Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on March 19, 1982, and was issued certificate number 99-4437. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the standards for law enforcement officer certification contained in Chapter 943, Florida Statutes, and related rules. It has concomitant authority to discipline such law enforcement officers as to their certification status if certain violations of the provisions in that Chapter are established. On October 25, 1980, the Respondent was cited by a law enforcement officer in Hillsborough County, Florida, for speeding. The fine and disposition of the case remained outstanding regarding that citation until September 27, 1984. In 1981 the Respondent moved to Florida from Ohio to accept employment with the Sarasota County Sheriff's Department. Soon after relocating in Florida, the Respondent attempted to obtain a Florida driver's license. A representative of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles informed him that he was "under suspension." Some months prior to June 1984, one of the Respondent's supervisors at the Sarasota County Sheriff's Department, Captain Johnson, informed the Respondent that his driving privilege in Florida was under suspension. He was instructed to get the matter "squared away." On June 30, 1984, the Respondent was involved in an automobile accident. The accident was investigated by Trooper Linda Perkins of the Florida Highway Patrol. During the course of the accident investigation, Trooper Perkins asked the Respondent for his driver's license. The Respondent furnished Trooper Perkins a piece of paper which had written on it the letter "F" followed by nine digits. The Respondent represented this number to the Trooper to be his Florida driver's license number. The structure and sequencing of the number was inconsistent with Florida driver's license numbers as well as those issued by the State of Ohio. The Respondent at the time possessed a valid Ohio driver's license. The Respondent, however, had no valid Florida driver's license on the date of the accident and was aware that his privilege to drive was under suspension in Florida on the date of the accident. On September 15, 1984, Sergeant Gerald Poole, Lieutenant Blakely, and Sergeant Kremm, each employed by the Sarasota County Sheriff's Department, met with the Respondent. The Respondent acknowledged that Captain Johnson had earlier notified him that he was aware of the license suspension in Florida and was requested to explain why the suspension had not been corrected, but remained outstanding. The Respondent informed his superiors that an "imposter" had obtained a California driver's license in his name, (after allegedly stealing his wallet), and had impersonated him when ticketed in Hillsborough County in 1980 for speeding. Respondent maintained at this meeting that he had a valid Florida driver's license, which was not the case. The Respondent was confronted with the fact that the "imposter's" ticket contained the address of 58 Brittany Drive, Cincinnati, Ohio. The Respondent denied that that address existed. The Respondent's employment application, which was on file at the Sarasota County Sheriff's Department, contained as the Respondent's prior address, 58 Brittany Drive, Fairfield, Ohio. The Respondent's employment application also listed Pomona, California, as a prior address. The Respondent had spent a short period of time in California shortly prior to his leaving his employment as a police officer in Ohio, at which time he apparently obtained a California driver's license. He elected not to remain in California, however, returned to Ohio and shortly thereafter moved to Sarasota County. In any event, Sergeant Poole obtained a computer check of the registrant of the tag number listed on the "imposter's" 1980 Hillsborough County traffic ticket. The car's license plate was registered in the name of Edward Foy. On September 27, 1984, the Respondent met with Lieutenant Vernie Skeens of the Sarasota County Sheriff's Department. Lieutenant Skeens had been assigned to conduct an "internal affairs" investigation regarding allegations that the Respondent gave false information to his superiors, had driven Department vehicles while unlicensed, and had driven under suspended driving privileges. The Respondent presented Lieutenant Skeens with a valid Florida driver's license which bore an issue date of the same day, September 27, 1984. Lieutenant Skeens questioned the Respondent regarding the unpaid 1980 speeding ticket which had caused his privilege to drive in Florida to become suspended. The Respondent repeated his explanation that an imposter was responsible for using his name in conjunction with the citation and that is why suspension had been entered against his name in the Florida driving records. The Respondent later that day admitted that it was he and not an imposter who received the 1980 ticket in Hillsborough County. When asked if he had lied to his superiors concerning this, the Respondent replied, "I believe I may have. I don't think I was..." The Respondent admitted that he had not obtained a Florida driver's license since moving to Florida until September 27, 1984, the day of his interview with Lieutenant Skeens. He also told Lieutenant Skeens that, at the scene of the June 30, 1984 traffic accident, he gave no driver's license number to Trooper Perkins and had no idea how she came to obtain such a number. The Respondent testified at the formal hearing, however, that he did give Trooper Perkins a driver's license number on the date of the June 30, 1984 accident, at the scene. He testified he believed the number to be that of his Ohio driver's license. Although the Respondent maintained he told Trooper Perkins he did not have a Florida driver's license, her testimony is accepted over his as more credible and worthy of belief. Her testimony establishes that, indeed, he represented the number he gave Trooper Perkins to be that of his Florida driver's license. He never told the Trooper that the number was an Ohio driver's license number or that of any other state. Indeed it has not been established that it was other than a bogus driver's license number and it was not proven that the number was that of his Ohio driver's license. The Respondent's own testimony establishes that the number Trooper Perkins was given does not have the same number of digits as the Ohio driver's license. The Respondent was confronted at the hearing with his prior statement in which he denied ever giving the Trooper any number. He testified "...I can't believe I said that." Trooper Perkins' testimony refutes that of the Respondent to the extent that he contended he told the Trooper he did not have a Florida driver's license. Indeed he never represented that the number he gave the Trooper was anything other than a Florida driver's license number. The Respondent has never before been subjected to disciplinary action regarding his licensure status in Florida or Ohio. He has had an exemplary record as a law enforcement officer, earning numerous awards including that of "Officer of the Year" in Ohio in 1982.
Recommendation Accordingly, the Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer should be revoked on account of his failure to maintain good moral character as a necessary prerequisite to continued certification. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of November, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Edward A. Foy 2910 Wood Street Sarasota, Florida 33577 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Janet E. Ferris, Esquire General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 APPENDIX Paragraphs 1-15: Accepted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, the undersigned makes the following findings of fact: Respondent holds a license issued by Petitioner which permits it to engage in the business of a motor vehicle dealer at 9901 N.W. 80th Avenue, Bay 3C, Hialeah Gardens, Florida. On Friday, September 9, 1988, during normal business hours, Karen Reyes, who is employed by Petitioner as a License and Registration Inspector, visited this location to attempt to conduct an annual inspection of Respondent's records. The doors to the warehouse where the business was supposed to be located were closed and locked and no one was around the dealership. Reyes left a note requesting that a representative of the dealership contact her. She then-departed. Reyes returned to the location on Tuesday, September 20, 1988. Although it was mid-morning, the warehouse doors were closed and locked and there was no one present. Before departing, Reyes left a second note asking that she be contacted by someone from the dealership. The following day Reyes attempted to telephone the dealership. No one answered the phone, however, when she called. Reyes reported her findings to her supervisor. As a result, on October 20, 1988, Respondent's President, Javier F. Rodriquez, was sent a letter in which he was advised that Petitioner proposed to revoke Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license on the ground that Respondent had closed and abandoned its licensed location. The letter further advised that Respondent had the right to request a formal hearing before any final action was taken against it. Rodriquez responded to the letter by requesting a hearing at which he would have the opportunity to present proof that the dealership had not been closed or abandoned. In view of this response, Reyes was instructed by her supervisor to pay another visit to the dealership. She made this visit on Tuesday, November 8, 1988. This time she encountered two men at the location. There were also a couple of cars there as well. One of the men, who claimed to be a representative of the dealership, telephoned Rodriquez's wife and had her speak with Reyes. During their telephone conversation, Mrs. Rodriquez informed Reyes that her husband was still active in the automobile sales business, but that he was conducting his business at their home. At the conclusion of their discussion, Reyes asked Mrs. Rodriquez to have her husband call Reyes' office. Mr. Rodriquez telephoned Reyes' office on November 16, 1988. Reyes was not in, so Rodriquez left a message. Later, that day, Reyes returned the call, but was unable to reach Rodriquez. The following day, Reyes went back to the dealership, where she found the same two men she had met there on November 8, 1988. Rodriquez, however, was not at the dealership. Reyes therefore left. She came back later in the day. This time Mr. Rodriquez was present and he spoke with Reyes. When asked by Reyes why there was no business activity nor records at the licensed business location, Rodriquez responded that the dealership was now open every day from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. He provided Reyes with no additional information. Reyes revisited the dealership on Friday, January 13, 1989, Wednesday, January 18, 1989, Thursday, January 19, 1989, and Monday, January 23, 1989, during normal business hours. On each of these occasions, she found no one at the location and the doors to the warehouse closed and locked. She made another visit on Monday, January 30, 1989. Although it was during normal business hours, there was no indication of any activity at the dealership. Furthermore, the sign which had identified the business had been removed. This prompted Reyes to speak with the leasing agent at the warehouse complex. The leasing agent told Reyes that Respondent was no longer occupying space at the complex.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Neil Kirkman Building, A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Javier F. Rodriquez, President Inrodar Auto Sales, Inc. 9901 N.W. 80th Avenue, Bay 3C Hialeah Gardens, Florida 33016 Charles J. Brantley, Director Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esquire General Counsel Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1997), by obtaining a license by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment; violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), by failing to disclose material information in her application; and, if so, what, if any, penalty is appropriate. (All Chapter and Section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated. All references to rules are to rules adopted in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of real estate licensees in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a real estate broker pursuant to license number 0421942. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker t/a Action First Realty, 7622 Praver Court, Jacksonville, Florida 32217. On January 9, 1984, Respondent applied for a license as a real estate salesperson. On February 11, 1993, Respondent applied for a license as a real estate broker. On each application, Respondent signed a sworn affidavit that all of her answers were true and correct and: . . . are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever. . . . In relevant part, question six on the sales license asked Respondent whether she had ever been arrested or charged with the commission of an offense against the laws of any municipality or state without regard to whether she was convicted. Question nine on the broker application asked Respondent whether she had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere, even if adjudication was withheld. Respondent answered "no" to both questions. In each case, Petitioner relied on the accuracy of the application and issued a license to Respondent. On November 7, 1978, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of cashing a worthless check in the amount of $5.00. Respondent wrote the check to Carvel Ice Cream for a birthday cake for her daughter's birthday. Respondent was in the process of moving, and the notice of insufficient funds was not delivered to her. Respondent went to court and paid the $5.00 check and the court costs. The judge characterized the charge as frivolous and was perturbed that the charge consumed time in his court. On October 30, 1980, adjudication was withheld on the charge of driving with a suspended license. Respondent attended driving school. The offense does not appear on Respondent's Florida driving record for her entire driving history. Respondent did not willfully misstate a material fact on either application. Respondent testified under oath that she did not consider either offense to be a crime and did not try to lie about either offense. Her testimony was credible and persuasive. Respondent answered "no" to questions six and nine on her applications in the good-faith belief that the offenses were immaterial and not the type of offenses addressed in either question. When Petitioner's investigator interviewed Respondent, Respondent answered all questions fully and truthfully and cooperated in the investigation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), finding Respondent guilty of violating Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and imposing no penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1900 Barbara Lynn Clarke 7622 Praver Court Jacksonville, Florida 32217 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 William Woodyard, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Florida Virtual School's intended decision to award a contract, challenged by All Florida Safety Institute, LLC, is contrary to Florida Virtual School's governing statutes, rules, policies, or the proposal specifications.
Findings Of Fact Florida Virtual was created by statute to develop and deliver online distance learning in the State of Florida. § 1002.37, Fla. Stat. Florida Virtual is governed by a board of trustees appointed by the Governor. § 1002.37(2), Fla. Stat. Florida Virtual issued the RFP on October 14, 2019, seeking responses from qualified proposers interested in providing hands-on, "Behind the 1 On April 20, 2020, Petitioner filed exceptions to the proposed recommended orders submitted by the other parties. These exceptions were filed at DOAH, before the Recommended Order was issued. Exceptions to proposed recommended orders are not authorized by statute or rule and have not been considered. Wheel" driver education courses to Florida Virtual's driver education students. Florida Virtual received proposals from two qualified vendors, All Florida and United Safety Council, the current Behind the Wheel course provider. The RFP established the following scoring criteria: Criteria No. Step 1: Main Criteria Description Weight 1. Compliance 10% 2. Qualifications, Experience of Team Members and References 24% 3. Contractor Methodology 20% 4. Demonstrated Ability to Meet or Exceed Stated Requirements and Responses to Questionnaire 25% 5. Price Proposal 20% 6. Acceptance of Invoice Payments via FLVS Visa Purchasing Card 1% TOTAL 100% The six categories were to be scored using a 1 to 20 scale. The contract was to be awarded to the respondent that received the highest total weighted score. The RFP required that the proposals be scored by the Proposal Evaluation Committee (Committee). Florida Virtual appointed four of its employees to serve on the Committee: Debbie Adams, the instructional leader over Florida Virtual's driver education program; Janet Conway, an accounting manager; Martin Kelly, the senior director of curriculum development; and Kevin Locke, the director of project management. On November 14, 2019, the Committee met at a public meeting to score the proposals. The meeting was audio-recorded. Ms. Conway, Mr. Kelly, and Mr. Locke were physically present at the meeting. Ms. Adams attended the meeting remotely with an audio connection. Karen Stolarenko is Florida Virtual's senior solicitation specialist. Ms. Stolarenko and her supervisor, Nathaniel Askew, facilitated the Committee's deliberation at the public meeting as representatives of Florida Virtual's procurement department. One or more representatives of United Safety Council attended the public meeting and observed the Committee's deliberations. All Florida was aware of the public meeting but did not send a representative to attend. The proposals were provided to the Committee before the meeting for review, but the scoring was done at the public meeting. The evaluators' individual scores were tabulated at the conclusion of the public meeting. Ms. Adams gave All Florida the highest weighted score, but the other three evaluators all gave United Safety Council the highest weighted score. United Safety Council had the higher total weighted score of 72.40, compared to All Florida's total weighted score of 70.48. At the conclusion of the public meeting, the Committee voted unanimously to award the contract to United Safety Council as the respondent receiving the highest total weighted score. PROTEST GROUNDS Class A v. Class E License Requirements for Instructors Section A.2(1) of the RFP includes the following minimum requirement for instructors: Class A license with a refresher every five (5) years or retest required as a result of passing examinations and road test approved by Bureau of Driver Education prior to issuance of certificate. Must possess 3 years of experience with a Class A CDL and no conviction on record within the last five years in order to be qualified. A Class A license is a commercial driver's license that is unrelated to the driver education course sought by the RFP. Although there was no testimony directly on point, Florida Virtual essentially conceded that the RFP's reference to a Class A license was an error. All Florida did not protest the RFP's Class A license requirements after the RFP was issued, to argue those requirements make no sense for the services sought by the RFP. Instead, it committed in its proposal to meet all qualifications for a Class E license, the license sought by students who attend the Behind the Wheel driver education course. While this is a logical response to what appears to be an error in the RFP, it was risky because it did not comply with the letter of the RFP. United Safety Council took the safe route, responding by confirming that its instructors would meet the requirements of section A.2(1). At the public meeting, before the proposals were scored, Ms. Adams (the instruction leader for Florida Virtual's driver education program) told the other evaluators that a Class A license was inapplicable to the course services sought in the RFP. No evidence was presented to prove that any evaluator scored All Florida lower because it committed to meet Class E—as opposed to Class A—license requirements for instructors. Committee's Deliberation at the Public Meeting At the conclusion of the public meeting, the evaluators were allowed to take a break and move around the room while their scores were handed to Ms. Stolarenko to be tabulated. The break was approximately 20 minutes long. This break was not recorded, but was not required to be under any governing statute, rule, policy, or RFP specification. Following this break to tabulate the scores, there was an interruption of the recording of the meeting. When the audio recording resumed, Ms. Stolarenko can be heard stating: This is Karen Stolarenko, November 14th 2019, 3:24 p.m. We are reconvening to go over the scores and rankings for the Behind the Wheel Driver Education RFP. Our network went down, and we did have our prior recording interrupted. So there will be two separate recording sessions for today's meeting. I'll do a quick—since we did have an interruption just do a quick roll call so everybody knows who is in the room. Thereafter, the evaluators can be heard on the audio recording confirming their unanimous recommendation to award the contract to United Safety Council as the highest-ranked respondent, a decision consistent with the tabulation of the evaluators' score sheets and the RFP's award specifications. There is no evidence that the interruption in the audio recording was intentional or in bad faith, or that it violated any governing statute, rule, policy, or specification of the RFP. The meeting was public; there is no evidence that anyone was excluded from this portion of the meeting. All Florida could have sent one or more representatives to attend the meeting but chose not to. Corrections to Evaluator Scoresheets The evaluators were provided individual scoresheets to record their scores. The evaluators who attended the meeting in person—Mr. Locke, Mr. Kelly, and Ms. Conway—were provided paper scoresheets and pens to handwrite their scores. Ms. Adams, who attended the meeting remotely, was provided a digital scoresheet and typed her scores. Mr. Kelly's scoresheet included two scores that were scratched out and rewritten. Under the category labeled "Compliance," Mr. Kelly's final rewritten score for All Florida was 19. Under the same category for United Safety Council, Mr. Kelly's final, rewritten score was 18. Mr. Kelly testified that he scratched out his original scores and replaced them with the rewritten final numbers listed above. He further testified that he could not recall why he scratched out the original scores before turning in his scorecard to Ms. Stolarenko other than that he changed his mind. Mr. Kelly's testimony was credible and is accepted here. Ms. Conway testified that she initially erred in the manner in which she scored the proposals; that is, she assigned scores based upon the total weight instead of using the 1 to 20 scale she should have applied to score the respondents for each of the six categories. For example, the "Compliance" category was weighted 10 percent, and Ms. Conway mistakenly applied a 1 to 10 scale (instead of a 1 to 20 scale) when initially scoring this category. She made the same mistake for both respondents. Ms. Stolarenko brought this error to Ms. Conway's attention when she handed in her scoresheet for tabulation at the public meeting. Ms. Conway testified that she corrected the error in her scoresheets without changing the intent behind her original scoring. Two of the categories required no alteration, because they were weighted 20 percent, and Ms. Conway therefore applied the correct 1 to 20 scale when she originally scored those categories. Ms. Conway's testimony was credible and is accepted here. Ms. Conway did not change the intent behind her original scores when she corrected her scores to apply the correct 1 to 20 scale, and this correction did not disadvantage All Florida or provide a competitive advantage to United Safety Council in any way. In fact, Ms. Conway's correction to her score sheet was required to comply with the RFP's specifications on the evaluation of responses. Evaluator Comment Regarding Tesla Fleet All Florida committed to include new Tesla vehicles in its fleet for the Behind the Wheel student drivers' use. When this commitment was discussed by the Committee, Evaluator Mr. Kelly can be heard on the audio recording making a statement that sounds like "[w]hat a bunch of idiots." All Florida argues that this comment shows bias against it and that it caused the other evaluators to view its proposal through a negative lens. That was not proven here. Mr. Kelly testified that he did not recall making the "idiots" comment, but that it sounds like something he might have said because he recalled thinking it was "silly to give those types of cars, that are quite expensive," to student drivers.2 Mr. Kelly went on to testify that his opinion regarding All Florida's Tesla commitment had no bearing on his scoring. Mr. Kelly's testimony was credible and is accepted. Although Mr. Kelly could have chosen better words to express himself, the use of the term "idiots" in this context does not suggest that he was biased. The other evaluators denied hearing Mr. Kelly's "idiots" comment; there is no evidence that this comment influenced any of the scores the other evaluators assigned to All Florida. Qualification and Experience Scores All Florida contends that the evaluators failed to consider the "real numbers" of teen drivers served by All Florida as compared to those served by United Safety Council when they scored the respondents in the category for "Qualifications, Experience of Team Members and References." All Florida offered no evidence to support this protest ground. The evaluators testified at the final hearing but were not questioned on this issue. United Safety Council failed to prove that the scores assigned by the evaluators for "Qualifications, Experience of Team Members and References" were arbitrary or capricious. United Safety Council's Proposal Irregularities Section B.1 of the RFP, entitled "Respondent Questionnaire," contains 14 questions the respondents were instructed to answer in their proposals. United Safety Council's proposal included answers to questions 1 through 5 but omitted the answers to questions 6 through 14. All Florida's proposal included answers to the entire questionnaire. United Safety Council's omission caught Ms. Stolarenko's attention; at the public meeting, she advised the evaluators that United Safety Council 2 The audio recording of this comment from Mr. Kelly is very faint and difficult to hear. But given Mr. Kelly's testimony that it "sounds like something he might have said," the inference is that he did make the "idiots" comment. failed to answer questions 6 through 14. Most, but not all, of the information answering questions 6 through 14 can be found elsewhere in United Safety Council's proposal. Ms. Stolarenko correctly advised the evaluators that they were to score United Safety Council's proposal based on the information contained in its proposal. The RFP required the respondents to consecutively number all pages of the proposal. United Safety Council did not consecutively number all pages of the proposal. All Florida does not allege that United Safety Council's proposal should have been deemed non-responsive—and thus ineligible for a contract award—due to these proposal irregularities.3 Instead, All Florida alleges that it should have received a higher score because its proposal did not contain the same deficiencies. All Florida failed to prove that the evaluators' scores were arbitrary or capricious because United Safety Council received overall higher weighted scores, notwithstanding these two irregularities in its proposal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Florida Virtual School dismissing the protest of All Florida Safety Institute, LLC. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRIAN A. NEWMAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: David Jeffrey D'Agata, General Counsel Florida Virtual School 2145 Metrocenter Boulevard, Suite 100 Orlando, Florida 32835 (eServed) Samuel P. Garrison, Esquire Bradley, Garrison & Komando, P.A. 1279 Kingsley Avenue Orange Park, Florida 32073-4603 (eServed) Jessica Beecham, Board Clerk Florida Virtual School 2145 Metrocenter Boulevard, Suite 100 Orlando, Florida 32835 Keith A. Graham, Esquire Marchena & Graham, P.A. 976 Lake Baldwin Lane, Suite 101 Orlando, Florida 32814 (eServed) Shannan Collier Stalvey, Esquire The Law Office of Shannan S. Collier, P.C. 100 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Dr. Barbara M. Jenkins, Superintendent Orange County School Board 445 West Amelia Street Orlando, Florida 32801-0271
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent Agency is a Florida-licensed (Class "A" license number A88- 00297 private investigative agency. Respondent Foreman is the owner of the Agency. He is a Florida-licensed (Class "C" license number C00-02486) private investigator. He has been licensed for approximately the past 20 years. At no time during the period of his licensure has the Department taken any disciplinary action against him. At around 10:00 a.m. on the morning of September 30, 1994, Foreman interrupted his work schedule to drive a male tenant living in an apartment that he owned (hereinafter referred to as the "Tenant") to the Henderson Mental Health Clinic, an outpatient mental health facility located in Broward County, Florida. The Tenant needed to receive treatment at the clinic. After parking his vehicle, Foreman escorted the Tenant to the reception area of the facility. Foreman was wearing a gun belt and a holster. A loaded firearm was encased in the holster. It was a warm day and Foreman did not have on a jacket. 2/ Consequently, the holstered firearm was in plain view. At the time, Foreman had a Department-issued Class "W" Concealed Weapon or Firearm License, but he did not have a Class "G" Statewide Firearm Permit. 3/ Detective Joel Maney of the Fort Lauderdale Police Department was working a uniformed off-duty security detail at Henderson Mental Health Clinic that morning. From his position behind the reception counter, Detective Maney observed Foreman enter the reception area with the Tenant and noticed that Foreman was carrying a firearm. Not wanting to cause a disturbance inside the facility, Detective Maney did not immediately confront Foreman. He did, however, monitor Foreman's activity. After informing the receptionist that the Tenant had arrived and was waiting to be seen, Foreman left the facility. Detective Maney followed Foreman outside. As Foreman was walking on the sidewalk toward his vehicle, Detective Maney approached him and asked for identification. Foreman responded to the request by stating that he was a detective/investigator and that he did not have time to talk inasmuch as he was in the middle of an investigation. Eventually, Foreman produced his Florida driver license, his Class "C" Private Investigator License, and his Class "W" Concealed Weapon or Firearm License for Detective Maney. He also showed Detective Maney a five-pointed, star-shaped badge. In the center of the badge was a replica of the Great Seal of the State of Florida. The words, "Special Investigator Foreman Investigative," were inscribed around the seal. When Detective Maney first saw the badge, he thought it was a Broward County deputy sheriff's badge because of its shape and because it bore the Great Seal of the State of Florida. Unlike a Broward County deputy sheriff's badge, however, Foreman's badge did not have a map of Florida superimposed on the seal. Moreover, the written inscription on the badge was different than that found on a Broward County deputy sheriff's badge. Throughout the period that he has been licensed, Foreman has used this badge as a means of identifying himself in connection with the performance of his duties as a private investigator.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding the evidence sufficient to establish that Respondent Foreman committed the violations alleged in Counts II and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint, disciplining Respondent Foreman him for having committed these violations by imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00, and (3) dismissing the remaining counts of the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of October, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner as a commercial driving instructor in November, 1981, until November, 1982. Until that license was summarily suspended on April 8, 1982, Respondent was employed by Fajardo Driving School. On January 8, 1982, at approximately 6:00 A.M., Respondent approached the waiting line at the Central Driver's License Office with two Cuban applicants for drivers' licenses. A number of Haitian applicants were at the beginning of the line. Respondent attempted to place his two students in front of the Haitians. When the Haitians refused to allow Respondent and his students to enter the line in front of them, Respondent and his two students went to some nearby trash cans, obtained bottles, and began fighting with and striking the Haitians who had refused to give up their place in line to Respondent and his students. After the altercation, Respondent got in his car and left the area. He subsequently returned to the Central Driver's License Office, where he was arrested and charged with aggravated battery with a bottle. As a result of the bottle throwing engaged in by Respondent and his two students, two of the Haitians who were attacked received head injuries requiring hospital treatment. On other occasions, Respondent has placed his students at the head of the line without resorting to violence in order to obtain such preferred treatment for his students. On March 23, 1982, at the Central Driver's License Office, Respondent had a disagreement with Enelio Rodriguez, another driving instructor for Fajardo Driving School, over a ten-dollar charge for a rental car. When Rodriguez refused to pay Respondent the ten dollars Respondent was demanding, Respondent struck Rodriguez in the eye. On March 23, 1982, Miguel Orlando Uria, a driving instructor and owner of Uria Driving School, requested Amado Perera, a driving instructor for Autosa Driving School, to move Perera's car from the starting position, so Uria could place his student in the starting position for the driving test at the Central Driver's License Office, since Uria's student was due to be tested earlier in time than any of Perera's students. Although neither Respondent's car nor Respondent's student was the subject matter of the discussion between Uria and Perera, Respondent interposed himself into the argument and became "nasty." Respondent did not strike anyone on this occasion; however, Department personnel were present.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered permanently revoking the commercial driving instructor's certificate card of Respondent, Ernesto E. Luque. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Judson M. Chapman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alan Goldfarb, Esquire 12th Floor, Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Mr. Chester F. Blakemore Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“Petitioner”) may properly terminate its contract with Perotte Driving and Traffic School, Inc. (“Respondent”), on the basis of failure to comply with the provisions of the contract, pursuant to section 322.56(3)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the State agency authorized to enter into contracts with driving schools to administer driving and skills portions of examinations for driver licenses, pursuant to section 322.56. Petitioner regulates third-party administrators for compliance with contract provisions in furtherance of Petitioner’s mission to ensure safe roads in the State of Florida. Section 322.56 authorizes Petitioner to contract with private sector entities to conduct services in the same manner Petitioner conducts services at both its driver license offices and tax collector offices. Respondent is a third-party administrator under contract with Petitioner to conduct Class E Knowledge Examinations for State of Florida driver licenses. Ms. Dume is employed as a Regulatory Program Specialist for Petitioner. Her duties include visiting third-party administrators and monitoring their activities to ensure that they are abiding by the terms of their contracts with Petitioner. Assistance by Misrepresentation On October 8, 2020, Ms. Dume was present at Respondent’s school conducting an on-site inspection. She left at 5:45 p.m., having been informed by Mr. Perotte that the school closed at 6:00 p.m. Ms. Dume returned to continue her inspection on October 9, 2020, arriving at 10:20 a.m. She monitored the school from the parking lot before entering at 11:20 a.m. Then, Ms. Dume observed Mr. Perotte entering information into his computer showing that a student had completed the four-hour Traffic Law Substance Abuse Education course (“TLSAE”). The TLSAE is a requirement to earn a Florida driver license. The course must be taken in one consecutive four-hour period. Ms. Dume obtained the certificate for TLSAE course completion for the student, which reflected a completion date of October 9, 2020. However, based on Ms. Dume’s credible testimony, it would have been impossible for the student to have completed the four-hour TLSAE course on the date that Mr. Perotte entered into the computer because Ms. Dume was present up until 15 minutes prior to the school closing and did not observe the student taking the course. Mr. Perotte’s claim that the student took the course after Ms. Dume left was not credible. His credibility was further diminished by his inconsistent and illogical testimony that he entered the erroneous date of course completion by mistake. Although it was established that the same student did complete the TLSAE in 2013, that fact is immaterial to Mr. Perotte’s clear misrepresentation of the course completion date. Ensuring Only Applicants Allowed in Examination Area During Ms. Dume’s on-site inspection on October 8, 2020, she observed an applicant inside the testing room taking the knowledge exam with an instructor also inside the testing room. The instructor explained to Ms. Dume that she was inside the testing room to have the applicant sign paperwork, but Ms. Dume believed that the reason was pretextual based on her observations. On October 14, 2020, during another on-site inspection of Respondent, Ms. Dume observed Mr. Perotte inside the testing room standing over a customer who was sitting down taking the knowledge exam. Mr. Perotte testified that he was inside the testing room while a test was in progress to fix a technical issue with the computer. He also testified, however, that in the event of a technical issue, he would ask the examinee to exit the testing room while a staff member addressed the issue. Mr. Perotte’s testimony was unconvincing and inconsistent. Allowing the Department to Conduct Random Inspections Ms. Dume testified that for each of her on-site inspections that are relevant to this proceeding, on October 8, 9, and 14, 2020, she entered Respondent’s facility through an unlocked door. During her October 14, 2020, inspection, Ms. Dume observed that there were a number of customers present when she arrived at 12:30 p.m. A few minutes later, all of the customers were gone, and Mr. Perotte stopped others from entering the school. Ms. Dume believed that the customers were discouraged by Mr. Perotte from patronizing the school while Ms. Dume was present. Ms. Dume left around 2:30 p.m., due to the school being empty. The reasons why customers may have left or decided not to enter the school in Ms. Dume’s presence were based on assumptions and were not conclusively established.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Elana J. Jones, Esquire Roberto R. Castillo, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 For Respondent: Matthew E. Ladd, Esquire Matthew E. Ladd P.A. Suite 301 4649 Ponce De Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33146
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found in violation of the contract, as alleged in the Complaint, and that the contract be terminated. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Elana J. Jones, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Joseph R. Gillespie, Agency Clerk Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432, MS02 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Terry L. Rhodes, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-443 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Christie S. Utt, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Matthew E. Ladd, Esquire Matthew E. Ladd P.A. Suite 301 4649 Ponce De Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33146
The Issue Whether two policy statements issued by Respondent, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, are unadopted rules, as defined in section 120.52(20), Florida Statutes, that violate section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.3/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a co-trustee of the Sparkhill Trust (the "Trust"), which was created in July 2009. Opinicus Sentinel, LLC ("Opinicus Sentinel") currently is a co-trustee of the Trust, and has been a trustee of the Trust since its creation. Barbara Williams is the manager of Opinicus Sentinel, and has served in that capacity since its creation.8/ Petitioner was appointed as a trustee of the Trust on October 11, 2016.9/ The Trust owns a 2001 Porsche 996/911 Turbo motor vehicle (hereinafter, "Vehicle"). Solely for purposes of this proceeding,10/ the Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") of the Vehicle is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830, as alleged in the Amended Petition. As of the final hearing, the Vehicle was located in Germany. During all times relevant to this proceeding, the Vehicle was located in a foreign country. Respondent is the state agency responsible for, among other things, implementing and administering chapter 319, Florida Statutes, governing the issuance of certificates of title for motor vehicles. See § 319.17, Fla. Stat. Background and Events Giving Rise to This Proceeding On or about September 30, 2014, Opinicus Sentinel——at that time, the sole trustee of the Trust——submitted an application consisting of completed Form 8204011/ and supporting documentation to the Lee County Tax Collector ("Tax Collector")12/ on behalf of the Trust, requesting issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle in the name of the Trust. The application included a letter from a motor vehicle dealer in London, Ontario, Canada, stating that the dealer had inspected the Vehicle and that the Vehicle's VIN is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830. On or about October 22, 2014, the Tax Collector sent a letter to Ms. Williams, as manager of Opinicus Sentinel, stating that the application for certificate of title could not be processed "because all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the Vehicle Identification Number verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner." When asked for further explanation, the Tax Collector responded by electronic mail ("email"): The Lee County Tax Collector is a Constitutional Office that provides the services of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). As such, we are bound by both statutory and department procedural guidance. Procedures often are entitled Technical Advisories. The technical advisory relied upon by this office indicates that all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the VIN verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner as referenced in TL-10 in effect on the date the correspondence was drafted. Email from Tax Collector to Barbara Williams, dated October 27, 2014 (emphasis added). This email directed Ms. Williams to contact Respondent if the trustee wished to challenge the denial of the application for certificate of title for the Vehicle. On November 3, 2014, Ms. Williams contacted Respondent, asserting that the Tax Collector's denial of the application for a certificate of title violated section 319.23(3)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Also on that date, Ms. Williams filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with Respondent on behalf of Opinicus Sentinel, challenging TL-10 as an invalid and unadopted rule pursuant to section 120.56(4).13/ On November 24, 2014, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Williams, refusing to issue the requested certificate of title. The letter stated: After researching the issue identified in your letter, the Department stands by the decision made by . . . [the Lee County Tax Collector]. Section 319.23(a)(2), Florida Statutes, states that, '[a]n appropriate departmental form evidencing that a physical examination has been made of the motor vehicle by the owner and by a duly constituted law enforcement officer in any state, a licensed motor vehicle dealer, a license inspector as provided by s. 320.58, or a notary public commissioned by this state and that the vehicle identification number shown on such form is identical to the vehicle identification number shown on the motor vehicle. Letter from Respondent to Barbara Williams, dated November 24, 2014 (emphasis added). The letter further stated: However, section 319.23(11), Florida Statutes, states that, '[t]he Department shall use security procedures, processes, and materials in the preparation and issuance of each certificate of title to prohibit to the extent possible a person's ability to alter, counterfeit, duplicate, or modify the certificate of title.' In the case at bar, the Department is choosing to implement the language found in 319.23(11) to ensure that the certificate of title is issued correctly. The Department has the authority to require VIN verifications on vehicles entering the state of Florida from a foreign country before a title can be issued. In subsequent correspondence to Ms. Williams, dated December 18, 2014, Respondent stated: I can only again point you to s. 319.23(11). Since April of 2000 the Department's policy is to require all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country to have the VIN verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * I have included a copy of the Department's Technical Advisory, TL 14-18, which explains the Department's policy in depth.[14/] On December 18, 2014, Respondent referred Opinicus Sentinel's Petition for Administrative Hearing to DOAH. The case was assigned DOAH Case No. 14-6005. On March 3, 2015, Opinicus Sentinel withdrew the petition, and the DOAH case file for Case No. 14-6005 was closed. Notwithstanding that Case No. 14-6005 was pending at DOAH, on February 25, 2015, Respondent sent Ms. Williams a letter dismissing the previously-filed petition for administrative hearing with leave to file an amended petition. The letter also asserted an additional basis15/ for Respondent's denial of the certificate of title for the Vehicle, specifically: Because the vehicle to be titled is not currently in Florida, clearly the vehicle will not be operated on the roads of Florida. Accordingly, the vehicle cannot be registered in Florida and the titling provisions of Chapter 319, Fla. Stat., do not apply. Therefore, the application for title you submitted to the Lee County Tax Collector pursuant to section 319.23, Fla. Stat. will not be approved. While DOAH Case No. 14-6005 was pending, Stephen J. Williams, as beneficiary of the Trust, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules pursuant to section 120.56(4). That case was assigned DOAH Case No. 15-0484 and ultimately was dismissed by Final Order dated March 25, 2015.16/ As previously noted, on October 11, 2016, Petitioner was appointed as a co-trustee of the Trust. On October 17, 2016, Petitioner, as a trustee of the Trust, initiated this proceeding by filing a Petition for Administrative Hearing, again challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules. As noted above, the scope of this proceeding subsequently was narrowed to eliminate the challenge to the substantive invalidity of TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, so that the sole issue in this proceeding is whether TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). The Challenged Statements: TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 TL-10, identified by the Tax Collector as the original basis for denial of issuance of the certification of title for the Vehicle, went into effect on April 30, 2014. The portion of TL-10 pertinent to this proceeding states: IV. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION * * * B. Vehicle identification number (VIN) verifications are to be completed by the applicant. * * * 2. VIN verification may be done by one of the following: * * * c. Florida Division of Motorist Services (DMS) Compliance Examiner, DMS or tax collector employees. * * * NOTE: All USED vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country, including dealer transactions, MUST have the VIN verified by a DMS Compliance Examiner. Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18 is titled "Motor Vehicles Coming Into Florida from a Foreign Country." It states in pertinent part: All used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country (including dealer transactions) must have the vehicle identification number verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * The Regional Motor Vehicle Field Office staff will perform an inspection of the vehicle that includes verification of the public VIN, confidential VIN or secondary VIN, manufacturer’s label or letterhead letter that states compliance with US vehicle standards, computer checks of NMVTIS/NICB data-bases, and a review of documentation showing vehicle clearance through US Customs (if applicable). Copies of these documents, including a copy of the completed form HSMV 84044, will be maintained in the regional office. The VIN verification will be completed by the compliance examiner on a form HSMV 84044, in lieu of a form HSMV 82040 or HSMV 82042. The compliance examiner will give the customer the original required documentation (including the original complete form HSMV 84044). The customer must submit all documentation to a tax collector’s office or license plate agency in order for him/her to apply for a Florida Certificate of Title. The undisputed evidence establishes that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 120.54. Respondent did not present any evidence showing that rulemaking was not practicable or feasible. Respondent's Position Respondent admitted, in its Amended Responses to Requests to Admissions served on Petitioner on November 21, 2016, that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are intended to be, and are, of general application; that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy and/or describe the procedure or practice requirements of Respondent; and that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 have not been, and are not published in the Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, Respondent acknowledges that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules. Respondent takes the position that Petitioner lacks standing to challenge TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted rules. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not suffered a "real or immediate injury in fact" for purposes of having standing because although the Tax Collector and Respondent referred the Trust to TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as grounds for denial of the certificate of title, they were not the "ultimate grounds" on which the Trust was denied a certificate of title. On this basis, Respondent asserts that it did not apply TL-10 or RS/TL 14-18 to Petitioner, so Petitioner did not suffer injury as a result of application of these statements. Respondent further asserts that because Petitioner cannot meet the requirements in section 319.23 to be entitled to issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle, Petitioner's claimed injury in this proceeding is speculative and hypothetical. To this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury in this proceeding is speculative because the Trust has not satisfied the requirements of section 319.23 for purposes of being entitled to issuance of a certificate of title. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is not physically present in the state of Florida, it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, and because it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, it is not required to be registered or to obtain a certificate of title——and, indeed, cannot be registered and a certificate of title issued until it is physically present in Florida. Accordingly, Respondent reasons, until the Vehicle is physically present in Florida and thus subject to registration and licensure requirements, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 were not, and cannot be, applied to determine whether the certificate of title for the Vehicle should be issued. Also on this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury is speculative because Petitioner did not meet the requirement in section 319.23 that a physical examination of the Vehicle be made by the owner and a motor vehicle dealer licensed in the state of Florida. Respondent further asserts that Petitioner's alleged interest does not fall within the zone of interest of this proceeding. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is located in a foreign country, Petitioner is unable to establish that the Vehicle must be registered and a certificate of title issued in Florida. Respondent concludes: Because Petitioner cannot meet the burden of establishing that the motor vehicle in question is required to be licensed and registered in Florida, and because he failed to satisfy the application requirements of section 319.23(3)(a)(2), he cannot meet the burden of establishing that any interest in obtaining a certificate of title for the vehicle in question is within the 'zone of interests' to be protected and regulated.
