographic data, including age, death rates by ethnicity, and causes of death. 20. Hispanics over 65 were 8.7% of the total Hispanic population in Broward County, 3.4% were over 75 years old. By comparison, over 20% of the total Broward County population is over 65, and over 10% over 75. Catholic Hospice offered its Dade County service, where 60% of its patients are Hispanics, as an example of its ability to achieve better results serving Hispanics in Broward County. In Dade County, however, the pool of potential patients is larger, with smaller differences between ethnic groups. Hispanics over 65 are 14.4% of the total population, almost identical to the 14.6% the non-Hispanic and total Dade populations over age 65. 21. Differences in age cohorts in the population are, as expected, reflected in differences in death rates. In 1998, 12 there were 641 Hispanic deaths in Broward County. of these, 383 were in the 65 and over age group, and 258 were under 65 years old. For 1999, there were 718 Hispanic deaths, of which 455 were 65 and over, and 261 were under 65. In the larger and older Hispanic population of Dade County, there were 9,220 Hispanic deaths, in 1999. 22. Hispanics in Broward County have a lower number of deaths per thousand, which is consistent with the relative youth of the group, as compared to the total population. In 1998, Hispanics accounted for 3.64 deaths per thousand, while there were 10.71 deaths per thousand in the total population of Broward County. In 1999, the Hispanic rate was 3.83 per thousand, as compared to 10.89 per thousand for the total population. When death rates are adjusted to exclude as causes accidents, suicides, and homicides, the Broward Hispanic death rates for 1998 and 1999 were 3.8 and 4%, respectively. 23. The analysis of the Hispanic population by age, death rates, and causes of death indicates that the current level hospice services, ranging between 2% for lower volume providers to 4% for Vitas, is the appropriate, expected level. 24. The level of hospice care which Catholic Hospice deemed appropriate is virtually impossible to reach considering the reality of the causes of death. Using Catholic Hospice's expert health planner's expectation that nine percent of all 13 Hispanics who died in Broward County should have hospice care, then 680 of 718 deaths in 1999, would have had to have been admitted to hospice. Numeric Need 25. Due to the demographic make-up and the level of care provided by the existing four hospice programs in District 10, AHCA published a zero numeric need for additional programs. AHCA publishes a need for a new hospice program when its formula demonstrates that the number of additional patients who would elect hospice care equals or exceeds 350 patients over and above the current volume of hospice admissions. 26. The formula, in Rule 59C-1.0355(4) (a), Florida Administrative Code, for projecting additional hospice deaths, uses actual three-year resident deaths in four groups of people, those with and without cancer, who are both over and under age 65. 27. When the formula was applied to the Broward County data, the result was 5,947 projected hospice patients for the July 2001, planning horizon. When compared to the actual volume, in 1999, of 7,550 patients served by the four existing hospice programs, the number of projected additional patients is a negative 1,603. The negative number is based on the statewide hospice experience and indicates that the hospices in Broward 14 County, in 1999, served 1,603 more people than they were expected to serve two years later. Penetration Rate, Accessibility and Availability 28. Although not used in the formula, the negative need calculation is, in part, a function of what the health planners described as the hospice use rate or hospice penetration rate. All of the expert health planners who testified agreed that the hospice penetration rate is the single most significant factor in determining the extent of the existing hospice utilization. The total number of hospice deaths divided by the total number of deaths during the same time period in the same planning area gives that planning area's penetration rate. 29. In Florida, the statewide hospice penetration rate for is 33.5%. In Broward County, District 10, the rate is 46.6%, the highest in the State. By contrast, the national average is approximately 29%. For adjacent District 11, which includes Dade County, the penetration rate is 30.7%. 30. For Hispanics in Broward County, the hospice penetration rate was 37.3% in 1999. In Dade County, the Hispanic hospice penetration rate was 28.2% in 1999, indicating greater opportunities for growth in Dade. In general, the data indicates that Hispanics in Broward are utilizing hospice care more than Hispanics in Dade County, and more than the total population of Florida. 15 31. The adequacy of access to hospice care in terms of geographical coverage has been considered. In Broward, with a total of 1,211 square miles and four hospices, each one averages 303 square miles. The smallest geographical area for hospices in Florida was 280 square miles for the one hospice operating in Pinellas County. The statewide average, however, is 1,083 square miles for each hospice in Florida. There are no apparent geographical limitations on access to hospice care in Broward County. 32. As the parties stipulated, accessibility in terms of timeliness is not at issue. There is no indication that hospice referrals do not get a response within 48 hours, a special circumstance, specified in Rule 59C-1.0355(4) (d)3., Florida Administrative Code. Spanish Language Material and Spanish-Speaking Staff 33. Catholic Hospice conceded that the existing Broward County hospices provide appropriate printed material, forms, and promotional information in Spanish. But, Catholic Hospice argued that it has the ability to reach out to and serve Hispanic patients better than any of the other existing providers based on its experience and staff. Catholic Hospice noted that the percentages of Hispanics to total Dade County patients it serves is higher, ranging between 61 to 67% than Vitas' to 35 to 40%, even though in absolute numbers Vitas 16 served twice as many Hispanics, in Dade County in 1999, as did Catholic Hospice. 34. Spanish-speaking staff is inadequate to serve Spanish- speaking patients, according to Catholic Hospice, unless every member of the hospice interdisciplinary team speaks Spanish. In response to discovery requesting numbers of fluent Spanish speakers on staff in Broward County, HBTS reported three full- time equivalent (FTE) employees. Each FTE represents a 40-hour work week. 35. Hospice Care of Broward reported that it employs, in Broward, three nurses, one home health aide, two chaplains, but no social workers or bereavement counselors who speak Spanish. Although that was considered inadequate by Catholic Hospice's expert, Hospice Care of Broward noted its ability to use Spanish-speaking staff from its Dade office. Catholic Hospice also indicated its intention to use its staff from Dade, if needed, as well as some of its current staff members and volunteers in Dade who actually reside in Broward County. 36. Vitas employed three chaplains, six registered nurses, three doctors, three home health aides, a secretary, a case worker, six pool staff and various others, for a total of 42 Spanish speakers in Broward County. Vitas was considered inadequately staffed by Catholic Hospice's expert for not having a Spanish-speaking social worker, although its chaplains and not 17 just social workers provide bereavement counseling. At the time, Vitas' census of Hispanic patients included seven in three different nursing homes, and 29 patients at home. 37. Catholic Hospice listed the names of 69 Spanish- speaking employees, who staff Catholic Hospices current operations in Dade County. Catholic Hospice's expert testified that, with 69 Spanish-speaking staff members, it adequately met the needs of 840 Hispanic patients. It must be concluded, logically, that Vitas, with 42 Spanish-speaking staff members, also had an adequate number to serve 238 Broward County Hispanic admissions in 1999. Including all of Catholic Hospice's administrators and excluding all but apparently fluent Spanish- speaking staff, the ratio of staff to Hispanic admissions is 9.9 to one for Catholic and 5.7 to one for Vitas. 38. All of the hospices rely on volunteers to help provide care to patients and their relatives. They also rely on relatives to serve as translators, if necessary. In addition, some hospice employees who are not fluent in the language do speak and understand some Spanish. Staffing 39. The staffing and related expenses, included in Catholic Hospice's financial projections, were criticized as inadequate. An expert for Vitas testified that $80,000 rather than $50,000 is appropriate for an hospice administrator; that 18 $18.99 an hour, Catholic Hospice's second year projection, is more appropriate for the first year than the first year projection of $17.78 an hour, or $37,000 a year, which was proposed for the first year for a registered nurse; that, although starting salaries are $16,000, or $7.69 an hour for nurses' aides, Catholic Hospice should expect to pay a minimum of $8.50 an hour in Broward County; that $35,000 a year is unreasonable for a patient care manager, a position typically filled by a registered nurse; and that $37,000 rather than $32,000 is more reasonable for a licensed clinical social worker. 40. The Vitas' expert also testified that 7.6 not 6 FTEs for registered nurses are needed, and more than one FTE for a social worker for the entire County for the first year. The proposal to hire one bereavement counselor, and one volunteer coordinator in the second year, but none in the first was also criticized as an underestimate of staffing needs, considering an average daily census of 30 patients in the first year, and 50 patients in the second. 41. Catholic Hospice used its experience and ratios established by national associations to project staffing needs. The projections are reasonable in providing, for example, one nurse for every ten patients and one home health aide for every eight patients. The nursing shortage, which all parties concede 19 exists in South Florida will likely increase the time and expense for Catholic Hospice to recruit its staff. Some health care facilities also find it necessary to provide signing bonuses, which Catholic Hospice has not proposed to do. At the time of the hearing, Catholic Hospice needed more staff and was participating in a jobs fair in Dade County. 42. In terms of its own operations, Catholic Hospice could also use and benefit from economies of scale, by using some of its existing staff and volunteers in Broward County. Its per unit costs would decrease primarily from sharing administrative staff, in much the sawe way as Hospice Care of Broward operates in both counties. For this reason, the criticism of Catholic Hospice that its propesed staffing and salaries are adequate is rejected, even though its work papers showed more staff than its CON application. Financial Feasibility 43. Catholic Hospice expects to serve 220 patients in the first year and 400 in the second. The average length of stay for each hospice patient in Broward County was around 40 days For Catholic Hospice, in Dade County, it was 48.9 days in 1999. When patient days are calculated from admissions with an average of 48.9 days, the results are 10,219 for the first year, and 19,574 for the second year. Catholic Hospice's application uses 10,905 patient days for the first year, and 25,520 for the 20 second year. It appears that utilization is overestimated by 700 admission in the first year and 6000 in the second year. To reach the second year projection of 400 admissions, the average length of stay would have to be 63.8 days. 44. One expert quantified the effect on projected revenues as a result of Catholic Hospice's overstatement of utilization by patient days. The conclusion was that projected revenues would decrease by $136,000 in the first year, and $1,063.881, in the second year. When Medicare rate increases approved by Congress are considered, the projected revenue decreases are approximately $65,000 in the first year, and that adds back $123,000, to the expected decrease of $1,063,881, increasing it to about a $900,000 reduction in revenues for the second year. 45. The analysis of revenues as compared to patient days was flawed having not reflected a proportionate reduction in variable expenses. Vita's expert's assumed that expenses should not be reduced because: Catholic Hospice had underestimated staffing and salaries. The finding that staffing and salaries are adequate means that, although Catholic Hospice overestimated revenues, the exact amount cannot be determined. The evidence that revenues and utilization are overestimated means that Catholic Hospice failed to prove that its proposal is financially feasible. The assumption is made that revenues are sufficient to‘cover projected start-up costs of $69,493. 21 46. Catholic Hospice's expert criticized the use of average length of stay to determine patient days. That approach is more reasonable than that used by Catholic Hospice which relied on its start-up experience in Dade County in 1989, to guess what Broward patient days might be in 2002 and 2003. When Catholic Hospice started, its average lengths of stay were 21.17 days in 1989, and 32.1 days in 1990. 47. Additional factors which cast doubt on the likelihood of Catholic Hospice achieving its projected utilization and revenues are the pattern of referral sources in Broward County and the level of charity care. Physicians referred approximately 43% of all hospice patients in Broward County, while approximately 24% came from hospitals in 1999. It will take Catholic Hospice longer to establish referral relationships with a number of different physicians. Lower revenues are also reasonably expected with higher percentages of charity care. Historically, in Dade County, charity care has accounted for -23% of Catholic Hospice's services, but it projected 3.5% for Broward County. 48. The CON application submitted to AHCA was incomplete, having omitted key information necessary for AHCA to determine financial feasibility, including the following: (1) failure to distinguish between Broward and Dade operations in sufficient detail for an evaluation of Broward separately, 22 although payer mix assumptions for each were different ; (2) inadequate breakdown of admission by payer type; (3) no provision for dietetic and nutritional counseling; (4) no specific allocation of FTEs for a medical director; (S) no details of a staff recruitment and retention plan; and (6) a material discrepancy of $3 million, given the projected year two net profit of $39,100, between revenues on one schedule as compared to the notes to the same schedule. Impact on Existing Providers 49. The existing providers presented evidence related to the potential impact on their admissions, revenues, and staffing, if Catholic Hospice begins operating in the Broward County market. They need to maintain or increase their censuses to have some leverage for contract negotiations, and to provide charity care and unreimbursed services, such as bereavement services. Catholic Hospice maintained that it would not adversely affect existing providers, citing the experience in Dade County when Hospice Care of Broward began operations in 1998. The situations are distinguishable. From 1997 to 1999, for example, hospice admissions increased 16.7% in Broward and 35.3% in Dade County. Dade County started with a lower-than- average hospice penetration rate in 1998. Most importantly, 23 AHCA published a numeric need for an additional hospice which led to the approval of the Hospice Care of Broward CON. 50. Although Vitas' market share in Dade County increased during the time that Hospice Care of Broward began operations there, the smaller hospices, Hospice Care of South Florida and Catholic Hospice lost market shares. Similarly, recent increases in the market share of HBTS in Broward County have adversely affected Hospice Care of Broward, but not Hospice of the Gold Coast, which has the affiliation with a hospital district, or Vitas. Based on these experiences, it is reasonable to expect that the smaller providers will experience a disproportionately greater adverse impact from the entry of Catholic Hospice into the Broward County market. 51. Assuming that: Catholic Hospice achieves it projection of 220 patients in its first year of operations in Broward County and 400 in the second year, then it will adversely affect all of the existing providers, at least to the extent of limiting their potential growth. 52. Using the total number of projected hospice patients for 2002 and 2003, and allocating all incremental admissions to Catholic Hospice first, the result is that 61 cases for 2002, and 120 for 2003, are available for Catholic Hospice. That leaves an additional 159 admissions for the first year and 280 24 for the second year, waich must come from patients who would have otherwise used the existing hospices. 53. When proportional losses of cases to Catholic Hospice are assumed with static market shares, the expected impact in terms of lost admissions are 5 and 8 from Hospice of the Gold Coast, 11 and 20 from HBTS, 21 and 37 from Hospice Care of Broward, and 121 and 215 from Vitas, in years one and two, respectively. 54. If the assumption is made that the market shares will change, following established trends, then projected losses will increase most (to 16 in 2002 and 29 in 2003) for the hospice which has been expanding most rapidly, HBTS. More consistent providers, in terms of volume, would have lower projected losses, for example, 15 and 26 admissions in years one and two, respectively, for Hospice Care of Broward County. 55. Of the three scenarios presented, the most reasonable assumptions are that proportional losses of the type which occurred in Dade County would also occur in Broward, and that market share trends would continue. If that happens, then the smaller providers would lose more potential patients, up to 91 and 165 from HBTS, 87 and 158 from Hospice Care of Broward, and 27 and 49 from Hospice of the Gold Coast, in years one and two, respectively. For Hospice Care of Broward, the loss of 158 is 25 significant when compared to total volume of approximately 1000 patients. 56. The market share analyses could be criticized for relying on projected population growth, but not factoring in an increase in the penetration rate. In fact, the penetration rate in Broward, as high as it is, has been increasing, but in relatively small increments, from 45.8% in 1993 to 46.6% in 1999. The .8% increase is considered approximately flat, particularly having followed a 7% decline in the Broward hospice penetration rate from 45.8% in 1993 to 38.6% in 1994. The fluctuations in the penetration rate and the decline in deaths from cancer and AIDs support the reasonableness of the assumption of a static penetration rate in the market share analysis. 57. Only HBTS presented evidence on the financial impact of the projected losses, ranging from a low of $61,554 for 20 lost admissions to a high of $507,464 for the more reasonable assumption of 165 lost admissions. The magnitude of the detrimental impact, put in context, is significant given HBTS' losses from operations of $1.8 million in 1999, and $1 million in 2000, which had to be offset by charitable contributions and income from investments. 58. In addition to lower operating revenues from patient care reimbursements, HBTS also projected losses from charitable 26 contributions. In 1993, HBTS received $629 in charitable donation for each hospice patient admitted, from bequests, memorials, tributes, holiday remembrances from families and friends. Contributions from these sources are directly related to the care given to individual patients and, therefore, to the total number of patients. At HBTS, over 64% of its total charitable contributions are in the combined categories of tributes and bequests. The adverse financial impact on HBTS including reduced charitable contributions, is $74,149 for 20 cases and up to $611,301 for 165 cases. 59. WVitas received referrals from Holy Cross Hospital, a Catholic facility in Broward County which would be expected to enter an agreement with Catholic Hospice. Vitas also runs a bereavement group for Spanish speakers at Holy Cross Hospital. Holy Cross Hospital is listed, in the CON application, as the likely source of a contract for services with Catholic Hospice. In a three-month period, Vitas received 30 referrals resulting in 25 hospice admissions from Holy Cross Hospital. In Dade County, Vitas receives virtually no referrals from Mercy Hospital, which is also a Catholic institution and one of the Catholic Hospice partners. Therefore, despite the projected disproportionate impact in the market, to Vitas' advantage, if all other things were comparable to the Dade County experience, because of the institutional relationships between Catholic 27 Hospice and Holy Cross Hospital, Vitas' is reasonably expected to be adversely affected. It is impossible to determine if projected losses are significant in terms of the total Vitas operation, since it provides over three-fourths of all hospice care in Broward and returned approximately $10 million in revenues in 1999, to its corporate operations. There is also no evidence that more competition with Vitas will enhance services or reduce costs. 60. Expert witnesses acknowledged a severe nursing shortage in South Florida, approaching crisis proportions. The existing providers are always recruiting and never fully staffed. The kind of care required of hospice nurses, the pressure of dealing with dying patients, the need for them to be on call rather than working only on scheduled shifts, the preference for oncology nurses, and the need for bilingual nurses further limits the available pool. The shortage has increased since 1998, when Hospice Care of Broward expanded into Dade County. Hospices are also not free to attract nurses by raising rates to pay increasingly higher salaries, but must resort to other incentives which increase recruiting costs. Hospice patient care is usually reimbursed on a per diem basis, regardless of actual costs, at rates set by the Medicaid and Medicare programs. The existing hospices reasonably expect an adverse impact on their staffing, recruiting time and costs, 28 particularly for nurses and home health aides, if Catholic Hospice enters the market in Broward County and succeeds in staffing its project as proposed. Agency Action and Rules 61. The Chief of the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation for AHCA, who is also an expert in health planning, testified that the review process in this case was the same as for most CONs. Within AHCA, however, the initial recommendation was to deny the application because of insufficient data to support the allegation of a lack of access for the Hispanic population. 62. The decision to approve CON Number 9333 was made because AHCA Secretary, "Ruben King-Shaw indicated that he felt that it was a policy priority at the highest level of the current administration, both within the Agency and I would say at the level of the Governor, to promote culturally sensitive access to end of life care. And that he referenced a presentation that I believe that he had heard Secretary Brookes (phonetic) of the Department of Health make a day or two prior to our meeting where he said that Dr. Brookes was one of the best speakers that he had ever seen on the issue of culturally sensitive health care and barriers to -- cultural barriers to health care." Transcript, p. 955-956. 63. In addition to the statutory review criteria for CONs, AHCA relied on Rule 59C-1.030, Florida Administrative Code, which lists general criteria for evaluation of CON applications, 29 and Rule programs. there is included 64. follows: 59C-1.0355, which applies specifically to hospice The need to serve a particular ethnic minority, if evidence that their access to a service is limited, is in the criteria. The most relevant provisions of Rule 59C-1.030 are as (2) Health Care Access Criteria. (a) The need that the population served or to be served has for the health or hospice services proposed to be offered or changed, and the extent to which all residents of the district, and in particular low income persons, racial and ethnic minorities, women, handicapped persons, other underserved groups and the elderly, are likely to have access to those services. (b) The extent to which that need will be met adequately under a proposed reduction, elimination or relocation of a service, under a proposed substantial change in admissions policies or practices, or by alternative arrangements, and the effect of the proposed change on the ability of members of medically underserved groups which have traditionally experienced difficulties in obtaining equal access to health services to obtain needed health care. (c) The contribution of the proposed service in meeting the health needs of members of such medically underserved groups, particularly those needs identified in the applicable local health plan and State health plan as deserving of priority. (d) In determining the extent to which a proposed service will be accessible, the following will be considered: 30 1. The extent to which medically underserved individuals currently use the applicant's services, as a proportion of the medically underserved population in the applicant's proposed service area(s), and the extent to which medically underserved individuals are expected to use the proposed services, if approved; 65. In the absence of numeric need, the special circumstances subsection in Rule 59C-1.0355(4) (d)1., Florida Administrative Code, on which Catholic Hospice relied is as follows: Evidence submitted by the applicant must document one of the following: 1. That a specific terminally ill population is not being served. 66. One expert testified that the provision should be narrowly construed to require a proposal to care for a specific terminal diagnosis, such as AIDS, but AHCA reasonably rejected that interpretation as applied to this case. Care fora particular ethnic group is specifically recognized as a valid consideration in Rule 59C-1.030. 67. AHCA's expert also noted, that under its rules, there is no reason to approve the application of Catholic Hospice if it fails to show that there is an underserved population, in this case, Hispanics in Broward County. The CON was prepared based on a belief that Hispanics are underserved, but without any data on Hispanic utilization. That data is not routinely 31 collected by AHCA and only became available in this case as a result of discovery. AHCA also determined that Catholic Hospice needed to show evidence that the existing providers are not meeting the area's needs. Catholic Hospice failed to show any need for its services in Broward County. In fact, there is affirmative evidence that the Hispanic hospice penetration rate should be what it is, which is approximately the same as the Hispanic death rate, adjusted to exclude unexpected causes of death. Therefore, the application of Catholic Hospice should be denied.
Conclusions For Petitioner Hospice by the Sea, Inc.: Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP 118 North Gadsden Street The Perkins House, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 For Petitioner Vitas Healthcare Corporation: Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Steven E. Oole, Esquire Blank, Meenan & Smith, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 For Petitioner Hospice Care of Broward County, Inc.: Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Thomas W. Konrad, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell and Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 For Respondent Catholic Hospice, Inc.: Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Powell & Mack 803 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For Respondent Agency for Health Care Administration: Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order denying the application of Catholic Hospice for Certificate of Need Number 9333 to establish a hospice program in District lo. DONE AND ENTERED this [3% day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Ahicamae rn Yt. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this /.3r* day of July, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 38 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Robert A. Weiss, Esquite Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP 118 North Gadsden Street The Perkins House, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Steven E. Oole, Esquire Blank, Meenan & Smith, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Thomas W. Konrad, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell and Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 22302-0551 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Powell & Mack 803 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issues are (1) whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) is entitled to recover certain Medicaid payments that it made to Respondent, Hospice of the Florida Suncoast, Inc., d/b/a Suncoast Hospice (Suncoast), pursuant to section 409.913(11), Florida Statutes, for hospice services provided during the audit period, September 1, 2009, through December 31, 2012; and (2) if overpayments were made, the amount of sanctions, if any, that should be imposed against Suncoast pursuant to section 409.913(15) through (17).
Findings Of Fact The Parties AHCA is designated as the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. § 409.902, Fla. Stat. Medicaid is a joint federal/state program to provide health care and related services to certain qualified individuals. Suncoast is a non-profit provider of hospice and end-of- life services in Pinellas County and is headquartered in Clearwater.1/ During the audit period, September 1, 2009, through December 31, 2012, Suncoast was enrolled as a Medicaid provider and had a valid Medicaid provider agreement with AHCA. The Medicaid Audit Process AHCA is authorized to recover Medicaid overpayments, as deemed appropriate. § 409.913, Fla. Stat. In this case, AHCA is defending a review conducted by federal government contractors and acting on behalf of the federal government. The United States Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), contracted with Health Integrity, LLC, a private vendor, now known as Qlarant, to perform an audit of Suncoast, along with 31 other hospices in Florida. The audit used Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards. Qlarant in turn retained a peer review organization, Advanced Medical Reviews (AMR), to provide physician peer reviews of claims in order to determine whether an audited claim was eligible for payment. The purpose of the audit was to determine whether recipients met eligibility requirements for hospice services during the period September 1, 2009, through December 31, 2012. To further define the scope of the audit, Qlarant selected recipients who had received hospice services in excess of 182 days. Qlarant also excluded any recipients with at least one malignancy (cancer) primary diagnosis with a date of death less than one year from the first date of service by Suncoast, and recipients who were eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid. When these limitations were applied, Qlarant identified 96 Suncoast recipients for review. The recipients' medical records first were reviewed by a Qlarant claims analyst, who is a registered nurse. If the analyst determined that a recipient clearly was eligible for Medicaid hospice services, the analyst would approve the file and remove it from further consideration. If the analyst had questions or concerns about a particular file, it would be set aside for peer review by a qualified physician who would make the ultimate determination with regard to the medical necessity of the hospice services provided. In this case, 45 recipient files were selected for review by an AMR peer review physician who made a determination with regard to medical necessity. After the peer review physicians reviewed the 45 files, they determined that 26 recipients were ineligible for Medicaid hospice services and 19 recipients were partially ineligible. Qlarant prepared a Draft Audit Report (DAR), which identified overpayments of Medicaid claims totaling $2,129,479.65, relating to the 45 recipients. On November 4, 2016, Qlarant forwarded the DAR to Suncoast for comment and response. Suncoast contested the entire amount. Its response was forwarded to the peer physicians, who then revised their opinions and reduced the number of recipients in dispute to 38. Qlarant prepared and issued an FAR, which upheld the overpayments as to the 38 recipients. The FAR sets forth the peer review physicians' basis for determining why each of the 38 recipients at issue was not eligible for Medicaid hospice services. The FAR was provided to CMS, who submitted it to AHCA with instructions for AHCA to initiate the state recovery process and to furnish a copy to Suncoast. During the hearing, AHCA withdrew its objection to recipients 7 and 14. Therefore, 36 recipients are at issue. The Florida Medicaid Hospice Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, the January 2007 edition (Handbook), as incorporated by reference in rule 59G-4.140, governs whether a service is medically necessary and meets the certification requirements for hospice services. AHCA, through Qlarant, instructed each peer review physician to review the criteria set forth in the Handbook to determine whether services provided to a recipient are eligible for Medicaid coverage. To qualify for the Medicaid hospice program, all recipients must: Be eligible for Medicaid hospice; Be certified by a physician as terminally ill with a life expectancy of six months or less if the disease runs its normal course; Voluntarily elect hospice care for the terminal illness; Sign and date a statement electing hospice care; Disenroll as a participant in a Medicaid or Medicare health maintenance organization (HMO), MediPass, Provider Service Network (PSN), Medicaid Exclusive Provider Organization, MediPass Pilot Programs or the Children's Medical Services Network; Disenroll as a participant in Project AIDS Care; and Disenroll as a participant in the Nursing Home Diversion Waiver. Further, the Handbook requires that: For each period of hospice coverage, the hospice must obtain written certification from a physician indicating that the recipient is terminally ill and has a life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness progresses at its normal course. The initial certification must be signed by the medical director of the hospice or a physician member of the hospice team and the recipient's attending physician (if the recipient has an attending physician). For the second and subsequent election periods, the certification is required to be signed by either the hospice medical director or the physician member of the hospice team. Certification documentation requirements used by the peer review physicians are as follows: Documentation to support the terminal prognosis must accompany the initial certification of terminal illness. This documentation must be on file in the recipient's hospice record. The documentation must include, where applicable, the following: Terminal diagnosis with life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness progresses at its normal course; Serial physician assessments, laboratory, radiological, or other studies; Clinical progression of the terminal disease; Recent impaired nutritional status related to the terminal process; Recent decline in functional status; and Specific documentation that indicates that the recipient has entered an end-stage of a chronic disease. The Medicaid hospice provider must provide a written certification of eligibility for hospice services for each recipient. The certification also is required for each election period. A recipient may elect to receive hospice services for one or more of the election periods. The election periods include: an initial 90-day period; a subsequent 90-day period; and subsequent 60-day time periods. The Handbook also explains: The first 90 days of hospice care is considered the initial hospice election period. For the initial period, the hospice must obtain written certification statements from a hospice physician and the recipient's attending physician, if the recipient has an attending physician, no later than two calendar days after the period begins. An exception is if the hospice is unable to obtain written certification, the hospice must obtain verbal certification within two days following initiation of hospice care, with a written certification obtained before billing for hospice care. If these requirements are not met, Medicaid will not reimburse for the days prior to the certification. Instead, reimbursement will begin with the date verbal certification is obtained. . . . and . . . For the subsequent election periods, written certification from the hospice medical director or physician member of the interdisciplinary group is required. If written certification is not obtained before the new election period begins, the hospice must obtain a verbal certification statement no later than two calendar days after the first day of each period from the hospice medical director or physician member of the hospice's interdisciplinary group. A written certification must be on file in the recipient's record prior to billing hospice services. Supporting medical documentation must be maintained by the hospice in the recipient's medical record. Peer Review Physicians The three peer reviewers assigned to review claims in this matter were Florida licensed physicians, in active practice, who were matched to "the maximum extent possible, of the same specialty or subspecialty" of Suncoast's physicians. § 409.9131(2)(c), Fla. Stat. Dr. Todd Eisner is an expert in internal medicine and gastroenterology. He treats patients with liver disease daily as part of his practice and has seen thousands of patients with liver disease during his career. Dr. Eisner understands what factors properly are considered when estimating a recipient's life expectancy. He reviewed and rendered an opinion as to the hospice eligibility of four recipients. Dr. Ibrahim Saad is an expert in internal medicine and is board-certified in that field. He treats recipients with a variety of illnesses including, but not limited to, cancer, heart disease, AIDS/HIV, chronic liver disease, and respiratory disease. He routinely makes prognoses related to whether a recipient has a terminal disease. He reviewed and rendered an opinion as to the eligibility of 15 recipients. Dr. Patrick Weston is an expert in internal medicine and cardiology. He evaluates and treats recipients with a variety of illnesses including, but not limited to, cancer, heart disease, AIDS/HIV, chronic liver disease, and respiratory disease. He routinely makes prognoses related to whether a recipient has a terminal disease. Dr. Weston reviewed and rendered an opinion as to 19 recipients. In performing their peer reviews, the doctors used their clinical experience, generally accepted medical standards, and the eligibility standards in the Handbook. Suncoast contends the AHCA peers were not qualified because they were not board-certified in hospice and palliative medicine. However, the record shows that many of the Suncoast physicians who certified, recertified, or treated the recipients in dispute likewise were not certified in that specialty. Also, the majority of the hospice physicians who treated the recipients were internists and family medicine physicians. The undersigned finds that each peer review physician was qualified to render an opinion on the eligibility of the respective recipients.2/ Suncoast Medical Witness Suncoast offered one expert at hearing, Dr. Wehr. She has been employed by Suncoast continuously since 2006 and treated some of the recipients during their time in hospice care at Suncoast. Dr. Wehr is board-certified in hospice and palliative medicine and internal medicine. In 2015, she was promoted to Suncoast's medical director. Currently, she works part-time for Suncoast and no longer is seeing patients. Over her long career, Dr. Wehr has assessed thousands of patients to determine whether they have a six-month life expectancy and whether they qualify for hospice care. Specific Patient Review The hospice service claims relate to 36 patients, who are identified as recipients 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, and 45. The parties' experts offered sharply conflicting testimony concerning the eligibility of each recipient. Except where noted below, these conflicts have been resolved in AHCA's favor. Recipient 2 BJ was a 19-year-old female with an assigned diagnosis of HIV. The dates in dispute are March 11, 2010, to June 7, 2010, and June 9, 2010, to November 23, 2010. Laboratory studies that physicians regularly will review to assess a recipient with HIV/AIDS include a CD4 count and a viral load. At the time of her admission to hospice, BJ had a viral load of 49,000 and a history of non-compliance with her antiretroviral medications. She had a normal nutritional status as evidenced by her albumin level of 3.0 and above during the relevant period. BJ also had a relatively high Palliative Performance Score (PPS) of 70 percent, which showed that she was mobile and able to complete her Activities of Daily Living (ADLs). (A PPS score of 100 percent would mean the patient is fully ambulatory and healthy, while every decrease in the score would represent a decrease in physical function.) Additionally, she was able to live alone which is indicative of her high functioning status. As a result of her functional status and nutritional status, BJ was not terminal and was not appropriate for hospice during this period. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that BJ was not eligible for hospice services for the period of March 11, 2010, to June 7, 2010, and June 9, 2010, to November 23, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $44,190.69. Recipient 3 AK was a 51-year-old female at the time she was admitted to hospice on August 31, 2011. Suncoast assigned a terminal diagnosis of alcoholic cirrhosis. The period in dispute is August 31, 2011, through June 22, 2012. The laboratory reports for AK do not support a terminal prognosis. Her albumin level, a protein made by the liver and a valuable tool in assessing the function of the liver, was 3.0 on August 29, 2011, just prior to the beginning of the hospice stay. This is a low level, but not an uncommon one for someone with liver disease. By the end of the hospice stay, her albumin was reported at a normal level of 3.5. In addition, while other liver function tests, such as amylase and lipases, initially were somewhat elevated, they soon moved into the normal range. Some other tests for anemia, very common in liver disease patients, were only mildly abnormal. AK also had a normal ammonia level and no signs of hepatic encephalopathy. That condition is very common in end-stage liver disease and was absent here. AK weighed 120 pounds at the time of admission. Her weight remained relatively stable throughout the admission period. There was no evidence of impaired nutritional status related to a terminal process and no decline in functional status. In fact, her PPS and Karnofsky scores steadily increased.3/ In addition, the record showed that AK was ambulatory, could go shopping, walk her dog, go fishing, and was independent in all of the ADLs. Taken as a whole, the evidence fails to show that AK had end-stage liver disease either at initial admission or at any point during the hospice stay. In fact, near the end of the benefit period, Suncoast discharged her for extended prognosis. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that AK was not eligible for hospice services for the period of August 31, 2011, through June 22, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $42,365.81. Recipient 4 GC was a 55-year-old male at the time of first admission to Suncoast in September 2009, with a terminal diagnosis of malignant neoplasm of prostate (metastatic prostate cancer). The dates in dispute are September 3, 2009, through August 30, 2010. GC's laboratory reports document an improvement in his tumor markers. His prostate cancer was being treated with chemotherapy when he was admitted to hospice, and he continued receiving chemotherapy during his hospice admission until late May or June 2010. Chemotherapy can slow down the normal progression of metastatic prostate cancer. GC's weight remained stable and actually increased throughout the disputed hospice period. This demonstrates he did not have an impaired nutritional status related to a terminal process. GC's functional status also was stable throughout the disputed hospice period. The medical record reflects that he helped his son in the son's roofing business, including working with tar on the ground, maintained a boat in his backyard and went out on his boat, and planted and maintained a garden in his backyard. GC's functional status scores/measures and his daily activities throughout the disputed hospice period demonstrate his functional status was stable. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that GC was not eligible for hospice services for the period of September 3, 2009, through August 30, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $52,292.31. Recipient 5 HM was a 60-year-old male upon admission to Suncoast on August 16, 2007, prior to the audit period, with a terminal diagnosis of HIV. He had been HIV positive for 20 years. The period in dispute is September 1, 2009 (the first day the audit applied) through March 21, 2010. HM was in hospice care for two years before the audit period began. In August 2009, just prior to the review period, HM had an undetectable viral load, which is a solid indication that his virus was being controlled by antiretroviral medication. While his CD4 count at that time was low, it had been lower in the pre- audit period and therefore was improving. CD4 counts also are positively impacted by antiretroviral medication. There was no clinical progression of the condition during the period under review. It was not until HM suffered a fall in the spring of 2010 that his condition deteriorated greatly. During this period, which was approved by the auditors, his CD4 count was extremely low; he suffered and was treated for upper respiratory infection; he became non-compliant with his medication; and he was cachexic (losing weight). Only after 27 years of the condition and three years of hospice care did he enter the terminal phase of the disease. There was no impairment of HM's nutritional status in the disallowed period. His functional capacity also was improved during the benefit period under review when compared with the two years of hospice care preceding the audit period. Likewise, there was dramatic improvement in HM's ability to handle ADLs. By September 2009, HM was able to move from hospice inpatient care to a private residence. Although HM suffered from a chronic illness, the medical records fail to show that he entered into the end-stage of HIV/AIDS prior to the last benefit period. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that HM was not eligible for hospice services for the period of September 1, 2009, through March 21, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $27,597.90. Recipient 6 LH was a 52-year-old female at the time she was admitted to hospice. Suncoast assigned a diagnosis of end-stage lung cancer. The period in dispute is July 29, 2011, through March 16, 2012. LH had a good appetite, and although she experienced some weight loss, her nutritional status during her hospice stay improved as evidenced by her rising albumin level. The medical records do not document incidences of difficulty breathing, which would be an expected occurrence in a terminal lung cancer recipient. LH's breathing capacity negated a terminal diagnosis. The medical records noted that she worked as a hairdresser. A terminal cancer recipient likely would be unable to manage that kind of work. LH was able to perform her ADLs and even work throughout the audit period and had a stable PPS score. The medical records did not evidence progression of the disease. On March 16, 2012, LH was discharged from hospice care in order to seek aggressive cancer treatment. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that LH was not eligible for hospice services for the period of July 29, 2011, through March 16, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $33,255.19. Recipient 7 The dispute concerning RM was withdrawn by AHCA during the hearing. Therefore, AHCA is not entitled to the alleged overpayment of $49,193.46. Recipient 8 LM was a 43-year-old female at the time she was admitted to hospice on November 8, 2006 (pre-audit period). She was assigned a diagnosis of debility, unspecified. The period in dispute is September 1, 2009, to June 18, 2010. In total, she received three and one-half years of hospice care for her illness. A diagnosis of debility means that a recipient experiences weakness that is so severe that he/she cannot feed themselves or complete their own ADLs. Although LM had a number of comorbid conditions, they were stable. LM had a history of infection but always was treatable with oral antibiotics. She did not have any hospitalizations during the relevant period. LM's nutritional status was not impaired; her weight varied from 206 to 242 pounds; and her albumin level ranged from 2.4 to 3.6, the latter reading within the normal range. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that LM was not eligible for hospice services for the period of September 1, 2009, to June 18, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $39,759.75. Recipient 9 MK was a 25-year-old female when she was admitted to Suncoast on April 7, 2011, with a terminal diagnosis of alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver. The dates in dispute are June 8, 2011, through November 4, 2011. At the first approved hospice period, and immediately preceding it, MK had an International Normalized Ratio of 2.6. By June 2011, and the next period, a disallowed period, she had improved to 1.3. The lower score signifies improvement in liver function. Likewise, MK's albumin level steadily improved from 1.9 pre-hospice to 2.4 in the approved initial period and then to 2.6 in June of 2011. While still an abnormal score, the higher albumin score denotes improved liver function. Her weight was stable during the final disallowed period. There also was evidence in these periods that MK no longer suffered from ascites, a build-up of fluid in the abdomen, and that she had stopped drinking. This action towards sobriety improved her prognosis. A nurse's note for June 14, 2011, one week into the disallowed period, states that "nutrition is adequate." MK's functional status continued to improve throughout her hospice admission. By the beginning of the disallowed periods, she began to feel stronger. By June 13, 2011, she only needed some help with mobility but was otherwise independent in her ADLs. By July 2011, she was well enough to perform yard work and was soon walking her dog and riding a bicycle. During the disallowed periods there was no evidence that MK had entered the end-stage of liver disease. In fact, near the end of the benefit period, Suncoast discharged her for extended prognosis. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that MK was not eligible for hospice services for the period from June 8, 2011, through November 4, 2011. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $21,241.55. Recipient 10 CD was a 52-year-old male upon admission to hospice with a diagnosis of malignant neoplasm of the kidney. The contested dates of service are August 25, 2010, to February 15, 2012. CD's medical records did not evidence progression of the disease. The computed tomography (CT) scans reflect that from January 2010 to June 2010 the mass in his kidney had not changed in size. A scan in December 2011 reflects that there were "no significant changes to the renal mass." CD never had a biopsy to confirm the diagnosis. CD's weight was stable. There was no impairment to the nutritional status. In addition, CD was functioning so well he was able to ride his bicycle and even attend a wedding on the beach. After seven recertifications, Suncoast finally discharged him as stabilized and with an extended prognosis on February 15, 2012. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that CD was not eligible for hospice services for the period of August 25, 2010, to February 15, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $76,855.33. Recipient 11 SR was a 62-year-old female at the time of her admission to Suncoast on January 15, 2010, with a diagnosis of malignant neoplasm of the anus. Only one benefit period, from January 15, 2010, through April 14, 2010, is in dispute. SR continued to have chemotherapy and radiation therapy throughout this benefit period. Aggressive radiation therapy and surgery are not palliative care. After only four days into the benefit period, Suncoast's hospice physician could not state that her condition mandated a terminal prognosis, labeling it instead as "uncertain." There was no clinical progression of the terminal disease. SR never entered the end-stage of a chronic disease and she was discharged from hospice for extended prognosis on April 14, 2010. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that SR was not eligible for hospice services for the period of January 15, 2010, through April 14, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $12,298.50. Recipient 12 SC was a 60-year-old female at the time of her admission to hospice. She was given a diagnosis of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). The benefit period in dispute is December 7, 2009, through August 27, 2010. The severity of COPD depends on the patient. Some patients may live 15 to 20 years with this diagnosis. SC continued to be responsive to treatment. Her functional capacity was stable as evidenced by her PPS score of 50 to 60 percent. Her nutritional status was stable as evidenced by her weight and ability to eat a normal diet. She was alert and oriented; there was no progression of her oxygen requirements; and her oxygen saturation rate improved. The recipient was finally discharged as stabilized with an extended prognosis on August 27, 2010. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that SC was not eligible for hospice services for the period of December 7, 2009, through August 27, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $36,075.60. Recipient 14 The overpayment dispute as to recipient 14 was withdrawn by AHCA at the hearing. Therefore, AHCA is not entitled to the alleged overpayment of $24,898.50. Recipient 15 MBH was a 51-year-old female at the time of her admission to Suncoast on November 9, 2010, with a terminal diagnosis of alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver. The period in dispute is November 9, 2010, through June 30, 2011. The laboratory reports for MBH do not support a terminal prognosis. Her laboratory results were only "mildly abnormal" and "moderate," but not terminal. There was no evidence supporting an impaired nutritional status related to the terminal process or functional decline. MBH lived at her home alone and was able to handle her medications. Even with a previous head injury in her medical history, there was no evidence of a decline in mentation. She was independent in the five ADLs. And while there was some evidence of hepatic encephalopathy pre-admission, a typical symptom of end-stage liver disease, the initial hospice summary upon admission stated that it was "improving." The medical records fail to show that MBH had entered the end-stage of liver disease. There was no variceal bleeding, another typical symptom of end-stage liver disease. Whatever minor symptoms of hepatic encephalopathy existed preadmission had resolved, and her mentation and levels of consciousness were fine. She had stopped drinking alcohol. MBH never entered the end-stage of a chronic disease, and she was discharged from hospice for extended prognosis on June 30, 2010. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that MBH was not eligible for hospice services for the period of November 9, 2010, through June 30, 2011. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $32,916.78. Recipient 16 DD was a 55-year-old female at the time of her admission to Suncoast on May 3, 2012, with a diagnosis of COPD. The denied dates at issue are May 3, 2012, through December 31, 2012, the end of the audit period. A review of DD's medical record, including assessment, laboratory, and radiological studies, does not support the terminal prognosis. On April 12, 2012, immediately prior to the admission to hospice, a chest x-ray revealed that her COPD was stable and there was no evidence of infection or other abnormalities. Near the end of her stay, DD had a normal blood gas reading, which is an unusually healthy rating for someone alleged to have end-stage COPD. She had no shortness of breath on admission. Any shortness of breath issues during her stay were being easily controlled with medication. There was no clinical progression of the disease. Her respiratory function was stable. DD did not suffer from any impaired nutritional status. Her weight was stable throughout the periods under review and she was able to eat without difficulty. DD's functional status also remained stable. She was able to ambulate independently. She was able to get out of her home to go shopping and for meals. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that DD was not eligible for hospice services for the period of May 3, 2012, through December 31, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $36,324.28. Recipient 17 TS was a 45-year-old female at the time of her admission to Suncoast on September 28, 2011, with a diagnosis of alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver. The denied dates at issue are October 16, 2011, through September 6, 2012. The first several weeks of the hospice period were approved by the auditors. Thereafter, TS's condition began to stabilize. Although TS was initially provided a high level of care at the hospice, she soon returned home and was independent in her ADLs. The laboratory and other studies in the medical records do not support the terminal prognosis or a clinical progression of a terminal disease. There was no sign of variceal bleeding, bacterial peritonitis, or jaundice, all symptoms associated with end-stage liver disease. There is no evidence to support a finding that TS had an impaired nutritional status related to a terminal illness. There was no recent decline in functional status. In addition, by October 18, 2011, TS was independent in her ADLs, and she had no difficulty with walking, shopping, or even in sweeping her front steps. The evidence supports a finding that TS was seeking more aggressive care, and not palliative hospice care. TS never entered the end-stage of the disease after October 2011. Suncoast was well aware of her positive progress and stability. On July 11, 2012, Suncoast was planning her discharge notwithstanding the recertification on July 24, 2012. She was discharged for extended prognosis on September 6, 2012. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that TS was not eligible for hospice services for the period of October 16, 2011, through September 6, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $47,316.90. Recipient 18 CC was a 62-year-old female at the time of her admission to Suncoast on September 3, 2009, with a diagnosis of pancytopenia. The diagnosis was changed on April 1, 2010, to alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver. The dates in dispute are from September 3, 2009, through September 28, 2010. The laboratory results and other medical studies in the record do not support a terminal prognosis. There was no proof of clinical progression of the disease. Indeed, Suncoast's own records reflect otherwise. For example, a report from CC's Interdisciplinary Team on March 2, 2010, reflects that Suncoast was already planning a "possible discharge." A clinical note by a hospice physician dated April 1, 2010, stated that the "patient has improved significantly and may be approaching a time where she no longer needs hospice." A summary report on June 28, 2010, stated that the "patient appears to be stabilized in her disease progression." The record as a whole does not warrant a finding of functional decline. CC had an active social life, including participation in line dancing. An activity such as line dancing is not consistent with someone suffering from hepatic encephalopathy. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that CC was not hospice-eligible for the period of September 3, 2009, through September 28, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $46,955.78. Recipient 19 SP was a 48-year-old male at the time of his admission to hospice on February 6, 2009, prior to the audit period. He was given a diagnosis of chronic airway obstruction (the same as COPD). The contested dates of admission are September 1, 2009, to September 28, 2010. He was in hospice care in excess of 18 months. COPD is a chronic illness. There are different classifications of COPD: mild, moderate, severe, and very severe. Even though SP was classified as having moderate COPD disease, he was able to achieve 97 percent oxygen saturation without any supplementation. An end-stage COPD patient would have increased oxygen needs. SP had a Body Mass Index (BMI) in the normal range throughout the period. Therefore, there was no impaired nutritional status attributable to a terminal process. There were no hospitalizations or ongoing infections in the medical record during the disputed period. SP was able to live on his own, an indication of his high functional status, and to perform such tasks as ambulating, moving, shopping, and preparing meals. An end-stage COPD patient would experience difficulty ambulating or doing these simple tasks. There was no clinical progression of SP's symptoms in the medical records. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that SP was not eligible for hospice services for the period of September 1, 2009, to September 28, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $49,598.55. Recipient 20 DG was a 59-year-old female upon admission to hospice. She was given the diagnosis of liver cirrhosis. The contested periods of hospice admission are from April 22, 2011, to January 22, 2012, when the recipient died. DG was able to complete some ADLs. Her weight was stable and her nutritional status was adequate. DG suffered a hip fracture shortly before she died on January 22, 2012. While AHCA contends that being bed-bound increased her mortality rate, and is the cause of death, it is more likely that DG died from her end-stage liver disease than the hip fracture. There is less than a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding that DG was not eligible for hospice services for the period of April 22, 2011, until January 22, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is not entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $48,188.68. Recipient 21 RM was a 46-year-old male when he was admitted to Suncoast on February 2, 2012, with the diagnosis of HIV disease. The period in dispute is the entire hospice stay from February 2, 2012, through October 4, 2012. There is a lack of physician assessments and laboratory, radiological, or other studies to support a terminal prognosis. RM was HIV-positive since 1986, but he was non- compliant with the antiretroviral therapy recommended for HIV/AIDS patients. He had psychological and substance abuse issues that contributed to the poor control of the disease, but these issues did not cause terminality. There is no credible evidence that RM had an impaired nutritional status related to the disease. He tolerated oral intake. There was no recent decline in functional status. RM was independent in his ADLs in February 2012 and August 2012 and his PPS numbers steadily increased. The medical record fails to show specific documentation that RM had entered the end-stage of AIDS. He continued to use and abuse illegal substances. Hospice care ended when RM decided to relocate to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that RM was not eligible for hospice services for the period of February 2, 2012, through October 4, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $46,624.85. Recipient 22 DJ was a 59-year-old male when he was first admitted to Suncoast on September 6, 2011, with the diagnosis of malignant neoplasm of intrahepatic bile ducts. Three separate periods of admission are in dispute: September 6, 2011, to September 23, 2011; October 10, 2011, to January 20, 2012; and February 9, 2012, to December 31, 2012 (end of audit period). The medical records support a finding that DJ's cancer was stable. His oncologist's report of October 11, 2011 (at the beginning of his second admission following a trip to Kentucky) reflects that his CT scan from August 2011 "reveals stable disease." By April 2012, the pathology reports "revealed no evidence of malignancy." His weight, while low, fluctuated between the mid-90s and 110 pounds during the entire 16-month period of hospice admissions. All of the objective signs for this patient point to stability of the disease. There was no showing of nutritional impairment. Just before his initial admission, his albumin reading was normal at 3.6. There was an improvement in his functional status over time, reaching 80 to 90 percent in January 2012. DJ lived alone the entire period and was independent in his ADLs. DJ never entered the end-stage of a terminal disease. In January 2012, he was discharged for extended prognosis. On February 8, 2012, DJ visited his oncologist who stated that he "need[s] to be readmitted, needs pain management ASAP," and that "[w]e will re-enroll him back at hospice." The readmission occurred the next day. Long-term management of pain in a chronic disease is inconsistent with the purpose of hospice. This improper admission was compounded by recertifications in May, August, October, and December 2012. The audit period ended December 31, 2012, and DJ was finally discharged on February 9, 2013. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that DJ was not eligible for hospice services for the periods of September 6, 2011, to September 23, 2011; October 10, 2011, to January 20, 2012; and February 9, 2012, to December 31, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $64,914.98. Recipient 23 VH was a 48-year-old female when she was admitted to Suncoast on June 9, 2009, prior to the start of the audit period, with the diagnosis of alcoholic liver cirrhosis. There are three separate periods of admission, but only the periods December 22, 2010, through January 4, 2011; and August 31, 2011, through August 21, 2012, are in dispute. There is no support in the record for the very brief, two-week admission that began on December 22, 2010. In fact, Suncoast recognized its error and discharged her. The Discharge Summary and Order states that VH "[d]oes not want EOL [end of life] support, care," and "[p]atient desires aggressive treatment not consistent with palliative care." The medical records do not support a terminal illness in the other disputed period. There is no record of a continued progression of end-stage liver disease. There are indications in the record that VH had quit drinking and was seeing improvement. Her liver disease was managed properly. There was no showing of a recently impaired nutritional status or a decline in VH's functional abilities. She never entered a true end-stage to her liver disease. Although she was recertified four more times in February, April, June, and August 2012, VH finally was discharged as not meeting hospice criteria on August 21, 2012. The evidence supports a finding that Suncoast engaged in the provision of long-term care for a chronic illness as opposed to providing Medicaid approved end-of-life care. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that VH was not eligible for hospice services for the periods of December 22, 2010, to January 4, 2011; and August 31, 2011, to August 21, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $57,644.89. Recipient 24 TF was a 62-year-old male when he was admitted to Suncoast on January 17, 2011, with the diagnosis of renal failure. The disputed period is January 17, 2011, through August 5, 2011. There was no clinical progression of end-stage renal failure. TF continued to improve throughout the hospice period. His functional status steadily improved. There is no documentation in the medical record to show that he had an impaired nutritional status due to his kidney problems. Nothing in TF's medical record supports a finding that he had entered the end-stage of renal failure. Although TF was recertified twice, notwithstanding the documented improvement, he finally was discharged as stabilized and with an extended prognosis on August 5, 2011. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that TF was not eligible for hospice services for the period January 17, 2011, through August 5, 2011. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $28,274.67. Recipient 26 NP was a 56-year-old female at the time she first was admitted to hospice on August 21, 2009. Suncoast assigned an end-stage diagnosis of metastatic lung cancer, including a mass in the adrenal gland. The periods in dispute are April 5, 2010, to June 7, 2010; August 10, 2010, to November 10, 2010; and December 2, 2010, to July 31, 2011. Follow-up imaging did not show growth of the mass in the adrenal gland. The medical records also failed to show any active evidence of the disease. On November 21, 2010, her tibial lesion had no evidence of disease. Another bone scan showed there was no active metastasis. A CT scan showed there was no active metastasis in the brain. Due to the lack of metastasis in the head, brain, and pelvis, there was no evidence of the metastasis of the cancer. Metastatic cancer is aggressive, but, according to hospice records, NP did not require oxygen supplementation and was able to breathe room air. Respiratory compromise would be an expected symptom in a recipient with aggressive lung cancer. NP's nutritional status was not compromised as her weight ranged from 210 to 225 pounds. For most of the period, NP was able to live alone, drive her car, and run errands. NP had a dyspnea score of zero, and with lung cancer, one would expect to see the clinical effects of the disease affecting her ability to breathe, which was not present here. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that NP was not eligible for hospice services for the periods April 5, 2010, to June 7, 2010; August 10, 2010, to November 10, 2010; and December 2, 2010, to July 31, 2011. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $77,524.36. Recipient 27 RH was a 49-year-old male at the time of first admission to Suncoast in October 2010, with a terminal diagnosis of alcohol cirrhosis of liver. Hepatitis C was a comorbid condition. The audit period dates in dispute are October 4, 2010, through May 8, 2011. During the disputed hospice period, there was no clinical progression of RH's chronic liver disease, he did not experience an impaired nutritional status or decline in functional status, and there was no documentation to demonstrate that he entered the end-stage of a chronic disease. RH was independent in his activities of daily living, and he ran errands. Likewise, the medical records document many leaves of absence (LOA), where RH left the hospice residential facility, often overnight, for recreational and entertainment purposes, including LOAs on April 2, 3, 9-10, 11, 16-17, 22-23, 29, and 30, 2011, and May 13-15 and 18, 2011. Taken as a whole, the medical evidence fails to show, either at admission or during the disputed hospice period, that RH had a terminal illness with a prognosis of six months or less if the illness were to progress at a normal course. Near the end of the benefit period, Suncoast decided the patient should be discharged for extended prognosis. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that RH was not eligible for hospice services for the period of October 4, 2010, through May 18, 2011. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $40,196.30. Recipient 29 MJ was a 59-year-old female when she was admitted to Suncoast on June 2, 2011, with malignant neoplasm of the colon. Two separate periods, June 2, 2011, through April 18, 2012; and June 11, 2012, through July 5, 2012, are in dispute. A CT scan taken on October 9, 2011, showed that MJ's tumor had been reduced in size and was not indicative of a progression in a terminal illness. The same scan showed that "there were other nodular densities which were indicative of the malignancy [and] were either unchanged or appeared to be stable compared to a prior study." There was no clinical progression of the disease, and the medical record as a whole reflected stability. When MJ was discharged after the first admission period, the Discharge Summary stated that she was stabilized. In addition, MJ was seeking a reversal of her colostomy, which Suncoast recognized as an aggressive treatment. This procedure was aggressive and not palliative care and thus incompatible with hospice care. There is nothing in the medical records to show recent impaired nutritional status related to a terminal process. MJ was at all times able to tolerate nutrition. Likewise, there was no decline in functional status. The medical records also reflect improvement in her functional capacity. MJ was independent in ADLs, worked in a craft booth at a flea market and then at a thrift store, and was able to do her laundry. MJ voluntarily left the hospice to pursue aggressive treatment for her disease. She eventually was discharged from the second admission when she moved to Missouri. The Discharge Summary noted that MJ "is not transferring to a hospice there due to her plan to continue chemotherapy which is not allowed under Missouri hospice protocol." The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that MJ was not eligible for hospice services for the period June 2, 2011, through April 18, 2012, and June 11, 2012, through July 5, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $52,223.92. Recipient 30 VG was a 52-year-old male at the time of first admission to Suncoast in July 2011, with a terminal diagnosis of malignant neoplasm of right tonsil (tonsillar cancer). The dates of July 21, 2011, through May 15, 2012; and July 18, 2012, through December 31, 2012, are in dispute. VG's medical records reflect he was diagnosed with cancer of his right tonsil in January 2011; he did not receive treatment for his tonsil cancer until at least March 2011; and by then, the cancer had spread to a single lymph node. By the time he was first admitted to hospice on July 21, 2011, he had been receiving laser/radiation treatments for his tonsillar cancer for several months. VG was scheduled to continue receiving laser/radiation treatments for at least one more week; and following the completion of the laser/radiation treatments, he was scheduled to start receiving chemotherapy to treat his cancer. Previously homeless, VG moved in with his friend, Linda, who was a certified nurse's assistant. Linda was VG's primary caregiver and support person. As his primary caregiver, Linda performed activities for VG like disconnecting and flushing the lines/tubes used to administer medications to him. An oncologist treated VG's tonsillar cancer. The record reflects his cancer treatments before and during the first hospice admission caused his cancer to be undetectable or eliminated. With the tonsillar cancer and cancer of the single lymph node resolved, a new area of concern at the base of VG's tongue, which turned out to be cancer, was seen on a positron emission tomography scan. He was discharged from hospice to have the lesion/tumor at the base of his tongue surgically removed. Suncoast discharged him to have the cancer surgery because it was considered aggressive care, and Suncoast could not pay for it under palliative care. Suncoast readmitted VG on July 18, 2012, after he had surgery to remove the lesion from his tongue. VG's admitting terminal diagnosis was malignant neoplasm of tonsil with comorbidities of malignant neoplasm of tongue, unspecified, and adult failure to thrive. Taken as a whole, the evidence fails to show VG had a terminal condition because he was being monitored closely by an oncologist and ear/nose/throat surgeon who provided aggressive treatments, including laser/radiation, chemotherapy, and surgery, that changed the trajectory or normal course of his illness by improving his prognosis. While this aggressive treatment likely saved VG's life, it undermines the purpose of hospice and precludes hospice admission for the recipient. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that VG was not eligible for hospice services for the periods July 21, 2011, through May 15, 2012; and July 18, 2012, through December 31, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $77,949.39. Recipient 33 AA was a four-year-old male who was admitted to the hospice with a terminal diagnosis of Ohtahara Syndrome (a seizure disorder). The audit period dates in dispute are September 1, 2009, through October 9, 2009; April 12, 2010, through June 23, 2010; and June 28, 2010, through September 25, 2010. AA's albumin level, recorded on one date, June 28, 2010, was in the low to normal range at 3.2. His weight, recorded only on two occasions, April 12, 2010, at 35 pounds, and June 28, 2010, at 33 pounds, also was stable. AA's PPS remained between 30 and 40 percent when it was recorded on April 12, 2010, and June 28, 2010. He regularly attended a special school except when he had acute episodes of seizures or aspiration pneumonia. AA's functional capacity remained low, and he was fed with a feeding tube, except during acute episodes when he experienced aspiration pneumonia. Patients with minimal or no functional capacity, such as stroke patients and brain-dead patients, can live for years with feeding tubes. When AA experienced acute episodes of seizures, aspiration (pneumonia), and acid reflux, he was treated aggressively each time and stabilized, rather than just left to progress to death. AA utilized the Medicaid hospice benefit as a rehabilitation program to help him get stronger after acute episodes. This utilization of hospice for rehabilitation purposes is not consistent with the spirit of hospice. Taken as a whole, the medical records fail to show that he had a terminal illness with a life expectancy of six months or less if the illness were to progress at a normal course at the beginning of the disputed hospice dates or at any point during the hospice stay. Near the end of the benefit period, Suncoast discharged him for extended prognosis. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that AA was not eligible for hospice services for the periods of September 1, 2009, through October 9, 2009; April 12, 2010, through June 23, 2010; and June 28, 2010, through September 25, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $27,597.90. Recipient 34 NI was a 78-year-old female upon admission to hospice. Suncoast assigned the diagnosis of congestive heart failure. The contested dates of service are May 14, 2012, to November 27, 2012. NI was given a New York Heart Association (NYHA) classification III during the contested dates of service. There are four stages in the NYHA classification system for congestive heart failure, ranked I to IV, with I being the mildest and IV being the most severe. She had an ejection fraction of 52 percent, slightly below a normal score of 55 percent. Her BMI was 21.5, which showed her nutritional status was adequate. Her weight ranged from 121 to 143 pounds during the relevant period. Any pains NI experienced were controlled by medications. By contrast, a terminal recipient often experiences pains so severe as to be untreatable with medications. As time progressed, NI was complaining of shortness of breath, but this was treated with oxygen. At other times, her oxygen saturation level was 97 or 98 percent on room air. NI also had a relatively high PPS of 50 percent and an albumin level of 3. She was able to complete her ADLs and eventually was discharged from hospice because of her improved condition. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that NI was not eligible for hospice services for the period of May 14, 2012, to November 27, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $28,020.38. Recipient 35 SE was a 51-year-old male when he was admitted to Suncoast on July 31, 2009 (pre-audit), with a diagnosis of unspecified chronic liver disease. The periods September 1, 2009, through January 15, 2010; and July 5, 2011, through August 21, 2012, are in dispute. In SE's first admission in 2009, the serial assessments and laboratory studies relate primarily to nutritional values. His albumin rates all generally were considered to be low, but they do not denote a terminal prognosis. There was no clinical progression to a terminal disease. SE never entered the end-stage of liver disease. Suncoast finally discharged SE as stabilized and with an extended prognosis on January 15, 2010. The second admission period also fails to satisfy the requirements for Medicaid hospice care. There was no clinical progression. As early as September 6, 2011, SE's records note he was "stable." His condition was "status quo" at the next recertification on September 28, 2011. On August 21, 2012, after five recertifications, SE was discharged as stabilized and with an extended prognosis. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that SE was not eligible for hospice services for the period September 1, 2009, through January 15, 2010; and July 5, 2011, through August 21, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $83,122.26. Recipient 36 JS was a 61-year-old male during the relevant admission to hospice. He was assigned a diagnosis of neoplasm of the liver. The contested hospice admission is November 19, 2009, to May 11, 2010. A biopsy was not administered on this patient before he was diagnosed with terminal liver cancer. Without that information, it would be difficult to decide if a recipient was terminal. Although JS had an elevated carcinoembryonic antigen level, this also may be found in benign forms of cancer, so that a single elevated laboratory value alone is not a sufficient indication of terminality. According to the hospice records, JS was able to ambulate to the beach and find a girlfriend, and he even considered joining a gym. His ability to ambulate shows his ability to function. JS had an adequate nutritional status and his weight was approximately 217 pounds. During the relevant period, he gained eight pounds. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that JS was not eligible for hospice services for the period of November 19, 2009, to May 11, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $23,777.10. Recipient 37 JF was a 61-year-old male at the time of first admission to Suncoast in January 2010, with a terminal diagnosis of congestive heart failure. The audit period dates of January 16, 2010, through November 1, 2010, are in dispute. During the April 16, 2010, through July 14, 2010, benefit period, and the July 15, 2010, through September 12, 2010, benefit period, Suncoast records reflected JF was NYHA class IV. A patient with class IV symptoms would have severe physical limitations, with symptoms of being uncomfortable and in pain occurring even at rest. However, during these periods, JF had outings, including trips on a handicap-equipped sailboat, which he was able to steer. Suncoast records do not reflect a NYHA classification of less than class III for this recipient. A person suffering from either NYHA class III or IV symptoms would not be able to perform the activities JF performed. Further, at the time of his discharge from hospice, his last functional capacity was measured at NYHA class IV, which is inconsistent with his much higher level of functioning and inconsistent with a discharge from hospice. Taken as a whole, the evidence fails to show that JF had a terminal diagnosis with a life expectancy of six months or less if the illness were to progress at a normal course at admission or at any point during the hospice stay. Near the end of the benefit period, Suncoast discharged him for extended prognosis after he was evaluated by a cardiologist for the first time during his hospice admission. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that JF was not eligible for hospice services for the period of January 16, 2010, through November 1, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $37,756.35. Recipient 38 JM was a 44-year-old male at the time of first admission to Suncoast in February 2010, with a terminal diagnosis of HIV. The dates in dispute are February 17, 2010, through August 15, 2010. JM's medical records reflect he was admitted to Morton Plant Hospital (MPH) on February 4, 2010, with anorexia, weight loss, depression, and confusion, and that during this admission, he was diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. An MRI of his brain showed abnormalities that suggested HIV encephalitis. The MPH doctors decided to continue to treat this condition with Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART), which already was being used to treat his newly diagnosed HIV/AIDS. At the beginning of his admission to Suncoast, JM made it clear to the hospice doctors that he wished to pursue "aggressive treatment no matter what the circumstances" for his HIV/AIDS and HIV encephalitis. He was seen and treated by an AIDS specialist. HAART is the standard of care for treatment of HIV and AIDS for patients who are not in hospice. It is common for individuals with HIV receiving HAART therapy to live for many years. JM's treatment with HAART was not palliative, and hospice was inappropriate for this recipient. The record reflects JM's laboratory studies, functional status, and mentation/orientation improved after he started HAART therapy. By June 24, 2010, it was noted JM was more talkative, ate an entire sandwich during a visit, and that he had been going out to stores with his significant other. On June 30, 2010, it was noted JM had been working with a physical therapist to stretch his hamstrings and straighten his neck, and that he wanted more independence from his significant other. On July 15, 2010, it was noted JM had been out on his scooter, he was going to make an effort to know his neighbors, and that he was thinking of getting a job. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that JM was not eligible for hospice services for the period February 17, 2010, through August 15, 2010. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment of $30,738.07. Recipient 39 LR was a 60-year-old male at the time of admission to Suncoast in September 2010, with a terminal diagnosis of cryptococcal meningitis. The audit period dates reviewed were September 22, 2010, through December 31, 2012. These dates are in dispute. LR had been admitted to Suncoast for two years and three months when the audit period ended and he remained in hospice care. His cryptococcal meningitis was diagnosed in February or March 2010. By the time he was admitted to hospice, he had been taking antifungal medications to treat this condition for seven months, and he continued taking antifungal medications throughout his hospice admission. The antifungal medications LR received before and throughout his hospice admission were aggressive treatments that stabilized his disease, improved his prognosis, and prolonged his life. This was consistent with LR's desire "to keep the fungus at a stable point to keep the symptoms down." Serial physician assessments and laboratory and radiological studies confirm that LR's disease was stabilized. Taken as a whole, the evidence fails to show LR had a terminal condition because he was treated and followed by an infectious disease doctor who provided an aggressive antifungal treatment regimen (not palliative) that changed the trajectory or normal course of his illness, improved his prognosis, and stabilized or improved his condition. While this aggressive therapy likely saved his life, it undermines the purpose of hospice and precludes hospice admission. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that LH was not eligible for hospice services for the period of September 22, 2010, through December 31, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $119,008.92. Recipient 40 DH was a 60-year-old female at the time of her most recent admission to Suncoast in June 2009, with a terminal diagnosis of heart disease. The audit period dates reviewed were September 1, 2009, through January 27, 2012. This period of service is in dispute. DH's medical record reflects she had been living with heart disease for more than ten years when she was admitted to hospice shortly before the beginning of the audit period. During the period of almost ten years preceding the end of the disputed hospice period, DH was admitted to Suncoast for her conditions at least four times and later was discharged. By the time she was discharged from hospice on January 27, 2012, with an extended prognosis, after more than a two and one-half year hospice admission, she had been in Suncoast for her heart disease for approximately eight of the last ten years. While Suncoast records showed DH was functioning at NYHA class III and IV throughout the disputed hospice period, meaning that either she was comfortable only at rest or she was uncomfortable even at rest, her activities demonstrate she had a much greater functional status than class III and IV. For example, the record reflects that she was active and independent in her ADLs throughout most of the disputed hospice stay, including going to the grocery store and shopping for a wedding dress with her granddaughter; she went on overnight and out-of- state trips, homeschooled a grandchild, prepared meals for her family and cleaned her home; she did in-home office work related to her husband's window business; and she organized and helped prepare her home for sale. Taken as a whole, the evidence fails to show she had a terminal condition with a life expectancy of six months or less if the illness were to progress at a normal course. Near the end of the benefit period, Suncoast decided DH should be discharged for extended prognosis. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that DH was not eligible for hospice services for the period of September 1, 2009, through January 27, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $122,535.20. Recipient 42 LL was a 58-year-old male at the time of his second admission to Suncoast in November 2011, with a terminal diagnosis of malignant carcinoid tumor of the jejunum (cancer of the intestine). Liver disease was a comorbid condition. The audit period dates reviewed were November 26, 2010, through August 12, 2011; and November 10, 2011, through February 7, 2012. AHCA peers approved the dates of the first admission, but the second admission remains in dispute. LL was discharged from hospice during the first admission because his liver disease was responsive to treatment, resulting in an extended prognosis. Suncoast records reflect that between his first and second admissions, LL was hospitalized for abdominal pain and an exacerbation of his chronic liver disease. However, Suncoast did not provide any medical records from this hospitalization or from LL's doctors and medical providers during the disputed hospice period. The information concerning his hospitalization and related treatment comes from Suncoast's records, which simply recount what the missing records purportedly depict. LL's medical history preceding his second hospice admission reflects his chronic liver disease was responsive to treatment and was not a terminal condition with a life expectancy of six months or less if the disease were to progress at a normal course. Also, during his second hospice period, LL's chronic liver disease was not considered a terminal condition. Instead, the cancerous tumor in the intestine was the admitting terminal diagnosis, and alcoholic cirrhosis of liver was listed as a co- existing or comorbid diagnosis/condition. Taken as a whole, the evidence fails to show that LL had a terminal illness with a prognosis of six months or less if the illness were to progress at a normal course. Near the end of the benefit period, less than three months after his second hospice admission, Suncoast decided LL should be discharged for extended prognosis. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that LL was not eligible for hospice services for the period of November 10, 2011, through February 7, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $14,023.26. Recipient 43 TGM was a 49-year-old female at the time of her admission to Suncoast in March 2011, with a terminal diagnosis of alcoholic liver damage. The audit period dates reviewed were March 18, 2011, through January 11, 2012. This period of service is in dispute. TGM was acutely ill when she was hospitalized on January 31, 2011 (before she was admitted to hospice). However, her physician assessments and laboratory studies did not indicate a terminal process or progression of a terminal disease; her weight remained stable and even increased; and her functional status remained stable and actually improved. The record reflects that during the disputed hospice period, TGM did things like reschedule a hospice visit because she was going out to lunch, take a walk around a park, go out to get her hair done, and attend one of her son's basketball games. On June 8, 2011, within three months of her hospice admission, hospice staff discussed not recertifying the patient (and discharging her) because her condition was stable. These discussions continued throughout the remainder of the year. Suncoast eventually discharged TGM on January 11, 2012, for extended prognosis. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that TGM was not eligible for hospice services for the period March 18, 2011, through January 11, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $42,616.09. Recipient 44 TEM was a 52-year-old male at the time of first admission to Suncoast in August 2011, with a terminal diagnosis of alcoholic cirrhosis of liver. Malignant neoplasm of the anus (anal cancer) was a comorbid condition. The audit period dates reviewed were August 23, 2011, through April 15, 2012. The dates in dispute are August 23, 2011, through February 8, 2012. While TEM had abnormal laboratory values, appeared to be malnourished, and was anemic, these are common findings in patients with liver disease or liver cirrhosis, but they do not indicate the liver disease is terminal. Further, hospital records from two and one-half weeks before TEM's hospice admission describe his medical history, including that he had chronic liver disease that was responsive to treatment. A patient's liver disease that is responsive to treatment is not a terminal condition within a six-month period if the illness were to progress at a normal course. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that TEM was not eligible for hospice services for the period August 23, 2011, through February 8, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $24,441.83. Recipient 45 JA was a 61-year-old female at the time of first admission to Suncoast in February 2012, with a terminal diagnosis of malignant neoplasm of breast (breast cancer). The audit dates reviewed were February 1, 2012, through December 31, 2012. These dates are in dispute. During the disputed hospice period, physician assessments and laboratory and radiological studies showed JA's cancer was stable with no significant changes or signs of progression; she did not have an impaired nutritional status; and there was no decline in functional status. Serial physician assessments by JA's treating oncologist showed that her cancer was stable during the disputed hospice period. JA did not experience a decline in her functional status during the disputed hospice period. She remained physically active throughout the disputed hospice period. Her activities during this hospice period included swimming regularly, going on two cruises with her husband, going to see the Lipizzaner Stallions, and taking frequent outings. She remained independent in performing her ADLs. The greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that JA was not eligible for hospice services for the period February 1, 2012, through December 31, 2012. Therefore, AHCA is entitled to recover an overpayment amount of $48,636.42. Summary of Recipients and Total Overpayment Due to AHCA After removing the time periods related to recipients 7 and 14, which were resolved in Suncoast's favor during the hearing, and based on the findings regarding the disputed or partially disputed recipients above, Suncoast owes $1,646,672.10 for the 35 recipients with identified overpayments. Fine Calculation When calculating the appropriate fine to impose against a provider, the program uses a formula based on the number of claims that are in violation of rule 59G-9.070(7)(e), which was in effect during the audit period. Specifically, the formula involves multiplying the number of claims in violation of the rule by $1,000.00 to calculate the total fine. Each month of hospice care is a separate claim. The final total may not exceed 20 percent of the total overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order directing Suncoast to pay $1,646,672.10 for the claims found to be overpayments; and imposing a fine calculated pursuant to the formula, unless the Secretary determines the imposition of a fine is not in the best interest of the Medicaid program. The undersigned reserves jurisdiction to award investigative, legal, and expert costs to the prevailing party. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who is black, was hired by Respondent on September 28, 1987. Respondent is in the business of providing health care institutions with management personnel to supervise environmental-services employees of the institutions. The management personnel supplied by Respondent for the typical customer consist of an on-site director, assistant director, and several supervisors. Respondent hired Petitioner as a supervisor for assignment to Holmes Regional Medical Center (Holmes). At the time, Respondent had six employees working at Holmes. The responsibilities of a supervisor typically include the management of 10-25 persons. The management responsibilities require, among other things: 1) "daily informal walk-through inspections of each area"; 2) "formal written inspections of each area or the job supervised with the employee at least every month"; 3) "aggressive[ness] in becoming acquainted with all key hospital personnel"; 4) the "develop[ment of] a good professional relationship with each [key hospital employee]"; and 5) the recruitment of personnel to be hired by the customer for assignment to the supervisor's department. Petitioner had limited relevant experience before joining Respondent. Petitioner had operated his own janitorial business, but had limited experience in supervision. As was the case with all employees, Respondent provided Petitioner with a fairly extensive orientation and training process. Prior to assuming his supervisory responsibilities, Petitioner successfully completed the training program, although he showed signs of ignoring the Medi-Dyn way of doing things and adhering to the ways of his former janitorial business. On December 28, 1987, Petitioner received his three-month evaluation, which employed a five-point rating. Petitioner averaged ratings of about "3," but received "marginal" ratings of "4" in areas such as initiative, planning, development of subordinates, training effectiveness, administrative ability, organization, and personnel management. Petitioner was responsible for supervising various areas of Holmes, including certain outbuildings, primarily during the late-evening and early- morning shift. The condition of these areas did not improve following the three-month evaluation. On January 25, 1988, a Holmes representative sent Respondent's director, Jeff Wahlen, a memorandum listing several complaints concerning the cleanliness of the diagnostic services area, for which Petitioner was responsible. On February 4, 1988, a representative of a user of one of the outbuildings for which Petitioner was responsible sent Petitioner a letter expressing "deep concern and frustration over the highly unsatisfactory work by [Respondent] at our hospital." On February 8, 1988, the supervisor of the health and fitness area at the hospital sent Mr. Wahlen a memorandum complaining that the cleanliness of the health and fitness area, for which Petitioner was responsible, was "getting worse." On February 9, 1988, Mr. Wahlen sent a memorandum to Petitioner itemizing numerous ;operational concerns" and establishing deadlines for achieving corrections of the noted problems. All of these deadlines were within February. On February 10, 1988, a representative of the bloodmobile/donor center sent a memorandum to Mr. Wahlen objecting to the uncleanliness of their work areas. Mr. Wahlen met with Petitioner that day and discussed cleaning problems in the bloodmobile/donor center areas. On February 18, 1988, Mr. Wahlen sent Petitioner a follow-up memorandum. Mr. Wahlen reminded Petitioner that the February 9 memorandum required that several objectives should already have been satisfied, but Mr. Wahlen had not received confirmation that these matters had been taken care of. On February 29, 1988, the supervisor of the health and fitness center sent Petitioner a memorandum informing him that many items on checklists dating from the prior November had still not been addressed. She advised Petitioner that she was considering the termination of the center's contract with Respondent. On March 10, 1988, Petitioner received a six-month evaluation in which his performance was rated as marginal, and he was placed on probation for 45 days. Petitioner received various tasks that he was to complete during the probationary period. He subsequently completed a large number of them. From April 13-15, 1988, Alfred Tambolio, who is the national operations director for Respondent, conducted a hospital-wide audit of the Holmes facility. He found that the areas within Petitioner's responsibility were unclean and in unsatisfactory condition. A week or two later, Mr. Tambolio returned to Holmes for a follow-up inspection. While examining the operating room, for which Petitioner was responsible, a physician told Mr. Tambolio and Petitioner that the area was "filthy." Leaving the operating room, with which Petitioner had displayed insufficient familiarity, Mr. Tambolio asked Petitioner to take him to the labor and delivery area, for which Petitioner was also responsible. Petitioner was unable even to find the area, and they had to ask a hospital employee for directions. Numerous other problems surfaced and many problems previously identified by Mr. Tambolio had not been corrected. By memorandum dated May 13, 1988, Mr. Wahlen reviewed Mr. Tambolio's second visit and informed Petitioner that he was being terminated. Mr. Wahlen acknowledged that Petitioner had recently been recommended for a satisfactory evaluation, but that Mr. Wahlen had declined to approve the tentative evaluation. Mr. Wahlen explained that, in essence, Petitioner's realization of certain goals did not outweigh his failure to provide satisfactory service in many other respects. Respondent replaced Petitioner with a person of Hispanic origin. As of May 1, 1988, Respondent employed a total of five blacks, one Hispanic, and one American Indian among its 27 employees serving as supervisors, assistant directors, and directors. Two of the eight directors were black.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be dismissed. ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Arthur Dennis, pro se 792 Cecilia Street Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Lynn Dunning Vice President, Operations Medi-Dyn, Inc. 8400 East Prentice Avenue Suite 800 Englewood, Colorado 80111
The Issue Whether the numeric need for hospice programs in health planning subdistrict 6A for the March 2000, batching cycle should be one, as originally published by the Agency for Health Care Administration, or zero, as published in a revision of the original publication?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Hernando-Pasco Hospice, Inc., was formed in 1982 and commenced service in 1984. It is licensed to provide hospice services in Service Areas 3D and 5A, Hernando and Pasco Counties, respectively. On average, it serves 500 patients per day. Hernando-Pasco has three offices for the delivery of care in its service areas. It operates three hospice residential houses with a total of 23 beds. The houses are in Hudson, Dade City, and Spring Hill. Hernando-Pasco also operates an inpatient unit at a nursing home in Brooksville serving Hernando County. LifePath Hospice is a not-for-profit community organization founded in 1983. It is licensed to provide hospice services in two service areas, 6A and 6B. Service Area 6A is Hillsborough County. Service Area 6B is comprised of three counties: Polk, Highlands, and Hardee. LifePath serves 820 patients on an average daily basis. In calendar year 2000, it served 4,002 patients. LifePath provides hospice service without regard to the patient's ability to pay. The services are provided, moreover, regardless of the circumstances in which the patient is found so long as the patient is in Service Area 6A or 6B. For example, services are provided to the patient whether at home, in another residential setting, in an inpatient facility such as a hospital or even if homeless. In other words, LifePath provides hospice service to patients wherever the patient might be within LifePath's two service areas. Similarly, Hernando-Pasco Hospice provides its hospice services to hospice patients at home, in residential settings, and in in-patient settings. It does not matter in what setting the hospice patient is found at the time of the request for hospice services as long as the patient is located within the service areas where Hernando-Pasco Hospice is authorized to provide its services. Hernando-Pasco delivers services within its authorized service areas "wherever the patient may be." (Tr. 64). Hospice services are also delivered by Hernando-Pasco Hospice to the homeless, although requests by the homeless for hospice services tend to be few. As Mr. Taylor, CEO of Hernando- Pasco Hospice explained at hearing: Fortunately, the few of them [the "homeless"] are able to go to an adequate facility, but some of them prefer to live in cardboard boxes . . . things of that nature. We go where they are. * * * [I]f they want to be living in a cardboard box, we will take service to that cardboard box for them. (Tr. 248, 249). The Agency for Health Care Administration is the single state agency responsible for the administration of certificate of need laws in Florida. In conjunction with these duties, it determines semi-annually the net numeric need for new hospice programs pursuant to Rule 59C-1.0355, Florida Administrative Code ("the Rule.") Numeric Need Under The Rule Rule 59C-1.0355, Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Hospice Programs" was adopted on April 17, 1995. Its purpose is to ensure "the availability of hospice programs as defined in this rule to all persons requesting and eligible for hospice services, regardless of ability to pay." Rule 59C-1.033(1), Hernando-Pasco Ex. 9. The Rule establishes criteria and standards for assessing the need for new hospice programs. For determining whether a new hospice is needed in a service area, the Rule includes a numeric need formula. The numeric need formula contains two terms: "HPH" and "HP." "HPH" is defined as "the projected number of patients electing a hospice program in the service area during the 12- month period beginning at the planning horizon." (Hernando Ex. 9). "HP" is defined as "the number of patients admitted to hospice programs serving a service area during the most recent 12-month period ending on June 30 or December 31. (Id.) If the number of patients denoted as HPH exceeds the number denoted by HP by 350 or more, then a numeric need is indicated for the service area. The formula is expressed as: HPH - HP > 350 [Rule 59C-1.0355(4)(a), Hernando-Pasco Ex. 9]. The "350" figure in the Rule's numeric need formula "is a threshold value to determine whether any difference that may exist between HPH and HP rises to a significant level. It represents a minimum volume that would be associated with a hospice that would be large enough to be financially viable and still offer comprehensive services to the patients who request hospice care." (Tr. 782). AHCA's Calculation and First Fixed Need Pool Publication On July 12, 1999, LifePath submitted the first of two "Semi-annual Reports of Hospice Utilization" for calendar year 1999 to the Agency. The report showed a total of 1,406 new patients admitted by LifePath for the period January 1, 1999, through June 30, 1999. The first half of the year total was broken down for LifePath's two service areas; the number of admissions in Service Area 6A totaled 1,282, and the number of admissions in Service Area 6B totaled 124. The report is signed in a space for the administrator of LifePath to show that it had been reviewed and approved. On January 7, 2000, LifePath filed its second utilization report for calendar year 1999. The second semi- annual report, covering the period from July 1, 1999, through December 31, 1999, showed a total of 1,368 patients admitted for the second half of 1999. Also broken down into admissions by service area, the report indicated that 1,228 of the admissions were in Service Area 6A and 140 of the admissions were in Service Area 6B for the second half of 1999. This report also shows review and approval by a LifePath Administrator, in this second case, by Kathy L. Fernandez, LifePath's CEO. With the two utilization reports in hand, AHCA calculated numeric need for the two service areas served by LifePath pursuant to the Rule's formula. With regard to Service Area 6A, Hillsborough County, AHCA determined HPH to be 2,871. (The HPH figure for Hillsborough County is not in dispute in this proceeding.) Based on LifePath's utilization reports, AHCA determined HP for Service Area 6A, Hillsborough County, to be 2,510. Inserting these two figures into the appropriate places in the formula yielded a resulting difference of 360. Since the result was a positive difference of 350 or more, the result indicated a numeric need for one more hospice in Service Area 6A. Different Information The Agency prepared to publish a hospice fixed need pool of "one" for Service Area 6A on January 28, 2000. While preparation was underway, LifePath's CEO Ms. Fernandez was informed of what the publication would show. Surprised, she asked her staff to investigate the utilization data LifePath had submitted to AHCA. The investigation conducted, the results were reported to Ms. Fernandez. In Ms. Fernandez' words, she realized: there was an error. When [staff] ran a simple computer report for the admissions that were admitted in 6A and 6B, they came back and told me the numbers that they had run on the computer were different than the numbers that we turned into AHCA. (Tr. 609) According to the new computer-run numbers, LifePath had admitted 32 more patients during Calendar Year 1999 in Service Area 6A than it had reported. The difference in the new numbers and the ones reported to AHCA concerned hospice patients who had been admitted to LifePath while patients of hospitals located in Hillsborough County but whose permanent residences were outside Hillsborough County and, conversely, patients who had been reflected as 6A admissions but had been admitted while outside Hillsborough County. The new numbers reflected where patients were located at the time of admission as opposed to where the patients permanently resided. Forty patients were involved. Thirty-six of them had been admitted to LifePath while physically present in Service Area 6A, that is, at the time of admission, they were patients in Hillsborough County hospitals. Another four patients had been reported to have been admitted in Service Area 6A, but had actually been admitted while physically present in Service Area 6B. In consideration of location at time of admission rather than permanent residence or home as the patient's place of admission, the new numbers, therefore, showed a net change of 32 patients that in LifePath's view should have been regarded as Service Area 6A admissions above the reported number of Service Area 6A admissions. The utilization reports submitted to the Agency, unlike the new numbers, did not show admissions by location of the patient at the time of admission because the reports had determined admissions by which LifePath team had cared for the patients. The 36 patients admitted while in Hillsborough County hospitals but omitted from the utilization reports as 6A admissions had been cared for by LifePath's Rose Team, a team "geographically placed in 6B." (Tr. 610). They were counted in the reports, therefore, as 6B admissions without regard to the fact that the admissions had occurred at a moment when the patients were actually located in Service Area 6A as Hillsborough County hospital patients. The same was true of the four patients reported to have been 6A admissions. They were all physically located in Service Area 6B at the time of their admission. In each of these cases, the teams were assigned on the basis of the patient's home address at the time of admission rather than the patient's actual location at the time of admission. In light of the new numbers that reflected a different approach and an understanding of the difference between those numbers and the ones LifePath had submitted by way of the reports, LifePath concluded that its utilization reports had underreported 6A admissions for calendar year 1999 by 32 patients. Armed with this new information and what it viewed as a sounder approach to the reporting of admissions, LifePath set out to correct what it hoped AHCA would see as an error. On January 26, 2000, two days in advance of the scheduled publication of the fixed need pool for hospice programs in the State, LifePath caused to be hand-delivered to the Agency, a letter from its attorney. In pertinent part, the letter reads as follows: Enclosed . . . is correspondence and a packet of information . . . which notifies the Agency of mistakes . . . made in LifePath's last two [reports]. This information included Patient Data Sheets from LifePath's information system for 36 patients who were admitted and cared for in Service Area 6A (Hillsborough County), but who were mistakenly counted as Service Area 6B patients. Also, enclosed are Data Sheets for 4 patients who were admitted and cared for in Service Area 6B (Polk County), but who were mistakenly counted as Service Area 6A patients . . . . The error occurred when patients were mistakenly counted by nursing team (e.g., the Rose and Yellow teams), rather than strictly by geographic location of where the patient received his/her care. The net result will be an addition of 32 patients to Service Area 6A and a reduction of 32 patients from Service Area 6B. It is respectfully requested that, based upon this new information, your office correct the upcoming fixed need pool projection for Hospice Service Area 6A, scheduled to be published on January 28, 2000 and, instead of publishing a need for one (1) new hospice program in Service Area 6A, publish a need for zero (0) new hospice programs in Service Area 6A for the upcoming CON batching cycle. (Hernando-Pasco Ex. No. 15). The forty Patient Data Sheets attached to the letter bear the title "Patient Referral Data." Below the title is the time that the data was generated by the computer. All forty sheets were generated between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., the morning of January 26, 2000. As current location, 36 of the sheets list one of a number of hospitals in Hillsborough County. The majority of the sheets show the Moffitt Cancer Center as the patient's current location. Some data sheets of these 36 list other hospitals in Hillsborough County as the patient's current location: Tampa General Hospital, St. Joseph's Hospital, Brandon Regional Hospital, and South Florida Baptist Hospital. The other four data sheets list as "current location" either Lakeland Regional Medical Center in Polk County or Winter Haven Hospital in Polk County. The forty referral data sheets generated by LifePath's information system on January 26, 2000, were not produced in the customary format used by LifePath. They were reformatted to show the patient's location at the time of admission (termed "current location") and to omit the patient's permanent residence or home address. At hearing, LifePath's CEO candidly stated that the "Patient Referral Data" sheets were "altered . . . to show the [patient's] location at the time of admission." (Tr. 612). Some of the information remained the same on the sheets produced on January 26 as was customary. Just as Ms. Fernandez testified, for example, the 36 sheets that show a hospital in Hillsborough County as the current location list under "Team Code" the Rose Team, LifePath's team that serves Service Area 6B. The four that show Polk County as "current location" list the Yellow Team, the LifePath team that serves Hillsborough County or Service Area 6A, under "Team Code." The January 26 data sheets' use of the word "current" to describe the patient's location is a misnomer if applied to the date the information was generated. The 36 patients with Hillsborough County locations had passed away by January 26, 2000. On the other hand, the use of the word "current" is accurate if understood to mean the location at the time of the referral and admission, a use consistent with the title of the document as reflecting "referral" data. Response by the Agency The January 28, 2000, publication proceeded as planned without change. But, after receiving the information submitted by LifePath, AHCA published a second "Notice of Hospice Program Fixed Need Pool." This second publication appeared in Volume 26, Number 6 of the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 11, 2000. It indicated a revised net need for zero (0) hospice programs for Service Area 6A. As reflected by the revised publication, AHCA believed that the second publication correctly determined the net need for the service area to be zero. The determination is based upon the Agency's interpretation of Rule 59C-1.0355. As Mr. Gregg, Chief of the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation, for the Agency explained at hearing: [T]he rule . . . directs us to consider the place where the patient was prior to admission. * * * For people who have been . . . nursing home residents, or ALF residents, or in and out of hospitals prior to being admitted to a hospice, their actual residence may not be quite so clear. And so the interpretation is that it is the place from which they are referred. (Tr. 932, 933). With regard to the 36 patients originally reported as Service Area 6B admissions but who had been admitted while in a hospital in 6A, LifePath continued to provide hospice services to the patients after they returned to a location in Service Area 6B. LifePath's ability to admit in one service area and provide treatment later in a different service area makes this case somewhat unusual. There are few hospices in Florida that provide service in more than one service area. For that reason, the issues presented in this case have not surfaced in the past. The more common situation for when a patient is admitted in a hospital in one service area and provided hospice services there and then returns to a permanent residence in another service area would call for the patient to be admitted to two different hospices at two different times. In such a case, for the sake of consistency, the Agency "would want to see . . . an admission to the program in [the service area in which the hospital was located]" (Tr. 934) and then a second admission to the hospice in the service area in which the patient had permanent residence when the patient moved back home or to a location in the second service area. This expectation of the Agency, however, is not required by rule. It is one that apparently has emerged in the context of this case. LifePath's Transmission of Data to Hernando-Pasco On February 18, 2000, LifePath transmitted to Mr. Rodney Taylor, the Administrator of Hernando-Pasco Hospice, referral records for the same forty patients whose referral data sheets generated on the previous January 26 had been submitted to the Agency. In its cover letter to Mr. Taylor, Ms. Fernandez wrote on behalf of LifePath: I'm enclosing the referral records for the patients who were inadvertently mis- classified as to county of admission by LifePath in 1999. We found a few original referral records were not filed appropriately in the medical record, or in error, reflected the home address versus the hospital in which they were admitted. In those instances, I am attaching a portion of the Admission Assessment or Patient Information Sheet to which show the actual point of admission. As you know, if I run a current referral record, HPMS will show the patient's current address rather than the point of admission. (Hernando-Pasco Ex. 16). Unlike the Patient Referral Data generated January 26, the Patient Referral Data sheets sent to Mr. Taylor show that they were generated earlier, on various dates in 1999. Also dissimilar from the sheets produced on January 26 that had omitted "home address" and had shown only the location at the time of admission, moreover, the sheets provided Mr. Taylor show not only a "current location" or a location at the time of admission but also the patient's home address. No attempt was made by LifePath to hide the fact that the Patient Referral Data Sheets submitted to AHCA on January 26, 2000, had been generated on that same date rather than any earlier date as in the case of the information transmitted later to Mr. Taylor and Hernando-Pasco Hospice. The other main difference between the two sets of data submitted to the Agency and to Mr. Taylor, that is, the omission from the data submitted to AHCA of the patient's home address, was explained by Ms. Fernandez as an act done for the State's benefit, "so as not to confuse them." (Tr. 622.) Other Provisions of the Rule Rule 59C-1.0355 is an extensive rule. The Rule consists of ten subsections that cover an array of topics related to hospice programs. In addition to the provisions setting forth criteria for determination of numeric need, the rule contains a "definition" section, general provisions related to quality of care and conformance with statutory criteria, consistency with plans, required description of the program, construction and changes in licensed capacities of freestanding hospice facilities, and grandfathering provisions. Also included in the Rule is a statement of intent and pertinent to this proceeding, Subsection (9), which governs semi-annual utilization reports. Subsection (9) of the Rule states: Each hospice program shall report utilization information to the agency or its designee on or before July 20 of each year and January 20 of the following year. The July report shall indicate the number of new patients admitted during the 6-month period composed of the first and second quarters of the current year, the census on the first day of each month included in the report, and the number of patient days of care provided during the reported period. The January report shall indicate the number of new patients admitted during the 6-month period composed of the third and fourth quarters of the prior year, the census on the first day of each month included in the report, and the number of patient days of care provided during the reporting period. The following detail shall also be provided: For the number of new patients admitted: The 6-month total of admissions under age 65 and age 65 and over by type of diagnosis (e.g., cancer; AIDS). The number of admissions during each of the 6 months covered by the report, by service area of residence. For the patient census on April 1 or October 1, as applicable, the number of patients receiving hospice care in: A private home. An adult congregate living facility. A hospice residential unit. A nursing home. A hospital. (Hernando-Pasco Ex. 9, emphasis supplied). There is no definition of "service area of residence." The term "service area resident" is used extensively in the descriptions of the factors that make up HPH, "the projected number of patients electing a hospice program in the service area during the 12 month period beginning at the planning horizon." See Subsection (4)(a) of the Rule. HPH, however, is not in dispute in this proceeding. It is the other term in the formula that is in dispute: "HP." The Rule's definition of "HP" does not use the term "service area of residence." But the definition cross-references to Subsection reporting requirements: "(HP) is the number of patients admitted to hospice programs serving an area during the most recent 12-month period ending on June 30 or December 31. The number is derived from reports submitted under subsection (9) of the rule." Section (4)(a) of the Rule. The Agency interprets "service area of residence" not to mean the service area where the patient has a "permanent residence," but the service area which is the patient's "location at the time of admission." There are good reasons in support of the AHCA's interpretation. Hospitalized hospice patients come from a population that has been mobile. Some have permanent residences in foreign countries, other states (so-called "snowbirds") or in other counties in the state or different health planning service areas than the one in which they are hospitalized. Some hospice patients may have no permanent residence at all, as in the case of the homeless. To report as admissions only those who reside permanently in a service area in Florida by that service area and to not report the patient as an admission when admitted in the service area in which the patient is hospitalized or located at the time of admission would omit many admissions. As Mr. Gregg testified on behalf of the Agency, the numeric need formula produces the "most accurate projection of need by having the best data and the most complete data; therefore you would want every possible admission to be reported." (Tr. 958). An Additional Contention In addition to contending that the numbers originally reported by LifePath were correct for calculation of HP and that the later reported numbers may not be used for calculation of HP, Hernando-Pasco raises a second, fundamental issue. Hernando- Pasco contends that the 36 patients did not achieve the status of admission while in the hospital. According to Hernando-Pasco's line of thinking, if the patients were ever admitted to LifePath, it was not until after their return to Service Area 6B. To address these contentions, it is necessary to examine the admissions process used by LifePath, whether that process was applied to the 36 patients, and, ultimately, whether that process meets the legal requirements for hospice admission. LifePath's Admissions Process for the Hospitalized Patient Whether hospitalized or not, admission of a patient to LifePath commences with a physician order or a request from the patient or family of the patient. A pre-admission visit is conducted to determine if the patient is eligible for hospice services. During the visit, a representative of LifePath speaks with the patient and family to ensure that services have been requested. In the case of a hospitalized patient, death is often imminent and occurs in the hospital. LifePath, therefore, does not wait for the patient to return home or to a residential setting to commence admission. The formal admission process is initiated at the hospital by the admissions nurse, a professional who has received training on how to conduct initial psychosocial, spiritual and financial assessments to be undertaken during the admissions process together with the physical assessment. The admitting nurse goes to the location of the patient where the admissions process takes between two and one-half and three hours. Because of the length of time required, LifePath's "admission nurses do [only] two admissions a day." (Tr. 641). If the patient's location is a hospital, the nurse does a physical assessment and an initial psychosocial, financial, and spiritual assessment of the patient. Forms for consent of care, medical exchange of information, and authorization of payment forms as well as a patient information sheet are completed. Advance directives are discussed. Prognostic indicators, criteria set by the state, are reviewed to determine whether the patient meets admission criteria. Emergency planning is discussed. A teaching record is prepared. A physician's referral and plan of treatment are completed and confirmed with the physician. An interdisciplinary plan of care is initiated. Referrals of patients, if necessary, are facilitated. For the hospitalized patient for whom end of life is not imminent and who will have the opportunity to return home, LifePath's objective is to facilitate that return. Planning for the discharge of a patient from a hospital is an important hospice service. Often it involves the ordering of medications and equipment in anticipation of the patient's return home, two functions that require admission to the hospice. In such cases, physician's orders are necessary and a physician will not give a hospice orders to care for a patient unless the patient is admitted to the hospice program. For the hospitalized patient for whom death is imminent, one of the important reasons for admission to hospice is to qualify the patient's family for the 13 months of bereavement services hospices are required to provide survivors under the Medicare hospice benefit. Hospices also admit patients near death so that they may be provided care as quickly as possible. A hospitalized patient is considered by LifePath to be admitted when the physical assessment and at least the initial psychosocial, spiritual, and financial assessments are conducted by the admitting nurse, all consent forms are complete and the hospice takes over the care of the patient in coordination with the hospital. LifePath's Administrative/Operational Manual with regard to the subject of "Admission Process" (see Hernando-Pasco Exhibit 25) requires more in the way of procedure for an admission than is done for the typical hospitalized patient. The manual describes procedure for the admissions process as consisting of 35 categories of items (Procedures A - Z, and AA through II), some of which have numerous sub-parts. The process leads to a Plan of Care. The procedure includes: W. In conjunction with one additional IDT member develop the "Plan of Care". Identify foci and document on the IDT Plan of Care. Complete a "Hospice Interdisciplinary Plan of Care Evaluation/Summary" form. (Id., emphasis supplied.) Normally, it is the social worker member of LifePath's interdisciplinary care team, together with the admissions nurse, who develops the plan of care. According to the "Position Description" of LifePath's "Hospital Team Patient/Family Counselor", it is the social worker also who "[w]orks closely with the LH Hospital Team RN to assure timely admissions." (Hernando-Pasco Exhibit 26, Li-He 974). In the case of a hospitalized patient for whom admission is requested, however, the social worker may not participate in LifePath's admission process at all. To complete a full psychosocial assessment and history takes up to three hours. To do so on the day of admission following the two and one-half hour to three-hour admissions process conducted by the nurse frequently "would be cumbersome and overburdening to a patient and family." (Tr. 644). This is especially true in the case of the patient for whom death is imminent. In the case of the patient who will have the chance to return home, the full follow-up psychosocial and spiritual assessments conducted by social workers and chaplains are often deferred by patient and family request. Understandably, conducting the full assessment can be too much for the hospitalized patient who has just received a prognosis of terminal illness and the patient's family in the midst of arrangements for transfer of the patient home and initiation of the care to be delivered. The family frequently chooses to defer "to a time when they can sit down and comfortably speak about what they need to, at a different time, when things are calmer." (Tr. 647). There may be other complications with a hospitalized patient, as opposed to a patient admitted at home or in another setting. Sometimes hospitals do not permit patients to elect the Medicare hospice benefit while they are inpatients. Nonetheless, they can still be admitted to the hospice and be provided hospice services. If the hospital allows the patient to elect hospital benefits, LifePath is eligible for reimbursement for services provided on the day of a patient's admission. Once LifePath admits a hospitalized patient, the LifePath hospital team is notified. The team consists of hospice nurses, social workers, and a chaplain. The team continues to see the patient while in the hospital and helps coordinate the care and, frequently, the discharge of the patient. The 36 Patients Hospitalized in 6A The 36 patients originally reported by LifePath as admissions in Service Area 6B were all eligible for admission to hospice at the time LifePath undertook to admit them to hospice care. All 36 were admitted while physically located in Service Area 6A. The admission process for the 36 patients included a professional initial assessment by the admitting nurse of the social, psychological, spiritual and financial needs of the patient as well as a physical assessment. LifePath was not reimbursed by Medicare for 34 of the patients in question for hospice care in the hospital. Nor did LifePath seek compensation from Medicare for the care in the hospital provided these patients. As to those patients who returned home or were transferred to another residential setting in Service Area 6B, LifePath received Medicare reimbursement for the hospice care provided in the residential setting. LifePath explained that it did not receive Medicare reimbursement for the care provided during the time the 34 spent in the hospital because the hospitals would not allow the patients to elect hospice Medicare benefits while in the hospital. Hospitalized patients, moreover, LifePath explained, can be admitted as patients who pay privately without the involvement of a third party payer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Agency for Health Care Administration determining the fixed need pool for health planning subdistrict 6A for the March 2000 batching cycle to be zero. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire Frank P. Rainer, Esquire Sternstein, Rainer & Clarke, P.A. 101 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Darrell White, Esquire McFarlain, Wiley, Cassedy & Jones, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2174
